Document for Walker, Richard vs. Joseph, Lilianne

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Monday, July 22, 2024, line 7, DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S Motion To Compel Plaintiff Henri Guite'S Discovery Responses, For Facts To Be Deemed Admitted, And For Monetary Sanctions Pro Tem Judge David McDonald, a member of the California State Bar who meets all the requirements set forth in CRC 2.812 to serve as a temporary judge, has been assigned to hear this motion. Prior to the hearing all parties to the motion will be asked to sign a stipulation agreeing that the motion may be heard by the Pro Tem Judge. If all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the hearing will proceed before the Judge Pro Tem who will decide the motion with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. If a party appears by telephone, the stipulation may be signed via fax or consent to sign given by email. If not all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the Pro Tem Judge will hold a hearing on the motion and, based on the papers submitted by the parties and the hearing, issue a report in the nature of a recommendation to the Dept. 302 Judge, who will then decide the motion. If a party does not appear at the hearing, the party will be deemed to have stipulated that the motion will be decided by the Pro Tem Judge with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. The Pro Tem Judge has issued the following tentative ruling: No opposition filed; motion granted. The facts in the RFAs will be deemed admitted unless objection free responses are served at or before the hearing. Responses to the interrogatories and RFPDs shall be served by August 16, 2024. Sanctions of $500 awarded to Defendant. For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 302 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 302. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to davididaho14@gmail.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. = (302/JPT)

MILLER VS KPC GLOBAL CVSW2301539 MOTIONS TO COMPEL MEDICAL CENTERS, INC Tentative Ruling: GRANT all discovery motions—Verified responses, without objections, shall be served within 30 days. GRANT $2,475.00 sanctions, payable within 30 days,

PADILLA, ET AL. VS. RAWLINS, ET AL. Case Number: 23CV-0202171 Tentative Ruling on Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint: This matter is on calendar for hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. The Motion was filed on June 4, 2024. Defendant Shannon Rawlins first appeared in this action by filing his Answer on June 6, 2024. The Motion was not served on Defendant Rawlins. In the interests of justice, the Court will continue hearing on this Motion and require service of the Motion on Defendant Rawlins. This matter is continued to Monday, August 19, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 64 for further proceedings on the Motion. Plaintiff is directed to file proof of service of notice of hearing on all Defendants for the future hearing date. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

23CV-00483 Rachael Perez, et al. v. Abdul Khattak, et al. Case Management Conference Appearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remote appearance. Appear to address the status of mediation.

Defendant's unopposed Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint is Granted. Hon. George J. Abdallah, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 23TRCV03725 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling HEARING DATE: July 25, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV03725 CASE NAME: Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan v. Steven Maurice Kane, et al. MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Steven Maurice Kane TRIAL DATE: Not Set. MOTION: (1) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (3) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents (4) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission (5) Request for Sanctions Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED if not already mooted (2) MOOTED (3) GRANTED in part and DENIED in part (4) GRANTED if not mooted (5) $2,000 to be awarded to Plaintiff. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual On November 9, 2023, Plaintiff, Engelver Alejandro Rodriguez Catalan (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants, Steven Maurice Kane, Richard I Kane, Darlene Ryan, and DOES 1 through 100. The complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) General Negligence. The parties meet and confer process and background of requests, responses, and such were outlined in the Courts June tentative ruling. B. Procedural On April 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed these motions to compel further. On May 30, 2024, Defendant Kane filed an opposition briefs. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply briefs. On June 11, 2024, these motions along with the IDC were continued to June 26, 2024. On June 26, 2024, this Court conducted an IDC in light of the Courts posted tentative rulings, and CONTINUED the hearing on the motions to July 25, 2024 if any lingering issues remained after the IDC. II. ANALYSIS A. Motion to Compel Further The Court provided a discussion of the legal standards to be applied for discovery and sanctions motions in its June 2024 tentative ruling. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories Form Interrogatory No. 16.9: Form Interrogatory No. 16.9 asks whether Defendant Kane or anyone acting on Defendant Kanes behalf have any document concerning claims for personal injuries made before or after the incident by a plaintiff in this case, and asks the responder, that if s, for each plaintiff, states: (a) the source of each document; (b) the date each claim arose; (c) the nature of each claim; and (d) the name, address, and telephone number of the person who has each document. Plaintiff seeks further responses to Form Interrogatory No. 16.9 on the grounds that Plaintiff argues he is entitled to know what Defendants contentions are and where he stands on each issue related the case. The Court discussed its agreement with the principal thrust of the motion as to prior claims evidence at the IDC. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories Special Interrogatory No. 55: Special Interrogatory No. 55 asks Defendant Kane to identify any automobile collisions he had been involved in during the three (3) years prior to the incident. Although Defendant Kane originally responded with numerous objections, it appears that he is submitting to further responses as no opposition brief was filed, and in his response to Request for an IDC, he noted that he will serve further responses to this interrogatory. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether Defendant has served the offered further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents RFP No. 4: RFP No. 4 asks for Defendant Kane to produce all documents related to all cellular and telephone records, including billing statements of his, on the day of the incident. Defendant Kane objected to this request indicating that such would violate his privacy rights. The Court discussed the request and objection at the IDC. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFP No. 12: RFP No. 12 asks Defendant Kane to produce all documents involving ISO claim searches conducted with regard to Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks further discovery responses because he argues that if Defendant Kane conducted an ISO search on Plaintiff, he must produce said documents as they are not work product by the attorney. The Court disagrees. At the IDC the Court discussed this RFP as well. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFP No. 13, 17, and 18: RFP No. 13 asks Defendant Kane to produce all documents relating to his sub rosa surveillance on Plaintiff including photos, videos and reports. RFP No. 17 asks Defendant Kane to produce any and all film and/or video footage in his possession, custody, or control (or in the possession, custody, or control of his agents) of Plaintiff at any time. Lastly, RFP NO. 18 asks Defendant Kane to produce any and all audio recordings in his possession, custody, or control (or in the possession, custody, or control of his agents) of Plaintiff at any time. Defendant Kane objected to this information on the grounds that the request was in violation of Evidence Code section 785 and that it sought information protected by the attorney work product doctrine and attorney client privilege. The Court discussed this issue at the IDC and defense counsel was to inquire as to whether any surveillance videos would be approved by defendants principal to be disclosed in the spirit of attempting to resolve the case. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the principal agreed and whether further argument on this issue is required. RFP No. 16: RFP No. 16 seeks documents from Defendant Kane pertaining to claims made by any other person against him, pertaining to any motor vehicle accidents, prior to the incident. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Kanes prior driving history and claims made against him prior to the incident are relevant to the underlying incident and reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence. At the IDC the COurt discussed the potential for narrowing the time perido for this RFP and the potential relevancy of the same. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether Defendant provided a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission RFA No. 6: RFA No. 6 asks Defendant Kane to admit he has conducted an ISO search on Plaintiff. Defendant Kane objected to this arguing it is vague, ambiguous, and violates the applicable code of procedure section 2034.010, et seq. pertaining to the timing of expert witness discovery. The Court disagreed as discussed at the IDC, so at oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. RFA No. 7 and 8: RFA No. 7 asks Defendant Kane to admit he has sub rosa photos, videos, and reports on Plaintiff. RFA No. 8 asks Defendant Kne to admit he has conducted sub rose surveillance of Plaintiff. Defendant Kane objected to this arguing it is vague, ambiguous, and violates the applicable code of procedure section 2034.010, et seq. pertaining to the timing of expert witness discovery. Defendant Kane also objected noting that the request is in violation of Evidence Code section 785. The Court disagreed as discussed at the IDC, so at oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss whether the Courts tentative ruling was followed by a further verified response and whether that further response moots this motion. B. Sanctions Additionally, Plaintiff has requested monetary sanctions in connection with each of its four motions to compel further responses. For the Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories and Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Plaintiff has requested monetary sanctions as imposed on Defendant Kane and/or his counsel of record in the amount of $1,260 as to each motion ($2,520 total for the two.) At the IDC, the Court discussed the reasonableness of the claimed hours as well as the claimed justifications for several of the objections. At oral argument, the parties should be prepared to discuss the Courts tentative ruling that the Court might award $1,000 per motion ($2,000 total for the two motions), to be paid to Plaintiffs counsel on or before August 7, 2024. Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice.

