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Filing # 193953982 E-Filed 03/13/2024 03:32:22 PM 24000022AP
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA
HENDERSON FRANKLIN
STARNES & HOLT, P.A., and
WILLIAM BOLTREK, III,
Non-Parties/ Appellants,
CASE NO. 16-001754-CA
WILLIAM H. SCHMITZ
and JANICE K. SCHMITZ,
as Husband and Wife, NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiffs/ Appellees,
ALEXMAR PIMIENTA GARRIDO,
JLL LOGISTIC INC.,
and ROBERTO LI,
Defendants/ Appellees.
NOTICE IS GIVEN that HENDERSON FRANKLIN STARNES &
HOLT, P.A., and WILLIAM BOLTREK, III, Non-Parties/Appellant,
appeals to the Sixth District Court of Appeal, the order of this court
rendered February 23, 2024 (the “Order”), pursuant to Fla. R. App.
gpis Certified to be a true and correct
copy of the original documient
of file
in my office,
Witness my Hand and official seal this
AY Gay of Marche 20 2
ROGER D. EATON,
Clerk of the Circuit
Court
by Le deputy ie
P. 9.110(a)(1). The nature of the order is a final order! denying the
Non-Parties’/Appellants’ motion to intervene (the “Motion”) to vacate
a void order appointing a Receiver for Defendant/Appellee, JLL
LOGISTIC INC.? The Motion was opposed by the Receiver, Gerard A.
McHale, in his ostensible capacity as Receiver for JLL LOGISTIC INC.
and Plaintiffs/Appellees, WILLIAM H. SCHMITZ and JANICE kK.
SCHMITZ. Defendants/Appellees, ALEXMAR PIMIENTA GARRIDO,
and ROBERTO LI have been dismissed from this matter.
A conformed copy of the Order is attached hereto as
Attachment A.
1 Litvak v. Scylla Properties, LLC, 946 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. lst DCA
2006) (“An order denying a motion to intervene is final as to and
appealable by the movant.”) (citing City of Sunrise v. Town of Davie,
472 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. 1985) (treating order denying motion to
intervene as a final order); P.C. v. Dep't of Children And Family
Services, 963 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); UR. v. R.M., 679
So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Superior Fence & Rail of N. Florida
v. Lucas, 35 So. 3d 104, 105 (Fla. Sth DCA 2010).
2 Alternatively, this appeal is made pursuant to Fla. R. App. P.
9.110(a)(3)(D).
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served via electronic mail pursuant to Florida Rule of
Judicial Administration 2.516 using Florida Court’s E-Filing Portal
to all counsel on: March 13, 2024.
By: __/s/ Bande Ber
Kenneth R. Drake, Esq.
Florida Bar Number: 375111
E-Mail: kdrake@cmlawfirm.com
Brandt Roen, Esq.
Florida Bar Number: 1033416
E-mail: broen@cmlawfirm.com
CRUSER, MITCHELL, NOVITZ, SANCHEZ,
GASTON & ZIMET LLP
Attorneys for Non-Parties/ Appellants,
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A.
and William Boltrek, III
Douglas Entrance
806 Douglas Road, 12* Floor
Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Telephone: (305) 488-4950
SERVICE LIST
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellee Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellee
[Angela E. Rodante, Esq. Reba Abraham Pearce, Esq.
Dale Swope Esq. St. Augustine Law Group, P.A.
Brent Steinberg, Esq. 2740 U.S. Highway 1 South
[Natalie Shoemaker, Esq. St. Augustine, FL 332086
Swope, Rodante P.A. E-Mails:
1234 E. 5th Avenue eba@staugustinelawgroup.com;
(Tampa, FL 33605 info@staugustinelawgroup.com).
Tel: (813) 273-0017
Fax: (813) 223-3678
E-mail:
Iteam2eservice@swopelaw.com;
leservice@swopelaw.com;
lteam3eservice@swopelaw.com
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellee
Scot Goldberg, Esq.
