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STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON C/A NO:
LONGBRIDGE FINANCIAL, LLC
Plaintiff, SUMMONS AND NOTICES
vs. (Non-Jury)
VIVIAN ANNETTE KELLY A/K/A ANNETTE FORECLOSURE OF REAL
W. KELLY A/K/A ANNETTE WHETSELL ESTATE MORTGAGE
KELLY; ANY HEIRS-AT-LAW, OR
DEVISEES OF WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR.,
DECEASED, THEIR HEIRS, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES, ADMINISTRATORS,
SUCCESSOR AND ASSIGNS, AND ALL
OTHER PERSON ENTITLED TO CLAIM
THROUGH THEM; ALL UNKNOWN
PERSONS WITH ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR
INTEREST IN THE REAL ESTATE
DESCRIBED HEREIN; ALSO ANY PERSONS
WHO MAY BE IN THE MILITARY SERVICE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BEING A CLASS DESIGNATED AS JOHN
DOE; AND ANY UNKNOWN MINORS OR
PERSON UNDER A DISABILITY BEING A
CLASS DESIGNATED AS RICHARD ROE;
PATRICIA RAMSEY; WILLIAM A. KELLY,
JR.; ANGELA M. KELLY A/K/A ANGELA
SCHLECHTA; TIMOTHY S. KELLY; UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA ACTING BY AND
THROUGH ITS AGENCY THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT
Defendant(s)
TO THE DEFENDANT(S) ABOVE NAMED:
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to appear and defend by answering the
Complaint in this action, a copy of which is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your
Answer on the subscribers at their offices at Robertson, Anschutz, Schneid, Crane &
ICANN HUAN ANA
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Partners, PLLC, 651 Brookfield Parkway, Suite 103, Greenville, SC 29607, within thirty (30)
days after the service hereof, exclusive of the day of such service; except that the United States of
America, if named, shall have sixty (60) days to answer after the service hereof, exclusive of the
day of such service; and if you fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against you for
the relief demanded in the Complaint.
TO MINOR(S) OVER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND/OR TO MINOR(S)
UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND THE PERSON WITH WHOM THE MINOR(S)
RESIDES, AND/OR TO PERSONS UNDER SOME LEGAL DISABILITY:
YOU ARE FURTHER SUMMONED AND NOTIFIED to apply for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem within thirty (30) days after the service of this Summons and Notice upon you.
If you fail to do so, application for such appointment will be made by Attorney for Plaintiff.
YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff will move for an Order of Reference or
the Court may issue a general Order of Reference of this action to a Master-in-Equity/Special
Referee, pursuant to Rule 53 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
YOU WILL ALSO TAKE NOTICE that under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. §
29-3-100, effective June 16, 1993, any collateral assignment of rents contained in the referenced
Mortgage is perfected and Attorney for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that all rents shall be payable
directly to it by delivery to its undersigned attorneys from the date of default. In the alternative,
Plaintiff will move before a judge of this Circuit on the 1oth day after service hereof, or as soon
thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an Order enforcing the assignment of rents, if any, and
compelling payment of all rents covered by such assignment directly to the Plaintiff,
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which motion is to be based upon the original Note and Mortgage herein and the Complaint
attached hereto.
