Motion-Secondary: Kashem Chowdhury v. Alain J. Derzie M.D., Neeti Misra M.D., Marni Mishler M.D., Long Island Jewish Medical Center, John Does 1-5, Jane Does, 1-5, Abc Corporations 1-5, Abc Cos. 1-5

On December 23, 2015 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Kashem Chowdhury, and Abc Corporations 1-5, Abc Cos. 1-5, Alain J. Derzie M.D., Jane Does, 1-5, John Does 1-5, Long Island Jewish Medical Center, Marni Mishler M.D., Neeti Misra M.D., for Torts - Medical, Dental, or Podiatrist Malpractice in the District Court of Queens County.

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File No: 903-6737 RLR:vy

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF QUEENS
------------------------------------------------------------------X
KASHEM CHOWDHURY, Index No. 713210/2015

Plaintiff, REPLY AFFIRMATION

-against-

ALAIN J. DERZIE, M.D.,

Defendants.
____________________ ________ _____________________________--------X

Robert L. Ryan, Jr.,Esq. an attorney duly licensed to practice law before the courts of the

State of New York, affirms pursuant to CPLR § 2106, the following to be true upon information

and belief, under the penalties of perjury:

1. That this affirmation is submitted in a reply to the affirmation in opposition of

plaintiff counsel, Justin Blitz, dated March 28, 2019, and in further support of the within motion

which seeks an order of this court pursuant to CPLR 4404; (a) setting aside the jury verdict based

upon jury misconduct and directing a new trial;or, in the alternative (b) setting aside the jury

verdict in favor of the plaintiff and directing a verdict in favor of the defendant; or, in the

alternative (c) setting aside the verdict which is against the credible evidence and directing a new

trial; or in the alternative, (d) granting a new trialon the issue of damages, or, in the alternative,

granting a substantial remittitur on the grounds that the jury's verdict of $500,000.00 for past

pain and suffering and $2,500,000.00 for future pain and suffering materially deviates from what

would be reasonable compensation for the personal injuries of the plaintiff.

JUROR MISCONDUCT

2. Your affiant set forth in the moving papers the substance of a conversation had

with the jurors following the verdict, which was held in the presence of the defendant, Dr. Derzie

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and, upon information and belief, Jeffrey Chiu, Esq., co-counsel for the plaintiff, which in

pertinent part, revealed that during deliberations the jurors utilized a ruler to measure on an

enlargement of an X-ray of the pelvis the distance between images described as Pro Tack

fastening devices and a line drawing by plaintiffs expert representing the left lateral femoral

cutaneous nerve and to measure the angle of the placement of the Pro Tacks.

3. In response to your affiant's supporting affirmation dated February 28, 2019,

plaintiffs counsel located and interrogated 5 of the 6 jurors and prepared identical Affidavits for

each juror which were all signed the same day, March 5, 2019, before the same notary. Each

juror swears under oath, in pertinent part, that he/she read the 30 page affirmation of your affiant

which includes a detailed description of the juror's misconduct and case law supporting the basis

for setting aside the verdict in favor of plaintiff and directing a new trial.The affirmation which

each swears he/she read also seeks the additional relief set forth above.

4. There is no explanation for why Juror number 6 did not sign the same affidavit.

5. In addition, Jeffrey Chiu, plaintiff's co-counsel submitted an affirmation in

opposition which indicates that while he was present he did not hear the statements made by the

jurors described by your affiant and the defendant, Dr. Derzie.

6. Rather incredibly, plaintiff counsel argues that a hearing to determine if a new

trial is warranted is now not necessary because the juror affidavits (obtained without the

supervision of the court) refute the events which concededly describe jury misconduct. The

defendants'
scenario relied upon by plaintiff to oppose the application has been created by

plaintiff's counsel. The conduct by plaintiffs counsel in locating and conducting interviews of

jurors who signed identical word-by-word verbatim affidavits raises more questions than this

opposition can describe.

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7. Your affiant submits that this Court must, at a minimum, grant the defendant's

motion without the customary post-verdict hearing, set aside the verdict and direct a new trial on

the grounds of jury misconduct pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) based on such impropriety which

substantially prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair determination of the instant application.

8. The Court of Appeals has made itclear that jurors may not impeach their verdict

by statements or testimony averring their own misconduct within or without the jury room.