[Michelle Keezel, Esq.
Goldberg, Noone, Abraham, LLC
1533 Hendry Street
Suite 200
[Fort Meyers, Florida, 33901
E-Mails:
scotgoldberg@goldberg-law.com;
imichellekeezel@goldberg-
law.com.
ATTACHMENT
A
Filing # 191810470 E-Filed 02/13/2024 08:22:35 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA
WILLIAM H. SCHMITZ and
JANICE K. SCHMITZ,
as Husband and Wife,
CASE NO.: 16001754CA
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALEXMAR PIMIENTA GARRIDO,
JLL LOGISTIC INC., and ROBERTO LI,
Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING NON-PARTIES’ MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MOTION
TO VACATE VOID ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER FOR JLL, LOGISTIC INC.
Before this Court is the Motion to Intervene and Motion to Vacate Void Order Appointing Receiver
for JLL, Logistic Inc. (“Motion”), filed by HENDERSON, FRANKLIN, STARNES & HOLT, P.A. and
WILLIAM BOLTREK, III (collectively “Non-Parties”) on November 9, 2023. A hearing on the Motion
was held December
21, 2023. This Court has considered the parties’ filings and the arguments of counsel.
Being fully advised in the premises, this Court finds as follows:
FACTS PRESENTED
On January 29, 2018, Plaintiffs obtained a consent judgment against the defendant, JLL Logistic,
Inc. (“JILL Logistic”) for $3,750,000, plus interest. See DE. 72 (“Final Judgment”). After obtaining the
consent judgment, Plaintiffs made multiple attempts to obtain post-judgment discovery from JLL Logistic.
See D.E. 81, paras. 4-7 (“Amended Motion to Appoint Receiver”). The company was, however, defunct,
and Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain the post-judgment discovery were unsuccessful. See id. at paras. 8-9.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed motions on October 4, 2019 and October 10, 2019 to appoint Gerard
McHale as receiver for JLL Logistic, pursuant to section 56.10, Florida Statutes. See D.E. 80 & 81.
Plaintiffs provided notice to Non-Parties and JLL Logistic that they were seeking appointment of a receiver.
See D.E. 80 & DE. 81, Certificates of Service. Neither JLL Logistic nor Non-Parties objected to Plaintiffs’
motions seeking appointment of a receiver. Further, no hearing was set conceming Plaintiffs’ request.
Subsequently, on October 28, 2019, this Court entered an order appointing Mr. McHale as receiver for JLL
Logistic, pursuant to section 56.10, Florida Statutes. See D-E. 82. The Order Appointing Receiver was
emailed to both Mr. Boltrck at William Boltrek@henlaw.com and sent via U.S. Mail to JLL Logistic’s
physical address. See D.E. 82.
On January 23, 2020, Mr. McHale, in his capacity as receiver for JLL Logistic, filed a separate
insurance bad faith claim against JLL Logistic’s insurance carrier, KnightBrook Insurance Company, and
a legal malpractice action against Non-Parties. See Charlotte County Circuit Court Case Number 20-
000066-CA. More than three years later, on November 9, 2023, Non-Parties filed the instant Motion,
secking both to intervene in this action and for this Court to vacate its October 28, 2019 Order appointing
Mr. McHale as receiver for JLL Logistic. See D.E. 83. Non-Parties’ filed the Motion for the purpose of
undermining their former client, JLL Logistic’s, separate suit against them for malpractice. See D.E. 83,
pp. 12-13.
ISSUES
Non-Parties’ Motion involves primarily two issues. The first is whether Non-Parties are entitled to
intervene in this litigation pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230. The second is whether this
Court must vacate its Order Appointing Receiver because no hearing was held prior to entry of that order.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
For the reasons discussed further below, this Court finds that Non-Parties are not entitled to
intervene in this litigation, nor are they entitled to an Order vacating the Order Appointing Receiver.
