Preview
FILED
4/9/2024 1:02 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Lafonda Sims DEPUTY
CAUSE NO. DC-21-17253
BRANDON RAY, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN THE DISTRICT COURT
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF KIMBERLY RAY,
DECEASED AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF
BR., A MINOR; MICHAEL
WOODWORTH, INDIVIDUALLY, AND
DELORES COOK, INDIVIDUALLY,
Plaintiffs,
VS. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOSEPH SCOTT HOUGHTON, APRN-
CRNA; MANSFIELD PAIN SERVICES,
LLC; TEXAS PARTNERS
HEALTHCARE GROUP, P.A.;
INTEGRITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC;
VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA,
M.D.; MAURO ALBERTO MOLINA,
APRN-CRNA; SLEEPYTIME
ANESTHESIA, PLLC; BABER YOUNAS,
M.D.; NORTHEAST ANESTHESIA
ASSOCIATES, PLLC; AND 1918T JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NORTHWEST ANESTHESIA
ASSOCIATES, PLLC;
Defendants.
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D., Defendant in the
above-entitled and numbered cause, before trial has begun, before voir dire examination of the
jury, and before receipt of any evidence, file this his Motion in Limine, and would respectfully
show the Court as follows:
lL
Defendant moves the Court to instruct Plaintiffs’ counsel, Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs’
witnesses to refrain from mentioning, commenting, or divulging, directly or indirectly, or
inquiring during the testimony of any witness, or inquiring of any juror or jurors during voir
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 1 of 22
dire examination regarding, or mentioning during jury argument, unless evidence of such
matters is admitted, any of the matters set forth herein in Exhibit “A.” If Plaintiffs’ attorneys
wish to propose a theory of admissibility concerning these matters, Defendant requests the Court
to order that counsel first must request a ruling from the Court outside the presence and hearing
of all prospective jurors and jurors ultimately selected in this cause.
IL.
The matters set forth in Exhibit “A,” attached hereto and incorporated herein by
teference, would not be admissible evidence for any purpose on proper and timely objection
because they have no rational relationship to any probable or controlling fact issue in dispute, nor
do they have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Ti.
Permitting interrogation of witnesses, comments to jurors, or prospective jurors, or offers
of evidence concerning any of the matters set forth in Exhibit “A” will prejudice the jury and
sustaining objections to such questions, statements, or evidence introduced by counsel or
witnesses will not prevent prejudice but will reinforce the development of questionable evidence.
IV.
Further, the probative value of the matters set forth in Exhibit “A” is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and
as such should not be admissible for any purpose in the cause, and to permit the mentioning of such
matters would unfairly prejudice the jury even with sustaining of any objection to such matters.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant VENKATESWARA RAO
MANDAVA, M.D. requests that this Motion in Limine be granted and an appropriate order be
signed and entered by the Court consistent with this Motion.
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 2 of 22
Respectfully submitted,
SHAW & ASSOCIATES, P.C
By: /s/_ Diane K. Shaw
Diane K. Shaw
State Bar No. 18140300
dshaw@dkshaw.com
Kalvin B. Wiar
State Bar No. 24122576
kwiar@dkshaw.com
10670 N Central Expressway, Suite 245
Dallas, Texas 75231
214/ 217-8357 - telephone
214/ 217-8289 — facsimile
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT,
VENKATESWARA MANDAVA, M.D.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was forwarded on this 9" day of April 2024, to the following:
Michael G. Sawicki ao regular mail
Andrew A. Jones O certified mail, return receipt requested
Sawicki Law c hand delivery
6116 N. Central Expressway, Ste. 1400 X e-file
Dallas, Texas 75206 a facsimile
/s/ Diane K. Shaw
Diane K. Shaw
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 3 of 22
EXHIBIT “A”
1.
Reference to Motion in Limine
Any reference to the filing of this Motion in Limine or to any ruling by the Court in response
to this Motion, as such references are inherently prejudicial in that they suggest or infer that the movant
has sought to prohibit proof or that the Court has excluded proof of certain matters. TEX. R. EVID:).
401-403; see Cody v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 595 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ
ref'd n..e.); Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 76970 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ
ref'd n.t.e.); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Phillips, 255 S.W.2d 364, 365-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1953, writ ref’d n-r.e.).
Sustained Denied Modified
2.
Insurance Coverag
Any reference, directly or indirectly, to the fact that Defendant is or was not covered by some
form of liability insurance with respect to the incident in question, any reference to Defendant’s
insurer(s) or his personnel, including use of the words “adjuster, 29 «6, claim agent,” or “claim” in any
form, or any investigation of the events of this case by the insurer(s), and any reference that any
health care provider called as an expert witness on Defendant’s behalf is covered by insurance, for
the reason that such fact is entirely immaterial to any issue in this cause, and any mention or
inference thereof, directly or indirectly, would be extremely harmful and prejudicial to Defendant.
TEX. R. Evip. 411; see General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1977); Texas
Co. v. Betterton, 88 S.W.2d 1039, 1040 (Tex. 1936); Page v. Thomas, 71 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. 1934);
Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20, 21-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1969, writ refd n.re.)
