Preview
DOCKET NO. HHB-CV24-5035570-S
STEVEN K. STANLEY, : SUPERIOR COURT
Plaintiff, :
: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
v. : NEW BRITAIN
:
STEPHEN R. FINUCANE, et al., : APRIL 18, 2024
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS
The Defendants, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Finucane, Attorney General William
Tong, State’s Attorney Gedansky, and Attorney Jaclyn Preville (“Defendants”) hereby respectfully
move to dismiss this case in its entirety pursuant to Prac. Book § 10-30. This Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this action for several reasons, and therefore the entire case must be
dismissed. First, the Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Second, Plaintiff’s
claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities for injunctive relief must be dismissed
as they are not cognizable. Third, any claims against Attorney Gedansky and Attorney General
Tong must be dismissed as barred by qualified immunity. Finally, Plaintiff’s entire action is barred
by Heck v. Humprhey and Taylor v. Wallace, which render the action not justiciable.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pro se litigant incarcerated within the Connecticut Department of Correction.
He brings this civil action against the Attorney General, William Tong, an Assistant Attorney
General (“AAG”), Stephen Finucane, the State’s Attorney for the Tolland judicial District,
Attorney Gedansky, and supervisory assistant State’s Attorney Jaclyn Preville. See Compl., Doc.
100.31.
Plaintiff’s complaint is long, rambling, and difficult to decipher, but it appears Plaintiff
brings the action claiming violations of his rights during a recent criminal prosecution during
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which he was convicted. Id. It is unclear the exact factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims, but he appears
to claim he was falsely arrested and certain records were improperly used during the trial at which
he was convicted. Id. Plaintiff has sued the Defendants in their individual capacities only but seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief as well as money damages. Id.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review, Motion to Dismiss.
A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process. Practice Book §10-30(a).
It “properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a
matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . .” Bellman v.
Town of W. Hartford, 96 Conn. App. 387, 393 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and
however raised.” Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of
jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke
judicial resolution of the dispute.” Goodyear v. DiScala, 269 Conn. 507, 511 (2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A]s soon as the jurisdiction of the court to decide an issue is called
into question, all other action in the case must come to a halt until such a determination is made.”
Bellman, 96 Conn. App at 392 (citing Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545 (1991)).
The issue of absolute immunity implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Bruno
v. Travelers Companies, 172 Conn. App. 717, 719 (2017). “Because the doctrine of federal
qualified immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it is an appropriate ground for granting
a motion to dismiss.” Johnson v. Rell, No. CV085016589S, 2008 WL 2930193, at *5 (Conn.
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Super. Ct. July 1, 2008), aff’d, 119 Conn. App. 730 (2010) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
299, 306 (1996) (“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established
law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of
discovery”); see also Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993) (“Unless
the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal of the action”); Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745,
761-63 (2005) (§ 1983 claim against state officer in his individual capacity was properly dismissed
on the grounds of federal qualified immunity and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “the
plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that, if proven, constitute a violation of any federal ...
constitutional provisions to which they refer in their complaint.”).
B. To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive or equitable relief against the
individual capacity Defendants, such claims must be dismissed.
As a matter of law, plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive or equitable relief against an
individual capacity state defendant, and such claims are therefore moot because the Court cannot
grant any practical relief. See Bonner v. Barone, No. 3:21-CV-0811(SRU), 2021 WL 4905437,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202949, *15 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2021) (“Claims for
prospective relief against a state official, however, may only be asserted against an official in his
official capacity. This is because, as individuals, the defendants are not authorized to take actions
on behalf of the state.”); Eason v. Walsh, No. 3:20-CV-0271(SALM), 2022 WL 326990, 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19483, *13 (D. Conn. Feb. 3, 2022) (“Plaintiff ‘cannot obtain
prospective injunctive relief from the Defendants sued in their individual capacities as
such Defendants would not have the authority to provide such relief in their individual
capacities.’”); Hinton v. Pearson, No. 3:21-CV-0863(MPS), 2021 WL 4521994, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 190649, *27; (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 2021) (“claims for prospective relief against a state official
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may be asserted against the official in his official capacity only.”); see, e.g., Paulino v. Comm’r of
Corr., 155 Conn. App. 154, 160 (2015) (“Mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which
imposes a duty on the trial court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to
the parties.”) (internal alterations omitted); Wyatt Energy, Inc., 308 Conn. at 736 (“Justiciability
requires . . . that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the
complainant. A case is considered moot if [the trial] court cannot grant the appellant
any practical relief through its disposition of the merits.”).
Plaintiff must seek injunctive or declaratory relief against a proper official capacity
defendant, and there is no such proper defendant in this case. All claims seeking injunctive or
equitable relief against the Defendants, who are all sued in their individual capacities, must be
dismissed.
C. To the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because the Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from
suit.
Absolute immunity gives “public officials entrusted with sensitive tasks a protected area
of discretion within which to carry out their responsibilities.” Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 2006). “As a general principle, a government attorney is entitled to absolute
immunity when functioning as an advocate of the state in a way that is intimately associated with
the judicial process.” Id. at 396 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976))."Courts
have extended the absolute judicial immunity afforded judges to individuals, such as prosecutors
and witnesses, who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process." Rodriguez v.
Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).
Absolute immunity determinations are made using functional analysis. Leseberg v.
O’Grady, 115 Conn. App. 18, 22 (2009). These “immunities are grounded in the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. (quoting Lombard v.
