Legal Document: Ivory K. Kiser v. Fort Bend County

On August 02, 2019 a Defendant Fort Bend County's Supplemental Plea to the Jurisdiction - Motion (No Fee) Doc ID# 15 was filed involving a dispute between Kiser, Ivory K., and Fort Bend County, for Injury or Damage - Other Injury or Damage in the District Court of Fort Bend County.

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Filed
4/1 3/2020 10:52 AM
Beverley McGrew Walker
Clerk
District
FortBend County, Texas
Michele Olguin

CAUSE NO. 19-DCV-2651 15

IVORY K. KISER, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff, §
sfh

v. g
434th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FORT BEND COUNTY g

Defendant, g FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS

DEFENDANT FORT BEND COUNTY’S SUPPLEMENTAL
PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

Comes now FORT BEND COUNTY, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause,

and ﬁles this its Supplemental Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss the claims set for by

Plaintiff Ivory K. Kiser (hereafter “Plaintiff “). There does not exist jurisdictional facts necessary

to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Therefore, this suit must be dismissed for lack 0f

jurisdiction. In this connection, Defendant would show unto the court as follows:

Factual Background

On July 13, 2019, Plaintiff Ivory K. Kiser alleges that he received personal injuries While

an invites atDefendant’s outdoor recreational park, Jones Creek Ranch Park in Richmond,

Texas. Plaintiff alleges that While participating in a relay race 0n the park premises, he fell into a

hole Which was concealed With sand and dirt.
II.

Summary 0f the Argument
A plea t0 the jurisdiction contests a trial court’s subj ect matter jurisdiction. State v.

Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007); Tex. Dep ’t ofParks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133

S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (TeX. 2004). Whether a trialcourt has subject matter jurisdiction is a

question of law. Holland, supra. A plea to the jurisdiction may be employed not only to
challenge whether the pleadings are sufﬁcient to confer jurisdiction, but also may

be properly employed t0 challenge the evidence supporting jurisdictional allegations. See City 0f

Magnolia 4A Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Smedley, 533 S.W.3d 297, 299 (TeX. 2017) (per curiam). Thus,

when deciding a plea t0 the jurisdiction, a court is not required t0 100k solely at the pleadings,

but may consider evidence and — as is the case here — must do so When necessary to resolve the

jurisdictional issues raised. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-28.

The standard 0f review for a jurisdictional plea based 0n evidence “generally mirrors that

0f a summary judgment under Texas Rule 0f Civil Procedure 166a(c).” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

at 228. If the conclusive evidence is undisputed, the trial court must rule on the plea to the

jurisdiction as a matter 0f law. Id. at 227-28. When a court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction over a claim, itmust be dismissed. Jansen v.Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex.

App.—H0ust0n [14th Dist] 2000, n0 pet.)

A. No-Evidence Summary Judgment Standard.

A no-evidence summary judgment motion is essentially a pretrial directed verdict motion.
See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Tex. 2003). In a no-evidence summary

judgment motion, the movant contends that there is n0 evidence 0f one 0r more essential
elements 0f the claims for Which the non-movant would bear the burden 0f proof at trial.Tex.

R. CiV. P. 166a (i). The trial court must grant the motion unless the non-movant produces

summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

As in a directed verdict context, the trial court must review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non—movant, crediting evidence favorable t0 that party if reasonable jurors

could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See Mack Trucks,

Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 583 (TeX. 2006) (citing City ofKeller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d

802, 822 (Tex. 2005)).

B. Immunity from Suit: Generally.

Governmental immunity protects local governmental entities from suits for damages

absent legislative consent. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City OfDallaS, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374-75

(2006). Fort Bend County is a political subdivision 0f the State 0f Texas and a governmental

unit as deﬁned by the Tort Claims Act, Tex. CiV. Prac. & Rem. Code, Title 5 Chap. 101.

