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  • Daniel Pronman Plaintiff vs. Brian Styles, et al Defendant Neg - Mass Tort document preview
  • Daniel Pronman Plaintiff vs. Brian Styles, et al Defendant Neg - Mass Tort document preview
  • Daniel Pronman Plaintiff vs. Brian Styles, et al Defendant Neg - Mass Tort document preview
  • Daniel Pronman Plaintiff vs. Brian Styles, et al Defendant Neg - Mass Tort document preview
						
                                

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Filing # 101734467 E-Filed 01/15/2020 06:04:44 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 17" JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA DANIEL PRONMAN an individual, Plaintiff, Case No: CACE 19-22567 (7) v. EDWARD J. O’SHEEHAN of SHUTTS & BOWEN, LAURIE THOMPSON of ZONE LAW and FOWLER-WHITE LAW FIRM, BRETT HOROWITZ , JOHN M. ROSS, JOHN SHAHADY of KOPELOWITZ, OSTROW, FERGUSON, WEISELBERG, GILBERT FIRM, All lawyers and LAW FIRMS. Defendants SWORN MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF THE HONORABLE JUDGE JACK IUTER AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW Plaintiff Daniel Pronman Pro Se respectively file this motion for disqualification of the honorable Judge Tutor, and in support thereof under Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160, Rule 2.330, and section 38.10, Florida Statutes states: It has long been said in the courts of this state that “every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939). The honorable Judge Tuter’s actions and comments have given Daniel Pronman a well founded fear he cannot receive a fair hearing or trial. **** FILED: BROWARD COUNTY, FL BRENDA D. FORMAN, CLERK 01/15/2020 06:04:44 PM.****INTRODUCTION On December 11 2019 the court held a hearing on the Defendants motion to consolidate cases 19-22567 and 09-043833. The Plaintiff, counter Plaintiffs filed an opposition to this motion arguing consolidation was not proper for these two cases. The judge ordered the case # 19-22567 transferred to his division without finding that consolidation was proper and just deferred to rule on it (exhibit A). When Daniel Pronman argued that there was no reason in fact or law to transfer the latter case without consolidation as that was the requested relief the Defendants has motioned the court for. Judge Tuter told the Plaintiff that as the chief Judge he can do anything he wants in his court house. Due to the evident bias displayed by Judge Tuter in this hearing Daniel Pronman respectfully request Judge Tuter to grant this motion for disqualification. The Plaintiff also requests that the court transfer both cases to the 15" judicial circuit in Palm Beach due to the evident influence Judge Tuter has on all the presiding Judges in this circuit. The court in Palm Beach has already rules that venue there is proper there; transferring these cases will avoid any further impression of bias and give the Plaintiff a fair and impartial Judge. Affidavit by Daniel Pronman in support of this motion is attached see (Exhibit B). JUDGE TUTER GRANTED A MOTION TO TRANSFER WHICH IS NOT PROPER On December 11" 2019 at the beginning of the hearing Judge Tuter said you guys are here again it’s been ten years I don’t want anything else to do with you. I have no interest presiding over this new case and initially indicated that he would deny the Defendants’ motion. As Soon as 2the Defendants reminded Judge Tuter that the Plaintiff filed a motion for disqualification and for a writ of prohibition, Judge Tutor immediately responded I am going to take this case. Judge Tuter went on to state that he didn’t want to saddle Judge Lepage with you staring directly at Daniel Pronman. This statement is blatantly biased and would put the fear of not receiving a fair hearing or trial in any rational person particularly knowing of the already adversarial relationship between the Judge and the Plaintiff. Daniel Pronman objected to this transfer and argued it didn’t qualify under the criteria established by statute buy Judge Tuter stated he didn’t care and could do anything he wants as the chief Judge. Plaintiff believes Judge Tuter transferred the case to himself with resentfully intention to hinder the Plaintiff to receive a fair trial. Judge Tutor has disobeyed his own administrative order 201 8-100-CIV, 4c which states an order on a motion to consolidate requires a finding if the cases will be consolidated for discovery, trial or both in order for the transfer to be completed. The judge makes no such finding in its order (exhibit A).The administrative order continues Sc requires a case being transferred between divisions the clerk shall randomly assign the case to a circuit civil division except for the complex litigation division. Judge Tuter has stated in numerous hearings over the course of many years that he didn’t like this case. He couldn’t understand how this case ended up in his court. He is going to shut down. I don’t want to hear anymore arguments. All these statements evidence the J udge continuously and unfairly denied the Plaintiff the opportunity to present their evidence and arguments to fairly adjudicate this case forcing us to file numerous unnecessary appeals.JUDGE TUTOR THREATENED DANIEL PRONMAN WITH 57.105 SANCTIONS In this hearing only seconds after Judge Tuter declared he was transferring case number 19-22567 to himself he looked Daniel Pronman in the eyes and stated if the Plaintiff filed any pleadings he doesn’t like he will sanction Daniel Pronman under 57.105. He went on to threaten Mr. Pronman that he recently sanctioned a party for over $500,000.00. This statement coming from a high ranking Judge did more than put a well founded fear of not getting a fair trial but in fact put the fear of god in the mind of Daniel Pronman. Judge Tuter immediately tried to spin this provocative