ROBERTSON, ANSCHUTZ, SCHNEID, CRANE
& PARTNERS, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
651 Brookfield Parkway, Suite 103
Greenville, SC 29607
Telephone: (470) 321-7112
Facsimile: (404) 393-1425
By: _/S/Mary Powers_
Genevieve Johnson, Esquire (S.C. Bar 78480)
Michael Nourie, Esquire (S.C. Bar 104717)
Elizabeth Brown, Esquire (S.C. Bar 68519)
Mary R. Powers, Esquire (S.C. Bar 16534)
Communication Email: giohnson@raslg.com
mnourie@, sl 7.com
elibrown@raslg.com
mpowers@raslg.com
4 day of June, 2024
24-197823
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON C/A NO:
COMPLAINT
LONGBRIDGE FINANCIAL, LLC
Plaintiff, (Non-Jury)
VS. FORECLOSURE OF
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
VIVIAN ANNETTE KELLY A/K/A
ANNETTE W. KELLY A/K/A ANNETTE
WHETSELL KELLY; ANY HEIRS-AT-LAW,
OR DEVISEES OF WILLIAM A. KELLY,
SR., DECEASED, THEIR HEIRS,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES,
ADMINISTRATORS, SUCCESSOR AND
ASSIGNS, AND ALL OTHER PERSON
ENTITLED TO CLAIM THROUGH THEM;
ALL UNKNOWN PERSONS WITH ANY
RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN THE REAL
ESTATE DESCRIBED HEREIN; ALSO ANY
PERSONS WHO MAY BE IN THE
MILITARY SERVICE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, BEING A CLASS
DESIGNATED AS JOHN DOE; AND ANY
UNKNOWN MINORS OR PERSON UNDER
A DISABILITY BEING A CLASS
DESIGNATED AS RICHARD ROE;
PATRICIA RAMSEY; WILLIAM A. KELLY,
JR.; ANGELA M. KELLY A/K/A ANGELA
SCHLECHTA; TIMOTHY S. KELLY;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ACTING
BY AND THROUGH ITS AGENCY THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT
Defendant(s).
The Plaintiff above-named, complaining of the Defendant(s) herein, alleges that:
1 Plaintiff, LONGBRIDGE FINANCIAL, LLC, is a business entity duly authorized to conduct
business in the State of South Carolina.
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2. Upon information and belief, the Defendant(s), VIVIAN ANNETTE KELLY A/K/A
ANNETTE W. KELLY A/K/A ANNETTE WHETSELL KELLY; ANY HEIRS-AT-LAW,
OR DEVISEES OF WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR., DECEASED, THEIR HEIRS, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES, ADMINISTRATORS, SUCCESSOR AND ASSIGNS, AND ALL
OTHER PERSON ENTITLED TO CLAIM THROUGH THEM; ALL UNKNOWN
PERSONS WITH ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN THE REAL ESTATE
DESCRIBED HEREIN; ALSO ANY PERSONS WHO MAY BE IN THE MILITARY
SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BEING A CLASS DESIGNATED
AS JOHN DOE; AND ANY UNKNOWN MINORS OR PERSON UNDER A DISABILITY
BEING A CLASS DESIGNATED AS RICHARD ROE; PATRICIA RAMSEY; WILLIAM
A. KELLY, JR.; ANGELA M. KELLY A/K/A ANGELA SCHLECHTA; TIMOTHY S.
KELLY; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS AGENCY
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, may claim some
interest in the real estate, which is the subject of this action and this Court has proper
jurisdiction over said Defendants.
The real property hereinafter described, that is the subject of this action, is situated and
located in the County of Charleston, State of South Carolina, and this Court has proper
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties of this action.
Heretofore, WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR. (hereinafter, "Borrower(s)") made, executed, and
delivered to TOWNEBANK MORTGAGE (hereinafter, "Lender") a certain Adjustable Note
dated May 16, 2018, in writing (hereinafter, "Note"), wherein and whereby WILLIAM A.
KELLY, SR. promised to repay to TOWNEBANK MORTGAGE, up to the maximum
principal sum of $363,000.00, equal to the sum of all advances made under the Note together
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with a variable rate of interest per annum on the unpaid balance; said principal and interest
being payable upon the occurrence of default as defined by the Note or maturity.
