Preview
MARK M. HATHAWAY.
DC 437335; IL 6327924; NY 243 1682)
(CA 151332;
JENNA PARKER (CA 303560)
E.
WERKSMAN JACKSON
HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP
888 West Sixth Street, Fourth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 688-0460
Facsimile: (213) 624-1942
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E-Mail: mhathaway(d>werksmaniackson.com __
NOV 8 2018
DAN ROTH (CA 270569)
LAW OFFICE OF DAN ROTH cmfimM1mwmmw
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803 Hearst Avenue
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Berkeley, CA
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Telephone: (510) 849-1389
Facsimile: (510) 295—2680
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E-mail: dan@dr0thlaw.com
11 Attorneys for Petitioner
12
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
14
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JOHN DOE, an individual, Case N0.: 18CV332751
16
Petitioner,
17
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
V. OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
18
PENDING COURT REVIEW 0F WRIT
CATHERINE GLAZE, an individual in her PETITION OR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
19
official capacity as Title IX Coordinator at UNDER CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085.
Stanford University; STANFORD VVVVVVUVVVVVVVVV
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UNIVERSITY, a California corporation; and [Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1085, 1094.5]
DOES 1 t0 20 inclusive,
Date: November 8, 201 8
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Respondents. Time: 8:15 am.
Dept: 10
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24 TO THE COURT AND RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
25 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 8, 2018 at 8:15 a.m. 1n Department 10 ofthc ibove— 1
26 titled Coun, located at 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 951 13 Petitioner W111, and hereby doe Sa
27 apply ex parte for an order to stay the operation 0f Stanford University’s administrative decision t(
28 proceed with disciplinary action against Petitioner, pending court review of his petition on the mer its, or
EXPAR TE APPLICATION FOR STAY
1
111 the alternative, issue a writ 0f mandate under Code Civ. Proc. § 1085, directed to Respondents 1nd
1
commanding Respondents to set aside their Notice of Charge against Petitioner, and issue a no ch rge
LWN letter in compliance with their internal rules and regulations, or to show cause why a peremptory rit of
mandate to the same effect should not be issued.
THERE IS URGENCY BECAUSE STANFORD UNIVERSITY HAS SCHEDULED A i
DISCIPLINARY HEARING FOR NOVEMBER 15, 201 8, BEFORE THE PETITION CAN BE
HEARD ON ITS MERITS OR A MOTION FOR STAY MAY BE HEARD ON NOTICE.
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This is Petitioner’s second application for stay. The Court denied Petitioner’s previous
application on September 20, 2018, stating, “Petitioner's ex parte application for stay is DENIED, thc
10 Court having concluded that petitioner's showing does not meet the requirements of Code 0f Civil‘
11 Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (g).”
12 As shown in the verified Petition filed herein, the attached memorandum, the declaration of
13 Petitioner, the declaration of Mark Hathaway and exhibits filed herewith, this court should stay the
14 operation ofthe administrative decision under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 subd. (g) because: (1) Petitioner
15 presents a colorable claim for writ relief; (2) the requested stay is not contrary to public interest, ( ) and
16 the Stay causes Respondents n0 prejudice while preventing irreparable harm t0 Petitioner’s acade1 ic
17 success, reputation, and standing in the academic community, 0r in the alternative issue a writ 0f
commanding Respondents to‘set
18 mandate under Code Civ. Proc. § 1085, directed to Respondents and
19 aside the Notice of Charge against Petitioner, and issue a no charge letter in compliance with their
20 internal rules and regulations.
21 Petitioner’s application is based 0n the Petition for Writ of Mandate; this Notice of Application
22 and Application; the supporting Memorandum 0f Points and Authorities; the Declaration 0f Mark M.
23 Hathaway; the exhibits hereto, the pleadings, files, and records in this action; and any such argum nt as
24 may be received by this Court at the hearing 0n the application
WERKSMAN JACKSON
25
HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP
26 f
27 Dated: November 8, 2018 By:
Maik M. Hathaway/
28
Jenna E. Parker
Attorneys for Petitioner John Doe
EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................. ...5
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .................................................................... ...7
.bWN
l. INTRODUCTION. ................................................................................................................. “.7
ll. LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND. ............................................................... ...8
A. Federal Title IX. .......................................................................................................... ...8
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B. California Law Requirements For Student Discipline ................................................ “.9
C. Respondents’ Final Decision t0 Proceed With Administrative Charges is Subj ect t0
Immediate Writ Review. ............................................................................................. .10
1o
D. Petitioner’s Sole Remedy is Writ Relief. .................................................................... .. 12
11
E. Stanford’s Title IX Coordinator Is Not An Improper Party To The Writ Action ....... 12 ..
12
13 Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW. ................................................................................................... .. 13
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A. “Fair Hearing” Is Reviewed De Novo ......................................................................... .. 13
