Motion to Dismiss in Atax New York, Inc., Atax Franchise, Inc., Atax Cloud Bookkeeping, Inc. v. Joel Canela #1, Alcides Mendoza alias JOEL CANELA a/k/a JOEL CANELA #2, Sterling Mateo, Ingrid Lamarche, Walber Lugo, Arcadio Consulting Inc., F1 Consulting Services, Inc., Joel Canela #2 a/k/a ALCIDES MENDOZA d/b/a F1 CONSULTING SERVICES| Trellis.Law

On January 22, 2019 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Atax Cloud Bookkeeping, Inc., Atax Franchise, Inc., Atax New York, Inc., and Alcides Mendoza Alias Joel Canela A K A Joel Canela #2, Arcadio Consulting Inc., F1 Consulting Services, Inc., Ingrid Lamarche, Joel Canela #1, Joel Canela #2 A K A Alcides Mendoza D B A F1 Consulting Services, Sterling Mateo, Walber Lugo, for Commercial - Other (Recovery-former employees) in the District Court of Bronx County.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF THE BRONX
----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
ATAX NEW YORK, INC.
ATAX FRANCHISE, INC.
ATAX CLOUD BOOKKEEPING, INC.,
Plaintiffs, Index No.: 20827/2019E
-against-

JOEL CANELA #1, ALCIDES MENDOZA alias
JOEL CANELA a/k/a JOEL CANELA #2,
STERLING MATEO, INGRID LAMARCHE,
WALBER LUGO, ARCADIO CONSULTING INC.,
FI CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., and
JOEL CANELA #2 a/k/a ALCIDES MENDOZA
d/b/a FI CONSULTING SERVICES,
Defendants
----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

AFFIRMATION IN REPLY TO PLAINTFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS
And
IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

WILLIAM A. GARCIA, an attorney duly admitted to practice law in the State of

New York, affirms the following under penalty of perjury:

1. I am the attorney for Joel Canela, sued here as Joel Canela #1 (hereinafter

“Defendant” or “Canela #1”), and I submit this affirmation in reply to

Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s Motionto Dismiss and in further support

of Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint by Plaintiffs pursuant to

CPLR § 3211(a)(7) in that the pleadings fail allege sufficient facts to state a

cause of action against Defendant.

2. I am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances set forth herein based

upon my conversations with Defendant, the affidavit of Defendant and

exhibits annexed hereto, and the file related to this case.

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3. In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Joel Canela #1 seeks to dismiss all

causes of action raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint (Affirmation of William A.

Garcia dated May 1, 2019, Par. 8). More specifically, Defendant seeks to

dismiss the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action for failure to state a

claim.

4. Plaintiffs have opposed Joel Canela #1’s Motion to Dismiss through the

Affirmation of Daniel T. Saltus, dated May 17, 2019 (the “Daltus Affr.”).

The First Cause of Action should be Dismissed
Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)

5. In sum, the First Cause of Action alleges that Defendants are liable to

Plaintiffs for damages for breach of the non-compete agreement through

conspiratorial activities of fraud, deceit, criminal theft, cyber fraud, cyber

theft, commercial theft, and illegal transfer of property, funds, income, and

other valuable assets.

Plaintiffs Improperly Attempt to Amend the First Cause of Action
To Include a Cause of Action for Fraud and Other Related Tortious Activities

6. In their opposition papers, Plaintiffs allege that the First Cause of Action is

not just based upon a breach of a non-compete agreement, but is also based

upon, among others, conspiracy to commit tortious activity. See Daltus Affr.,

Par. 19-20.

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7. This is an unsupported characterization of what the pleadings attempt to state

and an improper attempt to amend the Complaint. For example, Plaintiffs’

demand for relief under the First Cause of Action states that:

Based upon the foregoing, the Plaintiffs are entitled to
monetary damages and a judgment and/or summary
judgment declaring upon the grounds that the Defendants
as set forth in the allegations hereinabove as to the
conspiratorial wrongful activities, committed by all
individual, company, and corporate named Defendants by
acts of fraud, deceit, criminal theft, cyberfraud and
cybertheft, commercial theft, illegal transfer of property,
funds, income, and other valuable commercial assert [sic]
and additionally, breached the non-compete agreement as
set forth above.

See Complaint, Par. 135.

8. Thus, in sum and substance, Paragraph 135 states that “Plaintiffs are entitled

to monetary damages and a judgment . . . upon the grounds that the

Defendants . . . breached the non-compete agreement as set forth above.”

