Exhibit,Appendix: WALTER MEYER VS. ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (B/P)AS REFLECTED ON EXHIBITS et al

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                                HowarD ROME MARTIN & RIDLEY LLP

1775 WOODSIDE ROAD, SUITE 200

REDWOOD CITY, CA 94061-3456

TELEPHONE (650) 365-715

R WwW N

a

SHAWN M. RIDLEY, ESQ. SBN 144311 ELECTRONICALLY
e-mail: sridley@bhrmriaw.com FIL
CHRISTINA M. HELWIG, ESQ. SBN 240490 ED
e-mail; chelwig@brmrlaw.com

HOWARD ROME MARTIN & RIDLEY LLP
1775 Woodside Road, Suite 200

Redwood City, CA 94061-3436

Telephone: (650) 365-7715

Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco

JAN 07 2011

Clerk of the Court
BY: RAYMOND K. WONG
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant
EATON CORPORATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SII TO CUTLER-HAMMER INC.,

SUED HEREIN AS DOE 1

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

WALTER MEYER, Case No: CGC-09-275180
Plaintiff, COMPENDIUM OF OUT-OF-STATE
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF EATON
VS. CORPORATION’S, INDIVIDUALLY AND

AS SII TO CUTLER-HAMMER INC.,

ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS (BP), SUED HEREIN AS DOE 1, NOTICE OF

Defendants. MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION
Date: March 30, 2011
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Dept.: 220
Trial: May 2, 2011

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1113G) and 3.1110(f), defendant EATON
CORPORATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SII TO CUTLER-HAMMER INC., SUED
HEREIN AS DOE 1, hereby lodges the following authorities cited in its Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of EATON-CORPORATION’S, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SII TO

CUTLER-HAMMER INC., SUED HEREIN AS DOE 1, Motion for Summary Adjudication

1

COMPENDIUM OF OUT-OF-STATE AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF EATON CORPORATION'S, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SH TO
CUTLER-HAMMER INC., SUED HEREIN AS DOE 1, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION1 || (Attached as Exhibit 1):

2 |[exHipir | AUTHORITY
3
1. Celotex Corp. v, Catrett (1986) 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552.
4
5
6 DATED: January 7, 2011
7 HOWARD ROME MARTIN & RIDLEY LLP
8
~ 9 By: /s/ Christina M. Helwig
a SHAWN M. RIDLEY SBN 144311
> 10 CHRISTINA M. HELWIG SBN 240490
i HOWARD ROME MARTIN & RIDLEY LLP
1775 Woodside Road, Suite 200
5 5 Redwood City, CA 94061-3436
2 Telephone: (650) 365-7715
us
é g Attorneys for Defendant
3 EATON CORPORATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND
a AS SIE TO CUTLER-HAMMER INC., SUED
‘g HEREIN AS DOE 1
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3 17
2 18
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2

COMPENDIUM OF OUT-OF-STATE AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF EATON CORPORATION’S, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SII TO
CUTLER-HAMMER INC, SUED HEREIN AS DOE 1, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONHOWARD ROME MARTIN & RIDLEY LLP

1775 WOODSIDE ROAD, SUITE 200

REDWOOD CITY, CA 94061-3436

TELEPHONE (651) 365-7715

EXHIBIT 1

3

COMPENDIUM OF OUT-OF-STATE AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF EATON CORPORATION'S, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SH TO
CUTLER-HAMMER INC., SUED HEREIN AS DOE 1, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONLexisNexis”

Page |

LEXSEE 477 U.S. 317

CELOTEX CORP. y. CATRETT, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ES-
TATE OF CATRETT

No. 85-198

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

477 U.S. 317; 106 S, Ct, 2548; 91 L. Ed. 2d 265; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 118;
54 U.S.L.W. 47753 4 Ved. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1024

April 1, 1986, Argued
June 25, 1986, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY; CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-
PEALS FOR THR DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA CIRCUIT,

DISPOSITION: 244 U.S, App. D. C. 160,
756 F.2d 181, reversed and remanded,

DECISION:

Party moving for summary judgment held
not required by Rule 56 of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to support motion with affida-
vits or other similar materials negating oppo-
nent's claim.

SUMMARY:

A widow sued in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that
her husband's death resulted from his exposure
to asbestos manufactured or distributed by 15
named corporations. One corporation moved
for summary judgment, claiming that the plain-
tiff had failed to produce evidence that her hus-
band had been exposed to its asbestos products.

The plaintiff produced documents tending to
show such exposure, but the moving party ar-
gued that they were inadmissible hearsay and
could not be considered in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, The District
Court granted the motion, holding that there
had been no showing that the decedent had
been exposed to the moving party's products in
the District of Columbia or elsewhere. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the
moving party had not adduced evidence, in the
form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its
motion, and that Rule 56(¢) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Adickes v
S. H. Kress & Co, 398 US 144, 26 L Bd 2d
142, 90 S Ct 1598, required that the party op-
posing a motion for summary judgment bore
the burden of responding only after the moving
party had met its burden of coming forward
with proof of the absence of any genuine issue
of material fact (244-App DC 160, 756 Fad
181).