15
B. Independent Judgment, a Trial De Nova, Required Where Administrative Process
16 Affects a Vested Fundamental Right. ......................................................................... .. 14
17 Internal and External Pressure 0n Colleges and Universities. 15
C. .................................... ..
18
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ............................................................ .. 15
19
A. Stanford’s Title IX Policies. ....................................................................................... .. 15
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21 B. Summary 0f Relevant Events ...................................................................................... .. 16
22 1. Stanford Initiates Title IX Charges Against Petitioner ................................... .. 16
23 2. Stanford’s SecondAttempt to Initiate Title IX Charges .................................. .. I 7
24
ARGUMENT. ......................................................................................................................... .. 1 8
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A. Court Should Grant the Stay in Order to Preserve the Status Quo. ............ ................ .. 1 8
26 ‘
27 B. Petitioner Has A Colorable Claim. ............................................................................. .. 19
28 C. Issuance of Stay Not Contrary t0 Public Interest ........................................................ .. 19
EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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D. Petitioner’s Appellate Vindication Cannot Undo Irreparable Damage t0 His
Academic Success and Reputation Without the Stay. ................................................ ..20
E. Petitioner Has Complied With Ex Parle Rules for Stay . ........................................... .21
AU)
1 . ProofofService ofStay Request. .................................................................... .21
VI. CONCLUSION. ...................................................................................................................... .21
DECLARATION OF MARK M. HATHAWAY ............................................................................... .22
PROPOSED ORDER .......................................................................................................................... .24
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EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Applebaum v, Board ofDirs. ofBarZon Mem. Hosiazfgm) 104 Ca1.App.3d 648 ............................ 1..9
4; Association ofOrange County Deputy Sherifl‘s v. County ofOrange (2013) 217
Ca1.App.4th 29 ................................................................................................................................. .19
Berlinghieri v. Department ofMolor Vehicles (1983) 33 Ca1.3d 392 ................................................ .14
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Berman v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2014) 229 Ca1.App.4th 1265 ............................... 10, 12
Bells v. Board ofEducation (7th Cir.1972) 466 F.2d 629 .................................................................. .15
Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 ................................................................................................. 9, 14
10 Board ofCurators 0f University ofMissouri v. Horowitz (1978) 435 U.S. 78 ................................ 9, 15
11 v. Superior Court ofCalifornia in andfor Los Angeles County (1925) 70 Cal.App. 1
Br703vgn
13
12
13
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837 ...................... 8
Marin (CD. 306 F.Supp.3d 1147 ‘.20
14 Chhoeun v. Cal. 2018) ..................................................................
15 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281 ................................................................................... ...8
16 City QfI-Iollister v. Monterey Ins. C0. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455 ................................................... .18
17
Clark v. City ofHermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 ........................................................... .13
18
Doe v. Baum, et al., N0. 17—2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2018) .................................................................. .10
19
Doe v. Brandeis Univ. (D. Mass. 2016) 2016 WL 7428557 ............................................................... .15
20
Doe v. Brandeis University (D. Mass. 2016) 177 F.Supp.3d 561 ...................................................... .15
21
Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055 .................................................... .10
22
Doe v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055 ............................................. .10
23
Doe v. University ofCincinnati (6th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3d 393 20
24
25 Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221 ..................................... 9, 10, 13
26 Fa/zlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Ca1.4th 655 ...................................................... .14
27 Friends 0ft/1e Old Trees v. Department ofForestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52
Ca1.App.4th 1383 ............................................................................................................................. .11
28
Gaiffield v. Board ofMedical Examiners (1950) 99 Ca1.App.2d 219 ................................................. .13
EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565 ............................................................................................... passim
Greenhill v. Bailey (8th Cir. 1975) 519 F.2d 5 ................................................................................... .. 14
Hernandez v. Sessions (9th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3d 976 .......................................................................... .19
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Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Ca1.3d 770 ..................................... .14
JKH Enters, Inc. v. Dep ’t
oflndus. Rels. (2006) 142 Ca1.App.4th 1046 ........................................... .. 14
John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301 ...................................... .13
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Kuhn v. Department ofGeneral Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627 ............................................. ...9
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390 ............................................................................................ .14
‘
Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 .............................................................. . 14
Moran v. ofMedical Examiners ofDept. ofProfessional and Vocational
Stale Bd.
11 Standards ofCal. (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 301 .......................................................................................... .13
12 384 .......................................................
Peck v. Board ofLos Angeles County Sup'rs (1891) 90 Cal. .13
13
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society ofOrthodontisls (1974) 12 Cal.3d 541 ............................................. 13
14
Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Ca1.App.4th 93 .................... .14
15
Preminger v. Principi (9th Cir. 2005) 422 F.3d 815 .......................................................................... .19
16
Shaffer v. Board 0f Trustees (1977) 67 Ca1.App.3d 208 ................................................................ 13, 14
17
18 Statutes
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 ..................................................................................................................... ...7
19
Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 ............................................................................................................... passim
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21 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (d) ...................................................................................................... 12
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EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION.
Petitioner JOHN DOE, a rising sophomore student at Stanford University (“Stanford”), is {being
improperly subjected to an unfair Title IX sexual misconduct disciplinary process in the absence 0f
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reasonable grounds to proceed. Respondents have failed to comply with Stanford University’s intsmal
policies and regulations and have failed t0 proceed in the manner required by law.
Petitioner was falsely accused by another student 0f engaging in sexual activity while the other
student was incapacitated by alcohol. Stanford’s internal Title IX investigation confirmed that the
allegation was unsupported by the evidence — and that n0 reasonable panel 0f reviewers could find
otherwise — yet Respondents insist on proceeding with administrative disciplinary action against
Petitioner that could result in his expulsion. In deciding not to move forward with the alleged Prohibited
Conduct in the Notice 0f Concern, the Title IX Coordinator determined that a reasonable Hearing Panel
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could not find by a preponderance 0f the evidence that the alleged Prohibited Conduct occurred and was,
therefore, required t0 issue a written n0 charge decision and confirming Outcome Letter.