L Non-Parties are not Entitled to Intervene in this Action
Non-Parties are not parties to this action. Accordingly, the threshold issue for this Court’s
consideration is whether Non-Parties may intervene in this litigation. The standard applicable to the
intervention of a non-party is found in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230. In relevant part, this Rule
provides that “[aJnyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert a
right by intervention ....” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.230. In interpreting this standard, the Supreme Court of
Florida has held:
[T]he interest which will entitle a person to intervene . . . must be in the
matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the
intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment. In other words, the interest mustbe that created by a claim
to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the
property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.’
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla.1992) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 78
So. 14, 15 (1918))(emphasis added). Further, while intervention may be granted post-judgment when the
ends of justice require it, the Courts consider such intervention both “extraordinary and disfavored.” See
Ezem v. Fed. Nat. Mortg., 153 So. 3d 341, 344 (Fla.lst DCA 2014).
Non-Parties argue that they are entitled to intervene, because they have an interest in not being sued
“by an illegitimate Receiver” and that vacating the order appointing the Receiver would directly and
immediately affect their interest. See D.E. 83, p. 12. Specifically, they argue that “[u]pong vacating the
void order, the Receiver will lose standing to maintain the legal malpractice action against the Attorney-
Defendants and the malpractice case will necessarily be dismissed.” See D.E. 83, pp. 12-13.
Non-Parties’ argument is without merit. Specifically, the matter litigated in this action was the
Court’s appointment of a receiver. Here, the Court’s entry of the Order Appointing a Receiver in October
28, 2019 did not automatically: trigger the imposition of liability on Non-Parties in this or the separate
malpractice action. See Kissoon v. Araujo, 849 So. 2d 426, 429 (Fla. Ist DCA 2003)(denying intervention
where “[a] judgment in favor of defendants will not automatically trigger an investigation, nor can it impose
liability on Dr. Kissoon.”); see also Harbor Specialty Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 932 So. 2d 383, 387-88 (Fla.
2d DCA 2006)(denying intervention where, “[a]lthough a bad faith action could be initiated by Schwartz
on behalf of English as a result of the final judgment, the final judgment will not automatically result in
such an action being filed.”). Accordingly, Non-Parties lacked the kind of “direct” and “immediate” interest
“in the matter in litigation” required for intervention. For this reason, Non-Parties’ request to intervene is
denied.
I. Non-Parties are not Entitled to have the Order Appointing Receiver Vacated
Non-Parties’ Motion contends that this Court’s Order Appointing Receiver is void because
Plaintiffs neither set their motion for appointment of a receiver for hearing nor provided notice of any such
hearing. See DE. 83, pp. 1,7. The Motion argues that, because the order is void, this Court must vacate it
pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. See D.E. 83, pp. 1, 9.
Non-Parties’ argument is without merit. As discussed further below, this Court’s Order Appointing
Receiver is not void. Moreover, Non-Parties’ Motion is untimely under the express terms of Rule 1.540.
A. The Order Appointing Receiver is not Void
In State ex rel. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153 Fla. 599, 602 (1943), the Supreme
Court of Florida articulated the legal standard for determining when an order is void. Specifically, in
Burnside, the Supreme Court of Florida explains:
It is settled law that where it appears that a court is legally organized and
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the adverse parties are given an
opportunity to be heard as required by law, errors or irregularities, or even
wrong doing in the proceedings, short of an illegal deprivation of an
opportunity to be heard, will not render the judgment void.
See Burnside, 153 Fla. 599 at 602 (emphasis added). In other words, whether an order is “void” depends
on whether (a) this Court is legally organized, (b) whether this Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter,
(c) whether the adverse parties were given an opportunity to be heard as required by law, and (d) whether
there has been an illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard.
Here, it is undisputed that the Court is legally organized and the Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Accordingly, the only issues are whether adverse parties were given an opportunity to be
heard as required by law and/or whether there has been an illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard.