CVRI2201133 GRIFFITHE vs SAMEC Motion to Compel Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff Guy Griffithe alleges that after a financial transaction with Defendants Joseph Samec and Brenda Samec went bad, they began a campaign of harassment via e-mail and social media against him. Defendant Joseph Samec began to physically stalk him and recruited Defendant Chester Bennett to assist in the campaign. Bennett is a business representative and lawyer for Defendant Local Union 47. Plaintiff filed this action on 3/25/22 and filed the First Amended Complaint (FAC) on 4/20/22. After the court sustained in part Defendant Local Union 47’s demurrer, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on 9/20/22. The SAC asserts: (1) defamation/libel per se; (2) harassment; (3) online impersonation in violation of Penal Code §528.5; (4) fraud; (5) tortious interference; (6) economic interference; (7) intentional misrepresentation; (8) negligent misrepresentation; (9) negligence; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (11) good faith and fair dealing; and (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Trial is set for 10/4/24. Plaintiff’s motions are unclear as the titles, memoranda and separate statements do not match. It appears that Plaintiff is seeking to compel further responses to special interrogatories and requests for admissions as to Defendants Joseph and Brenda Samec (based on the separate statements), while only special interrogatories as to Defendant Chester. Plaintiff contends that Defendants served improper objections and is excused from meet and confer due to the court’s order at the last IDC. The Samecs oppose the motion contending that there is no meet and confer, the separate statement is improper, it is unclear what discovery is at issue and there is no support for sanctions. Defendant Chester opposes the motion contending that there was no meet and confer; Plaintiff failed to address the law cited in support of the objections; the interrogatories were compound, conjunctive or disjunctive; there is no declaration in support of the interrogatories in excess of the Rule of 35; and his objections are proper. Chester further asserts that there is no basis for sanctions. In reply, Plaintiff repeats that the court ordered on 5/10/24 that no meet and confer was required. He contends he only provided 35 interrogatories. There are no subparts, Defendants failed to make proper objections, and there was no meaningful investigation. Analysis “Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) A party may file a motion compelling further answers to interrogatories and requests for admission if it finds that the response is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (CCP §§2030.300, 2033.290.) Unless notice of the motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response. (CCP §§ 2030.300(c), 2033.290(c).) Here, Plaintiff does not indicate when the Defendants served responses. Thus, it is not clear whether the motions are timely. The parties are required to meet and confer. (CCP §§2030.300(b), 2033.290(b).) Plaintiff asserts the court excused the meet and confer requirement. The minutes do not indicate such. The court, on 5/10/24, that the parties are not required to engage in an Informal Discovery Conference, i.e. with the court. This does not excuse the requirement of the Civil Discovery Act that requires a meet and confer. Plaintiff is required to submit a separate statement that includes the text of the interrogatory or request, the response, a statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, the text of all definitions, and other discovery responses if the request is reliant on such. (Cal. R. Ct. 3.1345.) Plaintiff’s separate statement is confusing because it appears that Defendants created numbers for each objection in response to each interrogatory. This is not the fault of Plaintiff but the fault of Defendants. However, Plaintiff’s separate statement fails to include a reason for compelling further responses as to each response. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief as to requests for admissions, they were not properly in the notice or memorandum—just the caption and separate statement. The notice of motion must state in the first paragraph exactly what relief is sought and why (what grounds). (C.C.P., § 1010; CRC rule 3.1110(a); see People v. American Sur. Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, 726.) The court generally cannot grant different relief, or relief on different grounds, than stated in the notice of motion. (See People v. American Sur. Ins. Co., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at 726; Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124.) The court will not consider the motion as to requests for admissions. 1. Interrogatories Upon a timely motion to compel further, the responding party has the burden to justify any objection or failure to fully respond to the interrogatory. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) “Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the permits.” (CCP §2030.220(a).) “If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.” (CCP §2030.220(b).) “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information….” (CCP §2030.220(c).) First, the parties appear to fight over the rule of 35. For special interrogatories and requests for admissions, they are subject to the rule of 35. (CCP §§ 2030.030(a)(1), 2033.030(a).) Plaintiff did not serve more than 35. Thus, this has no application. Second, Defendants have the burden to justify its objections and responses. The Defendants did not in opposition. The objections consist of the violation of the Rule of 35 1; boilerplate objections of compound, conjunctive, vague and ambiguous; and confusion of the word “identify.” None of these objections have merit, and the motion is granted as to the Defendants. 2. Sanctions As for sanctions, a pro per litigant cannot recover attorney fees as discovery sanctions. (Kravitz v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1019-1020.) Instead, a pro per litigant can recover costs incurred. (Id. at 1020, 1021-1022.) First, Plaintiff does not provide a basis for costs—only 1 Even if there was a rule of 35 violation, the remedy is to file a motion for protective order. (CCP §2030.040(a).) A party may not merely object on this grounds. (Cantanese v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165 (disapproved on other grounds in Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232).) in the reply does he state he spent $15,000 with prior counsel, but does not break it down. Second, Plaintiff failed to meet and confer, and therefore, shall not recover sanctions.