People v. De Lucia, 15 N.Y.2d 294, 296 (1965). However, where an issue of juror misconduct is

raised the facts must be examined by the court to determine the nature of the material placed

before the jury and the likelihood that prejudice would result. Ryan v. Orange County Fair

Speedway, 227 A.D.2d 609 (2d Dept. 1996). Where there is evidence outside proof influenced

the verdict, there is a basis for setting aside that portion of the verdict influenced by the outside

proof. I_d. (Please also See, Maslinski v. Brunswick Hosp. Center, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 834 (2d

Dept. 1986).

9. Here, Plaintiff counsel's interference in the process by exparte communications

with jurors has destroyed this Court's ability to fairly determine the defendant's application by

inextricably tainting the procedures espoused by the Court of Appeals; to hear from the jurors

without the fear of reprisal. Surely, the jurors who already executed sworn affidavits, under

circumstances controlled are not in a position to be forthright with the court -
solely by plaintiff,

the usefulness of a hearing before the court has been soiled.

10. Surely, the actions of plaintiff's counsel may be a violation of DR 7-108

Jurors" "D"
"Communication with or Investigation of & "E", which provide in pertinent

part, as follows:

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"D. After discharge of a jury ....the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make
comments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or
service."
embarrass the juror or to influence the juror's actions in future jury
"E". A lawyer shall not conduct or cause, by financial support or otherwise, another
to conduct a vexatious or harassing investigation of either a member of the venire or
juror."
a

11. Arguably, the self-help taken by plaintiff in hunting down the jurors and having

them read your affiant's argument that juror misconduct took place is intimidating in and of itself

and certainly lends itself to a feeling of harassment. Conduct for which your affiant can find no

legitimate basis or authority to permit it. The proper procedure which was not followed by

plaintiff counsel was to allow this Court to proceed in accordance with the controlling case law

your affiant set forth in the moving papers: allow the court to determine the application to set

aside the verdict in an unimpeded fashion. It was wrong to take matters into their own hands

which has left the parties and the court with a mess that cannot be undone.

12. The case law is clear as espoused by the Court of Appeals that when a question of

juror misconduct has been raised a post-verdict hearing should be held to determine the facts and

circumstances raised by the motion. [People v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569 (2000); People v. Brown,

48 N.Y.2d 388 (1979)].

13. The Court of Appeals has declined to fashion any concrete test for assessing

claims of improper jury conduct, "because juror misconduct can take many forms, no ironclad

rule of decision is possible. In each case the facts must be examined to determine the nature of

engendered."
the material placed before the jury and the likelihood that prejudice would be

People v. Brown, 23 N.Y.S.2d 461, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 399 N.E.2d 514 (1979). The courts on the

civil side have adopted the same standard as used in the criminal courts. (Maslinski v. Brunswick

Hosp. Center, Inc., 500 N.Y.S.2d 318, 118 A.D.2d 834 (2d Dept. 1986); Razza v. Sanchez-Roda,

173 A.D.2d 594 (2nd Dept. 1991)).

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14. In Maslinski v. Brunswick Hosp. Center, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 834, 835 (2d Dept.

"malpractice"
1986) upon learning a juror copied the definition of from several outside medical

dictionaries and read them to the other jurors during deliberations, plaintiff moved under CPLR

4404a to set aside the verdict on the grounds of juror misconduct. The trial court held a hearing

at which time all of the jurors testified and the impropriety was confirmed. The ordered a new

trial holding that the misconduct tainted the jury's verdict and itwas prejudicial to the moving

party plaintiff. The appellate court affirmed noting that rule is settled that the jury may not take

with them to the jury room books and papers which were not admitted into evidence. The

"malpractice"
Appellate court also noted that once non-record definitions of were introduced

these definitions rather than the court instructions on negligence were considered.

15. When an issue of jury misconduct is raised, the particular facts must be examined

to determine the nature of the material placed before the jury in the likelihood that prejudice

would be engendered. People v. Brown, 23 N.Y.S.2d 461, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394 (1979). At the

outset we must consider whether the juror's conduct in question is to be considered improper,_Id.

at 392. In the case at bar, in light of plaintiff's self-help, that is no longer possible.

16. Generally, a jury verdict may not be impeached by proof of the tenor of its

deliberations, but itmay be upon a showing of improper influence. Maslinski v. Brunswick Hosp.