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Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 630-32 (2000)).”[A]cts arising out of, or related to,
individual cases before the judge” are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because they
are considered “judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009)."Connecticut
has long recognized the litigation privilege . . . [and has extended it] to judges, counsel and
witnesses participating in judicial proceedings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 536-37 (2013); see also Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166
Conn. App. 685, 699 cert. denied, 323 Conn. 915 (2016). “[A] government attorney is entitled to
absolute immunity when functioning as an advocate of the state in a way that is intimately
associated with the judicial process.” Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted).
“A defendant entitled to this immunity loses that privilege only if she acts ‘in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.’” Finn v. Anderson, 592 F. App'x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978)). That a defendant is
alleged to have acted erroneously, maliciously, dishonestly, in bad faith, or in excess of her
authority does not undermine absolute immunity. See ibid.; Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
1. The Defendants are entitled to Absolute Immunity due to their roles as
Prosecutors and an Assistant Attorney General.
“Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to their prosecutorial functions,
which include their actions as advocates and when their conduct involves the exercise of
discretion.” Bouchard v. Olmsted, 775 F. App'x 701, 703 (2d Cir. 2019); Leftridge v. Conn.
Judicial Branch, No. 3:22-cv-411 (JAM), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113106, at *20 (D. Conn. June
30, 2023). Even “[t]he fact that [the attorney] may or may not have engaged in questionable or
harmful conduct during the course of his representation of the State in that litigation is irrelevant.
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The immunity attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.” Barrett v.
United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986).
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, (1976), the Supreme Court held that state prosecutors
are afforded absolute immunity for all actions arising from conduct "intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. The Second Circuit has extended the absolute
immunity afforded to prosecutors to state assistant attorneys general defending civil actions against
the state and state employees. See Contreras v. Perimenis, 562 F. App'x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2014)
(affirming that Assistant Attorney General representing the Connecticut Department of Children
and Families “was entitled to absolute immunity because he was sued in his capacity as a
government advocate prosecuting child welfare cases”); Bogle-Assegai v. Comm'n on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 331 F. App'x 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding district court's dismissal
of claims against assistant attorney general “because any misstatements he is alleged to have made
were made in the course of defending the state against civil liability.”) (citation omitted). “Such
immunity exists to allow prosecutors at the state and federal level to be free to perform their
essential role in the judicial process without the possibility of civil liability hanging over their head
as a sword of Damocles.” Barese v. Clark, 62 Conn. App. 58, 61 (2001)).
Absolute immunity applies to prosecutorial job functions rather than job titles. Hill v. City
of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1995). “[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for
the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an
advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at
126 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Absolute immunity also includes a prosecutor’s decision
to bring charges and initiate a prosecution against a criminal defendant. See Perugini v. City of
Bristol, No. 3:18-CV-2095(VLB), 2019 WL 4193421, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149982, *7 (citing
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Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2005); Bahjat v. State’s Atty. Office,
No. CV 195046156, 2019 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3435, *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2019)(“a
state’s attorney’s decision of whether to initiate a criminal prosecution, [as] our Supreme Court
[has] noted . . ., that such a determination is a duty of a state’s attorney that is ‘entirely consistent
with judicial power as prescribed by [the Connecticut] constitution.’”) (quoting Massameno v.
Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 556-57 (1995)); Morneau v. State, 150 Conn.
App. 237, 265 (2014). Signing an information or arrest warrant application is similarly covered by
the cloak of absolute immunity. See Bhatia v. Gaetano, No. 3:06-CV-1771(SRU), 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25304, *7 (citing Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129); Figueroa v. Town of N. Haven, No. 3:17-CV-
0650(SRF), 2017 WL 6045421, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200298, *7 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 2017).
Absolute prosecutorial immunity also protects conduct in discovery, including failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence, or allegedly improperly using evidence at trial. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); D'Alessandro v. City of N.Y., No. 13-CV-930 (SLT), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163616, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016); Mistretta v. City of New York, No.
98-CV-2589 (ILG), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18493, 1999 WL 1129618, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
1999). “[W]hether to test for potentially inculpatory (or exculpatory) information, how and when
to disclose that information, and whether to seek to vacate [a defendant's] conviction [can all be]
exercises of legal judgment made in the 'judicial phase' of proceedings integral to the criminal
justice process” and protected by absolute immunity. Warney v. Monroe County, 587 F.3d 113,
121 (2d Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff brings this action against two State’s attorneys relating to their alleged
conduct during a criminal prosecution, including a trial at which he was convicted. All of his
allegations center around these Defendants’ choices during the course of his prosecution,
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conviction, and sentencing. Such conduct, even if inappropriate or questionable (which Defendants
vehemently dispute), is included in the shield of absolute prosecutorial immunity as it falls
squarely within the bounds of activities that are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process.’” Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S.
409, 430-31). Accordingly, this Court must dismiss all claims against the prosecutorial Defendants
as barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Attorneys general, like prosecutors, are generally absolutely immune from suit based on
discretionary decisions they make while representing the state in judicial proceedings. See
Morneau v. State, 150 Conn. App. 237, 265-66 (2014) (“Decision of attorney general and state’s
attorney not to prosecute state marshals for larceny, illegal billing, and making false statements
was consistent with judicial power prescribed by state constitution and integral part of judicial
process, and was thus afforded absolute immunity from suit. . .”); see also Mangiafico, 471 F.3d
at 397 (holding that Connecticut Attorney General was entitled to absolute immunity for declining
to represent a Department of Correction employee in § 1983 claim); Barrett v. United States, 798
F.2d at 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1986) (assistant attorney general defending state in wrongful death action
shielded by absolute immunity).