On certiorari, the, United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case for fur-Page 2

477 US. 317, *; 106 S, Ct, 2548, #;
“91 L, Ed, 2d 265, **; 1986 U.S, LEXIS 118

ther proceedings, In an opinion by Rehnquist,
J, joined by White, Marshall, Powell, and
O'Connor, JJ., it was held that the position
taken by the majority of the Court of Appeals
was inconsistent with the standard for summary
judgment set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, because Rule 56 did
not require the moving party to support its mo-
tion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim, Rule 56(c) sug-
gesting the absence of such requirement when
it referred to "the affidavits, if any," and be-
cause the decision in Adickes v 3, H. Kress &
Co, should not be construed to mean that the
burden is on the moving patty to produce evi-
dence showing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.

White, J., concurred in the court's opinion
and judgment, expressing the view that while
the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that
the moving party must always support his mo-
tion with evidence or affidavits showing the
absence of a genuine dispute about a material
fact, the moving party must discharge the bur-
den that the rules placed upon him and it was
not enough to move for summary judgment
without supporting the motion in any way or
with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff
had no evidence to prove his case.

Brennan, J., joined by Burger, Ch. J., and
Blackmun, J., dissented, expressing the view
that while the Court of Appeals erroneously
read the decision in Adickes v S. H. Kress &
Co. when it required the moving party to sub-
mit evidence establishing that the widow's de-
cedent ‘had not been exposed to the moving
party's asbestos, and while the moving party
could seek summary judgment on the ground
that the widow could not prove exposure to the
moving party's asbestos at trial, the moving
party was nevertheless still required to satisfy
its initial burden of production under Rule 36,
and it had failed to do so, thereby rendering
summary judgment improper.

Stevens, J., dissented, expressing the view
that, in the context of-the motion for summary
judgment based on the decedent's lack of expo-
sure to the moving party's asbestos in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the District Court's decision
to grant the motion was erroneous and the re~
versal of summary judgment should have been
affirmed on the narrow ground that the widow
had made an adequate’ showing that the dece-
dent had been exposed to the moving party's
asbestos in Illinois.

LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:

[***LEdHN 1}

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE PLEADINGS §3

summary judgment -- evidence negating
nonmoving party's claim --

Headnote:[1AJ[1B]{1C][1D][1E]

In a wrongful death action in Federal Dis-
trict Court arising from the death of the plain-
tiffs husband allegedly due to exposure to as-
bestos manufactured or distributed by named
corporations, where one corporation moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing the
decedent's exposure to the moving party's as-
estos, the decision of the Federal Court of Ap-
peals reversing the grant of summary judgment
on the ground that the moving party failed to
produce proof of the absence of any genuine
issues of material fact-is inconsistent with the
standard for summary judgment set forth in
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, because (1) Rule 56 does not require that
the moving party support its motion with affi-
davits or other similsr materials negating the
opponent's claim,. Rule 56(c) suggesting the
absence of such requirement when it refers to
"the affidavits, if any"; (2) Rule 56(e), in re-
quiring the nonmoving party to come forward
with rebuttal affidavits or other specified kinds
of materials only in response to a motion forPage 3

477 US, 317, *; 106 S. Ct. 2548, *;
91 L, Bd, 2d 265, ***;, 1986 U.S, LEXIS 118

summary judgment "made and supported as
provided in this rule," does not require that the
motion be supported by affidavits, since, in a
case such as the instant one where the nonmov-
ing party will bear the burden of proof at trial
on a dispositive issue, the moving party may
rely solely on the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
and such a motion will be "made and supported
as provided in this rule"; and (3) the statement
in Adickes v S. H. Kress & Co., 398 US 144,
26 I. Ed 2d 142, 90 S Ct 1598, that the moving
party must show initially the absence of a genu-
ine issue concerning any material fact, should
not be construed to mean that the moving party
Toust produce evidence showing the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact, even with re-
spect to an issue on which the nonmoving party
bears the burden of proof, but should instead be
understood as requiring the moving party to
discharge his burden by showing--that is, point-
ing out to the District Court-that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case, (Stevens, J., dissented from this
holding.)

[***LEdHN2]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE PLEADINGS §5

summary judgment -- nonmoving party's
burden --

Headnote:(2]

The plain language of Rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial; in such a situa-
tion, there can be no genuine issue ‘as to any
material fact, since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmov-
ing party's case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial; the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because the non-
moving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essertial element of his case
with respect to which he has the burden of
proof.