Center, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 834 (2d Dept. 1986); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, Improper

influence, of course, embraces not merely corrupt attempts to affect the jury process, but even

well-intentioned jury conduct which tends to put the jury in possession of evidence not

introduced at trial.People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388 (1974).

17. However, in all frankness, what does this Court believe a typical juror would do

when presented with a document signed by the trialattorney advising the Court that juror

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misconduct took place? It isnot a big step to conclude the juror would deny the acts described as

"misconduct"
misconduct as the word is one easily misunderstood and connotes potential

criminal implications.

18. Plaintiff has not disputed the proposition that juror misconduct requires a new

trial if the court were to find a ruler, non-record evidence, was used by the jury to conduct its

own experiment by measuring the distance between Pro Tack Fasteners and the left lateral

femoral cutaneous nerve on an enlargement of an X-ray allin contravention of the court's

instructions to only consider admissible evidence. This is a given. Instead, plaintiff argues that

holding a hearing where both parties can participate, one designed to elicit the truth, is now not

needed. It isplaintiff's contention that the affidavits of the jurors obtained through the use of

self-help in circumvention of the court is a proper basis to deny the within motion. Your affiant

the plaintiff should not be rewarded for his use of self- and in such
submits, help condoning

behavior would send a message to the bar that would have far reaching negative effects.

19. Plaintiff obstructed the court's ability to engage in a meaningful inquiry regarding

the alleged external influence on the jury immediately after the jury rendered the verdict to

determine whether testimony confirmed or denied the alleged misconduct and therefore a new

trial must be afforded to avoid injustice to the defendant. The conduct of parties, witnesses and

counsel in a case, as well as the conduct of jurors and officers of the court, may be of such a

character as not only to defeat the rights of litigants, but itmay directly affect the administration

of public justice. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-268 (1915).

20. The plaintiff's attorney has improperly and without authority boxed the 5 of 6

jurors into a position from which they cannot retreat even if questioned by the Court. A fair and

impartial post-verdict hearing cannot now be held given the influence already imposed upon the

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jurors who have read your affiant's affirmation, which raises among many things, juror

misconduct, and have executed affidavits under penalty of perjury prepared and secured by

plaintiff's counsel outside the presence of a judge.

21. To be clear, your affiant heard what the jurors said as set forth in the original

moving papers. Your affiant anticipated protocol would be followed and the Court would

conduct a post -verdict hearing as required by the Court of Appeals. The within application

would live or die by the outcome of that hearing. Unfortunately, based upon what plaintiff's

counsel has orchestrated a fair post-verdict hearing cannot be held. The Court must exercise its

discretion for the reason set forth above and set aside the verdict and direct a new trial.To do

otherwise, would sanction the self-help conduct by plaintiff which arguably may have been done

intentionally to prevent the defendant from having a fair hearing.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION FAILS TO DEMONSTATE THAT PLAINTIFF
ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL BY EXPERT TESTIMONY THE DEFENDANT
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED STANDARD OF MEDICAL PRACTICE AND
THAT SAID DEPARTURE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN CAUSING THE
PLAINTIFF'S INJURY, THUS THE COURT SHOULD SET ASIDE THE VERDICT
FOR PLAINTIFF AND DIRECT A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT; OR, IN THE
ALTERNATVE, THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE
VERDICT IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE CREDIBLE EVIDECE

22. Plaintiffs counsel has simply reiterated the very testimony relied upon by the

defendant arguing that the testimony supports a finding that the defendant committed a departure

and that said departure was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injury. This is inaccurate

inasmuch as the plaintiff in his papers merely reinforces the defendant's argument pointing out

that his expert testified as follows:

Q: What is that opinion?

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A: It ismy opinion based on a reasonable medical certainty that too many tacks were

placed. And that more importantly than that a number of these tacks put the lateral femoral

cutaneous nerve at risk. (Emphasis added.)

Q: Can you show the this slider which tacks you think were - are
jury using others,

negligently placed?

A: Yes. Any of these tacks, I would say these four are risky. (Emphasis added.)

(See Trial annexed to plaintiffs opposition papers at Exhibit H - Page
Transcript, 208,

Lines 8-25; Page 209, Lines 1-13, and see plaintiffs trial Exhibit 32, annexed to plaintiffs

opposition papers as Exhibit G).

Q: Now, the four tacks that you circled, do you have an opinion as to whether those

tacks are causing an injury to Mr. Chowdhury based upon a reasonable degree of medical

certainty?

