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DOC. NO.: X06-UWY-CV-21-5028294-S SUPERIOR COURT
NANCY BURTON JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY
Vv. COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET
DAVID PHILIP MASON, ETAL. MAY 30, 2024
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #491
On April 21, 2021, the plaintiff, Nancy Burton, filed this action against numerous
defendants,! including: (1) the town of Redding (town); (2) Julia Pemberton, the first
selectwoman for the town of Redding, and (3) Mark O’Donnell, the town of Redding’s chief of
police. In the operative pleading, the fifth amended complaint filed on April 12, 2022,? the
plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts. The plaintiff resided on property located at 147
Cross Highway in Redding for thirty-five years. Throughout her lifetime, the plaintiff has
become involved in numerous environmental causes including the anti-nuclear power movement.
2 At the present time, these defendants are the only defendants remaining in the case. Therefore,
for the sake of convenience, in this memorandum of decision, the defendants will both be
referred to collectively as “the defendants” and separately by their names as appropriate.
Pemberton and O’Donnell will also sometimes be referred to collectively as “the individual
defendants.”
2 On April 12, 2022, the plaintiff filed her fifth amended complaint. This court granted a motion
to strike certain counts from this complaint on July 22, 2022. Thereafter, on August 22, 2022,
the plaintiff filed a motion to file a late substitute complaint along with a proposed substitute
complaint. The court initially granted the plaintiff permission to file same on October 25, 2022,
however, by order dated January 11, 2023, the court noted that the plaintiff’s substitute
complaint did not comply with Practice Book § 10-44 in that it was not “accompanied by a
document showing the additions and deletions made to the previous filing.” Accordingly, the
court ordered the plaintiff to file a new substitute complaint that complied with the Practice Book
by January 23, 2023. Although the plaintiff has filed two more versions of her complaint, none
of these complaints complied with the court’s order or the requirements of the Practice Book.
For these reasons, the court will consider the April 12, 2022 complaint to be operative in this
matter. Notably, the defendants also directed their summary judgment motion to this iteration of
the plaintiff's complaint.
In furtherance of this objective, the plaintiff has adopted many goats and began testing their milk
in order to ascertain their radioactivity.
After adopting her goats, however, the plaintiff began experiencing problems with her
neighbors, David Philip Mason, Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons. The plaintiff alleges that
Mason, Carmody and Gibbons began to harass her and complain about the presence of the goats
on her property. For example, on April 26, 2020, Carmody and Gibbons allegedly “pursued
several of [the] plaintiff’s goats grazing along the stone wall separating their property from [the]
plaintiff’s property by blowing an air-horn loudly in their direction, causing the goats to panic
and flee from the stone wall; thereupon, Carmody and Gibbons erected the[ir] middle fingers
at the plaintiff... and they screamed repeatedly at her [expletive] you.” A similar incident also
occurred on April 30, 2020, that culminated in the plaintiff’s arrest after a motor vehicle hit one
of her goats. According to the plaintiff, O’Donnell “made haste” to issue a press release
regarding this arrest and announce it to the Connecticut news media.
The plaintiff further alleges that the police department and O’Donnell participated in a
scheme with Carmody and Gibbons “to cause the [plaintiffs] goats to be killed or injured in a
collision with oncoming vehicles [and] it was understood . . . that should the scheme go as
planned and [the] goats be killed or injured . . . [the] plaintiff would be wrongfully charged with
animal cruelty ....” Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that Pemberton “has actively fed a frenzy
of manufactured goat hysteria in the community through social media and other means” against
the plaintiff.
On March 9, 2021, the court, D'Andrea, J., signed a search warrant for the plaintiff's
property. According to the plaintiff, the affidavit that provided support for this warrant “was
replete with knowingly false statements” and that O’Donnell and other members of the police
department “deliberately and maliciously contributed to the submission of a false and fraudulent
application for a search and seizure warrant.” The following day, on March 10, 2021, members
of the police department and Pemberton, including other individuals, commenced a search of the
plaintiff’s home that allegedly violated her fourth amendment rights. This search culminated in
the removal of sixty-five goats along with various items of personal property from the plaintiff’s
residence. The goats were then moved to a large animal facility in Niantic where the plaintiff
alleges they have been subjected to “acts of wilful and deliberate abuse and cruelty to animals.”
According to the plaintiff, the defendants participated in this search even though they knew that
she had an active plan to transfer all of her goats to an animal rescue facility.
Thereafter, on April 9, 2021, the court, Cobb, J., entered a temporary order placing the
plaintiff’s goats in the state’s custody in the case of State v. Sixty-Five Goats, Superior Court,
judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6139702-S.> The plaintiff has repeatedly
asserted that the proceedings before Judge Cobb violated her rights and were otherwise unfair.
As part of that proceeding, the plaintiff learned that one of her goats had passed away. Some of
the town of Redding defendants were then given a sample of that goat’s milk by the plaintiff that
they deliberately discarded after failing to have it analyzed for the presence of radioisotopes.
Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that “the defendants, some or all of them” engaged in a
conspiracy with state Senator Will Haskell and Redding town counsel Steven Stafstrom to
disseminate “false, malicious, inflammatory and defamatory communications about [the]
[pJlaintiff and her goats,” search her home without probable cause, steal her property, and
engage in illegal surveillance of her residence.
3 This case was subsequently transferred to the Waterbury Complex Litigation Docket, and it
currently has a docket number of X06-UWY-CV-21-6064254-S.
3
As a result of all of this alleged conduct, the plaintiff alleges the following causes of
action: (1) count two—invasion of privacy as to all of the defendants; (2) count three—illegal
search and seizure as to all of the defendants; (3) count four—a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as
to all of the defendants; (4) count five—false arrest as to O’Donnell; (5) count six—intentional
infliction of emotional distress as to the town and O’Donnell; (6) count seven—negligent
infliction of emotional distress as to the town and O’Donnell; (7) count eight—conversion as to
the town and O’Donnell; (8) count nine—intentional spoliation of evidence as to the town and
Pemberton; (9) count ten—deprivation of equal rights and privileges as to the town and
O’Donnell; and (10) count eleven—invasion of privacy— intrusion as to all of the defendants.
On November 2, 2023, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a
memorandum of law in support of their motion. The defendants move for summary judgment as
to all of the remaining counts asserted against them on various grounds. On February 23, 2024,
the plaintiff filed her objection to the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff thereafter
filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the summary judgment motion on February 26,
2024. On March 8, 2024, the defendants filed their reply memorandum. The parties attach
numerous exhibits in support of their respective pleadings that will only be referred to as
necessary in this memorandum of decision. On April 15, 2024, the court heard oral argument on
the motion for summary judgment and the opposition thereto.
“Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v.
Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400, 414-15, 195 A.3d 664 (2018). “[SJummary
judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way. .. .
{A] summary disposition . ., should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to
disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party. .. . [A] directed
verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied
in the verdict as directed.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752
(2003). “[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward
before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the
material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred. ... A material fact has been
defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York
Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn, 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). “[T]he party moving for summary
judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including
affidavits.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310
Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). “The existence of the genuine issue of material fact
must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence. .. . If the affidavits and the
other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary
judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Rivera v. CR Summer Hill, Lid. Partnership, 170 Conn. App. 70, 74, 154 A.3d 55
(2017).