(inquiry as to connections with insurance industry during voir dire and references to insurance during
the trial); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Acosta, 435 S.W.2d 539, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1 Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.re.) (repeated reference to an “adjuster” during final
arguments); Green v. Ligon, 190 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(questions to the jury during voir dire about insurance and evidence that jury considered insurance in
deliberations).
Sustained. Denied. Modified
3.
Connection with Insurance Industry
From inquiring of any member of the venire as to any connection with the insurance industry,
and in this connection Defendant would point out to the Court that if Plaintiffs’ counsel is sincerely
interested in determining whether there is any such connection for purposes of exercising jury
strikes, they can do so by asking each individual juror their occupation, past occupations, and
that of those in their household, which will provide relevant information and at the same time,
avoid harming Defendant by interjecting insurance into the case. TEX. R. Evip. 411; see
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 4 of 22
Hemmenway v. Skibo, 498 S.W.2d 9, 11-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(cumulative error required reversal; questions to jury on voir dire about connections to the
insurance industry; statements inferring the Defendant was insured during examination of the
Plaintiffs and in closing argument; other objectionable argument); 4. J. Miller Trucking Co. v.
Wood, 474 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (questions and follow-
up questions to jury during voir dire about insurance); Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20, 21-22
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d n.re.) (inquiry as to connections with
insurance industry during voir dire and references to insurance during the trial); Atchison, Topeka
& Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Acosta, 435 S.W.2d 539, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1968,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (repeated reference to an “adjuster” during final arguments); Green v. Ligon,
190 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ ref’d n.t.e.) (questions to jury
during voir dire about insurance and evidence that jury considered insurance in deliberations).
Sustained Denied Modified
4.
Answer Damage Issue “Regardless of Who Pays”
From interrogating any member of the venire as to whether they would answer an issue
on damages in accordance with the evidence, regardless of who pays the damages or when they
will be paid, or whether they will ever be paid, or any similar version of inquiry, for the reason that
the same improperly injects the implication of insurance and wealth into the suit, and Defendant
further moves the Court to instruct Plaintiffs’ counsel not to make any such reference in jury
argument of similar import. TEx. R. Evip. 401-403, 411; see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Murphree, 357 S.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 1962); Wright v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 130,
133-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ); Griffith v. Castell, 313 S.W.2d 149, 155-56 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref’d n.t.e.); Ulmer v. Mackey, 242 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Sustained Denied Modified
5.
Adverse Verdict's Effect on Insurance Rates
Any inquiry about the identity of the professional liability insurance carrier(s) for
Defendant or any expert witness called by Defendant, and whether they have any feeling or
belief that an adverse verdict against Defendant would affect their malpractice insurance rates. In
Mendoza v. Varon, 563 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court
refused to permit Plaintiffs’ counsel to make this inquiry. Distinguishing the case from Barton
Plumbing Co. v. Johnson, 285 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955, writ ref?d), where an
expert medical witness was a stockholder and director of Defendants’ automobile liability
insurance carrier, the court in Mendoza stated that:
Tn the present case, however, the witness had no direct interest in the outcome of the
litigation, as would an agent, owner or employee of the Defendant’s insurer. While it is true
that a large judgment against any doctor will probably affect the insurance rates of other
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 5 of 22
physicians, this interest is remote, and any proof of bias based upon the interest is outweighed
by the prejudice by informing the jury of the Defendants’ insurance protection.
Mendoza, 563 S.W.2d at 649; see also Waddell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 660, 66163
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ) (improper argument on potential effect of judgment on
insurance premiums). Any inquiry by Plaintiffs’ counsel about liability insurance would be highly
prejudicial to Defendant. TEx. R. Evip. 403.
Sustained Denied Modified
6.
Financial Wealth
From mentioning, referring to, or asking questions regarding Defendant’s financial status,
or regarding the assets, property, liabilities, or wealth of Defendant for the reason that such
collateral financial matters are not relevant to any material issue in this lawsuit and would be brought
up solely for the purpose of prejudice and inflammation of the jury. Any reference to Defendant’s
finances, ability to pay, or other matters relating to their financial status would constitute an effort
to “compare the wealth” of the parties and can only serve the purpose of creating prejudice against
Defendant, thereby causing the jury to reach a verdict based on emotion, rather than fact, and would,
in all probability, have such effect. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011 (Vernon
1997); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cordova, 856 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ
denied); Murphy v. Waldrip, 692 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.);
First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. Bauert, 622 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ);
First Nat’l Bank of Marshall v. Beavers, 619 S.W.2d 288, 289-90 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Wilmoth v. Limestone Prods. Co., 255 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Sustained Denied Modified
7.
Damages Received
Any reference to the fact that Plaintiffs may not receive the full amount awarded because of
attorney’s fees, expenses, and taxes. Such collateral matters are irrelevant and not necessary to
determine the existence or extent of liability, injury, or damage in this case. Therefore, such
information is inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. TEX. R. EvID. 401-403.
Sustained Denied Modified
8.
Reference to Income Taxes
Any reference to income taxes, income tax consequences, or any failure to adjust any
opinions, testimony, or calculations for any income tax issues.
