Preview
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
FLETCHER C. ALFORD (SBN: 152314)
MICHAEL D. BRUNO (SBN: 166805)
J. DOMINIC CAMPODONICO (SBN: 188035)
GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 986-5900
Facsimile: (415) 986-8054
Attorneys for Defendant
STANFORD HEALTH CARE
FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
LILLIAN AUDYCKI, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated,
CASE NO. 19CV347173
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
STANFORD HEALTH CARE, a California
Corporation: and DOES | to 100, inclusive.
Defendants. Complaint Filed: May 1, 2019
Defendant STANFORD HEALTH CARE (hereafter “Defendant”) hereby answers the
First Amended Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) filed by Plaintiff LILLIAN AUDYCKI
(“Plaintiff”) as follows:
GENERAL DENIAL
Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 431.30(d), Defendant generally
and specifically denies each and every allegation contained in the First Amended Class Action
Complaint and each and every alleged cause of action therein, and further denies that Plaintiff
is entitled to any of the relief requested. that Defendant committed any wrongful conduct or
omission, whether alleged or otherwise, and that conduct or omissions of Defendant caused
any injury or damage to Plaintiff in the sum or manner alleged, or in any other sum or manner,
oratall.
-l-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant further alleges the following separate and affirmative defenses to each and
every cause of action alleged in the First Amended Class Action Complaint. By alleging the
defenses set forth below, Defendant does not thereby agree or admit that it has the burden of
proof, persuasion, or production with respect to any elements of any defense, or that Plaintiff
has properly asserted any cause of action against Defendant.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to State a Claim)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's claims, and those of the purported class, are barred, in
whole or in part, because the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action or to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Statute of Limitations)
Defendant alleges that each claim alleged in the Complaint is barred by all applicable
California statutes of limitations, including, but not limited to, California Code of Civil
Procedure sections 337, 339, 340, and 343; California Labor Code section 1197.5; and any
other applicable statutes of limitations.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Estoppel/Waiver)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has waived and is estopped by her own actions or
omissions from recovering against Defendant for the alleged loss, injury, or damage suffered
by her, ifany.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Preemption under Section 301 of LMRA)
Defendant alleges that members of the putative class were or are bound by various
collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). The CBAs covers conduct, policies and labor
practices in dispute in this action. The resolution of claims alleged in the Complaint requires
and is substantially dependent upon an analysis and application of the terms of the CBAs.
-2-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY “Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
Therefore, the claims alleged in the Complaint are completely preempted under Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Lack of Justifiable Reliance)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is barred from asserting each and every purported cause
of action set forth in the Complaint because she did not justifiably or detrimentally rely on any
communication, conduct or omission of Defendant.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Fault of Plaintiff, The Putative Class or Third Parties)
Defendant alleges that if Plaintiff, and the purported class, sustained any damages,
which Defendant denies, such damages were proximately caused or contributed to, in whole or
in part, by the acts, omissions, culpable conduct, lack of due diligence, negligence,
misconduct, and/or bad faith of Plaintiff, the putative class, and/or third parties, or, Plaintiff,
the putative class and/or third parties otherwise were at fault. Plaintiff and the putative class,
is therefore not entitled to any relief under the Complaint or under any cause of action
purported to be alleged against Defendant therein, or recovery, if any, should thereby be
reduced in proportion to such fault.
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Plaintiff's Own Conduct)
Defendant alleges that any damages sustained by Plaintiff were caused, cither wholly
or in part, by Plaintiffs own actions, inactions, or delay in acting, and said negligence
comparatively reduces the percentage of fault, if any, of Defendant.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Lack of Damages and Failure to Mitigate)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has suffered no damages as a result of any alleged act
or omission of Defendant, and even if Plaintiff has suffered damages or injuries, all or some
portion of said damages or injuries were caused or attributed to Plaintiffs failure to take
reasonable action to mitigate said damages or injuries barring Plaintiff from recovery in this
-3-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco. CA 94111
xn a
action.
