Preview
DOCKET NO. DBD-CV23-6045867-S SUPERIOR COURT
NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY J.D. OF DANBURY
VS. AT DANBURY
PATRICK A. GRIFFIN; PAMELA L. DRUCKER; APRIL 26, 2024
GABRIELA KNAPP and RYAN KNAPP, AS
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES E.
KNAPP, JR.; and GABRIELA KNAPP
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Connecticut Practice §17-44, et seq., the plaintiff Nationwide
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General Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) hereby moves for summary judgment
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20a because the alleged injuries and damages are not the result of an “occurrence” as
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excludes coverage for injuries that are “expected” or “intended”. In addition, the
subject policy excludes damages for injuries that constitute criminal acts as
defined by the policy. Finally, the policy excludes damages for injuries caused by
“physical abuse.”
The basis of the present motion is that there are no genuine issues of
material fact between the parties and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on grounds that the injuries and damages alleged in the underlying
Complaint are not covered under the Policy because the bodily injury: a) does not
constitute an “occurrence”; b) were “expected” or “intended”; c) were criminal in
nature; and d) constitutes “physical abuse”.
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff moves this court to grant summary
judgment and find that the plaintiff has no duty to defend or indemnify Mr. Griffin or
Mrs. Drucker for the claims set forth in the underling case of Knapp v. Griffin,
DBD-CV23-6045120-S.
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ees A Memorandum of Law in support hereof is submitted herewith.
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25 NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE CO.
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& By /s/400462
Miles Esty, Esq.
a Esty & Buckmir, LLC
2285 Whitney Avenue
Hamden, CT 06518
(203)248-5678
Juris #415435
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
| certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or
delivered electronically or non-electronically on this date to all counsel and self-
represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was
received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will
immediately be electronically served:
Patrick A. Griffin
Inmate #257475
Cheshire Correctional Institution
900 Highland Avenue
Cheshire, CT 06410
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ess Pamela L. Drucker
mes PO Box 8130
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<3 New Fairfield, CT 06812
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= pamela.drucker@gmail.com
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Cramer & Anderson
46 West Street
PO Box 278
Litchfield, CT 06759
kmancini@crameranderson.com
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/s/400462
Miles N. Esty, Esq.
Commissioner of the Superior Court
DOCKET NO. DBD-CV23-6045867-S SUPERIOR COURT
NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY J.D. OF DANBURY
VS. AT DANBURY
PATRICK A. GRIFFIN; PAMELA L. DRUCKER; APRIL 26, 2024
GABRIELA KNAPP and RYAN KNAPP, AS
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES E.
1 KNAPP, JR.; and GABRIELA KNAPP
MEMORANDUM OF LAW RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book §17-44, et seq., the plaintiff
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Mes Nationwide General Insurance Company submits the following in support of its
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I STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By Writ, Summons and Complaint returnable to the Judicial District of
Danbury on March 14, 2023, the undersigned plaintiff Nationwide General
Insurance Company (hereinafter “Nationwide”) brought this action seeking
declaratory judgment by this Court of the rights and duties of the parties to a
contract of insurance coverage (a homeowner's policy) between the plaintiff and
the defendants Patrick A. Griffin and Pamela Drucker (hereinafter “Griffin and
Drucker’). Specifically, Nationwide alleges that the subject homeowner's policy at
issue in this action because the alleged injuries and damages are not the result of
an “occurrence” as defined by the policy. The policy also excludes coverage for
injuries that are “expected” or “intended”. In addition, the subject policy excludes
damages for injuries that constitute criminal acts as defined by the policy. Finally,
the policy excludes damages caused by “physical abuse.”
iB The defendants Gabriella Knapp and Ryan Knapp as the Administrators of
the Estate of James E. Knapp, Jr. brought suit against Griffin and Drucker
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pursuant to a Summons and Complaint dated on or about January 10, 2023
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me Docket Number DBD-CV23-6045120-S. See Exhibit “A” hereto.
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The Knapp Complaint alleges that on or about May 7, 2022 the defendants
Griffin and Drucker caused the wrongful death of James Knapp when Griffin
stabbed and killed him. In the underlying case, Nationwide provided a defense to
Griffin and Drucker.
Plaintiffs Estate of James Knapp and his wife, Gabriela Knapp, bring suit in
twenty counts against Patrick Griffin, Pamela Drucker, and Zegarelli’s Pizzeria
alleging that Patrick Griffin stabbed James Knapp on May 7, 2022 at the insureds’
residence in New Fairfield, Connecticut, after the men had been drinking at a
pizzeria in New York earlier that evening. It is alleged that the men got into an
argument and that Patrick Griffin stabbed Knapp.
The Complaint alleges counts against Patrick Griffin as follows: 1)
intentional battery; 2) wrongful death based on intentional acts; 3) negligence for
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failure to exercise reasonable care with a knife and allowing himself to become
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intoxicated so as not to be able to exercise reasonable care; 4) recklessness; 5)
ry 5 intentional infliction of emotional distress as to Gabriela Knapp; 6) negligent
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infliction of emotional distress as to Gabriela Knapp; and 7) loss of consortium as
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The Complaint alleges counts against Pamela Drucker as follows: 1)
negligence for failure to ensure plaintiff's safety in the home, failing to properly
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secure the knife, and permitting Griffin to keep knives in the home; 2) recklessness
on the same grounds with the knowledge that Griffin was a convicted felon; 3)
negligent entrustment of the knife to Griffin; 4) and a loss of consortium claim on
the grounds set forth in the first three counts above.
Plaintiff Nationwide now moves for summary judgment as to the duty to
indemnify the defendants on grounds that the injuries and damages alleged in the
underlying Complaint are not covered under the Policy because the bodily injury:
a) does not constitute an “occurrence”; b) were “expected” or “intended”; c) were
criminal in nature; and d) constitutes physical abuse.
1
I. ARGUMENT
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
> “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits
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law...In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the
a evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party...Although the party
seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the non-existence of any
material fact...a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse
claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the
evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue...It is not enough, however, for
the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere
assertions of fact...are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and,
therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court in support of a
motion for summary judgment.” Buell Industries v. Greater New York Mutual Ins.
Co., 2000 WL 1337471 (Conn. Super.) citing Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 2-2-203 (1995). Summary judgment procedure
a would be defeated as a whole if the mere assertion that a material factual dispute
existed could force a case to trial. Great Country Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423,
436 (1997).
Ms “The existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by
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Telephone, 45 Conn. App. 657, 663 (1997). “If the affidavits and other supporting
documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary
o judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof’. 2830 Whitney
Avenue Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Assoc., Inc., 33 Conn. App. 563,
569 (1994). A material fact is one that will make a difference in the outcome of the
case. Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578 (1990).
In ruling upon a summary judgment motion, the court merely determines whether
an issue of fact exists, but does not try the issue if it does exist. Michaud v.
Gurney, 168 Conn. 431 (1975). The issue must be one which the opposing party
is entitled to litigate under its pleadings and the mere existence of a factual dispute
apart from the pleadings is not enough to preclude summary judgment. Shuster v.