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 6 of 22
Sustained Denied Modified
9.
Alteration of or Tampering with Records
Any reference to, mention of, or comment regarding alteration of or tampering with
records, as same is irrelevant, immaterial and highly inflammatory, and would result in unfair
prejudice to Defendant, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. TEX. R. Evip. 401-403.
Sustained Denied. Modified
10.
Conspiracy of Silenc:
Mention of the so-called “conspiracy of silence” between medical personnel, or any other
direct or indirect references, statements, or inferences suggestive to the jury that medical expert
witnesses, or any other form of testimony or access to witnesses, is less available to Plaintiffs in
this case than any other party to the case, for the reason that such would be wholly improper, would
be a reference to the proposed or alleged attempts of Plaintiffs to enlist witnesses in the case, which
would be matters of hearsay not subject to proof in the trial of this matter and not material or relevant
to any of Plaintiffs’ issues in the case. In addition, such matters would be solely for the purpose of
unfair prejudice and inflammation of the jury. TEX. R. EVID. 401-403, 801-804.
Sustained Denied Modified
11.
Privileged Communications
To refrain from mentioning, suggesting, or inquiring regarding any supposed
investigation, inquiries, hearings, or conversations or communications between or among
Defendant and/or his agents, servants, representatives, and/or employees subsequent to the
occurrence in issue, for the reason that whether such investigation, inquiries, hearings,
conversations, or communications did or did not occur is not a matter subject to discovery and is
not a matter which would be admissible as evidence in this case, that a suggestion to the inquiry by
Plaintiff that a thorough inquiry was not conducted would be just as harmful as would a
suggestion to the jury that such matters had been conducted, or did transpire, but that the jury had
not been advised of the results, accomplishments, contents, or conclusions thereof. All such
matters would be matters specifically exempted from admissibility by the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure as communications passing between agents and employees of Defendant, regardless of
the occurrence upon which Plaintiffs’ suit is based, or would be exempt from discovery under
Chapters 160, 164, and 300 of the Texas Occupations Code, Chapter 161 of the Texas Health &
Safety Code, and 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq., or would be matters of hearsay, or would be wholly
irrelevant and immaterial to any issue before the jury in this case and would be mentioned solely
for the purpose of prejudicing the jury against this Defendant regarding matters which are not
discoverable or admissible into evidence. TEX. R. EvID). 401-404, 503, 513, 802; TEX. R. Civ, P.
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 7 of 22
192.5; see also TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 160.006(a), (c); 160.007(a), (e); 164.007(c); 300.007
(Vernon 2001); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001); 42
US.C. § 11101 et seq.
Sustained Denied Modified
12.
Settlement Negotiation:
Any evidence of or any reference to any compromise and/or settlement demands, offers,
discussions, or negotiations, any invocations of the Stowers doctrine, or any final settlements
between any of the parties to this lawsuit. TEX. R. EVID. 408; see Laviage v. Laviage, 647 S.W.2d
758, 760 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ); Siegler v. Telco Leasing, Inc., 593 S.W.2d 850, 852
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1980, no writ); see also Brannan v. Texas Employers Ins.
Assoc., 248 $.W.2d 118, 119-20 (Tex. 1952).
Sustained Denied Modified
13.
Hearsay Statements
Any mention or statement to the jury concerning what Plaintiffs have been told by any
doctor, nurse, health care provider, or any medical witness as to the cause of their injuries, or of the
probable testimony or statements of a witness who is absent, unavailable, or not called to testify
in this case. Such matters are clearly hearsay and inadmissible. TEX. R. EviD. 801-804; see Brown
v. Bettinger, 882 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ) (doctor’s discussion with
patient regarding surgical procedures hearsay); Lopez v. Link, 757 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1* Dist.] 1988, no writ) (doctor’s out-of-court statement to Plaintiffs as to her condition
and diagnosis in-admissible hearsay); Massey v. Aztec Life Ins. Co., 532 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ) (statements by a doctor to the Plaintiff's inadmissible hearsay and
opinion testimony). This would include email communications from nonparties including
American Staffing and Delta Locums. Plaintiffs have a list of affidavits, letters, and other court
proceedings that are used for the sole purpose of prejudice to inflame the jury against Dr.
Mandava. Same is not only hearsay statements; it is also irrelevant and more prejudicial than
probative under Rule 403.
Sustained Denied Modified
14.
Failure to Call Equally Available Witnesse:
Any reference to or mention of Defendant’s failure to call to testify any witness equally
wailable to all parties in this cause. Cf Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 240 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Texas Power & Light Co. v. Walker, 559 S.W.2d 403, 406
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ); Sanders v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 429
S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 8 of 22
Sustained Denied Modified
15.
Testimony or Comments of Absent Witnes:
Any reference to, reading from, offer of, tender of, or exhibit of any ex parte statements
or reports from any witness who is absent, unavailable, or not called to testify and thereby subject
to examination by Defendant’s counsel, or the mention of or reference to the probable testimony of
such witness, or any suggestion of what would have been the testimony of any witness not actually
called. See Grogan v. Santos, 617 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); Texas Power &
Light Co. v. Walker, 559 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ); Sanders v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 429 S.W.2d 516, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref’d
m.r.e.).