A: It'smy opinion that one or more of those tacks is causing injury.

Q: Why?

A: The placement of the tacks is concerning .....so I have no argument with fixing

the left side. (Emphasis added.)

(See trial annexed to plaintiffs papers at Exhibit H - Page Lines 19-
transcript, reply 210,

24; please also see trialtranscript, annexed to defendant's moving papers as Exhibit A at

Pages 210, Lines 24-Page 211, 1-13).

23. The plaintiffs expert is using generalizations by stating that the tacks identified in

"risky"
the exhibits are and "concerning". The surgical expert did not opine that the placement of

the tacks were a departure from the standard of medical care, one of two a specific requirements

"why"
to establish medical malpractice. Furthermore, when the surgical expert is asked he has an

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opinion that one or more of these tacks caused an injury to the plaintiff, he rambles on about

having the hernia repaired on the left side as well as the right side being an appropriate

procedure. Frankly, he failsto answer the question; he fails to state there was a departure by

using the vague terms "risky "and "concerning". Furthermore, he does not causally connect a

departure to an injury. His conclusions are without any sound basis in medicine.

24. Plaintiffs counsel seeks to correct the deficiency in the expert's opinion by

"concerning,"
defining on his own the word to mean that there are certain tacks that are

impinging upon the nerve to which the expert agrees to this general proposition. (Plaintiff

Affirmation paragraph 20.) However, there is no follow-up question to connect which tack or

tacks the plaintiff is relying upon in utilizing plaintiffs counsel's definition of the word

"concerning"
nor a medical basis for agreeing with plaintiff counsel's definition. Again, there is

a patent disconnect between the expert's generalizations and lack of specificity as to what the

departure was by Dr. Derzie in his technique in performing the surgery and whether that

particular departure caused an injury to the plaintiff, both of which are required elements for a

malpractice action to be stated.

25. Inexplicably, plaintiffs counsel in his opposition papers admits that "it is not

possible to see a specific tack directly on Mr. Chowdhury's LFCN because there is no technology

available for anyone to see anyone's LFCN. There is no machine where one can see the nerves,

medicine."
including the LFCN, itis impossible as it stands today in modern Counsel goes on to

offer the opinion of his expert, Dr. Weiss, to confirm his proposition. (Please see plaintiffs

counsel's affirmation Paragraph 21.)

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26. This blatant admission is indicative of the plaintiffs inability to meet his burden

of proof as it requires a negative answer to the sole question submitted to the jury for

deliberations which was as follows:

Q: "Did Dr. Derzie depart from the accepted standard of medical care by

placing one or more Pro Tack fasteners in the left lateral femoral
cutaneous nerve during the performance of hernia surgery on
2013?"
November 11,

27. Since plaintiffs counsel has conceded that itis not possible to see a tack in the

"no." jurors'
plaintiffs nerve the answer can only have been reported back by the jury to be The

conclusion in answering this question in the affirmative is not only against the weight of the

evidence as admitted by the plaintiffs counsel himself; but itis made with no valid line of

reasoning or permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational people to the conclusion

reached by the jury in the basis of the evidence present at trial. Therefore, the jury verdict should

be set aside and a verdict should be entered on behalf of the defendant as the plaintiff has failed

to establish that the defendant committed a departure by placing a tack on the plaintiffs nerve

and that said departure was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, by admission. (Cohen v.

Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493,499)

28. Plaintiffs counsel through his expert Dr. Weiss implied that the use of 27 tacks by

Dr. Derzie was a departure which was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. However, a

careful reading of this topic set forth in Paragraph 23 of plaintiffs counsel's affirmation in

opposition indicates that his expert, Dr. Weiss, offers this opinion because he doesn't commonly

see 27 tacks used for the procedure that Dr. Derzie performed. However, what Dr. Weiss

commonly sees is not relevant. The only thing that is relevant is what the standard of care is for

this procedure, something that Dr. Weiss did not offer an opinion about. There is no opinion

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offered on the standard of care for the number of tacks to be used for the procedure Dr. Derzie

performed.

29. The issues for the jury in this case are whether Dr. Derzie departed from the

standard of care by placing one more or tacks in the LFCN (not whether a tack was improperly

placed or negligently placed tack -both of which could be unrelated to an injury) AND whether

the departure caused plaintiff's injury. What the expert does or does not do is his/her practice is

not dispositive. Plaintiff s counsel was unable to elicit from his experts that the placement of the

tacks by Dr. Derzie were a departure from the standard of care and that one or more of the tacks

caused an injury to the plaintiff.