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(No Actual Case or Controversy)
Defendant is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the Complaint presents
no actual case or controversy, or justiciable issue suitable for determination by this Court.
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Ill-Defined Classes)
Defendant alleges that the putative classes and subclasses alleged in the Complaint are
inadequately defined and not administratively ascertainable.
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Plaintiff Not Similarly Situated with Putative Members of Alleged Class)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is not similarly situated with members of the putative
classes and subclasses she purports to represent. Therefore, this action is not properly certified
or maintained as a class action.
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Unclean Hands)
Defendant alleges that the Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged
therein, is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands, where Plaintiff is not acting in good faith
by bringing the instant lawsuit and has fabricated all allegations of failure to pay all wages and
other wage and hour claims. This Affirmative Defense is plead in the alternative, is to be
determined by the Court at trial, and Defendant reserves the right to supplement the facts
stated herein after the parties have engaged in discovery.
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Laches)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is guilty of undue delay in filing and prosecuting this
suit, and accordingly, this action is barred by the doctrine of laches.
Mt
Mf
-4-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURYGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Exhaust Internal and Administrative Remedies)
Defendant alleges that the Complaint and any purported cause of action alleged therein
is barred by Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative and internal remedies available under
state and federal laws, including, without limitation, the California Labor Code, and
Defendant's internal policies and procedures.
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Predominance of Individualized Questions)
Defendant alleges that individualized questions of fact and law predominate over any
purported common questions in this action. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot meet the prerequisites
to a class action.
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Not a Suitable Class Representative)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is not a suitable class representative. Therefore,
Plaintiff cannot satisfy the prerequisites to a class action.
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Difficulties of Proposed Class Action)
Defendant alleges that this case is not properly maintained as a class action because of
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(No Question of Common or General Interest)
Defendant alleges that the Complaint does not raise any question of common or
general interest suitable for class treatment under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382.
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(PAGA Unconstitutional)
Defendant alleges the California Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004,
California Labor Code sections 2698, et seq., both on its face and as Plaintiff seek to apply it
here, violates the California and United States Constitutions because it constitutes an illegal
-5-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco. CA 94111
delegation of the State’s executive and/or prosecutorial power to individual litigants without
oversight by the State of California or any executive or prosecutorial agency thereof, PAGA is
also unconstitutional on the basis that it violates the separation of powers doctrine.
TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Good Faith Conformity with Law)
Defendant’s compensation of Plaintiff and others, including the information it has
provided on all wage statements, has been in a good faith belief that its related practices are in
conformity with both federal and state wage laws.
TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Good Faith Reliance on Interpretation of Law)
Defendant alleges that it acted in good faith reliance upon the reasonable interpretation
of applicable law, decisions by appellate courts in California, and the opinion(s) of the office
of the Labor Commissioner. As such, and without conceding that there are any violations,
there exists a good faith dispute regarding the alleged violation(s). Therefore, the penalties are
not warranted.
TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(No Standing)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims contained in the
Complaint.
TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Preemption)
Defendant alleges that federal law preempts some or all of Plaintiff's claims asserted
under state law.
TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Payment and Release)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff was paid in full and therefore Defendant is released
from any and all continuing obligations to them.
Il
-6-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURYGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
TWENTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Compliance with Law/De Minimim)
Defendant alleges that any recovery on the Complaint, or any cause of action contained
therein, may be barred by Defendant’s compliance or substantial compliance with all
applicable laws underlying Plaintiff's claim and the purported Labor Code violations, if any,
were de minimis.
TWENTY-SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Excessive Fines)
Defendant alleges that the penalties and fines sought are unconstitutional and excessive
under the United States Constitution, and specifically under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1.
TWENTY-SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Perform Job Duties)
Defendant alleges that each of Plaintiff's causes of action and claims for damages is
barred to the extent Plaintiff failed to perform job duties pursuant to the terms and conditions
of employment in conformity with cither the usage of the place of performance or as directed
by his supervisors. as required by Labor Code section 2857.