In this case, neither the applicable statute nor the rules of procedure required a hearing prior to
entry of the Order Appointing Receiver. First, Plaintiffs’ motions for appointment of a receiver were made
pursuant to section 56.10, Florida Statutes. Nothing in Section 56.10 requires a hearing for the appointment
of a receiver. See Fla. Stat. 56.10. Second, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.620(a) concems applications
for the appointment of a receiver. See Fla. R. Civ, P. 1.620(a). However, the plain language of Rule
1.620(a) only speaks to when notice is required. It does specify nor incorporate by reference requirements
for when a hearing is required. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.620(a)(“The provisions of rule 1.610 as to notice shall
apply to applications for the appointment of receivers.”).
Finally, there has been no illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard which would render
void the Order Appointing Receiver. Constitutional due process only requires the provision of notice and
a meaningful opportunity to be heard, where a parties’ life, liberty, and property are at stake. See Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)(“Whether any procedural protections are due depends on “whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. .. nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Fla. Const. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”).
Further, constitutional rights, including the right to due process, are personal and may be waived.
See Epstein v. Bank of Am., 162 So. 3d 159, 162 (Fla, 4th DCA 2015)(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
US. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)); see also Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641, 648
(1898)(“A person may, by his acts or omission to act, waive a right which he might otherwise have under
the constitution of the United States... .”). Constitutional due process rights may not be asserted
vicariously by another party to render an order void. See Epstein , 162 So. 3d at 162.
Here, Non-Parties, themselves, were not entitled to due process prior to entry of the Order
Appointing Receiver, because they had no life, liberty, or property interest at stake in that proceeding.
Furthermore, Non-Parties are without standing to assert JLL Logistic's constitutional due process rights to
render the subject order void.
In sum, neither the statute nor the procedural rules required a noticed hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion
to appoint a receiver. Moreover, Non-Parties had no constitutional right to due process with respect to the
appointment of a receiver and cannot assert JLL Logistic’s right to due process to render the subject order
void. Accordingly, the subject Order to Appoint Receiver is not void. Therefore, Non-Parties’ Motion is
denied.
B. Non-Parties’ Motion to Vacate Is Untimely under Rule 1.540(b)
Again, Plaintiffs moved for the appointment of Mr. McHale as receiver for JLL Logistic on October
4, 2019 and October 10, 2019. This Court entered its order granting Plaintiffs’ motion on October 28, 2019.
The court file demonstrates that Non-Parties had notice of these filings at about the time they were made.
More than four years later, Non-Parties now seek to vacate the Order Appointing Receiver, pursuant to
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, on the ground that it is “void.”
Rule 1.540(b) states: “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
a party's legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
.. (4) that the judgment, decree, or order is void ....” The Rule further provides that such motions “shall
be filed within a reasonable time ” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(underline added). As such, the plain
language of Rule 1.540(b) mandates that motions under it be “filed within a reasonable time.”
In this case, Non-Partics had notice of the filings related to the appointment of the receiver in
October of 2019. In light of that notice, Non-Parties’ decision to wait more than four years before filing its
Motion was unreasonable. Because the Court’s record demonstrates that Non-Parties did not file their
Motion within a “reasonable time,” as required by Rule 1.540, Non-Parties’ motion to vacate is also denied.
It is, therefore, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Non-Parties’ Motion to Intervene and Motion
to Vacate Void Order Appointing Receiver for JLL, Logistic Inc., filed November 9, 2023 is DENIED.