Rather than issue the no charge Outcome Letter, the Title IX Coordinator improperly issue} a
16 Notice 0f Charge letter with different, new, and broader allegations than the Notice of Concern let er.
17 Petitioner objected and after he was unable t0 resolve the matter informally, Petitioner filed his Pe ition
18 for Writ of Mandate and then sought a stay, which was denied.
19 After Petitioner’s first stay request was denied, Title IX Coordinator Jill Thomas improper y
20 issued a new Notice of Concern 0n September 24, 201 8 (Mt 7), so as to make the new Notice f
21 Concern letter conform t0 the improper Notice of Charge letter issued May 3 1, 2018, and then iss ed a
22 new Notice 0f Charge letter on October 16, 2018, to make the new charge conform to the new con ern.
23 (ELhibj 8.) Petitioner now seeks court intervention to compel Stanford t0 comply with its own policy
24 and issue an Outcome Letter with no charge based on the Notice of Concern letter dated April 13, 2018.
25 Petitioner requests a stay of the operation of Respondents’ administrative decision to proceed
26 pending court review of his Petition 0n two independent grounds under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5: (1)
27 unfair hearing, in that Respondents’ decision fails to comply with Stanford University policy; and, (2)
28 prejudicial abuse of discretion, in that Respondents are proceeding with a Title IX disciplinary action
EXPAR TE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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contrary to the weight of the evidence that no conduct violation has occurred.
ll. LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND.‘
A. Federal Title IX.
The issue 0f sexual misconduct on university campuses is primarily addressed at the feder l level
by Title IX? A university violates Title IX regarding student-on-student sexual violence if: (1) t1 e
alleged conduct is sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student‘s ability to participate 1n or benefi from
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the school's educational programsf’ and (2) the school, upon notice, fails to take prompt and effect've
steps reasonably calculated to end the sexual Violence, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent ts
recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects.4 The Dept. ofEducation’s Office for Civil Rig ts
10 (“OCR”), has expanded on Title IX enforcement through (a) regulations promulgated through noti e-
11 and-comment rulemaking5 that “have the force and effect 0f law”;6 and (b) “significant guidance 1
12 documents” such as the September 2017 “Dear Colleague Letter” and the September 2017 “Questions
13 and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence.” (Exhibits 3 and 4.) A school’s procedures must, at a
14 minimum, (1) “ensure the Title IX rights of the complainant,” but “accord due process to both parties
15 involved”; (2) provide an “adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation”; (3) provide the comp ainant
16
17
l
A more complete statement of the regulatory and procedural background is set forth in the Petition
18
for Writ 0f Mandamus (“Writ Petition”) at pp. 9-18, (Exhibit 7.)
2
19 TitleIX 0fthe Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
3
The Dept. of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) requires that conduct be evaluated from the
20 perspective 0f a reasonable person in the alleged victim's position, considering all the circumstanc :s.
21
OCR, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Othe '1
Students, 0r Third Parties — Title IX (2001) at p.18 (“2001 Guidance”) notice of publication at 66 Fed.
22 Reg. 5512 (January 19, 2001) http://Www.ed.gov/ocr/docs/shguide.html. (Exhibit 1.)
4
OCR, “Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence” (April 2014), (“2014 Questi )ns
23 and Answers”) (Exhibit 4.)
5
2001 Guidance at p. 36 11.98. (Exhibit 1.)
24 6
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281, 295, 301-02 (regulations promulgated pursuant to
25 notice- and- comment rulemaking that affect individual rights and obligations “have the force and effect
0f law”). The 2001 Guidance 1s under the doctrine articulated 1n Chew on U15. A.,
entitled to deference
26
v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. (1984) 467 U S. 837,
Inc. 842- 43 1
7
2001 Guidance at p 22 1Exhibitt1 ) Students facing suspension or expulsion have interests
27
qualifying for protection 0f the Due Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 577.)
8
28 2001 Guidance at p. 20. (Exhibit 1.)
EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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and the accused student “an equal opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence”; (4)
ensure that the “factfinder and decision maker . . . have adequate training or knowledge regarding sexual
AWN violence”1°; and (5) require proceedings to be documented and include written findings 0f fact and
11
reports that summarize all evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
B. California Law Requirements For Student Discipline.
California’s procedural and substantive standards for student disciplinary proceedings begin with
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Code Civ. Proc, § 1094.5 subdivisions (b) and (c), which require that (1) there be “a fair trial,” whlch
“means that there must have been ‘a fair administrative hearingmlz; (2) the proceeding be conducted “in
the manner required by law”; (3) the decision be “supported by the findings”; and (4) the findings be
10 “supported by the weight 0f the evidence,” or where an administrative action does not affect vested
11 fundamental rights, the findings must be “supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whc
12 record.”13 In addition, a reviewing court does not “blindly seize any evidence in support of the
13 respondent in order to affirm the judgment. . . . It must be reasonable, . . . credible, and 0f solid value.”
14 (Kuhn v. Department 0f General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.)
15 Students facing suspension or expulsion have interests qualifying for protection 0f the Due
16 Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 577 (for suspensions ofless than ten days fr 3m
17 high school, students are not entitled “to confront and cross-examine witnesses”).) The “[s]pecific
18 requirements for procedural due process vary depending upon the situation under consideration an d the
19 interests involved?“ The severity of the deprivation is one of several factors that must be weighed in
20 deciding the exact due process owed the student. (Board ofCuratorS 0f University ofMissouri v.
21 Horowitz (1 978) 435 U.S. 78, 86.) In this case, the deprivation ofa lengthy suspension or expulsi 3n
22 could not be more severe, resulting in the loss of an “an interest 0f almost incalculable value, especially
23
24 9
2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 3. (Exhibit 3.)