COUNTS TWO AND ELEVEN: INVASION OF PRIVACY
In counts two and eleven, the plaintiff alleges virtually indistinguishable causes of action
sounding in invasion of privacy. The defendants raise a number of arguments as to why they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these counts. First, the town argues that pursuant to
the doctrine of governmental immunity, it cannot be held liable for any intentional torts
committed by one of its employees and/or agents. Notably, in her memorandum of law, the
plaintiff offers no argument in opposition to this assertion raised by the town.
By statute, “a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or
property caused by . . . [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute
criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct ....” General Statutes § 52-557n (a)
(2) (A). “[O]ur Supreme Court has held that the term ‘wilfulness’ is synonymous with
‘intentional.’ . . . and, under our case law, a municipality cannot be held liable for the intentional
torts of its employees.” (Citation omitted.) Avoletta v. Torrington, 133 Conn. App. 215, 224, 34
A.3d 445 (2012). “Accordingly, a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action
against a municipal defendant when such actions are alleged unless its immunity has been
abrogated by statute.” Id., 221. Moreover, the Appellate Court has explicitly determined that
invasion of a privacy is an intentional tort covered by this rule. McCullough v. Rocky Hill, 198
Conn. App. 703, 711 n.12, 234 A.3d 1049, cert, denied, 335 Conn, 985, 242 A.3d 480 (2020).
Given that it is clear that the town is a political subdivision of this state, and the plaintiff fails to
cite to any statutory basis to maintain the invasion of privacy claims against the town, the court
grants summary judgment in favor of the town as to counts two and eleven.
Pemberton and O’Donnell also move for summary judgment on counts two and eleven on
the ground that the plaintiff has not alleged, nor can she prove, that either Pemberton or
O’Donnell were personally involved in the acts upon which she predicates her invasion of
privacy claims, Additionally, Pemberton and O’Donnell argue that the plaintiff’s invasion of
privacy causes of action must fail because the plaintiff cannot establish either the “intentional
intrusion” element or that any intrusion could be considered highly offensive to a reasonable
person, Pemberton and O’Donnell further argue that any “false light” in which the plaintiff may
have been placed in was actually true, and that any intrusion upon her seclusion was authorized
by a duly issued arrest warrant. In opposition, the plaintiff contends that: (1) Pemberton and
O’Donnell personally orchestrated the acts and conduct that constitute her invasion of privacy
claims; (2) the absence of probable cause to seize her goats during her arrest negates the
individual defendants’ arguments; (3) it is axiomatic that falsely accusing the plaintiff of a
serious crime would be highly offensive; and (4) Pemberton and O’Donnell cannot rely on the
search warrant to defeat the plaintiff’s claims because the warrant lacked probable cause.
“Our Supreme Court has observed that the law of privacy has not developed as a single
tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff,
which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common
except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be [left] alone. . . .
The four categories of invasion of privacy are: ([{1]) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another; ([2]) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; ([3]) unreasonable publicity given to
the other’s private life; or ({4]) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davidson v. Bridgeport, 180
Conn. App. 18, 29, 182 A.3d 639 (2018). In the present case, the two types of invasion of
privacy claims that potentially appear to be applicable are intrusion upon seclusion and false
light. As the two varieties of invasion of privacy are essentially distinct torts, they will be
addressed separately.
“In Davidson v. Bridgeport, [supra,] 180 Conn. App. 18 . . . [the Appellate Court]
addressed for the first time an intrusion upon seclusion claim . . . [and] noted that [§] 652B of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person. ... It is clear from the Restatement’s language that to establish a claim for intrusion
upon the seclusion of another, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) an intentional intrusion,
physical or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion or private affairs or concems,
(3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cornelius v. Markle Investigations, Inc., 220 Conn. App. 135, 152-53, 297 A.3d 248 (2023). As
to the second element, a “defendant is subject to liability .. . only when he has intruded into a
private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his
person or affairs.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 161-62. With
respect to the third element: “In the context of intrusion upon seclusion, questions about the
reasonable person standard are ordinarily questions of fact, but they become questions of law if
reasonable persons can draw only one conclusion from the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 165.
Although it is somewhat difficult to determine exactly what the plaintiff alleges that
Pemberton and O’Donnell allegedly did to intrude upon her seclusion, the gravamen of the
counts at issue are that these defendants invaded her privacy when they allegedly surveilled her
property and participated in the March 10, 2021 search of her residence. Despite these
allegations, in her affidavit, Pemberton attests that although she “was present on March 10, 2021,
during the [s]tate’s seizure of the goat herd . . .[m]y involvement was limited to observation of
the seizure, from the public road.” Similarly, in his affidavit, O’Donnell avers that “[o]ther than
conducting a brief drive by [the] plaintiff’s property after the [s]tate had already commenced the
seizure, I was not physically present for or personally involved in the [Department of
Agriculture] seizure of the goat herd on March 10, 2021.” The plaintiff offers no evidence that
contradicts these attestations. Nor does the plaintiff argue or present evidence that could
potentially establish that Pemberton or O’Donnell were on her property at any other time.
Ina case involving an intrusion upon seclusion cause of action, the Appellate Court has
determined that summary judgment was appropriate when “the defendants . . . did not physically
enter the plaintiff’s private property, the defendants did not utilize advanced electronic
surveillance equipment to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s affairs . . . and the purpose of the
surveillance was not to hound or harass the plaintiff.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cornelius v. Markle Investigations, Inc., supra, 220 Conn. App. 164; see also
Parnoffv. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut, 188 Conn. App. 153, 176, 204 A.3d 717 (2019)
(summary judgment on second element was proper where “[a]t no point does the plaintiff
indicate that the defendants entered his residence or that they compromised any private
information or [his] general privacy”). As the plaintiff has provided no evidence that could raise
an issue of fact regarding whether Pemberton and O’Donnell actually entered her property or
otherwise improperly surveilled it, the plaintiff cannot succeed on any claim sounding in
intrusion upon seclusion.*
4 Having made this determination, the court need not examine the parties’ respective arguments
regarding the legal validity of the search warrant signed by Judge D’Andrea.
9
As counts two and eleven also may be construed as attempts to plead a false light
invasion of privacy claim, the court will also discuss the legal requirements of such as cause of
action. “To establish a false light invasion of privacy claim, the claimant must show that the
false light in which [she] was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . .
the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter
and the false light in which [she] would be placed. ... The essence of a false light privacy claim
is that the matter published concerning the [claimant] (1) is not true . . . and (2) is such a major
misrepresentation of [her] character, history, activities or beliefs that serious offense may
reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable [person] in [her] position.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Borg v. Cloutier, 200 Conn. App. 82, 109, 239 A.3d 1249 (2020).
“The standard governing the tort of false light invasion of privacy is similar to the standard
governing the tort of defamation concerning a public official or public figure: that the publisher
of the false statement knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of the
falsity of the statement.... A finding of reckless disregard requires sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McIntire v. Piscottano,
Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-01-0076151-S (May 23, 2005,
Scholl, J.), quoting, Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525, 546, 646 A.2d 92
(1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149, 115 S. Ct. 1098, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1995).
Although it is once again not entirely clear from the pleadings what conduct Pemberton
or O’Donnell may have personally engaged in that could rise to the level of this tort, the
defendants’ brief posits that the plaintiff intends to hold them liable for statements made in a
press release following the plaintiff’s arrest in April, 2020. The plaintiff does not dispute this
10
characterization in her opposition memorandum, so the court will analyze the claim in the form
presented. In paragraph fifty-one of her complaint, which is incorporated by reference into
counts two and eleven, the plaintiff alleges that the Redding Police Department, per O’Donnell,
“made haste to issue a press release announcing [her] arrest” and that the press release was “false
and recklessly asserted to defame [the] plaintiff... .” It does not appear that either party
included the supposedly offending press release in the exhibits they filed in connection with the
motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, neither Pemberton nor O’Donnell’s affidavits
discuss the press release, their potential role in drafting same, or whether the press release was
truthful. Without the text of the press release, the court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that
its contents were truthful and would not have been highly offensive to a reasonable person. As
the moving parties on the motion, it is, of course, Pemberton and O’Donnell’s burden to establish
the absence of all genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, to the extent that counts two and
eleven set forth a claim sounding in false light invasion of privacy, the motion for summary
judgment is denied.