Sustained Denied Modified.
16.
Comment on Discovery
Any reference to the fact that Defendant or his attorneys sought to prevent discovery of
any documentation, information, or evidence during the pretrial discovery, or after the trial began,
through the assertion of objections, motions for protection, instructions from counsel, or
privileges. The fact that Defendant made or filed objections and refused to answer questions until
such objections were brought before this Court for a ruling, and Defendant’s claims of privilege in
this proceeding or upon prior occasion are meaningless, irrelevant, and immaterial to any issue in
this case, and such matters would be referred to only for the purpose of prejudicing the jury against
Defendant. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403, 513; TEX. R. Civ. P. 192; see also Goode v. Slionkfeh, 943 S.W.2d
441, 449 (Tex. 1997).
Sustained Denied Modified
17.
Demands or Requests from Defendant’s File:
To refrain from making any demands or requests before the jury for matters found or
contained in the files of Defendant or Defendant’s attorneys, which would include statements,
pleadings, photographs, or other documents or tangible things, and from making any reference to
the location of Defendant’s files, Defendant’s willingness to produce his files for inspection, or
any other reference to such files. Such matters are privileged or potentially privileged from
disclosure to Plaintiff under the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
TEX. R. Evib. 401-403, 503; TEX. R. CIv. P. 192.5; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Valdez,
863 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. 1993).
Sustained Denied Modified
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 9 of 22
18.
Request for Stipulation in Jury’s Presence
Requesting Defendant or Defendant’s attorneys to stipulate to the admissibility of any
evidence or to any facts or matters in front of the jury. TEX. R. EVID. 401-403.
Sustained Denied Modified
19.
Questioning Defendant’s Attorneys and Representative:
Making any statement or argument personalizing any of the issues in this case with regard
to counsel for the Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiffs should be restrained from making any
statements or arguments or asking questions calling upon any of Defendant’s attorneys, or any
agent, representative, or employee of Defendant, to respond as to how they would react or what
they may desire if they were in a position similar to the Plaintiffs in this action. Same would not be
proper as evidence and would be highly inappropriate jury argument. TEX. R. Evip. 401-403.
Sustained Denied Modified
20.
Attorneys’ Comments in Deposition
Any reading of or reference to comments or statements by an attorney, other than
questions to witnesses, contained in any deposition taken in this case because such constitutes
unsworn testimony or statements and is not relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 401-403, 801-802.
Sustained Denied Modified
21.
Reference to Deposition Questions with a Sustained Orde:
Any reference to questions asked in depositions to which the Court sustained objections,
as such matters are irrelevant, immaterial, nonresponsive, improper, without proper predicate,
and/ or privileged, and it would be prejudicial to Defendant to refer to such questions and
objections in the presence of the jury. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403.
Sustained Denied Modified
22.
Reference to Document Requests during a Deposition
Any reference to any remarks made to Defendant or counsel for Defendant in any
deposition or otherwise for the production of any documents and tangible items. Such is not
relevant to any issue which would be presented for jury determination. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403.
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 10 of 22
Sustained Denied Modified
23.
Opinion Testimony by Unqualified Witnesse:
That Plaintiffs or any of Plaintiffs’ witnesses who are not specifically qualified health care
practitioners have any opinion as to whether the events made the basis of this lawsuit were in
accordance with the applicable standard of care and/or supposedly caused any of the results or
medical problems, diseases, injuries, or conditions for which Plaintiffs seek to recover in their
case, for the reason that the existence of such opinions or the substance of such opinions would be
wholly inadmissible, would relate testimony about matters that require medical expertise, and/ or
must be established with reasonable medical probability by the medical opinion of medical
doctors. TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE §74.401 (VERNONS 2003); TEX. R. EvID.
401-403, 701-702; see also Daniels v. Yancey, 175 S.W.3d 889, 893 (Tex. App. — Texarkana
2005, no pet.); Merrell Dow Pharnns., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711-12 (Tex. 1997);
Broders v. Heise, 924 §.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Tex. 1996); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66
(Tex. 1977); Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tex. App.-Houston [14" Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Shook v.
Herman, 759 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); Ortiz v. Santa Rosa Hosp.,
702 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.t.e.). The EMT in this case has
made assertions without knowledge of Dr. Mandava’s conduct prior to arrival and the Director of
Nursing that was present refutes said statements. The EMT is not qualified, and Plaintiffs seek to
use his testimony solely to inflame the jury. This testimony is irrelevant and more prejudicial
than probative under Rule 403.
Sustained Denied Modified
24.
Jury Questions
Any statement by Plaintiffs’ attorneys calculated to inform the jury of the effect of their
answer to jury questions. See Waddell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 660, 66163 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ) (improper argument on potential effect of judgment on
insurance premiums); Cooper v. Argonaut, 430 S.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (improper comment to jury on potential dollar amount of award).
Sustained Denied Modified
25.
