Preview
2014-1-CV-275135
Santa Clara — Civil
CHRISTOPHER J. D’ANJOU, State Bar No. 234299
D’ANJOU LAW OFFICE
1625 The Alameda, Suite 310
San Jose, CA 95126
Telephone: (408) 291-5401
Fax: (408) 291-5302
Email: danjoulaw@gmail.com
Attorneys For Defendants/Cross-Defendants
A. Flot
Electronically Filed
by Superior Court of CA,
County of Santa Clara,
on 7/27/2020 5:33 PM
Reviewed By: A. Floresca
Case #2014-1-CV-275135
Envelope: 4666963
NIAZ BAIG, VILLA DEVELOPER, INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS AND INVESTMENT, LLC
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
MINA SHAHKARAML individually and as
trustee of The 2011 MINA SHAHKARAMI
REVOCABLE TRUST, dated September 16,
2011,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NIAZ BAIG, individually and d.b.a VILLA
DEVELOPER, INC. and d.b.a VILLA
DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLC;
VILLA DEVELOPER, INC.; VILLA
DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLC,
and DOES 1| through 25 inclusive,
Defendants.
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case)
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case)
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA
DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS
& INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Hearing Date: August 7, 2020
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 16
Judge: Hon. William Monahan
Complaint Filing Date: December 31, 2014
Trial Date: July 15, 2019
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants NIAZ BAIG, VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS &
INVESTMENT, LLC (“Defendants”) hereby submit the following points and authorities in support of
their opposition to Plaintiffs MINA SHAHKARAMIL, et al.’s (“Plaintiffs”) request for attorney fees.
a
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case
fescaAs detailed below, Plaintiff's request for a total $828,034.02 in attorney’s fees and costs is
unreasonable. The Court should use its discretion and either disallow any award, or substantially
reduce it. As to the costs Plaintiffs seek, they should not even be considered.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Even If Attorney’s Fees Are Allowed, The Amount Requested Is Unreasonable.
1. The Court Has Wide Discretion On The Amount of Fees Awarded.
It is well established that the amount of attorney’s fees lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court. “The trial court has wide latitude in determining the amount of an award of attorney’s fees.
The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional service rendered in [their]
court’” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)
In the present case, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of attorneys fees pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 1780(e) from the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7160; and
Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., § 1029.8(a). Defendants do not dispute that an award of attorneys fees is
available under these various statutes. However, the statutes vary in their language on whether fees
are mandatory or discretionary.
For example, under Cal. Civ. Code, § 1780(e), “[t]he court shall award court costs and
attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to this section.” In contrast, Cal.
Code of Civ. Proc., § 1029.8(a) is discretionary as “[t]he court may, in its discretion, award all costs
and attorney’s fees to the injured person if that person prevails in the action.” Similarly ; Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 7160, is a discretionary statute as “[a]ny person who is induced to contract for a work
of improvement....in reliance on false or fraudulent representations or false statements knowingly
made, may sue and recover from such contractor or solicitor a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500),
plus reasonable attorney’s fees.” (emphasis supplied).
De
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case2. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To “Full Compensation” Under the CLRA.
Plaintiffs seek “full compensation” of attorneys fees under the CLRA, but must concede that
not all of their efforts in litigation were directed towards that claim. In support of their claim,
Plaintiff cite various reasons to justify their large ask - however, those reasons do not hold water.
First, Plaintiffs oversell the “complexity” of this litigation (See Declaration of Michael
Brooks Carroll “MBC Decl.” §§ 22, 29, 30.) The central dispute between these specific parties is
whether the Defendants actually ever served as “contractors”. Defendants admitted at all times that
they were never contractors. The issue centered on whether any services provided to Plaintiffs by
defendant qualified as contractor services. While Plaintiff ultimately succeeded in her claims, it does
not lead to the conclusion that Defendants “fraudulently maintained” their vigorous defense to such
claims. Factual disputes are inherent in litigation, and this dispute does not rise to the level
“complex”.
Plaintiffs point to the fact that this case went on for five years. However, this was a result of
multiple acts by the Plaintiffs or jointly by the parties.
Plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit against the “contractor” Jesus Juarez and his entity Icons
Innovation, Inc. after her first failed Motion For Summary Adjudication. Although Plaintiff was
clearly aware of these “Defendants” (See MBC Decl. Entry on 6/4/2014) she never brought them
into the initial lawsuit. This in turn caused Defendants to file a Motion to Consolidate, which in turn
delayed the trial proceedings and brought more parties and attorneys into the matter. This caused
Plaintiff to be deposed again, and subjected her to additional discovery requests.
As the Court can easily see through the registry of actions, the trial was continued at the
behest of all parties multiple times for reasons that amounted to “good cause”. In one instance, it was
the sickness and unavailability of Plaintiffs’ own experts. In another instance, counsel for Mr. Juarez
ae
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Casewas welcoming a newborn. In another instance, both defense counsel were set for trial that had
statutory priority. These events were no fault of the parties involved, and it does not justify the
extremely high and unreasonable fee. As counsel points out, he was prepared for trial four times, so it
should have been less time, not more each time we got closer to trial.