Due to the rambling and incoherent nature of the complaint, it is difficult to determine the
factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims against AAG Finucane. To the extent, however, Plaintiff
attempts to sue AAG Finucane for his conduct representing the State in any of Plaintiff’s many
frivolous lawsuits against the State or State officials,1 AAG Finucane was clearly acting “as an
1
See, e.g., Stanley v. Barone, 210 Conn. App. 239, 269 A.3d 946 (2022); Stanley v. East Hartford,
Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-17-5007494-S, 2021 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 978 (May 26, 2021), aff'd, 218 Conn. App. 903, 290 A.3d 928, cert. denied, 346 Conn.
1020, 292 A.3d 1254 (2023); Stanley v. Macchiarulo, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland,
Docket No. CV-21-5014889-S, 2021 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2053 (December 15, 2021), aff'd, 218
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advocate of the state in a way that [was] intimately associated with the judicial process.”
Mangiafico, 471 F.3d at 396. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are based upon AAG Finucane’s
conduct in any case where he defended the state or a state employee, he is entitled to absolute
immunity and Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.
2. Attorney Finucane is entitled to Witness/Testimonial Immunity.
To the extent Plaintiff sues AAG Finucane based upon his testimony as a victim of
Plaintiff’s harassment and threatening, AAG Finucane is entitled to absolute immunity. As a
complaining and testimonial witness in a criminal prosecution, Attorney Finucane is also entitled
to absolute immunity from suit for defamation and other intentional torts, including constitutional
torts under 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 543-62, 69 A.3d 880 (2013);
Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 362 (2012); Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983).
"It is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged [as] long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of
the controversy . . . As to the relevance of the statements or documents produced . . . we note that
our law provides for a very generous test for relevance." Chamerda v. Opie, 185 Conn.App. 627,
642-43, 197 A.3d 982 (2018), quoting Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn.App. 717, 724-27, 161
A.3d 630 (2017). "The effect of an absolute privilege is that damages cannot be recovered for the
publication of the privileged statement even if the statement is false and malicious." Fiondella v.
Meriden, 186 Conn.App. 552, 558, 200 A.3d 196 (2018), quoting Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166
Conn.App. 685, 699-700, 142 A.3d 1162 (2016). “[A]bsolute immunity is intended to protect,
namely, participation and candor in judicial proceedings, remains protected regardless of the
Conn. App. 905, 291 A.3d 649, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1024, 294 A.3d 1026 (2023); Stanley v.
Taylor, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47460, *11 (collecting cases); Stanley v. Scott, 2022 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1862, *14-18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2022); Stanley v. Quiros, 222 Conn. App. 390, 392,
305 A.3d 335, 336 (2023).
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particular tort alleged in response to the words used during participation in the judicial process.
Indeed, we recently noted that [c]ommentators have observed that, because the privilege protects
the communication, the nature of the theory [on which the challenge is based] is irrelevant."
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310
Conn. 627-29; See also, Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717, 727 (2017).
Such immunity exists because "[a] witness's apprehension of subsequent damages liability
might induce . . . self-censorship," either by making witnesses reluctant to come forward in the
first place or by distorting their testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S. Ct. 1108,
75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983). Such self-censorship may "deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective,
and undistorted evidence" and therefore immunity is critical to the sanctity of the judicial process.
Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
Immunity also applies in the context of witness statements to police or prosecutors. “[A]ny
statements made in connection with a police investigation are qualifiedly privileged. . . [and] such
statements, even if false, are protected in the absence of a showing of malice.” Time Was Garage,
LLC v. Giant Steps, Inc., No. LLICV106002895S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2957, at *28-29
(Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2013) (citing Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 467-68 (2007)); see also Tierinni
v. Town of E. Hartford, No. HHDCV145038158S, 2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2490, at *6 (Super.
Ct. Sep. 26, 2016) (“[A]s to the allegation that defendant made defamatory statements in his police
report and warrant application, the plaintiff fails to allege facts to overcome the qualified privilege
that is afforded to statements related to a police investigation.”).
Because absolute immunity is “justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves,
not by the person to whom it attaches,” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98
L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988), in Austern v. Chicago Board of Options Exchange, Inc., 898 F.2d 882 (2d
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Cir. 1990), it does not matter whether a defendant is a state employee or a private citizen when
providing a statement or testimony under oath as a victim of a crime. “This immunity also applies
to an assistant attorney general’s role as witness.” Leftridge v. Support Enf't Servs., No. 3:12-cv-
150 (WWE), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65994, at *17 (D. Conn. May 2, 2013) (citing Rolon, 517
F.3d 140, 145).
Plaintiff’s allegations here all stem from AAG Finucane’s actions in relation to his role as
a victim of Plaintiff’s harassment and threatening, and as a witness in Plaintiff’s criminal trial for
those crimes. It is unclear exactly what Plaintiff claims AAG Finucane did that could give rise to
a claim for relief, but regardless, all of AAG Finucane’s actions alleged in the Complaint are
encompassed within the shield of witness or testimonial immunity. Consequently, Plaintiff’s
claims are barred and must be dismissed.
D. Defendants Gedansky and Tong are entitled to Qualified Immunity because
there are no allegations to establish their personal involvement in any
constitutional violation.