In order to secure the payment of said Note, the said WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR. AND
VIVIAN ANNETTE KELLY A/K/A ANNETTE W. KELLY A/K/A ANNETTE
WHETSELL KELLY (hereinafter, "Mortgagor(s)"), did make, execute, and deliver to
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., AS MORTGAGEE, AS
NOMINEE FOR TOWNEBANK MORTGAGE, its successors and assigns, a certain
mortgage dated May 16, 2018 (hereinafter, "Mortgage") securing the below described real
property, including any and all improvements to the property, located in the County and State
aforesaid (hereinafter, Property"):
ALL THAT CERTAIN LOT, PIECE OR PARCEL OF LAND, SITUATE, LYING
AND BEING IN THE CITY OF CHARLESTON, CHARLESTON COUNTY, SC,
AND KNOWN AND DESIGNATED AS LOT 57, PARK PLACE SUBDIVISION,
PHASE II, PREPARED BY CLARENCE S. MATTHEWS, RLS DATED NOVEMBER
2, 1987 AND WHICH PLAT WAS DULY RECORDED IN THE RMC OFFICE FOR
CHARLESTON COUNTY IN PLAT BOOK BP AT PAGE 122, SAID LOT HAVING
SUCH SIZE, SHAPE, DIMENSIONS, BUTTINGS AND BOUNDINGS AS SHOWN
ON SAID PLAT, REFERENCE TO WHICH IS HEREBY MADE FOR A MORE
COMPLETE DESCRIPTION.
BEING THE IDENTICAL PROPERTY CONVEYED TO WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR.
AND ANNETTE W. KELLY BY DEED OF JAMES M. CHAPMAN AND BELINDA
M. CHAPMAN BY DEED RECORDED NOVEMBER 2, 1993 IN BOOK B234 AT
PAGE 626. SUBSEQUENTLY, WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR. AND VIVIAN ANNETTE
KELLY A/K/A ANNETTE W. KELLY CONVEYED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO
WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR. AND VIVIAN ANNETTE KELLY BY DEED
RECORDED ON APRIL 6, 2015, IN BOOK 0467 AT PAGE 400, IN THE ROD
OFFICE FOR CHARLESTON COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA. SUBSEQUENTLY,
WILLIAM A KELLY, SR. PASSED AWAY, LEAVING THEIR INTEREST IN THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY TO THEIR HEIRS, NAMELY VIVIAN ANNETTE KELLY
AKA ANNETTE WHETSELL KELLY, PATRICIA RAMSEY, WILLIAM A.
KELLY, JR., ANGELA M. KELLY A/K/A ANGELA SCHLECHTA, AND TIMOTHY
S. KELLY.
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TMS No. 3101300017
Property Address: 2355 PARKSTONE DRIVE, CHARLESTON, SC 29414
Said Mortgage was recorded on May 22, 2018 in Book 0720 at Page 421, in the Charleston
County Registry.
Thereafter, the Mortgage was assigned to LONGBRIDGE FINANCIAL LLC by assignment
recorded on March 23, 2021, in Book 0973 at Page 723.
The Mortgage evidences and secures the repayment of money advanced by the Lender to, or
on behalf of, the Mortgagor(s) and constitutes a valid first lien on the Property.
On or about October 10, 2019, WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR. died and an estate case has been
filed under estate case number 2019ES 1002176.
10. Any notice required by the terms of the Mortgage or by State or Federal law has been given
to the applicable defendant(s) prior to the commencement of this action.
11 The Plaintiff herein is entitled to enforce said Note and has the right to foreclose by virtue of
the Plaintiffs status as holder of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of the instrument
who has the rights of a holder, or person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to
enforce the instrument pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-309 or 36-3-418(d) (2008).
12. This Mortgage is a "Home Equity Conversion” mortgage a/k/a reverse mortgages, therefore
in and by the terms of said Note and the Mortgage securing the same, it is provided, among
other things, that upon death of a Borrower, or if any of the conditions and requirements in
the Mortgage securing the same not be complied with, then the whole principal sum and
accrued interest shall at the option of the legal holder thereof become at once due and payable
without notice, and collectible by foreclosure.
13 Grounds for acceleration exist because at the time of death, WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR. was
the sole owner of the property by virtue of a deed recorded May 22, 2018 in Book 0720 at
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Page 421, in the Charleston County Registry. The subject property is not the principal
residence of any surviving borrower.
14 In and by the terms of the said Note it is further provided that the maker thereof shall pay all
collection costs including reasonable attorneys' fees if the said Note be placed in the hands of
an attorney for collection after default.