30. Plaintiffs counsel pokes fun at the diagram in evidence which was used to support

the motion to set aside the verdict because his expert referred to the diagram or a portion of the

"cartoon."
diagram as a (Defendant Exhibit D in Evidence). However, the court should be

reminded that itwas the plaintiffs surgical expert Dr Weiss who decided to draw on the diagram

by circling certain images he opined were ProTacks and and his other expert, Dr. Rigney, drew a

line with a blue marker representing the location of the LFCN which was remote from the four

images circled by Dr. Weiss. It isthe law that utilizing an exhibit for your own purposes makes

ityour exhibit even if itcould be otherwise objectionable. (Pouncey v. New York City Transit

2nd
Authority, 135 A.D.3d 728, Department 2016).

"cartoon"
31. Here, plaintiff argues that the diagram is a yet both of his experts used

the exhibit to illustrate and support their opinions to the jury. In fact, it should be given great

weight that out of the approximate 50 trialexhibits many of which were enlargements of

radiographic images, the jury requested one of the enlarged images to be brought into the jury

deliberations room; namely defendant's trialExhibit D which is the enlarged X-ray image

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depicting Pro Tack Fasteners circled by the plaintiffs surgical expert Dr. Weiss and a vertical

blue line representing the LFCN drawn by plaintiffs radiologist Dr. Rigney, which is remote

form the tacks. This, by the way, is the only exhibit the jury had with them in the deliberations

when they used the ruler to measure the distance between the tacks and the blue line representing

"U" -
the nerve. (See Exhibit annexed to Plaintiff's Opposition court exhibit #4-Note from Jury)

32. Plaintiffs argument that Dr. Weiss testified that tacks were negligently placed by

"negligently"
Dr. Derzie is a misnomer since it isup to the jury to decide whether tacks were

placed. The plaintiff failed to establish from the experts that there was a departure and that said

departure was a proximate cause of the injury. It isnot enough for an expert to state that tacks

placed"
were "negligently as this is a legal conclusion that can only be drawn by the jury after

proper testimony is placed before them. Moreover, there is no testimony causally connection

any negligently placed tacks to an injury. That was not the case here as illustrated above and in

the motion papers supporting the instant application.

33. Dr. John Rigney, plaintiffs radiology expert, also failed to establish a departure o

the part of Dr. Derzie and that said departure was a proximate cause of the injuries. It should be

noted that Dr. Rigney is a radiologist who admitted that his role was interpret diagnostic images

and not to opine about the surgical technique of Dr. Derzie which is outside of his realm as a

radiologist. In fact, plaintiffs counsel made an application at the commencement of trial to

preclude the defendant's radiologist from offering testimony as to the technique used by

Dr. Derzie in performing surgery. It isquite ironic that the plaintiff proffers a position that his

radiologist is somehow entitled to opine on whether Dr. Derzie was negligent in the performance

of his surgery in light of the admission by Dr. Rigney that he was there to testify to the

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interpretation of radiological images and the plaintiffs counsel himself objected to the use of

defendant's radiologist to support Dr. Derzie's surgical technique.

34. Along these lines, your affiant objected to the question posed to Dr. Rigney as

follows:

Q: Are those tacks placed in as - were those tacks placed in your
negligently

opinion?

Mr. Ryan objection.

The Court: Overruled.

A.: Those tacks should not be placed there because of the danger ithas to the lateral

femoral cutaneous nerve. As I said, with such tremendous variability, if you don't where it'sall

the way here, it'shere. If it'shere or here.

(See trial transcript, annexed to plaintiffs opposition papers as Exhibit H at Page 300,

Lines 17-25; see Exhibit A annexed hereto trialtranscript Pages 2-4.)

35. The following representation was made by plaintiffs counsel Mr. Blitz at Page 4

of the trial transcript in connection with his motion to preclude the defendant's radiologist from

testifying as to surgical technique:

Mr. Blitz: If Imay, Your Honor, we are looking to preclude the radiologist from offering

his opinions as to the general surgical techniques in the surgery that was actually

performed by the general surgeon. We have a general surgeon coming in as we do a

radiologist, but a radiologist testifying solely as to films ---.(Emphasis added).