COUNTS THREE, FOUR, AND FIVE
Next, the various defendants each move for summary judgment as to counts three, four,
and five. These counts allege causes of action sounding in: (1) count three—illegal search and
seizure as to all of the defendants; (2) count four—a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to all of the
defendants; and (3) count five—false arrest as to O’Donnell. As the arguments raised by the
individual defendants and the town are somewhat distinct, they will be addressed separately.
The individual defendants’ initial argument is that neither of them can be held liable for any of
these counts because they were not personally involved in the subject search, seizure, or arrest.
In response to this argument, the plaintiff blanketly asserts, without referencing any specific
11
exhibits, that both individual defendants personally participated in the events at issue. With
respect to Pemberton, the plaintiff further contends that she “acted personally and through her
designated agents” Stafstrom and O’Donnell.
In counts three’ and four, the plaintiff alleges various violations of her first and fourth
amendment rights under the United States constitution. Such claims are authorized under §
1983, which provides in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress... .” Despite a
plaintiff's ability to bring a claim under § 1983, “{i]t is well settled in the Second] Circuit that
personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an
award of damages under § 1983.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brandon v. Kinter, 938
F.3d 21, 36 (2d. Cir. 2019). “[A] defendant in a § 1983 action may not be held liable for
damages for constitutional violations merely because he held a high position of authority.”
Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d. Cir. 1996). “Rather, the plaintiff must directly plead and
prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d
609, 612 (2d. Cir. 2020); see also Wine v. Mulligan, 213 Conn. App. 298, 303, 277 A.3d 912
(2022) (“{tJo state a viable claim . . . against an individual defendant pursuant to § 1983, the
5 As previously noted by this court: “Although count three does not specifically mention § 1983,
the court assumes that the plaintiff is bringing it under § 1983, as ‘illegal search and seizure’ is
not a stand-alone cause of action.” Burton v. Mason, Superior Court, judicial district of
Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X06-CV-21-5028294-S (November 29,
2022, Bellis, J.).
12
plaintiff must allege the personal involvement in the alleged denial of access of that particular
defendant”).
As noted in the previous section of this decision, both O’Donnell and Pemberton aver in
their affidavits that they did not personally participate in the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s
claims in counts three and four, ic., the allegedly illegal search of her home and seizure of her
goats that took place on March 10, 2021. The plaintiff offers no evidence in opposition to these
attestations. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted in their favor on these counts.®
A similar result is mandated with respect to the false arrest cause of action alleged against
O’Donnell in count five. “False imprisonment, or false arrest, is the unlawful restraint by one
person of the physical liberty of another .... To prevail on a claim of false imprisonment, the
plaintiff must prove that his physical liberty has been restrained by the defendant and that the
restraint was against his will, that is, that he did not consent to the restraint or acquiesce in it
willingly.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nodoushani v. Southern
Connecticut State University, 152 Conn. App. 84, 92-93, 95 A.3d 1248 (2014). “A person is not
liable for false imprisonment unless his act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement, or
with knowledge that such confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it.” (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Greene v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 268, 440 A.2d 973
(1982). “The tort of false imprisonment requires that an individual be accused of committing the
actions that form the basis of the claim.” Fleming v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of
Hartford, Docket No. CV-14-6049550-S (November 6, 2015, Peck, J.). As the plaintiff has
® Having made this determination, the court need not examine whether these defendants are
entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the fact-intensive doctrine of qualified immunity.
Additionally, the court need not delve into the parties’ various arguments with respect to the
validity of the underlying search warrant signed by Judge D’Andrea.
13
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether O’Donnell personally participated in
either her 20207 or 2021 purportedly false arrests, summary judgment enters in O’Donnell’s
favor on this count.§
The town also moves for summary judgment as to counts three and four. According to
the town, the plaintiff has not alleged and cannot prove its potential liability under the doctrine
enunciated in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56
L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Specifically, the town argues that the plaintiff fails to allege or offer
evidence that: (1) a town policy, practice, or custom facilitated or caused the plaintiff's alleged
constitutional injury; (2) the town failed to train its employees properly; or that (3) the town
failed to supervise its employees adequately. In response, the plaintiff argues that the town did,
in fact, have a policy, practice, or custom that caused her alleged injury in that Pemberton “led a
corrupt regime dedicated to serving the expressed interests of a loud minority even though it
meant that there would be a wholesale disregard of the law and individuals’ rights.” As support
for this assertion, the plaintiff cites: (1) the death of certain town residents; (2) the illegal
condemnation of an individual’s property; (3) illegal destruction of trees at her residence; and
that (4) Pemberton authorized Stafstrom to make a fraudulent transfer offer regarding her goats.
With respect to whether the town inadequately trained its employees, the plaintiff simply argues
7 The summary judgment record reflects that the plaintiff’s 2020 arrest was conducted by an
Officer DeLuca.
8 Having reached this conclusion, the court need not examine O’Donnell’s alternate argument
that that he is entitled to summary judgment on count five on the basis that the false arrest claim
is not ripe because the plaintiff’s criminal charges are still pending. Despite this argument raised
by O’Donnell, this court has previously noted that “favorable termination of a criminal action on
the plaintiff’s behalf has not been established as a required element for a claim of false arrest in
Connecticut courts.” (Intemal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Mason, Superior Court,
Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X06-CV-21-5028294-S (January 21, 2022, Bellis, J.).
Therefore, O’Donnell would be unlikely to succeed on this argument.
14
that “[sJuch a claim is implicit in the operative complaint.” Finally, as to the town’s potential
inadequate supervision of its employees, the plaintiff states: “[t]he offensive conduct here was a
variation on the theme as [Pemberton] and [O’Donnell] acted outside the law believing they
would be shielded from liability.”
“A municipality or other local government may be liable under [§ 1983] if the
governmental body itself subjects a person to a deprivation of rights or causes a person to be
subjected to such deprivation. ... But, under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for
their own illegal acts. ... They are not vicariously liable under§ 1983 for their employees’
actions.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Street Garden
Apartments, LLC v. Hartford, 163 Conn. App. 219, 231, 135 A.3d 54, cert. denied, 321 Conn.
903, 136 A.3d 642 (2016). Despite this general rule, “[iJn Monell . . . the United States Supreme
Court . . . held that [I]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by that body’s officers. [I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249
Comn. 385, 410, 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S. Ct. 1239, 146 L. Ed.
2d 99 (2000). “To establish liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that he suffered the
denial of a constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom.”
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Frost v. New York City Police Dept., 980
Bb
F.3d 231, 257 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, US. _ , 142 S. Ct. 1666, 212 L. Ed. 2d 577
(2022).
may satisfy the policy, custom or practice requirement in one of four ways. . .
“A plaintiff
. Accordingly, [t]he plaintiff may allege the existence of(1) a formal policy officially endorsed
by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the
municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent
and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a
supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide
adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.”