15 The Plaintiff, as holder of the said Note and Mortgage, has and does hereby elect to declare
the entire balance of said principal and interest due and payable at once; that there is now due
and owing and unpaid upon the said Note and Mortgage the full and just principal sum of
$122,886.73, together with interest at a variable rate of interest per annum, together with
other advances, together with reasonable attorneys' fees for the collection thereof and the
costs of this action. Plaintiff may be forced to pay sums for taxes, insurance and costs for
securing the property, which sums, according to the terms of the Mortgage, should be added
to the amount of the debt.
16. In connection with the execution of Plaintiff's Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (aka
Reverse Mortgage), the Borrower(s)/Mortgagor(s) executed a Second Note and Second
Mortgage payable to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The Second
Mortgage was recorded on May 22, 2018 in Book 0720 at Page 427. The Second Note and
Second Mortgage are designed to secure payments made by the Secretary on behalf
of the
Borrower(s). In the event of a completed foreclosure by the First Note and First Mortgage,
the Second Mortgage shall be released and/or satisfied of record collectible by foreclosure.
17 Upon information and belief, said information having been obtained from the records of
Charleston County, South Carolina, the Defendant(s) below named has/have or may claim to
have some interest in or lien upon the Property by virtue of the matters and things herein
below alleged, to-wit:
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A. The Defendants, PATRICIA RAMSET, WILLIAM A. KELLY, JR., ANGELA M.
KELLY A/K/A ANGELA SCHLECHTA and TIMOTHY S. KELLY, have or may claim
to have some interest in the Property by virtue of being HEIRS. Any interest that this
Defendant would have received in the subject property would have been "subject to"
Plaintiff's Mortgage and this interest would be eliminated through a properly completed
foreclosure sale.
The Defendant, ANY HEIRS-AT-LAW OR DEVISEES OF WILLIAM A. KELLY, SR.,
DECEASED, THEIR HEIRS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES,
ADMINISTRATORS, SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
OR ENTITIES ENTITLED TO CLAIM THROUGH THEM; ALL UNKNOWN
PERSONS OR ENTITIES WITH ANY RIGHT, TITLE, ESTATE, INTEREST IN OR.
LIEN UPON THE REAL ESTATE DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT HEREIN;
ALSO ANY PERSONS WHO MAY BE IN THE MILITARY SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BEING A CLASS DESIGNATED AS JOHN DOE;
AND ANY UNKNOWN MINORS, INCOMPETENT OR IMPRISONED PERSON, OR
PERSONS UNDER A DISABILITY BEING A CLASS DESIGNATED AS RICHARD
ROE, has or may claim to have some interest in the Property by virtue of being an
UNKNOWN HEIR. Any interest that this Defendant has in the Property would be
"subject to" Plaintiffs Mortgage and this interest would be eliminated through a properly
completed foreclosure sale.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff
prays judgment that:
A The amount due upon the said Note and Mortgage held by the Plaintiff be ascertained and
determined under the direction of this Court, together with attorney's fees and costs of this action.
B Appoint a Receiver to collect the rents, issue, profits or designated sums from the
mortgagor(s), and/or the grantee(s) of the mortgagor(s), and/or tenant(s) occupying or exercising
control over the mortgaged premises and hold the same subject to the further order of this Court.
Cc Plaintiffs Mortgage be declared a valid first lien and that Plaintiff have judgment of
foreclosure for the amount so found to be due and owing thereon, together with any taxes or
insurance premiums which may be due or which may be or have been paid by Plaintiff, together
with attorney's fees and for the costs ofthis action.
D. The Property be sold according to law and the practice of this Court, the equity of
redemption be barred and that the proceeds of sale be applied as follows:
. First, to the costs and expenses of the within action and said sale;
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Second, to the payment and discharge of the amount due on Plaintiff's note and
Mortgage, together with attorney's fees as aforesaid; and
Third, the surplus, if any, be distributed according to law.
For such other and further reliefas may be just and proper.
FURTHER, in the event the successful bidder (at the time of this foreclosure sale) is other than
the Defendant(s) in possession herein, the Sheriff of Charleston County will be ordered and
directed to eject and remove from the premises the occupants of the property sold, together with
all personal property located therein, and put the successful bidder or his assigns in full, quiet
and peaceable possession of said Property without delay, and to keep the successful bidder or
his assigns in such peaceable possession.
