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DOCKET NO.: X03-HHD-CV21-6154161-S : SUPERIOR COURT
ISLAMIC AMERICAN SOCIETY OF : COMPLEX LITIGATION
CONNECTICUT, INC. : DOCKET
v. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
HARTFORD
JAWAD ASHRAF, ET AL. : APRIL 18, 2024
MOTION TO STRIKE
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39 et seq., the Counterclaim Defendant,
Islamic American Society of Connecticut, Inc. [IASC] , respectfully moves this
Court to strike Counts Three, Four, and Seven of the Revised Counterclaims of
Ossama Elawad, Ashraf Ibrahim, Hussein Ahmad and Kamal Rekaby, dated
February 8, 2024 (#216.00) for the reasons that the claims against the IASC are
legally insufficient as a matter of law. Specifically, the claims should be stricken
because:
(1) Count Three cannot be maintained because the Counterclaimants do
not and cannot allege that they retained ownership interests in the donated
property and funds in support of their Conversion/Civil Theft claim.
(2) Count Four, which alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA), fails because the IASC is not engaged in the business or
trade of commerce.
(3) The intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in Count Seven fail
to allege conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn.
433, 443 (2003).
A Memorandum of Law supporting this motion is appended hereto.
PLAINTIFF/COUNTERCLAIM
DEFENDANT,
BY_____418849___________
Keith R. Rudzik, Esq.
Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald
Post Office Box 261798
Hartford, Connecticut 06106
(860) 525-3101 Juris No. 028160
2
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that this pleading complies with the requirements of Practice
Book § 4-7 and a copy of the foregoing was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or
electronically delivered pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 to all counsel and pro
se parties of record who have given written consent for electronic delivery, on the
18th day of April, 2024, as follows:
Refai M. Arefin, Esq.
Law Office of Refai Arefin, LLC
1224 Mill Street, Bldg. B
East Berlin, CT 06023
refai@rarefinlaw.com
Meryl Anne Spat, Esq.
Law Office of Meryl Anne Spat
27 First Avenue
Waterbury CT 06710
spatfax@gmail.com
Jonathan Kaplan, Esq.
Pullman & Comley, LLC
jkaplan@pullcom.com
__________/s/_418849___________
Keith R. Rudzik, Esq.
Commissioner of the Superior Court
3
DOCKET NO.: X03-HHD-CV21-6154161-S : SUPERIOR COURT
ISLAMIC AMERICAN SOCIETY OF : COMPLEX LITIGATION
CONNECTICUT, INC. : DOCKET
v. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
HARTFORD
JAWAD ASHRAF, ET AL. : APRIL 18, 2024
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE
I. Background
The Counterclaimants are a small part of a group of litigants forming a
dissident faction who have persistently and pervasively attempted a hostile
takeover of the governance, control, property and decision-making of the Masjid
Al-Mustafa, a mosque owned by the IASC. The Counterclaimants have persisted
through any means necessary including: aggressive, forceful protests; obstructing
access to the mosque; disrupting prayer services during sermons; disrupting
attendees from peaceful prayer; initiating and encouraging social media
harassment of the mosque and the IASC's Board of Trustees, and initiating,
supporting, and filing frivolous lawsuits and/or claims against the IASC or its Board
of Trustees (and continuing to maintain said lawsuits after the Court rightfully
rejected their attempts to obtain control of the IASC).
Despite resounding and repeated defeats in court, the Counterclaimants
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continue to exponentially drive up the litigation expenses for the IASC and its
Board Members and to further divide the members of the Islamic community who
rely on the IASC for religious services and functions. The Court has already
decimated the most important and involved claims in this case by granting the
Motion to Dismiss, eliminating the bulk of the counts in the operative pleadings.
Requests to Revise and subsequent court orders have further clarified the
remaining causes of action.
IASC has filed the subject motion to strike several of the remaining claims
against it for the reasons that the claims against the IASC are legally insufficient
as a matter of law. Specifically, the claims should be stricken as follows:
(1) Count Three cannot be maintained because the Counterclaimants do
not and cannot allege that they retained ownership interests in the donated
property and funds in support of their Conversion/Civil Theft claim.
(2) Count Four, which alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA), fails because the IASC is not engaged in the business or
trade of commerce.
(3) The intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in Count Seven fail
to allege conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
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utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn.
433, 443 (2003).
II. Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of a
pleading. Practice Book § 10-39 provides, in part, that "[w]henever any party
wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint,
counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted . . . , that party may do so by filing a motion to
strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Novametrix Medical Systems v.
BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992) (internal q uotation
marks omitted). In considering a motion to strike, courts "construe the facts
alleged in the complaint in a light most favorable to the pleader. If facts provable
under the allegations would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be
denied." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153
(1994) (citations omitted). For the limited purpose of a motion to strike, “the
moving party admits all facts well pleaded." Id. at 389. "This includes the facts
necessarily implied and fairly provable under the allegations. . . ." Westport Bank &
Trust v. Corcoran, Mallin & Aresco, 221 Conn. 490, 495-96, 605 A.2d 862 (1992)
(citations omitted).