Id.;
1°
25 Id; 2001 Guidance at p. 21. (Exhibit 1.)
H 2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 5. (Exhibit 3.)
26 12
Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Ca1.App.4th 221, 239 (citations omitted .
California has undertaken to protect vested fundamental rights “from untoward intrusions by the
‘3
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massive apparatus of government.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 142-143.)
1d. at 244 [quoting Applebaum v. Board ofDirs. ofBarlon Mem. Hosp. (1980) 104 Ca1.App.3 d 648,
14
28
657.
EXPAR TE APPLICATION FOR STAY
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t0 those students Who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit of their college
training.” (Goldberg v. Regents 0f University ofCal. (1967) 248 Ca1.App.2d 867, 876.)
#WN While California law does not require any specific form ofdisciplinary hearing, a university is
bound by its own policies and procedures. (Berman v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2014) 229
Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271-72.)
In California, schools must provide for the questioning of the complainant, either directly c .1
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indirectly, by the accused student. (Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Ca1.App.5th 1 55;
Doe v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2016) 5 Ca1.App.5th 1055, 1084; see also Doe v. Baum, et
al., N0. 17-2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2018) (where credibility is an issue, “the university must give th (D
10 accused student or his agent an opportunity to cross—examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the
11 presence 0f a neutral fact-findcr.”) In addition, students are t0 have “ample opportunity to hear and
12 observe the witnesses against them.” (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Ca1.App.4th
13 221, 246, citing Goldberg v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 882.)
l4 A fair process also requires the university t0 present the evidence to the accused student sogthat
and respond t0 the accusation: “.
15 the student has a reasonable opportunity t0 prepare a defense t0 . .
16 requiring John t0 request access to the evidence against him does not comply with the requirements of a
17 fair hearing. [citing Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 582.]” (Doe v. University ofSouthem
18 California, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 245—246.)
19 “The right t0 a fair procedure includes the right t0 impartial adjudicators. (Applebaum v. Bc ard
20 osz'rectors, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 648, 658.) Moreover, "[flairness requires a practical method cf
21 testing impartiality." (Hackethal v. California Medical Assn, supra, 138 Ca1.App.3d 435, 444.)”
22 (Rosenblit v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Ca1,App.3d 1434, 1448.)
23 Respondents’ Final Decision t0 Proceed With Administrative Charges is Subject t0
C.
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24 Immediate Writ Review.
The Stanford Title IX Coordinator’s final charge decision 0n May 31, 2018 qualifies as “any
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final administrative order or decision made as the result 0f a proceeding in which by law a hearingiis
26
required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination 0f facts is
27
vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, 0r officer.” (Code CiV. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (a .)
28
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H Here, all the elements for mandamus relief are met.
First, discretion in the determination of facts in order t0 proceed With administrative charges is
vested in Stanford’s Title IX Coordinator. In fact, Stanford appointed Title IX Coordinator Catherine
Glaze, and now Jill M. Thomas, in order to comply with federal regulations” and the Title IX
Coordinator is responsible for monitoring Stanford’s overall compliance with Title IX, ensuring
appropriate training and education, and overseeing the university’s investigation, response, and
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resolution 0f reports made under the university’s Title IX policy.
Second, Title 1X16 requires Stanford University to accord accused students due process in sexual
misconduct disciplinary matters and California law, as shown above, requires Stanford University t0
provide a fair process. Due process and a fair process each include the requirement that the university
must present the evidence to the accused student so that the student has a reasonable opportunity to
prepare a defense and to respond to the accusation. (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246
u—t—‘H—‘p—‘H
MAWNH Ca1.App.4th 221, 245-246, citing Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 579—580.) It is this opportunity t0
review the evidence and present a defense that helps to satisfy the hearing requirement for writ relief
under Code CiV. Proc. § 1094.5.
16 Third, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 some process in the nature ofa hearing” is required and
17 even a “purely documentary” hearing, as is required at Stanford, satisfies Code CiV. Proc. § 1094.5,
18 subd. (a). (Friends 0fthe Old Trees v. Department QfForestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Ca1.App.4th
19 1383, 1391 .) While due process and California law do not require any specific form of hearing,
20
21
15
Stanford
regulations. Under
is a recipient of federal education funds and
the Title IX regulations, a recipient m is bound by
designate
Title
at least
IX and its implementing
one employee to sewe as
22
23
its Title IX coordinator. _S_e_e_
designated t0 handle Title IX complaints. The recipient
65 Fed Reg. 52867
M
at § 135(a). Ideally, this
name, office, address, and telephone number of the employee(s) designated t0 serve as the Title IX
notify
person
all its
may be the empIO) ee
students and employees, of the
Coordinator. Stanford’s Policy complies with this federal requirement. (Exhibit 2, p. 4.)
24 16
“The rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistent with any federally guaranteed
25 due process rights involved in a complaint proceeding.” 2001 Guidance, Exhibit 1, p. vi, p. 22.)