Additionally, Plaintiffs brought two motions for summary judgment/adjudication, which
failed because Plaintiffs never met their burden in each. As the Court succinctly pointed out in the
first adjudication motion, Plaintiff submitted her own declaration that stated in conclusory fashion
that defendants provided “construction contractor services”. The motion was against Defendants
Niaz Baig and Villa Developer, Inc., but the contract at issue clearly stated that Villa Developers and
Investment, LLC was the “builder” and Baig as “Project Manager”. Plaintiff failed to provide
evidence of the relationship between Defendants and no evidence or explanation of why the motion
was brought against Niaz Baig and Villa Developer, Inc. when VDI, LLC was identified by the
contract as the builder.' It was Plaintiffs failure to meet their burden which resulted in the motion
being denied - not the “fraudulent maintenance” of a vigorous defense.
Plaintiff took another bite at the apple with a second summary adjudication/judgment motion,
which was also denied. As these Defendants and the court pointed out in the May 4, 2018 order,
Plaintiff did not establish new discovered fact or circumstances or a change of law in violation of Cal.
Code of Civ. Proc., 437c(f)(2). Furthermore, despite over 450 pages of evidence, Plaintiffs did not
meet the burden of establishing a joint venture. Because the time records of Plaintiff's counsel are
lumped together with all by tasks date (as opposed to each identifiable task delineated by time and
date), it is difficult to ascertain the actual hours spent on the second summary judgment/adjudication
* The Court may take judicial notice of its own records pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code, § 452(d)(1), and Defendants request
that the court take such notice of the Registry of Actions in the Lead Matter and the consolidate matter.
a
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Casemotion. It appears though that Plaintiff spent over 35 hours or well over $16,000.00 on a motion to
nowhere. Again, Defendants did not create this situation through “fraudulent maintenance”. Plaintiffs
made the choice to bring a second motion without vigorously vetting its value.
The length of trial was also a product of Plaintiffs as the court made it clear that Plaintiffs
took way longer in the presentation of evidence, motions and argument than the Defense.
As detailed further below, the value of services stated relative to work performed is overstated
and unreasonable.
Thus, even if an award of fees is available, “full compensation” should not be allowed.
3. The Attorney’s Fee Sought Are Unreasonable.
Although entitlement to an award may be satisfied, the court must also be satisfied that the
fees requested are appropriate and reasonable.
In making this determination, the court will start with lodestar, which is the “number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000)
22 Cal.4th 1084.) Based on consideration of various factors, the “lodestar figure” may be adjusted so
“to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (PLCM, supra 22 Cal.4th 1084.)
Overall, “lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community.” (Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
The lodestar figure may be adjusted up or down based on factors including 1) the novelty and
difficulty of the litigation and questions involved, 2) the skill displayed in presenting them, 3) the
extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, 4) the
contingent nature of the fee award. (Serrano, supra 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) The purpose of the
adjustment is to fix a fee at fair market value for the particular action.” (Ketchum, supra 24 Cal. 4th at
1132.)
ase
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseThe party seeking fee must present evidence of the time spent and the hourly rate of each
attorney. The party seeking the fees has the “burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable,
were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Levy
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) Prevailing parties must prove the
hours they sought are reasonable and necessary (E/ Escorial Owners’ Assn v. DLC Plastering, Inc.
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337.)
Applying the foregoing factors to the Plaintiffs request for attorney fees, it is not a stretch of
the imagination to conclude that the fees sought in this case are unreasonable. As case law instructs,
the purpose of lodestar is to ensure the value of fees sought was appropriate and reasonable.
First, this case does not present novel questions, nor was it so complex as to justify the
amount of time expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel. In paragraph 13, of the MBC Decl., counsel asserts
in conclusory fashion that “all of such 1845.45 hours were reasonably incurred and diligently
necessary”. Counsel provides his CV which shows his substantial background in this area of law.
While counsel’s lengthy experience and tenure as a lawyer may justify his hourly rate, it does not
justify the inordinate amount of time spent on many of the items of litigation. As such, the reasonable
inference from counsel’s substantial experience is that the instant matter should take less time, not
more.
Up to the filing of the complaint, counsel had already expended 30.9 hours or $13,905.00.
While there is an an element of investigation and review, the issues were not novel or complex, such
that that amount of time was necessary and appropriate. Given counsel’s extensive experience in
construction defects and the CLRA, the drafting of a demand and complaint should not have been a
significant time burden.
oe
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseAs detailed above, counsel spent significant time on two summary adjudication/judgment
motions, neither of which Plaintiffs met their initial burden. Plaintiffs certainly have the right to bring
a dispositive motion. However, Plaintiffs should not be rewarded where they did not meet their
burden. This is especially true for the second summary adjudication/judgment motion where it was
brought in violation of Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., 437c(f)(2). It can be inferred from the grounds for
denial of the motion that there was little to any value in bringing the second dispositive motion
without proper vetting or diligence. As such, the fees incurred were neither appropriate or reasonable.