9. The clauses contained within the sentence mentioning fraud, deceit, criminal

theft, cyberfraud, etc. are all attendant circumstances that explain how the

breach is alleged to have taken place. They are not separate causes of action.

10. This is confirmed by the preceding allegations contained within the First

Cause of Action which all claim that there was an intent to steal Plaintiffs’

clients in violation of the non-compete agreement. The allegations preceding

Paragraph 135 of the Complaint in the First Cause of Action do not speak of

any fraud, deceit, criminal theft, cyberfraud and cybertheft, commercial theft,

illegal transfer of property, funds, income, and other valuable commercial

assets.

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11. Had Plaintiffs sought damages and judgment in the First Cause of Action for

fraud, deceit, etc., Plaintiffs had to clearly alleged sufficient facts with

particularity regarding the that fraud, deceit, etc.

12. Contrary to what Plaintiffs now claim, the First Cause of Action demands

damages for breach of an alleged non-compete agreement to which Canela #1

was never a party.

13. However, a party seeking to enforce an agreement bears the burden of proving

the existence of the agreement, its terms, and its validity. See Eden Temporary

Services, Inc. v House of Excellence, Inc. 270 A.D.2d 66, 704 N.Y.S.2d 239

(1st Dept 2000) (citing Paz v. Singer Co. , 151 A.D.2d 234, 235, 542

N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dept. 1989).

14. Here, while Plaintiffs have alleged that they entered into an agreement with

Defendant Alcide Mendoza, alias Joel Canela, a/k/a Joel Canela #2

(Complaint, Pars. 76 et seq.), Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they entered

into any agreement with Defendant Joel Canela #1.

Unsupported Characterization of the Allegations

15. Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss begin with

unsupported characterizations of the facts alleged in the Complaint. For

example, in Paragraph 3 of the Daltus Affr., Plaintiffs argue that Canela #1

“knowingly allowed the Defendant, Alcides Mendoza . . . to use the name

‘Joel Canela’ for purposes of falsely identifying himself to the public,

including to Plaintiffs, knowing that Canela #2 would use that identity to

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commit . . . fraud. . . .” (Emphasis added). Plaintiffs cite to Paragraphs 104

and 108 of the Complaint.

16. However, nothing contained in Paragraphs 1041 or 1082, or in the Complaint,

support the proposition that the alleged acts, even if true, were taken with the

purpose of having Alcides Mendoza falsely identify himself to the public, or

“knowing” that Alcides Mendoza would commit any wrongful act including

fraud, or theft.

17. However, there are no allegations whatsoever of facts related to the elements

of fraud, deceit, criminal theft, etc.

18. What is clear from the allegations in the Complaint is that Plaintiffs cannot

rely upon any claim of false identity because at all times Plaintiffs knew that

Alcides Mendoza was not Joel Canela.

19. As alleged by Plaintiffs, Alcides Mendoza started to use Joel Canela #1’s

identity while working for Plaintiffs. This is evident from Paragraph 104,

which states that “Alcides Mendoza . . . while employed by the Plaintiffs,

obtained permission from Defendant, Joel Canela #1 for his name to be used

as an alias and false identity for Defendant . . . .” (Emphasis added).

1
Paragraph 104 states that “Upon information and belief, the Defendant, Alcides Mendoza . . . while
employed by the Plaintiffs, obtained permission from Defendant, Joel Canela #1 for his name to be used as
an alias and false identity for Defendant, Alcides Mendoza in order to commit fraud, deceit, criminal theft,
cyber fraud and cybertheft . . . .”
2
Paragraph 108 simply states (also upon information and belief) that “Joel Canela #1, knowingly allowed
his name to be used as an alias and false identity by Joel Canela #2 in the commission of a fraud, deceit,
criminal theft, cyberfraud and cybertheft . . . .” (Emphasis added).

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20. Furthermore, Plaintiffs admit that at the time of “some of the events alleged

herein, the Defendant, Alcides Mendoza . . . was an employee” of the

Plaintiffs. (See Paragraphs 61, 62, and 63 of the Complaint).

21. The non-compete agreement was signed by Alcides Mendoza “[p]rior to

commencing and during his employment with Plaintiffs.” (Paragraph 76 of

the Complaint.).

22. Thus, prior to and during the terms of employment with Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs

knew that Alcides Mendoza was not Joel Canela #1. Yet, Plaintiffs permitted

Alcides Mendoza to work for Plaintiffs while using the name and/or identity

of Joel Canela #1.

23. In addition to Plaintiffs knowing that Alcides Mendoza was using Joel Canela

#1’s identity, nothing contained in the Complaint remotely suggests that the

alleged breach of the non-compete agreement resulted from Alcides

Mendoza’s use of Joel Canela #1’s identity or that Joel Canela #1 caused

Alcides Mendoza to breach the non-compete agreement.

Breach of Non-Compete Through Conspiratorial Activities

24. While Plaintiffs do not specifically state that Canela #1 breached the non-

compete agreement, in effect, by clumping everyone into the group of

“Defendants” in this case, Plaintiffs are attempting to claim that Canela #1

breached the non-compete agreement through the enumerated conspiratorial

activities.

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25. Plaintiffs also argue that the elements to establish a civil conspiracy have been

met and that, as such, the motion to dismiss must be denied. However,

Plaintiffs argument is not supported by the pleadings in the Complaint.

26. It is well settled that “New York does not recognize an independent cause of

action for conspiracy to commit a civil tort.” Abacus Federal Savings Bank v.

Lim, 75 A.D.3d 472, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (citing Romano v Romano, 2

AD3d 430, 432 [2003].

27. “Allegations of conspiracy are permitted only to connect the actions of

separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort." See Alexander

Alexander of New York, Inc. v. Fritzen, 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969 (N.Y. 1986)

(stating that “a mere conspiracy to commit a [tort] is never of itself a cause of

action”).

28. “Therefore, under New York law, to establish a claim of civil conspiracy, the

plaintiff ‘must demonstrate the primary tort, plus the following four elements:

(1) an agreement between two or more parties; (2) an overt act in furtherance

of the agreement; (3) the parties' intentional participation in the furtherance of

a plan or purpose; and (4) resulting damage or injury.’” Abacus, id at 474

(quoting World Wrestling Fedn. Entertainment, Inc. v Bozell, 142 F Supp 2d

514, 532 [SD NY 2001]).

29. Plaintiffs allege conspiratorial activities related to fraud, deceit, criminal theft,

and other activities. However, Plaintiffs have failed to allege with

particularity sufficient facts related to the primary tort (the alleged fraud,

deceit, criminal theft, and other related activities).

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30. Under Abacus, Id. at 474, Plaintiffs must demonstrate the primary tort in

addition to the four other elements. Here, Plaintiffs have not only failed to

state sufficient facts related to the four elements, but have also failed to allege

sufficient facts to state a cause of action for the primary torts.

31. For example, to state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege a material

misrepresentation of fact, knowledge of its falsity, an intent to induce reliance,

justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and damages. Eurycleia Partners, LP v.

Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 558 (2009). The allegations must be

stated with particularity to satisfy CPLR 3016(b). Id. Thus, the plaintiff must

provide sufficient facts to support a “reasonable inference” that the allegations

of fraud are true. Id. at 559-60. Conclusory allegations will not suffice. Id.

Neither will allegations based on information and belief. See Facebook, Inc. v.

DLA Piper LLP (US), 134 A.D.3d 610, 615 (1st Dept. 2015) (“Statements

made in pleadings upon information and belief are not sufficient to establish

the necessary quantum of proof to sustain allegations of fraud.”).

32. Plaintiffs have not only failed to allege the existence of a non-compete

agreement with Joel Canela #1, but they have also failed to allege sufficient

facts with particularity related to the purported fraud, deceit, criminal theft,

cyberfraud, cybertheft, commercial theft, illegal transfer of property, funds,

income, and other valuable commercial assets, and any related activities by

anyone, including Joel Canela #1.

33. Consequently, the First Cause of Action should be dismissed.

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Plaintiffs’ Reliance upon Adames v. Velasquez
and related cases is Misplaced

34. Plaintiffs allege that redress from the consequences of fraud may be had

against persons shown to have “aided and abetted” in its commission.

Plaintiff relies upon Adames v. Velasquez, 19 Misc. 3d 881, 889 (N.Y. Misc.

2008) to support such proposition. However, Adames v. Velasquez dealt with

a lab technician who is alleged to have performed dental services upon a

patient. The wife was the real dentist and she knew about the fact that

Velasquez was holding himself out as a dentist. Id. at

35. The Court in the case held that Adames had “adequately pleaded the elements

of a cause of action for fraud against defendant Velasquez by alleging that (1)

defendant Velasquez made material representations that were false or

concealed a material existing fact, (2) defendant Velasquez knew the

representations were false and made them with the intent to deceive the

plaintiff, (3) the plaintiff was deceived, (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on

the representations made by defendant Velasquez, and (5) the plaintiff was

injured as a result of the representations made by defendant Velasquez.” Id. at

890.