Accordingly, Fort Bend County is immune from suit unless such immunity has been waived by

the Tort Claims Act. See City ofGalveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Tex. 2007). Whether

immunity from suit has been waived must be determined on a claim-by-claim basis. See Thomas

v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338-39 (Tex. 2006

The burden to overcome immunity lies With the plaintiff: “When suing a state entity, the

’
plaintiff bears the burden 0f proving that the court has subj ect matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Workers

Comp. Comm ’n v.Horton, 187 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, n0 pet); see also

Laﬁ’erty v. Jasper County Sheriﬁ’iv Dep N0.
’t, 09-13-00039-CV, 2013 TeX. App. LEXIS 14276,

at *1 1, 2013 WL 6146049 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, n0 pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Dallas Area
Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d540, 542 (Tex. 2003)). Governmental immunity from suit

may be asserted 0n a plea t0 the jurisdiction (see Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-28), 0r by a n0-

evidence motion for summary judgment. See Laﬂerly, supra, at *13-15 (afﬁrming no-eVidence

motion for summary judgment 0n the ground 0f governmental immunity from suit).

C. Applicability 0f the Recreational Use Statute.

The recreational use statute, (Tex. CiV. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.001 et seq.) is applicable

t0 this case. The recreational use statute was enacted t0 encourage government and private parties

t0 open their land t0 the public. Itexpressly provides that the landowner does not “assure that the

premises are safe for [recreational] purpose[s].”TeX. CiV. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.002(c) (1). The

Legislature, through the recreational use statute, sought t0 encourage landowners to open their

lands to the public by limiting their potential liability. See City 0f Waco v.Kirwz'n 298 S. W. 3d

618 (Tex. 2009).

“Recreation” has been deﬁned by the Legislature t0 include “any activity associated with

enjoying nature and the outdoors,” and even more recently the Legislature expanded the deﬁnition

to include indoor recreation, like hockey 0r skating. “Premises” includes “buildings” and

“structures.” Tex. CiV. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.001(2) and (3)(C) In premises—defect cases, the

governmental unit owes “only the duty [0f care] that a private person owes to a licensee 0n private

property.”1d. § 101.022(a).

When property is open t0 the public for “recreation,” however, the recreational use statute

further limits the governmental unit’s duty by classifying recreational users as trespassers and

limiting liability for premises defects to claims involving gross negligence, malicious intent, or

bad faith. Id. at § 75.002. In doing so, the statute elevates the burden of proof necessary t0 invoke

the Tort Claims Act’s statutory waiver. Id. §§ 75.003(d)-(g) (the recreational use statute neither
creates liability nor waives sovereign immunity, but “limits the liability 0f a governmental unit

under circumstances in which the governmental unit would be liable under [the Tort Claims Act]”);

101 .058 (the recreational use statute controls to the extent itlimits a governmental unit’s liability

under the Tort Claims Act). See Suarez v. City ofTean City 465 S. W. 3d 623 (Tex. 2015).

If premises are open t0 the public for recreational activities, the Recreational Use Statute

elevates the burden of proof required t0 invoke the Tort Claims Act’s immunity waiver by

Classifying recreational users as trespassers and requiring proof 0f gross negligence, malicious

intent, 0r bad faith. Tex. CiV. Prac. & Rem. Code § 75.002; Suarez v. City ofTexas City, 465

S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. 2015). “The combined effect 0f the tort claims act and the recreational

use statute is that the governmental unit’s sovereign immunity iswaived for a premises defect

only if the governmental unit is grossly negligent.” City ofDalhart v. Lathem, 476 S.W.3d 103,

106-107 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. denied) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225).

IV.

Evidence and Request for Judicial Notice

Fort Bend County incorporates by reference allpapers 0n ﬁle with the Court in this

cause. TeX. R. CiV. P. 58. Fort Bend County also incorporates the following “Exhibit 1” as

evidence: Deposition of Ivory Kiser dated January 27, 2020. In addition, pursuant to Texas Rule

of Evidence 201(c)(2), Fort Bend County requests the Court t0 judicially notice the pleadings

and other papers ﬁled with the Court in this cause. Speciﬁcally, Fort Bend County requests the

Court to notice Plaintiffs Original Petition, ﬁled on August 2, 2019 as well as Plaintiff’s First

Amended Petition ﬁled 0n April 1, 2020.
V.

Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Claims for Gross Negligence.

A. Essential Elements 0f Gross Negligence: Generally.

As to Plaintiff’s claims for gross negligence under the Recreational Use Statute,

immunity iswaived only if Fort Bend County:

(1) Knew about a condition 0f the property giving rise t0 an extreme degree 0f risk 0f a

serious physical injury, and

(2) Proceeded With conscious indifference t0 the rights, safety, 0r welfare of others.

Suarez, 465 S.W.3d at 627.

Element (1) 0f this test requires consideration of both the magnitude and the probability

0f the potential injury. “Extreme risk” is not a remote possibility 0f injury 0r even a high

probability of minor harm, but rather the likelihood of serious injury t0 the plaintiff. Mobil Oil

Corp. v.Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1998). Under element (2), “actual awareness

means the defendant knew about the peril, but its acts 0r omissions demonstrated that it did not

care.” Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. 2014); see also H0 v. Johnson, N0. O9-

15-00077-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1668, at 37, 2016 WL 638046 (TeX. App.—Beaumont

Feb. 18, 2016, pet. denied) (mam. 0p.) (“T0 raise a fact issue regarding willful and wanton

negligence, there must be legally sufﬁcient evidence that a defendant had actual, subj ective

awareness that conditions constituted an extreme degree of harm but the defendant nevertheless

was consciously indifferent to the rights, safety, 0r welfare 0f others”).

In this matter Plaintiff has alleged gross negligence and malicious intent and/or bad faith

on the following conduct:
a. Creation 0f an unreasonably unsafe condition;

b. Failure to maintain the premises a reasonably safe condition (sic);

c. Failure t0 correct the condition by taking reasonable measure to safe guard persons

who entered the premises;

d. Failure to warn 0r inform Plaintiff 0f the dangerous condition existing on the

premises; and

e. Other acts deemed willful, wanton or grossly negligent 0r committed in bad faith 0r

With malicious intent.

When gross negligence 0f a governmental entity is alleged, immunity is waived .under the

“recreational use” limitation t0 waiver under the Texas Tort Claims Act, only if the

governmental entity (1) knew about a condition 0f the property giving rise t0 an extreme

degree 0f risk and (2) proceeded with conscious indifference t0 the rights, safety, 0r welfare

0f others. Suarez v. City 0f Texas City 465 S.W. 3d 623 (Tex. 2015).

As demonstrated below, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims because: (1) there is

no evidence 0f either the objective 0r subjective elements 0f gross negligence, and (2) the

evidence conclusively negates both elements, and Plaintiff has failed to raise a fact issue as to

either element.

B. Extreme Degree 0f Risk (Objective Element).

The test for determining Whether the plaintiff can satisfy the obj ective element 0f gross

negligence is set out in Transp. Ins. C0. v.Mariel, 879 S.W.Zd 10, 23 (Tex. 1994):

Determining whether an act 0r omission involves extreme risk 0r
peril requires an examination of the events and circumstances from
the Viewpoint of the defendant at the time the events occurred,
without viewing the matter in hindsight. In every negligence or gross
negligence case, some injury has allegedly occurred. However, the
magnitude 0f the injury may be entirely disproportionate to the
riskiness 0f the behavior. 0r example, inadvertently dropping a
wooden board into the metal hold of a ship may constitute
negligence, but cannot be gross negligence. This is so even though
the board, upon landing, triggers a Rube Goldberg chain reaction,
eventually causing the Whole ship to explode. See In re Polemis,
[1921] 3 KB 560. If somebody has suffered grave injury, it may
nevertheless be the case that the behavior which caused it, viewed
prospectively and without the beneﬁt ofhindsight, created no great
danger. Id. (emphasis added).

