Motion,Ex Parte: ROBERT TWIST vs. HOCHHEIM PRAIRIE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, ET. AL.

SUBWAY REAL ESTATE, LLC VS. ROSARIO SABET, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202926 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of default judgment. At the last hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the matter may settle. No default judgment packet has been submitted and no Notice of Settlement has been filed. The matter is continued to Tuesday, September 3, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 63 for status of default judgment or settlement. The Court expects that if the matter has not settled that Plaintiff will take the necessary steps to obtain a default judgment prior to the next hearing. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Case Number: 24PSCV01041 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: PVOM LLC v. LTG South Hills LLC, et al. 1 Defendant LTG South Hills LLCs Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint; 2 Defendant LTG South Hills LLCs Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Complaint; and 3 Defendants LT Management Group and Shao Xing Max Yangs Demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint TENTATIVE RULING The Court OVERRULES Defendant LTG South Hills LLCs demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action. The Court DENIES Defendant LTG South Hills LLCs motion to strike portions of the complaint. The Court SUSTAINS Defendants LT Management Group and Shao Xing Max Yangs demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action of the complaint with 20 days leave to amend. Defendants LT Management Group and Shao Xing Max Yang are ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is a breach of contract action. On April 2, 2024, plaintiff PVOM LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants LTG South Hills LLC (LTG), LT Management Group, Shao Xing Max Yang (Shao) (collectively, Defendants), and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and specific performance. On May 3, 2024, LTG filed a demurrer to and motion to strike portions of the complaint. On the same date, LT Management Group and Shao demurred to the complaint. On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed oppositions. On July 3, 2024, LTG filed replies. On the same date, LT Management Group and Shao filed a reply. LEGAL STANDARD Demurrer A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of other pleadings. It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). ( Code Civ. Proc., § 422.10; see Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint; and for purposes of ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. ( Id. ) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian , supra , 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. ( Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 [error for court to consider facts asserted in memorandum supporting demurrer]; see also Afuso v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 859, 862, disapproved on other grounds in Moradi-Shalal v. Firemans Fund Ins. Cos . (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 [error to consider contents of release not part of court record].) A demurrer can be utilized where the face of the complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. ( Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.) The face of the complaint includes material contained in attached exhibits that are incorporated by reference into the complaint, or in a superseded complaint in the same action. ( Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; see also Barnett v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleaders allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.]) A demurrer can only be sustained when it disposes of an entire cause of action. ( Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119; Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redev . Agency (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1046.) DISCUSSION Demurrer (LTG) Meet and Confer Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), LTG was required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The Court finds LTGs meet-and-confer efforts satisfactory. (Huang Decl., ¶ 2.) First Cause of Action Breach of Contract A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff's performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant's breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom. [Citation.] A written contract may be pleaded either by its termsset out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by referenceor by its legal effect. [Citation.] ( McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) LTG demurs to the First Cause of Action for breach of contract on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action. LTG contends the complaint lacks specificity and factual support for Plaintiffs breach of contract claim. LTG contends Plaintiff has failed to identify the specific contractual provisions or terms that LTG allegedly breached and that even if the allegations are accepted as true, they fail to state a claim for breach of contract because Plaintiff has not articulated how LTGs alleged conduct constitutes a breach or how LTG has suffered damages as a result. LTG further contends Plaintiff fails to show how, when, where, and by what means the alleged representations and warranties were allegedly false. LTG also contends Plaintiff failed to attach the agreement to the complaint or otherwise articulate specific facts regarding what LTG did or did not do. In opposition, Plaintiff contends it is not required to satisfy a heightened pleading standard here because of modern discovery procedures. Plaintiff cites various paragraphs from the complaint to show that it pleaded sufficient facts to support its breach of contract claim, and notes that it need only plead the legal effect of the contract. The Court finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for breach of contract. The complaint alleges that the parties entered into a written contract for the sale of certain commercial property, that Defendants were obligated to perform certain obligations thereunder, such as prorating expenses, providing original accounting records, and transferring tenant files and property plans. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-9.) The complaint further alleges Defendants failed to perform their respective obligations and that Defendants representations were false, resulting in damages to Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 10-14.) While the Court agrees the complaint could contain more specifics, particularly regarding the representations and warranties in the PSA, Plaintiff correctly contends that a breach of contract claim is not subject to a heightened pleading requirement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1) [complaint need only allege facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language]; compare Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 [heightened pleading requirements for fraud claims].) The Complaint alleges sufficient facts regarding the failure to accurately prorate expenses, provide original accounting records, and transfer tenant files and property plans. Moreover, Plaintiff need not have attached the written contract to the complaint to state a cause of action for breach of contract. In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language. [Citation.] ( Constr. Protective Servs., Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) As noted above, the complaint adequately alleges facts to apprise the parties of the contract at issue and what LTG allegedly did or failed to do in connection therewith. (See Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 886.) Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the First Cause of Action. Second Cause of Action Specific Performance [S] pecific performance and injunctive relief a re equitable remedies and not causes of action for injuries . [Citations.] ( Mesa Shopping Ctr.-E., LLC v. O Hill (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 890, 901.) LTG demurs to the Second Cause of Action for specific performance on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action. LTG contends specific performance is a remedy to a breach of contract, and not a cause of action in and of itself. LTG contends the complaint fails to adequately plead facts demonstrating the inadequacy of monetary damages, which is necessary for injunctive relief like specific performance. LTG contends Plaintiff has monetary damages as an available remedy when specific performance is impracticable or inequitable. LTG further contends the contract must be sufficiently certain to enable the Court to determine what action is required of the parties, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated the terms of the contract are sufficiently clear and enforceable to warrant specific performance. LTG also contends specific performance is an equitable remedy granted at the Courts discretion, and that Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts or legal arguments to warrant the Courts exercise of discretion in Plaintiffs favor. In opposition, Plaintiff contends the Second Cause of Action is another count of a breach of contract which seeks the remedy of specific performance, and that LTGs argument is one of form over substance. Plaintiff contends the complaint is properly pleaded here, and that certain allegations do not lend themselves to monetary damages, such as the obligation to provide original accounting records and transfer of tenant files and property plans. Plaintiff further contends the inadequacy of the legal remedy has been properly pleaded at paragraph 17 of the complaint and that it is self-evident here what contractual terms are sought to being enforced. Plaintiff then contends whether this equitable remedy is discretionary is beyond the scope of a demurrer. The Court agrees that specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract, not a cause of action. ( Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 49; Miller v. Dyer (1942) 20 Cal.2d 526, 531; Tamarind Lithography Workshop, Inc. v. Sanders (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 571, 575. A plaintiff seeking performance of a contract must demonstrate: "(1) the inadequacy of his legal remedy; (2) an underlying contract that is both reasonable and supported by adequate consideration; (3) the existence of a mutuality of remedies; (4) contractual terms which are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce; and (5) a substantial similarity of the requested performance to that promised in the contract." ( Tamarind 143 Cal.App.3d at 575.) As such, the specific performance remedy must be tethered to a breach of contract. As discussed above, Plaintiff adequately pled a cause of action for breach of contract. Plaintiff also adequately pled a claim for specific performance. (Compl., ¶¶ 7-17.) ( See Collins v. Marvel Land Co . (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 34, 40 (Court held trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to cause of action for specific performance).) Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action. LEGAL STANDARD Motion to Strike (LTG) Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof , but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e) . (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(2).) The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading . (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. ( Id. , § 436.) DISCUSSION Motion to Strike (LTG) Meet and Confer Per Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a), LTG was required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5, subd. (a).) The Court finds LTGs meet-and-confer efforts satisfactory. (Huang Decl., ¶ 2.) Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Complaint LTG contends paragraph 11 of the complaint is improper because it fails to specify the nature of the alleged failures regarding its obligations under the contract and lacks the necessary factual detail to support a claim for relief. LTG contends paragraph 12 of the complaint is also improper because it is speculative and fails to provide any factual basis or evidence to support the assertion of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment, and such allegations require a higher standard of pleading. LTG also contends Plaintiffs allegations of false representations is unfounded, improper, speculative, and lack any objective basis. In opposition, Plaintiff contends paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint are properly pleaded. Plaintiff contends this is a cause of action for breach of contract, and that the allegations of misrepresentations simply form part of the basis of LTGs alleged breach. The Court does not find these allegations to be improper, but instead form part of the basis for Plaintiffs breach of contract claim against LTG. Paragraph 11 specifically alleges what LTG failed to do under the contract, which is necessary for a breach of contract claim. (See Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) With respect to paragraph 12 of the complaint, the Court agrees that these allegations appear to be in the vein of a fraud claim rather than breach of contract. (See Vill. Northridge Homeowners Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 913, 921 [fraud in the inducement].) Nevertheless, the Court finds these allegations provide additional context and support for the breach of contract and are not irrelevant, false, or improper. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Compl., ¶¶ 7-14.) Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion to strike with respect to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint. Request for Pre-Judgment Interest at the Legal Rate LTG contends Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support its demand for prejudgment interest at legal rates. LTG cites Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), which provides for recovery of prejudgment interest based on damages capable of being made certain. LTG contends the complaint fails to state the exact amount of damages sought and lacks sufficient factual support to demonstrate that LTG knows the amount owed or could have calculated it based on readily available information. LTG contends prejudgment interest is not a matter of right but rather an equitable remedy that should be granted only when warranted by the circumstances, which Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate here. In opposition, Plaintiff contends uncertainty or inappropriateness of prejudgment interest is not the standard, and that LTGs argument on this point goes to the merits of the action, which is beyond the scope of this motion. Plaintiff contends that this is merely one of the remedies Plaintiff seeks here as supported by its claim, and that there is nothing irrelevant, false, or improper about Plaintiffs prayer for relief. The Court finds LTGs arguments unpersuasive and unavailing. In Stein v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 565, 573, the Court held that "Where the amount of damages cannot be resolved except by account, verdict or judgment, interest prior to judgment is not allowable." Civil Code section 3287 provides, in pertinent part: (a) A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day , is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt. This section is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the state. (Civ. Code § 3287(a) (emphasis added).) The plaintiff is entitled to seek an award of pre-judgment interest on his cause of action for breach of contract since, such claim is capable of being made certain by calculation, and his right to recover is vested upon him upon a particular day. He is entitled to recover interest thereon from that day. Nothing more is needed. Moreover, Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b), provides for recovery of prejudgment interest for unliquidated damage claims. (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (b).) The complaint does not need to specify the exact amount of damages sought in order to recover them. A legal dispute concerning the defendant's liability or the proper measure of damages, however, does not render damages unascertainable. [Citations.] ( Collins v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 151.) While the exact amount Plaintiff may be entitled to could be disputed, the Court could potentially award prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the lack of specified amount of damages in the complaint does not render the request for prejudgment interest improper or subject to a motion to strike. Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion to strike with respect to Plaintiffs request for prejudgment interest on page 4 of the complaint. Request for Specific Performance LTG contends Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support a request for specific performance. LTG contends Plaintiffs request for specific performance is insufficient because it fails to establish the elements necessary for equitable relief. LTG contends Plaintiff must demonstrate having satisfied all contractual requirements and that monetary damages are inadequate to remedy the breach, and that Plaintiff has failed to do so. LTG also contends the court must consider equitable factors in determining whether to grant such relief, and that specific performance is inequitable or impractical here. LTG further contends Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that monetary damages would be inadequate here. In opposition, Plaintiff contends these are the same arguments raised in LTGs demurrer and that such arguments fail for the same reasons set forth in Plaintiffs opposition to the demurrer. Plaintiff contends the complaint is properly pleaded here and that some of the alleged breaches do not lend themselves to monetary damages, such as the obligation to provide original accounting records and transfer of tenant files and property plans. Plaintiff further contends it is self-evident here what contractual terms are being sought to be enforced, and that there is nothing irrelevant, false, or improper about Plaintiffs prayer for relief. The Court finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts to support Plaintiffs request for specific performance. As noted above, the Court finds the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for breach of contract. The subject contract allegedly required LTG to perform certain obligations, such as prorating expenses, providing original accounting records, and transferring tenant files and property plans, and that LTG failed to perform those obligations. (Compl., ¶¶ 9-11.) The complaint also alleges that Plaintiff needs those records from the Defendants for tax, accounting, and reconciliation purposes. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-17.) The court finds these allegations adequately demonstrate the inadequacy of a legal remedy for these items. (See Valley Crest Landscape Dev., Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 468, 492 [party seeking specific performance must allege facts demonstrating inadequacy of legal remedy].) Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the motion to strike as to the request for specific performance on page 5 of the complaint. DISCUSSION Demurrer (LT Management Group and Shao) Meet and Confer Per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), LT Management Group and Shao were required to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference before bringing this demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).) The Court finds LT Management Group and Shaos meet-and-confer efforts satisfactory. (Huang Decl., ¶ 2.) First Cause of Action Breach of Contract A cause of action for breach of contract requires pleading of a contract, plaintiff's performance or excuse for failure to perform, defendant's breach and damage to plaintiff resulting therefrom. [Citation.] A written contract may be pleaded either by its termsset out verbatim in the complaint or a copy of the contract attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by referenceor by its legal effect. [Citation.] ( McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489.) LT Management Group and Shao (collectively, Moving Parties) demur to the First Cause of Action for breach of contract on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action. Moving Parties contend this cause of action fails because it is clear that Moving Parties are not parties to the subject contract. Moving Parties contend the complaint lacks any specific factual allegations indicating their involvement in the contract or the subject property. Moving Parties contend there are no allegations that they were signatories to the contract or that they knew of or participated in the alleged breaches. Moving Parties also contend whether they made any misrepresentations are immaterial. In opposition, Plaintiff contends Moving Parties are alleged in the complaint to be alter egos of LTG. Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges there is a unity of interest and ownership between the Defendants and that Shao is a principal of both LTG and LT Management Group. The Court finds the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for breach of contract against Moving Parties. The Court notes that paragraph 8 alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written agreement, while paragraphs 9 through 14 refers to Defendants. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-14.) Since Plaintiff alleges that only one Defendant entered into a written agreement and did not attach a copy of the agreement, there are no facts alleged to show the Plaintiff entered into any agreement with Moving Parties. Moreover, the Complaint fails to allege sufficient specific factual allegations that support an alter ego theory of liability against Moving Parties. Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the First Cause of Action with leave to amend. Second Cause of Action Specific Performance Moving Parties demur to the Second Cause of Action for specific performance on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action. Moving Parties contend this cause of action is duplicative of Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. Moving Parties then reiterate their arguments that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for breach of contract since there is no contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Moving Parties. Moving Parties also contend that specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract rather than a standalone claim. Plaintiffs opposition does not address these arguments. Since the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for breach of contract as to Moving Parties, the Court also finds that the Second Cause of Action fails because specific performance must be tethered to a breach of contract claim. Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action with leave to amend. CONCLUSION The Court OVERRULES Defendant LTG South Hills LLCs demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action. The Court DENIES Defendant LTG South Hills LLCs motion to strike portions of the complaint. The Court SUSTAINS Defendants LT Management Group and Shao Xing Max Yangs demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action of the complaint with 20 days leave to amend. Defendants LT Management Group and Shao Xing Max Yang are ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.

MOTION TO STRIKE 2ND AMENDED CVSW2302172 MADRID VS SINGLETON COMPLAINT Tentative Ruling: Technically, the moving party is correct as to the lateness of the amendment. However, the law abhors rulings on technicalities and with the matter fully briefed, no resulting prejudice is seen by the delay in the amendment. Punitive Damages are correctly stricken until the 3COA and 5COA are perfected. Again, the Attorney’s Fees is an interpretation of contract issue at the close of litigation. As such, it is not ripe. 3. MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY CVSW2309240 SPENCER VS ALVARADO JUDGMENT OF PARTITION AND APPOINTMENT OF REFEREE Tentative Ruling: With the pending MX to set aside the default set for August 1, 2024, this current hearing is continued until that date.

CU23-03915 Petition by Defendants STEVE and ROBYN BROWN to Compel Arbitration TENTATIVE RULING The unopposed motion to compel arbitration is granted, and this action is stayed pending the completion of arbitration. The Case Management Conference set for October 02, 2024 is VACATED. The matter is set for ARBITRATION REVIEW on July 10, 2025 at 9:00 a.m., Department 7.