17
Where an agency makes a decision based only upon one party’s unilateral submissions of
26 information and documents, without taking and considering evidence from opposing parties, no hearing
occurs within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5. (300 DeHaro
Preview
MARK M. HATHAWAY. DC 437335; IL 6327924; NY 243 1682) (CA 151332; JENNA PARKER (CA 303560) E. WERKSMAN JACKSON HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP 888 West Sixth Street, Fourth Floor Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 688-0460 Facsimile: (213) 624-1942 OOOOQQ'JI-RUJN E-Mail: mhathaway(d>werksmaniackson.com __ NOV 8 2018 DAN ROTH (CA 270569) LAW OFFICE OF DAN ROTH cmfimM1mwmmw » 803 Hearst Avenue 5" mmmmmmwmmcm DEPUTY Berkeley, CA 94710 Telephone: (510) 849-1389 Facsimile: (510) 295—2680 H 13:3» 'wm “ E-mail: dan@dr0thlaw.com 11 Attorneys for Petitioner 12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 13 FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 14 15 JOHN DOE, an individual, Case N0.: 18CV332751 16 Petitioner, 17 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY V. OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 18 PENDING COURT REVIEW 0F WRIT CATHERINE GLAZE, an individual in her PETITION OR ISSUANCE OF WRIT 19 official capacity as Title IX Coordinator at UNDER CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085. Stanford University; STANFORD VVVVVVUVVVVVVVVV 20 UNIVERSITY, a California corporation; and [Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1085, 1094.5] DOES 1 t0 20 inclusive, Date: November 8, 201 8 21 Respondents. Time: 8:15 am. Dept: 10 22 23 24 TO THE COURT AND RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 25 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 8, 2018 at 8:15 a.m. 1n Department 10 ofthc ibove— 1 26 titled Coun, located at 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 951 13 Petitioner W111, and hereby doe Sa 27 apply ex parte for an order to stay the operation 0f Stanford University’s administrative decision t( 28 proceed with disciplinary action against Petitioner, pending court review of his petition on the mer its, or EXPAR TE APPLICATION FOR STAY 1 111 the alternative, issue a writ 0f mandate under Code Civ. Proc. § 1085, directed to Respondents 1nd 1 commanding Respondents to set aside their Notice of Charge against Petitioner, and issue a no ch rge LWN letter in compliance with their internal rules and regulations, or to show cause why a peremptory rit of mandate to the same effect should not be issued. THERE IS URGENCY BECAUSE STANFORD UNIVERSITY HAS SCHEDULED A i DISCIPLINARY HEARING FOR NOVEMBER 15, 201 8, BEFORE THE PETITION CAN BE HEARD ON ITS MERITS OR A MOTION FOR STAY MAY BE HEARD ON NOTICE. ©00\l0\u1 This is Petitioner’s second application for stay. The Court denied Petitioner’s previous application on September 20, 2018, stating, “Petitioner's ex parte application for stay is DENIED, thc 10 Court having concluded that petitioner's showing does not meet the requirements of Code 0f Civil‘ 11 Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (g).” 12 As shown in the verified Petition filed herein, the attached memorandum, the declaration of 13 Petitioner, the declaration of Mark Hathaway and exhibits filed herewith, this court should stay the 14 operation ofthe administrative decision under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 subd. (g) because: (1) Petitioner 15 presents a colorable claim for writ relief; (2) the requested stay is not contrary to public interest, ( ) and 16 the Stay causes Respondents n0 prejudice while preventing irreparable harm t0 Petitioner’s acade1 ic 17 success, reputation, and standing in the academic community, 0r in the alternative issue a writ 0f commanding Respondents to‘set 18 mandate under Code Civ. Proc. § 1085, directed to Respondents and 19 aside the Notice of Charge against Petitioner, and issue a no charge letter in compliance with their 20 internal rules and regulations. 21 Petitioner’s application is based 0n the Petition for Writ of Mandate; this Notice of Application 22 and Application; the supporting Memorandum 0f Points and Authorities; the Declaration 0f Mark M. 23 Hathaway; the exhibits hereto, the pleadings, files, and records in this action; and any such argum nt as 24 may be received by this Court at the hearing 0n the application WERKSMAN JACKSON 25 HATHAWAY & QUINN LLP 26 f 27 Dated: November 8, 2018 By: Maik M. Hathaway/ 28 Jenna E. Parker Attorneys for Petitioner John Doe EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................. ...5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .................................................................... ...7 .bWN l. INTRODUCTION. ................................................................................................................. “.7 ll. LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND. ............................................................... ...8 A. Federal Title IX. .......................................................................................................... ...8 \OOONQ B. California Law Requirements For Student Discipline ................................................ “.9 C. Respondents’ Final Decision t0 Proceed With Administrative Charges is Subj ect t0 Immediate Writ Review. ............................................................................................. .10 1o D. Petitioner’s Sole Remedy is Writ Relief. .................................................................... .. 12 11 E. Stanford’s Title IX Coordinator Is Not An Improper Party To The Writ Action ....... 12 .. 12 13 Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW. ................................................................................................... .. 13 14 A. “Fair Hearing” Is Reviewed De Novo ......................................................................... .. 13 15 B. Independent Judgment, a Trial De Nova, Required Where Administrative Process 16 Affects a Vested Fundamental Right. ......................................................................... .. 14 17 Internal and External Pressure 0n Colleges and Universities. 15 C. .................................... .. 18 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ............................................................ .. 15 19 A. Stanford’s Title IX Policies. ....................................................................................... .. 15 20 21 B. Summary 0f Relevant Events ...................................................................................... .. 16 22 1. Stanford Initiates Title IX Charges Against Petitioner ................................... .. 16 23 2. Stanford’s SecondAttempt to Initiate Title IX Charges .................................. .. I 7 24 ARGUMENT. ......................................................................................................................... .. 1 8 25 A. Court Should Grant the Stay in Order to Preserve the Status Quo. ............ ................ .. 