C. Conscious Indifference t0 Known Risk (Subjective Element).

The subj ective element 0f gross negligence is itselfa two-part test:

(1) Actual knowledge 0f an extreme risk; and

(2) The defendant nevertheless was consciously indifferent to the rights, safety, 0r

welfare of others.

Plaintiff must prove Fort Bend County had (1) “actual, subjective awareness of the hole

in question and that conditions constituted an extreme degree 0f harm” and (2) Fort Bend County

nevertheless was consciously indifferent t0 the rights, safety, 0r welfare 0f others”).

See, e.g.,Sampson v. Univ. ofTex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 391-97 (TeX. 2016) (following

other cases in afﬁrming court of appeals immunity-based jurisdictional dismissal of premises

claims on the ground that the evidence negated Univ. 0f Tex.’s actual knowledge 0f a dangerous

condition); Vidrine v. Ctr.for the Performing Arts at the Woodlands, N0. 09-12-00378-CV,

2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11791, 2013 WL 5302654 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 19, 2013, pet.

denied) (mem. 0p.) (under licensee standard, afﬁrming no-evidence summary judgment on the

ground that the plaintiff adduced no evidence that the defendant had actual knowledge 0f the

alleged premises defect). See also Daniels v. Univ. ofTex. Health Sci. Cm, N0. 01-03-00997-

CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10401, at *10, 2004 WL 2613282 (Tex. App.—H0ust0n [lst Dist]

2004, n0 pet.) (mem. op.) (afﬁrming no evidence motion for summary judgment 0n the ground
that the plaintiff failed to adduce legally sufﬁcient evidence that Harris County actually knew 0f

the dangerous premises condition in question); Hernandez v .Gonzalez-Flores, 530 S.W.3d 253,

257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2017, pet. denied) (afﬁrming no evidence summary

judgment for landowner on actual knowledge element).

VI.

Plaintiff Testimony Negates the Essential Elements

In Plaintiff’s deposition (Exhibit 1) Mr. Kiser testiﬁes t0 the following:

Page43

Line Questions by Mr. Cannata

9 Q. You don't have any personal knowledge of any

10 evidence as how the hole got there, do you?

ll A. No.

12 Q. Could have been an animal?

l3 MR. PONCE: Objection.

l4 A. Are you asking me that?

15 Q. (By Mr. Cannata) Yes.

l6 A. Oh, I don't know.

17 Q. Okay. You just don't know, right?

18 A. I don't know.

l9 Q. You don't have any personal knowledge of any

20 evidence that anyone intentionally dug that hole, do

21 you?

22 MR. PONCE: Objection; form.

23 A. I don't know.

24 Q. (By Mr. Cannata) You don't know?
25 A. No, I don't know.

Page44
line Questions by Mr. Cannata

26 Q. You don't have any personal knowledge or any
27 evidence of anyone setting a trap for you, do you?

28 MR. PONCE: Objection; form.

29 A. No, I don't know.

30 Q. (By Mr. Cannata) You don't have any personal

31 knowledge of any evidence of anyone from the County

32 meant to cause you to have an injury, do you?

33 MR. PONCE: Objection; form.

34 A. Do I know? No, I don't know.

35 Q. (By Mr. Cannata) And you don't know of any

36 evidence that anyone from the County intended to cause

37 you any harm, do you?

38 MR. PONCE: Objection; form.

39 A. Not that I know.

4O Q. (By Mr. Cannata) You don't have any personal

41 knowledge of any evidence of anyone from the County knew

42 there was a risk of harm to you prior to you coming on

43 the premises, do you?

44 MR. PONCE: Objection; form.

45 A. Not that I know.

10
VII.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims made by Plaintiff,

Defendant Fort Bend County respectfully prays that the Court enter an order granting this plea,

dismissing the claims with prejudice, and awarding it such other and further relief t0 which it is

entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

ROY L. CORDERS, JR.
FORT BEND COUNTY ATTORNEY

By: /s/ KENNETH S. CANNATA
KENNETH S. CANNATA
SBN 03 743860
301 Jackson Street (Mail)
401 Jackson Street (Ofﬁce)
Richmond, Texas 77469
Telephone: (28 1) 34 1 -4555
Facsimile: (28 1) 341 -4557
Kenneth.Cannata@fortbendcountytx.gov
Attorney for Defendant
Fort Bend County

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy 0f the foregoing instrument
has been forwarded t0 all known counsel of record Via E ﬁle 0r Electronic Mail, this the 13th day
0f April, 2020.

/s/ KENNETH S. CANNATA
KENNETH S. CANNATA

11
EXHIBIT 1
CINDIBENCHREPORTING.COM

CAUSE NO. l9-DCV-265115

IVORY KISER ) IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS
)

FORT BEND COUNTY, )

Defendant. ) 434TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

********************************************************

ORAL DEPOSITION OF

IVORY KISER

January 27, 2020

VOLUME l OF l

********************************************************

ORAL DEPOSITION OF IVORY KISER, produced as a

witness at the instance of the Defendant and duly sworn,

was taken in the above—styled and numbered cause on

January 27, 2020, from 10:03 a.m. to 11:05 a.m., before

Cindi L. Bench, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for

the State of Texas, reported by computerized stenotype

machine at the offices of Daspit Law Firm 440 Louisiana,

Suite 2400, Houston, Texas, pursuant to the Texas Rules

of Civil Procedure and the provisions stated on the

record or attached hereto.

10701 Corporate Drive *** Suite 172 ** Stafford, Texas 77477
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l APPEARANCES
2

3 FOR PLAINTIFF(S):
4 Mr. Michael Sean Ponce
Daspit Law Firm
5 440 Louisiana, Suite 2400
Houston, Texas 77002
6 Telephone: 713.588.0383
E—mail: sponce@daspitlaw.com
7
FOR DEFENDANT(S):
8
Mr. Kenneth Cannata
9 Ms. Ruhee Leonard
Fort Bend County's Office
10 301 Jackson, 3rd Floor
Richmond, Texas 77469
ll Telephone: 281.341.4555
E—mail: kenneth.cannata@fortbendcountytx.gov

10701 Corporate Drive *** Suite 172 ** Stafford, Texas 77477
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l INDEX

2 PAGE

3 IVORY KISER
4 Examination by Mr. Cannata ........................ 4
Signature Page .................................. 5O
5 Court Reporter's Certificate ..................... 52

7 EXHIBITS

9 EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION PAGE

10 l Google Earth photo 24

ll 2 Photo of park 25

12 3 Photo of park 25

10701 Corporate Drive *** Suite 172 ** Stafford, Texas 77477
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IVORY KISER,

having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:

EXAMINATION

BY MR. CANNATA:

Q. Sir, would you please state your full name?

A. Ivory Keith Kiser.

Q. And Mr. Kiser, my name is Ken Cannata. My

colleague and I, Ruhee Leonard, represent Fort Bend

County in a lawsuit that you filed against the county.

10 You understand that, correct?

ll A. Correct.

12 Q. Have you had your deposition taken before?

l3 A. Yes.

l4 Q. In what connection was that?

15 A. Probably in years ago in a case with

l6 Carabba's.

l7 Q. Okay. Let me go over a couple of ground rules

18 with you, some of them which may seem to be familiar to

l9 you, but the first of which would be to make sure that

2O you completely verbalize your responses as opposed to a

21 nod of the head or a uh—huh or huh—uh. That way Mr.

22 Ponce and I don't have to argue later on which one it

23 was. Okay?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. And the second would be if you would let me

10701 Corporate Drive *** Suite 172 ** Stafford, Texas 77477
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know if you don't understand any of my questions, so

that I can do my best to rephrase that for you so that

you do understand. Is that agreed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so I'm going to assume that if you don't

tell me that you don't understand, that you fully

understand the question. Okay?

A. Okay.

Q. And I guess finally would be if you would

10 completely verbalize your responses, again, yes or no as

ll opposed to a nod of the head or uh—huh or huh—uh. Okay?

12 A. Okay.

l3 Q. Okay. All right. What's your date of birth?

l4 A. 7/11/17.

15 Q. And your Texas driver's license number?

l6 A. 14529157.

l7 Q. Are you a married man?

18 A. No, sir.

l9 Q. Have you ever been married?

2O A. No, sir.

21 Q. Do you have children?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How many do you have?

24 A. Two.

25 Q. And what are their names and ages?

10701 Corporate Drive *** Suite 172 ** Stafford, Texas 77477
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Preston Kiser, who just turned 32, and Trammel

Kemp, just turned -- well, he'll be turning 29.

And did you go to high school in the Houston

area?

W Yes, sir.

{D And where'd you go?

W Kemper High School.

(D How about college?

W Texas Southern University.

10 (D Did you graduate from Texas Southern?

ll W Yes, sir.

12 (D And what's your degree in?

l3 W Health Kinesiology. Education major.

l4 (D Did you get your teaching certificate?

15 W Yes, sir.

l6 (D When did you get your teaching certificate?

l7 W A year, I believe —— around early 2000 ——

18 (D Okay.

l9 W —— I don't know the exact date, but ——

2O (D I understand.

21 W —— recently I renewed it, so it's current now.

22 K) Okay. Did you play football when you were in

23 high school?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. What position did you play?

10701 Corporate Drive *** Suite 172 ** Stafford, Texas 77477
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A. Cornerback.

Q. Did you ever suffer any can concussions while

you were in high school?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. Okay. Ever had any permanent injuries from

playing football?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. Okay. Talk a little bit about your employment

background. Do you remember your first job?

10 A. First job ever in life, if I had to guess, it

ll would be Eckerd Drugs. Or Safeway. One of them, I

12 don't know.

l3 Q. Okay. You ever work at Gerland's?

l4 A. Yes.

15 Q. How about Kroger?

l6 A. Yes.

l7 Q. Okay. That would have back in high school?

18 A. Yes.

l9 Q. Okay. What do you recall of being your next

2O employment?

21 A. Possibly Pizza Hut.

22 Q. Okay. How about after Pizza Hut? I know

23 we're going back a long way.

24 A. Possibly Pappadeaux.

25 Q. Pappadeaux?

10701 Corporate Drive *** Suite 172 ** Stafford, Texas 77477
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A. If I had to guess. I don't know for sure.

Q. Okay. During that time period, did you work

at the Cheesecake Factory too?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you worked at Carabba's, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And you told me previously that's ——

your employment at Carabba's caused you to have your

deposition taken, right?

10 A. Yes.

ll Q. Okay. We'll talk a little bit more about

12 that.

l3 Did you ever work for Fort Bend ISD?

l4 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. And that was for a relatively short

l6 period of time, right?

l7 A. Yes.

18 Q Okay. What are you doing now?

l9 A. I do graphics and make T—shirts.

2O Q Okay. How long have you been doing that?

21 A Approximately —— well, off and on for over

22 10 years.

23 Q. And you did some photography work for a while?

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. Okay. And how long did you do that? Or do

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you still do that?

A. I still take pictures.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you consider yourself to

be a law-abiding citizen?

A. A law—abiding citizen? For the most part,

yes.

Q. Okay. Do you consider to have always have

been a law-abiding citizen?

A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. Do you consider yourself to be a

ll Violent person?

12 A. Violent person? No.

l3 Q. Ever been arrested?

l4 A. Yes.

15 Q. Ever been charged

Case Info

Judge

James H. Shoemake Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

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Document Filed Date

April 13, 2020

Case Filing Date

August 02, 2019

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