ROBERTSON, ANSCHUTZ, SCHNEID, CRANE
& PARTNERS, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
651 Brookfield Parkway, Suite 103
Greenville, SC 29607
Telephone: (470) 321-7112
Facsimile: (404) 393-1425
By: _/S/Mary Powers_
Genevieve Johnson, Esquire (S.C. Bar 78480)
Michael Nourie, Esquire (S.C. Bar 104717)
Elizabeth Brown, Esquire (S.C. Bar 68519)
Mary R. Powers, Esquire (S.C. Bar 16534)
Communication Email: giohnson@raslg.com
mnourie@, slg.com
elibrown@raslg.cor
mpowers@raslg.com
4 day of June, 2024
24-197823
Related Content
in Charleston County
Ruling
DEESON PAN VS XUESONG GUAN
Jul 15, 2024 |
23AHCV01728
Case Number:
23AHCV01728
Hearing Date:
July 15, 2024
Dept:
P
[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT XUENSONG GUANS
MOTION TO DEEM REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION ADMITTED AND AWARDING SANCTIONS OF $1,500
I.
INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 2023, Plaintiff DEESON PAN (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against XUENSONG GUAN (Defendant) alleging five causes of action for: 1) breach of contract, 2) constructive fraud, 3) negligent misrepresentation of facts, 4) unfair business practice violations, 5) unfair competition related to Plaintiffs ownership in real property, located at 1420 S. Del Mar Ave, unit #6 San Gabriel, California 91776.
On January 23, 2024, Defendant served Plaintiff by U.S. mail with Requests for Admission, with a deadline to respond by February 22, 2024. Plaintiff failed to respond. (Declaration of James L. Andion, ¶ 3, Exh. A.)
On April 29, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion asking the Court to deem the RFAs admitted. To date, Plaintiff has not served responses to the RFA request. (Andion Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant also requests $1,500 in sanctions.
Defendant has not filed any opposition to the pending motion.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Requests for
Admission
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (Code Civ. Proc.), section 2033.280(b), a party may move for an order
that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well
as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with section 2023.010). The court shall grant the motion to
deem requests for admission admitted unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been
directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in
substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c).)
B.
Mandatory Sanctions Deem RFAs Admitted
Sanctions are mandatory on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to request for admission necessitated this motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c).)
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Request to be Deemed Admitted is Granted
Defendant filed the pending motion requesting the Court order the truth of any matters specified in the RFAs
be deemed admitted.
On January 23, 2024, Defendant served Plaintiff with copies of the RFAs. As discussed above, the
time for Plaintiff to serve timely responses expired on February 23, 2023, and Plaintiff failed to serve responses as of the
date Defendant filed the instant motion on April 29, 2024. (Andion Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.)
Accordingly, the Court grants the
Defendants motion to deem the RFAs admitted
. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)
B.
The Requests for Monetary Sanctions is Granted
Sanctions are mandatory in connection with motions to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for
production of documents against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to
compel. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290(c), 2031.300(c).) However, sanctions are not mandatory if the court finds that
the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the
sanction unjust. (
Id
.)
Furthermore, regardless of the reason for the delay in responding, monetary sanctions are mandatory against a
party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response necessitated the filing of the deemed-admitted motion.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(c).)
Defendants counsel, a California and Florida-licensed attorney, moves the Court to impose monetary sanctions
against Plaintiff in the total amount of $1,500.00 based his hourly billing rate of $350 being applied to: (1) three hours to
prepare the motion, (2) one and a half hours to prepare for the hearing, travel to the hearing, and attend the hearing, and
(3) parking and the $60 filing fee. (Andion Decl., ¶ 7.)
Defendant is entitled to monetary sanctions for reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection with the
motions. Plaintiff failed to serve timely responses, necessitating the filing of the motions, and Plaintiff has still not served
responses. In addition, given the non-opposition by Plaintiff, there is no evidence suggesting that Defendant acted without
substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanctions unjust. Utilizing a
lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances including Plaintiffs lack of opposition, the Court finds
the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the
pending motion is $1,500.
The Court grants Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced total amount of
$1,500.