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Although the court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably
to the pleader, “A motion to strike is properly granted if the [count] alleges mere
conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical
Systems, supra, 224 Conn. at 214-15 (citations and internal q uotation marks
omitted). " The court cannot be assisted ”by the assumption of any facts not
therein alleged." Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby, 215 Conn. 345, 348, 576 A.2d
149 (1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. ARGUMENT
A. Count Three cannot be maintained because the Counterclaimants do not
and cannot allege that they retained ownership interests in the donated
property and funds in support of their Conversion/Civil Theft claim.
Count Three of the Revised Counterclaim incorporates the first fifty-one
(51) paragraphs of Count One and then adds eight (4) paragraphs in an effort to
change the cause of action alleged therein from a fraudulent misrepresentation
claim to a conversion/civil theft count. The crux of the claim is that the IASC
wrongfully obtained and converted the Counterclaimants’ financial payments and
donations of labor and materials to the IASC, and simultaneously deprived them of
the “promised” right to membership, community, and use of the Masjid and IASC
facilities.
There are two related claims being asserted in Count Three and neither are
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sufficiently alleged.
The tort of [c]onversion occurs when one, without authorization,
assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to
another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights ... Thus, [c]onversion
is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property
permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption
and exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of
the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff have been dealt
with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right of
dominion and to his harm. Statutory theft under § 52–564 is
synonymous with larceny under General Statutes § 53a–119 ...
Pursuant to § 53a–119, [a] person com mits larceny when, with intent
to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself
or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or [withholds] such
property from an owner.
Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 770–71 (2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). While these causes of
action are similar, “[s]tatutory theft ... requires an element over and above what is
necessary to prove conversion, namely, that the defendant intentionally deprived
the complaining party of his or her property ... Nonetheless, to prevail on either
claim, the party alleging conversion or statutory theft must prove a sufficient
property interest in the items in question.” Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions
Worldwide, LLC, 284 Conn. 408, 418 (2007). “Although our case law is clear that a
claim for money, not just tangible goods, may be the subject of conversion or
statutory theft, a claim for money owed on a debt is not sufficient to establish such
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causes of action ... [I]n order to establish a valid claim of conversion or statutory
theft for money owed, a party must show ownership or the right to possess
specific, identifiable money, rather than the right to the payment of money
generally.” Id. at 421 (Citations omitted.).
Conspicuously absent from Count Three is any allegation of fact concerning
the Counterclaimants’ retention of ownership interests or the right to possess the
donated funds, materials, and labor. The Counterclaimants do not even contend
that they retained any ownership interest in the donations of time, services,
materials, or cash because they have not and are precluding from making such
claims. The Court has already determined that the Counterclaimants lack
standing to assert that the IASC misused their donations and/or breached a
contract as to restricted donations, and concluded that ev en if the donations were
restricted, only the Attorney General had standing to purse any claimed breach of
such restrictions. There was no right of reverter expressed in any of the
donations.
The donations were completed gifts to the IASC in furtherance of the
religious organization.
When a donor completes a gift, he gives up all control over the
donated property, which is irrevocably transferred to the donee.
Parley v. Parley, supra, 72 Conn. App. at 749, 807 A.2d 982. He no
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longer has any legal interest in the completed gift.
Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 203 Conn. App. 197, 216 (2021), af f'd, 346
Conn. 333 (2023). Rather, as is evident from Paragraph 51, Counterclaimants
focus on the failed promises regarding the impact of their contributions and
donations—i.e., that they donated time, services, labor, materials, and money in
response to solicitations for the funding of the IASC because Plaintiffs were misled
about being IASC members.
The Counterclaimants’ failure to allege that they retained ownership
interests in the donated property, labor and funds in support of their
Conversion/Civil Theft claim is fatal. Count Three must be stricken.
B. Count Four, which alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA), fails because the IASC is not engaged in the
business or trade of commerce.
Count Four of the Revised Counterclaim incorporates the first fifty-two (52)
paragraphs of Count One and then adds eleven (11) paragraphs in an effort to
change the cause of action alleged therein from a fraudulent misrepresentation
one to a CUTPA claim. The basis for the CUTPA claim is that the IASC allegedly
concealed and withheld bylaws and amendments from the Counterclaimants, and
the IRS, and the general public and that such unscrupulous and deceptiv e conduct
harmed the Plaintiffs and consumers. They also contend in a conclusory manner
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that IASC was operating as a for-profit business.
The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) is codified at General
Statutes Section 42-110a, et seq. General Statutes §42-110b(a) (2023), states
that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Trade or
commerce, in turn, is defined as “the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the
offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any
property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article,
commodity, or thing of value in this state.” Connecticut General Statutes §
42-110a(4) (2023). In determining whether conduct constitutes an unfair trade
practice the Courts of this state have adopted the criteria set out in the “cigarette
rule” by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair:
“ ‘(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise whether, in
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law,
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it
causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other
businessmen) ].’ Conaway v. Prestia, supra, 492-93, quoting FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n. 5, 92 S.Ct. 898,
31 L.Ed.2d 170 (1972).”
McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 567-68 (1984).