Buckley, 5 Conn. App. 473, 477 (1985).
The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate the delay and expense
Accompanying a trial where there is no real issue to be tried. Dowling v. Kielak,
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eis 160 Conn. 14 (1968).
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gs undertake a defense on the insured’s behalf, depends on whether the terms of the
a insurance policy provide coverage for the dispute in which the insured is
engaged.” Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn. App. 640, 641 (2009). “[C]onstruction of a
contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court....An insurance
policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction
of any written contract...In accordance with those principles, [t]he determinative
question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the... [insured] expected
to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of
the policy...If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the
language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be
accorded its natural and ordinary meaning...Under those circumstances, the policy
is to be given effect according to its terms....When interpreting [an insurance
iB policy], we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions
together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach
re a reasonable overall result.
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Be a In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy are clear and
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ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity... Similarly, any ambiguity in a
contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from
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one party's subjective perception of the terms...As with contracts generally, a
provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to
more than one reading...Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms of
an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the insured because the
insurance company drafted the policy... This rule of construction may not be
10
applied, however, unless the policy terms are indeed ambiguous." Zulick v.
Patron’s Mutual Ins., 287 Conn. 367, 372-373 (2008). (Citations omitted; internal
quotations omitted).
C. The Policy Language
The claims of the plaintiff Nationwide are based on the following provisions
of the Policy (a certified copy of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit “B’):
Section II - Liability Coverages
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nes A. Coverage E — Personal Liability
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If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an “insured” for damages due
to an “occurrence” resulting from negligent personal acts or negligence
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arising out of the ownership, maintenance of use of real or personal
BRS property, we will:
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1. Pay up to our limit of liability for damages for which an “insured” is
legally liable....; and
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice.
With regard to an occurrence, the policy defines an occurrence as:
11. “Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same several harmful conditions, which
results during the policy period, in a) “bodily injury” or b) property damage.
The main exclusions for liability coverage applicable herein are noted in
11
the policy, where it states on page 30:
E. Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F — Medical
Payments to Others
Coverages E and F do not apply to the following:
1. Expected or Intended Injury
“Bodily injury” or “property damage” which is expected or intended by the
“insured”, even if the resulting “bodily injury” or “property damage”:
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a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended;
or
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b. Is sustained by a different person, entity or property than initially
expected or intended.
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BR = “Bodily injury” or “property damage” caused by or resulting from an act or
omission which is criminal in nature and committed by the “insured”. This
exclusion applies regardless of whether the “insured” is actually charged
with, or convicted of a crime.
8. Sexual Molestation, Corporal Punishment, Physical Or Mental
Abuse, Or Harassment
“Bodily injury” or “property damage’ arising out of sexual molestation,
corporal punishment, physical or mental abuse...”
The underlying incident does not constitute an occurrence as defined by the
policy. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jussaume, 35 F.Supp.3d 231 (2014), the
12
Connecticut District Court granted summary judgment to the insurer where the
insured was alleged to have assaulted the third-party plaintiff during a larger
altercation at a raceway. Despite plaintiff alleging that the insured had “negligently
contacted” him while he was also being attacked by others, the court held that the
facts alleged were intentional and therefore did not fall under the policy definition
19
of an “occurrence”, or accident.
With regard to expected or intended injury, the defendants will rely on the
>e8 phrasing of the complaint and the conclusory labeling of the claims as negligence.
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routinely the practice of Connecticut courts to “look past the terminology in a
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pleading to grant summary judgment for the insurer, holding there is no duty to
defend a negligence action which is actually based on intentional acts by the
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insured”. Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mara, 699 F.Supp.2d 439, at 456 (D. Conn. 2010);
see also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sapna Tandon, et al., United States District Court,
District of Connecticut, 3:13 CV 585 (2015).
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Charles J. Funari, Superior Court of
Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, HHD CV 16 6073550 S (Shapiro, J.;
13
9/6/17), Judge Shapiro granted declaratory judgment to the carrier under an
“intentional acts” exclusion where the defendant was alleged to have sexually
assaulted, attacked, and groped the third-party plaintiff. Despite claiming it was
negligent conduct alleged in the complaint, the court noted that the acts
constituted voluntary and intentional acts that resulted in neither the duty to defend
or indemnify the insured. In finding that the acts were in fact intentional, Judge
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Shapiro noted the common law standard that “harmful intent may be inferred at
rez law in circumstances where the alleged behavior is so inherently harmful that the
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With regard to criminal acts, the Nationwide policy specifically states the
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a underlying Complaint alleges that Patrick Griffin caused the death of James Knapp
by inserting a knife into his stomach. Exhibit “A”. The underlying incident is
documented in the attached copy of the Police Report (Exhibit “C’).’ Further, Mr.
' The attached Police Report is uncertified. On February 6, 2024 counsel for the plaintiff ordered a certified
copy of the police report. That request remains pending. On April 25, 2024 counsel’s office was advised by
the Connecticut State Police that it will take ten to twelve months to comply with the request. See Affidavit
of Ashley Erickson attached hereto as Exhibit D. The plaintiff filed this motion to comply with the current
summary judgment deadline of April 26, 2024. Accordingly, if the court or parties’ require a certified copy,
then the plaintiff will and can issue a Subpoena to have the appropriate representative of the State Police
appear at the hearing on the summary judgment motion to provide the report and testimony.
14
Griffin was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree 53a-55(a)(1) which
provides:
(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
(1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with
intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person under ...”
A certified copy of Mr. Griffin's conviction is attached as Exhibit “E”.
Accordingly, the only inquiry is whether the act(s) were criminal in nature (whether
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there were criminal charges or not). Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the
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are precluded from coverage under the subject policy herein.
Finally, the claims against both Griffin and Drucker are excluded from
coverage as acts “arising out of physical abuse”. Specifically, these claims clearly
“arise out of’ the physical abuse committed by Griffin against Knapp.
"[I]t is generally understood that for liability for an accident or an injury to be
said to "arise out of’ [an occurrence or offense], it is sufficient to show only that the
accident or injury “was connected with," "had its origins in," "grew out of," "flowed
15
from," or "was incident to" [that occurrence or offense], in order to meet the
requirement that there be a causal relationship between the accident or injury and
[that occurrence or offense].' Hogle v. Hogle, 167 Conn. 572, 577, 356 A.2d 172
(1975). To ‘arise’ out of means ‘to originate from a specified source.' Webster's
Third New International Dictionary (1961); see also Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed
19
1999) (defining ‘arise’ as '1. [t]o originate; to stem [from] . . . 2. [t]o result [from]').
‘The phrase arising out of is usually interpreted as indicat[ing] a causal
resip connection.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coregis Ins. Co. v. American
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Meg Health Foundation, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 99-9300 (2d Cir.
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£0 February 14, 2001); see also McGinniss v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 648 F.
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Sup. 1263, 1267 (S.D.N.Y 1986)." QSP, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 374, 773 A.2d 906 (2001).