TWENTY-EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Consent)
Defendant alleges that the relief prayed for in the Complaint is barred because Plaintiff
consented to Defendant’s conduct by virtue of Plaintiff's own conduct.
TWENTY-NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Mandatory Arbitration)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff may not proceed in a civil forum, as by contract
between the Parties, Plaintiff has agreed to pursue all claims which are the subject of this
action, via private arbitration.
-7-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
THIRTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Class Action Waiver)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff may not proceed as a Class Representative, as by
contract between the Parties, Plaintiff has agreed not to pursue any of the claims which are the
subject of this action on a class-wide basis.
THIRTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Representative Action Waiver)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff may not proceed on behalf of other “aggrieved
employees” within the meaning of California Labor Code section 2699 et. seq. as by contract
between the Parties, Plaintiff has agreed not to pursue any of the claims which are the subject
of this action as a representative.
THIRTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(No Injury-In-Fact)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs and/or the purported class members’ claims against
Defendant are barred because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient injury-in-fact, causation, or
redressability for Article III standing, cither with respect to Plaintiff or members of any
putative class.
THIRTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Mistake of Fact or Law)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs and/or the purported class members’ claims are
barred in whole or part to the extent that Defendant’s conduct was based upon a mistake of
fact or law.
THIRTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Bona Fide Errors)
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's Complaint and the cause of action alleged therein are
barred because the violations alleged, assuming such violations occurred, were not intentional
but the result of bona fide errors notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures that
Defendant adopted.
-8-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
San Francisco, CA 94111
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
Defendant reserves the right to allege other affirmative defenses as they may arise
during the course of discovery.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1. That this action be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
2 That judgment be entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.
3. That Defendant be awarded its costs of suit and attorneys’ fees incurred herein;
and
4. For such and other further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
This answering Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury in the above-entitled action.
Dated: September 20, 2019 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP.
By:
*. ALFORD
). BRUNO
J.DOMINIC CAMPODONICO
Attorneys for Defendant
STANFORD HEALTH CARE
-9-
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94111
PROOF OF SERVICE
Lillian Audycki v. Stanford Health Care
Superior Court, County of Santa Clara, Case No. 19CV347173
Iam a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party
to the within action. My business address is: Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000, San Francisco, CA 94111. On the date set forth below, I
served the within documents:
ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
oO Via E-Mail: by transmitting via electronic mail the document(s) listed above to the
email address(es) set forth below.
Via Court Approved Efiling & Eservice Vendor: by transmitting via electronic
service the document(s) listed above to the parties and/or email address(es) set forth
below.
Via Facsimile: by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax
number(s) set forth below.
O
Oo Via Hand: by causing the document(s) listed above to be hand delivered to the
person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.
O
Via Fed Ex: by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, at a station
designated for collection and processing of envelopes and packages for overnight
delivery by FedEx as part of the ordinary business practices of Gordon Rees Scully
Mansukhani, LLP described below, addressed as follows:
Via U.S. Mail: by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with
postage thereon fully prepaid. in United States mail in the State of California at San
Francisco, addressed as set forth below.
Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Edward W. Choi, Esq. William L. Marder, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF CHOI & POLARIS LAW GROUP
ASSOCIATES 501 San Benito Street, Suite 200
515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250 Hollister, CA 95023
Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (831) 531-4214
Telephone: (213) 381-1515 Facsimile: (831) 634-0333
Facsimile: (213) 465-4885 bill@polarislawgroup.com
edward,choi@choiandassociates.com
Dennis S. Hyun, Esq. Larry W. Lee, Esq.
HYUN LEGAL, APC DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
Los Angeles, CA 90071 Los Angeles, CA 90071
Felephone: (213) 488-6555 Telephone: (213) 488-6555
Facsimile: (213) 488-6554 Facsimile: (213) 488-6554
dhyun@hyunlegal.com wlee@ sitylaw.com
515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
-10-
PROOF OF SERVICESan Francisco, CA 94111
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
275 Battery Street, Suite 2000
18s 1394 7436244v 1
Nu
ue
PROOF OF SERVICE
Lillian Audycki v. Stanford Health Care
Superior Court, County of Santa Clara, Case No. 19CV347173
Page Two
Iam readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal
Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business.