1 8 26 ‘ 27 B. Petitioner Has A Colorable Claim. ............................................................................. .. 19 28 C. Issuance of Stay Not Contrary t0 Public Interest ........................................................ .. 19 EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 3 D. Petitioner’s Appellate Vindication Cannot Undo Irreparable Damage t0 His Academic Success and Reputation Without the Stay. ................................................ ..20 E. Petitioner Has Complied With Ex Parle Rules for Stay . ........................................... .21 AU) 1 . ProofofService ofStay Request. .................................................................... .21 VI. CONCLUSION. ...................................................................................................................... .21 DECLARATION OF MARK M. HATHAWAY ............................................................................... .22 PROPOSED ORDER .......................................................................................................................... .24 0006\10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Applebaum v, Board ofDirs. ofBarZon Mem. Hosiazfgm) 104 Ca1.App.3d 648 ............................ 1..9 4; Association ofOrange County Deputy Sherifl‘s v. County ofOrange (2013) 217 Ca1.App.4th 29 ................................................................................................................................. .19 Berlinghieri v. Department ofMolor Vehicles (1983) 33 Ca1.3d 392 ................................................ .14 KOOONOU‘I Berman v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2014) 229 Ca1.App.4th 1265 ............................... 10, 12 Bells v. Board ofEducation (7th Cir.1972) 466 F.2d 629 .................................................................. .15 Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 ................................................................................................. 9, 14 10 Board ofCurators 0f University ofMissouri v. Horowitz (1978) 435 U.S. 78 ................................ 9, 15 11 v. Superior Court ofCalifornia in andfor Los Angeles County (1925) 70 Cal.App. 1 Br703vgn 13 12 13 Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837 ...................... 8 Marin (CD. 306 F.Supp.3d 1147 ‘.20 14 Chhoeun v. Cal. 2018) .................................................................. 15 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281 ................................................................................... ...8 16 City QfI-Iollister v. Monterey Ins. C0. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455 ................................................... .18 17 Clark v. City ofHermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152 ........................................................... .13 18 Doe v. Baum, et al., N0. 17—2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2018) .................................................................. .10 19 Doe v. Brandeis Univ. (D. Mass. 2016) 2016 WL 7428557 ............................................................... .15 20 Doe v. Brandeis University (D. Mass. 2016) 177 F.Supp.3d 561 ...................................................... .15 21 Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055 .................................................... .10 22 Doe v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055 ............................................. .10 23 Doe v. University ofCincinnati (6th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3d 393 20 24 25 Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221 ..................................... 9, 10, 13 26 Fa/zlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Ca1.4th 655 ...................................................... .14 27 Friends 0ft/1e Old Trees v. Department ofForestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Ca1.App.4th 1383 ............................................................................................................................. .11 28 Gaiffield v. Board ofMedical Examiners (1950) 99 Ca1.App.2d 219 ................................................. .13 EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 5 Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565 ............................................................................................... passim Greenhill v. Bailey (8th Cir. 1975) 519 F.2d 5 ................................................................................... .. 14 Hernandez v. Sessions (9th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3d 976 .......................................................................... .19 4>UJN Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1980) 26 Ca1.3d 770 ..................................... .14 JKH Enters, Inc. v. Dep ’t oflndus. Rels. (2006) 142 Ca1.App.4th 1046 ........................................... .. 14 John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301 ...................................... .13 OCOONONLII Kuhn v. Department ofGeneral Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627 ............................................. ...9 Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390 ............................................................................................ .14 ‘ Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614 .............................................................. . 14 Moran v. ofMedical Examiners ofDept. ofProfessional and Vocational Stale Bd. 11 Standards ofCal. (1948) 32 Ca1.2d 301 .......................................................................................... .13 12 384 ....................................................... Peck v. Board ofLos Angeles County Sup'rs (1891) 90 Cal. .13 13 Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society ofOrthodontisls (1974) 12 Cal.3d 541 ............................................. 13 14 Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Ca1.App.4th 93 .................... .14 15 Preminger v. Principi (9th Cir. 2005) 422 F.3d 815 .......................................................................... .19 16 Shaffer v. Board 0f Trustees (1977) 67 Ca1.App.3d 208 ................................................................ 13, 14 17 18 Statutes 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 ..................................................................................................................... ...7 19 Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 ............................................................................................................... passim 20 21 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (d) ...................................................................................................... 