II.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
The Court GRANTS Defendants Request to Deem Admitted by Plaintiff the truth of any matters specified in the Requests for Admissions (Set One).
The Court GRANTS Defendants Request for Monetary Sanctions
against Plaintiff in the amount of $1,500, which Plaintiff is to pay within thirty days of this order.
Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.
DATED: July 15, 2024
JARED D. MOSES
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Ruling
FRANKLIN vs BANK OF AMERICA, N.,A.
Jul 16, 2024 |
CVRI2402331
DEMURRER ON COMPLAINT FOR
FRANKLIN VS BANK OF OTHER REAL PROPERTY (OVER
CVRI2402331
AMERICA, N.,A. $35,000) OF JAMILA M. FRANKLIN BY
BANK OF AMERICA, N.,A.
Tentative Ruling: Hearing continued to 7/30/24.
Ruling
KEVIN MODA VS JM HOLDINGS LLC, ET AL.
Jul 16, 2024 |
23VECV05240
Case Number:
23VECV05240
Hearing Date:
July 16, 2024
Dept:
107
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
NORTHWEST DISTRICT
Kevin Moda,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JM Holdings LLC, et al.
Defendants.
Case Number Department
23VECV05240
107
COURTS
[TENTATIVE]
RULING RE:
(1) Demurrer
(2) Motion to Strike
[THE FOLLOWING IS A TENTATIVE RULING IN THE ABOVE CASE]:
Defendants
JM Holdings LLC and Joseph Mersi demur to the sixth cause of action for battery in and move to strike punitive damages from the complaint brought by Plaintiff Kevin Moda. This court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend and denies the motion to strike.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kevin Moda (Plaintiff) has been a residential tenant of defendants JM Holdings LLC (JM Holdings) and Joseph Mersi (Mersi and, together with JM Holdings, Defendants) since August 2017. (Complaint p. 3, 8.) Plaintiff alleges that during his tenancy, Defendants failed to correct the uninhabitable conditions at Plaintiffs rented apartment.
On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint (the Complaint) alleging causes of action for (1) Breach of the warranty of habitability (Civil Code § 1941.1), (2) breach of the warranty of habitability (Health & Safety Code § 17920.3), (3) breach of the warranty of habitability (Civil Code § 1942.4), (4) negligencepremises liability, (5) nuisance, (6) battery, (7) intentional infliction of emotional stress, (8) breach of contract, (9) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (10) unfair business practices (Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.).
On June 3, 2024, Defendants filed a demurrer (the Demurrer) and a motion to strike (the Motion). On July 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed oppositions (the Oppositions) to the Demurrer and the Motion, to which Defendants replied on July 8, 2024.
II. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A.
Timeliness of Filings
Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.40, subdivision (a), a demurrer to a complaint should be filed within 30 days after service of the complaint. Similarly, per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿435, subdivision (b)(1), a motion to strike should be filed within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, which is 30 days. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿412.20, subd. (a)(3).)
If the parties are not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, on or before the date on which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under penalty of perjury that a good faith attempt to meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not meet and confer. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §¿430.41(a)(2).)
¿
Per California Code of Civil Procedure §¿1005, subdivision (b), moving papers should be filed at least 16 court days before they are set for hearing, oppositions thereto should be filed at least nine court days before the set hearing, and replies to any oppositions should be filed at least five court days before the set hearing.
Judges have discretion as to whether to consider or strike an untimely demurrer or pleading. (
McAllister v. County of Monterey
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 281;
Tuck v. Thuesen
(1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 193, 196, disapproved on other grounds by
Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand
(1971) 6 Cal.3d 176.)¿¿¿¿
Plaintiff filed proofs of service indicating that Defendants were each personally served on April 8, 2024. On May 3, 2024, Defendants filed
a declaration stating that parties had not been able to meet and confer and seeking an automatic 30-day extension of time within which to file a demurrer or motion to strike.
We are satisfied that all filings made in connection with the Demurrer and the Motion are timely.
B.