[**"LEdHN3}

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE PLEADINGS §3

summary judgment -- moving party's duty -

Headnote:[3}

A party seeking summary judgment always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of the pleading,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, which it believes will demonstrate the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

[***LEdHN4)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE PLEADINGS §1

summary judgment -- purpose ~~

Headnote:[4]

One of the principal purposes of the sum-
mary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims or defenses, and

the rule should be interpreted in a way that al-
lows it to accomplish this purpose.

[***LEdHNS}

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE PLEADINGS $4

summary judgment -- nonmoving party's
proof --
Headnote:[5]

The nonmoving party is not required to
produce evidence in a form that would be ad-Page 4

477 US. 317, *; 106 8, Ct, 2548, **;
91 L, Ed, 2d 265, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 118

missible at trial in order to avoid summary
judgment; Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not require the nonmoving
party to depose his own witnesses; Rule 56(e)
permits a proper summary judgment motion. to
be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary
materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere
pleadings themselves, and. it is from this list
that one would normally expect the nonmoving
party to show that there is a genmine issue for
trial.

[***LEGHN6]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE PLEADINGS §3

summary judgment -- premature motion --
Headnote:[6]

The plaintiff in an action in Federal District
Court cannot claim to have been "railroaded"
by a premature motion for summary judgment,
where the motion is filed 12 months after the
commencement of the action; any potential
problem with a premature motion can be ade-
quately dealt with under Rule 56(f) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a
summary judgment motion to be denied, or the
hearing on the motion to be continued, if the
nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to
make full discovery.

[***LEdHN7]
APPEAL §1692.2

summary judgment - issues not determined
~~ remand --

Headnote:[7]

In a wrongful death action in Federal Dis-
trict Court arising from the death of the plain-
tiffs husband allegedly due to exposure to as-
bestos manufactured or distributed by named
corporations, where one corporation moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the

- plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing the

decedent's exposure to the moving party's as-
bestos, and the plaintiff produced documents
tending to show such exposure, but the moving
party argued that they. were inadmissible hear-
say and could not be considered in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment, and
where the United States Supreme Court re-
verses and remands for further proceedings the

decision of the Federal Court of Appeals which ~

reversed summary judgment for the moving
party's failure to produce evidence negating the
nonmoying, party's claim, the Supreme Court
will leave to the Court of Appeals the determi-
nation of the adequacy of the showing made by
the plaintiff in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment and whether such a show~
ing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would
be sufficient to carry the plaintiff's burden of
proof at trial, because that court with its supe-
rior knowledge of local law is better suited than
the Supreme Court to make these determina-
tions in the first instance.

[*** LEGHN8}

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JUDG-
MENT ON THE PLEADINGS §3

summary judgment -- construction of Rule
36 --

Headnote:[8]

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure must be construed with due regard not
only for the rights of persons asserting claims
and defenses that are adequately based in fact
to have those claims:and defenses tried to a
jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing
such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the
manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that
the claims and defenses have no factual basis,

SYLLABUS

Jn September 1980, respondent administra-
trix filed this wrongful-death action in Federal
District Court, alleging that her husband's death
in 1979 resulted from his exposure to asbestosPage 5

477 U.S, 317, *, 106 S, Ct. 2548, **;
91 L, Ed, 2d 265, #**, 1986 U.S, LEXIS 118.

products manufactured or distributed by the
defendants, who included petitioner corpora-
tion. In September 1981, petitioner filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment, asserting that dur-
ing discovery respondent failed to produce any
evidence to support her allegation that the de-
cedent had been exposed to petitioner's prod-
ucts. In response, respondent produced docu-
ments tending to show such exposure, but peti-
tioner argued that the documents were inadmis-
sible hearsay and thus could not be considered
in opposition to the summary judgment motion.
In July 1982, the court granted the motion be-
cause there was no showing of exposure to pe-
titioner's products, but the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that summary judgment in
petitioner's favor was precluded because of pe-
titioner's failure to support its motion with evi-
dence tending to negate such exposure, as re-
quired by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
and the decision in Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144.

Held:

1. The Court of Appeals' position is incon-
sistent with the standard for summary judgment
set forth in Rule 56(c), which provides that
summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Pp.
322-326,

(a) The plain language of Rule 56(c) man-
dates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an sle-
ment essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial, In such a situation, there can be "no
genuine issue as to any material fact," since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essen-
tial element of the nonmovying party's case nec-
essarily renders all other facts immaterial, The

moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law" because the nonmoving party
has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential clement of its case with respect to
which it has the burden of proof. Pp. 322-323.

