Document for OLD NATIONAL BANK v. BRANDON HOLZHAUER, FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION DBA FREEDOM HOME MORTGAGE CORPORATION

Delage, et al. v. Wall, et al. – Case No. 2023-12309 5/16/24 – Demurrer Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant JOSHUA DELAGE filed a Demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainant MARK WALL’s Amended Answer on April 11, 2024. Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant DELAGE also filed a Reply on May 8, 2024. The Reply refers to an Opposition, however no Opposition was filed with the Court. It appears it may have been served, but not filed. As such, the Court continues Demurrer to July 16, 2024 at 9:00 am in Dept. 10B. Defendant/Cross-Complainant is ORDERED to file the Opposition served on Plaintiff/Cross-Complainant. No further briefing is allowed without leave of Court. Blanca A. Bañuelos Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: BC722308 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 61 NIKE USA INC VS 5860 WEST JEFFERSON LLC ET AL TENTATIVE Plaintiff Nike USA, Inc.s Motion for New Trial is DENIED. Defendants to provide notice. DISCUSSION The authority of a trial court to grant a new trial is established and circumscribed by statute. Section 657 sets out seven grounds for such a motion: (1) [i]rregularity in the proceedings; (2) [m]isconduct of the jury; (3) [a]ccident or surprise; (4) [n]ewly discovered evidence; (5) [e]xcessive or inadequate damages; (6) [i]nsufficiency of the evidence; and (7) [e]rror in law. [Citation.] (Montoya v. Barragan (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1227.) When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant, and Cross-Complainant Nike USA, Inc. (Nike) moves for a new trial on three of the above grounds: irregularity in the proceedings, insufficiency of the evidence, and errors of law. Nikes argument based on procedural irregularity is based on the courts purported lack of consideration of its objections to its statement of decision. (Motion at pp. 1213.) Nike argues for insufficiency of the evidence, based on purportedly contradictory findings that neither Nike nor Defendants and Cross-Complainants 5860 West Jefferson, LLC, 5860 West Jefferson I, LLC, and Samitaur Constructs (Defendants) had prevailed on their respective claims for damages based on construction delay, and on other issues. (Motion at pp. 1320.) Nike finally argues that the statement of decision contains errors of law in the application of the burden of proof under the lease agreement, and fails to adequately set forth any declaration of the parties rights under the lease. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Defendants in opposition argue that the present motion exceeds the page limit articulated in California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1113. (Opposition at p. 9.) They further contend that the present motions memorandum, declaration, and supporting evidence were filed and served tardily. (Opposition at pp. 89.) Defendant argues that Nikes objections to the statement of decision were late, and that the court in any event had notice of Nikes objections from its earlier-filed Request for Statement of Decision. (Opposition at pp. 1011.) Defendants argue that the courts statement of decision was based on substantial evidence and contains no errors of law. (Opposition at pp. 1118.) Plaintiffs memorandum exceeds the page limits prescribed by CRC Rule 3.1113. That rule states that no opening or responding memorandum except in summary judgment motions may exceed 15 pages, excluding the caption page, the notice of motion and motion, exhibits, declarations, attachments, the table of contents, the table of authorities, or the proof of service. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (d).) Excluding these last matters, Plaintiffs memorandum here extends to 21 pages. A memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (CRC Rule 3.1113, subd. (g).) The memorandum and supporting materials are also actually late. Nikes notice of intent to move for new trial was filed on May 28, 2024. Per Code of Civil Procedure § 659a, the party seeking new trial shall serve upon all other parties and file any brief and accompanying documents, including affidavits in support of the motion within 10 days of filing the notice [of intention to move for a new trial]. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) Although Nike filed the memorandum and supporting declaration by the June 7, 2024 deadline, it did not serve them until June 8 (Evans Decl. ¶ 8), and did not file or serve the supporting evidence until June 10. These timelines are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 342), and the statute provides courts the power, for good cause shown by affidavit or by written stipulation of the parties to extend the period for filing and serving materials for an additional period not to exceed 10 days. (Code Civ. Proc. § 659a.) A court may retroactively extend the deadline for filing to the full 30-day period even if the party did not seek an extension in advance. (Kabran, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 342.) Here, in the absence of prejudice shown by Defendants arising from the tardiness of service of the memorandum and supporting evidence, the court will exercise its discretion to assess the motion on its merits. Nike argues that the entry of judgment on the statement of decision evidenced irregularity in the proceedings, because the court entered judgment on May 14, 2024, in the erroneous belief that Nikes objections had not been timely filed, when in fact Nike had until May 16, 2024, to file such objections. Nikes argument as to the timing of the objections is persuasive. The proposed statement of decision not captioned proposed, but identified as such in its opening paragraph was filed and served on April 26, 2024. Per CRC Rule 3.1590, subd. (g), [a]ny party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment. 15 days after service of the statement of decision would have been May 11, a Saturday, rendering the deadline for filing objections Monday, May 13, 2024. Yet because the statement of decision was served by mail, the time for filing of objections was extended by five calendar days, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure § 1013, subd. (a). Thus the deadline by which to serve objections was May 16, 2024. Nikes objections were served on May 14, 2024, the same day the court entered judgment on the proposed statement of decision in the belief that no objections had been timely filed. (See 5/14/2024 Minute Order.) However, Nike has suffered no prejudice resulting from the claimed irregularity. In granting a new trial based on judicial error, [p]rejudice is required . . . and there is no discretion to grant a new trial for harmless error. (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.) Before Nike filed its objections to the statement of decision, it filed on May 8, 2024, a Request for Statement of Decision, taking issue with what Nike termed procedural ambiguities in the statement of decision and itemizing 87 issues, questions, and arguments for the court to consider. The court considered these issues in its order dated May 14, 2024, and found that its proposed statement of decision sufficiently addresses the evidence and legal and factual issues raised by Nike. (5/14/2024 Minute Order.) The issues raised in Nikes request for statement of decision parallel the objections it later offered, and were considered by the court. This is thus unlike the case in Raville v. Singh (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1130, cited by Nike, in which a different judge signed off on a statement of decision after the judge who had authored the tentative version had died. The same judge here held trial, prepared a proposed statement of decision, reviewed Nikes arguments, and entered judgment. As to insufficiency of the evidence, Nike contends that the courts decision does not support its conclusion that the premises were substantially complete on July 28, 2018. (Motion at pp. 1415.) However, the statement of decision notes that the City issued a temporary certificate of occupancy on July 28, 2018. (Statement of Decision (SOD) at p. 6.) The court noted that it was necessary to determine whether the BSC [base shell and core] or tenant improvements were completed to the extent that only punchlist items remained and whether any remaining uncompleted items adversely affected Nikes use of the property. (Ibid.) The court cited the myriad photos of the construction, and determined no items remained to be addressed which adversely affected Nikes occupancy. (Ibid.) The courts finding was supported by substantial evidence, as noted by Defendants in opposition. (Opposition at p.13.) Nike argues that this courts findings that neither Nike nor Defendants prevailed on their breach of contract claims as to who caused the delay are inherently contradictory, because one party must have caused the delay. (Motion at p. 16.) Yet this argument fails to reckon with the applicable burden of proof. The parties each bore the burden to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e. to present evidence, which when weighed with contrary evidence, has more convincing force and the greater probability of truth. (City of Long Beach v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 314 .) But if two parties make conflicting showings of culpability for the same event, and both showings are equally persuasive, then neither has shown that theirs has the greater probability of truth, and neither has met their burden. The courts statement of decision on the causes of the delay addresses all material disputes and is supported by substantial evidence. Although Nike argues that the court was required to make findings as to the cause of each period of delay, it presents no authority holding that such detail is required. (Motion at pp. 1618.) The applicable authority suggests otherwise: A trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A trial court is not required to make findings with regard to detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence. Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result. Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error. [Citation.] In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a party's request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the court's decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 163.) The statement of decision meets this standard. Nike further argues that the courts finding as to the tardiness of its request to rent parking spaces under the lease was erroneous. This argument is as follows: The lease provides that Nike could exercise an option to certain parking spaces by the commencement of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date. (Motion Exh. 81, Addendum ¶ 54.1.) Nike cites evidence that it provided notice of its intent to rent 123 monthly parking passes in an email dated January 23, 2020. (Motion Exh. T.) And because Nike had 18 months to request the parking until February 1, 2020, given a commencement date of July 28, 2018 Nike argues that no substantial evidence supports the courts finding that Nikes request was untimely. (Motion at pp. 1819.) The lease, however, did not give Nike until the end of the eighteenth (18th) month of the Lease term following the Commencement Date to seek the parking spaces. The lease instead set the deadline at the commencement of the eighteenth month i.e., until January 1, 2020. Nike thus did not have until February 1, 2020,to rent the parking spaces, and by this reckoning, Nikes January 23, 2020 request was untimely, and the courts reasoning stands. Nikes argument as to the breach of warranty claim is also unpersuasive, as the courts findings as to the condition of the roof was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the parties were aware of the susceptibility of the roof to leaks, yet requested the type of roof at issue anyway. (SOD at p. 7.) The court found no evidence of structural defects, and that the Defendants had maintained and addressed the leaks that Nike identified. (Ibid.) Nikes arguments as to errors of law, meanwhile, are similarly unavailing. Nike argues that the court misapplied the burden of proof, because under the lease, any delay was attributed to Defendants unless proven to be caused by Nike. (Motion at pp. 2025.) Yet Nike identifies no provision of the lease attributing delayed substantial completion to Defendants by default. It identifies a provision of an attached work letter stating that the date of substantial completion shall be deemed to be . . . the date on which the Tenant Improvements would have been Substantially completed if no such a . . . Delay had occurred, provided that the delay was caused by the lessee (Nike). (Motion at pp. 2021, citing Motion Exh. 81, at pp. 6465.) This provision does not purport to create a presumption of either partys default for the cause of delay, or to affect the ordinary burden of proof applicable to a breach of contract action. Nike further identifies provisions indicating that time was of the essence, and setting a date for completion of construction, but once more, these provisions do not purport to assign a presumption of fault for the delay to Defendants. (Motion at p. 22, citing Motion Exh. 81 at p. 65.) Finally, Nike argues that the statement of decision rendered judgment in favor of Defendants on their declaratory relief cause of action, without offering the actual declaration of rights requested, or a contrary declaration to what Nike requested in its Complaint. (Motion at p. 25.) Nike relies on the case Kroff v. Kroff (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 404, in which the court stated: A dispute existed as to the meaning of a document and the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration of her rights. It was the duty of the court to set forth the meaning and effect of the clause in question. Here the court merely adjudged that plaintiff take nothing by her said cause of action, and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff. (Id. at p. 405.) The present case is distinguishable, as the court here did not merely adjudge that plaintiff take nothing and defendants prevail, but offered a statement of decision explaining the facts of the case and its reasoning. Nike sought a declaration that the property was not substantially complete as of the date of the complaint, that its obligation to pay rent had not begun, that Plaintiff was entitled to immediate correction and completion of all incomplete or defective aspects of the property, and it is entitled to free rent for a number of days determined by the court. (FAC ¶ 57.) Yet these prayers for relief were addressed by the courts determination that the property was substantially complete as of July 28, 2018. (SOD at p. 6.) The motion is therefore DENIED.