Done and Ordered.
on 62/13/2024 a
Electronic Service List
Angela E Rodante , ,
Natalie Isabella Shoemaker ,
,
Brent G Steinberg ,
Brandt Roen ,
Reba Abraham Pearce
Angela Rodante
Scot D Goldberg ,
John W. Weihmuller , ,
James M Shaw Jr. , ,
Curtright C. Truitt
Elizete D Velado
Kenneth R Drake ,
Michael M. Noone ,
Natalie Isabella Shoemaker , ,
Richard Lee Brooks II ,
John W. Weihmuller
Julia Newton
Steven A Ramunni , ,
KENNETH RUSSELL DRAKE
KENNETH RUSSELL DRAKE
Preview
Filing # 193953982 E-Filed 03/13/2024 03:32:22 PM 24000022AP IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA HENDERSON FRANKLIN STARNES & HOLT, P.A., and WILLIAM BOLTREK, III, Non-Parties/ Appellants, CASE NO. 16-001754-CA WILLIAM H. SCHMITZ and JANICE K. SCHMITZ, as Husband and Wife, NOTICE OF APPEAL Plaintiffs/ Appellees, ALEXMAR PIMIENTA GARRIDO, JLL LOGISTIC INC., and ROBERTO LI, Defendants/ Appellees. NOTICE IS GIVEN that HENDERSON FRANKLIN STARNES & HOLT, P.A., and WILLIAM BOLTREK, III, Non-Parties/Appellant, appeals to the Sixth District Court of Appeal, the order of this court rendered February 23, 2024 (the “Order”), pursuant to Fla. R. App. gpis Certified to be a true and correct copy of the original documient of file in my office, Witness my Hand and official seal this AY Gay of Marche 20 2 ROGER D. EATON, Clerk of the Circuit Court by Le deputy ie P. 9.110(a)(1). The nature of the order is a final order! denying the Non-Parties’/Appellants’ motion to intervene (the “Motion”) to vacate a void order appointing a Receiver for Defendant/Appellee, JLL LOGISTIC INC.? The Motion was opposed by the Receiver, Gerard A. McHale, in his ostensible capacity as Receiver for JLL LOGISTIC INC. and Plaintiffs/Appellees, WILLIAM H. SCHMITZ and JANICE kK. SCHMITZ. Defendants/Appellees, ALEXMAR PIMIENTA GARRIDO, and ROBERTO LI have been dismissed from this matter. A conformed copy of the Order is attached hereto as Attachment A. 1 Litvak v. Scylla Properties, LLC, 946 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. lst DCA 2006) (“An order denying a motion to intervene is final as to and appealable by the movant.”) (citing City of Sunrise v. Town of Davie, 472 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. 1985) (treating order denying motion to intervene as a final order); P.C. v. Dep't of Children And Family Services, 963 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); UR. v. R.M., 679 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Superior Fence & Rail of N. Florida v. Lucas, 35 So. 3d 104, 105 (Fla. Sth DCA 2010). 2 Alternatively, this appeal is made pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(a)(3)(D). CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via electronic mail pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516 using Florida Court’s E-Filing Portal to all counsel on: March 13, 2024. By: __/s/ Bande Ber Kenneth R. Drake, Esq. Florida Bar Number: 375111 E-Mail: kdrake@cmlawfirm.com Brandt Roen, Esq. Florida Bar Number: 1033416 E-mail: broen@cmlawfirm.com CRUSER, MITCHELL, NOVITZ, SANCHEZ, GASTON & ZIMET LLP Attorneys for Non-Parties/ Appellants, Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A. and William Boltrek, III Douglas Entrance 806 Douglas Road, 12* Floor Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Telephone: (305) 488-4950 SERVICE LIST Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellee Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellee [Angela E. Rodante, Esq. Reba Abraham Pearce, Esq. Dale Swope Esq. St. Augustine Law Group, P.A. Brent Steinberg, Esq. 2740 U.S. Highway 1 South [Natalie Shoemaker, Esq. St. Augustine, FL 332086 Swope, Rodante P.A. E-Mails: 1234 E. 5th Avenue eba@staugustinelawgroup.com; (Tampa, FL 33605 info@staugustinelawgroup.com). Tel: (813) 273-0017 Fax: (813) 223-3678 E-mail: Iteam2eservice@swopelaw.com; leservice@swopelaw.com; lteam3eservice@swopelaw.com Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellee Scot Goldberg, Esq. [Michelle Keezel, Esq. Goldberg, Noone, Abraham, LLC 1533 Hendry Street Suite 200 [Fort Meyers, Florida, 33901 E-Mails: scotgoldberg@goldberg-law.com; imichellekeezel@goldberg- law.com. ATTACHMENT A Filing # 191810470 E-Filed 02/13/2024 08:22:35 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA WILLIAM H. SCHMITZ and JANICE K. SCHMITZ, as Husband and Wife, CASE NO.: 16001754CA Plaintiffs, v. ALEXMAR