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Relying on LaBonte v. Federal Mutual Ins. Co., 159 Conn. 252, 259, 268
A.2d 663 (1970), the court in Sloat concluded that “in determining whether the
complaint alleges a claim for bodily injury arising out of excluded activity, the court
must inquire not merely into the status of the parents as parents but into the
underlying conduct of their son—‘the subject matter of the [incident] without regard
16
to the involvement of the insured’ parents.” Sloat, supra, at 694. The court noted
that the subject matter of the complaint in that action alleged bodily injury “which
arises out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental
abuse...” and that the complaint alleges injuries that are connected with, originate
in, grow out of, flow from, or are incident to the physical and mental abuse. @SP
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 256 Conn. 374. In other words, the
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allegations in that action “arose out of” the underlying physical and mental abuse,
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vis and therefore were removed from coverage under exclusion “k”. Cf, Christ v.
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operations performed by or on behalf of the insured,” held unambiguous).
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The case of Merrimack v. Mutual Fire Insurance, 117 Conn. App. 769
(2009) is directly on point and involved an identical exclusion to the one contained
in Nationwide’s policy. In that case the Court held that a stabbing incident
constitutes physical abuse under an exclusion for “physical and mental abuse’.
In the more recent matter of General Ins. Co. of America v. Agatha Okeke.
et al., 182 Conn. App. 83 (2018), the Appellate Court dealt with the same issue. In
17
that action, Ms. Okeke and her son, Michael Okeke, were insured under a
homeowner's policy at the time Michael went to an elderly neighbor's house and
assaulted, stabbed, and beat Ms. Teresa Craft. The subsequent civil litigation
against both Agatha and Michael Okeke alleged intentional and negligent assault
against Michael, as well as negligent supervision of Michael against Agatha
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Okeke. Indeed, the main claim against Agatha Okeke was that she knew that her
son Michael was a danger to himself and others, but she negligently failed to
supervise him and to prevent him from obtaining access to knives, which are
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“expected or intended” actions or criminal acts. The court then took the additional
step and held the claims were not covered, because even if the claims against her
were an “occurrence” under the policy, Ms. Craft’s injuries “arose out of” Michael
Okeke’s physical abuse of her. The court distinguished between the intentional
acts exclusion being limited to the actual actor, Michael, versus the physical abuse
exclusion not including such a limitation, in so holding.
18
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff Nationwide hereby moves this Court to grant the
present Motion for Summary Judgment and find in favor of the plaintiff that it has
no duty to defend or indemnify Patrick Griffin and Pamela Drucker for the claims
and injuries set forth in the Complaint.
THE PLAINTIFF,
1 NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE CO.
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By /s/400462
Miles Esty, Esq.
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2285 Whitney Avenue
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
| certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or
delivered electronically or non-electronically on this date to all counsel and self-
represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was
received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will
immediately be electronically served:
Patrick A. Griffin
Inmate #257475
Cheshire Correctional Institution
900 Highland Avenue
Cheshire, CT 06410
rus Pamela L. Drucker
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go PO Box 8130
S <6 New Fairfield, CT 06812
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pamela.drucker@gmail,com
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Cramer & Anderson
46 West Street
PO Box 278
Litchfield, CT 06759
kmancini@crameranderson,com
/s/400462
Miles N. Esty, Esq.
Commissioner of the Superior Court
20
EXHIBIT A
SUMMONS - CIVIL For information on cS
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
JO-CV-1 Rev. 2.22 ADA accommodations, SUPERIOR COURT
jome
www jud.et.gov a
C.G.S. §§ 51-346, 61-347, 51-349, 51-380, 52-450, 52-48, 52-259; contact a court clerk or
PB. §§ 9-1 through 3-21, 8-1, 10-1 go to: wwwjud.ct. gov/ADA.
Instructions are on page 2.
CO Select if amount, legal interest, or property in demand, not including interest and costs, is LESS than $2,500.
[&] Select if amount, legal interest, or property in demand, not including interest and costs, is $2,500 or MORE.
(2 Select if claiming other relief in addition to, or in place of, money or damages.
TO: Any proper officer
By authority of the State of Connecticut, you are hereby commanded to make due and legal service of this summons and attached complaint.
‘Adsress Of court cietk (Number, siraet, town and zip code) ‘Telephone number of clerk Retin Date (ust be a Tuasdayp
146 White Street, Danbury, CT 06810 (203 ) 207 ~ 8600 01/31/2023
Judicial District GA. At (Giyviowny Case type code (See list on page 2)
(J Housing Session (Number: Danbury Major. T Minor; 90
For the plaintiff(s) enter the appearance of:
Name and address of attomey, law fir or plaintiff sal-represonted (Wuniber, strael, town and zip code) ‘Jutis number (# allomey or taw fen)
Cramer and Anderson, LLP, 46 West Street, P.O. Box 278, Litchfield, CT 06759 012732
"Telephone number ‘Signature Of plainii (i seiFrepresonted)
( 860 ) 567 ~ 8718
‘The attomey or law firm appearing for the plaintiff, or the plaintiff if E-mail address for delivery of papers under Section 10-13 of the
self-represented, agrees to accept papers (service) electronically Connecticut Practice Book (if agreed)
in this case under Section 10-13 of the Connecticut Practica Book, Yes [_] No kmancini@crameranderson.com
Partles Name (Last, First, Middle Initial) and address of each party (Number; street; P.O. Box; town; state; zip; country, if not USA)
First Name: Knapp, Gabriella and Knapp, Ryan, as Administrators of the Estate of James Knapp
plaintiff Address: 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook, CT 06482 P01
Additional Name: Knapp, Gabriella
plaintiff Address: 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook, CT 06482 P02
First Name: Griffin, Patrick
defendant Address: 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, CT 06812 D-01
Additional Name: Drucker, Pamela
defendant Address: 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, CT 06812 D-02
Additional Name: Zegarelli’s Pizzeria & Tavern, Inc.
defendant Address: 185 Fairfield Drive, Brewster, NY 10509 D-03
Additional Name:
defendant Address: D-04
Total number of piaintiffs; 02 Total number of defendants: 93 | Co) Form Jo-cv-2 attached for additional parties,
Notice to each defendant
1 You are being sued. This is a summons in a lawsuit. The complaint attached states the claims the plaintiff is making against you.
2. To receive further notices, you or your attorney must file an Appearance (form JD-CL-12) with the clerk at the address above. Generally,
it must be filed on or before the second day after the Return Date. The Return Date is not a hearing date. You do not have to come to
court on the Retum Date unless you receive a separate notice telling you to appear.
if you or your attorney do not file an Appearance on time, a default judgment may be entered against you. You can get an Appearance
form at the court address above, or on-tine at https:/jud.ct.govAwebforms/.
Ifyou believe that you have insurance that may cover the claim being made against you in this lawsuit, you should immediately contact
your insurance representative. Other actions you may take are described in the Connecticut Practice Book, which may be found in a
superior court law library or on-line at https:/(www jud.ct.gov/pb.htm.
If you have questions about the summons and complaint, you should talk to an attorney.