Damage Limitation
Any reference to or mention of the damage limitations on civil liability contained in
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, and/or the United States or Texas Constitutions, for the reason that such
collateral matters are not related to any material issue in this lawsuit and would be inquired into
solely for the purpose of prejudice and inflammation of the jury. TEx. R. Evip. 401-403; see Tex.
Civ. P. REM. CODE§ 74.301, 74.302, 74.303, (Vernon 2003); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 11 of 22
41.012 (Vernon 1997).
Sustained Denied Modified
26.
Attorney-Client and Other Claims of Privilege
Any matters or communications that have transacted between Defendant’s attorneys, both
past and present, and Defendant, including but not limited to the terms and conditions of any and all
employment contracts and all transactions connected thereto. In this connection, Defendant claims
the lawyer-client privilege under Texas Rule of Evidence 503. Further, to refrain from mentioning,
referring to, or asking questions regarding Defendant’s claim of privilege, whether in the present
proceeding or upon prior occasion, for the reason that such is not a proper subject of comment by
judge or counsel, and no inference may be drawn therefrom. Rule 513 of the Texas Rules of
Evidence states that in jury cases proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to
facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury. TEx. R. EviD). 503,
513; see also Bearden v. Boone, 693 S.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ); Foster
v. Buchele, 213 S.W.2d 738, 742-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Sustained Denied Modified
27.
Production of Privileged Documents
To refrain from mentioning, referring to, or suggesting that Defendant, his witnesses, or
defense counsel objected to, refused, allegedly refused, or failed to produce or cause to be produced
any document, report, statement, or other material or information that is either privileged under the
Texas Rules of Evidence, or any other statute including, without limitation, the Texas Medical
Practice Act, the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, the Texas Health and
Safety Code, the Texas Occupations Code, and any relevant federal statutes or federal or state
regulations, when production of same was not required by Court Order, or which production was
objected to by Defendant and such objection was not overruled by the Court. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403;
TEX. R. Crv. P. 192; see Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 8.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex. 1997).
Sustained Denied Modified
28.
Prior Court Appearances and Testimony of Defendant
Any reference or inference that Defendant, Defendant’s witnesses, or any employee of
Defendant has or may have appeared as a witness in a court of law or given testimony in any
capacity during a deposition or trial of any other cause of action, for the reason that such collateral
matters are not related to any material issue in this lawsuit and would be inquired into solely for the
purpose of prejudice and to inflame the jury, and would be highly prejudicial to Defendant. TEX. R.
Evip. 401-403. Further, any other lawsuits, trials, testimony, opinions, or outcome of trial for any
party or their experts. This is not intended to include the number of times the experts have testified.
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 12 of 22
Specifically, Plaintiffs have raised lawsuit documents with substantiated claims relating to
privileges to inflame and prejudice Dr. Mandava. Same is irrelevant and more prejudicial than
probative under Rule 403.
Sustained Denied _ Modified
29,
Other Litigation
Any reference or inference that either Defendant or any agent or employee of Defendant has
been or is involved in any litigation, including but not limited to any court opinion, jury verdict,
any verdict for punitive damages, and/or jury finding that Defendant has been found professionally
negligent or to have committed medical malpractice. Such collateral matters are not related to any
material issue in this lawsuit and would be inquired into solely for the purpose of prejudicing the
jury with collateral matters, the merits of which could not possibly be litigated in this suit, and
would be highly prejudicial to Defendant. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403; see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Murphree, 357 S.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 1962); Wright v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 130,
133-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ). This is intended to include, though is not limited to,
Mandava, M.D. v. Howard County General Hospital, Inc., 1992 WL 165804 (D.D.Mar. 1992).
Specifically, Plaintiffs have raised lawsuit documents with substantiated claims relating to
privileges to inflame and prejudice Dr. Mandava. Same is irrelevant and more prejudicial than
probative under Rule 403.
Sustained Denied Modified
30.
Unrelated or Prior Suits, Claims, or Settlements
To refrain from mentioning, suggesting, implying, or inquiring about any lawsuits or other
types of claims, demands, accusations, charges, inquiries, or investigations that have in the past
been filed, made, or conducted or are presently pending against Defendant or any employee, agent,
or representative of Defendant, or that Defendant or his employees, agents, or representatives
have settled any such claim(s), or the amount(s) of any such settlement(s), for the reason that such
matters are wholly irrelevant to the medical issues in the case, and would be mentioned solely for
the purpose of prejudicing the jury with collateral matters, the merits of which could not possibly
be litigated in this suit. TEX. R. EvID. 401-403; see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree,
357 S.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 1962); Wright v. Excalibur Ins. no., 486 S.W.2d 130,133-35 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, no writ).
Sustained Denied Modified
31.
Prior Claims or Lawsuits Against Defendant’s Experts or Other Witnesse:
Any reference to prior lawsuits or claims, including malpractice claims or suits, filed against
any expert witness or other witness called by Defendant to testify at the trial of this case. Any such
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 13 of 22
reference would be highly prejudicial to Defendant, would lead to confusion of the issues, and
would only tend to mislead the jury. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403; see Irwin v. Parc-Oil Well Servicing
Co., 349 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (offer of pleadings
between a party to the present action and a third party is wholly inadmissible unless admission
against interest).