12 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 6 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION. Petitioner JOHN DOE, a rising sophomore student at Stanford University (“Stanford”), is {being improperly subjected to an unfair Title IX sexual misconduct disciplinary process in the absence 0f \OOOQQUI-bmmr—n reasonable grounds to proceed. Respondents have failed to comply with Stanford University’s intsmal policies and regulations and have failed t0 proceed in the manner required by law. Petitioner was falsely accused by another student 0f engaging in sexual activity while the other student was incapacitated by alcohol. Stanford’s internal Title IX investigation confirmed that the allegation was unsupported by the evidence — and that n0 reasonable panel 0f reviewers could find otherwise — yet Respondents insist on proceeding with administrative disciplinary action against Petitioner that could result in his expulsion. In deciding not to move forward with the alleged Prohibited Conduct in the Notice 0f Concern, the Title IX Coordinator determined that a reasonable Hearing Panel r—n—nu—Av—ty—‘v—t Lh-hUJNHO could not find by a preponderance 0f the evidence that the alleged Prohibited Conduct occurred and was, therefore, required t0 issue a written n0 charge decision and confirming Outcome Letter. Rather than issue the no charge Outcome Letter, the Title IX Coordinator improperly issue} a 16 Notice 0f Charge letter with different, new, and broader allegations than the Notice of Concern let er. 17 Petitioner objected and after he was unable t0 resolve the matter informally, Petitioner filed his Pe ition 18 for Writ of Mandate and then sought a stay, which was denied. 19 After Petitioner’s first stay request was denied, Title IX Coordinator Jill Thomas improper y 20 issued a new Notice of Concern 0n September 24, 201 8 (Mt 7), so as to make the new Notice f 21 Concern letter conform t0 the improper Notice of Charge letter issued May 3 1, 2018, and then iss ed a 22 new Notice 0f Charge letter on October 16, 2018, to make the new charge conform to the new con ern. 23 (ELhibj 8.) Petitioner now seeks court intervention to compel Stanford t0 comply with its own policy 24 and issue an Outcome Letter with no charge based on the Notice of Concern letter dated April 13, 2018. 25 Petitioner requests a stay of the operation of Respondents’ administrative decision to proceed 26 pending court review of his Petition 0n two independent grounds under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5: (1) 27 unfair hearing, in that Respondents’ decision fails to comply with Stanford University policy; and, (2) 28 prejudicial abuse of discretion, in that Respondents are proceeding with a Title IX disciplinary action EXPAR TE APPLICATION FOR STAY 7 contrary to the weight of the evidence that no conduct violation has occurred. ll. LEGAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND.‘ A. Federal Title IX. The issue 0f sexual misconduct on university campuses is primarily addressed at the feder l level by Title IX? A university violates Title IX regarding student-on-student sexual violence if: (1) t1 e alleged conduct is sufficiently serious to limit or deny a student‘s ability to participate 1n or benefi from \OOO\]G\UI-b the school's educational programsf’ and (2) the school, upon notice, fails to take prompt and effect've steps reasonably calculated to end the sexual Violence, eliminate the hostile environment, prevent ts recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects.4 The Dept. ofEducation’s Office for Civil Rig ts 10 (“OCR”), has expanded on Title IX enforcement through (a) regulations promulgated through noti e- 11 and-comment rulemaking5 that “have the force and effect 0f law”;6 and (b) “significant guidance 1 12 documents” such as the September 2017 “Dear Colleague Letter” and the September 2017 “Questions 13 and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence.” (Exhibits 3 and 4.) A school’s procedures must, at a 14 minimum, (1) “ensure the Title IX rights of the complainant,” but “accord due process to both parties 15 involved”; (2) provide an “adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation”; (3) provide the comp ainant 16 17 l A more complete statement of the regulatory and procedural background is set forth in the Petition 18 for Writ 0f Mandamus (“Writ Petition”) at pp. 9-18, (Exhibit 7.) 2 19 TitleIX 0fthe Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. 3 The Dept. of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) requires that conduct be evaluated from the 20 perspective 0f a reasonable person in the alleged victim's position, considering all the circumstanc :s. 21 OCR, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Othe '1 Students, 0r Third Parties — Title IX (2001) at p.18 (“2001 Guidance”) notice of publication at 66 Fed. 22 Reg. 5512 (January 19, 2001) http://Www.ed.gov/ocr/docs/shguide.html. (Exhibit 1.) 4 OCR, “Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence” (April 2014), (“2014 Questi )ns 23 and Answers”) (Exhibit 4.) 5 2001 Guidance at p. 36 11.98. (Exhibit 1.) 24 6 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown (1979) 441 U.S. 281, 295, 301-02 (regulations promulgated pursuant to 25 notice- and- comment rulemaking that affect individual rights and obligations “have the force and effect 0f law”). The 2001 Guidance 1s under the doctrine articulated 1n Chew on U15. A., entitled to deference 26 v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. (1984) 467 U S. 837, Inc. 842- 43 1 7 2001 Guidance at p 22 1Exhibitt1 ) Students facing suspension or expulsion have interests 27 qualifying for protection 0f the Due Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 577.) 8 28 2001 Guidance at p. 20. (Exhibit 1.) EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 8 and the accused student “an equal opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence”; (4) ensure that the “factfinder and decision maker . . . have adequate training or knowledge regarding sexual AWN violence”1°; and (5) require proceedings to be documented and include written findings 0f fact and 11 reports that summarize all evidence, both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. B. California Law Requirements For Student Discipline. California’s procedural and substantive standards for student disciplinary proceedings begin with \OOONOLA Code Civ. Proc, § 1094.5 subdivisions (b) and (c), which require that (1) there be “a fair trial,” whlch “means that there must have been ‘a fair administrative hearingmlz; (2) the proceeding be conducted “in the manner required by law”; (3) the decision be “supported by the findings”; and (4) the findings be 10 “supported by the weight 0f the evidence,” or where an administrative action does not affect vested 11 fundamental rights, the findings must be “supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whc 12 record.”13 In addition, a reviewing court does not “blindly seize any evidence in support of the 13 respondent in order to affirm the judgment. . . . It must be reasonable, . . . credible, and 0f solid value.” 14 (Kuhn v. Department 0f General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.) 