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At the outset, the Counterclaimants fail to allege sufficient facts to
demonstrate that the IASC engaged in trade or commerce. The claim is that the
IASC solicited donations from them and concealed and withheld the IASC’s
bylaws and amendments from them, the IRS, and the public. The solicitation of
donations and disclosure/nondisclosure of bylaws and amendments are not
activities that involve trade, business or commerce. The Counterclaimants do not
actually allege any facts in support of its conclusory suggestion that the IASC was
engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of CUTPA. In fact, the
Counterclaimants do not even attempt to explain how the IASC engaged in “trade
or commerce” in any way. "A motion to strike is properly granted if the [count]
alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged."
Novametrix Medical Systems, supra, 224 Conn. at 214-15 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The meaning of engaging in trade or commerce activities is clear in
business contexts. But, the entrpreneurial aspect of engaging in business is
generally missing in the ordinary day to day activities of a religious organization.
The inability of the Counterclaimants to link their claims to business activities is
fatal to the CUTPA claim. In related cases where a Church and Diocese were
Defendants in a claim brought against them and its priest arising out of the priest’s
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sexual misconduct with minors, the Court struck CUTPA counts where the
assertions concerning trade or commerce included: (1) that the Church and
Diocese were engaged in the commerce or trade of offering and selling the service
of religious sacraments; (2) the decision to retain the priest was made in the
course of trade and business of the Diocese, and (3) the decision by the Diocese
was an unfair and deceptive act and practice. Judge Aurigemma found that:
The CUTPA claim here is based on the allegation that the
defendants engaged in the trade or commerce of providing religion.
CUTPA was intended to redress wrongs which occurred in the
context of business or commerce. The work of the defendant Church
and Diocese did not constitute business or commerce.
Reynolds v. Zizka, No. CV 950555222S, 1998 W L 123047, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 5, 1998); Reed v. Zizka, No. CV 950555221S, 1998 W L 123050, at *6 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1998). The IASC is not saying that it could never be that a
religious organization is engaging in trade or commerce, but rather, based on the
facts and circumstances alleged in this action, the IASC was not engaging in trade
or commerce within the meaning of CUTPA.
In other jurisdictions, courts have found that charitable organizations and
institutions are not really engaged in trade or commerce in similar statutory
schemes governing unfair trade practices. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, Inc., v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc., 398 Mass.
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480 (1986); Save Immaculata/Dublane Inc., v. Immaculata Preparatory School,
Inc., 514 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1986); Mackenzie v. Aids Support Group of Cape Cod,
2006 WL 2425063 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006).
Concomitantly, the work of the IASC and its Board members, here, does
not constitute business or commerce let alone their primary trade or business.
C. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in Count Seven Fail
to Allege Conduct That Is Sufficiently Extreme and Outrageous.
Count Seven of the Revised Counterclaim incorporates the first fifty-one
(51) paragraphs of Count One and then adds five (5) conclusory paragraphs in an
effort to change the cause of action alleged therein from a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The
crux of the claim is that IASC wrongfully obtained and converted the
Counterclaimants’ financial payments and donations of labor and materials to the
IASC, and simultaneously deprived them of the “promised” right to membership,
community, and use of the Masjid and IASC facilities. The Counterclaimants
allege that the IASC’s conduct was “intentional, extreme and outrageous” and
“caused severe emotional distress.” Revised Counterclaim, Count Seven, at ¶¶
53-54.
The law in Connecticut regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress
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is well settled.
In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under ...
[intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be
established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict
emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that
emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's
conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the
emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.
Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct
that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ...
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead
him to exclaim, Outrageous! ... Conduct on the part of the defendant
that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt
feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). “W hether a
defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and
outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine ... Only where
reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.” (Citation
omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, at 210.
[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
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the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role
of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ...
set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be
extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is
not fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a
matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to
establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835,
847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).
The Counterclaimants’ claims in a nutshell are that the IASC made
fraudulent misrepresentations concerning their status as members of the IASC,
that the IASC induced and solicited donations f rom them under these false
pretenses, that the IASC refused to provide them with bylaws, that the IASC’s
Board gave a bogus resignation and later rescinded, and that the IASC expelled
the Counterclaimants from the IASC property forcing them to suffer a loss of
community and a place of worship. The occurrences alleged by the
Counterclaimants may very well have been distressing and hurtful. They do not,
however, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct within the scope of the
precedents of our Supreme Court.