Sustained Denied Modified
32.
Personal History
Any evidence of or reference to the personal history or any character trait of Defendant or
any agent, representative, or employee of Defendant, as such would only obscure the issues
before the jury and are wholly irrelevant and highly prejudicial to Defendant, as there is no direct
evidence that any of these issues affected the care and treatment that Kimberly Ray received by
Defendant. TEx. R. EviD. 401-404, 608; see Dudley v. Humana Hosp. Corp., 817 S.W.2d 124, 126
(Tex. App.-Houston [14" Dist.] 1991, no writ) (“although facts may be established circumstantially,
the circumstances themselves must be shown with direct evidence”); Lade v. Keller, 615 S.W.2d 916,
919 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (rule is well settled that evidence of a party’s character is not
admissible except where it is directly on the issue and is of special importance).
Sustained Denied Modified
33.
Violation of Laws
Any reference to the violation or alleged violation of any law, statute, or ordinance by
Defendant, for the reason that such violations, if any, are matters of law for the Court only. Cf
Simms y. Southwest Tex. Methodist Hosp., 535 S.W.2d 192, 200-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1976, writ ref’'d n.r.e.).
Sustained Denied Modified
34,
Predicate for Standard of Care Negligence, and Proximate Cause Testimony
Seeking to introduce any purported expert opinion testimony as to standard of care, negligence,
or proximate cause from any witness until proper predicate, admissibility, qualifications, and
competency have been established. TEX. R. EvID. 701-703, 705; see Daniels v. Yancy, 175 S.W.3d
889, 893 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 711-13 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119 (1998); Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d
148, 152 (Tex. 1996) (not every licensed medical doctor is automatically qualified to testify as an
expert on every medical question); /sern v. Watson, 942 S.W.2d 186, 193 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1997, writ denied).
Sustained Denied Modified
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 14 of 22
35.
Medical Standard of Care on “Good Medical Practice” Basis
Inquiring of any treating physician or expert witness regarding “good medical practice,”
“reasonable medical practice, 9 66 ‘prudent medical practice,” “standard medical practice,” or other such
inquiries as such is an improper inquiry regarding standard of care, invades the province of the jury as
being a mixed question of law and fact, and is otherwise confusing and prejudicial. See Snow v.
Bond, 438 8.W.2d 549, 550-51 (Tex. 1969); Guidry v. Phillips, 580 S.W.2d 883, 885-86 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14" Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Burks v. Meredith, 546 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Killion v. Hyde, 471 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Sustained Denied Modified
36.
Grading Defendant or Comment on What Testifying Expert Would Have Done
Asking a witness to grade the actions of Defendant (i.e., A, B, C, D, F or otherwise), or
asking a witness if Defendant’s actions were “passing” or “failing,” or any reference as to what any
witness personally did or would have done under the same or similar circumstances, as such
inquiry invades the province of the jury and departs from the proper method of witness questioning
regarding compliance with the applicable standard of care. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403; see Milke v.
Metni, 658 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ) (conclusory statements of what expert
witness would have done, whether he would have done same as Defendant, or whether Defendant
was negligent are inadmissible conclusions); see also Coan v. Winters, 646 S.W.2d 655, 657-58
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same); McGrath v. Brown, 622 S.W.2d 647, 648
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (expert opinion inadmissible absent establishment of
standard of care); Stanton v. Westbrook, 598 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14
Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (testifying expert cannot establish standard of care by testifying as to
what he would have done under the same or similar circumstances); Smith v. Guthrie, 557 S.W.2d
163, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ) (testimony of what specialist expert witness
would have done inadmissable concerning actions by general practitioner Defendants).
Sustained Denied Modified
37.
Standard of Care
Ask any question, provide any testimony, or otherwise make any reference to any practices,
writings, policies, procedures, protocols, guidelines, standards, care plans, or otherwise of
Defendant or any other entity as creating or establishing a standard of care in and of themselves
without first establishing, outside the presence of the jury, that such was in fact the prevailing
standard of care at the time of the incident in question. Hilzendager v. Methodist Hosp., 596
S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 Dist.] 1980, no writ).
Sustained Denied Modified
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 15 of 22
38.
Testimony of Any Witness Not Particularly Disclosed
Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
The offering by Plaintiffs of any expert or opinion testimony of any kind or character of any
witness who has not been fully, properly, or timely designated by Plaintiffs as an expert or as a
person with knowledge of relevant facts in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Further, Plaintiffs should be precluded from offering any opinion testimony from any witness
other than the opinions and conclusions that were timely disclosed pursuant to outstanding
discovery requests, particularly concerning the medical standards of care and practice or the
reasonably prudent medical care and treatment, or any ultimate negligence or malpractice or
causation issues applicable to this case. Any attempt to elicit any testimony from any person not
properly, timely, and fully disclosed or designated should be excluded. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403; TEX.