Tam aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal
cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for
mailing in affidavit.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
above is true and correct. Executed on Septembe: at San Francisco, California.
Mary Grogan
“lle
PROOF OF SERVICE
Preview
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 FLETCHER C. ALFORD (SBN: 152314) MICHAEL D. BRUNO (SBN: 166805) J. DOMINIC CAMPODONICO (SBN: 188035) GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 986-5900 Facsimile: (415) 986-8054 Attorneys for Defendant STANFORD HEALTH CARE FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA LILLIAN AUDYCKI, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, CASE NO. 19CV347173 ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff, vs. STANFORD HEALTH CARE, a California Corporation: and DOES | to 100, inclusive. Defendants. Complaint Filed: May 1, 2019 Defendant STANFORD HEALTH CARE (hereafter “Defendant”) hereby answers the First Amended Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) filed by Plaintiff LILLIAN AUDYCKI (“Plaintiff”) as follows: GENERAL DENIAL Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 431.30(d), Defendant generally and specifically denies each and every allegation contained in the First Amended Class Action Complaint and each and every alleged cause of action therein, and further denies that Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested. that Defendant committed any wrongful conduct or omission, whether alleged or otherwise, and that conduct or omissions of Defendant caused any injury or damage to Plaintiff in the sum or manner alleged, or in any other sum or manner, oratall. -l- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES Defendant further alleges the following separate and affirmative defenses to each and every cause of action alleged in the First Amended Class Action Complaint. By alleging the defenses set forth below, Defendant does not thereby agree or admit that it has the burden of proof, persuasion, or production with respect to any elements of any defense, or that Plaintiff has properly asserted any cause of action against Defendant. FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Failure to State a Claim) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's claims, and those of the purported class, are barred, in whole or in part, because the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant. SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Statute of Limitations) Defendant alleges that each claim alleged in the Complaint is barred by all applicable California statutes of limitations, including, but not limited to, California Code of Civil Procedure sections 337, 339, 340, and 343; California Labor Code section 1197.5; and any other applicable statutes of limitations. THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Estoppel/Waiver) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has waived and is estopped by her own actions or omissions from recovering against Defendant for the alleged loss, injury, or damage suffered by her, ifany. FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Preemption under Section 301 of LMRA) Defendant alleges that members of the putative class were or are bound by various collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”). The CBAs covers conduct, policies and labor practices in dispute in this action. The resolution of claims alleged in the Complaint requires and is substantially dependent upon an analysis and application of the terms of the CBAs. -2- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY “Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 Therefore, the claims alleged in the Complaint are completely preempted under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Lack of Justifiable Reliance) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is barred from asserting each and every purported cause of action set forth in the Complaint because she did not justifiably or detrimentally rely on any communication, conduct or omission of Defendant. SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Fault of Plaintiff, The Putative Class or Third Parties) Defendant alleges that if Plaintiff, and the purported class, sustained any damages, which Defendant denies, such damages were proximately caused or contributed to, in whole or in part, by the acts, omissions, culpable conduct, lack of due diligence, negligence, misconduct, and/or bad faith of Plaintiff, the putative class, and/or third parties, or, Plaintiff, the putative class and/or third parties otherwise were at fault. Plaintiff and the putative class, is therefore not entitled to any relief under the Complaint or under any cause of action purported to be alleged against Defendant therein, or recovery, if any, should thereby be reduced in proportion to such fault. SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Plaintiff's Own Conduct) Defendant alleges that any damages sustained by Plaintiff were caused, cither wholly or in part, by Plaintiffs own actions, inactions, or delay in acting, and said negligence comparatively reduces the percentage of fault, if any, of Defendant. EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Lack of Damages and Failure to Mitigate) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has suffered no damages as a result of any alleged act or omission of Defendant, and even if Plaintiff has suffered damages or injuries, all or some portion of said damages or injuries were caused or attributed to Plaintiffs failure to take reasonable action to mitigate said damages or injuries barring Plaintiff from recovery in this -3- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco. CA 94111 xn a action. NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Actual Case or Controversy) Defendant is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that the Complaint presents no actual case or controversy, or justiciable issue suitable for determination by this Court. TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Ill-Defined Classes) Defendant alleges that the putative classes and subclasses alleged in the Complaint are inadequately defined and not administratively ascertainable. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Plaintiff Not Similarly Situated with Putative Members of Alleged Class) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is not similarly situated with members of the putative classes and subclasses she purports to represent. Therefore, this action is not properly certified or maintained as a class action. TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Unclean Hands) Defendant alleges that the Complaint, and each purported cause of action alleged therein, is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands, where Plaintiff is not acting in good faith by bringing the instant lawsuit and has fabricated all allegations of failure to pay all wages and other wage and hour claims. This Affirmative Defense is plead in the alternative, is to be determined by the Court at trial, and Defendant reserves the right to supplement the facts stated herein after the parties have engaged in discovery. THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Laches) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is guilty of undue delay in filing and prosecuting this suit, and accordingly, this action is barred by the doctrine of laches. Mt Mf -4- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURYGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Failure to Exhaust Internal and Administrative Remedies) Defendant alleges that the Complaint and any purported cause of action alleged therein is barred by Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative and internal remedies available under state and federal laws, including, without limitation, the California Labor Code, and Defendant's internal policies and procedures. FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Predominance of Individualized Questions) Defendant alleges that individualized questions of fact and law predominate over any purported common questions in this action. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot meet the prerequisites to a class action. SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Not a Suitable Class Representative) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is not a suitable class representative. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the prerequisites to a class action. SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Difficulties of Proposed Class Action) Defendant alleges that this case is not properly maintained as a class action because of the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Question of Common or General Interest) Defendant alleges that the Complaint does not raise any question of common or general interest suitable for class treatment under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (PAGA Unconstitutional) Defendant alleges the California Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004, California Labor Code sections 2698, et seq., both on its face and as Plaintiff seek to apply it here, violates the California and United States Constitutions because it constitutes an illegal -5- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco. CA 94111 delegation of the State’s executive and/or prosecutorial power to individual litigants without oversight by the State of California or any executive or prosecutorial agency thereof, PAGA is also unconstitutional on the basis that it violates the separation of powers doctrine. TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Good Faith Conformity with Law) Defendant’s compensation of Plaintiff and others, including the information it has provided on all wage statements, has been in a good faith belief that its related practices are in conformity with both federal and state wage laws. TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Good Faith Reliance on Interpretation of Law) Defendant alleges that it acted in good faith reliance upon the reasonable interpretation of applicable law, decisions by appellate courts in California, and the opinion(s) of the office of the Labor Commissioner. As such, and without conceding that there are any violations, there exists a good faith dispute regarding the alleged violation(s). Therefore, the penalties are not warranted. TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Standing) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims contained in the Complaint. TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Preemption) Defendant alleges that federal law preempts some or all of Plaintiff's claims asserted under state law. TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Payment and Release) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff was paid in full and therefore Defendant is released from any and all continuing obligations to them. Il -6- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURYGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 TWENTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Compliance with Law/De Minimim) Defendant alleges that any recovery on the Complaint, or any cause of action contained therein, may be barred by Defendant’s compliance or substantial compliance with all applicable laws underlying Plaintiff's claim and the purported Labor Code violations, if any, were de minimis. TWENTY-SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Excessive Fines) Defendant alleges that the penalties and fines sought are unconstitutional and excessive under the United States Constitution, and specifically under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, Section 1. TWENTY-SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Failure to Perform Job Duties) Defendant alleges that each of Plaintiff's causes of action and claims for damages is barred to the extent Plaintiff failed to perform job duties pursuant to the terms and conditions of employment in conformity with cither the usage of the place of performance or as directed by his supervisors. as required by Labor Code section 