15 Students facing suspension or expulsion have interests qualifying for protection 0f the Due 16 Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 577 (for suspensions ofless than ten days fr 3m 17 high school, students are not entitled “to confront and cross-examine witnesses”).) The “[s]pecific 18 requirements for procedural due process vary depending upon the situation under consideration an d the 19 interests involved?“ The severity of the deprivation is one of several factors that must be weighed in 20 deciding the exact due process owed the student. (Board ofCuratorS 0f University ofMissouri v. 21 Horowitz (1 978) 435 U.S. 78, 86.) In this case, the deprivation ofa lengthy suspension or expulsi 3n 22 could not be more severe, resulting in the loss of an “an interest 0f almost incalculable value, especially 23 24 9 2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 3. (Exhibit 3.) Id.; 1° 25 Id; 2001 Guidance at p. 21. (Exhibit 1.) H 2017 Dear Colleague Letter at p. 5. (Exhibit 3.) 26 12 Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Ca1.App.4th 221, 239 (citations omitted . California has undertaken to protect vested fundamental rights “from untoward intrusions by the ‘3 27 massive apparatus of government.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 142-143.) 1d. at 244 [quoting Applebaum v. Board ofDirs. ofBarlon Mem. Hosp. (1980) 104 Ca1.App.3 d 648, 14 28 657. EXPAR TE APPLICATION FOR STAY 9 t0 those students Who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the pursuit of their college training.” (Goldberg v. Regents 0f University ofCal. (1967) 248 Ca1.App.2d 867, 876.) #WN While California law does not require any specific form ofdisciplinary hearing, a university is bound by its own policies and procedures. (Berman v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1271-72.) In California, schools must provide for the questioning of the complainant, either directly c .1 \DOONQU‘I indirectly, by the accused student. (Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Ca1.App.5th 1 55; Doe v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (2016) 5 Ca1.App.5th 1055, 1084; see also Doe v. Baum, et al., N0. 17-2213 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2018) (where credibility is an issue, “the university must give th (D 10 accused student or his agent an opportunity to cross—examine the accuser and adverse witnesses in the 11 presence 0f a neutral fact-findcr.”) In addition, students are t0 have “ample opportunity to hear and 12 observe the witnesses against them.” (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 Ca1.App.4th 13 221, 246, citing Goldberg v. Regents 0f University ofCalifomia (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 882.) l4 A fair process also requires the university t0 present the evidence to the accused student sogthat and respond t0 the accusation: “. 15 the student has a reasonable opportunity t0 prepare a defense t0 . . 16 requiring John t0 request access to the evidence against him does not comply with the requirements of a 17 fair hearing. [citing Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 582.]” (Doe v. University ofSouthem 18 California, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 245—246.) 19 “The right t0 a fair procedure includes the right t0 impartial adjudicators. (Applebaum v. Bc ard 20 osz'rectors, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 648, 658.) Moreover, "[flairness requires a practical method cf 21 testing impartiality." (Hackethal v. California Medical Assn, supra, 138 Ca1.App.3d 435, 444.)” 22 (Rosenblit v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Ca1,App.3d 1434, 1448.) 23 Respondents’ Final Decision t0 Proceed With Administrative Charges is Subject t0 C. ‘ 24 Immediate Writ Review. The Stanford Title IX Coordinator’s final charge decision 0n May 31, 2018 qualifies as “any 25 final administrative order or decision made as the result 0f a proceeding in which by law a hearingiis 26 required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination 0f facts is 27 vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, 0r officer.” (Code CiV. Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (a .) 28 EXPARTE APPLICATION FOR STAY 10 H Here, all the elements for mandamus relief are met. First, discretion in the determination of facts in order t0 proceed With administrative charges is vested in Stanford’s Title IX Coordinator. In fact, Stanford appointed Title IX Coordinator Catherine Glaze, and now Jill M. Thomas, in order to comply with federal regulations” and the Title IX Coordinator is responsible for monitoring Stanford’s overall compliance with Title IX, ensuring appropriate training and education, and overseeing the university’s investigation, response, and OOOONOUIAUJN resolution 0f reports made under the university’s Title IX policy. Second, Title 1X16 requires Stanford University to accord accused students due process in sexual misconduct disciplinary matters and California law, as shown above, requires Stanford University t0 provide a fair process. Due process and a fair process each include the requirement that the university must present the evidence to the accused student so that the student has a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense and to respond to the accusation. (Doe v. University ofSouthern California (2016) 246 u—t—‘H—‘p—‘H MAWNH Ca1.App.4th 221, 245-246, citing Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 579—580.) It is this opportunity t0 review the evidence and present a defense that helps to satisfy the hearing requirement for writ relief under Code CiV. Proc. § 1094.5. 16 Third, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5 some process in the nature ofa hearing” is required and 17 even a “purely documentary” hearing, as is required at Stanford, satisfies Code CiV. Proc. § 1094.5, 18 subd. (a). (Friends 0fthe Old Trees v. Department QfForestry & Fire Protection (1997) 52 Ca1.App.4th 19 1383, 1391 .) While due process and California law do not require any specific form of hearing, 20 21 15 Stanford regulations. Under is a recipient of federal education funds and the Title IX regulations, a recipient m is bound by designate Title at least IX and its implementing one employee to sewe as 22 23 its Title IX coordinator. _S_e_e_ designated t0 handle Title IX complaints. The recipient 65 Fed Reg. 52867 M at § 135(a). Ideally, this name, office, address, and telephone number of the employee(s) designated t0 serve as the Title IX notify person all its may be the empIO) ee students and employees, of the Coordinator. Stanford’s Policy complies with this federal requirement. (Exhibit 2, p. 4.) 24 16 “The rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistent with any federally guaranteed 25 due process rights involved in a complaint proceeding.” 2001 Guidance, Exhibit 1, p. vi, p. 22.) 17 Where an agency makes a decision based only upon one party’s unilateral submissions of 26 information and documents, without taking and considering evidence from opposing parties, no hearing occurs within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5. (300 DeHaro