36. As the court can see the plaintiff deviated from his representation made to the

court at the outset of the trial by asking Dr. Rigney questions about the surgical technique as to

whether the tacks were placed "negligently". Your affiant raised the appropriate objection which

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was overruled. Plaintiff's radiologist was permitted to give testimony concerning the proprer

location of the tacks which is clearly a technique of the surgery. Nevertheless, your affiant still

maintains that plaintiffs radiologist, despite his efforts, failed to establish a departure on the part

of Dr. Derzie and that said departure was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury despite the

court's error in overruling your affiant's objection.

37. It isabundantly clear from the use of defendant's Exhibit D which annexed to the

moving papers that Dr. Rigney who used a blue marker to draw a vertical line representing the

LFCN failed to draw the line in the vicinity of any of the Pro Tacks circled by Dr. Weiss

plaintiffs surgical expert. This is a clear indication that the plaintiff did not sustain the burden of

proof in establishing that Dr. Derzie placed one or more tacks on or in the lateral femoral

cutaneous nerve which is the sole jury question presented on the issue of liability. This lack of

"no"
evidence clearly indicates that the jury should have answered that question and returned to

the courtroom. The failure of the jury to do so, should be rectified by the Court by granting the

within motion and directing a verdict indefendant's favor.

38. Dr. Rigney's ambivalence in his expert testimony on causation is clearly

demonstrated by his statement that, "I saw a total of eight tacks which I though any one of which

nerve."
could have compromised the (Plaintiff affirmation in opposition at Paragraph 28 on Page

"could"
15). The use of the is an indication that the expert is not clear. Whether something

happen"
"could is not a preponderance of the evidence but speculation. If the expert stated that

"did"
one or more of these tacks compromise the nerve, he would have arguably established his

burden of proof. However, this is not what the testimony was.

39. Similarly, Dr. Rigney testified that he could "see 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 tacks which

are too far lateral and that would make it"dangerous".

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40. Again, Dr. Rigney is ambivalent and offers speculation and not precision in

testifying. He fails to establish that one or more of the tacks were in or on the lateral femoral

"dangerous"
cutaneous nerve causing an injury. The opinion that one or more of the tacks was

was not the question presented to the jurors and cannot form the predicate for the answer the

liability question affirmatively.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY OPPOSE THE MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE VERDICT AND A NEW TRIAL BE GRANTED ON THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES OR,

Case Info

Judge

Ernest F Hart Track Judge’s New Case

Case No.

(Subscribe to View)

Document Filed Date

April 12, 2019

Case Filing Date

December 23, 2015

County

Parties

ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5 Defendant
ABC COs. 1-5 Defendant
Alain J. Derzie M.D. Defendant
BAILEY, ERIC NATHAN Attorney for the Defendant
BAILEY, ERIC NATHAN Attorney for the Defendants
BENVENUTO, THOMAS J Attorney for the Defendant
BENVENUTO, THOMAS J Attorney for the Defendants
DAVEY, BRIAN R. Attorney for the Defendant
DAVEY, BRIAN R. Attorney for the Defendants
FEMIA, RICHARD JOHN Attorney for the Defendant
FEMIA, RICHARD JOHN Attorney for the Defendants
JANE DOES, 1-5 Defendant
JOHN DOES 1-5 Defendant
Kashem Chowdhury Plaintiff
LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER Defendant
Marni Mishler M.D. Defendant
Neeti Misra M.D. Defendant
PATEL, SHEENA ASHOK Attorney for the Defendants
RYAN, ROBERT L. Attorney for the Defendant
RYAN, ROBERT L. Attorney for the Defendants
SCHNEIDER, WILLIAM SCOTT Attorney for the Defendant
SCHNEIDER, WILLIAM SCOTT Attorney for the Defendants
SCHULMAN, FREDRICK A Attorney for the Plaintiff
JUSTIN BLITZ Attorney
JEFFREY LIU Attorney
THOMAS SCHIRO Attorneys for Plaintiffs
JUSTIN LIN Attorney
JUSTIN BLOOM Attorney
MARK ABLEMAN Attorney

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Motion-Secondary: Kashem Chowdhury v. Alain J. Derzie M.D., Neeti Misra M.D., Marni Mishler M.D., Long Island Jewish Medical Center, John Does 1-5, Jane Does, 1-5, Abc Corporations 1-5, Abc Cos. 1-5

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