Case Number: 23STCV26467 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING CIRCA 1200, LLC, vs. FRANCISCO MEZA. Case No.: 23STCV26467 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Circa 1200, LLCs Request for Default Judgment Having considered all documents submitted in support of a default judgment, the Court rules as follows: Background On October 30, 2023, Circa 1200, LLC (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendant Francisco Meza (Defendant) for common count and breach of contract. On December 15, 2023, the clerk entered defaults against Defendant. On June 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Court Judgment to be heard on July 9, 2024. Partys Request Plaintiff requests the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendant and award Plaintiff damages in the amount of $113,760.75, prejudgment interest at a rate of 10% in the amount of $8,913.86, attorneys fees in the amount of $702.00, and costs in the amount of $498.00, for a total judgment of $123,874.61. Discussion Plaintiff submitted a completed default judgment packet, with all applicable attachments. The Court finds sufficient evidence to justify the requested award and grants Plaintiffs request in full. Conclusion The application for default judgment filed on June 18, 2024, is granted. Judgment in the amount of $123,874.61 is entered against Defendant. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 20STCV39725 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 20 Tentative Ruling Judge Kevin C. Brazile Department 20 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Case Name: Roth, et al. v. 818 North Alfred Street LLC, et al. Case No.: 20STCV39725 Matter: Motion to Augment Expert Designation Moving Party: Plaintiffs Jennifer Roth and Matthew Lifson Responding Party: Defendant D&A Endeavors, Inc., joined by Defendants 818 North Alfred Street LLC and Edward Markley Notice: OK Ruling: The Motion is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a habitability matter. On June 3, 2024, the Court granted a motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs expert, Shilpa Sayana, M.D, on ground that her opinion was unsubstantiated. Plaintiffs Jennifer Roth and Matthew Lifson now seek leave to augment their expert designation to include Dr. Nachman Brautbar. Plaintiffs argue that because of the Courts ruling and because the deadline to designate expert witnesses has passed, Plaintiffs are left without a medical expert witness and cannot designate one. Code Civ. Proc. § 2034.620 states, The court shall grant leave to augment or amend an expert witness list or declaration only if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (a) The court has taken into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied on the list of expert witnesses. (b) The court has determined that any party opposing the motion will not be prejudiced in maintaining that party's action or defense on the merits. (c) The court has determined either of the following: (1) The moving party would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call that expert witness or have decided to offer the different or additional testimony of that expert witness. (2) The moving party failed to determine to call that expert witness, or to offer the different or additional testimony of that expert witness as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and the moving party has done both of the following: (A) Sought leave to augment or amend promptly after deciding to call the expert witness or to offer the different or additional testimony. (B) Promptly thereafter served a copy of the proposed expert witness information concerning the expert or the testimony described in Section 2034.260 on all other parties who have appeared in the action. (d) Leave to augment or amend is conditioned on the moving party making the expert available immediately for a deposition under Article 3 (commencing with Section 2034.410 ), and on any other terms as may be just, including, but not limited to, leave to any party opposing the motion to designate additional expert witnesses or to elicit additional opinions from those previously designated, a continuance of the trial for a reasonable period of time, and the awarding of costs and litigation expenses to any party opposing the motion. A motion to augment shall be made at a sufficient time in advance of the time limit for the completion of discovery under Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 2024.010) to permit the deposition of any expert to whom the motion relates to be taken within that time limit. Under exceptional circumstances, the court may permit the motion to be made at a later time. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2034.610.) T he cutoff for expert discovery is 15 days before the initial trial date. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2024.030.) Prior to the Courts ruling that excluded Plaintiffs former expert, it was not foreseeable that an additional expert would be necessary. Further, Plaintiffs moved promptly within 10 days to augment their expert designation. The Court will allow the expert discovery cutoff to relate to the current trial date of September 9, 2024, such that (a) the new expert can be available for deposition within the next 14 days and (b) any prejudice to Defendants would be minimized. A trial continuance can be discussed if necessary. For these reasons, the Motion is granted. Moving party to give notice. If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Number: 22BBCV00006 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: E Hearing Date: 07/12/2024 8:30am Case No. 22BBCV00006 Trial Date: UNSET Case Name: TRACEY L BAUMERT v. BANK OF AMERICA, et al. 2 TENTATIVE RULINGS MOTION TO WITHDRAW DEEMED ADMISSIONS AND MJOP RELIEF REQUESTED ¿ Plaintiff TRACEY BAUMERT (Plaintiff) will and hereby does move this Court for an Order, pursuant to C.C.P. § 2033.300, permitting withdrawal of her admission of Defendant HSBC Banks Requests for Admission on the grounds that the admissions were the result of her mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that Defendant will not be substantially prejudiced in its defense of this action