Plaintiff asserts that their high fee is justified because these Defendants brought “several
unsuccessful, but potentially dispositive and expensive motions predicated on their false assertions
they were not required to to be licensed and that the CLRA did not apply (see, e.g. Defendants;
denied 6/3/15 Motion For Judgment on Pleadings”) (See MBD Decl, p. 8, lines 13-15). Defendants
brought one dispositive Motion For Judgment on Pleadings on the issue of whether the CLRA
covered an “entirely new house”. The motion would have struck one cause of action. It was an
appropriate challenge as part of a vigorous defense, and was not substantially time consuming.
Defendants did not bring several dispositive motions.
Defendants sent basic discovery requests, including Special Interrogatories, Requests For
Production and Requests For Admission. The vast majority of of the Interrogatories were contention
interrogatories directed specifically to the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiffs overstate the
voluminous nature of the requests, and said requests were necessary to obtain any kind of factual
basis for the unverified allegations of the complaint.
Defendants deposed the Plaintiff one time. Plaintiff was deposed by Mr. Juarez’s counsel one
time.
ae
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseDefendants had to depose multiple expert witnesses based on Plaintiffs’ disclosures and the
scarce availability of Plaintiffs’ experts.
Whereas nobody can dispute that the trial took six weeks to complete, it should not have taken
that long. As the Court noted, Plaintiffs took substantially longer to present their case than
Defendants. The unofficial tally of questions from jurors clearly went to the Plaintiffs.
Cumulatively, Plaintiffs overstate and exaggerate the amount of reasonable attorney time that
was necessary to prosecute their matter. For these reasons, the reasonable attorney time should be
substantially reduced, or even disregarded.
4, Counsel’s “Block Billing” Is Vague and Should Be Disregarded.
Additionally, counsel’s billing records are vague because it is difficult to ascertain the actual
amount time spent on different activities because they are not delineated. On the billing records, each
date has a block of time corresponding to a wide range of activities. It is therefore unclear how much
time counsel actually spent on reasonable attorney work for a significant portion of the entries.
Although no specific level of detail in the supporting evidence is required, declarations setting
forth block billing and general descriptions of work might be deemed insufficient by the court.
(Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2007) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242; See Also Christian Research
Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315 (“vague billing entries and block billing held
insufficient to substantiate award”. ) Where a lawyer handles several disparate tasks in the same day
and bills one block of time to all of them, some cases indicate that this disguises non-compensable
tasks. (See, e.g., Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000), 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687-689.) Other
judges and arbitrators consider the use of block billing a patent violation of the requirement that the
bills “clearly state the basis thereof,” enabling the client to void the fee agreement and put the burden
of proving the reasonableness of the fees on the attorney months, if not years, after the tasks were
aa
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Caseperformed. This court should exercise the same type of scrutiny fee arbitrators do to counsel’s
billings. Plaintiffs have not established the reasonableness of their billing entries because of the
extensive use of “block billing”.
Block billing, the practice of “assigning one time charge to multiple tasks,” can also result in
reduction of fees recoverable because it can inflate the actual time the lawyer takes to complete the
tasks. (See Arbitration Advisory 2016-02 cited in December, 2016 MCLE Self Study, The State Bar
of California). Accordingly, both courts and arbitrators can scrutinize block-billed entries, place the
burden on the lawyer regarding such entries, or even disregard them entirely. In Christian Research
Institute, the court found that block billing, “while not objectionable per se in our view, it exacerbated
the vagueness of counsel’s fee request.” The same problems are present in counsel’s billing records.
At first blush, it is very easy to see that counsel block billed phone calls, checking the court website,
legal research and drafting all in one block. Courts also recognize that many lawyers simultaneously
perform administrative, ministerial and secretarial tasks while representing a client. Operating a law
practice requires substantial efforts on the part of the lawyers wholly unrelated to representing clients.
This includes dozens of administrative, managerial and ministerial tasks lawyers must perform every
day. In the vast majority of cases, it is inappropriate to seek to charge a client for such non-legal
tasks.” (See Arbitration Advisory 2016-02, cited in December, 2016 MCLE Self Study, The State Bar
of California.) The court should strike any and all entries where counsel engaged in these ministerial
tasks such checking the website, calendaring checking billing records and so forth. The fact that these
entries are lumped or blocked with other entries where attorney work may have been performed
increases the vagueness of the fee request and decreases the reasonableness of the amount sought.
For these reasons, a significant portion of the fees sought should be stricken.
5. The Costs Sought Under Section 1029.5 Are Vague and Unreasonable.
oe
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseCal. Code of Civ. Proc., §1029.8(a) states:
“Any unlicensed person who causes injury or damage to another person as a result of
providing goods or performing services for which a license is required under Division 2
(commencing with Section 500 ) or any initiative act referred to therein, Division 3
(commencing with Section 5000), or Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 18600) or Chapter
3 (commencing with Section 19000 ) of Division 8, of the Business and Professions Code, or
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 25210) or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 25230)
of Part 3 of Division 1 of Title 4 of the Corporations Code , shall be liable to the injured
person for treble the amount of damages assessed in a civil action in any court having proper
jurisdiction. The court may, in its discretion, award all costs and attorney's fees to the injured
person if that person prevails in the action.”
The statute does not define what “costs” are. Plaintiff interpret this to mean all costs not
covered section 1033.5 (which she already covered), but for which Plaintiff was contractually
obligated her attorney for. However, Defendants submit that the “costs” provision was not intended to
be a catch-all for any and all costs under the sun.
“The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers
so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by
examining the language of the statute. [Citations.] But ‘[i]t is a settled principle of statutory
interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result
in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.' [Citations.] Thus, ‘[t]he intent prevails
over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.’
[Citation.] Finally, we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute with
teference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and
retain effectiveness.' [Citation.]” (See Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 [87
Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927] (Horwich).)
Here the term “costs” is not fully defined. However, a few statutes later, the Legislature has
defined types of allowable costs (See e.g. Cal Code of Civ. Proc, §§ 1032-1034.) Following
102
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CasePlaintiffs’ interpretation would lead to absurd results. Because of the ambiguity, the term needs to be
harmonized with the rest of the statutory scheme.
Fortunately, Section 1033.5 lists certain allowable costs (in subdivision (a)) and certain
excluded costs (in subdivision (b)); it also gives the trial court discretion (in subdivision (c)(4)) to
allow or deny any other costs that are not specifically enumerated in either subdivision (a) or
subdivision (b). (E7 Dorado Meat Co. v. Yosemite Meat & Locker Serv., Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
612, 616; Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) Even if
a cost is potentially allowable under section 1033.5, it does not become automatically recoverable in
whatever amount a prevailing party demands. To the contrary, there are two additional limitations on
any request for costs, which serve to protect against a prevailing party’s abusive demands for
unnecessary costs.First, “[allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the
litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5 ,
subd. (c)(2); see Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 743.) Second, “[allowable costs
shall be reasonable in amount.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(3); see Jn re Ins. Installment
Fee Cases (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1431, fn. 24.) The Court thus must disallow any costs (even
those “allowable as a matter of right”) that are not “reasonably necessary” and must also reduce the
amount of any allowed costs to that which is “reasonable.” (Perko ’s Enters., Inc. v. RRNS Enters.
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244-245.) It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to
harmonize the “costs” in section 1029.8 with the available “costs” provided in the neighboring
statutes. If the Legislature intended to expand the availability of costs under section 1029.8, it would
have explicitly said so. For these reasons, counsel should not be able to expand the amount of costs
beyond what was already ordered. If Plaintiffs sought to obtain costs not specifically enumerated,
ae
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Casethey could have done so in their costs memorandum. Plaintiffs seek another bite at the apple without
vetting the claims.
Beyond the limitations described above, Plaintiffs’ cost claims are patently unreasonable and
vague. Counsel seeks $39,126.52 in extra costs, which consists of $13,572.00 in “word processing
costs”; $9,671.55 in copy/fax/postage charges; travel costs of $2091.70; overnight lodging of
$2,399.65 and research of $5,470.00. Counsel makes no attempt to define or explain what “work
processing costs” are. Charging a client for the attorney to use a computer is patently unreasonable.
Plaintiffs do not provide any invoices, receipts or otherwise to justify the rest of the other claimed
costs. The Court should be extremely wary of the claimed costs and should deny them in full.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court deny an award of attorney fees. If
the Court allows a fee award, it should be substantially reduced. Any and all costs claimed by
Plaintiffs should be denied.
Dated: July 27, 2020
Respectfully Submitted,
D’A LAW OFFICE
Christopher J- jou
Attorneys for Defendants/X-Defendants
NIAZ BAIG, VILLA DEVELOPER, INC.
VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLC
ae
DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CasePROOF OF SERVICE
SHAHKARAM1 y. N. BAIG, et al.
Santa Clara County Superior Court
Lead Case No.: 114CV275135/Consolidated Case No. 116CV295125
I, CHRISTOPHER D’ ANJOU, hereby declare under penalty of perjury:
Tam over the age of eighteen and not a party to this action. My business address is:
D’ANJOU LAW OFFICE
1625 The Alameda, Suite 310
San Jose, CA 95126
On July 27, 2020, I served a copy of the accompanying document(s) described herein, to the
recipients stated below.
DOCUMENTS
1. DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS &
INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
RECIPIENTS
Michael Carroll, Esq.
Law Offices of Michael Brooks Carroll
3919 Happy Valley Rd.
Lafayette, CA 94549
carroll law@sbcglobal.net
The method of service was as follows:
By personal service to the address(es) listed above.
By placing a copy of the document described above for deposit with the United States
Postal Service, in a sealed envelope, with postage prepaid, for collection and mailing
on the same date following ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the
business practice of processing correspondence for mailing with the United States
Postal Service.
By emailing to the address(es) listed above.
By faxing to the fax number(s) listed above.
ae
PROOF OF SERVICE
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case)
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case)Dated: July 27, 2020
Christopher J. D’Anjou
72-
PROOF OF SERVICE
Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case)
Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case)
Preview
2014-1-CV-275135 Santa Clara — Civil CHRISTOPHER J. D’ANJOU, State Bar No. 234299 D’ANJOU LAW OFFICE 1625 The Alameda, Suite 310 San Jose, CA 95126 Telephone: (408) 291-5401 Fax: (408) 291-5302 Email: danjoulaw@gmail.com Attorneys For Defendants/Cross-Defendants A. Flot Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 7/27/2020 5:33 PM Reviewed By: A. Floresca Case #2014-1-CV-275135 Envelope: 4666963 NIAZ BAIG, VILLA DEVELOPER, INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS AND INVESTMENT, LLC SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINA SHAHKARAML individually and as trustee of The 2011 MINA SHAHKARAMI REVOCABLE TRUST, dated September 16, 2011, Plaintiff, vs. NIAZ BAIG, individually and d.b.a VILLA DEVELOPER, INC. and d.b.a VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLC; VILLA DEVELOPER, INC.; VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLC, and DOES 1| through 25 inclusive, Defendants. AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case) Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case) DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Hearing Date: August 7, 2020 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: 16 Judge: Hon. William Monahan Complaint Filing Date: December 31, 2014 Trial Date: July 15, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION Defendants NIAZ BAIG, VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLC (“Defendants”) hereby submit the following points and authorities in support of their opposition to Plaintiffs MINA SHAHKARAMIL, et al.’s (“Plaintiffs”) request for attorney fees. a DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case fescaAs detailed below, Plaintiff's request for a total $828,034.02 in attorney’s fees and costs is unreasonable. The Court should use its discretion and either disallow any award, or substantially reduce it. As to the costs Plaintiffs seek, they should not even be considered. II. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Even If Attorney’s Fees Are Allowed, The Amount Requested Is Unreasonable. 1. The Court Has Wide Discretion On The Amount of Fees Awarded. It is well established that the amount of attorney’s fees lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. “The trial court has wide latitude in determining the amount of an award of attorney’s fees. The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional service rendered in [their] court’” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) In the present case, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of attorneys fees pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code, § 1780(e) from the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7160; and Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., § 1029.8(a). Defendants do not dispute that an award of attorneys fees is available under these various statutes. However, the statutes vary in their language on whether fees are mandatory or discretionary. For example, under Cal. Civ. Code, § 1780(e), “[t]he court shall award court costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to this section.” In contrast, Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., § 1029.8(a) is discretionary as “[t]he court may, in its discretion, award all costs and attorney’s fees to the injured person if that person prevails in the action.” Similarly ; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7160, is a discretionary statute as “[a]ny person who is induced to contract for a work of improvement....in reliance on false or fraudulent representations or false statements knowingly made, may sue and recover from such contractor or solicitor a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500), plus reasonable attorney’s fees.” (emphasis supplied). De DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case2. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To “Full Compensation” Under the CLRA. Plaintiffs seek “full compensation” of attorneys fees under the CLRA, but must concede that not all of their efforts in litigation were directed towards that claim. In support of their claim, Plaintiff cite various reasons to justify their large ask - however, those reasons do not hold water. First, Plaintiffs oversell the “complexity” of this litigation (See Declaration of Michael Brooks Carroll “MBC Decl.” §§ 22, 29, 30.) The central dispute between these specific parties is whether the Defendants actually ever served as “contractors”. Defendants admitted at all times that they were never contractors. The issue centered on whether any services provided to Plaintiffs by defendant qualified as contractor services. While Plaintiff ultimately succeeded in her claims, it does not lead to the conclusion that Defendants “fraudulently maintained” their vigorous defense to such claims. Factual disputes are inherent in litigation, and this dispute does not rise to the level “complex”. Plaintiffs point to the fact that this case went on for five years. However, this was a result of multiple acts by the Plaintiffs or jointly by the parties. Plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit against the “contractor” Jesus Juarez and his entity Icons Innovation, Inc. after her first failed Motion For Summary Adjudication. Although Plaintiff was clearly aware of these “Defendants” (See MBC Decl. Entry on 6/4/2014) she never brought them into the initial lawsuit. This in turn caused Defendants to file a Motion to Consolidate, which in turn delayed the trial proceedings and brought more parties and attorneys into the matter. This caused Plaintiff to be deposed again, and subjected her to additional discovery requests. As the Court can easily see through the registry of actions, the trial was continued at the behest of all parties multiple times for reasons that amounted to “good cause”. In one instance, it was the sickness and unavailability of Plaintiffs’ own experts. In another instance, counsel for Mr. Juarez ae DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Casewas welcoming a newborn. In another instance, both defense counsel were set for trial that had statutory priority. These events were no fault of the parties involved, and it does not justify the extremely high and unreasonable fee. As counsel points out, he was prepared for trial four times, so it should have been less time, not more each time we got closer to trial. Additionally, Plaintiffs brought two motions for summary judgment/adjudication, which failed because Plaintiffs never met their burden in each. As the Court succinctly pointed out in the first adjudication motion, Plaintiff submitted her own declaration that stated in conclusory fashion that defendants provided “construction contractor services”. The motion was against Defendants Niaz Baig and Villa Developer, Inc., but the contract at issue clearly stated that Villa Developers and Investment, LLC was the “builder” and Baig as “Project Manager”. Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the relationship between Defendants and no evidence or explanation of why the motion was brought against Niaz Baig and Villa Developer, Inc. when VDI, LLC was identified by the contract as the builder.' It was Plaintiffs failure to meet their burden which resulted in the motion being denied - not the “fraudulent maintenance” of a vigorous defense. Plaintiff took another bite at the apple with a second summary adjudication/judgment motion, which was also denied. As these Defendants and the court pointed out in the May 4, 2018 order, Plaintiff did not establish new discovered fact or circumstances or a change of law in violation of Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., 437c(f)(2). Furthermore, despite over 450 pages of evidence, Plaintiffs did not meet the burden of establishing a joint venture. Because the time records of Plaintiff's counsel are lumped together with all by tasks date (as opposed to each identifiable task delineated by time and date), it is difficult to ascertain the actual hours spent on the second summary judgment/adjudication * The Court may take judicial notice of its own records pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code, § 452(d)(1), and Defendants request that the court take such notice of the Registry of Actions in the Lead Matter and the consolidate matter. a DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Casemotion. It appears though that Plaintiff spent over 35 hours or well over $16,000.00 on a motion to nowhere. Again, Defendants did not create this situation through “fraudulent maintenance”. Plaintiffs made the choice to bring a second motion without vigorously vetting its value. The length of trial was also a product of Plaintiffs as the court made it clear that Plaintiffs took way longer in the presentation of evidence, motions and argument than the Defense. As detailed further below, the value of services stated relative to work performed is overstated and unreasonable. Thus, even if an award of fees is available, “full compensation” should not be allowed. 3. The Attorney’s Fee Sought Are Unreasonable. Although entitlement to an award may be satisfied, the court must also be satisfied that the fees requested are appropriate and reasonable. In making this determination, the court will start with lodestar, which is the “number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084.) Based on consideration of various factors, the “lodestar figure” may be adjusted so “to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (PLCM, supra 22 Cal.4th 1084.) Overall, “lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) The lodestar figure may be adjusted up or down based on factors including 1) the novelty and difficulty of the litigation and questions involved, 2) the skill displayed in presenting them, 3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, 4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Serrano, supra 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) The purpose of the adjustment is to fix a fee at fair market value for the particular action.” (Ketchum, supra 24 Cal. 4th at 1132.) ase DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseThe party seeking fee must present evidence of the time spent and the hourly rate of each attorney. The party seeking the fees has the “burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Levy Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) Prevailing parties must prove the hours they sought are reasonable and necessary (E/ Escorial Owners’ Assn v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337.) Applying the foregoing factors to the Plaintiffs request for attorney fees, it is not a stretch of the imagination to conclude that the fees sought in this case are unreasonable. As case law instructs, the purpose of lodestar is to ensure the value of fees sought was appropriate and reasonable. First, this case does not present novel questions, nor was it so complex as to justify the amount of time expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel. In paragraph 13, of the MBC Decl., counsel asserts in conclusory fashion that “all of such 1845.45 hours were reasonably incurred and diligently necessary”. Counsel provides his CV which shows his substantial background in this area of law. While counsel’s lengthy experience and tenure as a lawyer may justify his hourly rate, it does not justify the inordinate amount of time spent on many of the items of litigation. As such, the reasonable inference from counsel’s substantial experience is that the instant matter should take less time, not more. Up to the filing of the complaint, counsel had already expended 30.9 hours or $13,905.00. While there is an an element of investigation and review, the issues were not novel or complex, such that that amount of time was necessary and appropriate. Given counsel’s extensive experience in construction defects and the CLRA, the drafting of a demand and complaint should not have been a significant time burden. oe DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseAs detailed above, counsel spent significant time on two summary adjudication/judgment motions, neither of which Plaintiffs met their initial burden. Plaintiffs certainly have the right to bring a dispositive motion. However, Plaintiffs should not be rewarded where they did not meet their burden. This is especially true for the second summary adjudication/judgment motion where it was brought in violation of Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., 437c(f)(2). It can be inferred from the grounds for denial of the motion that there was little to any value in bringing the second dispositive motion without proper vetting or diligence. As such, the fees incurred were neither appropriate or reasonable. Plaintiff asserts that their high fee is justified because these Defendants brought “several unsuccessful, but potentially dispositive and expensive motions predicated on their false assertions they were not required to to be licensed and that the CLRA did not apply (see, e.g. Defendants; denied 6/3/15 Motion For Judgment on Pleadings”) (See MBD Decl, p. 8, lines 13-15). Defendants brought one dispositive Motion For Judgment on Pleadings on the issue of whether the CLRA covered an “entirely new house”. The motion would have struck one cause of action. It was an appropriate challenge as part of a vigorous defense, and was not substantially time consuming. Defendants did not bring several dispositive motions. Defendants sent basic discovery requests, including Special Interrogatories, Requests For Production and Requests For Admission. The vast majority of of the Interrogatories were contention interrogatories directed specifically to the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiffs overstate the voluminous nature of the requests, and said requests were necessary to obtain any kind of factual basis for the unverified allegations of the complaint. Defendants deposed the Plaintiff one time. Plaintiff was deposed by Mr. Juarez’s counsel one time. ae DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseDefendants had to depose multiple expert witnesses based on Plaintiffs’ disclosures and the scarce availability of Plaintiffs’ experts. Whereas nobody can dispute that the trial took six weeks to complete, it should not have taken that long. As the Court noted, Plaintiffs took substantially longer to present their case than Defendants. The unofficial tally of questions from jurors clearly went to the Plaintiffs. Cumulatively, Plaintiffs overstate and exaggerate the amount of reasonable attorney time that was necessary to prosecute their matter. For these reasons, the reasonable attorney time should be substantially reduced, or even disregarded. 4, Counsel’s “Block Billing” Is Vague and Should Be Disregarded. Additionally, counsel’s billing records are vague because it is difficult to ascertain the actual amount time spent on different activities because they are not delineated. On the billing records, each date has a block of time corresponding to a wide range of activities. It is therefore unclear how much time counsel actually spent on reasonable attorney work for a significant portion of the entries. Although no specific level of detail in the supporting evidence is required, declarations setting forth block billing and general descriptions of work might be deemed insufficient by the court. (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2007) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242; See Also Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315 (“vague billing entries and block billing held insufficient to substantiate award”. ) Where a lawyer handles several disparate tasks in the same day and bills one block of time to all of them, some cases indicate that this disguises non-compensable tasks. (See, e.g., Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000), 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 687-689.) Other judges and arbitrators consider the use of block billing a patent violation of the requirement that the bills “clearly state the basis thereof,” enabling the client to void the fee agreement and put the burden of proving the reasonableness of the fees on the attorney months, if not years, after the tasks were aa DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Caseperformed. This court should exercise the same type of scrutiny fee arbitrators do to counsel’s billings. Plaintiffs have not established the reasonableness of their billing entries because of the extensive use of “block billing”. Block billing, the practice of “assigning one time charge to multiple tasks,” can also result in reduction of fees recoverable because it can inflate the actual time the lawyer takes to complete the tasks. (See Arbitration Advisory 2016-02 cited in December, 2016 MCLE Self Study, The State Bar of California). Accordingly, both courts and arbitrators can scrutinize block-billed entries, place the burden on the lawyer regarding such entries, or even disregard them entirely. In Christian Research Institute, the court found that block billing, “while not objectionable per se in our view, it exacerbated the vagueness of counsel’s fee request.” The same problems are present in counsel’s billing records. At first blush, it is very easy to see that counsel block billed phone calls, checking the court website, legal research and drafting all in one block. Courts also recognize that many lawyers simultaneously perform administrative, ministerial and secretarial tasks while representing a client. Operating a law practice requires substantial efforts on the part of the lawyers wholly unrelated to representing clients. This includes dozens of administrative, managerial and ministerial tasks lawyers must perform every day. In the vast majority of cases, it is inappropriate to seek to charge a client for such non-legal tasks.” (See Arbitration Advisory 2016-02, cited in December, 2016 MCLE Self Study, The State Bar of California.) The court should strike any and all entries where counsel engaged in these ministerial tasks such checking the website, calendaring checking billing records and so forth. The fact that these entries are lumped or blocked with other entries where attorney work may have been performed increases the vagueness of the fee request and decreases the reasonableness of the amount sought. For these reasons, a significant portion of the fees sought should be stricken. 