PIMIENTA GARRIDO, JLL LOGISTIC INC., and ROBERTO LI, Defendants. / ORDER DENYING NON-PARTIES’ MOTION TO INTERVENE AND MOTION TO VACATE VOID ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER FOR JLL, LOGISTIC INC. Before this Court is the Motion to Intervene and Motion to Vacate Void Order Appointing Receiver for JLL, Logistic Inc. (“Motion”), filed by HENDERSON, FRANKLIN, STARNES & HOLT, P.A. and WILLIAM BOLTREK, III (collectively “Non-Parties”) on November 9, 2023. A hearing on the Motion was held December 21, 2023. This Court has considered the parties’ filings and the arguments of counsel. Being fully advised in the premises, this Court finds as follows: FACTS PRESENTED On January 29, 2018, Plaintiffs obtained a consent judgment against the defendant, JLL Logistic, Inc. (“JILL Logistic”) for $3,750,000, plus interest. See DE. 72 (“Final Judgment”). After obtaining the consent judgment, Plaintiffs made multiple attempts to obtain post-judgment discovery from JLL Logistic. See D.E. 81, paras. 4-7 (“Amended Motion to Appoint Receiver”). The company was, however, defunct, and Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain the post-judgment discovery were unsuccessful. See id. at paras. 8-9. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed motions on October 4, 2019 and October 10, 2019 to appoint Gerard McHale as receiver for JLL Logistic, pursuant to section 56.10, Florida Statutes. See D.E. 80 & 81. Plaintiffs provided notice to Non-Parties and JLL Logistic that they were seeking appointment of a receiver. See D.E. 80 & DE. 81, Certificates of Service. Neither JLL Logistic nor Non-Parties objected to Plaintiffs’ motions seeking appointment of a receiver. Further, no hearing was set conceming Plaintiffs’ request. Subsequently, on October 28, 2019, this Court entered an order appointing Mr. McHale as receiver for JLL Logistic, pursuant to section 56.10, Florida Statutes. See D-E. 82. The Order Appointing Receiver was emailed to both Mr. Boltrck at William Boltrek@henlaw.com and sent via U.S. Mail to JLL Logistic’s physical address. See D.E. 82. On January 23, 2020, Mr. McHale, in his capacity as receiver for JLL Logistic, filed a separate insurance bad faith claim against JLL Logistic’s insurance carrier, KnightBrook Insurance Company, and a legal malpractice action against Non-Parties. See Charlotte County Circuit Court Case Number 20- 000066-CA. More than three years later, on November 9, 2023, Non-Parties filed the instant Motion, secking both to intervene in this action and for this Court to vacate its October 28, 2019 Order appointing Mr. McHale as receiver for JLL Logistic. See D.E. 83. Non-Parties’ filed the Motion for the purpose of undermining their former client, JLL Logistic’s, separate suit against them for malpractice. See D.E. 83, pp. 12-13. ISSUES Non-Parties’ Motion involves primarily two issues. The first is whether Non-Parties are entitled to intervene in this litigation pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230. The second is whether this Court must vacate its Order Appointing Receiver because no hearing was held prior to entry of that order. LAW AND ANALYSIS For the reasons discussed further below, this Court finds that Non-Parties are not entitled to intervene in this litigation, nor are they entitled to an Order vacating the Order Appointing Receiver. L Non-Parties are not Entitled to Intervene in this Action Non-Parties are not parties to this action. Accordingly, the threshold issue for this Court’s consideration is whether Non-Parties may intervene in this litigation. The standard applicable to the intervention of a non-party is found in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230. In relevant part, this Rule provides that “[aJnyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert a right by intervention ....” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.230. In interpreting this standard, the Supreme Court of Florida has held: [T]he interest which will entitle a person to intervene . . . must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. In other words, the interest mustbe that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.’ Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla.1992) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 78 So. 14, 15 (1918))(emphasis added). Further, while intervention may be granted post-judgment when the ends of justice require it, the Courts consider such intervention both “extraordinary and disfavored.” See Ezem v. Fed. Nat. Mortg., 153 So. 3d 341, 344 (Fla.lst DCA 2014). Non-Parties argue that they are entitled to intervene, because they have an interest in not being sued “by an illegitimate Receiver” and that vacating the order appointing the Receiver would directly and immediately affect their interest. See D.E. 83, p. 12. Specifically, they argue that “[u]pong vacating the void order, the Receiver will lose standing to maintain the legal malpractice action against the Attorney- Defendants and the malpractice case will necessarily be dismissed.” See D.E. 83, pp. 12-13. Non-Parties’ argument is without merit. Specifically, the matter litigated in this action was the Court’s appointment of a receiver. Here, the Court’s entry of the Order Appointing a Receiver in October 28, 2019 did not automatically: trigger the imposition of liability on Non-Parties in this or the separate malpractice action. See Kissoon v. Araujo, 849 So. 2d 426, 429 (Fla. Ist DCA 2003)(denying intervention where “[a] judgment in favor of defendants will not automatically trigger an investigation, nor can it impose liability on Dr. Kissoon.”); see also Harbor Specialty Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 932 So. 2d 383, 387-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)(denying intervention where, “[a]lthough a bad faith action could be initiated by Schwartz on behalf of English as a result of the final judgment, the final judgment will not automatically result in such an action being filed.”). Accordingly, Non-Parties lacked the kind of “direct” and “immediate” interest “in the matter in litigation” required for intervention. For this reason, Non-Parties’ request to intervene is denied. I. Non-Parties are not Entitled to have the Order Appointing Receiver Vacated Non-Parties’ Motion contends that this Court’s Order Appointing Receiver is void because Plaintiffs neither set their motion for appointment of a receiver for hearing nor provided notice of any such hearing. See DE. 83, pp. 1,7. The Motion argues that, because the order is void, this Court must vacate it pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540. See D.E. 83, pp. 1, 9. Non-Parties’ argument is without merit. As discussed further below, this Court’s Order Appointing Receiver is not void. Moreover, Non-Parties’ Motion is untimely under the express terms of Rule 1.540. A. The Order Appointing Receiver is not Void In State ex rel. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Burnside, 153 Fla. 599, 602 (1943), the Supreme Court of Florida articulated the legal standard for determining when an order is void. Specifically, in Burnside, the Supreme Court of Florida explains: It is settled law that where it appears that a court is legally organized and has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the adverse parties are given an opportunity to be heard as required by law, errors or irregularities, or even wrong doing in the proceedings, short of an illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard, will not render the judgment void. See Burnside, 153 Fla. 599 at 602 (emphasis added). In other words, whether an order is “void” depends on whether (a) this Court is legally organized, (b) whether this Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, (c) whether the adverse parties were given an opportunity to be heard as required by law, and (d) whether there has been an illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard. Here, it is undisputed that the Court is legally organized and the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Accordingly, the only issues are whether adverse parties were given an opportunity to be heard as required by law and/or whether there has been an illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard. In this case, neither the applicable statute nor the rules of procedure required a hearing prior to entry of the Order Appointing Receiver. First, Plaintiffs’ motions for appointment of a receiver were made pursuant to section 56.10, Florida Statutes. Nothing in Section 56.10 requires a hearing for the appointment of a receiver. See Fla. Stat. 56.10. Second, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.620(a) concems applications for the appointment of a receiver. See Fla. R. Civ, P. 1.620(a). However, the plain language of Rule 1.620(a) only speaks to when notice is required. It does specify nor incorporate by reference requirements for when a hearing is required. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.620(a)(“The provisions of rule 1.610 as to notice shall apply to applications for the appointment of receivers.”). Finally, there has been no illegal deprivation of an opportunity to be heard which would render void the Order Appointing Receiver. Constitutional due process only requires the provision of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, where a parties’ life, liberty, and property are at stake. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)(“Whether any procedural protections are due depends on “whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. .. nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Fla. Const. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”). Further, constitutional rights, including the right to due process, are personal and may be waived. See Epstein v. Bank of Am., 162 So. 3d 159, 162 (Fla, 4th DCA 2015)(quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)); see also Pierce v. Somerset Ry., 171 U.S. 641, 648 (1898)(“A person may, by his acts or omission to act, waive a right which he might otherwise have under the constitution of the United States... .”). Constitutional due process rights may not be asserted vicariously by another party to render an order void. See Epstein , 162 So. 3d at 162. Here, Non-Parties, themselves, were not entitled to due process prior to entry of the Order Appointing Receiver, because they had no life, liberty, or property interest at stake in that proceeding. Furthermore, Non-Parties are without standing to assert JLL Logistic's constitutional due process rights to render the subject order void. In sum, neither the statute nor the procedural rules required a noticed hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion to appoint a receiver. Moreover, Non-Parties had no constitutional right to due process with respect to the appointment of a receiver and cannot assert JLL Logistic’s right to due process to render the subject order void. Accordingly, the subject Order to Appoint Receiver is not void. Therefore, Non-Parties’ Motion is denied. B. Non-Parties’ Motion to Vacate Is Untimely under Rule 1.540(b) Again, Plaintiffs moved for the appointment of Mr. McHale as receiver for JLL Logistic on October 4, 2019 and October 10, 2019. This Court entered its order granting Plaintiffs’ motion on October 28, 2019. The court file demonstrates that Non-Parties had notice of these filings at about the time they were made. More than four years later, Non-Parties now seek to vacate the Order Appointing Receiver, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, on the ground that it is “void.” Rule 1.540(b) states: “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: .. (4) that the judgment, decree, or order is void ....” The Rule further provides that such motions “shall be filed within a reasonable time ” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(underline added). As such, the plain language of Rule 1.540(b) mandates that motions under it be “filed within a reasonable time.” In this case, Non-Partics had notice of the filings related to the appointment of the receiver in October of 2019. In light of that notice, Non-Parties’ decision to wait more than four years before filing its Motion was unreasonable. Because the Court’s record demonstrates that Non-Parties did not file their Motion within a “reasonable time,” as required by Rule 1.540, Non-Parties’ motion to vacate is also denied. It is, therefore, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Non-Parties’ Motion to Intervene and Motion to Vacate Void Order Appointing Receiver for JLL, Logistic Inc., filed November 9, 2023 is DENIED. Done and Ordered. on 62/13/2024 a Electronic Service List Angela E Rodante , , Natalie Isabella Shoemaker , , Brent G Steinberg , Brandt Roen , Reba Abraham Pearce Angela Rodante Scot D Goldberg , John W. Weihmuller , , James M Shaw Jr. , , Curtright C. Truitt Elizete D Velado Kenneth R Drake , Michael M. Noone , Natalie Isabella Shoemaker , , Richard Lee Brooks II , John W. Weihmuller Julia Newton Steven A Ramunni , , KENNETH RUSSELL DRAKE KENNETH RUSSELL DRAKE