The court staff is not allowed to give advice on fegal matters.
i
Bate Signed ‘and soteet proper bor) [&] Commissioner of Superior Court | Neme of person signi inf
01/10/2023 Lye o Clark Kent J. Mancini/ Esq.
If this summons is signed by a Clerk:
bE Filed kf Fes Court Use Only
a.
b.
The signing has been done so that the plaintiff(s) will not be denied access to the courts.
Itis the responsibility of the plaintiff(s) to ensure that service is made in the manner provided by law,”
k
4
CoP 7
c, The court staff is not permitted to give any legal advice in connection with any lawsuit.
d, The Clerk signing this summons at the request of the plaintifi(s) is not responsible in any way for any"
seen
ssn
errors or omissions in the summons, any allegations contained in the complaint, or the service of the 2, State
summons or complaint. MFRS
| certify | have read and_ | Sianed (SelF represented plaintit Baie
understand the above:
Page 1 of2
Instructions
4. Type or print legibly. If you are a self-represented party, this summons must be signed by a clerk of the court.
2 if there is more than one defendant, make a copy of the summons for each additional defendant. Each defendant must receive a copy of
this summons. Each copy of the summons must show who signed the summons and when it was signed. If there are more than two
plaintiffs or more than four defendants, complete the Civil Summons Continuation of Parties (form JD-CV-2) and attachit to the original
and all copies of the summons.
Attach the summons to the complaint, and attach a copy of the summons to each copy of the complaint, Include a copy of the Civil
Summons Continuation of Parties form, if applicable.
After service has been made by a proper officer, file the original papers and the officer's retum of service with the clerk of the court.
Use this summons for the case type codes shown below.
Do not use this summons for the following actions:
(a) Family matters (for example divorce, child support, (e) Administrative appeals
custody, parentage, and visitation matters} (®) Proceedings pertaining to arbitration
(b) Any actions or proceedings in which an attachment, (g) Summary Process (Eviction) actions
gamishment or replevy is sought (h) Entry and Detainer proceedings
(¢) Applications for change of name
{) Housing Code Enforcement actions
(d) Probate appeals
Case Type Codes
CODE
DESCRIPTION Majer?
Minor
MINOR DESCRIPTION MAJOR
DESCRIPTION
CODE
Waloré
Minor
MINOR DESCRIPTION
Contracts coo ‘Construction - All other Property Poo Farsclosure
co Construction ~ State and Local P10 Partition
cz Insurance Policy P20 (Quiet THe/Discharge of Mortgage or Lien
c30 ‘Spatifc Performance P30 Asset Forfeiture:
C40 Collections Pao All other
C60 UninsuredUnderinsured Motorist Coverage
ceo Uniform Limited Liebilty Company Act~C.G.S, 4-243
cae All other Torts (Other TO2 Defective Prer 08 - Private- Snow or lee
than Vehicutar} TOS Defective Pret a8 Private - Other
Eminent E00 State Highway Condemnation TH Defective Premises - Public» Snow or ice
Domain £10 Redevelopment Condemnation 112 Defective Pre 08 - Publie- Other
E20 ‘Other State or Municipal Agencies T2 Products Liability - Other than Vehicular
E30 Publle Utiities & Gas Transmission Companies 128 Malpractice - Medical
Ego All other 128 Malpractice - Legal
T30 Malprectice ~All other
Housing H10 Housing - Retum of Security Deposit T40
T50
Assautt and Batiery
Defamation
H12 Housing ~ Rent and/or Damages
H40 Housing - Housing - Audita Querela/injunction T6i Animals - Dog
HO Housing
- Administrative Appeal Tee Animals - Other
He0 Housing» Municipal Enforcement 170 False Arrest
H90 Housing- All Other m7 Fire Damage
T980 All other
Miscellaneous M00 Injunction
M40 Recelvership Vehicular Torts vot Motor Vehicles* - Driver endlor Passengsr(e) vs. Drver(s)
M15 Receivarship for Abandoned/Blighted Property vod Motor Vehicles* - Pedestrian vs. Driver
M20 Mandamus vos Motor Vehicles* - Property Damage only
M30 Hebeas Corpus (extradition, release from Penel Institution) vo8 Motor Vehicle’ - Products Liability Ineluding Warranty
mao Asbitration voe Motor Vehicle* - All other
M50 Declaratory Judgment vio Boats
M63 ‘Bar Discipiine v20 Airplanes
M6e Department of Labor Unemployment Compensation v30 Raiiroads
Enforcement v40 ‘Snowmobiles
mes Bar Diseipline - Inactive Status veo Alt other
M70 Municipal Ordinanes and Regulation Enforcement “Motor Vehicles include cars, tucks,
eo Foreign Civil Judgments - C.G.S. 62-604 & C.G.S. 602-30 motorcycles, and motor scooters.
M83 ‘Small Claims Transfer to Regular Docket Wills, Estates wid ‘Construction of Wills end Trusts
M84 Foreign Protective Order and Trusts weo Allother
M68 CHRO Action in the Public Interest- PA. 19-93
M90 Allother
Page 2 of 2
RETURN DATE: JANUARY 31, 2023 SUPERIOR COURT
GABRIELLA AND RYAN KNAPP, AS
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
ESTATE OF JAMES KNAPP, and
GABRIELLE KNAPP INDIVIDUALLY JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY
Vv. AT DANBURY
PATRICK GRIFFIN;
PAMELA DRUCKER; and
ZEGARELLI’S PIZZERIA &
TAVERN, INC. JANUARY 10, 2023
COMPLAINT
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
eg 4. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§52-555 and/or 52-599(a), Plaintiffs, Gabriella and
Ryan Knapp, bring this action in their capacity as administrators of the estate of James
Q-3
is
Knapp. A copy of the Probate Court Certificate Appointing Gabriella and Ryan Knapp
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
2. Onor about March 7, 2022, James Knapp, age 65, resided at 22 Oakview Road,
i
Sandy Hook, Connecticut.
3. Gabriella Knapp, at all relevant times, resided at 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook,
Connecticut and was James Knapp’s wife.
4. Ryan Knapp, at all relevant times, resided at 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook,
Connecticut and was James Knapp’s son.
5. Atall times relevant hereto, Patrick Griffin was a resident of the state of
cut.
Connecticut, residing at 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, Connecti
6. Atall times relevant hereto, Pamela Drucker was a resident of the state of
icut.
Connecticut, residing at 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, Connect
7. Pamela Drucker is the record-owner of the property located at 2 Hillview Drive
East, New Fairfield, Connecticut as evidenced by a deed recorded at Volume 523, Page
88 in the Town of New Fairfield land records.