(Citation omitted; intemal quotation marks omitted.) Lalonde v. Ogdensburg, 662 F. Supp. 3d
289, 315 (N.D. N.Y. 2023). “Under either a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise theory, a
municipality is liable only where the inadequate training or supervision amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of person with whom the [officials] come into contact. ... From this
deliberate-indifference standard, the Second Circuit has established three requirements: (1) the
plaintiff must show that a policymaker knows to a moral certainty that her employees will
confront a given situation, (2) the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the
employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or
that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation, and (3) the plaintiff must show that
the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s
constitutional rights. ... In addition, at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must identify a
specific deficiency in the city’s training program and establish that that deficiency is closely
related to the ultimate injury, such that it actually caused the constitutional deprivation.”
16
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bisson v. Hartford, United States District
Court, Docket No. 3:10cv1341 (JBA) (D. Conn. June 4, 2013).
Given the legal standards for setting forth a claim under Monell, it is apparent that the
town is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Although the plaintiff
makes various accusations about a pattern of misconduct on the part of town officials, none of
these allegations of wrongdoing having anything to do with the issues at hand in these counts,
ie., the allegedly improper search of the plaintiff’s home and resulting seizure of her goats.
Moreover, the plaintiff fails to allege or provide any evidence of a specific deficiency in the
town’s training or supervision programs that led to her injuries. Therefore, she has failed to raise
a genuine issue of material fact as to these issues. For these reasons, summary judgment enters
in favor of the town on counts three and four.
COUNT SIX: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In count six, the plaintiff brings an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of
action against the town and O’Donnell. Although the argument is only raised in a footnote, the
town initially asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because, pursuant to § 52-557n (a)
(2) (A), it cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees. As discussed in a
previous section of this decision, the law in Connecticut is clear that municipalities cannot be
liable when their employees commit an intentional tort such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress. McCullough v. Rocky Hill, supra, 198 Conn. App. 711 n.12. Accordingly, summary
judgment enters in favor of the town on this count.
With respect to the individual defendant O’Donnell, he argues that the court should grant
summary judgment in his favor for a number of reasons. The primary argument advanced by
O’Donnell is that the plaintiff does not allege any facts or present any evidence that could
17
potentially satisfy the “extreme and outrageous” element of this tort. Notably, via a
memorandum of decision issued on January 21, 2022, previously struck the plaintiff's
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on that basis. O’Donnell asserts that the current
iteration of the complaint still does not allege facts that could meet the extreme and outrageous
element. In response, the plaintiff argues that the “extreme and outrageous” requirement is
satisfied here because O’Donnell: (1) “succumbed to the longstanding pattern of misconduct and
misbehavior that bespeak a community’s . . . gross lawlessness and disregard for human and
animal welfare and civil rights”; (2) engaged in “misbegotten falsehoods [that] cannot be taken
seriously”; and (3) “stood by meekly in silence when he should have obeyed the Redding Police
Department’s written policies and rules” when another town resident committed suicide.
The law in Connecticut regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress is well
settled. “In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction
of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor
intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional
distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)
that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional
distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v.
Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). “Liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by
decent society. . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
18
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! ... Conduct on the part of
the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is
insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional
distress.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262
Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).
“Whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme
and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine. ... Only where reasonable
minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.” (Citation omitted.) Appleton v. Board of
Education, 254 Conn. 210. “[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to
determine whether the allegations of a complaint . . . set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact
finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not
fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged
behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of
emotional distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism
District Commission, 92 Conn. App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).
As previously noted in this court’s January 21, 2022 memorandum of decision on the
motion to strike, none of the conduct alleged in the previous version of the plaintiff's complaint
met this high standard. Although the plaintiff has added some more detailed factual allegations
to the currently operative complaint, the plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress arise out of the
following alleged conduct: (1) a purported conspiracy to surveil the plaintiff’s property and
subsequently remove her goats; (2) unknown individuals allegedly depositing a deceased goat on
her property; (3) failure by certain individuals to care for her goats in an adequate manner after
19
they were removed from the plaintiff’s custody; and (4) an alleged conspiracy with “[s]ome or
all of the defendants and others” including Haskell and Stafstrom to undermine the plaintiff’s
access to the state court system. Even if these allegations are construed in a manner most
favorable to the pleader and the evidence offered by the plaintiff is viewed in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, none of this alleged conduct satisfies the “extreme and
outrageous” element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Therefore,
summary judgment is granted in O’Donnell’s favor on count six.”
COUNT SEVEN: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Count seven is a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Similar to
count six, the town and O’Donnell move for summary judgment as to this count on the ground
that none of the conduct alleged against them could possibly have created an unreasonable risk
of causing the plaintiff severe emotional distress.'° The plaintiff opposes summary judgment on
count seven by raising the exact same arguments as count six.
“To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must
prove: (1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough
that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grasso v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc.,
138 Conn. App. 759, 771, 54 A.3d 221 (2012). “[I]n order to prevail on a claim of negligent
9 Having made this determination, the court need not examine the other arguments raised by
O’Donnell as to why he is entitled to summary judgment on this count. The court does note,
however, that the complaint barely alleges any conduct that O’Donnell himself allegedly engaged
in,
10 Q’Donnell also argues that he is entitled to governmental immunity for his alleged acts. Given
that the court is granting summary judgment as to this count based on other arguments, it need
not reach this ground.
20
infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized
that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress,
if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. ... This . . . test essentially requires that
the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the
defendants. If such [distress] were reasonable in light of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants
should have realized that their conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing distress, and they,
therefore, properly would be held liable. Conversely, if the [distress] were unreasonable in light
of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants would not have recognized that their conduct could
cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Angiolillo y. Buckmiller, 102 Conn. App. 697, 707-08, 927 A.2d 312, cert. denied, 284 Conn.
927, 934 A.2d 243 (2007). “While the articulation of the elements of an action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress does not employ the adjectives “extreme” “outrageous,” the
requirement that any emotional distress complained of must be severe enough that it might result
in illness or bodily harm establishes a standard against which the scope of this tort might be
measured.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Micek-Holt v. Papageorge, 180 Conn. App.
540, 571, 183 A.3d 1213, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 934, 183 A.3d 634 (2018).
Notably, this court previously struck the plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants should have foreseen that
their acts could have created an unreasonable risk of emotional distress. Viewing the evidence
submitted in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact to support the claim that the conduct allegedly
committed by O’Donnell and other town employees could have created an unreasonable risk of
emotional distress. Rather, the plaintiff merely asserts that these individuals engaged in what are
21
essentially traditional law enforcement functions. The court grants summary judgment in favor
of the town and O’Donnell as to count seven.
COUNT EIGHT: CONVERSION
In count eight, the plaintiff alleges a conversion claim against the town and O’Donnell.
The town once again moves for summary judgment as to this count on the ground that it cannot
be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees. “Although a claim for conversion does
not require proof of intent to deprive another of his or her property . . . conversion nevertheless
remains an intentional tort.” (Citation omitted.) U.S. Electrical Services v. Zolla, Superior
Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-14-6012106-S (December 17, 2015,
Aurigemma, J.), citing, Luciani v. Stop & Shop Cos., 15 Conn. App. 407, 411-12, 544 A.2d
1238, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 437 (1988); see also 90 C.J.S, Trover and
Conversion § 1 (stating that “[t]he intentional tort of conversion is the civil counterpart to
theft.”). Accordingly, the town is granted summary judgment on this basis.
O’Donnell also individually moves for summary judgment. Initially, he asserts that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff cannot present any evidence from
which a jury could reasonably conclude that he actually converted the plaintiff’s property.