(b) There is no express or implied require-
ment in Rule 56 that the moving party support
its motion with affidavits or other similar mate-
rials negating the opponent's claim. On the
contrary, Rule 56(c),, which refers to the affida-
vits, "if any,” suggests the absence of such a
Tequirement, and Rules 56(a) and (b) provide
that claimants and defending parties may move
for summary judgment "with or without sup-
porting affidavits." Rule 56(e), which relates to
the form and use of affidavits and other materi-
als, does not require that the moving party's
motion always be supported by affidavits to
show initially the absence of a genuine issue
for trial. Adickes vy. S.H. Kress & Co., supra,
explained. Pp. 323-326,

(c) No serious claim can be made that re-
spondent was "railroaded" by a premature mo-
tion for summary judgment, since the motion
was not filed until one year after the action was
commenced and since the parties had con-
ducted discovery, Moreover, any potential
problem with such premature motions can be
adequately dealt with under Rule S6(f). P. 326,

2, The questions whether an adequate *

showing of exposure to petitioner's products
was in fact made by respondent in opposition to
the motion, and whether such a showing, if re-
duced to admissible evidence, would be suffi-
cient to carry respondent's burden of proof at
trial, should be deterinined by the Court of Ap-
peals in the first instance. Pp. 326-327.

COUNSEL: Leland §. Van Koten argued the
cause for petitioner: “With him on the briefs
were H. Emslie Parks and Drake C. Zaharris.

Paul March Smith argued the cause for respon-
dent: With him on the brief were Joseph N.Page 6

477 US, 317, *; 106 S, Ct, 2548, **;
91 L, Ed, 2d 265, ***; 1986 U.S, LEXIS 118

Onek, Joel I, Kiein, James F. Green, and Peter
T. Enslein. *

* Stephen M, Shapiro, Robert L. Stern,
William H. Crabtree, Edward P. Good,
and Paul M. Bator filed a brief for the
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion et al, as amici curiae urging reversal.

JUDGES: REHNQUIST, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MAR-
SHALL, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p, 328. BRENNAN, J,, filed a dissenting
opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and
BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 329. STE-
VENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.
337.

OPINION BY: REHNQUIST

OPINION

(#319) [***271) [#2550] JUSTICE
REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.

[**LEdHRIA] [1A]The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the motion of petitioner Celotex Corpo-
ration for summary judgment against respon-
dent Catrett because the latter was unable to
produce evidence in support of her allegation in
her wrongful-death complaint that the decedent
had been exposed to petitioner's asbestos prod-
ucts, A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
however, holding that petitioner's failure to
support its motion with evidence tending to ne-
gate such exposure precluded the entry of
summary judgment in its favor. Catret v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 U.S. App. D.
C, 160, 756 F.2d 181 (1985). This view con-
flicted with that of the Third Circuit in In re
Japanese ["*2551] Electronic Products, 723
F.2d 238 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Ze-

nith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), | We
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 474
U.S, 944 (1985), and-now reverse the decision
of the District of Columbia Circuit.

1 Since our grant of certiorari in this
case, the Fifth Circuit has rendered a de-
cision squarely’ rejecting the position
adopted here by:the District of Columbia
Circuit. See Fontenot v, Upjohn Co.,
780 F.2d 1190 (1986).

Respondent commenced this lawsuit in
September 1980, alleging that the death in 1979
of her husband, Louis H. Catrett, resulted from
his exposure to products containing asbestos
manufactured or distributed by 15 named cor-
porations. Respondent's complaint sounded in
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict li-
ability, Two of the defendants filed motions
challenging the District Court's in personam
jurisdiction, and the remaining 13, including
petitioner, filed motions for summary judg~
ment, Petitioner's motion, which was first filed
in September 1981, argued that summary
judgment was proper because respondent had
[***272] “failed to produce evidence that any
[Celotex] product . .. was the proximate cause
of the injuries alleged within the jurisdictional
[320] limits of [the District] Court." In par-
ticular, pétitioner noted that respondent had
failed to identify, in answering interrogatories
specifically requesting such information, any
witnesses who could testify about the dece-
dent's exposure to petitioner's asbestos prod-
ucts, In response to petitioner's summary
judgment motion, respondent then produced
three documents which she claimed “demon-
strate that there is a genuine material factual
dispute" as to whether the decedent had ever
been exposed to petitioner's asbestos products,
The three documents included a transcript of a
deposition of the decédent, a letter from an of-
ficial of one of the decedent's former employers
whom petitioner planned to call as a trial wit-
ness, and a letter from an insurance company to
respondent's attorney, all tending to establishPage 7

477 U.S. 317, *; 106 8. Ct, 2548,
91 L, Bd, 2d 265, **#; 1986 U.S, LEXIS 118

that the decedent had been exposed to peti-
tioner's asbestos products in Chicago during
1970-1971, Petitioner, in turn, argued that the
three documents were inadmissible hearsay and
thus could not be considered in opposition to
the summary judgment motion.