5. The Costs Sought Under Section 1029.5 Are Vague and Unreasonable. oe DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CaseCal. Code of Civ. Proc., §1029.8(a) states: “Any unlicensed person who causes injury or damage to another person as a result of providing goods or performing services for which a license is required under Division 2 (commencing with Section 500 ) or any initiative act referred to therein, Division 3 (commencing with Section 5000), or Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 18600) or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 19000 ) of Division 8, of the Business and Professions Code, or Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 25210) or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 25230) of Part 3 of Division 1 of Title 4 of the Corporations Code , shall be liable to the injured person for treble the amount of damages assessed in a civil action in any court having proper jurisdiction. The court may, in its discretion, award all costs and attorney's fees to the injured person if that person prevails in the action.” The statute does not define what “costs” are. Plaintiff interpret this to mean all costs not covered section 1033.5 (which she already covered), but for which Plaintiff was contractually obligated her attorney for. However, Defendants submit that the “costs” provision was not intended to be a catch-all for any and all costs under the sun. “The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.] But ‘[i]t is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.' [Citations.] Thus, ‘[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.’ [Citation.] Finally, we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute with teference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.' [Citation.]” (See Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927] (Horwich).) Here the term “costs” is not fully defined. However, a few statutes later, the Legislature has defined types of allowable costs (See e.g. Cal Code of Civ. Proc, §§ 1032-1034.) Following 102 DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CasePlaintiffs’ interpretation would lead to absurd results. Because of the ambiguity, the term needs to be harmonized with the rest of the statutory scheme. Fortunately, Section 1033.5 lists certain allowable costs (in subdivision (a)) and certain excluded costs (in subdivision (b)); it also gives the trial court discretion (in subdivision (c)(4)) to allow or deny any other costs that are not specifically enumerated in either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b). (E7 Dorado Meat Co. v. Yosemite Meat & Locker Serv., Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 612, 616; Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) Even if a cost is potentially allowable under section 1033.5, it does not become automatically recoverable in whatever amount a prevailing party demands. To the contrary, there are two additional limitations on any request for costs, which serve to protect against a prevailing party’s abusive demands for unnecessary costs.First, “[allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5 , subd. (c)(2); see Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 730, 743.) Second, “[allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(3); see Jn re Ins. Installment Fee Cases (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1431, fn. 24.) The Court thus must disallow any costs (even those “allowable as a matter of right”) that are not “reasonably necessary” and must also reduce the amount of any allowed costs to that which is “reasonable.” (Perko ’s Enters., Inc. v. RRNS Enters. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244-245.) It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to harmonize the “costs” in section 1029.8 with the available “costs” provided in the neighboring statutes. If the Legislature intended to expand the availability of costs under section 1029.8, it would have explicitly said so. For these reasons, counsel should not be able to expand the amount of costs beyond what was already ordered. If Plaintiffs sought to obtain costs not specifically enumerated, ae DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Casethey could have done so in their costs memorandum. Plaintiffs seek another bite at the apple without vetting the claims. Beyond the limitations described above, Plaintiffs’ cost claims are patently unreasonable and vague. Counsel seeks $39,126.52 in extra costs, which consists of $13,572.00 in “word processing costs”; $9,671.55 in copy/fax/postage charges; travel costs of $2091.70; overnight lodging of $2,399.65 and research of $5,470.00. Counsel makes no attempt to define or explain what “work processing costs” are. Charging a client for the attorney to use a computer is patently unreasonable. Plaintiffs do not provide any invoices, receipts or otherwise to justify the rest of the other claimed costs. The Court should be extremely wary of the claimed costs and should deny them in full. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court deny an award of attorney fees. If the Court allows a fee award, it should be substantially reduced. Any and all costs claimed by Plaintiffs should be denied. Dated: July 27, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, D’A LAW OFFICE Christopher J- jou Attorneys for Defendants/X-Defendants NIAZ BAIG, VILLA DEVELOPER, INC. VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLC ae DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case’ Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated CasePROOF OF SERVICE SHAHKARAM1 y. N. BAIG, et al. Santa Clara County Superior Court Lead Case No.: 114CV275135/Consolidated Case No. 116CV295125 I, CHRISTOPHER D’ ANJOU, hereby declare under penalty of perjury: Tam over the age of eighteen and not a party to this action. My business address is: D’ANJOU LAW OFFICE 1625 The Alameda, Suite 310 San Jose, CA 95126 On July 27, 2020, I served a copy of the accompanying document(s) described herein, to the recipients stated below. DOCUMENTS 1. DEFENDANTS NIAZ BAIG AND VILLA DEVELOPER INC.,VILLA DEVELOPERS & INVESTMENT, LLCS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES RECIPIENTS Michael Carroll, Esq. Law Offices of Michael Brooks Carroll 3919 Happy Valley Rd. Lafayette, CA 94549 carroll law@sbcglobal.net The method of service was as follows: By personal service to the address(es) listed above. By placing a copy of the document described above for deposit with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope, with postage prepaid, for collection and mailing on the same date following ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the business practice of processing correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. By emailing to the address(es) listed above. By faxing to the fax number(s) listed above. ae PROOF OF SERVICE Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case) Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case)Dated: July 27, 2020 Christopher J. D’Anjou 72- PROOF OF SERVICE Case No. 114CV275135 (Lead Case) Case No. 116CV295525 (Consolidated Case)