Comparison to other cases is instructive in showing that worse conduct has
been held insufficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Yale University,
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268 Conn. 426, 428, 844 A.2d 853 (2004) (plaintif f's coworker and co-worker's
boyfriend made insulting and derogatory comments to plaintiff and, on one
occasion, defendant pointed at plaintiff and said: “ ‘[s]ooner or later I'm going to
kick your fucking ass' ”); Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 211, 757
A.2d 1059 (2000) (defendant supervisors' conduct not extreme and outrageous
where, inter alia, they made condescending comments about plaintiff in front of
colleagues, asked police to escort her from work and suspended her); Gillians v.
Vivanco–Small, 128 Conn.App. 207, 213, 15 A.3d 1200 (2011) (claim that
defendants were motivated by personal vendettas as a result of unsuccessful
complaints previously filed against plaintiff, falsely accused plaintiff of racial and
sexual bias, and gave plaintiff negative performance evaluations, were insufficient
to allege extreme or outrageous conduct); Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools,
101 Conn.App. 560, 922 A.2d 280 (conduct not outrag eous where supervisor
conspired with superintendent in pattern of harassment including denial of
position, initiating disciplinary actions without proper investigation, defamation of
character and intimidation), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007);
Bator v. Yale–New Haven Hospital, 73 Conn.App. 576, 577, 808 A.2d 1149 (2002)
(plaintiff alleged that he was required to report for duty when under physician's
care, was recommended for discipline when he failed to report and person in
17
authority falsely accused him of serious misconduct and of endangering patient's
life), cert. denied, 279 Conn. 903, 901 A.2d 1225 (2006); Dollard v. Board of
Education, 63 Conn.App. 550, 552–53, 777 A.2d 714 (2001) (superv isors engaged
in concerted and successful plan to force plaintiff to resign by hypercritically
examining her professional and personal conduct, transferring her involuntarily,
placing her under intensive supervision and publicly admonishing her); Davis v.
Davis, 112 Conn.App.56, 59–60 (2009) (former husband made repeated angry
and hostile threats that he would have police evict plaintiff from their former marital
residence, and defendant and new spouse gained access to the residence when
plaintiff was not home and changed locks so that plaintiff had to telephone police
to regain entry).
More recently, on the complex litigation docket, Judge Pierson struck an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim with equally, if not more,
objectionable conduct than the claim being made against the IASC in this
case—specifically the plaintiff alleged:
the plaintiff and third-party defendant knew they owed Castro
commissions in excess of $100,000 and deliberately chose not to
pay her; knew that Castro lacks substantial savings and was saving
to purchase a home; “intentionally inflict[ed] financial hardship and
extreme and intolerable distress on [Castro]”; threatened to hav e
Castro arrested and falsely accused her of failing to return
equipment; monitoring and altering Castro's personal phone after her
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termination; failing to remove Castro as an authorized administrator
of the plaintiff's Facebook page for one month following her
termination, resulting in her receipt of several “unwarranted
messages”; and initiating a lawsuit with “improper purposes”.
The Pub.'s Adjuster, LLC v. Juliana R. Castro & Ipae, LLC, No. X10-UWY-CV19-
5032217-S, 2024 WL 339792, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2024).
Similarly, Judge Ozalis, in performing the gate-keeping function referenced
above, granted summary judgment on an IIED claim in a complex litigation case
involving allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation and CUTPA, arising out of a
series of investments totaling $6.75 million. Barr v. MFI Mgmt., Inc., No. X08-FST-
CV17-5017309-S, 2022 W L 18107587, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2022).
In that case, Barr (plaintiff) testified that the conduct of the defendants that caused
him emotional distress was the defendants’ conduct during and before the
investments; the conduct of telling the plaintiff that if he did not leave the firm, he
we would be eating out of a soup kitchen; the secretive act of going behind his
back to hire someone else to take his position; the act of intervening in his other
business relationships; the act of creating a rescission of the investment; and the
act of causing damage to his firm and the publishing of a devastating
memorandum called Project Soothsayer (which detailed (a) that Barr was actively
destroying value investors, had rampant financial difficulties, was functionally
19
unable to the tell the truth at any juncture, was rude and dismissive towards his
colleagues, (b) that Barr had few hedge fund contacts, had no ability to raise
money, maintained poor judgment, was a spendthrift, had no respect for
confidentiality, rarely followed up on pipeline opportunities, and had a dem oralizing
effect on team morale such that many team members desired to leave; and (c)
that Barr needed to be removed from his leadership position at FCP). See id. at
*3. Judge Ozalis determined that “[a]lthough this conduct may very well have
been distressing and hurtful to Barr, it does not, however, constitute extreme and
outrageous conduct within the meaning of our caselaw.” Id.
The IASC’s alleged actions in the present case are not so atrocious as to
exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society; thus, they are insufficient as
a matter of law to form the basis of an action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court must strike Counts Three, Four,
and Seven, and Nine of the Revised Counterclaim (#216.00) because the claims
against IASC are legally insufficient as a matter of law.
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PLAINTIFF/ COUNTERCLAIM
DEFENDANTS,
BY_____418849___________
Keith R. Rudzik, Esq.
Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald
Post Office Box 261798
Hartford, Connecticut 06106
(860) 525-3101 Juris No. 028160
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that this pleading complies with the requirements of Practice
Book § 4-7 and a copy of the foregoing was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or
electronically delivered pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 to all counsel and pro
se parties of record who have given written consent for electronic delivery, on the
18th day of April, 2024.
Refai M. Arefin, Esq.
Law Office of Refai Arefin, LLC
1224 Mill Street, Bldg. B
East Berlin, CT 06023
refai@rarefinlaw.com
Meryl Anne Spat, Esq.
Law Office of Meryl Anne Spat
27 First Avenue
Waterbury CT 06710
spatfax@gmail.com
Jonathan Kaplan, Esq.
Pullman & Comley, LLC
jkaplan@pullcom.com
__________/s/_418849___________
Keith R. Rudzik, Esq.
Commissioner of the Superior Court
21
Preview
DOCKET NO.: X03-HHD-CV21-6154161-S : SUPERIOR COURT ISLAMIC AMERICAN SOCIETY OF : COMPLEX LITIGATION CONNECTICUT, INC. : DOCKET v. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD JAWAD ASHRAF, ET AL. : APRIL 18, 2024 MOTION TO STRIKE Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39 et seq., the Counterclaim Defendant, Islamic American Society of Connecticut, Inc. [IASC] , respectfully moves this Court to strike Counts Three, Four, and Seven of the Revised Counterclaims of Ossama Elawad, Ashraf Ibrahim, Hussein Ahmad and Kamal Rekaby, dated February 8, 2024 (#216.00) for the reasons that the claims against the IASC are legally insufficient as a matter of law. Specifically, the claims should be stricken because: (1) Count Three cannot be maintained because the Counterclaimants do not and cannot allege that they retained ownership interests in the donated property and funds in support of their Conversion/Civil Theft claim. (2) Count Four, which alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), fails because the IASC is not engaged in the business or trade of commerce. (3) The intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in Count Seven fail to allege conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443 (2003). A Memorandum of Law supporting this motion is appended hereto. PLAINTIFF/COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT, BY_____418849___________ Keith R. Rudzik, Esq. Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald Post Office Box 261798 Hartford, Connecticut 06106 (860) 525-3101 Juris No. 028160 2 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that this pleading complies with the requirements of Practice Book § 4-7 and a copy of the foregoing was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or electronically delivered pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 to all counsel and pro se parties of record who have given written consent for electronic delivery, on the 18th day of April, 2024, as follows: Refai M. Arefin, Esq. Law Office of Refai Arefin, LLC 1224 Mill Street, Bldg. B East Berlin, CT 06023 refai@rarefinlaw.com Meryl Anne Spat, Esq. Law Office of Meryl Anne Spat 27 First Avenue Waterbury CT 06710 spatfax@gmail.com Jonathan Kaplan, Esq. Pullman & Comley, LLC jkaplan@pullcom.com __________/s/_418849___________ Keith R. Rudzik, Esq. Commissioner of the Superior Court 3 DOCKET NO.: X03-HHD-CV21-6154161-S : SUPERIOR COURT ISLAMIC AMERICAN SOCIETY OF : COMPLEX LITIGATION CONNECTICUT, INC. : DOCKET v. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD JAWAD ASHRAF, ET AL. : APRIL 18, 2024 MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE I. Background The Counterclaimants are a small part of a group of litigants forming a dissident faction who have persistently and pervasively attempted a hostile takeover of the governance, control, property and decision-making of the Masjid Al-Mustafa, a mosque owned by the IASC. The Counterclaimants have persisted through any means necessary including: aggressive, forceful protests; obstructing access to the mosque; disrupting prayer services during sermons; disrupting attendees from peaceful prayer; initiating and encouraging social media harassment of the mosque and the IASC's Board of Trustees, and initiating, supporting, and filing frivolous lawsuits and/or claims against the IASC or its Board of Trustees (and continuing to maintain said lawsuits after the Court rightfully rejected their attempts to obtain control of the IASC). Despite resounding and repeated defeats in court, the Counterclaimants 4 continue to exponentially drive up the litigation expenses for the IASC and its Board Members and to further divide the members of the Islamic community who rely on the IASC for religious services and functions. The Court has already decimated the most important and involved claims in this case by granting the Motion to Dismiss, eliminating the bulk of the counts in the operative pleadings. Requests to Revise and subsequent court orders have further clarified the remaining causes of action. IASC has filed the subject motion to strike several of the remaining claims against it for the reasons that the claims against the IASC are legally insufficient as a matter of law. Specifically, the claims should be stricken as follows: (1) Count Three cannot be maintained because the Counterclaimants do not and cannot allege that they retained ownership interests in the donated property and funds in support of their Conversion/Civil Theft claim. (2) Count Four, which alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), fails because the IASC is not engaged in the business or trade of commerce. (3) The intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in Count Seven fail to allege conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 5 utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443 (2003). II. Legal Standard The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Practice Book § 10-39 provides, in part, that "[w]henever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . , that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Novametrix Medical Systems v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992) (internal q uotation marks omitted). In considering a motion to strike, courts "construe the facts alleged in the complaint in a light most favorable to the pleader. If facts provable under the allegations would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994) (citations omitted). For the limited purpose of a motion to strike, “the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." Id. at 389. "This includes the facts necessarily implied and fairly provable under the allegations. . . ." Westport Bank & Trust v. Corcoran, Mallin & Aresco, 221 Conn. 490, 495-96, 605 A.2d 862 (1992) (citations omitted). 