According to O’Donnell, it is legally impossible for him to be held liable for conversion because
he did not participate in the March 10, 2021 search of the plaintiff’s home and resulting seizure
of some of her property. In response to this assertion, the plaintiff contends that “the entire
operation took place under [O’Donnell’s] strategizing” and “{h]e maintained a watchful eye as
he engaged in drive-bys as the seizure was underway as a means to monitor the activities ....”
Under Connecticut law, “[t]he tort of [cJonversion occurs when one, without
authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the
22
exclusion of the owner’s rights. ... Thus, [cJonversion is some unauthorized act which deprives
another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and
exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 770, 905
A.2d 623 (2006). “Fraud is not a necessary part of a conversion. Conversion occurs when one
assumes and exercises the right of ownership over property belonging to another, without
authorization and to the exclusion of the owner’s rights. ... The intent required for a conversion
is merely an intent to exercise dominion or control over an item . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Plikus
y. Plikus, 26 Conn. App. 174, 180, 599 A.2d 392 (1991). “On the other hand, a person who does
not direct, advise, participate in, or benefit from another person’s act of conversion is not liable
for it.’ (Emphasis added.) 90 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion § 64.
In count eight, the plaintiff alleges that various individuals converted items of personal
property from her home, including but not limited
Preview
DOC. NO.: X06-UWY-CV-21-5028294-S SUPERIOR COURT NANCY BURTON JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WATERBURY Vv. COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET DAVID PHILIP MASON, ETAL. MAY 30, 2024 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #491 On April 21, 2021, the plaintiff, Nancy Burton, filed this action against numerous defendants,! including: (1) the town of Redding (town); (2) Julia Pemberton, the first selectwoman for the town of Redding, and (3) Mark O’Donnell, the town of Redding’s chief of police. In the operative pleading, the fifth amended complaint filed on April 12, 2022,? the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts. The plaintiff resided on property located at 147 Cross Highway in Redding for thirty-five years. Throughout her lifetime, the plaintiff has become involved in numerous environmental causes including the anti-nuclear power movement. 2 At the present time, these defendants are the only defendants remaining in the case. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, in this memorandum of decision, the defendants will both be referred to collectively as “the defendants” and separately by their names as appropriate. Pemberton and O’Donnell will also sometimes be referred to collectively as “the individual defendants.” 2 On April 12, 2022, the plaintiff filed her fifth amended complaint. This court granted a motion to strike certain counts from this complaint on July 22, 2022. Thereafter, on August 22, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion to file a late substitute complaint along with a proposed substitute complaint. The court initially granted the plaintiff permission to file same on October 25, 2022, however, by order dated January 11, 2023, the court noted that the plaintiff’s substitute complaint did not comply with Practice Book § 10-44 in that it was not “accompanied by a document showing the additions and deletions made to the previous filing.” Accordingly, the court ordered the plaintiff to file a new substitute complaint that complied with the Practice Book by January 23, 2023. Although the plaintiff has filed two more versions of her complaint, none of these complaints complied with the court’s order or the requirements of the Practice Book. For these reasons, the court will consider the April 12, 2022 complaint to be operative in this matter. Notably, the defendants also directed their summary judgment motion to this iteration of the plaintiff's complaint. In furtherance of this objective, the plaintiff has adopted many goats and began testing their milk in order to ascertain their radioactivity. After adopting her goats, however, the plaintiff began experiencing problems with her neighbors, David Philip Mason, Elinore Carmody and Dennis Gibbons. The plaintiff alleges that Mason, Carmody and Gibbons began to harass her and complain about the presence of the goats on her property. For example, on April 26, 2020, Carmody and Gibbons allegedly “pursued several of [the] plaintiff’s goats grazing along the stone wall separating their property from [the] plaintiff’s property by blowing an air-horn loudly in their direction, causing the goats to panic and flee from the stone wall; thereupon, Carmody and Gibbons erected the[ir] middle fingers at the plaintiff... and they screamed repeatedly at her [expletive] you.” A similar incident also occurred on April 30, 2020, that culminated in the plaintiff’s arrest after a motor vehicle hit one of her goats. According to the plaintiff, O’Donnell “made haste” to issue a press release regarding this arrest and announce it to the Connecticut news media. The plaintiff further alleges that the police department and O’Donnell participated in a scheme with Carmody and Gibbons “to cause the [plaintiffs] goats to be killed or injured in a collision with oncoming vehicles [and] it was understood . . . that should the scheme go as planned and [the] goats be killed or injured . . . [the] plaintiff would be wrongfully charged with animal cruelty ....” Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that Pemberton “has actively fed a frenzy of manufactured goat hysteria in the community through social media and other means” against the plaintiff. On March 9, 2021, the court, D'Andrea, J., signed a search warrant for the plaintiff's property. According to the plaintiff, the affidavit that provided support for this warrant “was replete with knowingly false statements” and that O’Donnell and other members of the police department “deliberately and maliciously contributed to the submission of a false and fraudulent application for a search and seizure warrant.” The following day, on March 10, 2021, members of the police department and Pemberton, including other individuals, commenced a search of the plaintiff’s home that allegedly violated her fourth amendment rights. This search culminated in the removal of sixty-five goats along with various items of personal property from the plaintiff’s residence. The goats were then moved to a large animal facility in Niantic where the plaintiff alleges they have been subjected to “acts of wilful and deliberate abuse and cruelty to animals.” According to the plaintiff, the defendants participated in this search even though they knew that she had an active plan to transfer all of her goats to an animal rescue facility. Thereafter, on April 9, 2021, the court, Cobb, J., entered a temporary order placing the plaintiff’s goats in the state’s custody in the case of State v. Sixty-Five Goats, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6139702-S.> The plaintiff has repeatedly asserted that the proceedings before Judge Cobb violated her rights and were otherwise unfair. As part of that proceeding, the plaintiff learned that one of her goats had passed away. Some of the town of Redding defendants were then given a sample of that goat’s milk by the plaintiff that they deliberately discarded after failing to have it analyzed for the presence of radioisotopes. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that “the defendants, some or all of them” engaged in a conspiracy with state Senator Will Haskell and Redding town counsel Steven Stafstrom to disseminate “false, malicious, inflammatory and defamatory communications about [the] [pJlaintiff and her goats,” search her home without probable cause, steal her property, and engage in illegal surveillance of her residence. 3 This case was subsequently transferred to the Waterbury Complex Litigation Docket, and it currently has a docket number of X06-UWY-CV-21-6064254-S. 3 As a result of all of this alleged conduct, the plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) count two—invasion of privacy as to all of the defendants; (2) count three—illegal search and seizure as to all of the defendants; (3) count four—a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to all of the defendants; (4) count five—false arrest as to O’Donnell; (5) count six—intentional infliction of emotional distress as to the town and O’Donnell; (6) count seven—negligent infliction of emotional distress as to the town and O’Donnell; (7) count eight—conversion as to the town and O’Donnell; (8) count nine—intentional spoliation of evidence as to the town and Pemberton; (9) count ten—deprivation of equal rights and privileges as to the town and O’Donnell; and (10) count eleven—invasion of privacy— intrusion as to all of the defendants. On November 2, 2023, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support of their motion. The defendants move for summary judgment as to all of the remaining counts asserted against them on various grounds. On February 23, 2024, the plaintiff filed her objection to the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff thereafter filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the summary judgment motion on February 26, 2024. On March 8, 2024, the defendants filed their reply memorandum. The parties attach numerous exhibits in support of their respective pleadings that will only be referred to as necessary in this memorandum of decision. On April 15, 2024, the court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment and the opposition thereto. “Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation, 330 Conn. 400, 414-15, 195 A.3d 664 (2018). “[SJummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way. .. . {A] summary disposition . ., should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party. .. . [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). “[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred. ... A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn, 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). “[T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). “The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence. .. . If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivera v. CR Summer Hill, Lid. Partnership, 170 Conn. App. 70, 74, 154 A.3d 55 (2017). COUNTS TWO AND ELEVEN: INVASION OF PRIVACY In counts two and eleven, the plaintiff alleges virtually indistinguishable causes of action sounding in invasion of privacy. The defendants raise a number of arguments as to why they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these counts. First, the town argues that pursuant to the doctrine of governmental immunity, it cannot be held liable for any intentional torts committed by one of its employees and/or agents. Notably, in her memorandum of law, the plaintiff offers no argument in opposition to this assertion raised by the town. By statute, “a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . [a]cts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct ....” General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (A). “[O]ur Supreme Court has held that the term ‘wilfulness’ is synonymous with ‘intentional.’ . . . and, under our case law, a municipality cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees.” (Citation omitted.) Avoletta v. Torrington, 133 Conn. App. 215, 224, 34 A.3d 445 (2012). “Accordingly, a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action against a municipal defendant when such actions are alleged unless its immunity has been abrogated by statute.” Id., 221. Moreover, the Appellate Court has explicitly determined that invasion of a privacy is an intentional tort covered by this rule. McCullough v. Rocky Hill, 198 Conn. App. 703, 711 n.12, 234 A.3d 1049, cert, denied, 335 Conn, 985, 242 A.3d 480 (2020). Given that it is clear that the town is a political subdivision of this state, and the plaintiff fails to cite to any statutory basis to maintain the invasion of privacy claims against the town, the court grants summary judgment in favor of the town as to counts two and eleven. Pemberton and O’Donnell also move for summary judgment on counts two and eleven on the ground that the plaintiff has not alleged, nor can she prove, that either Pemberton or O’Donnell were personally involved in the acts upon which she predicates her invasion of privacy claims, Additionally, Pemberton and O’Donnell argue that the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy causes of action must fail because the plaintiff cannot establish either the “intentional intrusion” element or that any intrusion could be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person, Pemberton and O’Donnell further argue that any “false light” in which the plaintiff may have been placed in was actually true, and that any intrusion upon her seclusion was authorized by a duly issued arrest warrant. In opposition, the plaintiff contends that: (1) Pemberton and O’Donnell personally orchestrated the acts and conduct that constitute her invasion of privacy claims; (2) the absence of probable cause to seize her goats during her arrest negates the individual defendants’ arguments; (3) it is axiomatic that falsely accusing the plaintiff of a serious crime would be highly offensive; and (4) Pemberton and O’Donnell cannot rely on the search warrant to defeat the plaintiff’s claims because the warrant lacked probable cause. “Our Supreme Court has observed that the law of privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be [left] alone. . . . The four categories of invasion of privacy are: ([{1]) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; ([2]) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; ([3]) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; or ({4]) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davidson v. Bridgeport, 180 Conn. App. 18, 29, 182 A.3d 639 (2018). In the present case, the two types of invasion of privacy claims that potentially appear to be applicable are intrusion upon seclusion and false light. As the two varieties of invasion of privacy are essentially distinct torts, they will be addressed separately. “In Davidson v. Bridgeport, [supra,] 180 Conn. App. 18 . . . [the Appellate Court] addressed for the first time an intrusion upon seclusion claim . . . [and] noted that [§] 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. ... It is clear from the Restatement’s language that to establish a claim for intrusion upon the seclusion of another, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, (2) upon the plaintiff’s solitude or seclusion or private affairs or concems, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cornelius v. Markle Investigations, Inc., 220 Conn. App. 135, 152-53, 297 A.3d 248 (2023). As to the second element, a “defendant is subject to liability .. . only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 161-62. With respect to the third element: “In the context of intrusion upon seclusion, questions about the reasonable person standard are ordinarily questions of fact, but they become questions of law if reasonable persons can draw only one conclusion from the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 165. Although it is somewhat difficult to determine exactly what the plaintiff alleges that Pemberton and O’Donnell allegedly did to intrude upon her seclusion, the gravamen of the counts at issue are that these defendants invaded her privacy when they allegedly surveilled her property and participated in the March 10, 2021 search of her residence. Despite these allegations, in her affidavit, Pemberton attests that although she “was present on March 10, 2021, during the [s]tate’s seizure of the goat herd . . .[m]y involvement was limited to observation of the seizure, from the public road.” Similarly, in his affidavit, O’Donnell avers that “[o]ther than conducting a brief drive by [the] plaintiff’s property after the [s]tate had already commenced the seizure, I was not physically present for or personally involved in the [Department of Agriculture] seizure of the goat herd on March 10, 2021.” The plaintiff offers no evidence that contradicts these attestations. Nor does the plaintiff argue or present evidence that could potentially establish that Pemberton or O’Donnell were on her property at any other time. Ina case involving an intrusion upon seclusion cause of action, the Appellate Court has determined that summary judgment was appropriate when “the defendants . . . did not physically enter the plaintiff’s private property, the defendants did not utilize advanced electronic surveillance equipment to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s affairs . . . and the purpose of the surveillance was not to hound or harass the plaintiff.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cornelius v. Markle Investigations, Inc., supra, 220 Conn. App. 164; see also Parnoffv. Aquarion Water Co. of Connecticut, 188 Conn. App. 153, 176, 204 A.3d 717 (2019) (summary judgment on second element was proper where “[a]t no point does the plaintiff indicate that the defendants entered his residence or that they compromised any private information or [his] general privacy”). As the plaintiff has provided no evidence that could raise an issue of fact regarding whether Pemberton and O’Donnell actually entered her property or otherwise improperly surveilled it, the plaintiff cannot succeed on any claim sounding in intrusion upon seclusion.* 4 Having made this determination, the court need not examine the parties’ respective arguments regarding the legal validity of the search warrant signed by Judge D’Andrea. 9 As counts two and eleven also may be construed as attempts to plead a false light invasion of privacy claim, the court will also discuss the legal requirements of such as cause of action. “To establish a false light invasion of privacy claim, the claimant must show that the false light in which [she] was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . . the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which [she] would be placed. ... The essence of a false light privacy claim is that the matter published concerning the [claimant] (1) is not true . . . and (2) is such a major misrepresentation of [her] character, history, activities or beliefs that serious offense may reasonably be expected to be taken by a reasonable [person] in [her] position.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borg v. Cloutier, 200 Conn. App. 82, 109, 239 A.3d 1249 (2020). “The standard governing the tort of false light invasion of privacy is similar to the standard governing the tort of defamation concerning a public official or public figure: that the publisher of the false statement knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of the falsity of the statement.... A finding of reckless disregard requires sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McIntire v. Piscottano, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-01-0076151-S (May 23, 2005, Scholl, J.), quoting, Woodcock v. Journal Publishing Co., 230 Conn. 525, 546, 646 A.2d 92 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1149, 115 S. Ct. 1098, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1995). Although it is once again not entirely clear from the pleadings what conduct Pemberton or O’Donnell may have personally engaged in that could rise to the level of this tort, the defendants’ brief posits that the plaintiff intends to hold them liable for statements made in a press release following the plaintiff’s arrest in April, 2020. The plaintiff does not dispute this 10 characterization in her opposition memorandum, so the court will analyze the claim in the form presented. In paragraph fifty-one of her complaint, which is incorporated by reference into counts two and eleven, the plaintiff alleges that the Redding Police Department, per O’Donnell, “made haste to issue a press release announcing [her] arrest” and that the press release was “false and recklessly asserted to defame [the] plaintiff... .” It does not appear that either party included the supposedly offending press release in the exhibits they filed in connection with the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, neither Pemberton nor O’Donnell’s affidavits discuss the press release, their potential role in drafting same, or whether the press release was truthful. Without the text of the press release, the court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that its contents were truthful and would not have been highly offensive to a reasonable person. As the moving parties on the motion, it is, of course, Pemberton and O’Donnell’s burden to establish the absence of all genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, to the extent that counts two and eleven set forth a claim sounding in false light invasion of privacy, the motion for summary judgment is denied. COUNTS THREE, FOUR, AND FIVE Next, the various defendants each move for summary judgment as to counts three, four, and five. These counts allege causes of action sounding in: (1) count three—illegal search and seizure as to all of the defendants; (2) count four—a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to all of the defendants; and (3) count five—false arrest as to O’Donnell. As the arguments raised by the individual defendants and the town are somewhat distinct, they will be addressed separately. The individual defendants’ initial argument is that neither of them can be held liable for any of these counts because they were not personally involved in the subject search, seizure, or arrest. In response to this argument, the plaintiff blanketly asserts, without referencing any specific 11 exhibits, that both individual defendants personally participated in the events at issue. With respect to Pemberton, the plaintiff further contends that she “acted personally and through her designated agents” Stafstrom and O’Donnell. In counts three’ and four, the plaintiff alleges various violations of her first and fourth amendment rights under the United States constitution. Such claims are authorized under § 1983, which provides in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress... .” Despite a plaintiff's ability to bring a claim under § 1983, “{i]t is well settled in the Second] Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 36 (2d. Cir. 2019). “[A] defendant in a § 1983 action may not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations merely because he held a high position of authority.” Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d. Cir. 1996). “Rather, the plaintiff must directly plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 612 (2d. Cir. 2020); see also Wine v. Mulligan, 213 Conn. App. 298, 303, 277 A.3d 912 (2022) (“{tJo state a viable claim . . . against an individual defendant pursuant to § 1983, the 5 As previously noted by this court: “Although count three does not specifically mention § 1983, the court assumes that the plaintiff is bringing it under § 1983, as ‘illegal search and seizure’ is not a stand-alone cause of action.” Burton v. Mason, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X06-CV-21-5028294-S (November 29, 2022, Bellis, J.). 12 plaintiff must allege the personal involvement in the alleged denial of access of that particular defendant”). As noted in the previous section of this decision, both O’Donnell and Pemberton aver in their affidavits that they did not personally participate in the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claims in counts three and four, ic., the allegedly illegal search of her home and seizure of her goats that took place on March 10, 2021. The plaintiff offers no evidence in opposition to these attestations. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted in their favor on these counts.® A similar result is mandated with respect to the false arrest cause of action alleged against O’Donnell in count five. “False imprisonment, or false arrest, is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another .... To prevail on a claim of false imprisonment, the plaintiff must prove that his physical liberty has been restrained by the defendant and that the restraint was against his will, that is, that he did not consent to the restraint or acquiesce in it willingly.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nodoushani v. Southern Connecticut State University, 152 Conn. App. 84, 92-93, 95 A.3d 1248 (2014). “A person is not liable for false imprisonment unless his act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement, or with knowledge that such confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Greene v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 268, 440 A.2d 973 (1982). “The tort of false imprisonment requires that an individual be accused of committing the actions that form the basis of the claim.” Fleming v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-14-6049550-S (November 6, 2015, Peck, J.). As the plaintiff has ® Having made this determination, the court need not examine whether these defendants are entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the fact-intensive doctrine of qualified immunity. Additionally, the court need not delve into the parties’ various arguments with respect to the validity of the underlying search warrant signed by Judge D’Andrea. 13 failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether O’Donnell personally participated in either her 20207 or 2021 purportedly false arrests, summary judgment enters in O’Donnell’s favor on this count.§ The town also moves for summary judgment as to counts three and four. According to the town, the plaintiff has not alleged and cannot prove its potential liability under the doctrine enunciated in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Specifically, the town argues that the plaintiff fails to allege or offer evidence that: (1) a town policy, practice, or custom facilitated or caused the plaintiff's alleged constitutional injury; (2) the town failed to train its employees properly; or that (3) the town failed to supervise its employees adequately. In response, the plaintiff argues that the town did, in fact, have a policy, practice, or custom that caused her alleged injury in that Pemberton “led a corrupt regime dedicated to serving the expressed interests of a loud minority even though it meant that there would be a wholesale disregard of the law and individuals’ rights.” As support for this assertion, the plaintiff cites: (1) the death of certain town residents; (2) the illegal condemnation of an individual’s property; (3) illegal destruction of trees at her residence; and that (4) Pemberton authorized Stafstrom to make a fraudulent transfer offer regarding her goats. With respect to whether the town inadequately trained its employees, the plaintiff simply argues 7 The summary judgment record reflects that the plaintiff’s 2020 arrest was conducted by an Officer DeLuca. 8 Having reached this conclusion, the court need not examine O’Donnell’s alternate argument that that he is entitled to summary judgment on count five on the basis that the false arrest claim is not ripe because the plaintiff’s criminal charges are still pending. Despite this argument raised by O’Donnell, this court has previously noted that “favorable termination of a criminal action on the plaintiff’s behalf has not been established as a required element for a claim of false arrest in Connecticut courts.” (Intemal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Mason, Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X06-CV-21-5028294-S (January 21, 2022, Bellis, J.). Therefore, O’Donnell would be unlikely to succeed on this argument. 14 that “[sJuch a claim is implicit in the operative complaint.” Finally, as to the town’s potential inadequate supervision of its employees, the plaintiff states: “[t]he offensive conduct here was a variation on the theme as [Pemberton] and [O’Donnell] acted outside the law believing they would be shielded from liability.” “A municipality or other local government may be liable under [§ 1983] if the governmental body itself subjects a person to a deprivation of rights or causes a person to be subjected to such deprivation. ... But, under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts. ... They are not vicariously liable under§ 1983 for their employees’ actions.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Edgewood Street Garden Apartments, LLC v. Hartford, 163 Conn. App. 219, 231, 135 A.3d 54, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 903, 136 A.3d 642 (2016). Despite this general rule, “[iJn Monell . . . the United States Supreme Court . . . held that [I]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers. [I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Comn. 385, 410, 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S. Ct. 1239, 146 L. Ed. 2d 99 (2000). “To establish liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that he suffered the denial of a constitutional right that was caused by an official municipal policy or custom.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Frost v. New York City Police Dept., 980 Bb F.3d 231, 257 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, US. _ , 142 S. Ct. 1666, 212 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2022). may satisfy the policy, custom or practice requirement in one of four ways. . . “A plaintiff . Accordingly, [t]he plaintiff may allege the existence of(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.” (Citation omitted; intemal quotation marks omitted.) Lalonde v. Ogdensburg, 662 F. Supp. 3d 289, 315 (N.D. N.Y. 2023). “Under either a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise theory, a municipality is liable only where the inadequate training or supervision amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of person with whom the [officials] come into contact. ... From this deliberate-indifference standard, the Second Circuit has established three requirements: (1) the plaintiff must show that a policymaker knows to a moral certainty that her employees will confront a given situation, (2) the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation, and (3) the plaintiff must show that the wrong choice by the city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights. ... In addition, at the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs must identify a specific deficiency in the city’s training program and establish that that deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury, such that it actually caused the constitutional deprivation.” 