In July 1982, almost two years after the
commencement of the lawsuit, the District
Court granted all of the motions filed by the
yarious defendants. The court explained that it
was granting petitioner's summary judgment
motion because "there [was] no showing that
the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant Ce-
lotex’s product in the District of Columbia or
elsewhere within the statutory period," App.
217, ? Respondent [321] appealed only the
grant of summary judgment in favor of peti-
tioner, and a divided panel of the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed. The majority of the
Court of Appeals held that petitioner's
[**2552] summary judgment motion was ren-
dered “fatally defective" by the fact that peti-
tioner "made no effort to adduce any evidence,

_in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to sup-
port its motion,” 244 U, 5, App. D. C., at 163,
756 F.2d, at 184 (emphasis in original). Ac-
cording to the majority, Rule 56(c) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, * and this Court's
decision in [***273] Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S, 144, 159 (1970), establish that
"the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment bears the burden of responding only
after the moving party has met its burden of
coming forward with proof of the absence of
any genuine issues of material fact." 244 U. 8,
App. D, C., at 163, 756 F.2d, at 184 [*322]
(emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The
majority therefore declined to consider peti-
tioner's argument that none of the evidence
produced by respondent in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment would have
been admissible at trial. Jbid. The dissenting
judge argued that "[the] majority errs in sup-
posing that a party seeking summary judgment
must always make an affirmative evidentiary
showing, even in cases where there is not a tri-

able, factual dispute.” /d,, at 167, 756 F.2d, at
188 (Bork, J., dissenting). According to the
dissenting judge, the majority's decision "un-
dermines the traditional authority of trial judges
to grant summary judgment in meritless cases,”
Id., at 166, 756 F.2d, at 187.

2 JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, ar-
gues that the District Court granted
summary judgsnent only because respon-
dent presented no evidence that the dece-
dent was exposed to Celotex asbestos
products in the District of Columbia, See
post, at 338-339. According to JUSTICE
STEVENS, we should affirm the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals, reversing
the District Court, on the "narrower
ground" that respondent "made an ade~
quate showing" that the decedent was
exposed to Celotex asbestos products in
Chicago during 1970-1971, See ibid.

JUSTICE STEVENS' position is fac-
tually incorrect. The District Court ex-
pressly stated that respondent had made
no showing of exposure to Celotex as-
bestos products “in the District of Co-
lumbia or elsewhere." App, 217 (empha-
sis added). Unlike JUSTICE STEVENS,
we assume that the District Court meant
what it said. The majority of the Court
of Appeals addressed the very issue
raised by JUSTICE STEVENS, and de-
cided that "[the] District Court's grant of
summary judgment must therefore have
been based on-its conclusion that there
was ‘no showing that the plaintiff was
exposed to defendant Celotex's product
jn the District of Columbia or elsewhere
within the statutory period." Catreit v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 U. 8.
App. D. C. 160, 162, n, 3, 756 F.2d 181,
183, n, 3 (1985). (emphasis in original).
In other words, no judge involved in this
case to date shares JUSTICE STEVENS'
view of the District Court's decision.

3 Rule 56(e) provides:Page 8

477 U.S, 317, *; 106 S. Ct. 2548, #*;
91 L, Ed, 2d 265, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 118

"Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be ad-
missible in evidence, and shall show af-
firmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affida-

. vits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and sup-
ported as provided in this rule, an ad-
verse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as other-
wise provided in this rule, must set forth
specifie facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial, If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropri-
ate, shall be entered against him."

[***_LEdHRI1B} (1B) [***LEdHR2]
[2]We think that the position taken by the ma-
jority of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent
with the standard for summary judgment set
forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. * Under Rule 56(c), summary judg-
ment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." In our view, the
plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the en-
try of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation,
{*323] there can be "no genuine issue as to any
material fact," since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmov-
ing party's case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial, The moving party is “entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law" because the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of
proof. "[The] standard [for granting summary
judgment] mirrors the:standard [***274] for a
directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a) ... ." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., ante, at 250,

4 Rule 56(c) provides:

“The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affi-
davits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages."

{**2553] (*""LEdHRIC] Tc]
(***LEdHR3] = [3] [***LEdHR4] = ([4JOf
course, a party seeking summary judgment al-
ways bears the initial responsibility of inform-
ing the district court of the basis for its motion,
and identifying those portions of "the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any," which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
But unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no
express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that
the moving party support its motion with affi-
davits or other similar materials negating the
opponent's claim, On the contrary, Rule 56(c),
which refers to "the affidavits, if any" (empha-
sis added), suggests the absence of such a re-477 US. 317, *; 106 S. Ct, 2548, *;

Page 9

D1 L, Bd, 2d 265, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 118

quirement. And if there were any doubt about
the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and
(b), which provide that claimants and defen-
dants, respectively, may move for summary
judgment “with or without supporting ajfida-
viis" (emphasis added), The import of these
subsections is that, regardless of whether the
moving patty accompanies its summary judg-
Ment motion with affidavits, the motion may,
and should, be granted so long as whatever is
before the district court demonstrates that the
standard for the entry of summary judgment, as
set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the
principal purposes of the summary judgment
tule is to isolate and dispose of factually un-
supported [324] claims or defenses, and we
think it should be interpreted in a way that al-
lows it to accomplish this purpose. *

5 See Louis, Federal Summary Judg-
ment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83
Yale L, J. 745, 752 (1974); Currie,
Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and
Summary Judgments, 45 U. Chi. L, Rev.
72, 79 (1977).

