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*** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL HOWARD FORMAN, CLERK 5/3/2013 5:31:11 PM.****
Electronically Filed 05/03/2013 05:31:12 PM ET
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND
FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 12-35089 (07)
(Complex Litigation Unit)
GAYLA SUSAN LEVIN,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
TD BANK, N.A; SCOTT W. ROTHSTEIN;
FRANK A. SPINOSA; and ROSANNE
CARETSKY,
Defendants.
/
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT FRANK SPINOSA’S
MOTION TO STRIKE
Plaintiff opposes Defendant Frank Spinosa's Motion to Strike Certain Allegations in the
Complaint, as follows.
First, Spinosa’s Motion to Strike is premature. Whether an adverse inference can be
drawn from Spinosa’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment properly should be brought before the
Court in a motion in limine before trial, not in a Rule 1.140(f) motion to strike.
Spinosa’s Motion is unfounded as well as premature. In Court-Appointed Receiver of
Lancer Mgmt. Group LLC vy. Lauer, No. 05-60584-CIV-MARRA, 2010 WL 1372442, at *7
(S.D. Fla. March 31, 2010), the court refused to strike from the complaint references to the
defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a separate proceeding unless the defendant
could show that he is (i) actually a defendant in a parallel criminal action and (ii) that he would
be subject to automatic summary judgment in this proceeding duc to his invocation of his FifthAmendment rights. Absent such a showing, moving to strike such references in the Complaint
“constitutes an improper blanket assertion of the privilege.” Id. at *7.
Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(f), “the court may strike redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from any pleading at any time.” Motions to strike
are generally disfavored. See Van Valkenberg v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 252 So. 2d 280, 284
(Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (“a motion to strike is not favored and is viewed with skepticism.”). Such
motions “should only be granted if the material is wholly irrelevant, can have no bearing on the
equities, and no influence on the decision.” Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 853 So.2d
1125, 1133-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), quoting Pentecostal Holiness Church, Inc. v. Mauney, 270
So.2d 762, 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). In other words, unless a moving party can carry the heavy
burden of proving that an allegation lacks any relevance and could have no effect whatsoever on
a determination on the merits, the motion to strike should be denied.
Spinosa moves to strike the allegations in paragraph 104 of the Complaint:
In Spinosa’s deposition, he asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and declined to answer the following questions, thus creating an
inference that the answers would have been adverse to TD Bank:
a. Rothstein gave Spinosa a $50,000 cash bribe;
b. Rothstein gave Spinosa gifts;
c. Spinosa had actual knowledge of the Rothstein Ponzi
Scheme;
d. Spinosa provided substantial assistance to the Ponzi
Scheme;
e. Spinosa prepared and signed TD Bank “lock letters” in
support of the Scheme;
f. Spinosa knew that the statements in the lock letter were
false;
g. Spinosa scanned and emailed the lock letters;
2h. Spinosa acted within the course and scope of his
employment when he prepared and signed the lock
letters;
i. Spinosa provided TD Bank letterhead to Rothstein;
j. Spinosa knew that TD Bank account statements shown
by Rothstein to investors were false;
k. Spinosa used key bank employees and bank facilities to
induce investors in invest into the Ponzi Scheme; and
1. Spinosa helped wire $16 million to Rothstein in
Morocco.
Spinosa does not deny these allegations. In his Answer served on February 8, 2013, he admits
with regard to paragraph 104 that “Spinosa asserted his constitutional Sth Amendment right at
various depositions.”
The adverse inferences described in paragraph 104 are relevant to Plaintiff's claims, and
will, we contend, be allowed at trial. See, e.g., Atlas v. Atlas, 708 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)). They clearly are not “wholly
irrelevant,” “hav[ing] ... no bearing on the equities,” or “no influence on the decision” (see Rice-
Lamar, 853 So, 2d at 1133).
Plaintiff is entitled in her Complaint to allege the depth and breadth of Spinosa’s
participation in the fraudulent scheme, to allege how the scheme operated, and to allege
wrongdoing and the resultant harm inflicted on victims by Spinosa and his fellow aiders/abettors
and co-conspirators. In order to state a valid aiding and abetting claim, a plaintiff must (among
other things) allege that the defendant had knowledge of the fraudulent conduct and provided
substantial assistance to advance the commission of the fraud. See ZP No. 54 Ltd. P’ship v. Fid.
& Deposit Co. of Md., 917 So. 2d 368, 372 (Fla. Sth DCA 2005); In re Caribbean K Line, Ltd.,
288 B.R. 908, 919 (S.D. Fla. 2002). In establishing knowledge, “the surrounding circumstancesand expectations of the parties [are] critical, because knowledge of the [improper conduct] must
usually be inferred.” Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009 (1 1th Cir.