Case Number: 24TRCV00170 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: 8 Tentative Ruling ¿¿ ¿¿¿ HEARING DATE: July 26, 2024 ¿¿¿ CASE NUMBER: 24TRCV00170 ¿¿¿ CASE NAME: Karin Friedman v. Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, et al. ¿ MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. ¿ RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Karin Friedman TRIAL DATE: Not Set. ¿¿¿ MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint, 3 rd cause of action for negligent hiring ¿¿ Tentative Rulings: (1) SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ A. Factual ¿¿¿ ¿¿¿ On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff, Karin Friedman (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Anthony Cavuoti, LMFT, Carellon Behavioral Health of CA, Inc., and DOES 1 through 100. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Hiring. On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleging causes of action for: (1) Professional Negligence; (2) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (3) Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. The SAC is based on Plaintiffs allegation that on August 18, 2023, Plaintiff called Defendant, Carelon and spoke to a therapist regarding issues of depression and anxiety for forty-five minutes. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff contends that Carelon then emailed her on August 21, 2023 the information of two therapists, both of whom said they were a good match for her, and both of whom were men. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that she called back and asked for female therapists, and they said that none were available in her area. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Thus, Plaintiff indicates that she contacted Defendant Cavuoti to set up an initial meeting because he was the closest therapist to her location. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff notes that a few days after, she spoke with Defendant Cavuoti to explain to him that she requires consistent therapy due to her psychological disorder of depression and anxiety (among other issues). (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further notes that she told him she was adopted and suffered abuse from her mother. (SAC, ¶ 10.) After informing him of this, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti stated he was also adopted, was the same age as her, and stated that they had a lot in common, and that he could not wait to meet her. (SAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that on August 30, 2023, she had her first appointment with Defendant Cavuoti. During this initial appointment Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cavuoti spoke with her about his previous weekend in Vegas and brought the conversation back to himself when he informed Plaintiff about his own history of abuse. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff contends that she was upset by this information as she was also abused as a child. (SAC, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff notes that the conversation continuously came back to Defendant Cavuoti, and she did not get a lot of time to speak with him about her own issues. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Cavuoti abruptly and stated, our time is over. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff notes that he then opened the door and said, I know I am not supposed to do this, and proceeded to hug her while pressing her close to him while making audible, strange noises which sounded like oh, oh. (SAC, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that after she left, she had her partner pull over on the side of the road and she vomited. (SAC, ¶ 15.) As soon as she got home, Plaintiff notes she took a shower and called her psychiatrists office and told him what had happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also notes that she called Defendant Carelon and told them what happened. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Carelon apologized profusely and said they would send her more referrals, to which they subsequently sent five (5) women. (SAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff notes that she proceeded to speak with her psychiatrist weekly due to the incident, who prescribed her mediation to address her nerves in the wake of the incident. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Subsequently, Plaintiff notes that she unintentionally left her files at Defendant Cavuotis office, and he forced her into further communications to retrieve her paperwork, which caused her additional stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness. (SAC, ¶ 16.) Defendant, Carelon Behavioral Health of California, Inc. (Carelon) now files a demurrer to the SAC. B. Procedural¿ ¿¿ ¿¿ On June 14, 2024, Carelon filed a demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC. On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On July 23, 2024, Carelon filed a reply brief. ¿ II. ANALYSIS ¿¿ A. Legal Standard Leave to amend is permitted under the Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a) and section 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. ( Magpali v. Farmers Group ( 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) A motion for leave to amend a pleading must also comply with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a supporting declaration to set forth explicitly what allegations are to be added and where, and explicitly stating what new evidence was discovered warranting the amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must also include (1) a copy of the proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, subds. (a), (b).) B. Discussion Defendant Carelon demurs to Plaintiffs SAC on the grounds that it argues Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of An Independent Contractor fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. i. Meet and Confer Requirement The declaration of Kelsey A. Hill is offered in support of Carelons counsels compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. Hill declares that on April 2, 2024, she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying the defects in the FAC and asking to meet and confer. (Declaration of Kelsey A. Hill (Hill Decl.), ¶ 2.) On April 10, 2024, Hill indicates that she and her colleague, Junga Kim, met and conferred with Plaintiffs counsel and that subsequently, the FAC was amended. On June 6, 2024, Hill indicates that she sent Plaintiffs counsel an email identifying and outlining the legal arguments and bases of Carelons anticipated demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC and asking Hill to meet and confer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 7.) Hill asserts that after receiving no response to her initial email, she sent a follow-up email to Plaintiffs counsel on June 10, 2024, after which Hill and Plaintiffs counsel exchanged emails regarding the anticipated demurrer. (Hill Decl., ¶ 9.) Hill further notes that in her June 13, 2024 email, she explained that Carelons demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC is based on the same grounds as previously articulated with respect to the FAC. (Hill Decl., ¶ 10.) However, despite efforts, Hill notes that the parties were unable to reach an agreement resolving the objections. (Hill Decl., ¶ 11.) Thus, this Court finds that the parties have met and conferred in good faith prior to filing the demurrer, and the meet and confer requirements have been met. ii. Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor Carelon argues that Plaintiffs third cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor fails as a matter of law. Carelon argues that Plaintiffs cause of action is defective for three reasons: (1) first, Plaintiff fails to plead that at the time of hiring or prior to , Carelon knew or should have known Defendant Cavuoti presented an undue risk of the particular harm to which Plaintiff was allegedly exposed; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that Carelon owed her any duty of care in selecting (and recommending and referring) Cavuoti as a potential therapist; and (3) even if Carelon owed a duty of care to Plaintiff, she has not alleged that Carelon breached that duty by selecting Defendant Cavuoti as a participating provide, or that any such breach was a substantial factor in causing her injury. Generally, a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor or its employees. ( American States Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co . (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 18, 28.) However, [o]ver time, the courts have, for policy reasons, created so many exceptions to this general rule of nonliability that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions. ( Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 693.) One of these exceptions is referred to as the peculiar risk doctrine. ( Ibid .) California recognizes a cause of action that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. ( Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054, citing Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836.) The basis for such a claim is that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes. ( Capital Cities , supra , at p. 1054; Evan F ., supra, at pp. 836-837.) In Capital Cities , the Second District determined that the demurrer to the plaintiffs pleading was properly sustained because of a lack of specific factual allegations that the casting director, who allegedly drugged, beat, and then facilitated the gang rape of the aspiring actor, was previously known by the employer to act in such a fashion. Plaintiff there had only alleged that the employer knew that the casting director used his position to gain sexual favors, that the director personally used drugs, and that the use of a casting couch is common in the entertainment industry. From Capital Cities the Court finds that when a claim such as negligent hiring or negligent selection of an independent contractor is asserted, greater specificity in pleading the prior knowledge of the employer or hirer is required. In the Second Districts analysis of the demurrer there, the panel stated: knowledge that [casting director] Marshall used his position of authority to extract or to coerce sexual favors is not knowledge that he would first drug and then attack a potential employee. ( Capital Cities, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 10541055.) Applying that reasoning here, plaintiff would need to allege that Carelon knew or should have known from some prior incident, screening process, a prior claim, or otherwise that Cavuoti would discuss his own personal history of childhood abuse with a new patient, that he would make veiled romantic overtures to female therapy patients, and that he would hug, embrace, or make inappropriate physical contact with therapy patients. No allegatison of those sort are contained in the SAC. Carelon cites to CACI No. 426 (Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Retention of Employee), noting that in order to sufficiently state a claim for negligent selection of an independent contractor, a plaintiff must show among other things that the hiring defendant knew or should have known that the contractor was unfit or incompetent and that the contractors unfitness or incompetence created a particular risk of harm to other people. ( See CACI No. 426 element 2.) While Plaintiff has alleged each element of CACI 426 in conclusory fashion, more factual detail is required. For example, was Carelon aware of inappropriate behavior of Defendant Cavuoti prior to hiring him? Did other patients of Defendant Cavuoti make similar complaints to Defendant Carelon prior to him being recommended as a therapist to Plaintiff? Without more detailed facts and allegations, Plaintiff may not maintain a cause of action for Negligent Selection of an Independent Contractor. As such, this Court SUSTAINS demurrer with leave to amend. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Carelons demurrer is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend. Carelon is ordered to give notice.