on the merits[.] This motion is and will be based on this Notice, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Tracey Baumert attached hereto, the pleadings and records on file herein, such matters as the court may take judicial notice of and on such other argument and evidence as may be presented at the time of or in connection with the hearing. (Mot. p. 1-2.) Procedural Moving Party: Plaintiff, Tracey Baumert Responding Party: Defendants, HSBC Bank USA National Association, As Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Deutsche Alt-A Securities Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2007-OA3 (HSBC) and National Default Servicing Corporation (National Default) Moving Papers: Notice/Motion Opposition Papers: Opposition; Dailey Declaration Reply: Reply 16/21 Day Lapse (CCP § 12c and § 1005(b): Ok Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, Rule 3.1300): Ok Correct Address (CCP § 1013, § 1013a): Yes/No Plaintiff served this motion via email. The email address that Plaintiff used for Defendants counsel does not match Defendants counsels email address provided on eCourt. However, Defendant submitted an Opposition; therefore, Defendant received this motion. ANALYSIS On 9/15/2023, the Court granted HSBCs motion deeming admitted the truth of the matters specified in requests for admission, set one, propounded on Tracey L. Baumert because Plaintiff did not provide responses to the RFAs. On March 22, 2024, this Court granted Plaintiffs motion to set aside/vacate the dismissal. Now, Plaintiff seeks withdrawal of her admissions that were deemed admitted on September 15, 2023. CCP § 2033.300 A party may withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission only on leave of court granted after notice to all parties. (CCP § 2033.300(a).) The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. (CCP § 2033.300(b).) Baumert Declaration Plaintiff argues that failing to respond to the RFAs, and thus the motion to deem admitted being granted, was a result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Plaintiffs provides the declaration of Tracey Baumert which states in relevant part: 2. From on or about September 15, 2022 to February 28, 2024, I was representing myself, in pro per in this action and/or attorney Mark Goodfriend has represented me on one or more occasions under a Notice of Limited Scope Representation. Because of illness and unemployment (see below) and because I am not familiar with or knowledgeable about the law or legal procedures, even with Mr. Goodfriends assistance to a limited extent until he substituted in on February 28, 2024, which he mostly provided and is providing to me without charge, Defendants requests for admission were admitted. 3. Although I apparently received Defendants Requests for Admission in or about April 2023 and Defendants Motion that Requests for Admission be deemed admitted in or about July 2023, I did not understand that I needed to respond to them or how to do so. 4. Starting in June 2023 and continuing for several months, I was in and out of the hospital and suffered and have continued to suffer from serious health issues, including bleeding ulcers, gallstones, liver issues that might require a liver transplant as soon as early 2024, breathing issues, jaundice and my losing about 60 pounds over about 2 months (about a third of my body weight). In addition to debilitating health issues, I have been unemployed and have had substantially no income since at least about April of last year due to strikes by writers and actors I work in the entertainment industry which has multiplied the stress I have been under. Although the strikes ended in or about November 2023, I have still not been able to return to work. Also, in or about early December 2023, I got Covid for the first time, and did not recover quickly. 5. I also had been sick starting on or about August 31, 2023, and was hospitalized from September 8 to 15, 2023 (as reflected by Exhibit 1 hereto), the date of the hearing where the court granted Defendants Motion that Requests for Admission be deemed admitted. I did not attend that hearing both because I was hospitalized and because I was not even aware of it. 6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 are verified responses to Defendants Requests for Admission that I request that the Court allow me to use in this action. (Baumert Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.) Dailey Declaration In Opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not demonstrated mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Defendants submit the declaration of its counsel, Steven M. Dailey. In relevant part, the Dailey declaration states: 2. On April 12, 2023, on behalf of HSBC, my office served written discovery including First Sets of Requests for Production, Special Interrogatories, Form Interrogatories and Requests for Admission upon Plaintiff TRACEY L. BAUMERT and Plaintiffs counsel, Mark E. Goodfriend, who has appeared for her on a limited basis at various times in this case. 3. Plaintiffs responses to the discovery were due on May 15, 2023. Plaintiff did not provide responses by that date. 4. On May 30, 2023, I provided an extension for Plaintiff to respond to the outstanding discovery up until and including June 14, 2023. 5. On June 21, 2023, I sent correspondence via email to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel, Mark E. Goodfriend, requesting the responses, without objections, and all requested documents, no later than June 28, 2023. 6. Despite these efforts, my office did not receive the discovery responses or responses to the Requests for Admissions. On July 12, 2023, I caused Motions to Compel/Deem Requests Admitted to be filed and served relating to the deficient discovery. The hearing on the Motions to Compel/Deem Requests Admitted was scheduled for September 15, 2023. 