The Meet and Confer Requirement
California Code of Civil Procedure §¿430.41, subdivision (a) and §¿435.5, subdivision (a) requires parties to meet and confer in good faith before the filing of a demurrer or a motion to strike, respectively, to attempt to informally resolve the objections raised in the demurrer or the motion to strike. Each section requires that such meet and confer be done in person or by telephone. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§¿430.1, subd. (a), 435.5, subd. (a).)¿¿¿¿¿
Defendants submit with the Demurrer and the Motion a declaration by their counsel stating that she met and conferred with Plaintiffs counsel before the filing of the Demurrer and the Motion but that they were unable to resolve the issues therein. (Mintesnot Decl. ¶ 2.) We are therefore satisfied that this requirement has been met.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
The Demurrer
Defendants demur to the sixth cause of action for battery on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute the cause of action. (Notice of Demurrer p. 2.) They argue that the Complaint offers no facts reflecting any intent on the part of Defendants required to maintain a battery cause of action.
The
e
lements of civil battery are: (1) defendant intentionally performed an act that resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3)the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to plaintiff. (
Brown v. Ransweiler
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 52627.) That defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff is one of the essential elements of a cause of action for battery. (
So v. Shin
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.) Battery is an intentional tort and [i]n the perpetration of [battery] negligence is not involved. (
Bartosh v. Banning
(1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 378, 385.)
Plaintiff rebuts that he pleads throughout the Complaint that Defendants acted intentionally in failing to remedy the bedbug infestation in his apartment. (Opposition p. 8.)
While Plaintiff does plead that Defendants acted intentionally in failing to remedy the alleged bedbug infestation, this is a step removed from the harm that Plaintiff suffered, that being offensive and harmful contact from the bedbugs. Following
So v. Shin
,
supra
, 212 Cal.App.4th 652 at 669, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants intended the harm or offensive contact with Plaintiff to occur, not just the act that caused such harm or offensive contact. As Defendants observe, the conduct that Plaintiff alleges could arise to mere negligence rather than intentionality, which is insufficient to support a cause of action for battery.
Accordingly, this court SUSTAINS the Demurrer.
B.
The Motion to Strike
Defendants move to strike punitive damages and all allegations supporting punitive damages from the Complaint. (Motion p. 4.)
A motion to strike is appropriate to attack a claim for punitive damages. (
Grieves v. Superior Court
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.¿In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. (
Clausen v. Superior Court
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 (internal citations omitted).) Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants' conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of¿punitive¿damages. (
Monge v. Superior Court
(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510.)¿¿¿
¿¿¿
In order to state a prima facie claim for¿punitive¿damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general¿punitive¿damage¿statute,¿Civil Code section 3294. (
Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc.
(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages
[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice&.
¿ (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) In order to justify an award of punitive¿damages, the defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. He must act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights. (
Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co.
(1974) 11 Cal.3d 452, 462 (internal citations omitted).) A claim for exemplary damage may be supported by pleading that the wrong was committed willfully or with a design to injure. (
Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055.)
[M]alice in fact is required rather than implied malice.¿However, malice does not require actual intent to harm.¿Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. (
Angie M. v. Superior Court
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 (internal citations omitted).) In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his¿conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (
Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 89596.)¿¿¿¿
¿¿¿
Punitive¿damages¿may not be¿pleaded¿generally. (
Todays IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.) The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of¿punitive¿damages. (
Grieves v. Superior Court
,
supra
, 157 Cal.App.3d 159 at 166.) And, conclusory characterization of defendant's conduct as intentional, wilful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, within the meaning of¿section 3294. (
Brousseau v. Jarrett
(1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. (
Grieves
,
supra
, at 166;
Todays IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
,
supra
, at 1193 [In addition to the requirement that the operative complaint set forth the elements as stated in¿section 3294, it must include¿specific¿factual allegations showing that defendant's conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious to support a claim for¿punitive¿damages.].)¿
[P]unitive¿damages¿may be awarded in an action by a¿residential¿tenant¿based on the landlord's interference with peaceful possession. Punitive¿damages¿likewise are recoverable for& the infliction of emotional distress. (
Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments
,
supra
, 171 Cal.App.4th 1004 at 1055, internal citations omitted.) In
Stoiber v. Honeychuck
(1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920, a residential tenant pleaded sufficient facts to support her prayer for exemplary damages when her complaint both alleged that defendant had actual knowledge of defective conditions in the premises including leaking sewage, deteriorated flooring, falling ceiling, leaking roof, broken windows, and other unsafe and dangerous conditions and alleged that defendants In maintaining said nuisance,& acted with full knowledge of the consequences thereof and the damage being caused to plaintiff, and their conduct was willful, oppressive and malicious.¿
Defendants argue that the Complaint ha[s] made broad allegations and blanket characterizations of Defendant[s] conduct without explaining how such conduct arises to the requisite level of culpability to impose punitive damages. (Motion p. 7.) Defendants contend that the Complaint contains mere conclusions of law rather than the ultimate facts. (
Ibid
.)