16 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bisson v. Hartford, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:10cv1341 (JBA) (D. Conn. June 4, 2013). Given the legal standards for setting forth a claim under Monell, it is apparent that the town is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Although the plaintiff makes various accusations about a pattern of misconduct on the part of town officials, none of these allegations of wrongdoing having anything to do with the issues at hand in these counts, ie., the allegedly improper search of the plaintiff’s home and resulting seizure of her goats. Moreover, the plaintiff fails to allege or provide any evidence of a specific deficiency in the town’s training or supervision programs that led to her injuries. Therefore, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to these issues. For these reasons, summary judgment enters in favor of the town on counts three and four. COUNT SIX: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS In count six, the plaintiff brings an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against the town and O’Donnell. Although the argument is only raised in a footnote, the town initially asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because, pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (2) (A), it cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees. As discussed in a previous section of this decision, the law in Connecticut is clear that municipalities cannot be liable when their employees commit an intentional tort such as intentional infliction of emotional distress. McCullough v. Rocky Hill, supra, 198 Conn. App. 711 n.12. Accordingly, summary judgment enters in favor of the town on this count. With respect to the individual defendant O’Donnell, he argues that the court should grant summary judgment in his favor for a number of reasons. The primary argument advanced by O’Donnell is that the plaintiff does not allege any facts or present any evidence that could 17 potentially satisfy the “extreme and outrageous” element of this tort. Notably, via a memorandum of decision issued on January 21, 2022, previously struck the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on that basis. O’Donnell asserts that the current iteration of the complaint still does not allege facts that could meet the extreme and outrageous element. In response, the plaintiff argues that the “extreme and outrageous” requirement is satisfied here because O’Donnell: (1) “succumbed to the longstanding pattern of misconduct and misbehavior that bespeak a community’s . . . gross lawlessness and disregard for human and animal welfare and civil rights”; (2) engaged in “misbegotten falsehoods [that] cannot be taken seriously”; and (3) “stood by meekly in silence when he should have obeyed the Redding Police Department’s written policies and rules” when another town resident committed suicide. The law in Connecticut regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress is well settled. “In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society. . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his 18 resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! ... Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). “Whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine. ... Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.” (Citation omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 210. “[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint . . . set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather it is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn. App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006). As previously noted in this court’s January 21, 2022 memorandum of decision on the motion to strike, none of the conduct alleged in the previous version of the plaintiff's complaint met this high standard. Although the plaintiff has added some more detailed factual allegations to the currently operative complaint, the plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress arise out of the following alleged conduct: (1) a purported conspiracy to surveil the plaintiff’s property and subsequently remove her goats; (2) unknown individuals allegedly depositing a deceased goat on her property; (3) failure by certain individuals to care for her goats in an adequate manner after 19 they were removed from the plaintiff’s custody; and (4) an alleged conspiracy with “[s]ome or all of the defendants and others” including Haskell and Stafstrom to undermine the plaintiff’s access to the state court system. Even if these allegations are construed in a manner most favorable to the pleader and the evidence offered by the plaintiff is viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, none of this alleged conduct satisfies the “extreme and outrageous” element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Therefore, summary judgment is granted in O’Donnell’s favor on count six.” COUNT SEVEN: NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS Count seven is a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Similar to count six, the town and O’Donnell move for summary judgment as to this count on the ground that none of the conduct alleged against them could possibly have created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff severe emotional distress.'° The plaintiff opposes summary judgment on count seven by raising the exact same arguments as count six. “To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grasso v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc., 138 Conn. App. 759, 771, 54 A.3d 221 (2012). “[I]n order to prevail on a claim of negligent 9 Having made this determination, the court need not examine the other arguments raised by O’Donnell as to why he is entitled to summary judgment on this count. The court does note, however, that the complaint barely alleges any conduct that O’Donnell himself allegedly engaged in, 10 Q’Donnell also argues that he is entitled to governmental immunity for his alleged acts. Given that the court is granting summary judgment as to this count based on other arguments, it need not reach this ground. 20 infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. ... This . . . test essentially requires that the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the defendants. If such [distress] were reasonable in light of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants should have realized that their conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing distress, and they, therefore, properly would be held liable. Conversely, if the [distress] were unreasonable in light of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants would not have recognized that their conduct could cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Angiolillo y. Buckmiller, 102 Conn. App. 697, 707-08, 927 A.2d 312, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 927, 934 A.2d 243 (2007). “While the articulation of the elements of an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress does not employ the adjectives “extreme” “outrageous,” the requirement that any emotional distress complained of must be severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm establishes a standard against which the scope of this tort might be measured.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Micek-Holt v. Papageorge, 180 Conn. App. 540, 571, 183 A.3d 1213, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 934, 183 A.3d 634 (2018). Notably, this court previously struck the plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants should have foreseen that their acts could have created an unreasonable risk of emotional distress. Viewing the evidence submitted in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concludes, as a matter of law, that there is no genuine issue of material fact to support the claim that the conduct allegedly committed by O’Donnell and other town employees could have created an unreasonable risk of emotional distress. Rather, the plaintiff merely asserts that these individuals engaged in what are 21 essentially traditional law enforcement functions. The court grants summary judgment in favor of the town and O’Donnell as to count seven. COUNT EIGHT: CONVERSION In count eight, the plaintiff alleges a conversion claim against the town and O’Donnell. The town once again moves for summary judgment as to this count on the ground that it cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its employees. “Although a claim for conversion does not require proof of intent to deprive another of his or her property . . . conversion nevertheless remains an intentional tort.” (Citation omitted.) U.S. Electrical Services v. Zolla, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-14-6012106-S (December 17, 2015, Aurigemma, J.), citing, Luciani v. Stop & Shop Cos., 15 Conn. App. 407, 411-12, 544 A.2d 1238, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 437 (1988); see also 90 C.J.S, Trover and Conversion § 1 (stating that “[t]he intentional tort of conversion is the civil counterpart to theft.”). Accordingly, the town is granted summary judgment on this basis. O’Donnell also individually moves for summary judgment. Initially, he asserts that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff cannot present any evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that he actually converted the plaintiff’s property. According to O’Donnell, it is legally impossible for him to be held liable for conversion because he did not participate in the March 10, 2021 search of the plaintiff’s home and resulting seizure of some of her property. In response to this assertion, the plaintiff contends that “the entire operation took place under [O’Donnell’s] strategizing” and “{h]e maintained a watchful eye as he engaged in drive-bys as the seizure was underway as a means to monitor the activities ....” Under Connecticut law, “[t]he tort of [cJonversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the 22 exclusion of the owner’s rights. ... Thus, [cJonversion is some unauthorized act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of the powers of the owner to his harm.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 770, 905 A.2d 623 (2006). “Fraud is not a necessary part of a conversion. Conversion occurs when one assumes and exercises the right of ownership over property belonging to another, without authorization and to the exclusion of the owner’s rights. ... The intent required for a conversion is merely an intent to exercise dominion or control over an item . . . .” (Citation omitted.) Plikus y. Plikus, 26 Conn. App. 174, 180, 599 A.2d 392 (1991). “On the other hand, a person who does not direct, advise, participate in, or benefit from another person’s act of conversion is not liable for it.’ (Emphasis added.) 90 C.J.S. Trover and Conversion § 64. In count eight, the plaintiff alleges that various individuals converted items of personal property from her home, including but not limited