36. Furthermore, the Court held that “[p]ursuant to the doctrine of respondeat

superior, Adames has also adequately stated a cause of action for fraud against

[the wife] and the defendant businesses by alleging, inter alia, that defendant

Velasquez was their employee who held himself out as a dentist, with their

permission. If defendant Velasquez is found to have committed a fraud,

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liability could also attach to defendant Dr. Nino and the defendant

businesses.” Id. at 890 (N.Y. Misc. 2008).

37. This case did not hinge upon the issue of conspiracy or aiding and abetting,

but on the question of whether there was an employer-employee relationship

or a respondeat superior relationship.

38. Plaintiff has not alleged such respondeat superior relationship in this case as it

relates to Canela #1.

Plaintiffs Argument that Defendant Did not Deny the Allegation
That Canela #1 Permitted Canela #2 to falsely use his identity

39. Plaintiffs argue that “the Affidavit of Canela #1, submitted in support of the

within motion, makes no reference at all, and therefore no denial of the

allegation that Canela #1 permitted Canela #2 to falsely use his identity, the

identity of “Joel Canela,” and further, no reference at all, and therefore no

denial of the allegation that Canela #1 and Canela #2 acted knowingly as to

the tortious scheme alleged herein, and did aid and abet such by the high

impropriety of allowing Canela #2 to utilize false credentials and identity of

Canela #1 to effectuate same in the name of Canela #1. See Daltus Affr., Par.

21.

40. However, Plaintiffs completely ignored Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Joel

Canela, sworn to on May 1, 2019, which states that “I did not engage in the

activities that Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint and I did not receive any

benefit or expect any benefit from said alleged activities.”

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41. Thus, Mr. Canela denied having engaged in the activities alleged in the

Complaint, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions.

The Second Cause of Action should be Dismissed
Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)

42. In the Second Cause of Action, Plaintiffs seek damages and an injunction as

against Joel Canela #2, a/k/a Alcides Mendoza, d/b/a F1 Consulting Services

from breaching the restrictive covenant contained in the non-compete

agreement.

43. Although such injunction is not specifically sought against Joel Canela #1, in

the ad damnum clause, Plaintiffs do not distinguish between Joel Canela #2

and Joel Canela #1 in seeking damages and injunctive relief.

44. In their opposition papers, Plaintiffs concede that there is no injunctive relief

being sought against Defendant Canela #1. Plaintiffs state that “[a]s there is

no injunctive relief sought against Canela #1, there is nothing to dismiss

against him in Count II.” Daltus Affr., Par. 29.

45. Thus, the Second Cause of Action should be dismissed as it is not opposed by

Plaintiffs.

The Third Cause of Action should be Dismissed
Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)

46. The Third Cause Action seeks damages for losses that Plaintiffs claim they

suffered because Joel Canela #1 allowed Joel Canela #2 to commit felonious

acts of theft, larceny, fraud, cyber theft, cyber fraud, misrepresentation and

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deceit in violation of State of New York and Federal RICO Act laws, 18

U.S.C. Sec. 1961, et seq., including Sec. 1964(c).

Plaintiffs Unsupported Characterization

47. At the outset, in their opposition papers, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the

allegations in the Complaint. Plaintiffs incorrectly claim that “[i]n Count III,

it is then alleged that Canela #1’s intentional, voluntary, and knowing

permission, as granted to Canela #2 to use the identity of Canela #1, is in

violation of New York State and Federal [law] . . . and resulted in Plaintiff’s

losses. (Daltus Affr., Par. 4). In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite to

Paragraph 144 of the Complaint.

48. However, the preceding Paragraph 143 of the Complaint only alleges that Joel

Canela #1 allowed Joel Canela #2 to commit felonious acts of thef, larceny,

fraud, cybertheft, cyberfraud, misrepresentation and deceipt of the Plaintiffs

and Plaintiffs clients . . . ” and Paragraph 144 alleges that “[a]s a result of the

aforementioned violations by the Defendant, Joel Canela #1, of New York and

Federal Law, the Plaintiffs were caused to sustain losses of and to its property

and income.”

49. Nothing contained in Paragraphs 143 and 144 supports Plaintiffs’ argument of

intentional, voluntary and knowing permission.

50. Furthermore, Plaintiffs also claim that the “Complaint alleges that [Canela

#2], all while acting with the permission of Canela #1, falsely held himself out

to be a person named Joel Canela,” and whiles so doing, gained employment

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with Plaintiffs as ‘provider of sundry financial services.’” (Daltus Affr., Par.

5). In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite to Paragraph 72 of the

Complaint.