6 Although the court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the pleader, “A motion to strike is properly granted if the [count] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, supra, 224 Conn. at 214-15 (citations and internal q uotation marks omitted). " The court cannot be assisted ”by the assumption of any facts not therein alleged." Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby, 215 Conn. 345, 348, 576 A.2d 149 (1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). III. ARGUMENT A. Count Three cannot be maintained because the Counterclaimants do not and cannot allege that they retained ownership interests in the donated property and funds in support of their Conversion/Civil Theft claim. Count Three of the Revised Counterclaim incorporates the first fifty-one (51) paragraphs of Count One and then adds eight (4) paragraphs in an effort to change the cause of action alleged therein from a fraudulent misrepresentation claim to a conversion/civil theft count. The crux of the claim is that the IASC wrongfully obtained and converted the Counterclaimants’ financial payments and donations of labor and materials to the IASC, and simultaneously deprived them of the “promised” right to membership, community, and use of the Masjid and IASC facilities. There are two related claims being asserted in Count Three and neither are 7 sufficiently alleged. The tort of [c]onversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights ... Thus, [c]onversion is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right of dominion and to his harm. Statutory theft under § 52–564 is synonymous with larceny under General Statutes § 53a–119 ... Pursuant to § 53a–119, [a] person com mits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or [withholds] such property from an owner. Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 770–71 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). While these causes of action are similar, “[s]tatutory theft ... requires an element over and above what is necessary to prove conversion, namely, that the defendant intentionally deprived the complaining party of his or her property ... Nonetheless, to prevail on either claim, the party alleging conversion or statutory theft must prove a sufficient property interest in the items in question.” Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide, LLC, 284 Conn. 408, 418 (2007). “Although our case law is clear that a claim for money, not just tangible goods, may be the subject of conversion or statutory theft, a claim for money owed on a debt is not sufficient to establish such 8 causes of action ... [I]n order to establish a valid claim of conversion or statutory theft for money owed, a party must show ownership or the right to possess specific, identifiable money, rather than the right to the payment of money generally.” Id. at 421 (Citations omitted.). Conspicuously absent from Count Three is any allegation of fact concerning the Counterclaimants’ retention of ownership interests or the right to possess the donated funds, materials, and labor. The Counterclaimants do not even contend that they retained any ownership interest in the donations of time, services, materials, or cash because they have not and are precluding from making such claims. The Court has already determined that the Counterclaimants lack standing to assert that the IASC misused their donations and/or breached a contract as to restricted donations, and concluded that ev en if the donations were restricted, only the Attorney General had standing to purse any claimed breach of such restrictions. There was no right of reverter expressed in any of the donations. The donations were completed gifts to the IASC in furtherance of the religious organization. When a donor completes a gift, he gives up all control over the donated property, which is irrevocably transferred to the donee. Parley v. Parley, supra, 72 Conn. App. at 749, 807 A.2d 982. He no 9 longer has any legal interest in the completed gift. Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 203 Conn. App. 197, 216 (2021), af f'd, 346 Conn. 333 (2023). Rather, as is evident from Paragraph 51, Counterclaimants focus on the failed promises regarding the impact of their contributions and donations—i.e., that they donated time, services, labor, materials, and money in response to solicitations for the funding of the IASC because Plaintiffs were misled about being IASC members. The Counterclaimants’ failure to allege that they retained ownership interests in the donated property, labor and funds in support of their Conversion/Civil Theft claim is fatal. Count Three must be stricken. B. Count Four, which alleges violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), fails because the IASC is not engaged in the business or trade of commerce. Count Four of the Revised Counterclaim incorporates the first fifty-two (52) paragraphs of Count One and then adds eleven (11) paragraphs in an effort to change the cause of action alleged therein from a fraudulent misrepresentation one to a CUTPA claim. The basis for the CUTPA claim is that the IASC allegedly concealed and withheld bylaws and amendments from the Counterclaimants, and the IRS, and the general public and that such unscrupulous and deceptiv e conduct harmed the Plaintiffs and consumers. They also contend in a conclusory manner 10 that IASC was operating as a for-profit business. The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) is codified at General Statutes Section 42-110a, et seq. General Statutes §42-110b(a) (2023), states that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Trade or commerce, in turn, is defined as “the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state.” Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110a(4) (2023). In determining whether conduct constitutes an unfair trade practice the Courts of this state have adopted the criteria set out in the “cigarette rule” by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: “ ‘(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen) ].’ Conaway v. Prestia, supra, 492-93, quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n. 5, 92 S.Ct. 898, 31 L.Ed.2d 170 (1972).” McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 567-68 (1984). 11 At the outset, the Counterclaimants fail to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that the IASC engaged in trade or commerce. The claim is that the IASC solicited donations from them and concealed and withheld the IASC’s bylaws and amendments from them, the IRS, and the public. The solicitation of donations and disclosure/nondisclosure of bylaws and amendments are not activities that involve trade, business or commerce. The Counterclaimants do not actually allege any facts in support of its conclusory suggestion that the IASC was engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of CUTPA. In fact, the Counterclaimants do not even attempt to explain how the IASC engaged in “trade or commerce” in any way. "A motion to strike is properly granted if the [count] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, supra, 224 Conn. at 214-15 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The meaning of engaging in trade or commerce activities is clear in business contexts. But, the entrpreneurial aspect of engaging in business is generally missing in the ordinary day to day activities of a religious organization. The inability of the Counterclaimants to link their claims to business activities is fatal to the CUTPA claim. In related cases where a Church and Diocese were Defendants in a claim brought against them and its priest arising out of the priest’s 12 sexual misconduct with minors, the Court struck CUTPA counts where the assertions concerning trade or commerce included: (1) that the Church and Diocese were engaged in the commerce or trade of offering and selling the service of religious sacraments; (2) the decision to retain the priest was made in the course of trade and business of the Diocese, and (3) the decision by the Diocese was an unfair and deceptive act and practice. Judge Aurigemma found that: The CUTPA claim here is based on the allegation that the defendants engaged in the trade or commerce of providing religion. CUTPA was intended to redress wrongs which occurred in the context of business or commerce. The work of the defendant Church and Diocese did not constitute business or commerce. Reynolds v. Zizka, No. CV 950555222S, 1998 W L 123047, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1998); Reed v. Zizka, No. CV 950555221S, 1998 W L 123050, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1998). The IASC is not saying that it could never be that a religious organization is engaging in trade or commerce, but rather, based on the facts and circumstances alleged in this action, the IASC was not engaging in trade or commerce within the meaning of CUTPA. In other jurisdictions, courts have found that charitable organizations and institutions are not really engaged in trade or commerce in similar statutory schemes governing unfair trade practices. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc., 398 Mass. 13 480 (1986); Save Immaculata/Dublane Inc., v. Immaculata Preparatory School, Inc., 514 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1986); Mackenzie v. Aids Support Group of Cape Cod, 2006 WL 2425063 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006). Concomitantly, the work of the IASC and its Board members, here, does not constitute business or commerce let alone their primary trade or business. C. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims in Count Seven Fail to Allege Conduct That Is Sufficiently Extreme and Outrageous. Count Seven of the Revised Counterclaim incorporates the first fifty-one (51) paragraphs of Count One and then adds five (5) conclusory paragraphs in an effort to change the cause of action alleged therein from a fraudulent misrepresentation claim to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The crux of the claim is that IASC wrongfully obtained and converted the Counterclaimants’ financial payments and donations of labor and materials to the IASC, and simultaneously deprived them of the “promised” right to membership, community, and use of the Masjid and IASC facilities. The Counterclaimants allege that the IASC’s conduct was “intentional, extreme and outrageous” and “caused severe emotional distress.” Revised Counterclaim, Count Seven, at ¶¶ 53-54. The law in Connecticut regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress 14 is well settled. In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under ... [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe. Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ... Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! ... Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress. Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). “W hether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine ... Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.” (Citation omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, at 210. [I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 15 the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ... set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress. Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006). The Counterclaimants’ claims in a nutshell are that the IASC made fraudulent misrepresentations concerning their status as members of the IASC, that the IASC induced and solicited donations f rom them under these false pretenses, that the IASC refused to provide them with bylaws, that the IASC’s Board gave a bogus resignation and later rescinded, and that the IASC expelled the Counterclaimants from the IASC property forcing them to suffer a loss of community and a place of worship. The occurrences alleged by the Counterclaimants may very well have been distressing and hurtful. They do not, however, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct within the scope of the precedents of our Supreme Court. Comparison to other cases is instructive in showing that worse conduct has been held insufficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Yale University, 16 268 Conn. 426, 428, 844 A.2d 853 (2004) (plaintif f's coworker and co-worker's boyfriend made insulting and derogatory comments to plaintiff and, on one occasion, defendant pointed at plaintiff and said: “ ‘[s]ooner or later I'm going to kick your fucking ass' ”); Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 211, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000) (defendant supervisors' conduct