7. Loan Defendants also filed an Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial to be heard on September 15, 2023, requesting a continuance of the February 20, 2024 trial date. 8. On September 15, 2023, the Court granted Defendants Motions to Compel and attendant requests for monetary sanctions. The Court vacated certain dates, including the then-scheduled February 20, 2024 trial date. The Court set a hearing on an Order to Show Cause Re Dismissal for Plaintiffs failure to prosecute for October 9, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. in Department E of the above-captioned Court. The Court ruled that if Plaintiff fails to appear at the October 9, 2023 hearing, the Court may dismiss the matter. On September 19, 2023, I caused a Notice of Ruling on Motions to Compel/Deem Requests Admitted and Ex Parte Application to Continue Trial to be filed and served on Plaintiff and her counsel Mark E. Goodfriend. 9. Plaintiff did not appear at the October 9, 2023 hearing that the Court scheduled on September 15, 2023. At the October 9, 2023 hearing, the Court ordered Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint dismissed, without prejudice. 10. On December 21, 2023, HSBC filed an Unlawful Detainer Complaint, Case No. 23STUD16481 seeking possession of the Property. 11. On March 22, 2024, the Court set aside the October 9, 2023 dismissal. 12. On March 28, 2024, a Judgment was entered in favor of HSBC and against Plaintiff TRACEY BAUMERT in the unlawful detainer case. 13. On April 1, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel Mark Goodfriend and I met and conferred about the case, including the outstanding discovery. Mr. Goodfriend represented that he would provide answers, without objection, to the Special Interrogatories, Form Interrogatories and Requests for Production and produce all responsive documents no later than April 17, 2024. 14. More than two months after the dismissal was set aside, on May 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed and served the instant Motion for Withdrawal of Deemed Admissions and served the proposed Responses. 15. To date, Plaintiff has not served the remaining discovery responses despite Mr. Goodfriends representation that they would be provided by April 17, 2024. 16. The Property at issue in this case sold at a trustees sale on October 4, 2019, reverting to HSBC. 17. Plaintiffs disregard of the discovery rules impedes HSBCs rights in this case. It has been unable to obtain Plaintiffs substantive responses and documents relating to the facts she claim support her causes of action. It is unable to frame a summary judgment motion or prepare for trial absent responsive discovery. 18. Plaintiffs dilatory inaction has been prejudicial and costly to HSBC. Because of the non-responses, HSBC has filed the Motions to Compel, met and conferred, had many communications and provided extensions, all incurring substantial costs and fees relating to discovery served in April 2023. (Dailey Decl. ¶ 18.) TENTATIVE RULING The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. (CCP § 2033.300(b).) Section 2033.300 eliminates undeserved windfalls obtained through requests for admission and furthers the policy favoring the resolution of lawsuits on the merits. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1418.) Further: The statutory language mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect (§ 2033.300, subd. (b)) is identical to some of the language used in section 473, subdivision (b). Section 473, subdivision (b) states that a court may *1419 relieve a party ... from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The use of identical terms in two different statutes serving similar purposes suggests that the Legislature intended those terms to have the same meaning in both statutes. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1418-1419.) Additionally: The trial court's discretion in ruling on a motion to withdraw or amend an admission is not unlimited, but must be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner that serves the interests of justice. Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 2033.300 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. Accordingly, the court's discretion to deny a motion under the statute is limited to circumstances where it is clear that the mistake, inadvertence, or * 1421 neglect was inexcusable, or where it is clear that the withdrawal or amendment would substantially prejudice the party who obtained the admission in maintaining that party's action or defense on the merits. ( New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420-1421.) The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect Here, the Court does not find that Plaintiff demonstrated the admissions were the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The Courts primary concern is the apparent unjustifiable delay in the Plaintiff seeking this relief. Party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits Here, the Court does not find that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. Overall Tentative Ruling Plaintiffs motion to withdraw admissions of Defendant HSBC Banks Requests for Admissions is DENIED. The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission only if it determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that partys action or defense on the merits. (CCP § 2033.300(b).) TENTATIVE RULING MJOP On 1/9/2023 a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) was filed. Although the caption of the TAC indicates there are three causes of action: (1) Wrongful Foreclosure, (2) Recission/Cancellation, and (3) Declaratory Relief, the body of the TAC alleges a fourth cause of action titled Fourth Cause of Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure. On 3/17/2023, the Court ruled on Defendants demurrer to the TAC. The Court overruled the demurrer as to the first and third causes of action. The Court sustained with leave to amend the second cause of action, but Plaintiff never filed a fourth amended complaint. Further, as to the fourth cause of action in the TAC, the Court explained how the Defendants did not demur to the fourth cause of action, and that the Court considers the allegations of the fourth cause of action to be part of the first cause of action. Moving Defendants here, the same Defendants that Opposed the motion to withdraw admissions, now move for judgment on the pleadings to the remaining causes of action in the TAC, the first, third, and fourth causes of action. The Court will hear argument.