51. However, Paragraph 72 of the Complaint simply states that “[a]t the time of

some of the events alleged herein, the Defendant, Alcides Mendoza . . . was

employed by the Plaintiffs in the capacity of tax preparer-bookkeeper-

accountant and provider of sundry financial services.”

52. In fact, as argued above, Alcides Mendoza did not gain employment using the

Joel Canela alias, but instead using his own name of Alcides Mendoza.

Plaintiff alleged that it was while employed by Plaintiffs that Alcides

Mendoza obtained permission from Joel Canela #1 to use the name of Joel

Canela. (Complaint, Paragraph 104).

53. This means that Plaintiff cannot rely upon Alcides Mendoza’s use of Joel

Canela’s identity to claim fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, cyberfraud, etc.,

because Plaintiffs knew of such use of the identity.

54. As stated above, to state a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must allege a material

misrepresentation of fact, knowledge of its falsity, an intent to induce reliance,

justifiable reliance by the plaintiff and damages. Eurycleia Partners, LP v.

Seward & Kissel, LLP, 12 N.Y.3d 553, 558 (2009).

55. Plaintiff cannot claim that there was a misrepresentation, intent to induce

reliance, or justifiable reliance.

Plaintiffs Have Failed to Allege Sufficient Facts
to State a Claim Under RICO

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56. Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for

violation of any RICO laws.

57. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that:

(a) Calena #1

i. has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly,
ii. from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt;
iii. in which Canela #1 has participated as a principal
within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code,
iv. to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which
v. affect, interstate or foreign commerce. . . .

or that

(b) Canela #1

i. has through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt
j. acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control
k. of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which
l. affect interstate or foreign commerce.

or that

i. was employed by or associated with any enterprise
j. engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce,
k. to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs
l. through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt

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18 U.S.C. § 1962

58. As required by 18 U.S.C. 1961(1), which defines “racketeering activity,”

Plaintiffs have failed to alleged:

. . . (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or
listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;

(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery),
sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting),
section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if
the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section
664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit
transactions), section 1028 (relating to fraud and related
activity in connection with identification documents),
section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in
connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to
the transmission of gambling information), section 1341
(relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire
fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud),
section 1351 (relating to fraud in foreign labor contracting),
section 1425 (relating to the procurement of citizenship or
nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to the
reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers),
section 1427 (relating to the sale of naturalization or
citizenship papers), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene
matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice),
section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal
investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of
State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to
tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section
1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an
informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in
application and use of passport), section 1543 (relating to
forgery or false use of passport), section 1544 (relating to
misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to fraud and
misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections
1581-1592 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in

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persons).,So in original. sections 1831 and 1832 (relating to
economic espionage and theft of trade secrets), section
1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section
1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of
illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the
laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating
to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived
from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to
use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of
murder-for-hire), section 1960 (relating to illegal money
transmitters), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260
(relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312
and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to
interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2318
(relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for
phonorecords, computer programs or computer program
documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures
or other audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to
criminal infringement of a copyright), section 2319A
(relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in
sound recordings and music videos of live musical
performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in
goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321
(relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor
vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white
slave traffic), sections 175-178 (relating to biological
weapons), sections 229-229F (relating to chemical
weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear materials),

(C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States
Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments
and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating
to embezzlement from union funds),

(D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case
under title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title),
fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed
chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled

{3604/19-1008/00063372 /} 16

16 of 19
FILED: BRONX COUNTY CLERK 05/21/2019 09:44 PM INDEX NO. 20827/2019E
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 37

Case Info

Judge

Donald Miles Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

May 21, 2019

Case Filing Date

January 22, 2019

County

Parties

Alcides Mendoza alias JOEL CANELA a/k/a JOEL CANELA #2 Defendant
ARCADIO CONSULTING INC. Defendant
ATAX CLOUD BOOKKEEPING, INC. Plaintiff
ATAX FRANCHISE, INC. Plaintiff
ATAX NEW YORK, INC. Plaintiff
CODRINGTON, NIGEL REUBEN Attorney for the Defendants
F1 CONSULTING SERVICES, INC. Defendant
Fuld, Elliot H Attorney for the Defendants
GARCIA, WILLIAM A Attorney for the Defendants
Ingrid Lamarche Defendant
Joel Canela #1 Defendant
Joel Canela #2 a/k/a ALCIDES MENDOZA d/b/a F1 CONSULTING SERVICES Defendant
OROCHENA, JOSE XAVIER Attorney for the Defendants
SCHWARTZBERG, RAYMOND B Attorney for the Plaintiff
Sterling Mateo Defendant
Walber Lugo Defendant

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