1985).
The damning facts in paragraph 104 that Spinosa declined to answer questions about are
directly relevant to Plaintiff's claims, and his refusal to answer questions about them -- thus
arguably creating adverse inferences against TD Bank -- form a significant part of Plaintiff's
allegations of aiding and abetting and conspiracy, including allegations of knowledge and
assistance of the fraudulent conduct. Spinosa’s Fifth Amendment rights do not stretch so far as
to justify striking such allegations. See Lauer, supra, at *7.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant Frank Spinosa’s Motion to
Strike.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy hereof was served by email on all parties listed on the attached Service
List, on May 3, 2013.
CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
633 South Federal Highway, 8th Floor
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Tel: (954) 462-5500; Fax: (954) 463-9244
BY: /s/William S. Scherer
WILLIAM R. SCHERER
wscherer@conradscherer.com
Florida Bar No. 169454
REID A. COCALIS
rcocalis@conradscherer.com
Florida Bar No. 0724114JAMES F. CARROLL
jfc@conradscherer.com
Florida Bar No. 984681
KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, 9" Floor
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Tel: (305) 372-1800
Fax: (305) 372-3508
HARLEY S. TROPIN
hst@kttlaw.com
Florida Bar No. 241253
THOMAS A. TUCKER RONZETTI
tr@kttlaw.com
Florida Bar No. 965723
ADAM M. MOSKOWITZ
amm@kttlaw.com
Florida Bar No. 984280
JAMES R. BRYAN
jrb@kttlaw.com
Florida Bar No. 696862
GAIL MCQUILKIN
gam@kttlaw.com
Florida Bar No. 969338SERVICE LIST
WILLIAM R. SCHERER, ESQ.
REID A. COCALIS, ESQ.
JAMES F. CARROLL, ESQ.
Conrad & Scherer, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 14723
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33302
Tel: (954) 847-3362
Fax: (954) 463-9244
wscherer@conradscherer.com
reocalis@conradscherer.com
jfe@conradscherer.com
HARLEY S. TROPIN, ESQ.
THOMAS A. TUCKER RONZETTI, ESQ.
ADAM M. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ.
JAMES R. BRYAN, ESQ.
GAIL MCQUILKIN, ESQ.
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, 9°" Floor
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Tel: (305)372-1800
Fax: (305)372-3508
hst@kttlaw.com
tr@kttlaw.com
amm@kttlaw.com
jrb@kttlaw.com
gam@kttlaw.com
MICHAEL J. SCHLESINGER, ESQ.
ANDREW ABEL, ESQ.
LORI SOCHIN, ESQ.
Schlesinger & Associates, P.A.
Attorney for Defendant Spinosa
799 Brickell Plaza, Suite 700
Miami, Florida 33131
Tel: (305) 373-8993
Fax: (305) 373-8098
mjs@mijsjd.com
aabel@mjsjd.com
lsochin@mijsjd.com
MARCOS DANIEL JIMENEZ, ESQ.
AUDREY M. PUMARIEGA, ESQ.
McDermott Will & Emery
Attorneys for Defendant TD Bank, N.A.
333 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 4500
Miami, FL 33131
Tel: (305) 329-4458
Fax: (305) 347-6500
mjimenez@mwe.com
apumariega@mwe.com
WILLIAM O.L. HUTCHINSON, ESQ.
JILL CRAWLEY GRISET, ESQ.
McGuireWoods
Attorneys for Defendant TD Bank, N.A.
201 North Tryon Street, Suite 3000
Charlotte, NC 28202
Tel: (704) 343-2000
Fax: (704) 343-2300
whutchinson@mcguirewoods.com
jgriset@meguirewoods.com
R. ERIC BILIK, ESQ.
McGuireWoods
Attorneys for Defendant TD Bank, N.A.
50 North Laura Street, Suite 3300
Jacksonville, FL 32202-3661
Tel: (904) 798-2685
Fax: (904) 798-3207
ebilik@mcguirewoods.com
W. TUCKER CRAIG, ESQ.
VIVIAN H. FAZIO, ESQ.
Billing, Cochran, Lyles, Mauro & Ramsey
Attorneys for Defendant Caretsky
Sun Trust Center, 6th Floor
515 E. Las Olas Boulevard
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Tel: (954) 764-7150
Fax: (954) 764-7279
wtc@bclmr.com
vhf@belmr.comDAN GELBER, ESQ.
ADAM M. SCHACHTER, ESQ.
Gelber Schachter & Greenberg, P.A.