Case Number: 24VECV00579 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: T FRANDSEN V FOXMAN 24VECV00579 [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Plaintiffs Russell M. Frandsen, Christie H. Frandsen, Andre Berger, and Tracy Bergers Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. Introduction Plaintiffs move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the answer fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the cause of action for unlawful detainer. Defendants oppose on the grounds that the denials are sufficient. No reply has been filed. Discussion Plaintiffs claim they have presented a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer (forcible detainer), and that Defendants have not provided facts constituting a defense. Plaintiffs are the owners of the real property located at 14606 Sutton St., Sherman Oaks, CA, which they purchased on January 25, 2024, through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. They have not granted Defendants any rights to possess the property. In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert that they established a prima facie case for unlawful detainer against Defendants and provided them with timely and proper notice to vacate, which Defendants ignored despite having no legal right to remain on the property. Plaintiffs filed and served a complaint for unlawful detainer. Defendants filed a verified answer, admitting to certain allegations but denying others (paragraphs 7, 8, 10, and 11). The denials were based on facts alleged in a proposed second amended cross-complaint in a related case (Foxman v. Frandsen et al, LASC Case No. 23STCV19020). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants denials were not positive as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30 because they fail to specifically identify the allegations they deny in paragraphs 7, 8, 10, and 11. For instance, paragraph 7 includes multiple allegations regarding Plaintiffs purchase of the property and compliance with foreclosure procedures, which Defendants did not specifically deny or refute. Similarly, paragraphs 8, 10, and 11 contain specific claims about notice to quit, the rental value of the property, and Plaintiffs acquisition of title, none of which Defendants denied specifically. Due to these insufficient denials, Plaintiffs assert that they cannot discern Defendants intent. In Hoelzle v. Fresno County (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 478, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial courts denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings. There, the appellant argued that the answer failed because it did not specifically deny all allegations in the complaint. (Hoelzle, supra 159 Cal.App.2d at 482.) Like Plaintiff here, the appellant in Hoelzle also relied on Muraco v. Don (App.3 Dist. 1926) 79 Cal.App. 738, 743, for the assertion that Code of Civil Procedure section 437 requires an answer to be specific and directed to certain paragraphs or specific parts of the complaint. (Id.) The Hoelzle Court pointed out that most of the cases relied on by the appellant were decided before the 1927 amendment to Section 437, which now allows for general or specific denials of material allegations and does not require each allegation to be specifically denied. (Id.) The court explained that the current version of Section 437 states that an answer can contain a general or specific denial of material allegations and a statement of any new matter constituting a defense, without requiring specific denials for each allegation. (Id. at 483.) The court concluded that the answer in Hoelzle was sufficient to raise an issue regarding the complaints allegations. Similarly here, the Court finds that the requirement for specific denials is no longer part of the current statute. Plaintiffs fail to explain how the denials are not positive. Plaintiffs argue that denying whole paragraphs is deficient, but Defendants contend that modern pleading practice does not require this level of specificity. Upon review of the answer, the Court finds the denials to be clear and sufficient. Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Case Number: 23NWCV03984 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: C TEJEDA v. CHRISTOPHER LEE MAGDOSKU, ET AL. CASE NO.: 23NWCV03984 HEARING : 7/10/24 @ 10:30 A.M. #10 TENTATIVE RULING I. Defendant Christopher Lee Magdoskus Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED. The Answer and Cross-Complaint attached to the motion are not deemed filed as of this date. Defendant is ordered to file and serve their Answer and Cross-Complaint within 5 days. Moving Party to give NOTICE. This is an action for quiet title based on adverse possession. On March 25, 2024, default was entered against defendant Christopher Lee Magdosku. Defendant seeks to set aside default based upon mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect under CCP § 473, subd. (b). No opposition has been filed as of July 8, 2024. Discussion Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) states: The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted , and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. The purpose of mandatory relief is to alleviate the hardship on parties who lose their day in court due to an inexcusable failure to act by their attorneys. ( Rodriguez v. Brill (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 715, 723.) Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. [Citations.] In such situations very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default. [Citations.] [¶] Moreover, because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default. ( Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 681, 695.) Here, default was entered on March 25, 2024, and Defendant filed the instant motion on April 19, 2024, within the six-month time specified in CCP § 473. Hence, the motion is timely. Defendants attorney states that he miscalculated the time to respond to the pleading. (Decl. Pena, ¶ 3.) This is inadvertence and excusable neglect. Defendant included a copy of the answer and cross-complaint. The Court will not adjudicate Defendants requests for judicial notice because they are not material to the determination of the instant motion. Hence, the Court GRANTS the motion. The Answer and Cross-Complaint attached to the motion is not deemed filed as of this date. Defendant is ordered to file and serve their Answer and Cross-Complaint within 5 days.

Re: Sandeep Sekhon as Trustee of the 3S Trust Dated February 14, 2014 v. Darlene Perez Superior Court Case No. 22CECG02770 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501) Motion: by Plaintiff to Deem Requests for Admissions to be Admitted, and for Monetary Sanctions Tentative Ruling: To deny the motions by plaintiff trustees Sandeep Sekhon and Ramanpreet Sekhon to deem requests for admissions admitted. To grant monetary sanctions against defendants Juan Jose Perez and Darlene Antoinette Perez, jointly and severally, in the amount of $570.00, to be paid within 20 calendar days from the date of service of the minute order by the clerk. Explanation: Untimely Service of Motion Waived Noticed motions must be served and filed 16 court days before the hearing date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) This time may be extended to accommodate time for mailing or other methods of delayed delivery. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1013.) There is not an extension for personally served documents. However, it is well settled that “the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of any defects or irregularities in the notice of motion.” (Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 7, quoting Lacey v. Bertone (1949) 33 Cal.2d 649, 651; Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.) Here, plaintiffs filed and served these motions on defendants personally on June 17, 2024. The hearing date is set for July 10, 2024. Service of the motion was not timely pursuant to code. However, the oppositions were filed timely and address the merits of the motion, thus waiving the defective notice. Motion to Deem Matters Admitted A propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) Failure to timely respond to requests for admissions results in a waiver of all objections to the requests. (Id., subd. (a).) However, the court may relieve the responding party of this waiver if (1) substantially compliant responses have been served, and (2) the failure to serve timely responses was the result of a mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Id.) the time to respond is extended two days when service is by overnight delivery or e-mail. (Code. Civ. Proc., §§ 1013 subd. (c), 1010.6 subd. (a)(3)(B).) The discovery requests were served via overnight courier and electronic mail on May 13, 2024 to defendants, who were in pro per at the time. Responses were not received by the deadline to respond, so plaintiffs brought these motions. Defendants filed opposition to the motions and concurrently served on plaintiffs their responses to discovery. A proof of service for these responses was filed on July 2, 2024. There was no reply filed by plaintiffs raising any objection as to the substantial compliance of the responses; thus, seeing as how defendant filed a proper proof of service, the motions are denied. Monetary Sanctions Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280, subdivision (c), it is mandatory to impose a monetary sanction on the party (or attorney) whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion requiring the court to issue an order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Although delayed responses may defeat a motion to compel, they will not avoid monetary sanctions. Plaintiffs were within their rights to bring this motion because responses were not received within the established timeframe. Therefore, they are entitled to sanctions. However, the sanctions amount can be reduced. Both motions are fairly straightforward and virtually identical. Counsel does not need to spend time preparing for and attending the hearing. The court finds it reasonable to allow 1.5 hours for preparation of all the motion documents billed at $300.00 an hour, and $60.00 for each of the two motions, totaling a sanctions award of $570.00. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Tentative Ruling Issued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)