8. Atall times relevant hereto, Zeg
Preview
DOCKET NO. DBD-CV23-6045867-S SUPERIOR COURT NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY J.D. OF DANBURY VS. AT DANBURY PATRICK A. GRIFFIN; PAMELA L. DRUCKER; APRIL 26, 2024 GABRIELA KNAPP and RYAN KNAPP, AS ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES E. KNAPP, JR.; and GABRIELA KNAPP e MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pursuant to Connecticut Practice §17-44, et seq., the plaintiff Nationwide gasEok og General Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) hereby moves for summary judgment Me oaa8 Ose 20a because the alleged injuries and damages are not the result of an “occurrence” as fz o geese yf defined by the applicable homeowner's policy. In addition, it the subject policy aos 6 excludes coverage for injuries that are “expected” or “intended”. In addition, the subject policy excludes damages for injuries that constitute criminal acts as defined by the policy. Finally, the policy excludes damages for injuries caused by “physical abuse.” The basis of the present motion is that there are no genuine issues of material fact between the parties and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on grounds that the injuries and damages alleged in the underlying Complaint are not covered under the Policy because the bodily injury: a) does not constitute an “occurrence”; b) were “expected” or “intended”; c) were criminal in nature; and d) constitutes “physical abuse”. Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff moves this court to grant summary judgment and find that the plaintiff has no duty to defend or indemnify Mr. Griffin or Mrs. Drucker for the claims set forth in the underling case of Knapp v. Griffin, DBD-CV23-6045120-S. >28 ees A Memorandum of Law in support hereof is submitted herewith. ES Se <5 Be ee THE PLAINTIFF, EE 25 NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. eu Mee Bee yA & By /s/400462 Miles Esty, Esq. a Esty & Buckmir, LLC 2285 Whitney Avenue Hamden, CT 06518 (203)248-5678 Juris #415435 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on this date to all counsel and self- represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served: Patrick A. Griffin Inmate #257475 Cheshire Correctional Institution 900 Highland Avenue Cheshire, CT 06410 pe ess Pamela L. Drucker mes PO Box 8130 a3 es <3 New Fairfield, CT 06812 ee = pamela.drucker@gmail.com ~ 60 mee Bes A Cramer & Anderson 46 West Street PO Box 278 Litchfield, CT 06759 kmancini@crameranderson.com a /s/400462 Miles N. Esty, Esq. Commissioner of the Superior Court DOCKET NO. DBD-CV23-6045867-S SUPERIOR COURT NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY J.D. OF DANBURY VS. AT DANBURY PATRICK A. GRIFFIN; PAMELA L. DRUCKER; APRIL 26, 2024 GABRIELA KNAPP and RYAN KNAPP, AS ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES E. 1 KNAPP, JR.; and GABRIELA KNAPP MEMORANDUM OF LAW RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book §17-44, et seq., the plaintiff eas Mes Nationwide General Insurance Company submits the following in support of its <3 Me Os Motion for Summary Judgment filed concurrently herewith. 60 pos BRS ya I STATEMENT OF THE CASE By Writ, Summons and Complaint returnable to the Judicial District of Danbury on March 14, 2023, the undersigned plaintiff Nationwide General Insurance Company (hereinafter “Nationwide”) brought this action seeking declaratory judgment by this Court of the rights and duties of the parties to a contract of insurance coverage (a homeowner's policy) between the plaintiff and the defendants Patrick A. Griffin and Pamela Drucker (hereinafter “Griffin and Drucker’). Specifically, Nationwide alleges that the subject homeowner's policy at issue in this action because the alleged injuries and damages are not the result of an “occurrence” as defined by the policy. The policy also excludes coverage for injuries that are “expected” or “intended”. In addition, the subject policy excludes damages for injuries that constitute criminal acts as defined by the policy. Finally, the policy excludes damages caused by “physical abuse.” iB The defendants Gabriella Knapp and Ryan Knapp as the Administrators of the Estate of James E. Knapp, Jr. brought suit against Griffin and Drucker > mss pursuant to a Summons and Complaint dated on or about January 10, 2023 go gs te Meg (hereinafter the “Knapp Complaint’), pending in the Judicial District of Danbury, me Docket Number DBD-CV23-6045120-S. See Exhibit “A” hereto. BRB aé The Knapp Complaint alleges that on or about May 7, 2022 the defendants Griffin and Drucker caused the wrongful death of James Knapp when Griffin stabbed and killed him. In the underlying case, Nationwide provided a defense to Griffin and Drucker. Plaintiffs Estate of James Knapp and his wife, Gabriela Knapp, bring suit in twenty counts against Patrick Griffin, Pamela Drucker, and Zegarelli’s Pizzeria alleging that Patrick Griffin stabbed James Knapp on May 7, 2022 at the insureds’ residence in New Fairfield, Connecticut, after the men had been drinking at a pizzeria in New York earlier that evening. It is alleged that the men got into an argument and that Patrick Griffin stabbed Knapp. The Complaint alleges counts against Patrick Griffin as follows: 1) intentional battery; 2) wrongful death based on intentional acts; 3) negligence for 8 failure to exercise reasonable care with a knife and allowing himself to become z intoxicated so as not to be able to exercise reasonable care; 4) recklessness; 5) ry 5 intentional infliction of emotional distress as to Gabriela Knapp; 6) negligent Ses te ay a oe infliction of emotional distress as to Gabriela Knapp; and 7) loss of consortium as E€ 26 £0 maz to Gabriela Knapp on the grounds set forth in the first four counts above. Besae NE The Complaint alleges counts against Pamela Drucker as follows: 1) negligence for failure to ensure plaintiff's safety in the home, failing to properly e secure the knife, and permitting Griffin to keep knives in the home; 2) recklessness on the same grounds with the knowledge that Griffin was a convicted felon; 3) negligent entrustment of the knife to Griffin; 4) and a loss of consortium claim on the grounds set forth in the first three counts above. Plaintiff Nationwide now moves for summary judgment as to the duty to indemnify the defendants on grounds that the injuries and damages alleged in the underlying Complaint are not covered under the Policy because the bodily injury: a) does not constitute an “occurrence”; b) were “expected” or “intended”; c) were criminal in nature; and d) constitutes physical abuse. 1 I. ARGUMENT A. Standard for Summary Judgment > “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits Mes ef oe <5 ee a and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any Ofe 3} iO Ze material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of BR ae law...In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the a evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party...Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the non-existence of any material fact...a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue...It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact...are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court in support of a motion for summary judgment.” Buell Industries v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1337471 (Conn. Super.) citing Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 2-2-203 (1995). Summary judgment procedure a would be defeated as a whole if the mere assertion that a material factual dispute existed could force a case to trial. Great Country Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423, 436 (1997). Ms “The existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by Ue mas counter-affidavits and concrete evidence”. Pion v. Southern New England BS a a8 & Telephone, 45 Conn. App. 657, 663 (1997). “If the affidavits and other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary o judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof’. 2830 Whitney Avenue Corp. v. Heritage Canal Development Assoc., Inc., 33 Conn. App. 563, 569 (1994). A material fact is one that will make a difference in the outcome of the case. Hammer v. Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578 (1990). In ruling upon a summary judgment motion, the court merely determines whether an issue of fact exists, but does not try the issue if it does exist. Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431 (1975). The issue must be one which the opposing party is entitled to litigate under its pleadings and the mere existence of a factual dispute apart from the pleadings is not enough to preclude summary judgment. Shuster v. Buckley, 5 Conn. App. 473, 477 (1985). The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate the delay and expense Accompanying a trial where there is no real issue to be tried. Dowling v. Kielak, ree eis 160 Conn. 14 (1968). mes sé A gs undertake a defense on the insured’s behalf, depends on whether the terms of the a insurance policy provide coverage for the dispute in which the insured is engaged.” Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn. App. 640, 641 (2009). “[C]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court....An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract...In accordance with those principles, [t]he determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the... [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy...If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning...Under those circumstances, the policy is to be given effect according to its terms....When interpreting [an insurance iB policy], we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach re a reasonable overall result. Sec <5 Be a In determining whether the terms of an insurance policy are clear and Og 26 EU Ze unambiguous, [a] court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the Bes a ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity... Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from Ss one party's subjective perception of the terms...As with contracts generally, a provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one reading...Under those circumstances, any ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy must be construed in favor of the insured because the insurance company drafted the policy... This rule of construction may not be 10 applied, however, unless the policy terms are indeed ambiguous." Zulick v. Patron’s Mutual Ins., 287 Conn. 367, 372-373 (2008). (Citations omitted; internal quotations omitted). C. The Policy Language The claims of the plaintiff Nationwide are based on the following provisions of the Policy (a certified copy of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit “B’): Section II - Liability Coverages pe nes A. Coverage E — Personal Liability EE If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an “insured” for damages due to an “occurrence” resulting from negligent personal acts or negligence DE arising out of the ownership, maintenance of use of real or personal BRS property, we will: = 1. Pay up to our limit of liability for damages for which an “insured” is legally liable....; and 2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. With regard to an occurrence, the policy defines an occurrence as: 11. “Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same several harmful conditions, which results during the policy period, in a) “bodily injury” or b) property damage. The main exclusions for liability coverage applicable herein are noted in 11 the policy, where it states on page 30: E. Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F — Medical Payments to Others Coverages E and F do not apply to the following: 1. Expected or Intended Injury “Bodily injury” or “property damage” which is expected or intended by the “insured”, even if the resulting “bodily injury” or “property damage”: Zz a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended; or >25iB gS = b. Is sustained by a different person, entity or property than initially expected or intended. Oe & DES 23 2. Criminal Acts Bes yA BR = “Bodily injury” or “property damage” caused by or resulting from an act or omission which is criminal in nature and committed by the “insured”. This exclusion applies regardless of whether the “insured” is actually charged with, or convicted of a crime. 8. Sexual Molestation, Corporal Punishment, Physical Or Mental Abuse, Or Harassment “Bodily injury” or “property damage’ arising out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment, physical or mental abuse...” The underlying incident does not constitute an occurrence as defined by the policy. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jussaume, 35 F.Supp.3d 231 (2014), the 12 Connecticut District Court granted summary judgment to the insurer where the insured was alleged to have assaulted the third-party plaintiff during a larger altercation at a raceway. Despite plaintiff alleging that the insured had “negligently contacted” him while he was also being attacked by others, the court held that the facts alleged were intentional and therefore did not fall under the policy definition 19 of an “occurrence”, or accident. With regard to expected or intended injury, the defendants will rely on the >e8 phrasing of the complaint and the conclusory labeling of the claims as negligence. mee cs pe However, the court is not required to rely on the allegations of the complaint. It is oe EE = 6 EO routinely the practice of Connecticut courts to “look past the terminology in a Be ag pleading to grant summary judgment for the insurer, holding there is no duty to defend a negligence action which is actually based on intentional acts by the se insured”. Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mara, 699 F.Supp.2d 439, at 456 (D. Conn. 2010); see also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sapna Tandon, et al., United States District Court, District of Connecticut, 3:13 CV 585 (2015). In Allstate Insurance Company v. Charles J. Funari, Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, HHD CV 16 6073550 S (Shapiro, J.; 13 9/6/17), Judge Shapiro granted declaratory judgment to the carrier under an “intentional acts” exclusion where the defendant was alleged to have sexually assaulted, attacked, and groped the third-party plaintiff. Despite claiming it was negligent conduct alleged in the complaint, the court noted that the acts constituted voluntary and intentional acts that resulted in neither the duty to defend or indemnify the insured. In finding that the acts were in fact intentional, Judge Zz Shapiro noted the common law standard that “harmful intent may be inferred at rez law in circumstances where the alleged behavior is so inherently harmful that the ees ES SE Mee resulting damage is inarguably foreseeable.” gE 2 20 With regard to criminal acts, the Nationwide policy specifically states the ao ya a g exclusion applies whether the insured is actually charged with a crime or not. The a underlying Complaint alleges that Patrick Griffin caused the death of James Knapp by inserting a knife into his stomach. Exhibit “A”. The underlying incident is documented in the attached copy of the Police Report (Exhibit “C’).’ Further, Mr. ' The attached Police Report is uncertified. On February 6, 2024 counsel for the plaintiff ordered a certified copy of the police report. That request remains pending. On April 25, 2024 counsel’s office was advised by the Connecticut State Police that it will take ten to twelve months to comply with the request. See Affidavit of Ashley Erickson attached hereto as Exhibit D. The plaintiff filed this motion to comply with the current summary judgment deadline of April 26, 2024. Accordingly, if the court or parties’ require a certified copy, then the plaintiff will and can issue a Subpoena to have the appropriate representative of the State Police appear at the hearing on the summary judgment motion to provide the report and testimony. 14 Griffin was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree 53a-55(a)(1) which provides: (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under ...” A certified copy of Mr. Griffin's conviction is attached as Exhibit “E”. Accordingly, the only inquiry is whether the act(s) were criminal in nature (whether pe there were criminal charges or not). Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Og contents of the Police report, and Mr. Griffin’s certified conviction record, there can a me BS 4 be no other finding but that the alleged injuries claimed in the underlying tort case A are precluded from coverage under the subject policy herein. Finally, the claims against both Griffin and Drucker are excluded from coverage as acts “arising out of physical abuse”. Specifically, these claims clearly “arise out of’ the physical abuse committed by Griffin against Knapp. "[I]t is generally understood that for liability for an accident or an injury to be said to "arise out of’ [an occurrence or offense], it is sufficient to show only that the accident or injury “was connected with," "had its origins in," "grew out of," "flowed 15 from," or "was incident to" [that occurrence or offense], in order to meet the requirement that there be a causal relationship between the accident or injury and [that occurrence or offense].' Hogle v. Hogle, 167 Conn. 572, 577, 356 A.2d 172 (1975). To ‘arise’ out of means ‘to originate from a specified source.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961); see also Black's Law Dictionary (7th Ed 19 1999) (defining ‘arise’ as '1. [t]o originate; to stem [from] . . . 2. [t]o result [from]'). ‘The phrase arising out of is usually interpreted as indicat[ing] a causal resip connection.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coregis Ins. Co. v. American mee ES gs ts Meg Health Foundation, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 99-9300 (2d Cir. ee gs £0 February 14, 2001); see also McGinniss v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 648 F. Ze BR ae Sup. 1263, 1267 (S.D.N.Y 1986)." QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 374, 773 A.2d 906 (2001). a Relying on LaBonte v. Federal Mutual Ins. Co., 159 Conn. 252, 259, 268 A.2d 663 (1970), the court in Sloat concluded that “in determining whether the complaint alleges a claim for bodily injury arising out of excluded activity, the court must inquire not merely into the status of the parents as parents but into the underlying conduct of their son—‘the subject matter of the [incident] without regard 16 to the involvement of the insured’ parents.” Sloat, supra, at 694. The court noted that the subject matter of the complaint in that action alleged bodily injury “which arises out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse...” and that the complaint alleges injuries that are connected with, originate in, grow out of, flow from, or are incident to the physical and mental abuse. @SP Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 256 Conn. 374. In other words, the z allegations in that action “arose out of” the underlying physical and mental abuse, pes vis and therefore were removed from coverage under exclusion “k”. Cf, Christ v. ES fs <2 Ms oe Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 214 Conn. 216, 223 n.5, 571 A.2d 107 (1990) gE 29 (exclusion for “bodily injury or property damage arising out of demolition ms > Ba8 yA operations performed by or on behalf of the insured,” held unambiguous). 5 The case of Merrimack v. Mutual Fire Insurance, 117 Conn. App. 769 (2009) is directly on point and involved an identical exclusion to the one contained in Nationwide’s policy. In that case the Court held that a stabbing incident constitutes physical abuse under an exclusion for “physical and mental abuse’. In the more recent matter of General Ins. Co. of America v. Agatha Okeke. et al., 182 Conn. App. 83 (2018), the Appellate Court dealt with the same issue. In 17 that action, Ms. Okeke and her son, Michael Okeke, were insured under a homeowner's policy at the time Michael went to an elderly neighbor's house and assaulted, stabbed, and beat Ms. Teresa Craft. The subsequent civil litigation against both Agatha and Michael Okeke alleged intentional and negligent assault against Michael, as well as negligent supervision of Michael against Agatha 1D Okeke. Indeed, the main claim against Agatha Okeke was that she knew that her son Michael was a danger to himself and others, but she negligently failed to supervise him and to prevent him from obtaining access to knives, which are Sees EGR gs 2g <= Me aa nearly the identical allegations against Drucker herein. The lower court granted Ose 26s 20a Zak summary judgment to General Insurance on grounds that Michael’s actions were gee ge Egg not an “occurrence” under the policy and, even if they were, they were excluded as “expected or intended” actions or criminal acts. The court then took the additional step and held the claims were not covered, because even if the claims against her were an “occurrence” under the policy, Ms. Craft’s injuries “arose out of” Michael Okeke’s physical abuse of her. The court distinguished between the intentional acts exclusion being limited to the actual actor, Michael, versus the physical abuse exclusion not including such a limitation, in so holding. 18 WHEREFORE, the plaintiff Nationwide hereby moves this Court to grant the present Motion for Summary Judgment and find in favor of the plaintiff that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Patrick Griffin and Pamela Drucker for the claims and injuries set forth in the Complaint. THE PLAINTIFF, 1 NATIONWIDE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. Zz By /s/400462 Miles Esty, Esq. pe mele Se Esty & Buckmir, LLC Sek foe 2285 Whitney Avenue gk PEs Hamden, CT 06518 Oz ESa (203)248-5678 MEL x Juris #415435 ges” yA xg 8 19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on this date to all counsel and self- represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served: Patrick A. Griffin Inmate #257475 Cheshire Correctional Institution 900 Highland Avenue Cheshire, CT 06410 rus Pamela L. Drucker eis go PO Box 8130 S <6 New Fairfield, CT 06812 ps ee Ee 26 pamela.drucker@gmail,com £0 Bes yA Cramer & Anderson 46 West Street PO Box 278 Litchfield, CT 06759 kmancini@crameranderson,com /s/400462 Miles N. Esty, Esq. Commissioner of the Superior Court 20 EXHIBIT A SUMMONS - CIVIL For information on cS STATE OF CONNECTICUT JO-CV-1 Rev. 2.22 ADA accommodations, SUPERIOR COURT jome www jud.et.gov a C.G.S. §§ 51-346, 61-347, 51-349, 51-380, 52-450, 52-48, 52-259; contact a court clerk or PB. §§ 9-1 through 3-21, 8-1, 10-1 go to: wwwjud.ct. gov/ADA. Instructions are on page 2. CO Select if amount, legal interest, or property in demand, not including interest and costs, is LESS than $2,500. [&] Select if amount, legal interest, or property in demand, not including interest and costs, is $2,500 or MORE. (2 Select if claiming other relief in addition to, or in place of, money or damages. TO: Any proper officer By authority of the State of Connecticut, you are hereby commanded to make due and legal service of this summons and attached complaint. ‘Adsress Of court cietk (Number, siraet, town and zip code) ‘Telephone number of clerk Retin Date (ust be a Tuasdayp 146 White Street, Danbury, CT 06810 (203 ) 207 ~ 8600 01/31/2023 Judicial District GA. At (Giyviowny Case type code (See list on page 2) (J Housing Session (Number: Danbury Major. T Minor; 90 For the plaintiff(s) enter the appearance of: Name and address of attomey, law fir or plaintiff sal-represonted (Wuniber, strael, town and zip code) ‘Jutis number (# allomey or taw fen) Cramer and Anderson, LLP, 46 West Street, P.O. Box 278, Litchfield, CT 06759 012732 "Telephone number ‘Signature Of plainii (i seiFrepresonted) ( 860 ) 567 ~ 8718 ‘The attomey or law firm appearing for the plaintiff, or the plaintiff if E-mail address for delivery of papers under Section 10-13 of the self-represented, agrees to accept papers (service) electronically Connecticut Practice Book (if agreed) in this case under Section 10-13 of the Connecticut Practica Book, Yes [_] No kmancini@crameranderson.com Partles Name (Last, First, Middle Initial) and address of each party (Number; street; P.O. Box; town; state; zip; country, if not USA) First Name: Knapp, Gabriella and Knapp, Ryan, as Administrators of the Estate of James Knapp plaintiff Address: 