not extreme and outrageous where, inter alia, they made condescending comments about plaintiff in front of colleagues, asked police to escort her from work and suspended her); Gillians v. Vivanco–Small, 128 Conn.App. 207, 213, 15 A.3d 1200 (2011) (claim that defendants were motivated by personal vendettas as a result of unsuccessful complaints previously filed against plaintiff, falsely accused plaintiff of racial and sexual bias, and gave plaintiff negative performance evaluations, were insufficient to allege extreme or outrageous conduct); Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 922 A.2d 280 (conduct not outrag eous where supervisor conspired with superintendent in pattern of harassment including denial of position, initiating disciplinary actions without proper investigation, defamation of character and intimidation), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007); Bator v. Yale–New Haven Hospital, 73 Conn.App. 576, 577, 808 A.2d 1149 (2002) (plaintiff alleged that he was required to report for duty when under physician's care, was recommended for discipline when he failed to report and person in 17 authority falsely accused him of serious misconduct and of endangering patient's life), cert. denied, 279 Conn. 903, 901 A.2d 1225 (2006); Dollard v. Board of Education, 63 Conn.App. 550, 552–53, 777 A.2d 714 (2001) (superv isors engaged in concerted and successful plan to force plaintiff to resign by hypercritically examining her professional and personal conduct, transferring her involuntarily, placing her under intensive supervision and publicly admonishing her); Davis v. Davis, 112 Conn.App.56, 59–60 (2009) (former husband made repeated angry and hostile threats that he would have police evict plaintiff from their former marital residence, and defendant and new spouse gained access to the residence when plaintiff was not home and changed locks so that plaintiff had to telephone police to regain entry). More recently, on the complex litigation docket, Judge Pierson struck an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim with equally, if not more, objectionable conduct than the claim being made against the IASC in this case—specifically the plaintiff alleged: the plaintiff and third-party defendant knew they owed Castro commissions in excess of $100,000 and deliberately chose not to pay her; knew that Castro lacks substantial savings and was saving to purchase a home; “intentionally inflict[ed] financial hardship and extreme and intolerable distress on [Castro]”; threatened to hav e Castro arrested and falsely accused her of failing to return equipment; monitoring and altering Castro's personal phone after her 18 termination; failing to remove Castro as an authorized administrator of the plaintiff's Facebook page for one month following her termination, resulting in her receipt of several “unwarranted messages”; and initiating a lawsuit with “improper purposes”. The Pub.'s Adjuster, LLC v. Juliana R. Castro & Ipae, LLC, No. X10-UWY-CV19- 5032217-S, 2024 WL 339792, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2024). Similarly, Judge Ozalis, in performing the gate-keeping function referenced above, granted summary judgment on an IIED claim in a complex litigation case involving allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation and CUTPA, arising out of a series of investments totaling $6.75 million. Barr v. MFI Mgmt., Inc., No. X08-FST- CV17-5017309-S, 2022 W L 18107587, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2022). In that case, Barr (plaintiff) testified that the conduct of the defendants that caused him emotional distress was the defendants’ conduct during and before the investments; the conduct of telling the plaintiff that if he did not leave the firm, he we would be eating out of a soup kitchen; the secretive act of going behind his back to hire someone else to take his position; the act of intervening in his other business relationships; the act of creating a rescission of the investment; and the act of causing damage to his firm and the publishing of a devastating memorandum called Project Soothsayer (which detailed (a) that Barr was actively destroying value investors, had rampant financial difficulties, was functionally 19 unable to the tell the truth at any juncture, was rude and dismissive towards his colleagues, (b) that Barr had few hedge fund contacts, had no ability to raise money, maintained poor judgment, was a spendthrift, had no respect for confidentiality, rarely followed up on pipeline opportunities, and had a dem oralizing effect on team morale such that many team members desired to leave; and (c) that Barr needed to be removed from his leadership position at FCP). See id. at *3. Judge Ozalis determined that “[a]lthough this conduct may very well have been distressing and hurtful to Barr, it does not, however, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct within the meaning of our caselaw.” Id. The IASC’s alleged actions in the present case are not so atrocious as to exceed all bounds usually tolerated by decent society; thus, they are insufficient as a matter of law to form the basis of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. IV. Conclusion Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court must strike Counts Three, Four, and Seven, and Nine of the Revised Counterclaim (#216.00) because the claims against IASC are legally insufficient as a matter of law. 20 PLAINTIFF/ COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS, BY_____418849___________ Keith R. Rudzik, Esq. Howard, Kohn, Sprague & FitzGerald Post Office Box 261798 Hartford, Connecticut 06106 (860) 525-3101 Juris No. 028160 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that this pleading complies with the requirements of Practice Book § 4-7 and a copy of the foregoing was mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, or electronically delivered pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 to all counsel and pro se parties of record who have given written consent for electronic delivery, on the 18th day of April, 2024. Refai M. Arefin, Esq. Law Office of Refai Arefin, LLC 1224 Mill Street, Bldg. B East Berlin, CT 06023 refai@rarefinlaw.com Meryl Anne Spat, Esq. Law Office of Meryl Anne Spat 27 First Avenue Waterbury CT 06710 spatfax@gmail.com Jonathan Kaplan, Esq. Pullman & Comley, LLC jkaplan@pullcom.com __________/s/_418849___________ Keith R. Rudzik, Esq. Commissioner of the Superior Court 21