“[A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 raises a question
of federal law ... and not state law. Therefore, in reviewing ... claims of qualified immunity we
are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of immunity available
to government officials.” Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 742-43 (1994) (citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)
“[B]ecause the doctrine of qualified immunity seeks to protect state actors not only from
liability, but from having to defend against protected claims, it is the obligation of the court to
consider its availability at the earliest point in the case at which that availability can be
determined.” Birch v. City of New York, 184 F. Supp. 3d 21, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), aff'd, 675 F.
App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Since “qualified
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immunity is not only a defense to liability, but also provides immunity from suit, an important part
of its benefit is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. . .” Lynch v. Ackley,
811 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2016). “Unnecessary litigation of constitutional issues also wastes the
parties’ resources.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237. “As such, the ‘driving force behind creation of the
qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that insubstantial claims against government
officials [will] be resolved’ as early as possible.” Brown v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-1018
(KBF), 2016 WL 1611502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2016), aff’d, 862 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2017)
(internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231).
“Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability if ‘(1) his conduct [did]
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions were lawful at
the time of the challenged act.’” Tuttle v. Semple, No. 3:17-CV-02037 (JAM), 2018 WL 2088010,
at *3–4 (D. Conn. May 4, 2018) (quoting Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir.
2015)). Consequently, defendants are shielded by qualified immunity if the court finds that the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated, may also be shielded if the court finds that there
was no clearly established constitutional right at issue, and may also be shielded even if clearly
established rights were violated, so long as they acted reasonably.
This doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise
power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Terebesi v. Torreso, 764
F.3d 217, 230 (2d Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity applies “regardless of whether the government
official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law
and fact.” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
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quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 565). Thus, qualified immunity “protects
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 743 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether
plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
737 (2002). “A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right
asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the determination
of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.” Siegert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
“In order to state a claim for damages under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate
the defendant’s direct or personal involvement in the actions which are alleged to have caused the
constitutional deprivation.” Roque v. Armstrong, 392 F. Supp. 2d 382, 388 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing
Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d. Cir. 1987)); see also Brown v. Rotenberg, 268 F. Supp. 3d
445, 450 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom. Brown v. Koslow, No. 17-2499, 2017 WL
7542534 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2017) (“A claim which fails to demonstrate a defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is subject to sua sponte dismissal.”). In
addition, a plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate an affirmative causal link between the action
of the supervisory official and the plaintiff’s injury. See Poe v. Leonard, 282 F. 3d 123, 140 (2d
Cir. 2002).
The Second Circuit recently and definitively clarified that only direct personal involvement
is sufficient to state a §1983 claim and therefore did away with supervisory liability:
“Following Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009), courts may not apply a special rule for supervisory liability. Rather, the
plaintiff must directly plead and prove that ‘each Government-official defendant,
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through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’ Id. at
676. . . The violation must be established against the supervisory official directly.”
Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020).
Failure to allege the personal involvement of defendants mandates a grant of qualified
immunity. See Richardson v. Semple, No. HHDCV186098918S, 2021 Conn. Super. LEXIS 275,
at *9 (Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2021) (dismissing claims based on a grant of qualified immunity because
plaintiff’s failure to allege personal involvement of DOC defendants); Edwards v. Lantz, No.
HHBCV074015952, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 138, at *9 (Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2009) (“None of
these defendants is alleged to have done anything other than occupy a supervisory position within
the Department of Corrections. That fact, by itself, is not sufficient to subject them to liability in
the face of the doctrine of qualified immunity.”).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any actual facts about Defendants Tong and Gedansky that
could establish personal involvement. At best, Plaintiff states their positions and lists their names
in the caption of the Complaint. This is not enough to state the personal involvement of these
Defendants. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of a constitutional violation against these
Defendants and because he fails this “threshold” requirement, Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 737; see also Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 221 (2010)
(holding “the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential predicate of her equal protection claim,
and, consequently, [the defendants] both are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for her §
1983 claims.”). Since qualified immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction, this matter
therefore must be dismissed. See Jan G. v. Semple, 202 Conn. App. 202, 244 A.3d 644, 653 (2021)
(affirming dismissal because the Court agreed that the trial “court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities on the basis
of the doctrine of qualified immunity.”).
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E. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the entire action because it
is barred by the Heck v. Humphrey Doctrine.
The action is unripe and not justiciable, because Plaintiff’s allegation, if found to be true,
would necessarily call into question the validity of his conviction—which has not been invalidated
in a proper forum. This action is therefore barred by the doctrines of Heck v. Humphrey and Taylor
v. Wallace. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn.
App. 43, 51-52 (2018).
“If success in a tort action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, the action
is to be dismissed unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated.” Taylor, 184 Conn. App.
43, 51. Plaintiff’s claims or allegations here, if presumed true, would undermine the validity of his
current conviction and incarceration. Plaintiff is suing the criminal prosecutors and victim in his
criminal prosecution for actions they took during his prosecution and conviction. See Compl. Doc.
# 100.31. Should Plaintiff be successful in this action and his unfounded allegations be deemed
true, it would necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s conviction is invalid, laid upon shaky ground and
improper evidence. Plaintiff cannot sue in civil court unless he first invalidates the convictions in
proper forum. See Stanley v. Scott, 2022 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1862, *14-18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug.