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook, CT 06482 P01 Additional Name: Knapp, Gabriella plaintiff Address: 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook, CT 06482 P02 First Name: Griffin, Patrick defendant Address: 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, CT 06812 D-01 Additional Name: Drucker, Pamela defendant Address: 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, CT 06812 D-02 Additional Name: Zegarelli’s Pizzeria & Tavern, Inc. defendant Address: 185 Fairfield Drive, Brewster, NY 10509 D-03 Additional Name: defendant Address: D-04 Total number of piaintiffs; 02 Total number of defendants: 93 | Co) Form Jo-cv-2 attached for additional parties, Notice to each defendant 1 You are being sued. This is a summons in a lawsuit. The complaint attached states the claims the plaintiff is making against you. 2. To receive further notices, you or your attorney must file an Appearance (form JD-CL-12) with the clerk at the address above. Generally, it must be filed on or before the second day after the Return Date. The Return Date is not a hearing date. You do not have to come to court on the Retum Date unless you receive a separate notice telling you to appear. if you or your attorney do not file an Appearance on time, a default judgment may be entered against you. You can get an Appearance form at the court address above, or on-tine at https:/jud.ct.govAwebforms/. Ifyou believe that you have insurance that may cover the claim being made against you in this lawsuit, you should immediately contact your insurance representative. Other actions you may take are described in the Connecticut Practice Book, which may be found in a superior court law library or on-line at https:/(www jud.ct.gov/pb.htm. If you have questions about the summons and complaint, you should talk to an attorney. The court staff is not allowed to give advice on fegal matters. i Bate Signed ‘and soteet proper bor) [&] Commissioner of Superior Court | Neme of person signi inf 01/10/2023 Lye o Clark Kent J. Mancini/ Esq. If this summons is signed by a Clerk: bE Filed kf Fes Court Use Only a. b. The signing has been done so that the plaintiff(s) will not be denied access to the courts. Itis the responsibility of the plaintiff(s) to ensure that service is made in the manner provided by law,” k 4 CoP 7 c, The court staff is not permitted to give any legal advice in connection with any lawsuit. d, The Clerk signing this summons at the request of the plaintifi(s) is not responsible in any way for any" seen ssn errors or omissions in the summons, any allegations contained in the complaint, or the service of the 2, State summons or complaint. MFRS | certify | have read and_ | Sianed (SelF represented plaintit Baie understand the above: Page 1 of2 Instructions 4. Type or print legibly. If you are a self-represented party, this summons must be signed by a clerk of the court. 2 if there is more than one defendant, make a copy of the summons for each additional defendant. Each defendant must receive a copy of this summons. Each copy of the summons must show who signed the summons and when it was signed. If there are more than two plaintiffs or more than four defendants, complete the Civil Summons Continuation of Parties (form JD-CV-2) and attachit to the original and all copies of the summons. Attach the summons to the complaint, and attach a copy of the summons to each copy of the complaint, Include a copy of the Civil Summons Continuation of Parties form, if applicable. After service has been made by a proper officer, file the original papers and the officer's retum of service with the clerk of the court. Use this summons for the case type codes shown below. Do not use this summons for the following actions: (a) Family matters (for example divorce, child support, (e) Administrative appeals custody, parentage, and visitation matters} (®) Proceedings pertaining to arbitration (b) Any actions or proceedings in which an attachment, (g) Summary Process (Eviction) actions gamishment or replevy is sought (h) Entry and Detainer proceedings (¢) Applications for change of name {) Housing Code Enforcement actions (d) Probate appeals Case Type Codes CODE DESCRIPTION Majer? Minor MINOR DESCRIPTION MAJOR DESCRIPTION CODE Waloré Minor MINOR DESCRIPTION Contracts coo ‘Construction - All other Property Poo Farsclosure co Construction ~ State and Local P10 Partition cz Insurance Policy P20 (Quiet THe/Discharge of Mortgage or Lien c30 ‘Spatifc Performance P30 Asset Forfeiture: C40 Collections Pao All other C60 UninsuredUnderinsured Motorist Coverage ceo Uniform Limited Liebilty Company Act~C.G.S, 4-243 cae All other Torts (Other TO2 Defective Prer 08 - Private- Snow or lee than Vehicutar} TOS Defective Pret a8 Private - Other Eminent E00 State Highway Condemnation TH Defective Premises - Public» Snow or ice Domain £10 Redevelopment Condemnation 112 Defective Pre 08 - Publie- Other E20 ‘Other State or Municipal Agencies T2 Products Liability - Other than Vehicular E30 Publle Utiities & Gas Transmission Companies 128 Malpractice - Medical Ego All other 128 Malpractice - Legal T30 Malprectice ~All other Housing H10 Housing - Retum of Security Deposit T40 T50 Assautt and Batiery Defamation H12 Housing ~ Rent and/or Damages H40 Housing - Housing - Audita Querela/injunction T6i Animals - Dog HO Housing - Administrative Appeal Tee Animals - Other He0 Housing» Municipal Enforcement 170 False Arrest H90 Housing- All Other m7 Fire Damage T980 All other Miscellaneous M00 Injunction M40 Recelvership Vehicular Torts vot Motor Vehicles* - Driver endlor Passengsr(e) vs. Drver(s) M15 Receivarship for Abandoned/Blighted Property vod Motor Vehicles* - Pedestrian vs. Driver M20 Mandamus vos Motor Vehicles* - Property Damage only M30 Hebeas Corpus (extradition, release from Penel Institution) vo8 Motor Vehicle’ - Products Liability Ineluding Warranty mao Asbitration voe Motor Vehicle* - All other M50 Declaratory Judgment vio Boats M63 ‘Bar Discipiine v20 Airplanes M6e Department of Labor Unemployment Compensation v30 Raiiroads Enforcement v40 ‘Snowmobiles mes Bar Diseipline - Inactive Status veo Alt other M70 Municipal Ordinanes and Regulation Enforcement “Motor Vehicles include cars, tucks, eo Foreign Civil Judgments - C.G.S. 62-604 & C.G.S. 602-30 motorcycles, and motor scooters. M83 ‘Small Claims Transfer to Regular Docket Wills, Estates wid ‘Construction of Wills end Trusts M84 Foreign Protective Order and Trusts weo Allother M68 CHRO Action in the Public Interest- PA. 19-93 M90 Allother Page 2 of 2 RETURN DATE: JANUARY 31, 2023 SUPERIOR COURT GABRIELLA AND RYAN KNAPP, AS ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES KNAPP, and GABRIELLE KNAPP INDIVIDUALLY JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY Vv. AT DANBURY PATRICK GRIFFIN; PAMELA DRUCKER; and ZEGARELLI’S PIZZERIA & TAVERN, INC. JANUARY 10, 2023 COMPLAINT FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS eg 4. Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §§52-555 and/or 52-599(a), Plaintiffs, Gabriella and Ryan Knapp, bring this action in their capacity as administrators of the estate of James Q-3 is Knapp. A copy of the Probate Court Certificate Appointing Gabriella and Ryan Knapp attached hereto as Exhibit A. 2. Onor about March 7, 2022, James Knapp, age 65, resided at 22 Oakview Road, i Sandy Hook, Connecticut. 3. Gabriella Knapp, at all relevant times, resided at 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook, Connecticut and was James Knapp’s wife. 4. Ryan Knapp, at all relevant times, resided at 22 Oakview Road, Sandy Hook, Connecticut and was James Knapp’s son. 5. Atall times relevant hereto, Patrick Griffin was a resident of the state of cut. Connecticut, residing at 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, Connecti 6. Atall times relevant hereto, Pamela Drucker was a resident of the state of icut. Connecticut, residing at 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, Connect 7. Pamela Drucker is the record-owner of the property located at 2 Hillview Drive East, New Fairfield, Connecticut as evidenced by a deed recorded at Volume 523, Page 88 in the Town of New Fairfield land records. 8. Atall times relevant hereto, Zeg