statement to appear as if he had directed it to all parties but he is well aware as a pro se party Daniel Pronman is not legally entiled to collect any 57.105 sanctions that would be available only to the attorney defendants making this statement clearly one sided. There can be no doubt who this threat was directed at Daniel Pronman. The prejudicial connotation of the Judge’s comment is evident as he hasn’t even seen any pleadings in this early stage of this case. The Judge’s pre disposition in this case is ample reason for disqualification. JUDGE TUTER IS A MATERIAL WITNESS IN THIS CASE Judge Tuter is an indispensable material witness in this case. He is the only person that can that can answer to the question of what his final order of summary judgment in favor of Daniel Pronman in case number 09-043833 says and the rationale behind it. This evidence will be imperative to prove one of the elements of the Plaintiffs claim. The evidence Judge Tutor will provide goes to the heart of the Plaintiffs claim and no other person can provide the evidence needed. The Plaintiff will need to depose Judge Tuter and serve discovery on him and hisjudicial staff. For this reason alone the Judge must disqualify himself. Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(d)(2) requires a trial judge to disqualify himself if the judge is a "material witness for or against one of the parties to the cause.” See also § 38.02, Fla. Stat. (2004); Canon 3(E)(1)(b), Code of Jud. Conduct. A material witness is one "who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify." Wingate v. Mach, 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421, 422 (1934) (defining "material witness" as contemplated by chapter 16053, Laws of Florida (1933), the predecessor to section 38.02 Florida Evidence Code. See F.S. 90.201 et seq.; Chapter 2 of this manual. If it is determined that a presiding judge is a material witness, a motion for disqualification of the judge is appropriate. See Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.330 (formerly Rule 2.160); Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1276 (Fla. 2006) (citations omitted) (rule requires a trial judge to disqualify himself if the judge is a material witness for or againee one of the parties to the cause. A material witness is one who gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify); see also Van Fripp v. State, 412 So.2d 915 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), JUDGE TUTER HELD AN ILLEGAL EXPARTE HEARING Attorney Corey Pronman is the lawyer for Moviestar Musclecars a counter Defendant in case # 09-043833 had properly notice the court that he would be appearing by phone. Judge Tuter started the hearing recognizing the defendants to argue first. Daniel Pronman tried to stop the hearing to inform the court that Corey Pronman was not present but Judge Tuter shut him down. Judge Tuter in prior hearings has threatened Daniel Pronman that if he talked out of turn thecourt would hold him in contempt and possible jail him. When Judge Tuter for some unknown reason stated after the Defendants’ had made their complete argument that the attorney Corey Pronman wasn’t called before the hearing started he then call him. Instead of resetting the hearing or at a minimum restarted it the court only asked Corey Pronman to state his argument without the benefit of hearing any of the opposition’s argument. This action is obviously unacceptable and an attack of the counter Plaintiff's due process rights. This prejudice can’t be allowed to stand. For these reasons the Plaintiff/ counter Plaintiff request Judge Tuter to disqualify himself from both case #19-22567 and 09-043833 and transfer both cases to the 15" Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach to avoid any further appearance of bias. In Scull v. State, 569 So.2d 1251, 1252 (Fla.1990), the supreme court stated: One of the most basic tenets of Florida law is the requirement that all proceedings affecting life, liberty, or property must be conducted according to due process. Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. While we often have said that "due process" is capable of no precise definition, e.g. Gilmer v. Bird, 15 Fla. 410 (1875), there nevertheless are certain well-defined rights clearly subsumed within the meaning of the term. The essence of due process is that fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard must be given to interested parties before judgment is rendered. Tibberts v. Olson, 91 Fla, 824, 108 So. 679 (1926). Due process envisions a law that hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after proper consideration of issues advanced by adversarial parties. State ex rel. Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 244, 196 So. 491, 494 (1940). In this respect the term "due process" embodies a fundamental conception of fairness that derives ultimately from the natural rights of all individuals. See art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. Here, the appearance of irregularity so permeates these proceedings as to justify suspicion of unfairness. This, we believe, is as much a violation of due process as actual bias would be. LEGAL STANDARD FOR DISQUALIFICATION A motion to disqualify is legally sufficient if it alleges facts that would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial. See MacKenzie v.Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.1990). The facts alleged in the motion must be accepted as true, see Knarich v. State, 866 So.2d 165, 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(d)(1), which sets forth the procedural aspects of the disqualification process, provides: (d) Determination. The judge against whom the motion is directed shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion. The judge shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. If the motion is legally sufficient, the judge shall enter an order of disqualification and proceed no further in the action. Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330, titled “Disqualification of Trial Judges,” provides, in pertinent part, that any party may move to disqualify the trial judge assigned to the case by filing a sworn written motion, specifically alleging the facts and reasons upon which the movant relies that show that the movant will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of the specifically described prejudice or bias of the judge. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(a)—(d)(1). Upon receipt of the motion, the trial judge is limited to determining only the legal sufficiency of the motion. If legally sufficient, the judge must immediately enter an order granting disqualification; if not, the judge shall immediately enter an order denying the motion. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(£). The standard by which the judge must base a decision to disqualify is well-established: [A] party seeking to disqualify a judge need only show "a well grounded fear that he will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. It is not a question of how the judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's mind and the basis for such feeling.” State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 573, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (1938). See also Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So.2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The question of disqualification focuses on those matters from which a litigant may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than thejudge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially. The question of disqualification focuses not on what the judge intended, but rather how the message is received and the basis of the feeling. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1086 (la.1983) ("[I]t is not a question of how the judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's mind and the basis for such feeling.") quoting State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 131 Fla. 566, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (1938). CONCLUSION This motion to disqualify is legally sufficient and alleges facts that has created a reasonably a well-founded fear in the mind of Plaintiff/ Counter Plaintiffs that they can’t receive a fair and impartial hearing and trial. | am requesting this court to do the right and just thing and not let the adversarial animosity between the parties and the judge cloud his judgment. PRAYER FOR RELIEF The Pronman’s respectfully request this court to grant this motion and allow the clerk of this court to reassign these cases to a successor Judge in the 15" Judicial Circuit Palm Beach or at a minimum back to Judge Lapage and any other relief this court deems just. Daniel Pronman dansmopar@aol.com 5700, nw 125" Terrace al Springs FL, 33076 770-2314 ffelephoneCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice was served via efile to John j Shahady, B.C.S. ishahady@swlawyers.law, One West Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500 Fort Lauderdale FL 33301. Edward O’ sheehan,eosheehan@shutts.com on this 20th day of December 2019. VERIFICATION 1 Daniel Pronman , hereby affirm under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing facts and statements in the attached motion are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. The statements made in this motion are made in good faith. Supporting affidavit attached see (Exhibit B). 7 niel PronmanEXHIBIT AFiling # 100269790 E-Filed 12/13/2019 10:05:21 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA DANIEL PRONMAN Plaintiff, Vs. Case No. 19-22567 EDWARD O’SHEEHAN et. al., Division Judge Lopane Defendants. / ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE TO DIVISION (07) THIS CAUSE was considered on a Motion to Transfer and Consolidate. The Motion to Consolidate is Deferred. The Motion to Transfer is GRANTED. This case is hereby transferred to Division (07) of the circuit court. DONE and ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale. Broward County. 12" day of December 2019, Florida, on \ Judge Chie! Judge iS Copics: Counsel of Record. Pro Se Plaintiffs & Judge LopaneEXHIBIT BIN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE 17° JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA . DANIEL PRONMAN an individual, Plaintiff, Case No: CACE 19-22567 (7) EDWARD J. O’SHEEHAN of SHUTTS & BOWEN, LAURIE THOMPSON of ZONE LAW and FOWLER-WHITE LAW FIRM, BRETT HOROWITZ , JOHN M. ROSS, JOHN SHAHADY of KOPELOWITZ, OSTROW, FERGUSON, WEISELBERG, GILBERT FIRM, All lawyers and LAW FIRMS. Defendants ey, AEFIDAVIT OF DANIEL PRONMAN IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR DISOUALIFICATION STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF BROWARD I, the undersigned, being duly sworn, do hereby state under oath and under penalty of perjury that the following facts are true:1. My name is Daniel Pronman and I am over the age of eighteen years old. 2. Ihave personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. 3. I Daniel Pronman certify that the statements made in the motion are true to the best of my knowledge. 4. I Daniel Pronman certify that the motion and the statements in the motion are made in good faith 5. I Daniel Pronman based on the actions and statements of Judge Tuter, I have an objectively reasonable fear I will not receive a fair hearing or trial in front of the Honorable Judge Jack Tuter. Daniel Pronman Individually Sworn to or affirmed and subscribed before me thise_ day of December, 2019 by Daniel Pronman who: Is personally known to me v__ Produced fyi YGKCLET & 11320For identification. Signature of Notary