2, 2022) (citing Heck and Taylor). Plaintiff has not done so. Consequently, his claims here are
barred and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request this Court grant their
motion to dismiss and dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DEFENDANTS
FINUCANE, ET AL
WILLIAM TONG
ATTORNEY GENERAL
15
BY:__ _/s/ Janelle R. Medeiros
Janelle R. Medeiros
Assistant Attorney General
CT Bar No. 439341
110 Sherman Street
Hartford, CT 06105
Telephone No.: (860) 808-5450
Fax No.: (860) 808-5591
e-mail: Janelle.medeiros@ct.gov
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on this 18th Day
of April, 2024:
STEVEN STANLEY # 144056
MACDOUGALL-WALKER CI
1153 SOUTH SUFFIELD, CT
06080
_/s/ Janelle R. Medeiros ________
Janelle R. Medeiros
Assistant Attorney General
16
Preview
DOCKET NO. HHB-CV24-5035570-S STEVEN K. STANLEY, : SUPERIOR COURT Plaintiff, : : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF v. : NEW BRITAIN : STEPHEN R. FINUCANE, et al., : APRIL 18, 2024 Defendants. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS The Defendants, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Finucane, Attorney General William Tong, State’s Attorney Gedansky, and Attorney Jaclyn Preville (“Defendants”) hereby respectfully move to dismiss this case in its entirety pursuant to Prac. Book § 10-30. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action for several reasons, and therefore the entire case must be dismissed. First, the Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Second, Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities for injunctive relief must be dismissed as they are not cognizable. Third, any claims against Attorney Gedansky and Attorney General Tong must be dismissed as barred by qualified immunity. Finally, Plaintiff’s entire action is barred by Heck v. Humprhey and Taylor v. Wallace, which render the action not justiciable. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a pro se litigant incarcerated within the Connecticut Department of Correction. He brings this civil action against the Attorney General, William Tong, an Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”), Stephen Finucane, the State’s Attorney for the Tolland judicial District, Attorney Gedansky, and supervisory assistant State’s Attorney Jaclyn Preville. See Compl., Doc. 100.31. Plaintiff’s complaint is long, rambling, and difficult to decipher, but it appears Plaintiff brings the action claiming violations of his rights during a recent criminal prosecution during 1 which he was convicted. Id. It is unclear the exact factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims, but he appears to claim he was falsely arrested and certain records were improperly used during the trial at which he was convicted. Id. Plaintiff has sued the Defendants in their individual capacities only but seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as money damages. Id. II. ARGUMENT A. Standard of Review, Motion to Dismiss. A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the person, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process. Practice Book §10-30(a). It “properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . .” Bellman v. Town of W. Hartford, 96 Conn. App. 387, 393 (2006) (internal citations omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.” Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.” Goodyear v. DiScala, 269 Conn. 507, 511 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]s soon as the jurisdiction of the court to decide an issue is called into question, all other action in the case must come to a halt until such a determination is made.” Bellman, 96 Conn. App at 392 (citing Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545 (1991)). The issue of absolute immunity implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Bruno v. Travelers Companies, 172 Conn. App. 717, 719 (2017). “Because the doctrine of federal qualified immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it is an appropriate ground for granting a motion to dismiss.” Johnson v. Rell, No. CV085016589S, 2008 WL 2930193, at *5 (Conn. 2 Super. Ct. July 1, 2008), aff’d, 119 Conn. App. 730 (2010) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996) (“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery”); see also Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993) (“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal of the action”); Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn. App. 745, 761-63 (2005) (§ 1983 claim against state officer in his individual capacity was properly dismissed on the grounds of federal qualified immunity and a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “the plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that, if proven, constitute a violation of any federal ... constitutional provisions to which they refer in their complaint.”). B. To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive or equitable relief against the individual capacity Defendants, such claims must be dismissed. As a matter of law, plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive or equitable relief against an individual capacity state defendant, and such claims are therefore moot because the Court cannot grant any practical relief. See Bonner v. Barone, No. 3:21-CV-0811(SRU), 2021 WL 4905437, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202949, *15 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2021) (“Claims for prospective relief against a state official, however, may only be asserted against an official in his official capacity. This is because, as individuals, the defendants are not authorized to take actions on behalf of the state.”); Eason v. Walsh, No. 3:20-CV-0271(SALM), 2022 WL 326990, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19483, *13 (D. Conn. Feb. 3, 2022) (“Plaintiff ‘cannot obtain prospective injunctive relief from the Defendants sued in their individual capacities as such Defendants would not have the authority to provide such relief in their individual capacities.’”); Hinton v. Pearson, No. 3:21-CV-0863(MPS), 2021 WL 4521994, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190649, *27; (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 2021) (“claims for prospective relief against a state official 3 may be asserted against the official in his official capacity only.”); see, e.g., Paulino v. Comm’r of Corr., 155 Conn. App. 154, 160 (2015) (“Mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the trial court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties.”) (internal alterations omitted); Wyatt Energy, Inc., 308 Conn. at 736 (“Justiciability requires . . . that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant. A case is considered moot if [the trial] court cannot grant the appellant any practical relief through its disposition of the merits.”). Plaintiff must seek injunctive or declaratory relief against a proper official capacity defendant, and there is no such proper defendant in this case. All claims seeking injunctive or equitable relief against the Defendants, who are all sued in their individual capacities, must be dismissed. C. To the extent Plaintiff seeks money damages, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Absolute immunity gives “public officials entrusted with sensitive tasks a protected area of discretion within which to carry out their responsibilities.” Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2006). “As a general principle, a government attorney is entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as an advocate of the state in a way that is intimately associated with the judicial process.” Id. at 396 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976))."Courts have extended the absolute judicial immunity afforded judges to individuals, such as prosecutors and witnesses, who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process." Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997). Absolute immunity determinations are made using functional analysis. Leseberg v. O’Grady, 115 Conn. App. 18, 22 (2009). These “immunities are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. (quoting Lombard v. 4 Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 630-32 (2000)).”[A]cts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge” are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because they are considered “judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009)."Connecticut has long recognized the litigation privilege . . . [and has extended it] to judges, counsel and witnesses participating in judicial proceedings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 536-37 (2013); see also Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166 Conn. App. 685, 699 cert. denied, 323 Conn. 915 (2016). “[A] government attorney is entitled to absolute immunity when functioning as an advocate of the state in a way that is intimately associated with the judicial process.” Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “A defendant entitled to this immunity loses that privilege only if she acts ‘in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Finn v. Anderson, 592 F. App'x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978)). That a defendant is alleged to have acted erroneously, maliciously, dishonestly, in bad faith, or in excess of her authority does not undermine absolute immunity. See ibid.; Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. 1. The Defendants are entitled to Absolute Immunity due to their roles as Prosecutors and an Assistant Attorney General. “Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to their prosecutorial functions, which include their actions as advocates and when their conduct involves the exercise of discretion.” Bouchard v. Olmsted, 775 F. App'x 701, 703 (2d Cir. 2019); Leftridge v. Conn. Judicial Branch, No. 3:22-cv-411 (JAM), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113106, at *20 (D. Conn. June 30, 2023). Even “[t]he fact that [the attorney] may or may not have engaged in questionable or harmful conduct during the course of his representation of the State in that litigation is irrelevant. 5 The immunity attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.” Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1986). In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, (1976), the Supreme Court held that state prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity for all actions arising from conduct "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. The Second Circuit has extended the absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors to state assistant attorneys general defending civil actions against the state and state employees. See Contreras v. Perimenis, 562 F. App'x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming that Assistant Attorney General representing the Connecticut Department of Children and Families “was entitled to absolute immunity because he was sued in his capacity as a government advocate prosecuting child welfare cases”); Bogle-Assegai v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 331 F. App'x 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding district court's dismissal of claims against assistant attorney general “because any misstatements he is alleged to have made were made in the course of defending the state against civil liability.”) (citation omitted). “Such immunity exists to allow prosecutors at the state and federal level to be free to perform their essential role in the judicial process without the possibility of civil liability hanging over their head as a sword of Damocles.” Barese v. Clark, 62 Conn. App. 58, 61 (2001)). Absolute immunity applies to prosecutorial job functions rather than job titles. Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1995). “[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Absolute immunity also includes a prosecutor’s decision to bring charges and initiate a prosecution against a criminal defendant. See Perugini v. City of Bristol, No. 3:18-CV-2095(VLB), 2019 WL 4193421, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149982, *7 (citing 6 Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2005); Bahjat v. State’s Atty. Office, No. CV 195046156, 2019 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3435, *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2019)(“a state’s attorney’s decision of whether to initiate a criminal prosecution, [as] our Supreme Court [has] noted . . ., that such a determination is a duty of a state’s attorney that is ‘entirely consistent with judicial power as prescribed by [the Connecticut] constitution.’”) (quoting Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 556-57 (1995)); Morneau v. State, 150 Conn. App. 237, 265 (2014). Signing an information or arrest warrant application is similarly covered by the cloak of absolute immunity. See Bhatia v. Gaetano, No. 3:06-CV-1771(SRU), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25304, *7 (citing Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129); Figueroa v. Town of N. Haven, No. 3:17-CV- 0650(SRF), 2017 WL 6045421, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200298, *7 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 2017). Absolute prosecutorial immunity also protects conduct in discovery, including failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, or allegedly improperly using evidence at trial. See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); D'Alessandro v. City of N.Y., No. 13-CV-930 (SLT), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163616, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016); Mistretta v. City of New York, No. 98-CV-2589 (ILG), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18493, 1999 WL 1129618, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1999). “[W]hether to test for potentially inculpatory (or exculpatory) information, how and when to disclose that information, and whether to seek to vacate [a defendant's] conviction [can all be] exercises of legal judgment made in the 'judicial phase' of proceedings integral to the criminal justice process” and protected by absolute immunity. Warney v. Monroe County, 587 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff brings this action against two State’s attorneys relating to their alleged conduct during a criminal prosecution, including a trial at which he was convicted. All of his allegations center around these Defendants’ choices during the course of his prosecution, 7 conviction, and sentencing. Such conduct, even if inappropriate or questionable (which Defendants vehemently dispute), is included in the shield of absolute prosecutorial immunity as it falls squarely within the bounds of activities that are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31). Accordingly, this Court must dismiss all claims against the prosecutorial Defendants as barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Attorneys general, like prosecutors, are generally absolutely immune from suit based on discretionary decisions they make while representing the state in judicial proceedings. See Morneau v. State, 150 Conn. App. 237, 265-66 (2014) (“Decision of attorney general and state’s attorney not to prosecute state marshals for larceny, illegal billing, and making false statements was consistent with judicial power prescribed by state constitution and integral part of judicial