2857. TWENTY-EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Consent) Defendant alleges that the relief prayed for in the Complaint is barred because Plaintiff consented to Defendant’s conduct by virtue of Plaintiff's own conduct. TWENTY-NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Mandatory Arbitration) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff may not proceed in a civil forum, as by contract between the Parties, Plaintiff has agreed to pursue all claims which are the subject of this action, via private arbitration. -7- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 THIRTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Class Action Waiver) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff may not proceed as a Class Representative, as by contract between the Parties, Plaintiff has agreed not to pursue any of the claims which are the subject of this action on a class-wide basis. THIRTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Representative Action Waiver) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff may not proceed on behalf of other “aggrieved employees” within the meaning of California Labor Code section 2699 et. seq. as by contract between the Parties, Plaintiff has agreed not to pursue any of the claims which are the subject of this action as a representative. THIRTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (No Injury-In-Fact) Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs and/or the purported class members’ claims against Defendant are barred because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability for Article III standing, cither with respect to Plaintiff or members of any putative class. THIRTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Mistake of Fact or Law) Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs and/or the purported class members’ claims are barred in whole or part to the extent that Defendant’s conduct was based upon a mistake of fact or law. THIRTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Bona Fide Errors) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's Complaint and the cause of action alleged therein are barred because the violations alleged, assuming such violations occurred, were not intentional but the result of bona fide errors notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures that Defendant adopted. -8- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP San Francisco, CA 94111 RESERVATION OF RIGHTS Defendant reserves the right to allege other affirmative defenses as they may arise during the course of discovery. WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 1. That this action be dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. 2 That judgment be entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. 3. That Defendant be awarded its costs of suit and attorneys’ fees incurred herein; and 4. For such and other further relief as this Court may deem just and proper. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL This answering Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury in the above-entitled action. Dated: September 20, 2019 GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP. By: *. ALFORD ). BRUNO J.DOMINIC CAMPODONICO Attorneys for Defendant STANFORD HEALTH CARE -9- ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIALGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA 94111 PROOF OF SERVICE Lillian Audycki v. Stanford Health Care Superior Court, County of Santa Clara, Case No. 19CV347173 Iam a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is: Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000, San Francisco, CA 94111. On the date set forth below, I served the within documents: ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL oO Via E-Mail: by transmitting via electronic mail the document(s) listed above to the email address(es) set forth below. Via Court Approved Efiling & Eservice Vendor: by transmitting via electronic service the document(s) listed above to the parties and/or email address(es) set forth below. Via Facsimile: by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set forth below. O Oo Via Hand: by causing the document(s) listed above to be hand delivered to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below. O Via Fed Ex: by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, at a station designated for collection and processing of envelopes and packages for overnight delivery by FedEx as part of the ordinary business practices of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP described below, addressed as follows: Via U.S. Mail: by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid. in United States mail in the State of California at San Francisco, addressed as set forth below. Attorneys for Plaintiff: Edward W. Choi, Esq. William L. Marder, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF CHOI & POLARIS LAW GROUP ASSOCIATES 501 San Benito Street, Suite 200 515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250 Hollister, CA 95023 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (831) 531-4214 Telephone: (213) 381-1515 Facsimile: (831) 634-0333 Facsimile: (213) 465-4885 bill@polarislawgroup.com edward,choi@choiandassociates.com Dennis S. Hyun, Esq. Larry W. Lee, Esq. HYUN LEGAL, APC DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C. 515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Felephone: (213) 488-6555 Telephone: (213) 488-6555 Facsimile: (213) 488-6554 Facsimile: (213) 488-6554 dhyun@hyunlegal.com wlee@ sitylaw.com 515 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 1250 -10- PROOF OF SERVICESan Francisco, CA 94111 Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP 275 Battery Street, Suite 2000 18s 1394 7436244v 1 Nu ue PROOF OF SERVICE Lillian Audycki v. Stanford Health Care Superior Court, County of Santa Clara, Case No. 19CV347173 Page Two Iam readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. Tam aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on Septembe: at San Francisco, California. Mary Grogan “lle PROOF OF SERVICE