[***LEdHR1D] [1D]}Respondent argues,
however, that Rule 56(e), by its terms, places
on the nonmoving party the burden of coming
forward with rebuttal affidavits, or other speci-
fied kinds of materials, only in response to a
motion for summary judgment "made and sup-
ported as provided in this rule." According to
respondent's argument, since petitioner did not
“support” its motion with affidavits, summary
judgment was improper in this case. But as we
have already explained, a motion for summary
judgment may be made pursuant to Rule 56
"with or without supporting affidavits.” In
cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving
party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a
dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion
may properly be made in reliance solely on the
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogato-
ries, and admissions on file." Such a motion,
whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will

be "made and supported as provided in this
rule,” and Rule 56(e), therefore requires the
nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings
and by her own affidavits, or by the "deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file," designate "specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

(***LEdHR5] [5]We do not mean that the
nonmoving party must produce evidence in a
form that would be admissible at trial in order
to avoid summary judgment. Obviously, Rule
56 does [***275] not require the nonmoving
party to depose her own witnesses, Rule 56(e)
permits a proper summary judgment motion to
be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary
materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere
pleadings themselves, and it is from this list
that one would normally expect the nonmoving
party to make the showing to which we have
referred. .

[#325] [***LEdHRIE}] [1E]The Court of
Appeals in this case felt itself constrained,
however, by language in our decision in
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co,, 398 U.S, 144
(1970), There we held that summary judgment
had been improperly entered in favor of the de-
fendant restaurant in an action brought under
42. U.S.C, § 1983, In the course of its opinion,
the Adickes Court said that “both the commen-
tary on and the background of the 1963
amendment conclusively [*#2554] show that
it was not intended to modify the burden of the
moving party . . . to show initially the absence
of a genuine issue concerning any material
fact," Id., at’ 159.We think that this statement is
accurate in a literal sense, since we fully agree
with the Adickes Court that the 1963 amend-
ment to Rule 56(e) was not designed to modify
the burden of making the showing generally
required by Rule 56(c). It also appears to us
that, on the basis of the showing before the
Court in Adickes, the motion for summary
judgment in that case ‘should have been denied.Page 10

477 U.S. 317, *; 106 S. Ct. 2548, **;
91 L, Bu, 24 265, **#*; 1986 U.S, LEXIS 118

But we do not think the Adickes language
quoted above should be construed to mean that
the burden is on the party moving for summary
judgment to produce evidence showing the ab-
sence of a genuine issue of material fact, even
with respect to an issue on which the nonmov-
ing party bears the burden of proof. Instead, as
we have explained, the burden on the moving
party may be discharged by “showing” -- that
is, pointing out to the district court -- that there
is an absence of evidence to support the non-
moving party's case.

The last two sentences of Rule 56(e) were
added, as this Court indicated in Adickes, to
disapprove a line of cases allowing a party op-
posing summary judgment to resist a properly
made motion by reference only to its pleadings,
While the Adickes Court was undoubtedly cor-
rect in concluding that these two sentences
were not intended to reduce the burden of the
moving party, it is also obvious that they were
not adopted to add to that burden, Yet that is
exactly the result which the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals would produce; in effect, an
amendment to Rule 56(e) designed to [¥*326]
facilitate the granting of motions for summary
judgment would be interpreted to make it more
difficult to grant such motions, Nothing in the

two sentences themselves requires this result,
for the reasons we have previously indicated,
and we now put to rest any inference that they
do so.

Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
district courts are widely acknowledged to pos-
sess the power to enter summary judgments sua
sponte, so long as the losing party was on no-
tice that she had to come forward with all of
her evidence, See 244 U. S. App. D. C,, at
167-168, 756 F.2d, at 189 (Bork, J, dissent-
ing); 1OA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, pp. 28-
29 (1983). It would surely defy common sense
to hold that the District [***276] Court could
haye entered summary judgment sue sponte in
favor of petitioner in the instant case, but that

petitioner's filing of a motion requesting such a
disposition precluded .the District Court from
ordering it. .

{**LEdHR6] [6]Respondent commenced this

action in September 1980, and petitioner's mo-
tion was filed in September 1981, The parties
had conducted discovery, and no serious claim
can be made that respondent was in any sense
"railroaded" by a premature motion for sum-
mary judgment. Any potential problem with
such premature motions can be adequately
dealt with under Rule 56(f), * which allows a
summary judgment motion to be denied, or the
hearing on the motion to be continued, if the
nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to
make full discovery.