process, and was thus afforded absolute immunity from suit. . .”); see also Mangiafico, 471 F.3d at 397 (holding that Connecticut Attorney General was entitled to absolute immunity for declining to represent a Department of Correction employee in § 1983 claim); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d at 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1986) (assistant attorney general defending state in wrongful death action shielded by absolute immunity). Due to the rambling and incoherent nature of the complaint, it is difficult to determine the factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims against AAG Finucane. To the extent, however, Plaintiff attempts to sue AAG Finucane for his conduct representing the State in any of Plaintiff’s many frivolous lawsuits against the State or State officials,1 AAG Finucane was clearly acting “as an 1 See, e.g., Stanley v. Barone, 210 Conn. App. 239, 269 A.3d 946 (2022); Stanley v. East Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-17-5007494-S, 2021 Conn. Super. LEXIS 978 (May 26, 2021), aff'd, 218 Conn. App. 903, 290 A.3d 928, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1020, 292 A.3d 1254 (2023); Stanley v. Macchiarulo, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-21-5014889-S, 2021 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2053 (December 15, 2021), aff'd, 218 8 advocate of the state in a way that [was] intimately associated with the judicial process.” Mangiafico, 471 F.3d at 396. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are based upon AAG Finucane’s conduct in any case where he defended the state or a state employee, he is entitled to absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. 2. Attorney Finucane is entitled to Witness/Testimonial Immunity. To the extent Plaintiff sues AAG Finucane based upon his testimony as a victim of Plaintiff’s harassment and threatening, AAG Finucane is entitled to absolute immunity. As a complaining and testimonial witness in a criminal prosecution, Attorney Finucane is also entitled to absolute immunity from suit for defamation and other intentional torts, including constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 543-62, 69 A.3d 880 (2013); Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 362 (2012); Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983). "It is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged [as] long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy . . . As to the relevance of the statements or documents produced . . . we note that our law provides for a very generous test for relevance." Chamerda v. Opie, 185 Conn.App. 627, 642-43, 197 A.3d 982 (2018), quoting Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn.App. 717, 724-27, 161 A.3d 630 (2017). "The effect of an absolute privilege is that damages cannot be recovered for the publication of the privileged statement even if the statement is false and malicious." Fiondella v. Meriden, 186 Conn.App. 552, 558, 200 A.3d 196 (2018), quoting Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166 Conn.App. 685, 699-700, 142 A.3d 1162 (2016). “[A]bsolute immunity is intended to protect, namely, participation and candor in judicial proceedings, remains protected regardless of the Conn. App. 905, 291 A.3d 649, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1024, 294 A.3d 1026 (2023); Stanley v. Taylor, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47460, *11 (collecting cases); Stanley v. Scott, 2022 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1862, *14-18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2022); Stanley v. Quiros, 222 Conn. App. 390, 392, 305 A.3d 335, 336 (2023). 9 particular tort alleged in response to the words used during participation in the judicial process. Indeed, we recently noted that [c]ommentators have observed that, because the privilege protects the communication, the nature of the theory [on which the challenge is based] is irrelevant." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 310 Conn. 627-29; See also, Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717, 727 (2017). Such immunity exists because "[a] witness's apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce . . . self-censorship," either by making witnesses reluctant to come forward in the first place or by distorting their testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983). Such self-censorship may "deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence" and therefore immunity is critical to the sanctity of the judicial process. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008). Immunity also applies in the context of witness statements to police or prosecutors. “[A]ny statements made in connection with a police investigation are qualifiedly privileged. . . [and] such statements, even if false, are protected in the absence of a showing of malice.” Time Was Garage, LLC v. Giant Steps, Inc., No. LLICV106002895S, 2013 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2957, at *28-29 (Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2013) (citing Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 467-68 (2007)); see also Tierinni v. Town of E. Hartford, No. HHDCV145038158S, 2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2490, at *6 (Super. Ct. Sep. 26, 2016) (“[A]s to the allegation that defendant made defamatory statements in his police report and warrant application, the plaintiff fails to allege facts to overcome the qualified privilege that is afforded to statements related to a police investigation.”). Because absolute immunity is “justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches,” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988), in Austern v. Chicago Board of Options Exchange, Inc., 898 F.2d 882 (2d 10 Cir. 1990), it does not matter whether a defendant is a state employee or a private citizen when providing a statement or testimony under oath as a victim of a crime. “This immunity also applies to an assistant attorney general’s role as witness.” Leftridge v. Support Enf't Servs., No. 3:12-cv- 150 (WWE), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65994, at *17 (D. Conn. May 2, 2013) (citing Rolon, 517 F.3d 140, 145). Plaintiff’s allegations here all stem from AAG Finucane’s actions in relation to his role as a victim of Plaintiff’s harassment and threatening, and as a witness in Plaintiff’s criminal trial for those crimes. It is unclear exactly what Plaintiff claims AAG Finucane did that could give rise to a claim for relief, but regardless, all of AAG Finucane’s actions alleged in the Complaint are encompassed within the shield of witness or testimonial immunity. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims are barred and must be dismissed. D. Defendants Gedansky and Tong are entitled to Qualified Immunity because there are no allegations to establish their personal involvement in any constitutional violation. “[A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 raises a question of federal law ... and not state law. Therefore, in reviewing ... claims of qualified immunity we are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of immunity available to government officials.” Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 742-43 (1994) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) “[B]ecause the doctrine of qualified immunity seeks to protect state actors not only from liability, but from having to defend against protected claims, it is the obligation of the court to consider its availability at the earliest point in the case at which that availability can be determined.” Birch v. City of New York, 184 F. Supp. 3d 21, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), aff'd, 675 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Since “qualified 11 immunity is not only a defense to liability, but also provides immunity from suit, an important part of its benefit is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. . .” Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2016). “Unnecessary litigation of constitutional issues also wastes the parties’ resources.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237. “As such, the ‘driving force behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that insubstantial claims against government officials [will] be resolved’ as early as possible.” Brown v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-1018 (KBF), 2016 WL 1611502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2016), aff’d, 862 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). “Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability if ‘(1) his conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act.’” Tuttle v. Semple, No. 3:17-CV-02037 (JAM), 2018 WL 2088010, at *3–4 (D. Conn. May 4, 2018) (quoting Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 2015)). Consequently, defendants are shielded by qualified immunity if the court finds that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated, may also be shielded if the court finds that there was no clearly established constitutional right at issue, and may also be shielded even if clearly established rights were violated, so long as they acted reasonably. This doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 230 (2d Cir. 2014). Qualified immunity applies “regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal 12 quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 565). Thus, qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 743 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002). “A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). “In order to state a claim for damages under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant’s direct or personal involvement in the actions which are alleged to have caused the constitutional deprivation.” Roque v. Armstrong, 392 F. Supp. 2d 382, 388 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 196 (2d. Cir. 1987)); see also Brown v. Rotenberg, 268 F. Supp. 3d 445, 450 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom. Brown v. Koslow, No. 17-2499, 2017 WL 7542534 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2017) (“A claim which fails to demonstrate a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation is subject to sua sponte dismissal.”). In addition, a plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate an affirmative causal link between the action of the supervisory official and the plaintiff’s injury. See Poe v. Leonard, 282 F. 3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002). The Second Circuit recently and definitively clarified that only direct personal involvement is sufficient to state a §1983 claim and therefore did away with supervisory liability: “Following Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009), courts may not apply a special rule for supervisory liability. Rather, the plaintiff must directly plead and prove that ‘each Government-official defendant, 13 through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’ Id. at 676. . . The violation must be established against the supervisory official directly.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). Failure to allege the personal involvement of defendants mandates a grant of qualified immunity. See Richardson v. Semple, No. HHDCV186098918S, 2021 Conn. Super. LEXIS 275, at *9 (Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2021) (dismissing claims based on a grant of qualified immunity because plaintiff’s failure to allege personal involvement of DOC defendants); Edwards v. Lantz, No. HHBCV074015952, 2009 Conn. Super. LEXIS 138, at *9 (Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2009) (“None of these defendants is alleged to have done anything other than occupy a supervisory position within the Department of Corrections. That fact, by itself, is not sufficient to subject them to liability in the face of the doctrine of qualified immunity.”). Here, Plaintiff does not allege any actual facts about Defendants Tong and Gedansky that could establish personal involvement. At best, Plaintiff states their positions and lists their names in the caption of the Complaint. This is not enough to state the personal involvement of these Defendants. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of a constitutional violation against these Defendants and because he fails this “threshold” requirement, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 737; see also Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 221 (2010) (holding “the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential predicate of her equal protection claim, and, consequently, [the defendants] both are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for her § 1983 claims.”). Since qualified immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction, this matter therefore must be dismissed. See Jan G. v. Semple, 202 Conn. App. 202, 244 A.3d 644, 653 (2021) (affirming dismissal because the Court agreed that the trial “court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities on the basis of the doctrine of qualified immunity.”). 14 E. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the entire action because it is barred by the Heck v. Humphrey Doctrine. The action is unripe and not justiciable, because Plaintiff’s allegation, if found to be true, would necessarily call into question the validity of his conviction—which has not been invalidated in a proper forum. This action is therefore barred by the doctrines of Heck v. Humphrey and Taylor v. Wallace. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn. App. 43, 51-52 (2018). “If success in a tort action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, the action is to be dismissed unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated.” Taylor, 184 Conn. App. 43, 51. Plaintiff’s claims or allegations here, if presumed true, would undermine the validity of his current conviction and incarceration. Plaintiff is suing the criminal prosecutors and victim in his criminal prosecution for actions they took during his prosecution and conviction. See Compl. Doc. # 100.31. Should Plaintiff be successful in this action and his unfounded allegations be deemed true, it would necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s conviction is invalid, laid upon shaky ground and improper evidence. Plaintiff cannot sue in civil court unless he first invalidates the convictions in proper forum. See Stanley v. Scott, 2022 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1862, *14-18 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2022) (citing Heck and Taylor). Plaintiff has not done so. Consequently, his claims here are barred and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. III. CONCLUSION Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request this Court grant their motion to dismiss and dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. DEFENDANTS FINUCANE, ET AL WILLIAM TONG ATTORNEY GENERAL 15 BY:__ _/s/ Janelle R. Medeiros Janelle R. Medeiros Assistant Attorney General CT Bar No. 439341 110 Sherman Street Hartford, CT 06105 Telephone No.: (860) 808-5450 Fax No.: (860) 808-5591 e-mail: Janelle.medeiros@ct.gov CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on this 18th Day of April, 2024: STEVEN STANLEY # 144056 MACDOUGALL-WALKER CI 1153 SOUTH SUFFIELD, CT 06080 _/s/ Janelle R. Medeiros ________ Janelle R. Medeiros Assistant Attorney General 16