Case Number: 20STCV35324 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT 16220 LINDA TERRACE LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. HA TIKVA MANAGEMENT LLC, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 20STCV35324 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER FOR RELIEF FROM WAIVER OF EXPERT WITNESSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 11, 2024 On September 15, 2020, Plaintiffs 16220 Linda Terrace LLC and Scott A. Moore filed this action against Defendants Ha Tikva Management LLC and Eugene Rapaport. On January 17, 2023, the parties exchanged expert witness information. (Kalter Decl. ¶ 2.) When Defendants current handling attorney took over this case, he discovered that a withdrawal of expert witnesses was inadvertently served on Plaintiffs. (Kalter Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) On August 11, 2023 and September 7, 2023, Defendants counsel informed Plaintiffs counsel about the inadvertent disclosure. (Kalter Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Defendants counsel has never received any request to depose Defendants expert witnesses. (Kalter Decl. ¶ 7.) Defendants counsel attempted to get a stipulation for relief from waiver, but Plaintiffs did not agree. (Kalter Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) On June 12, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for relief from waiver of expert witnesses. Plaintiffs did not file any oppositions. On motion of any party who has failed to submit expert witness information on the date specified in a demand for that exchange, the court may grant leave to submit that information on a later date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.710.) Defendants provided their expert witness information on January 17, 2023, for experts Sergey Shvartsman and Tatyana Skevin. Defendants discovered the erroneous withdrawal by August 11, 2023 and notified Plaintiffs. Trial is not until October 28, 2024, and there is sufficient time for Plaintiffs to depose Defendants experts. No prejudice is shown. Accordingly, the unopposed Motion for Order for Relief from Waiver of Expert Witnesses is GRANTED. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 11th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23LBCV02290 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Complaint Plaintiff, Miraleste Canyon Estates filed this action against Defendant, Robert Beliveau for breach of CC&Rs, breach of contract, nuisance, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff filed its complaint on 12/01/23. Plaintiff filed proof of service of the summons and complaint on Defendant on 4/05/24. Defendant responded to the complaint by filing a special motion to strike on 5/31/24. 2. Motion to Strike a. Procedural History of Motion Defendant filed this special motion to strike on 5/31/24, setting it for hearing on 7/11/24. Plaintiff filed timely opposition papers on 6/27/24. On the same day, Defense Counsel substituted out of the action and Defendant commenced representing himself in these proceedings. Defendant has not, to date, filed a reply to Plaintiffs opposition. Defendant did, however, file additional declarations relating to the motion on 7/05/24, 7/08/24, and 7/09/24. b. Law Governing Anti-SLAPP Motions Pursuant to Navellier v. Sletten, (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88 89, Section 425.16 posits instead a two-step process for determining whether an action is a SLAPP. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e) (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1043). If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see generally Quilon, supra, 29 Cal. 4th at p. 67.)" Pursuant to Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn., (2006) 136 Cal. App. 4th 464, 476, In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), a plaintiff responding to an anti SLAPP motion must state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity[, supra,] 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, quoting Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412.) Put another way, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. c. First Prong of Analysis Defendant has the moving burden to establish the first prong of the analysis, which is that the complaint arises out of protected activity under the statute. Defendant contends the complaint arises out of his protected free speech and petitioning activity, including emailing public agencies to inform them of Plaintiffs embezzlement, defamation, assault, and extortion. Plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, contends the free speech and petitioning activity is merely incidental to the complaint, which is primarily based on Defendants verbal and physical intimidation and harassment of Plaintiff. The Court need not determine, in connection with this motion, whether Defendant established the first prong of the test. This is so because, as will be discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff met its burden of showing a probability of success on the merits, and therefore the threshold issue of whether the statute applies need not be determined. d. Second Prong, Probability of Success on the Merits i. Law re: Second Prong The probability of prevailing is tested by the same standard governing a motion for summary judgment, nonsuit or directed verdict. I.e., in opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, it is plaintiff's burden to make a prima facie showing of facts that would support a judgment in plaintiff's favor. Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714. The court does not weigh credibility or the comparative strength of the evidence. The court considers defendant's evidence only to determine if it defeats plaintiff's showing as a matter of law. Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. ii. Plaintiffs Burden of Proof With respect to its nuisance cause of action, Plaintiff provides evidence that Defendant uses profanity-laced verbal assaults at HOA meetings, up-ended a table during a meeting, and has engaged in violent and conflictive behavior with neighbors, including throwing their childrens toys and intentionally over-watering and leaving puddles in front of units. Plaintiff also provides evidence that Defendant has sent hundreds of emails to the Association using derogatory and defamatory attacks toward the Board and other Owners, referencing their sexual orientation. With respect to the breach of CC&Rs and breach of contract causes of action, Plaintiff provides evidence that the parties entered into a 2017 stay away agreement, which Defendant breached through the foregoing conduct. Plaintiff provides evidence that the CC&Rs prevent nuisances, which Defendants conduct, detailed above, would violate. Finally, Plaintiff shows that the claim for declaratory relief can succeed on its merits, as it rises and falls with the other claims. Defendant, in his reply declarations, disputes each of Plaintiffs showings. This serves, however, to show that there are triable issues of material fact concerning Plaintiffs claims. As discussed above, the Court does not weigh the evidence at this stage of the proceedings, and decides the matter using a summary judgment standard. The motion is therefore denied. e. Attorneys Fees Plaintiff seeks to recover its attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $5076.65. CCP §425.16(c)(1) permits a plaintiff who prevails on an anti-slapp motion to recover fees if and only if the Court finds the motion was frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. Because the action does involve Defendants rights to petition and speak, the Court finds the motion was neither frivolous nor solely intended to cause delay. The request for fees is denied. 3. Motion for Sanctions On 6/12/24, the Court held an OSC re: sanctions for failure to prosecute. The Court noted Plaintiff had filed a brief in opposition to the OSC, and set the matter for hearing as a motion on 7/11/24. The Court has read Plaintiffs attorneys 6/11/24 declaration and discharges the OSC re: sanctions, finding Plaintiff has taken steps to prosecute the case such that imposition of sanctions is not appropriate. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

S-CV-0052455 Jorrin, Christopher D. vs. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged NOTE: No party has paid advance jury fees pursuant to CCP § 631. Trial Date & Length: 12/08/25 5 day Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 11/21/25 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 11/14/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7. Per Local Rule 20.1.7 D. If a party or attorney has a conflict with future hearing dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, or opposes the future dates set in the Case Management Conference calendar notes, the party or attorney must appear at the Case Management Conference. That attorney or party must provide at least 7 days’ notice to all other parties in the case of their intent to appear at the Case Management Conference. [Effective 1/1/19] 07/15/2024 CMC in Dept. 6 at 3 PM Calendar Notes

CU23-04724 Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint; Motion to Strike TENTATIVE RULING Defendant GENERAL MOTORS, LLC demurs to the cause of action against it for fraudulent inducement in Plaintiff DARRELL WAYNE BROWN, SR.’s first amended complaint (“1AC”). Defendant additionally moves to strike the 1AC’s prayer for punitive damages. The core of the 1AC’s allegations is that Plaintiff purchased or leased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 vehicle (the “Vehicle”) from Defendant’s authorized dealership that he alleges is defective due to a faulty transmission, among other things. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of the faulty transmission and fraudulently concealed it from him. Plaintiff also presents causes of action against Defendant for violation of the Song- Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “Act”) based on the faulty transmission and other alleged defects in the Vehicle. Notice of Tentative Ruling. Defendant’s notices of demurrer and motion do not advise the recipient that the Solano County Superior Court uses a tentative ruling system, as is required under Local Rule 3.9, subdivision (d). The court cautions Defendant to provide proper notice of the tentative ruling system in future filings. Legal Standard on Demurrer. “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts, but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.) Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [ultimate facts sufficient].) The Court “assume[s] the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) Statute of Limitations. Fraud-based causes of action have a three-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) However, a fraud cause of action only accrues, and the matching statute of limitations thus only begins to run, upon the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud. (Ibid.) Also, in order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised on demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough if the complaint suggests that an action merely may be barred. (E-Fab Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316.) The 1AC states that “transmission defects” in the Vehicle, among other kinds, manifested “within the applicable express warranty period.” (1AC at ¶ 11.) This allegation does not establish a clear point at which Plaintiff became aware of transmission defects in the Vehicle and so does not on the face of the complaint establish a limitations bar. Plaintiff’s allegation that he took the Vehicle in for repairs on January 17, 2020 only mentions brake and seat belt concerns, with no clear link to the Vehicle’s transmission. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff’s other allegations of taking the Vehicle in for repairs state occurrence within the limitations period. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) Additionally, even if the allegations were read as establishing that Plaintiff experienced some form of problem with the Vehicle’s transmission more than three years before filing his original complaint, there is nothing to establish on the face of the complaint that Plaintiff was aware at any of those times that the Vehicle had the allegedly fraudulently concealed latent transmission defect causing unsteady vehicle motions and loss of control over acceleration and deceleration as opposed to an unrelated, correctable transmission issue. (Id. at ¶ 64 [effects of allegedly concealed transmission defect].) The statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement cause of action. Fraudulent Inducement. Dhital v. Nissan North America Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (Dhital) offers instructive precedent here. In Dhital the plaintiff brought a lemon law action over his Nissan vehicle’s faulty transmission and additionally alleged fraudulent inducement. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.) The trial court sustained Nissan’s demurrer on the fraudulent inducement cause of action, deciding that the economic loss rule barred the claim. (Id. at p. 835-836.) The appellate court reversed, finding both that the economic loss rule did not bar the claim and that the plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently stated fraudulent inducement (insufficiency of pleading being an alternative ground for affirming the trial court ruling that Nissan urged on appeal). (Id. at p. 845.) Fraudulent inducement is a subset of fraud and so Plaintiffs must plead the elements of fraud: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damages. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 843; Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294-295.) Fraud must always be pleaded with specificity. (Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 132.) The Dhital plaintiff’s allegations included that Nissan manufactured and distributed more than 500,000 vehicles with faulty transmissions; that Nissan knew or should have known of the faults from premarket testing and consumer complaints to both the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) and to Nissan itself; and that Nissan issued Technical Service Bulletins (“TSBs”) regarding the transmission problem. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833-834.) The Dhital court found all of this sufficient to state fraudulent inducement: the allegations stated that Nissan made vehicles with transmission defects, Nissan knew of the transmission defects and the hazards they posed, Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but did not disclose them to consumers, Nissan intended to conceal the information, and the plaintiff would not have bought the vehicle in question had the plaintiff known the information. (Id. at p. 844.) Allegations that the plaintiff bought the car from a Nissan dealership with a Nissan-backed warranty and that dealerships are Nissan’s agents for purposes of sale sufficed to state a buyer-seller relationship between the parties. (Ibid.) The court rebuffed Nissan’s argument that the plaintiff was not specific enough about what it should have disclosed where the plaintiff described the effects of the transmission defect and alleged that Nissan knew of these effects from premarket testing and consumer complaints. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s allegations in the 1AC align with those of the Dhital plaintiff. Plaintiff here describes the transmission defect at issue as causing “hard or harsh shifts, jerking, lurching, hesitation on acceleration, surging and/or inability to control the vehicle’s speed, acceleration, or deceleration.” (1AC at ¶ 64.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew or should have known of the coolant system defect from pre- and post-production market testing, consumer complaints, and warranty data. (Id. at ¶ 65.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has issued at least eight transmission defect-related TSBs between 2014 and 2019, showing its knowledge of the problem, but never informed the consumer market. (Id. at ¶ 69, fn. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s president acknowledged the existence of the transmission defect in internal discussions in 2016 and that the defect was known internally as a “neck-snapper.” (Id. at ¶ 67.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant concealed information about the transmission defect that would have changed Plaintiff’s purchase decision had it been known to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 71- 72, 75.) Plaintiff alleges obtaining the Vehicle under a warranty Defendant backed, through an authorized dealership of Defendant’s. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff’s cause of action for fraudulent inducement is adequately pled, per Dhital. Motion to Strike. Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivision (a) permits a court to strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, upon a motion or in its discretion. Irrelevant matters are those not essential to the statement of a claim or defense or not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense and demands for relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice;” therefore, a motion to strike may not be based upon extrinsic evidence such as a declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a cause of action sounding in fraud, which supports imposition of punitive damages. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a) [fraud as basis for punitive damages].) This is so even where he simultaneously alleges lemon law violations. (Anderson v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 946 [permitting punitive damages on fraudulent inducement claim alongside civil penalties on Song-Beverly claim].) Conclusion. Defendant’s demurrer is overruled. Defendant’s motion to strike is denied. Join ZoomGov Meeting https://www.zoomgov.com/j/1602210102?pwd=emlhR29SczExam56NFFqWHFvSitmZz09 Meeting ID: 160 221 0102 Passcode: 650928 One tap mobile +16692545252,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose) +16692161590,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose)