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1 Jeffrey R. Loew, Esq. (SBN 216808)
LOEW LAW GROUP, APLC
2 1650 Borel Place, Suite 123
San Mateo, CA 94402 ELECTRONICALLY
3 Telephone: (650) 397-8700
Facsimile: (650) 397-8889 FILED
Superior Court of California,
4 Email: jloew@loewlawgroup.com County of San Francisco
5 Ciarán O'Sullivan, Esq. (SBN 198970) 04/15/2024
Clerk of the Court
THE LAW OFFICE OF CIARÁN O'SULLIVAN BY: AUSTIN LAM
6 50 California Street, 34th Floor Deputy Clerk
San Francisco, CA 94111
7 Telephone: (415) 391-3711
Facsimile: (415) 247-7901
8 Email: ciaran@cosullivanlaw.com
9 Attorneys for Plaintiff Ray Torres, Individually and as
Trustee of the California Revocable Living Trust of
10 Lillian Wong
11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
12 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
13 CGC-24-613951
Ray Torres, Individually and as Trustee of Case No.:
the California Revocable Living Trust of
14 Lillian Wong, COMPLAINT FOR:
15 (1) Recovery of Trust and Estate Property
Plaintiff, Under Probate Code Section 850;
16 v. (2) Recovery of Trust and Estate Property
Under Estate of Heggstad;
17 (3)
Nelson Wong, individually and as Fees Under Probate Code Section 859;
Administrator of the Estate of Lillian (4) Breach of Oral Agreement Damages
18 Wong, and
DOES 1 to 20, and Specific Performance;
19 (5) Breach of Agreement to Make a
Testamentary Devise -- Damages and
20 Defendants. Specific Performance;
(6) Unjust Enrichment/Restitution; and
21 (7) Constructive Trust.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
COMPLAINT
1 Plaintiff Ray Torres , individually and as Trustee of the
2 California Revocable Living Trust of Lillian Wong files
3 this Complaint against Defendant Nelson Wong, individually and as Administrator of the
4 alleges as follows:
5 I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
6 A. Ray and Lillian
7 1. This case involves a love story spanning almost four decades, between
8 Plaintiff Ray Torres . Ray and Lillian
9 began dating in 1985 while working together at a photo lab, Only One Hour Photo. This
10 would be the start of a relationship spanning 37 years.
11 2. While many of the formal claims asserted herein are brought under Marvin v.
12 Marvin (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 660 and its progeny, the relief requested is also what Lillian would
13 want if she were standing before the Court today.
14 3. In August 1994, Ray and Lillian began living together at the residence located
15 ).
16 Lillian was finding it challenging to take care of her elderly mother, who lived with Lillian,
17
18
19 4.
20
21 September 20, 1998.
22 5. Ray and Lillian paid for the post-
23
24
25 6. Ray and Lillian periodically discussed getting married; however, there did not
26 seem to be any particular urgency. They continued living together and registering their love
27
28 immediately.
2
COMPLAINT
1 7.
2
3 the Cameo Way Property to obtain financing. Lillian trusted Ray implicitly. And true to his
4
5
6 8. Ray and Lillian continued to occasionally discuss getting married. In March
7
8 reality.
9 9. Setting up an estate plan was also one of those things that Ray and Lillian
10 knew they needed to do. Lillian decided to create a trust. Even if Ray and Lillian were
11 married, Ray would only inherit one half of Cameo Way under the laws of intestacy because
12
13 wanted Ray to have the Cameo Way home they had shared for the previous three decades if
14 she were to predecease him.
15 10. On March 11, 2021, Lillian executed the Trust. Ray believes that this was a
16 stop gap, and that Lillian intended to execute a more complete document leaving everything
17 to Ray once they were married.
18 Way Property as a trust asset, identifying the property both by its address and legal
19 description. Exhibit A.
20 11. Ray and Lillian planned to exchange wedding vows in July 2021. On June 12,
21 2021, Lillian suffered a major stroke. Ray called an ambulance and Lillian was taken to the
22
23 was facing physical challenges. Ray and Lillian decided that Lillian should be transferred to
24 an acute rehabilitation center at California Pacific Medical Center Davies Campus.
25 12.
26 2021, and August 8, 2021, Ray would typically arrive at 10:00 AM and leave at 7:00 PM so
27 that Lillian would not be alone. Also, Ray wanted to learn everything he could about how to
28 assist Lillian when she returned home. This proved to be important.
3
COMPLAINT
1 13. When Lillian returned to their Cameo Way home, Ray worked with Lillian
2 around the clock to overcome her physical disabilities. Within eight months, Lillian had
3 learned to walk, use her hands, prepare meals, and engage in other activities she had
4 previously taken for granted. Ray used the instructions from her medical providers to
5
6 her stunning achievements.
7 14.
8 was glad to do it. Ray was glad to be there for Lillian to ensure that her needs were met,
9
10 unable to do for herself. It was a labor of love.
11 15.
12
13 formal
14 wedding
15 Lillian just wanted Lillian to get well.
16 16. It all seemed to be progressing, but then Lillian was stricken with her last
17 illness. On August 8, 2022, Lillian was admitted to California Pacific Medical Center
18 Davies Campus. She would never leave.
19 17. Lillian died on August 20, 2022. Ray was devastated. The love of his life, his
20
21
22 18. , could not even wait
23 until
24 Among other things, Nelson has asserted that he is entitled to , because he
25 -five years before
26
27 19. Nelson filed a petition for probate on September 27, 2022 - just thirty-eight
28 days after Lillian died. (Estate of Lillian Wong, San Francisco County Superior Court Case
4
COMPLAINT
1 No. PES-22-305690.) The only asset listed was real property with a value of $1.9 million
2 namely the Cameo Way Property, which is included in the Trust at Schedule A.
3 20. On November 14, 2022, Ray filed a petition under Probate Code section 850
4 to ensure that the Cameo Way Property would be titled in the Trust, as Lillian intended. (In
5 re the California Revocable Living Trust of Lillian Wong, San Francisco County Superior
6 Court Case No. PTR-22-305818.) In that proceeding Ray prayed for an Order that Cameo
7 Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, and
8 other applicable law, and should pass pursuant to the T
9 21.
10 filed under Probate
11 Code section 850
12
13 property would then be part of her Estate and thus part of the claims asserted herein.
14 22. To be clear, Ray alleges that his implied oral agreement with Lillian provides
15 Estate. The fact that the ownership of the real
16 property remains unadjudicated means that the precise amount that would be part of the
17 Estate
18 23. Ray devoted his time, skill and efforts including by providing valuable
19 caretaking services to both Lillian and her mother. This required Ray to alter his position by
20 forgoing other employment opportunities. An implied oral agreement existed between Ray
21 and Lillian providing that Lillian would leave her entire Estate to Ray arising from Ray and
22 Marvin and its
23 progeny provide the Court with broad equitable powers. Again, Lillian would be the first to
24 tell the Court that this is what she wanted if she were able to appear before the Court today.
25
26 24. On March 1, 2023, in compliance with Probate Code section 9150 et seq., Ray
27
28 (1) that Lillian had
5
COMPLAINT
1 promised to leave her entire estate to Ray, and (2) that pursuant to the terms of her Trust, the
2 Cameo Way property should be deemed an asset of the T
3 failure to convey title to Cameo Way to the Trust by a transfer deed
4 agreement, Estate of Heggstad, and for other reasons. A true and correct copy of the
5 as part of Exhibit B, attached hereto.
6 25. On January 17, 2024, Nelson filed and served on Ray a Rejection of the
7 is attached
8 hereto as Exhibit B. This action is therefore proper and timely. (Cal. Prob. Code §§ 9350 -
9 9354.)
10 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
11 A. Plaintiff has Standing to Bring this Complaint.
12 26. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(A) provides that an interested person may
13 bring an action concerning property belonging to an Estate where, as here, the decedent
14 while living is bound by a contract in writing to convey real property or to transfer personal
15 property and dies before making the conveyance or transfer and the decedent, if living, could
16 have been compelled to make the conveyance or transfer. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(C)
17 further provides that an interested person may bring an action concerning property belonging
18 to an Estate where, as here the decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, real or
19 personal property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to belong to another.
20 Probate Code section 850(a)(3)(A) further provides that a trustee, such as Plaintiff, may
21
22 possession of, or holds title to, real or personal property, and the property, or some interest, is
23
24 Estate holds assets that she promised to Plaintiff, who acted in reliance on those promises to
25 his detriment. An agreement enforceable in equity was thus formed between the Decedent
26 and Plaintiff, as described herein.
27 27. Probate Code section 855 further provides that an action brought under
28
6
COMPLAINT
1 civil action to the extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of a
2 Plaintiff to bring these
3 claims before this Court, which has jurisdiction over all matters concerning the Estate and
4 Trust.
5 28.
6 is satisfied that a conveyance, transfer, or other order should be made, the court shall make
7 an order authorizing and directing the personal representative or other fiduciary, or the
8 person having title to or possession of the property, to execute a conveyance or transfer to the
9
10 that the assets requested by Plaintiff herein shall be transferred to him according to proof.
11 29.
12 claims procedures.
13 30. Plaintiff is unaware of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued
14 herein as DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, including but not limited to the named Trust
15 beneficiaries, and therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will
16 amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when the same have been
17 ascertained. Each of such Defendants is responsible in some manner for the damages as
18 hereinafter alleged.
19 B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Ownership of Cameo Way Under Estate of Heggstad.
20 31.
21 Lillian attached a schedule to showing that Lillian intended Ray and Lillian
22 Cameo Way home to be part of . It states as follows:
23 Under this Living Trust the Grantor has conveyed, transferred, or assigned to
the Trustee the following assets and property to be managed and held under
24
the terms of aforementioned:
25
26
Maps at page 18 to 21 inclusive, in the office of the Recorder of the City of
27 San Francisco, State of California.
28
22 Cameo Way
San Francisco, CA 94131
7
COMPLAINT
1 25. In other words, Lillian expressly conveyed Cameo Way to ,
2 identifying Cameo Way both by its physical address and legal description. Under applicable
3 law (including Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, and its progeny), that is
sufficient for Cameo Way to pass according to the terms of , notwithstanding
4
the fact that Lillian never executed a deed formally transferring title of record.
5
6 C. Plaintiff
Marvin v. Marvin
7 32. As described above, Lillian and Ray lived together and shared all aspects of
8 their lives for 37 years before Lillian untimely death. Ray relied on Lillian and
9 implied promises that he would never have to worry about money after his death, and that he
10 would be taken care of. Specifically, Ray relied on Lillian
11 receive the Cameo Way Property upon her death, and he arranged his personal and
12 professional life accordingly. Ray is owed a significant portion of Lillian
13 compensation for the substantial services he provided Lillian and her mother in reliance on
14 her promises.
15 33. Ray performed these significant caretaking duties for Lillian and her mother
16 out of love, but also out of a shared understanding that he would benefit from Lillian Estate
17 and assets. Ray sacrificed other professional duties and hobbies to do so and, collectively,
18 these sacrifices came at great personal cost to Ray.
19 34. The case of Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, is directly on point.
20 In Marvin v. Marvin, the plaintiff, Michelle Marvin, alleged that she and Lee Marvin entered
21 into an oral and implied
22 would combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property
23 Marvin, supra, 18
24
25 Id. With Marvin, the Supreme Court
26 made new law, holding that even in the absence of an express agreement, the plaintiff could
27 establish an implied contract or implied partnership and therefore invoke such remedies as
28 constructive trust, resulting trust, and quantum meruit. Id. at 665.
8
COMPLAINT
1 35. Lillian and Ray established an agreement conforming to the criteria set forth
2 in Marvin. Under this agreement, they shared their property and Ray would take care of all
3 Lillian in exchange for the promise of support, including
4 after death in this case, a repeated and express promise that Ray would receive,
5 among other things, the Cameo Way Property that was his residence for approximately 30
6 years, including during the last, difficult years of Lillian
7 Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 674-675;
8 Cochran v. Cochran (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1118 (agreement to share property
9 Friedman v. Friedman
10 (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 876, 887-888 (implied agreement for support upon termination of
11 relationship).
12 under Probate Code section 850, the result would be a breach of the agreement between
13 Lillian and Ray; accordingly, Ray is entitled to specific performance or damages arising from
14 the agreement.
15 D. If Nelson Succeeds in Voiding the Trust or Preventing Transfer of the Cameo
Way Property, the Result Will Be a Breach Agreement to Support
16 Ray and Devise Her Assets to Him
17 36. Under Probate Code section 21700(a)(5), a contract to make a testamentary
18
19 agreement between the decedent and another person for the benefit of the claimant or a
20 promise by the decedent to another person for the benefit of the claimant that is enforceable
21 Lillian made statements and engaged in conduct consistent with her
22 promise that Ray would be taken care of, and that he would receive the Cameo Way Property
23 and other assets upon her death.
24 37. Ray the care of Lillian and her mother including his
25 abandonment of his own residence and of professional or recreational activities in favor of
26 their needs provides the requisite evidence of Lillian Ray detrimentally relied on
27 the agreement, and he will suffer an unconscionable injury if the agreement is not enforced.
28 Further, Defendant would be unjustly enriched if he is allowed to retain the benefits of
9
COMPLAINT
1 Lillian Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 342, 359;
2 see also Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 892.
3 CAUSES OF ACTION
4 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
5 (Recovery of Trust and Estate Property Under Probate Code Section 850)
6 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20)
7 38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
8 foregoing paragraphs.
9 39. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(A) provides that an interested person may
10 bring an action concerning property belonging to an Estate where, as here, the decedent
11 while living is bound by a contract in writing to convey real property or to transfer personal
12 property and dies before making the conveyance or transfer and the decedent, if living, could
13 have been compelled to make the conveyance or transfer. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(C)
14 further provides that an interested person may bring an action concerning property belonging
15 to an Estate where, as here, the Decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, real or
16 personal property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to belong to another.
17 Probate Code section 850(a)(3)(A) further provides that a trustee, such as Plaintiff, may
18
19 possession of, or holds title to, real or personal property, and the property, or some interest, is
20
21 Estate holds assets that she promised to Plaintiff, who acted in reliance on those promises to
22 his detriment. An agreement enforceable in equity was thus formed between the Decedent
23 and Plaintiff, as described herein.
24 40. Probate Code section 855 further provides that an action brought under
25
26 civil action to the extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of a
27 Here, it is reasonable and necessary for Plaintiff to bring these
28 claims before this Court, which has jurisdiction over all matters concerning the Estate.
10
COMPLAINT
1 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
2 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
3 (Recovery of Trust and Estate Property Pursuant to Estate of Heggstad)
4 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20)
5 41. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
6 foregoing paragraphs.
7 42. In Estate of Heggstad,
8 of trust by the owner of real property, in which he names himself as trustee, is sufficient to
9 create a trust in that property, and the law does not require a separate deed transferring the
10 Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 947-950.
11 43. Lillian explicitly declared her trust that Cameo Way was trust property, and
12 she thereby created a trust in that property. Pursuant to the terms of the Trust, Cameo Way
13
14 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
15 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
16 ( )
17 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20)
18 44. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
19 foregoing paragraphs.
20 45. Probate Code section 859 provides as follows, in relevant part, concerning
21 actions brought under Probate Code section 850:
22 If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed,
23
by an action under this part. In addition, except as otherwise required by
24 law, including Section 15657.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the
25 fees and costs. The remedies provided in this section shall be in addition to
any other remedies available in law to a person authorized to bring an
26 action pursuant to this part.
27 46. By this action, Plaintiff seeks, under Probate Code section 850, relief
28 concerning and recovery of personal property assets belonging to the Trust, namely the
11
COMPLAINT
1 property located at Cameo Way in San Francisco, as well as financial assets that may be held
2 by the Trust or Estate, and other damages according to proof. If the Court finds that Nelson
3 has wrongfully withheld these assets, then Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to the
4 assets recovered by Plaintiff or by the Trust, damages in the amount of twice those assets and
5
6 which he is entitled to distribution.
7 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.
8 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
9 (Breach of Oral Agreement Damages and Specific Performance)
10 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20)
11 47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
12 foregoing paragraphs.
13 48. In the case of Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, the Supreme
14 Court of California established a rule whereby an implied contract or implied partnership can
15 be established as the grounds for remedies including constructive trust, resulting trust, or
16 quantum meruit. In that case, the parties entered into an oral and implied agreement
17
18 and would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether
19 Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 666. In essence, the court
20 acknowledged that cohabiting partners can arrange their personal and economic affairs via
21 any (non-meretricious) arrangement they desire, including implied contracts for domestic
22 services.
23 49. Lillian and Ray established an agreement conforming to the criteria set forth
24 in Marvin. Under this agreement, they shared their property and Ray would take care of all
25 Lillian and her mother s needs in exchange for the promise of support for Ray,
26 including after her death in this case, a promise that Ray would receive, among other
27 assets, the Cameo Way Property that was his residence for approximately 30 years, including
28
12
COMPLAINT
1 . Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 674-675; Cochran v.
2 Cochran (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1118 (agreement to share property acquisitions
3 Friedman v. Friedman (1993) 20
4 Cal.App.4th 876, 887-888 (implied agreement for support upon termination of relationship).
5 50. As alleged herein, Lillian and Ray lived together and shared all aspects of
6 their lives for 37 years, especially during the final,
7 . Ray relied on Lillian
8 and implied promises that he would never have to worry about money, including after her
9 death, and that he would be taken care of. Specifically, Ray relied on Lillian
10 that he would receive the Cameo Way Property and other assets upon her death and arranged
11 his personal and professional life accordingly. Ray is owed a significant portion of Lillian
12 assets as compensation for the substantial services he provided to Lillian and her mother in
13 reliance on her promises.
14 51. Ray performed these significant caretaking duties out of love, but also out of a
15 shared understanding that he would be supported by Lillian and that he would benefit from
16 Lillian assets and Estate. Ray sacrificed other professional duties and hobbies to do so and,
17 collectively, these sacrifices came at great personal cost to Ray. If the Court finds that the
18 Trust is invalid or was left unfunded, then this would cause a breach of the contract between
19 Lillian and Ray; accordingly, Ray is entitled to specific performance of damages arising from
20 the agreement according to proof.
21 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
22 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
23 (Breach of Agreement to Make a Testamentary Devise Damages and Specific
24 Performance)
25 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20)
26 52. Under Probate Code section 21700(a)(5), a contract to make a testamentary
27
28 agreement between the decedent and another person for the benefit of the claimant or a
13
COMPLAINT
1 promise by the decedent to another person for the benefit of the claimant that is enforceable
2
3 53. Here, Lillian made statements and engaged in conduct consistent with her
4 promise that Ray would be taken care of and would receive the Cameo Way Property upon
5 her death. Ray the care of Lillian including
6 his abandonment of his own residence and of professional or recreational activities in favor
7 of the needs of Lillian and her mother provides the requisite evidence of Lillian
8 as well as his own performance under the agreement. Ray detrimentally relied on the
9 agreement, and he will suffer an unconscionable injury if the agreement is not enforced.
10 54. Further, Defendant would be unjustly enriched if he is allowed to retain the
11 benefits of Lillian Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th
12 342, 359; see also Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 892.
13 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
14 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
15 Unjust Enrichment / Restitution
16 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20)
17 55. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
18 foregoing paragraphs.
19 56. Defendant has been and will be unjustly enriched if Defendant wrongfully
20 withholds and retains the assets rightfully belonging to Plaintiff.
21 57. Plaintiff is equitably entitled to, and hereby seeks, recovery of the assets
22 wrongfully withheld or retained by Defendant. These assets constitute real and personal
23 property which, in equity and good conscience, Defendant should transfer to Plaintiff
24 pursuant to the equitable doctrine of restitution/unjust enrichment.
25 58. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the transfer and restitution of the full value of all
26 benefits and enrichment Defendant has obtained or would otherwise obtain at Plaintiff
27 expense.
28 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
14
COMPLAINT
1 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 (Constructive Trust)
3 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20)
4 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the
5 foregoing paragraphs.
6 60. As described herein, a constructive trust is appropriate where the parties,
7 through their actions and explicit assurances, establish a domestic contract. Marvin, supra,
8 18 Cal.3d at 666. In the instant matter, Lillian and Ray had an arrangement whereby Ray
9 would take care of and support Lillian and her mother, and he did so for approximately 30
10
11 return, Lillian would ensure that he was
12 provided for thereafter. The assurances on Lillian Ray
13 was to be taken care of after her death, and Ray was to receive the house upon her death.
14 Ray Lillian mother for several years, as described herein,
15 and his care and support for Lillian throughout her life including the difficult period before
16 her untimely death, demonstrate his own performance in the domestic bargain, as well as his
17 reliance on the agreement.
18 61. Accordingly, the Court should establish a constructive trust pending the
19 resolution of this matter. Plaintiff may have no adequate remedy at law and the imposition
20 of a constructive trust is required to avoid the unjust enrichment of Defendant. The Court
21 should further order that no further funds may be withdrawn from the Trust, and that all
22 income received from any asset of Lillian Estate or the Trust, shall be transferred into a
23 blocked account, pending resolution of this action.
24 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
25 III. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
26 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for an Order from this Court granting him relief as
27 follows:
28 1. Issue an Order awarding specific performance and damages to Plaintiff based
15
COMPLAINT
Exhibit A
DE-174
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY
Pamela Ty 197285
PROTEC-LAW, APC
712 Bancroft Road, #320
Walnut Creek, CA 94598
TELEPHONE NO.: (925) 262-8238 FAX NO. (Optional): (925) 262-8272
ELECTRONICALLY
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): pty@proteclawcorp.com
ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Nelson Wong FILED
Superior Court of California,
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO County of San Francisco
STREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister Street
MAILING ADDRESS: 01/17/2024
San Francisco, CA 94102
CITY AND ZIP CODE:
Clerk of the Court
BY: MICHAEL RAYRAY
BRANCH NAME: Civic Center Deputy Clerk
ESTATE OF
(Name): LILLIAN WONG
DECEDENT
CASE NUMBER:
ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM
PES-22-305690
NOTE TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Attach a copy of the creditor's claim to this form. If approval or rejection by the court is not required, do not
include any pages attached to the creditor's claim.
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION
1. Name of creditor (specify): Ray Torres
2. The claim was filed on (date): 03/01/2023
3. Date of first issuance of letters: 09/15/2023
4. Date of Notice of Administration:
5. Date of decedent's death: 08/20/2022
6. Estimated value of estate: $ 1,950,000.00
7. Total amount of the claim: $ 1,904,085.71 (The court must approve certain claims before they are paid.)
8. Claim is allowed for: $ (A creditor has 90 days to act on a rejected claim.* See box below.)
9.
X Claim is rejected for: $ 1,904,085.71
10. Notice of allowance or rejection given on (date): 1/17/2024
11.
X The personal representative is authorized to administer the estate under the Independent Administration of Estates Act.
Date:1/12/2024
Nelson Wong
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE) (SIGNATURE OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE)
NOTICE TO CREDITOR ON REJECTED CLAIM
From the date that notice of rejection is given, you must act on the rejected claim (e.g., file a lawsuit) as follows:
1. Claim due: within 90 days* after the notice of rejection.
2. Claim not due: within 90 days* after the claim become due.
* The 90-day period mentioned above may not apply to your claim because some claims are not treated as creditors' claims
or are subject to special statutes of limitations, or for other legal reasons. You should consult with an attorney if you have
any questions about or are unsure of your rights and obligations concerning your claim.
COURT'S APPROVAL OR REJECTION
12. Approved for: $
13. Rejected for: $
Date:
SIGNATURE OF JUDICIAL OFFICER
14. Number of pages attached: SIGNATURE FOLLOWS LAST ATTACHMENT
(Proof of Mailing or Personal Delivery on reverse) Page 1 of 2
Form Adopted for Mandatory Use ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM Probate Code § 9000 et seq.,
Judicial Council of California 9250-9256, 9353
DE-174 [Rev. January 1, 2009] (Probate-Decedents' Estates) www.courtinfo.ca.gov
Ty_Pamela
DE-174
ESTATE OF CASE NUMBER:
(Name): LILLIAN WONG PES-22-305690
DECEDENT
PROOF OF
X MAILING PERSONAL DELIVERY TO CREDITOR
1. At the time of mailing or personal delivery I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this proceeding.
2. My residence or business address is (specify):
1090 "B" Street, PMB 170
Hayward, CA 94541
3. I mailed or personally delivered a copy of the Allowance or Rejection of Creditor's Claim as follows (complete either a or b):
a.
X Mail. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred.
(1) I enclosed a copy in an envelope AND
(a) X deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid.
(b) placed the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown in items below
following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting
and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for
collecting and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal
Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
(2) The envelope was addressed and mailed first-class as follows:
(a) Name of creditor served: Ray Torres and Others See Attached
(b) Address on envelope:
(c) Date of mailing: 01/17/2024
(d) Place of mailing (city and state): Hayward, CA
b. Personal delivery. I personally delivered a copy to the creditor as follows:
(1) Name of creditor served:
(2) Address where delivered:
(3) Date delivered:
(4) Time delivered:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: 01/17/2024
Helen M. Bellamy
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF DECLARANT) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT)
DE-174 [Rev. January 1, 2009] ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM Page 2 of 2
(Probate-Decedents' Estates)
Ty_Pamela
Estate of Lillian Wong Case No. PES-22-305690
Attachment 1 to Allowance or Rejection of Creditor’s Claim Notice of Hearing
______________________________________________________________________________
Ray Torres Timothy Wong
22 Cameo Way 2041 Willow Way
San Francisco, CA 94131 San Bruno, CA 94066
Ray Torres June Lee
c/o The Law Office of Ciarán O'Sullivan 1111 Anacapa
50 California Street, 34th Floor Irvine, CA 92602
San Francisco, CA 94111
Jason J. Granskog
BOWLES & VERNA LLP
2121 N. California Blvd., Ste 875
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Estate of Lillian Wong
Case No. PES-22-305690
DE-174 Attachment Proof of Mailing Allowance and Rejection of Creditor’s Claim
ELECTRONICALLY
FILED
Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco
03/01/2023
Clerk of the Court
BY: ALISON AGBAY
Deputy Clerk
Attachment to Creditors’ Claim
The following facts relate to the claim brought by Ray Torres (“Ray”) in Lillian Wong’s
(“Lillian”) estate:
This case involves a love story spanning almost four decades. While the formal claim is
brought under Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 660 and its progeny, Ray believes that this is
what Lillian would want if she were standing before the Court today.
Ray and Lillian began dating in 1985 while working together at a photo lab, Only One
Hour Photo. This would be the start of a relationship spanning 37 years.
In August 1994, Ray and Lillian began living together at Cameo Way. Lillian was finding
it challenging to take care of her elderly mother, who lived with Lillian, without any meaningful
assistance from Lillian’s siblings. Ray and Lillian worked together as a team, and Lillian’s
mother accepted Ray as a member of the family.
Ray often took Lillian’s mother to medical appointments, ran errands for her, and
financially contributed to household expenses. Lillian’s mother passed away on September 20,
1998.
Ray and Lillian paid for the post-death arrangements for Lillian’s mother, again without
any meaningful assistance from Lillian’s siblings. But Ray was willing to do it. It was the last
thing Ray could do for Lillian’s mother.
Ray and Lillian periodically discussed getting married; however, there did not seem to be
any particular urgency. They continued living together and registering their love with the
bureaucratic authorities didn’t seem to be something that needed to be done immediately.
During the 1990s, it was clear that Lillian’s real property on Cameo Way needed
substantial maintenance and renovation work. Lillian added Ray’s name and title to Cameo Way
in order to obtain financing. Lillian trusted Ray implicitly. And true to his word, Ray conveyed
title back to Lillian’s name alone once it was no longer necessary for Ray’s name to be on title
for financing purposes.
Ray and Lillian continued to occasionally discuss getting married. In March 2021, they
finally decided to do it. The “when we get around to it” was finally becoming a reality.
Setting up an estate plan was also one of those things that Ray and Lillian knew they
needed to do. Lillian decided to create a trust. Even if Ray and Lillian were married, Ray would
only inherit one half of Cameo Way under the laws of intestacy because it would have been
Lillian’s separate property. Regardless of whatever else happened, Lillian wanted Ray to have
the Cameo Way home they had shared for the previous quarter of a century if she were to
predecease him.
On March 11, 2021, Lillian executed The California Revocable Living Trust of Lillian
Wong (“Lillian’s Trust”). Ray believes that this was a stop gap, and that Lillian intended to
execute a more complete document leaving everything to Ray once they were married.
Ray and Lillian planned to exchange wedding vows in July 2021. Sadly, that didn’t
happen.
On June 12, 2021, Lillian suffered a major stroke. Ray called an ambulance and Lillian
was taken to the hospital at UCSF. Lillian’s cognitive abilities were not severely affected;
however, Lillian was facing physical challenges. Ray and Lillian decided that Lillian should be
transferred to an acute rehabilitation center at California Pacific Medical Center – Davies
Campus.
During Lillian’s stay at the hospital and rehabilitation center between June 12, 2021 to
August 8, 2021, Ray would typically arrive at 10:00 AM and leave at 7:00 PM so that Lillian
would not be alone. Also, Ray wanted to learn everything he could about how to assist Lillian
when she returned home. This proved to be important.
When Lillian returned to their Cameo Way home, Ray worked with Lillian around the
clock to overcome her physical disabilities. Within eight months, Lillian had learned to walk, use
her hands, prepare meals, and engage in other activities she had previously taken for granted.
Ray used the instructions from her medical providers to establish a daily routine. Lillian’s team
of therapists and medical providers were amazed by her stunning achievements.
While being responsible for Lillian’s care 24 hours a day was demanding, Ray was glad
to do it. Ray was glad to be there for Lillian to ensure that her needs were met, whether bathing
Lillian or taking care of things that Lillian’s physical limitations left her unable to do for herself.
It was a labor of love.
With all of this happening, the wedding did not happen. It wasn’t that Ray and Lillian
didn’t want to be married. If anything, Lillian’s recovery drew Ray and Lillian closer together.
But Ray and Lillian were focused on Lillian’s recovery and having a ceremony just wasn’t as
much of a priority under the circumstances. Ray and Lillian just wanted Lillian to get well.
It all seemed to be progressing, but then Lillian was stricken with illness. On August 8,
2022, Lillian was admitted to California Pacific Medical Center – Davies Campus. She would
never leave.
Lillian died on August 20, 2022. Ray was devastated. The love of his life, his companion
for the past 37 years was gone. Taking control of Lillian’s assets and coldly managing business
affairs were the last things on Ray’s mind. Meanwhile, Lillian’s brother Nelson Wong (“Nelson”)
could not even wait for the memorial service was over before he began harassing Ray about
Lillian’s assets. Among other things, Nelson has asserted that he is entitled to Lillian’s home
because he resents that Lillian’s mother gave the property to Lillian over twenty-five years
before Lillian’s death.
Ray devoted his time, skill and efforts including by providing valuable caretaking
services to both Lillian and her mother. This required Ray to alter his position by forgoing other
employment opportunities. Ray alleges that an implied oral agreement existed between Ray and
Lillian providing that Lillian would leave her entire estate to Ray arising from the Ray and
Lillian’s conduct, including the facts alleged herein. Ray is m
Preview
1 Jeffrey R. Loew, Esq. (SBN 216808) LOEW LAW GROUP, APLC 2 1650 Borel Place, Suite 123 San Mateo, CA 94402 ELECTRONICALLY 3 Telephone: (650) 397-8700 Facsimile: (650) 397-8889 FILED Superior Court of California, 4 Email: jloew@loewlawgroup.com County of San Francisco 5 Ciarán O'Sullivan, Esq. (SBN 198970) 04/15/2024 Clerk of the Court THE LAW OFFICE OF CIARÁN O'SULLIVAN BY: AUSTIN LAM 6 50 California Street, 34th Floor Deputy Clerk San Francisco, CA 94111 7 Telephone: (415) 391-3711 Facsimile: (415) 247-7901 8 Email: ciaran@cosullivanlaw.com 9 Attorneys for Plaintiff Ray Torres, Individually and as Trustee of the California Revocable Living Trust of 10 Lillian Wong 11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 12 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 13 CGC-24-613951 Ray Torres, Individually and as Trustee of Case No.: the California Revocable Living Trust of 14 Lillian Wong, COMPLAINT FOR: 15 (1) Recovery of Trust and Estate Property Plaintiff, Under Probate Code Section 850; 16 v. (2) Recovery of Trust and Estate Property Under Estate of Heggstad; 17 (3) Nelson Wong, individually and as Fees Under Probate Code Section 859; Administrator of the Estate of Lillian (4) Breach of Oral Agreement Damages 18 Wong, and DOES 1 to 20, and Specific Performance; 19 (5) Breach of Agreement to Make a Testamentary Devise -- Damages and 20 Defendants. Specific Performance; (6) Unjust Enrichment/Restitution; and 21 (7) Constructive Trust. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 COMPLAINT 1 Plaintiff Ray Torres , individually and as Trustee of the 2 California Revocable Living Trust of Lillian Wong files 3 this Complaint against Defendant Nelson Wong, individually and as Administrator of the 4 alleges as follows: 5 I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL SUMMARY 6 A. Ray and Lillian 7 1. This case involves a love story spanning almost four decades, between 8 Plaintiff Ray Torres . Ray and Lillian 9 began dating in 1985 while working together at a photo lab, Only One Hour Photo. This 10 would be the start of a relationship spanning 37 years. 11 2. While many of the formal claims asserted herein are brought under Marvin v. 12 Marvin (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 660 and its progeny, the relief requested is also what Lillian would 13 want if she were standing before the Court today. 14 3. In August 1994, Ray and Lillian began living together at the residence located 15 ). 16 Lillian was finding it challenging to take care of her elderly mother, who lived with Lillian, 17 18 19 4. 20 21 September 20, 1998. 22 5. Ray and Lillian paid for the post- 23 24 25 6. Ray and Lillian periodically discussed getting married; however, there did not 26 seem to be any particular urgency. They continued living together and registering their love 27 28 immediately. 2 COMPLAINT 1 7. 2 3 the Cameo Way Property to obtain financing. Lillian trusted Ray implicitly. And true to his 4 5 6 8. Ray and Lillian continued to occasionally discuss getting married. In March 7 8 reality. 9 9. Setting up an estate plan was also one of those things that Ray and Lillian 10 knew they needed to do. Lillian decided to create a trust. Even if Ray and Lillian were 11 married, Ray would only inherit one half of Cameo Way under the laws of intestacy because 12 13 wanted Ray to have the Cameo Way home they had shared for the previous three decades if 14 she were to predecease him. 15 10. On March 11, 2021, Lillian executed the Trust. Ray believes that this was a 16 stop gap, and that Lillian intended to execute a more complete document leaving everything 17 to Ray once they were married. 18 Way Property as a trust asset, identifying the property both by its address and legal 19 description. Exhibit A. 20 11. Ray and Lillian planned to exchange wedding vows in July 2021. On June 12, 21 2021, Lillian suffered a major stroke. Ray called an ambulance and Lillian was taken to the 22 23 was facing physical challenges. Ray and Lillian decided that Lillian should be transferred to 24 an acute rehabilitation center at California Pacific Medical Center Davies Campus. 25 12. 26 2021, and August 8, 2021, Ray would typically arrive at 10:00 AM and leave at 7:00 PM so 27 that Lillian would not be alone. Also, Ray wanted to learn everything he could about how to 28 assist Lillian when she returned home. This proved to be important. 3 COMPLAINT 1 13. When Lillian returned to their Cameo Way home, Ray worked with Lillian 2 around the clock to overcome her physical disabilities. Within eight months, Lillian had 3 learned to walk, use her hands, prepare meals, and engage in other activities she had 4 previously taken for granted. Ray used the instructions from her medical providers to 5 6 her stunning achievements. 7 14. 8 was glad to do it. Ray was glad to be there for Lillian to ensure that her needs were met, 9 10 unable to do for herself. It was a labor of love. 11 15. 12 13 formal 14 wedding 15 Lillian just wanted Lillian to get well. 16 16. It all seemed to be progressing, but then Lillian was stricken with her last 17 illness. On August 8, 2022, Lillian was admitted to California Pacific Medical Center 18 Davies Campus. She would never leave. 19 17. Lillian died on August 20, 2022. Ray was devastated. The love of his life, his 20 21 22 18. , could not even wait 23 until 24 Among other things, Nelson has asserted that he is entitled to , because he 25 -five years before 26 27 19. Nelson filed a petition for probate on September 27, 2022 - just thirty-eight 28 days after Lillian died. (Estate of Lillian Wong, San Francisco County Superior Court Case 4 COMPLAINT 1 No. PES-22-305690.) The only asset listed was real property with a value of $1.9 million 2 namely the Cameo Way Property, which is included in the Trust at Schedule A. 3 20. On November 14, 2022, Ray filed a petition under Probate Code section 850 4 to ensure that the Cameo Way Property would be titled in the Trust, as Lillian intended. (In 5 re the California Revocable Living Trust of Lillian Wong, San Francisco County Superior 6 Court Case No. PTR-22-305818.) In that proceeding Ray prayed for an Order that Cameo 7 Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, and 8 other applicable law, and should pass pursuant to the T 9 21. 10 filed under Probate 11 Code section 850 12 13 property would then be part of her Estate and thus part of the claims asserted herein. 14 22. To be clear, Ray alleges that his implied oral agreement with Lillian provides 15 Estate. The fact that the ownership of the real 16 property remains unadjudicated means that the precise amount that would be part of the 17 Estate 18 23. Ray devoted his time, skill and efforts including by providing valuable 19 caretaking services to both Lillian and her mother. This required Ray to alter his position by 20 forgoing other employment opportunities. An implied oral agreement existed between Ray 21 and Lillian providing that Lillian would leave her entire Estate to Ray arising from Ray and 22 Marvin and its 23 progeny provide the Court with broad equitable powers. Again, Lillian would be the first to 24 tell the Court that this is what she wanted if she were able to appear before the Court today. 25 26 24. On March 1, 2023, in compliance with Probate Code section 9150 et seq., Ray 27 28 (1) that Lillian had 5 COMPLAINT 1 promised to leave her entire estate to Ray, and (2) that pursuant to the terms of her Trust, the 2 Cameo Way property should be deemed an asset of the T 3 failure to convey title to Cameo Way to the Trust by a transfer deed 4 agreement, Estate of Heggstad, and for other reasons. A true and correct copy of the 5 as part of Exhibit B, attached hereto. 6 25. On January 17, 2024, Nelson filed and served on Ray a Rejection of the 7 is attached 8 hereto as Exhibit B. This action is therefore proper and timely. (Cal. Prob. Code §§ 9350 - 9 9354.) 10 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT 11 A. Plaintiff has Standing to Bring this Complaint. 12 26. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(A) provides that an interested person may 13 bring an action concerning property belonging to an Estate where, as here, the decedent 14 while living is bound by a contract in writing to convey real property or to transfer personal 15 property and dies before making the conveyance or transfer and the decedent, if living, could 16 have been compelled to make the conveyance or transfer. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(C) 17 further provides that an interested person may bring an action concerning property belonging 18 to an Estate where, as here the decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, real or 19 personal property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to belong to another. 20 Probate Code section 850(a)(3)(A) further provides that a trustee, such as Plaintiff, may 21 22 possession of, or holds title to, real or personal property, and the property, or some interest, is 23 24 Estate holds assets that she promised to Plaintiff, who acted in reliance on those promises to 25 his detriment. An agreement enforceable in equity was thus formed between the Decedent 26 and Plaintiff, as described herein. 27 27. Probate Code section 855 further provides that an action brought under 28 6 COMPLAINT 1 civil action to the extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of a 2 Plaintiff to bring these 3 claims before this Court, which has jurisdiction over all matters concerning the Estate and 4 Trust. 5 28. 6 is satisfied that a conveyance, transfer, or other order should be made, the court shall make 7 an order authorizing and directing the personal representative or other fiduciary, or the 8 person having title to or possession of the property, to execute a conveyance or transfer to the 9 10 that the assets requested by Plaintiff herein shall be transferred to him according to proof. 11 29. 12 claims procedures. 13 30. Plaintiff is unaware of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued 14 herein as DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, including but not limited to the named Trust 15 beneficiaries, and therefore sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will 16 amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when the same have been 17 ascertained. Each of such Defendants is responsible in some manner for the damages as 18 hereinafter alleged. 19 B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Ownership of Cameo Way Under Estate of Heggstad. 20 31. 21 Lillian attached a schedule to showing that Lillian intended Ray and Lillian 22 Cameo Way home to be part of . It states as follows: 23 Under this Living Trust the Grantor has conveyed, transferred, or assigned to the Trustee the following assets and property to be managed and held under 24 the terms of aforementioned: 25 26 Maps at page 18 to 21 inclusive, in the office of the Recorder of the City of 27 San Francisco, State of California. 28 22 Cameo Way San Francisco, CA 94131 7 COMPLAINT 1 25. In other words, Lillian expressly conveyed Cameo Way to , 2 identifying Cameo Way both by its physical address and legal description. Under applicable 3 law (including Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, and its progeny), that is sufficient for Cameo Way to pass according to the terms of , notwithstanding 4 the fact that Lillian never executed a deed formally transferring title of record. 5 6 C. Plaintiff Marvin v. Marvin 7 32. As described above, Lillian and Ray lived together and shared all aspects of 8 their lives for 37 years before Lillian untimely death. Ray relied on Lillian and 9 implied promises that he would never have to worry about money after his death, and that he 10 would be taken care of. Specifically, Ray relied on Lillian 11 receive the Cameo Way Property upon her death, and he arranged his personal and 12 professional life accordingly. Ray is owed a significant portion of Lillian 13 compensation for the substantial services he provided Lillian and her mother in reliance on 14 her promises. 15 33. Ray performed these significant caretaking duties for Lillian and her mother 16 out of love, but also out of a shared understanding that he would benefit from Lillian Estate 17 and assets. Ray sacrificed other professional duties and hobbies to do so and, collectively, 18 these sacrifices came at great personal cost to Ray. 19 34. The case of Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, is directly on point. 20 In Marvin v. Marvin, the plaintiff, Michelle Marvin, alleged that she and Lee Marvin entered 21 into an oral and implied 22 would combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property 23 Marvin, supra, 18 24 25 Id. With Marvin, the Supreme Court 26 made new law, holding that even in the absence of an express agreement, the plaintiff could 27 establish an implied contract or implied partnership and therefore invoke such remedies as 28 constructive trust, resulting trust, and quantum meruit. Id. at 665. 8 COMPLAINT 1 35. Lillian and Ray established an agreement conforming to the criteria set forth 2 in Marvin. Under this agreement, they shared their property and Ray would take care of all 3 Lillian in exchange for the promise of support, including 4 after death in this case, a repeated and express promise that Ray would receive, 5 among other things, the Cameo Way Property that was his residence for approximately 30 6 years, including during the last, difficult years of Lillian 7 Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 674-675; 8 Cochran v. Cochran (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1118 (agreement to share property 9 Friedman v. Friedman 10 (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 876, 887-888 (implied agreement for support upon termination of 11 relationship). 12 under Probate Code section 850, the result would be a breach of the agreement between 13 Lillian and Ray; accordingly, Ray is entitled to specific performance or damages arising from 14 the agreement. 15 D. If Nelson Succeeds in Voiding the Trust or Preventing Transfer of the Cameo Way Property, the Result Will Be a Breach Agreement to Support 16 Ray and Devise Her Assets to Him 17 36. Under Probate Code section 21700(a)(5), a contract to make a testamentary 18 19 agreement between the decedent and another person for the benefit of the claimant or a 20 promise by the decedent to another person for the benefit of the claimant that is enforceable 21 Lillian made statements and engaged in conduct consistent with her 22 promise that Ray would be taken care of, and that he would receive the Cameo Way Property 23 and other assets upon her death. 24 37. Ray the care of Lillian and her mother including his 25 abandonment of his own residence and of professional or recreational activities in favor of 26 their needs provides the requisite evidence of Lillian Ray detrimentally relied on 27 the agreement, and he will suffer an unconscionable injury if the agreement is not enforced. 28 Further, Defendant would be unjustly enriched if he is allowed to retain the benefits of 9 COMPLAINT 1 Lillian Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 342, 359; 2 see also Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 892. 3 CAUSES OF ACTION 4 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 5 (Recovery of Trust and Estate Property Under Probate Code Section 850) 6 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20) 7 38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the 8 foregoing paragraphs. 9 39. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(A) provides that an interested person may 10 bring an action concerning property belonging to an Estate where, as here, the decedent 11 while living is bound by a contract in writing to convey real property or to transfer personal 12 property and dies before making the conveyance or transfer and the decedent, if living, could 13 have been compelled to make the conveyance or transfer. Probate Code section 850(a)(2)(C) 14 further provides that an interested person may bring an action concerning property belonging 15 to an Estate where, as here, the Decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, real or 16 personal property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to belong to another. 17 Probate Code section 850(a)(3)(A) further provides that a trustee, such as Plaintiff, may 18 19 possession of, or holds title to, real or personal property, and the property, or some interest, is 20 21 Estate holds assets that she promised to Plaintiff, who acted in reliance on those promises to 22 his detriment. An agreement enforceable in equity was thus formed between the Decedent 23 and Plaintiff, as described herein. 24 40. Probate Code section 855 further provides that an action brought under 25 26 civil action to the extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of a 27 Here, it is reasonable and necessary for Plaintiff to bring these 28 claims before this Court, which has jurisdiction over all matters concerning the Estate. 10 COMPLAINT 1 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 2 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 3 (Recovery of Trust and Estate Property Pursuant to Estate of Heggstad) 4 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20) 5 41. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the 6 foregoing paragraphs. 7 42. In Estate of Heggstad, 8 of trust by the owner of real property, in which he names himself as trustee, is sufficient to 9 create a trust in that property, and the law does not require a separate deed transferring the 10 Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 947-950. 11 43. Lillian explicitly declared her trust that Cameo Way was trust property, and 12 she thereby created a trust in that property. Pursuant to the terms of the Trust, Cameo Way 13 14 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 15 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 16 ( ) 17 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20) 18 44. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the 19 foregoing paragraphs. 20 45. Probate Code section 859 provides as follows, in relevant part, concerning 21 actions brought under Probate Code section 850: 22 If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, 23 by an action under this part. In addition, except as otherwise required by 24 law, including Section 15657.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the 25 fees and costs. The remedies provided in this section shall be in addition to any other remedies available in law to a person authorized to bring an 26 action pursuant to this part. 27 46. By this action, Plaintiff seeks, under Probate Code section 850, relief 28 concerning and recovery of personal property assets belonging to the Trust, namely the 11 COMPLAINT 1 property located at Cameo Way in San Francisco, as well as financial assets that may be held 2 by the Trust or Estate, and other damages according to proof. If the Court finds that Nelson 3 has wrongfully withheld these assets, then Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to the 4 assets recovered by Plaintiff or by the Trust, damages in the amount of twice those assets and 5 6 which he is entitled to distribution. 7 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 8 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 9 (Breach of Oral Agreement Damages and Specific Performance) 10 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20) 11 47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the 12 foregoing paragraphs. 13 48. In the case of Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, the Supreme 14 Court of California established a rule whereby an implied contract or implied partnership can 15 be established as the grounds for remedies including constructive trust, resulting trust, or 16 quantum meruit. In that case, the parties entered into an oral and implied agreement 17 18 and would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether 19 Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 666. In essence, the court 20 acknowledged that cohabiting partners can arrange their personal and economic affairs via 21 any (non-meretricious) arrangement they desire, including implied contracts for domestic 22 services. 23 49. Lillian and Ray established an agreement conforming to the criteria set forth 24 in Marvin. Under this agreement, they shared their property and Ray would take care of all 25 Lillian and her mother s needs in exchange for the promise of support for Ray, 26 including after her death in this case, a promise that Ray would receive, among other 27 assets, the Cameo Way Property that was his residence for approximately 30 years, including 28 12 COMPLAINT 1 . Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 674-675; Cochran v. 2 Cochran (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1118 (agreement to share property acquisitions 3 Friedman v. Friedman (1993) 20 4 Cal.App.4th 876, 887-888 (implied agreement for support upon termination of relationship). 5 50. As alleged herein, Lillian and Ray lived together and shared all aspects of 6 their lives for 37 years, especially during the final, 7 . Ray relied on Lillian 8 and implied promises that he would never have to worry about money, including after her 9 death, and that he would be taken care of. Specifically, Ray relied on Lillian 10 that he would receive the Cameo Way Property and other assets upon her death and arranged 11 his personal and professional life accordingly. Ray is owed a significant portion of Lillian 12 assets as compensation for the substantial services he provided to Lillian and her mother in 13 reliance on her promises. 14 51. Ray performed these significant caretaking duties out of love, but also out of a 15 shared understanding that he would be supported by Lillian and that he would benefit from 16 Lillian assets and Estate. Ray sacrificed other professional duties and hobbies to do so and, 17 collectively, these sacrifices came at great personal cost to Ray. If the Court finds that the 18 Trust is invalid or was left unfunded, then this would cause a breach of the contract between 19 Lillian and Ray; accordingly, Ray is entitled to specific performance of damages arising from 20 the agreement according to proof. 21 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 22 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 23 (Breach of Agreement to Make a Testamentary Devise Damages and Specific 24 Performance) 25 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20) 26 52. Under Probate Code section 21700(a)(5), a contract to make a testamentary 27 28 agreement between the decedent and another person for the benefit of the claimant or a 13 COMPLAINT 1 promise by the decedent to another person for the benefit of the claimant that is enforceable 2 3 53. Here, Lillian made statements and engaged in conduct consistent with her 4 promise that Ray would be taken care of and would receive the Cameo Way Property upon 5 her death. Ray the care of Lillian including 6 his abandonment of his own residence and of professional or recreational activities in favor 7 of the needs of Lillian and her mother provides the requisite evidence of Lillian 8 as well as his own performance under the agreement. Ray detrimentally relied on the 9 agreement, and he will suffer an unconscionable injury if the agreement is not enforced. 10 54. Further, Defendant would be unjustly enriched if he is allowed to retain the 11 benefits of Lillian Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 12 342, 359; see also Juran v. Epstein (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 882, 892. 13 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 14 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 15 Unjust Enrichment / Restitution 16 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20) 17 55. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the 18 foregoing paragraphs. 19 56. Defendant has been and will be unjustly enriched if Defendant wrongfully 20 withholds and retains the assets rightfully belonging to Plaintiff. 21 57. Plaintiff is equitably entitled to, and hereby seeks, recovery of the assets 22 wrongfully withheld or retained by Defendant. These assets constitute real and personal 23 property which, in equity and good conscience, Defendant should transfer to Plaintiff 24 pursuant to the equitable doctrine of restitution/unjust enrichment. 25 58. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the transfer and restitution of the full value of all 26 benefits and enrichment Defendant has obtained or would otherwise obtain at Plaintiff 27 expense. 28 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 14 COMPLAINT 1 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 2 (Constructive Trust) 3 (Against Defendant Nelson Wong and Does 1-20) 4 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the 5 foregoing paragraphs. 6 60. As described herein, a constructive trust is appropriate where the parties, 7 through their actions and explicit assurances, establish a domestic contract. Marvin, supra, 8 18 Cal.3d at 666. In the instant matter, Lillian and Ray had an arrangement whereby Ray 9 would take care of and support Lillian and her mother, and he did so for approximately 30 10 11 return, Lillian would ensure that he was 12 provided for thereafter. The assurances on Lillian Ray 13 was to be taken care of after her death, and Ray was to receive the house upon her death. 14 Ray Lillian mother for several years, as described herein, 15 and his care and support for Lillian throughout her life including the difficult period before 16 her untimely death, demonstrate his own performance in the domestic bargain, as well as his 17 reliance on the agreement. 18 61. Accordingly, the Court should establish a constructive trust pending the 19 resolution of this matter. Plaintiff may have no adequate remedy at law and the imposition 20 of a constructive trust is required to avoid the unjust enrichment of Defendant. The Court 21 should further order that no further funds may be withdrawn from the Trust, and that all 22 income received from any asset of Lillian Estate or the Trust, shall be transferred into a 23 blocked account, pending resolution of this action. 24 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 25 III. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 26 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for an Order from this Court granting him relief as 27 follows: 28 1. Issue an Order awarding specific performance and damages to Plaintiff based 15 COMPLAINT Exhibit A DE-174 ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY Pamela Ty 197285 PROTEC-LAW, APC 712 Bancroft Road, #320 Walnut Creek, CA 94598 TELEPHONE NO.: (925) 262-8238 FAX NO. (Optional): (925) 262-8272 ELECTRONICALLY E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): pty@proteclawcorp.com ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Nelson Wong FILED Superior Court of California, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO County of San Francisco STREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister Street MAILING ADDRESS: 01/17/2024 San Francisco, CA 94102 CITY AND ZIP CODE: Clerk of the Court BY: MICHAEL RAYRAY BRANCH NAME: Civic Center Deputy Clerk ESTATE OF (Name): LILLIAN WONG DECEDENT CASE NUMBER: ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM PES-22-305690 NOTE TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE Attach a copy of the creditor's claim to this form. If approval or rejection by the court is not required, do not include any pages attached to the creditor's claim. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION 1. Name of creditor (specify): Ray Torres 2. The claim was filed on (date): 03/01/2023 3. Date of first issuance of letters: 09/15/2023 4. Date of Notice of Administration: 5. Date of decedent's death: 08/20/2022 6. Estimated value of estate: $ 1,950,000.00 7. Total amount of the claim: $ 1,904,085.71 (The court must approve certain claims before they are paid.) 8. Claim is allowed for: $ (A creditor has 90 days to act on a rejected claim.* See box below.) 9. X Claim is rejected for: $ 1,904,085.71 10. Notice of allowance or rejection given on (date): 1/17/2024 11. X The personal representative is authorized to administer the estate under the Independent Administration of Estates Act. Date:1/12/2024 Nelson Wong (TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE) (SIGNATURE OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE) NOTICE TO CREDITOR ON REJECTED CLAIM From the date that notice of rejection is given, you must act on the rejected claim (e.g., file a lawsuit) as follows: 1. Claim due: within 90 days* after the notice of rejection. 2. Claim not due: within 90 days* after the claim become due. * The 90-day period mentioned above may not apply to your claim because some claims are not treated as creditors' claims or are subject to special statutes of limitations, or for other legal reasons. You should consult with an attorney if you have any questions about or are unsure of your rights and obligations concerning your claim. COURT'S APPROVAL OR REJECTION 12. Approved for: $ 13. Rejected for: $ Date: SIGNATURE OF JUDICIAL OFFICER 14. Number of pages attached: SIGNATURE FOLLOWS LAST ATTACHMENT (Proof of Mailing or Personal Delivery on reverse) Page 1 of 2 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM Probate Code § 9000 et seq., Judicial Council of California 9250-9256, 9353 DE-174 [Rev. January 1, 2009] (Probate-Decedents' Estates) www.courtinfo.ca.gov Ty_Pamela DE-174 ESTATE OF CASE NUMBER: (Name): LILLIAN WONG PES-22-305690 DECEDENT PROOF OF X MAILING PERSONAL DELIVERY TO CREDITOR 1. At the time of mailing or personal delivery I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this proceeding. 2. My residence or business address is (specify): 1090 "B" Street, PMB 170 Hayward, CA 94541 3. I mailed or personally delivered a copy of the Allowance or Rejection of Creditor's Claim as follows (complete either a or b): a. X Mail. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. (1) I enclosed a copy in an envelope AND (a) X deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with the postage fully prepaid. (b) placed the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at the place shown in items below following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collecting and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. (2) The envelope was addressed and mailed first-class as follows: (a) Name of creditor served: Ray Torres and Others See Attached (b) Address on envelope: (c) Date of mailing: 01/17/2024 (d) Place of mailing (city and state): Hayward, CA b. Personal delivery. I personally delivered a copy to the creditor as follows: (1) Name of creditor served: (2) Address where delivered: (3) Date delivered: (4) Time delivered: I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: 01/17/2024 Helen M. Bellamy (TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF DECLARANT) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT) DE-174 [Rev. January 1, 2009] ALLOWANCE OR REJECTION OF CREDITOR'S CLAIM Page 2 of 2 (Probate-Decedents' Estates) Ty_Pamela Estate of Lillian Wong Case No. PES-22-305690 Attachment 1 to Allowance or Rejection of Creditor’s Claim Notice of Hearing ______________________________________________________________________________ Ray Torres Timothy Wong 22 Cameo Way 2041 Willow Way San Francisco, CA 94131 San Bruno, CA 94066 Ray Torres June Lee c/o The Law Office of Ciarán O'Sullivan 1111 Anacapa 50 California Street, 34th Floor Irvine, CA 92602 San Francisco, CA 94111 Jason J. Granskog BOWLES & VERNA LLP 2121 N. California Blvd., Ste 875 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Estate of Lillian Wong Case No. PES-22-305690 DE-174 Attachment Proof of Mailing Allowance and Rejection of Creditor’s Claim ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco 03/01/2023 Clerk of the Court BY: ALISON AGBAY Deputy Clerk Attachment to Creditors’ Claim The following facts relate to the claim brought by Ray Torres (“Ray”) in Lillian Wong’s (“Lillian”) estate: This case involves a love story spanning almost four decades. While the formal claim is brought under Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 660 and its progeny, Ray believes that this is what Lillian would want if she were standing before the Court today. Ray and Lillian began dating in 1985 while working together at a photo lab, Only One Hour Photo. This would be the start of a relationship spanning 37 years. In August 1994, Ray and Lillian began living together at Cameo Way. Lillian was finding it challenging to take care of her elderly mother, who lived with Lillian, without any meaningful assistance from Lillian’s siblings. Ray and Lillian worked together as a team, and Lillian’s mother accepted Ray as a member of the family. Ray often took Lillian’s mother to medical appointments, ran errands for her, and financially contributed to household expenses. Lillian’s mother passed away on September 20, 1998. Ray and Lillian paid for the post-death arrangements for Lillian’s mother, again without any meaningful assistance from Lillian’s siblings. But Ray was willing to do it. It was the last thing Ray could do for Lillian’s mother. Ray and Lillian periodically discussed getting married; however, there did not seem to be any particular urgency. They continued living together and registering their love with the bureaucratic authorities didn’t seem to be something that needed to be done immediately. During the 1990s, it was clear that Lillian’s real property on Cameo Way needed substantial maintenance and renovation work. Lillian added Ray’s name and title to Cameo Way in order to obtain financing. Lillian trusted Ray implicitly. And true to his word, Ray conveyed title back to Lillian’s name alone once it was no longer necessary for Ray’s name to be on title for financing purposes. Ray and Lillian continued to occasionally discuss getting married. In March 2021, they finally decided to do it. The “when we get around to it” was finally becoming a reality. Setting up an estate plan was also one of those things that Ray and Lillian knew they needed to do. Lillian decided to create a trust. Even if Ray and Lillian were married, Ray would only inherit one half of Cameo Way under the laws of intestacy because it would have been Lillian’s separate property. Regardless of whatever else happened, Lillian wanted Ray to have the Cameo Way home they had shared for the previous quarter of a century if she were to predecease him. On March 11, 2021, Lillian executed The California Revocable Living Trust of Lillian Wong (“Lillian’s Trust”). Ray believes that this was a stop gap, and that Lillian intended to execute a more complete document leaving everything to Ray once they were married. Ray and Lillian planned to exchange wedding vows in July 2021. Sadly, that didn’t happen. On June 12, 2021, Lillian suffered a major stroke. Ray called an ambulance and Lillian was taken to the hospital at UCSF. Lillian’s cognitive abilities were not severely affected; however, Lillian was facing physical challenges. Ray and Lillian decided that Lillian should be transferred to an acute rehabilitation center at California Pacific Medical Center – Davies Campus. During Lillian’s stay at the hospital and rehabilitation center between June 12, 2021 to August 8, 2021, Ray would typically arrive at 10:00 AM and leave at 7:00 PM so that Lillian would not be alone. Also, Ray wanted to learn everything he could about how to assist Lillian when she returned home. This proved to be important. When Lillian returned to their Cameo Way home, Ray worked with Lillian around the clock to overcome her physical disabilities. Within eight months, Lillian had learned to walk, use her hands, prepare meals, and engage in other activities she had previously taken for granted. Ray used the instructions from her medical providers to establish a daily routine. Lillian’s team of therapists and medical providers were amazed by her stunning achievements. While being responsible for Lillian’s care 24 hours a day was demanding, Ray was glad to do it. Ray was glad to be there for Lillian to ensure that her needs were met, whether bathing Lillian or taking care of things that Lillian’s physical limitations left her unable to do for herself. It was a labor of love. With all of this happening, the wedding did not happen. It wasn’t that Ray and Lillian didn’t want to be married. If anything, Lillian’s recovery drew Ray and Lillian closer together. But Ray and Lillian were focused on Lillian’s recovery and having a ceremony just wasn’t as much of a priority under the circumstances. Ray and Lillian just wanted Lillian to get well. It all seemed to be progressing, but then Lillian was stricken with illness. On August 8, 2022, Lillian was admitted to California Pacific Medical Center – Davies Campus. She would never leave. Lillian died on August 20, 2022. Ray was devastated. The love of his life, his companion for the past 37 years was gone. Taking control of Lillian’s assets and coldly managing business affairs were the last things on Ray’s mind. Meanwhile, Lillian’s brother Nelson Wong (“Nelson”) could not even wait for the memorial service was over before he began harassing Ray about Lillian’s assets. Among other things, Nelson has asserted that he is entitled to Lillian’s home because he resents that Lillian’s mother gave the property to Lillian over twenty-five years before Lillian’s death. Ray devoted his time, skill and efforts including by providing valuable caretaking services to both Lillian and her mother. This required Ray to alter his position by forgoing other employment opportunities. Ray alleges that an implied oral agreement existed between Ray and Lillian providing that Lillian would leave her entire estate to Ray arising from the Ray and Lillian’s conduct, including the facts alleged herein. Ray is m