6 Rule 56(f) provides:

“Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affi-
davit facts essential to justify his opposi-
tion, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance
to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is
just,"

[***LEdHR7] © [7]In this Court, respon-
dent's brief and ora] argument have been de-
voted as much to the proposition that an ade-
quate showing of exposure to petitioner's asbes-
tos products was [*327] made as to the propo-
sition that no such showing should have been
required, But the Court of Appeals declined to
address either the adequacy of the showing
made by respondent in opposition to peti-
tioner's motion for summary judgment, or the
question whether such a showing, if [**2555]
reduced to admissible evidence, would be suf-
ficient to carry respondent's burden of proof at
trial, We think the Court of Appeals with its
superior knowledge of local law is betterPage 11

477 ULS, 317, *; 106 S. Ct, 2548, *#;
91 L, Bd, 2d 265, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 118

suited than we are to make these determinations
in the first instance.

[***LHdHR8] [8]The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have for almost 50 years au-
thorized motions for summary judgment upon
proper showings of the lack of a genuine, tri-
able issue of material fact. Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfa-
vored procedural shortcut, but rather as an inte-
gral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which
are designed "to secure the just, speedy and in-
expensive determination of every action." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 1; see Schwarzer, Summary
Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining
Genuine Issues of Material Pact, 99 F.R.D.
465, 467 (1984). Before the shift to "notice
pleading" accomplished by the Federal Rules,
motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a
defense were the principal tools by which fac-
tually insufficient claims or defenses could be
isolated and prevented from going to trial with
the attendant unwarranted consumption of pub-
lic and private resources, But with the advent
of "notice pleading,” the motion to dismiss sel-
dom fulfills this function any more, and its
place has been taken by the motion for sum-
mary judgment, Rule 56 must be construed
with due regard not only for the rights of per-
sons asserting claims and defenses that are ade-
quately based in fact to have those claims and
defenses tried to a jury, but-also for the rights
of persons opposing such claims and defenses
to demonstrate in the manner provided by the

Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses

have no factual basis,

[#328] [**277] The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

tis so ordered.
CONCUR BY: WHITE

CONCUR

JUSTICE WHITE, concurring,

I agree that the Court of Appeals was
wrong in holding that the moving defendant
must always support his motion with evidence
or affidavits showing the absence of a genuine
dispute about a material fact. I also agree that
the movant may rely on depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and the like, to demonstrate that
the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case
and hence that there can be no factual dispute.
But the movant must discharge the burden the
Rules place upon him: It is not enough to move
for summary judgment without supporting the
motion in any way or with a conclusory asser-
tion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove
his case.

A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery
or reveal his witnesses or evidence unless re-
quired to do so under the discovery Rules or by
court order, Of course, he must respond if re-
quired to do so; but he need not also depose his
witnesses or obtain their affidavits to defeat a
summary judgment motion asserting only that
he has failed to produce any support for his
case, It is the defendant's task to negate, if he
can, the claimed basis for the suit.

Petitioner Celotex-does not dispute that if
respondent has named.a witness to support her
claim, summary judgment should not be
granted without Celotex somehow showing that
the named witness’ possible testimony raises no
genuine issue of material fact, ‘Tr. of Oral Arg.
43, 45. It asserts, however, that respondent has
failed on request to produce any basis for her
case. Respondent, on the other hand, does not
contend that she was not obligated to reveal her
witnesses and evidence but insists that she has
revealed enough to defeat the motion for sum-
mary judgment, Because the Court of Appeals
found it tmnecessary:to address this aspect
[*329] of the case, I agree that the case should
be remanded for further proceedings.

DISSENT BY: BRENNAN, STEVENSPage 12

477 US, 317, * 106 S, Ct 2548, **;
9} L, Hd. 2d 265, ***; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 118

DISSENT

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, dissenting,

This case requires the Court to determine

whether Celotex satisfied its initial [**2556]
burden of production in moving for summary

judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked:

evidence to establish an essential element of
her case at trial. I do not disagree with the
Court's legal analysis, The Court clearly rejects
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the de-
fendant must provide affirmative evidence dis-
proving the plaintiff's case. Beyond this, how-
ever, ‘the Court has not clearly explained what
is required of a moving party secking summary
judgment on the ground that the nonmoving
party cannot prove its case, ' This lack of
[***278] clarity is unfortunate: district courts
must routinely decide summary judgment mo-
tions, and the Court's opinion will very likely
create confusion, For this reason, even if I
agreed with the Court's result, [ would have

written separately to explain more clearly the ©

law in this area, However, because I believe
that Celotex did not meet its burden of produc-
tion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, 1
respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment.