Co-Counsel for Defendant Caretsky
1441 Brickell Avenue
Suite 1420
Miami, Florida 33131
Tel: (305) 728-0950
Fax: (305) 728-0951
dgelber@gsgpa.com
aschachter@gsgpa.com
Preview
*** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL HOWARD FORMAN, CLERK 5/3/2013 5:31:11 PM.**** Electronically Filed 05/03/2013 05:31:12 PM ET IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO.: 12-35089 (07) (Complex Litigation Unit) GAYLA SUSAN LEVIN, Plaintiff, Vv. TD BANK, N.A; SCOTT W. ROTHSTEIN; FRANK A. SPINOSA; and ROSANNE CARETSKY, Defendants. / PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT FRANK SPINOSA’S MOTION TO STRIKE Plaintiff opposes Defendant Frank Spinosa's Motion to Strike Certain Allegations in the Complaint, as follows. First, Spinosa’s Motion to Strike is premature. Whether an adverse inference can be drawn from Spinosa’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment properly should be brought before the Court in a motion in limine before trial, not in a Rule 1.140(f) motion to strike. Spinosa’s Motion is unfounded as well as premature. In Court-Appointed Receiver of Lancer Mgmt. Group LLC vy. Lauer, No. 05-60584-CIV-MARRA, 2010 WL 1372442, at *7 (S.D. Fla. March 31, 2010), the court refused to strike from the complaint references to the defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a separate proceeding unless the defendant could show that he is (i) actually a defendant in a parallel criminal action and (ii) that he would be subject to automatic summary judgment in this proceeding duc to his invocation of his FifthAmendment rights. Absent such a showing, moving to strike such references in the Complaint “constitutes an improper blanket assertion of the privilege.” Id. at *7. Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(f), “the court may strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from any pleading at any time.” Motions to strike are generally disfavored. See Van Valkenberg v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 252 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (“a motion to strike is not favored and is viewed with skepticism.”). Such motions “should only be granted if the material is wholly irrelevant, can have no bearing on the equities, and no influence on the decision.” Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 853 So.2d 1125, 1133-34 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), quoting Pentecostal Holiness Church, Inc. v. Mauney, 270 So.2d 762, 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). In other words, unless a moving party can carry the heavy burden of proving that an allegation lacks any relevance and could have no effect whatsoever on a determination on the merits, the motion to strike should be denied. Spinosa moves to strike the allegations in paragraph 104 of the Complaint: In Spinosa’s deposition, he asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination and declined to answer the following questions, thus creating an inference that the answers would have been adverse to TD Bank: a. Rothstein gave Spinosa a $50,000 cash bribe; b. Rothstein gave Spinosa gifts; c. Spinosa had actual knowledge of the Rothstein Ponzi Scheme; d. Spinosa provided substantial assistance to the Ponzi Scheme; e. Spinosa prepared and signed TD Bank “lock letters” in support of the Scheme; f. Spinosa knew that the statements in the lock letter were false; g. Spinosa scanned and emailed the lock letters; 2h. Spinosa acted within the course and scope of his employment when he prepared and signed the lock letters; i. Spinosa provided TD Bank letterhead to Rothstein; j. Spinosa knew that TD Bank account statements shown by Rothstein to investors were false; k. Spinosa used key bank employees and bank facilities to induce investors in invest into the Ponzi Scheme; and 1. Spinosa helped wire $16 million to Rothstein in Morocco. Spinosa does not deny these allegations. In his Answer served on February 8, 2013, he admits with regard to paragraph 104 that “Spinosa asserted his constitutional Sth Amendment right at various depositions.” The adverse inferences described in paragraph 104 are relevant to Plaintiff's claims, and will, we contend, be allowed at trial. See, e.g., Atlas v. Atlas, 708 So. 2d 296, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)). They clearly are not “wholly irrelevant,” “hav[ing] ... no bearing on the equities,” or “no influence on the decision” (see Rice- Lamar, 853 So, 2d at 1133). Plaintiff is entitled in her Complaint to allege the depth and breadth of Spinosa’s participation in the fraudulent scheme, to allege how the scheme operated, and to allege wrongdoing and the resultant harm inflicted on victims by Spinosa and his fellow aiders/abettors and co-conspirators. In order to state a valid aiding and abetting claim, a plaintiff must (among other things) allege that the defendant had knowledge of the fraudulent conduct and provided substantial assistance to advance the commission of the fraud. See ZP No. 54 Ltd. P’ship v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 917 So. 2d 368, 372 (Fla. Sth DCA 2005); In re Caribbean K Line, Ltd., 288 B.R. 908, 919 (S.D. Fla. 2002). In establishing knowledge, “the surrounding circumstancesand expectations of the parties [are] critical, because knowledge of the [improper conduct] must usually be inferred.” Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009 (1 1th Cir. 1985). The damning facts in paragraph 104 that Spinosa declined to answer questions about are directly relevant to Plaintiff's claims, and his refusal to answer questions about them -- thus arguably creating adverse inferences against TD Bank -- form a significant part of Plaintiff's allegations of aiding and abetting and conspiracy, including allegations of knowledge and assistance of the fraudulent conduct. Spinosa’s Fifth Amendment rights do not stretch so far as to justify striking such allegations. See Lauer, supra, at *7. CONCLUSION Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant Frank Spinosa’s Motion to Strike. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy hereof was served by email on all parties listed on the attached Service List, on May 3, 2013. CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff 633 South Federal Highway, 8th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Tel: (954) 462-5500; Fax: (954) 463-9244 BY: /s/William S. Scherer WILLIAM R. SCHERER wscherer@conradscherer.com Florida Bar No. 169454 REID A. COCALIS rcocalis@conradscherer.com Florida Bar No. 0724114JAMES F. CARROLL jfc@conradscherer.com Florida Bar No. 984681 KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiff 2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, 9" Floor Coral Gables, FL 33134 Tel: (305) 372-1800 Fax: (305) 372-3508 HARLEY S. TROPIN hst@kttlaw.com Florida Bar No. 241253 THOMAS A. TUCKER RONZETTI tr@kttlaw.com Florida Bar No. 965723 ADAM M. MOSKOWITZ amm@kttlaw.com Florida Bar No. 984280 JAMES R. BRYAN jrb@kttlaw.com Florida Bar No. 696862 GAIL MCQUILKIN gam@kttlaw.com Florida Bar No. 969338SERVICE LIST WILLIAM R. SCHERER, ESQ. REID A. COCALIS, ESQ. JAMES F. CARROLL, ESQ. Conrad & Scherer, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff P.O. Box 14723 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33302 Tel: (954) 847-3362 Fax: (954) 463-9244 wscherer@conradscherer.com reocalis@conradscherer.com jfe@conradscherer.com HARLEY S. TROPIN, ESQ. THOMAS A. TUCKER RONZETTI, ESQ. ADAM M. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ. JAMES R. BRYAN, ESQ. GAIL MCQUILKIN, ESQ. Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A. Attorneys for Plaintiff 2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, 9°" Floor Coral Gables, FL 33134 Tel: (305)372-1800 Fax: (305)372-3508 hst@kttlaw.com tr@kttlaw.com amm@kttlaw.com jrb@kttlaw.com gam@kttlaw.com MICHAEL J. SCHLESINGER, ESQ. ANDREW ABEL, ESQ. LORI SOCHIN, ESQ. Schlesinger & Associates, P.A. Attorney for Defendant Spinosa 799 Brickell Plaza, Suite 700 Miami, Florida 33131 Tel: (305) 373-8993 Fax: (305) 373-8098 mjs@mijsjd.com aabel@mjsjd.com lsochin@mijsjd.com MARCOS DANIEL JIMENEZ, ESQ. AUDREY M. PUMARIEGA, ESQ. McDermott Will & Emery Attorneys for Defendant TD Bank, N.A. 333 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 4500 Miami, FL 33131 Tel: (305) 329-4458 Fax: (305) 347-6500 mjimenez@mwe.com apumariega@mwe.com WILLIAM O.L. HUTCHINSON, ESQ. JILL CRAWLEY GRISET, ESQ. McGuireWoods Attorneys for Defendant TD Bank, N.A. 201 North Tryon Street, Suite 3000 Charlotte, NC 28202 Tel: (704) 343-2000 Fax: (704) 343-2300 whutchinson@mcguirewoods.com jgriset@meguirewoods.com R. ERIC BILIK, ESQ. McGuireWoods Attorneys for Defendant TD Bank, N.A. 50 North Laura Street, Suite 3300 Jacksonville, FL 32202-3661 Tel: (904) 798-2685 Fax: (904) 798-3207 ebilik@mcguirewoods.com W. TUCKER CRAIG, ESQ. VIVIAN H. FAZIO, ESQ. Billing, Cochran, Lyles, Mauro & Ramsey Attorneys for Defendant Caretsky Sun Trust Center, 6th Floor 515 E. Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Tel: (954) 764-7150 Fax: (954) 764-7279 wtc@bclmr.com vhf@belmr.comDAN GELBER, ESQ. ADAM M. SCHACHTER, ESQ. Gelber Schachter & Greenberg, P.A. Co-Counsel for Defendant Caretsky 1441 Brickell Avenue Suite 1420 Miami, Florida 33131 Tel: (305) 728-0950 Fax: (305) 728-0951 dgelber@gsgpa.com aschachter@gsgpa.com