However, the Complaint alleges that (1) there was a bedbug infestation in the apartment Plaintiff rented from Defendants (Complaint p. 13), (2) Plaintiff notified Defendants of the infestation incessantly (
id
. at pp. 1314), (3) Defendants, who are experienced landlords, failed to remedy the infestation despite this notice (
id
. at p. 14), and (4) Defendants conduct in doing so was intentional, malicious, willful and reckless (
ibid
.). Following
Stoiber v. Honeychuck
,
supra
, 101 Cal.App.3d 903 at 920, these constitute sufficient facts to support Plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages.
Accordingly, this court DENIES the Motion.
C.
Leave to Amend
Where the defect raised by a¿motion¿to¿strike¿or by demurrer is reasonably capable of cure, leave¿to¿amend¿is routinely and¿liberally¿granted to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect in question. (
CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146.) [An order granting a motion to strike] is analogous to an order sustaining a demurrer. (
Vaccaro v. Kaiman
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) If the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to amend the complaint in response to the demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment. (
City of Stockton v. Superior Court
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Courts generally allow at least one time to amend a complaint, after sustaining a demurrer, even without any request for leave to amend. (
McDonald v. Superior Court
(1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 297, 303.)¿¿
¿
¿
We note that this is the first time the Complaint has been subject to a motion to strike or demurrer and believe that the defects in the Complaint that are struck are reasonably capable of cure.¿
¿
Accordingly, this court GRANTS leave to amend.¿
Dated: July 16, 2024 __________________________________ Hon. Eric Harmon
Judge of the Superior Court
Ruling
Wilkinson vs. Wilkinson, et al.
Jul 19, 2024 |
23CV-0202523
WILKINSON VS. WILKINSON, ET AL.
Case Number: 23CV-0202523
This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The matter is at issue. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II
case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. The parties are ordered to meet and
confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for a court trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s
calendar.
Ruling
Wilkinson vs. Wilkinson, et al.
Jul 16, 2024 |
23CV-0202523
WILKINSON VS. WILKINSON, ET AL.
Case Number: 23CV-0202523
This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The matter is at issue. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II
case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than December 16, 2024. The parties are ordered to meet and
confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for a court trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s
calendar.
Ruling
Eckelman, et al. vs. OLCO, Inc
Jul 17, 2024 |
23CV-0202690
ECKELMAN, ET AL. VS. OLCO, INC
Case Number: 23CV-0202690
This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case and trial setting. The Court designates this
matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than January 22, 2025. The parties are
ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary
on today’s calendar.
Ruling
FREDA A. LEEPER VS. PORTIA L. OSBORNE ET AL
Jul 17, 2024 |
CGC24611388
Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 17, 2024 line 5. DEFENDANT JONATHAN POWELL , AN INDIVIDUAL Notice Of Joinder And Joinder In Defendant Portia L. Osbornes Notice Of Motion And Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiff'S First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.
Ruling
WAGNER VS. LLOYD
Jul 19, 2024 |
CVCV21-0198602
WAGNER VS. LLOYD
Case Number: CVCV21-0198602
This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of counsel. At the last hearing on May 20, 2024, both
parties represented that they were trying to obtain counsel. There was also a question of whether Plaintiff was
acting in her capacity as a Trustee. An appearance by both parties is required on today’s calendar. Plaintiff
should be prepared to address whether the property is held by a trust or as individuals.