1 It is also unclear what the Court of
Appeals is supposed to do in this case on
remand, JUSTICE WHITE -- who has
provided the Court's fifth vote -- plainly
believes that the Court of Appeals should
reevaluate whether the defendant met its
initial burden of production. However,
the decision to reverse rather than to va-
cate the judgment below implies that the
Court of Appeals should assume that Ce-
lotex has met its initial burden of produc-
tion and ask only whether the plaintiff re-
sponded adequately, and, if so, whether
the defendant has met its ultimate burden
of persuasion that no genuine issue exists
« for trial, Absent some clearer expression

from the Court to the contrary, JUSTICE
WHITE's understanding would seem to
be controlling, Cf. Marks v, United
States, 430 U.S, 188, 193 (1977).

[*330] [

Summary judgment is appropriate where
the court is satisfied "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc, 56(c), The bur-
den of establishing ‘the nonexistence of a
"genuine issue" is on the party moving for
summary judgment. 10A C. Wright, A. Miller,
& M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2727, p. 121 (2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter Wright)
(citing cases); 6 J. Moore, W, Taggart & J.
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice para.
56,15[3] (2d ed. 1985) (hereinafter Moore) (cit-
ing cases). See also, ante, at 323; ante, at 328
(WHITE, J., concurring), This burden has two
distinct components: an initial burden of pro-
duction, which shifts to the nonmoving party if
satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate
burden of persuasion, which always remains on
the moving party. See 10A Wright § 2727, The
court need not decide whether the moving party
has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion *
unless and until the court finds that the moving
party has discharged its initial [*331] burden
of production. Adickes v, S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157-161 (1970); 1963 Advisory
Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Ciy, Proc.
56(e), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 626.

2 The burden of persuasion imposed on
a moving party by Rule 56 is a stringent
one. 6 Moore para. 56.15[3], p. 56-466;
10A Wright § 2727, p. 124, Summary
judgment should not be granted unless it
. is clear that a trial is unnecessary, Ander-
son y. Liberty Lobby, Inc., ante, at 255,
and any doubt as to the existence of a
genuine issue for trial should be resolved
against the moving party, Adickes v. S.A.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S, 144, 158-159Page 13

477 U.S. 317, *, 106 8, Ct, 2548,
91 L, Bd, 2d 265, ***;, 1986 U.S, LEXIS 118

(1970), In determining whether a moving _

party has met its burden of persuasion,
the court is obliged to take account of the
entire setting of the case and must con-
sider all papers of record as well as any
materials prepared for the motion. 10A
Wright § 2721, p. 44; see, e. g., Ste-
panischen v. Merchants Despatch Trans-
portation Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 930 (CAI
1983); Higgenbotham vy. Ochsner Foun-
dation Hospital, 607 F.2d 653, 636 (CAS
1979), As explained by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit in Jn re Japa-
nese Electronic Products Antitrust Liti-
gation, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom, Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Carp.,
475 US, 574 (1986), “fif] ... there is
any evidence in the record from any
source from which a reasonable inference
in the [nonmoving party's] favor may be
drawn, the moving party simply cannot
obtain a summary judgment... ." 723
F.2d, at 258,

[**2557] The burden of production im-
posed by Rule 56 requires the moving
[***279] party to make a prima facie showing
that it is entitled to summary judgment, 10A
Wright § 2727, The manner in which this
showing can be made depends upon which
party will bear the burden of persuasion on the
challenged claim at trial. If the moving party
will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that
party must support its motion with credible
evidence -- using any of the materials specified
in Rule 56(c) -- that would entitle it to a di-
rected verdict if not controverted at trial. ibid.
Such an affirmative showing shifts the burden
of production to the party opposing the motion
and requires that party either to produce evi-
dentiary materials that demonstrate the exis-
tence of a "genuine issue" for trial or to submit
an affidavit requesting additional time for dis-
covery, Jbid.; Fed. Rules Ciy. Proc. 56(e), (f).

If the burden of persuasion at trial would be
on the nonmoving party, the party moving for
summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56's bur-
den of production in either of two ways. First,
the moving patty may submit affirmative evi-
dence that negates an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim. Second, the moving
party may demonstrate to the court that the
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim, See 10A Wright § 2727, pp. 130-
131, Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doc-
trine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L, J, 745,
750 (1974) (hereinafter Louis), If the nonmov-
ing party cannot muster sufficient evidence to
make out its claim, a trial would be useless and
the moving party is entitled to summary judg-
ment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., ante, at 249,

Where the moving party adopts this second
option and secks summary judgment on the
ground that the nonmoving party -- who will
bear the burden of persuasion at trial -- has
[*332] no evidence, the mechanics of dis-
charging Rule 56's burden of production are
somewhat trickier. Plainly, a conclusory asser-
tion that the nonmoving party has no evidence
is insufficient. See ante, at 328 (WHITE, }.,
concurring). Such a “burden" of production is
no burden at all and would simply permit
summary judgment procedure to be converted
into a tool for harassment, See Louis 750-751.
Rather, as the Court confirms, a party who
moves for summary judgment on the ground
that the nonmoving party has no evidence must
affirmatively show the absence of evidence in
the record, Ante, at 323, This may require the
moving party to depose the nonmoving party's
witnesses