R. Clv. P. 192.3(e), 193.5, 193.6, 197, 215.2; see Schein v. American Rest. Group, Inc., 852 $.W.2d
496, 497 (Tex. 1993) (party who fails to comply with discovery request may be prohibited from
introducing that evidence at trial); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 363
(Tex. 1987) (op. on reh’g); Morrow v. HEB, Inc., 714 $.W.2d 297, 297-98 (Tex. 1986); Yeldell v.
Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Ctr., Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243, 246-47 (Tex. 1985); Tinkle v.
Henderson, 777 §.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied) (once party fails to timely
identify witness, exclusion is automatic).
Sustained Denied Modified
39.
Rebuttal Testimony
Referring to or seeking rebuttal testimony from any person and/or expert not previously
identified or disclosed in written discovery by the party presenting such witness without first
establishing, outside the presence of the jury, the appropriateness of such testimony.
Sustained Denied Modified
40.
Matters/Evidence Not Properly Provided in
Response to Defendant’s Discovery to Plaintiffs
Any matters, testimony, evidence, or documentation, including but not limited to
medical/mental health records, expenses or other damages, photographs, publications, slides, and
visual representations that have not been timely, properly, and fully supplied or produced by
Plaintiffs in response to Defendant’s discovery requests to Plaintiffs, or mention or allusion to
any such matters, testimony, evidence, or documentation. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403; TEX. R. Clv. P.
192.3(e), 193.5, 193.6, 197, 215.2; see Schein v. American Rest. Group, Inc., 852 8.W.2d 496, 497
(Tex. 1993) (party who fails to comply with discovery request may be prohibited from
introducing that evidence at trial); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 363
(Tex. 1987) (op. on reh’g); Morrow v. HEB, Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 297-98 (Tex. 1986); Yeldell v.
DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 16 of 22
Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Ctr. Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243, 246-47 (Tex. 1985); Tinkle v.
Henderson, 777 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied) (once party fails to timely
identify witness, exclusion is automatic).
Sustained Denied Modified
41.
Evidence from Records Not Properly Proved and Filed with the Court
Any evidence or documentation, including but not limited to Plaintiffs’ medical records
and expenses, that has not been properly proved up and filed with the Court in accordance with the
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code and the Texas Rules of Evidence. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 18.001 (Vernon 1997); TEX. R. EVID. 803(6), 902(10).
Sustained Denied Modified
42.
Presentation of Equipment
Presenting to the jury, having in the courtroom, or seeking manipulation of or handling of
any equipment or devices without first establishing outside the presence of the jury the relevancy of
same and that such equipment and/or device or otherwise establish a foundation for use of same.
Sustained Denied Modified
43.
Use of Photographs or Motion Pictures
Should Plaintiffs wish to introduce any photographs, videotapes, videotaped depositions,
movies, motion picture films, day-in-the-life films, computer
Preview
FILED 4/9/2024 1:02 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Lafonda Sims DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-21-17253 BRANDON RAY, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN THE DISTRICT COURT AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF KIMBERLY RAY, DECEASED AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF BR., A MINOR; MICHAEL WOODWORTH, INDIVIDUALLY, AND DELORES COOK, INDIVIDUALLY, Plaintiffs, VS. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS JOSEPH SCOTT HOUGHTON, APRN- CRNA; MANSFIELD PAIN SERVICES, LLC; TEXAS PARTNERS HEALTHCARE GROUP, P.A.; INTEGRITY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC; VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.; MAURO ALBERTO MOLINA, APRN-CRNA; SLEEPYTIME ANESTHESIA, PLLC; BABER YOUNAS, M.D.; NORTHEAST ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, PLLC; AND 1918T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NORTHWEST ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, PLLC; Defendants. DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D., Defendant in the above-entitled and numbered cause, before trial has begun, before voir dire examination of the jury, and before receipt of any evidence, file this his Motion in Limine, and would respectfully show the Court as follows: lL Defendant moves the Court to instruct Plaintiffs’ counsel, Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs’ witnesses to refrain from mentioning, commenting, or divulging, directly or indirectly, or inquiring during the testimony of any witness, or inquiring of any juror or jurors during voir DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 1 of 22 dire examination regarding, or mentioning during jury argument, unless evidence of such matters is admitted, any of the matters set forth herein in Exhibit “A.” If Plaintiffs’ attorneys wish to propose a theory of admissibility concerning these matters, Defendant requests the Court to order that counsel first must request a ruling from the Court outside the presence and hearing of all prospective jurors and jurors ultimately selected in this cause. IL. The matters set forth in Exhibit “A,” attached hereto and incorporated herein by teference, would not be admissible evidence for any purpose on proper and timely objection because they have no rational relationship to any probable or controlling fact issue in dispute, nor do they have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ti. Permitting interrogation of witnesses, comments to jurors, or prospective jurors, or offers of evidence concerning any of the matters set forth in Exhibit “A” will prejudice the jury and sustaining objections to such questions, statements, or evidence introduced by counsel or witnesses will not prevent prejudice but will reinforce the development of questionable evidence. IV. Further, the probative value of the matters set forth in Exhibit “A” is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and as such should not be admissible for any purpose in the cause, and to permit the mentioning of such matters would unfairly prejudice the jury even with sustaining of any objection to such matters. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D. requests that this Motion in Limine be granted and an appropriate order be signed and entered by the Court consistent with this Motion. DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 2 of 22 Respectfully submitted, SHAW & ASSOCIATES, P.C By: /s/_ Diane K. Shaw Diane K. Shaw State Bar No. 18140300 dshaw@dkshaw.com Kalvin B. Wiar State Bar No. 24122576 kwiar@dkshaw.com 10670 N Central Expressway, Suite 245 Dallas, Texas 75231 214/ 217-8357 - telephone 214/ 217-8289 — facsimile ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT, VENKATESWARA MANDAVA, M.D. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was forwarded on this 9" day of April 2024, to the following: Michael G. Sawicki ao regular mail Andrew A. Jones O certified mail, return receipt requested Sawicki Law c hand delivery 6116 N. Central Expressway, Ste. 1400 X e-file Dallas, Texas 75206 a facsimile /s/ Diane K. Shaw Diane K. Shaw DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 3 of 22 EXHIBIT “A” 1. Reference to Motion in Limine Any reference to the filing of this Motion in Limine or to any ruling by the Court in response to this Motion, as such references are inherently prejudicial in that they suggest or infer that the movant has sought to prohibit proof or that the Court has excluded proof of certain matters. TEX. R. EVID:). 401-403; see Cody v. Mustang Oil Tool Co., 595 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n..e.); Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 76970 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.t.e.); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Phillips, 255 S.W.2d 364, 365-66 (Tex. Civ. App.- Eastland 1953, writ ref’d n-r.e.). Sustained Denied Modified 2. Insurance Coverag Any reference, directly or indirectly, to the fact that Defendant is or was not covered by some form of liability insurance with respect to the incident in question, any reference to Defendant’s insurer(s) or his personnel, including use of the words “adjuster, 29 «6, claim agent,” or “claim” in any form, or any investigation of the events of this case by the insurer(s), and any reference that any health care provider called as an expert witness on Defendant’s behalf is covered by insurance, for the reason that such fact is entirely immaterial to any issue in this cause, and any mention or inference thereof, directly or indirectly, would be extremely harmful and prejudicial to Defendant. TEX. R. Evip. 411; see General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1977); Texas Co. v. Betterton, 88 S.W.2d 1039, 1040 (Tex. 1936); Page v. Thomas, 71 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. 1934); Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20, 21-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1969, writ refd n.re.) (inquiry as to connections with insurance industry during voir dire and references to insurance during the trial); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Acosta, 435 S.W.2d 539, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.- Houston [1 Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.re.) (repeated reference to an “adjuster” during final arguments); Green v. Ligon, 190 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (questions to the jury during voir dire about insurance and evidence that jury considered insurance in deliberations). Sustained. Denied. Modified 3. Connection with Insurance Industry From inquiring of any member of the venire as to any connection with the insurance industry, and in this connection Defendant would point out to the Court that if Plaintiffs’ counsel is sincerely interested in determining whether there is any such connection for purposes of exercising jury strikes, they can do so by asking each individual juror their occupation, past occupations, and that of those in their household, which will provide relevant information and at the same time, avoid harming Defendant by interjecting insurance into the case. TEX. R. Evip. 411; see DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 4 of 22 Hemmenway v. Skibo, 498 S.W.2d 9, 11-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (cumulative error required reversal; questions to jury on voir dire about connections to the insurance industry; statements inferring the Defendant was insured during examination of the Plaintiffs and in closing argument; other objectionable argument); 4. J. Miller Trucking Co. v. Wood, 474 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (questions and follow- up questions to jury during voir dire about insurance); Brockett v. Tice, 445 S.W.2d 20, 21-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d n.re.) (inquiry as to connections with insurance industry during voir dire and references to insurance during the trial); Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Acosta, 435 S.W.2d 539, 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (repeated reference to an “adjuster” during final arguments); Green v. Ligon, 190 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, writ ref’d n.t.e.) (questions to jury during voir dire about insurance and evidence that jury considered insurance in deliberations). Sustained Denied Modified 4. Answer Damage Issue “Regardless of Who Pays” From interrogating any member of the venire as to whether they would answer an issue on damages in accordance with the evidence, regardless of who pays the damages or when they will be paid, or whether they will ever be paid, or any similar version of inquiry, for the reason that the same improperly injects the implication of insurance and wealth into the suit, and Defendant further moves the Court to instruct Plaintiffs’ counsel not to make any such reference in jury argument of similar import. TEx. R. Evip. 401-403, 411; see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 357 S.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 1962); Wright v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 130, 133-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ); Griffith v. Castell, 313 S.W.2d 149, 155-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, writ ref’d n.t.e.); Ulmer v. Mackey, 242 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Sustained Denied Modified 5. Adverse Verdict's Effect on Insurance Rates Any inquiry about the identity of the professional liability insurance carrier(s) for Defendant or any expert witness called by Defendant, and whether they have any feeling or belief that an adverse verdict against Defendant would affect their malpractice insurance rates. In Mendoza v. Varon, 563 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court refused to permit Plaintiffs’ counsel to make this inquiry. Distinguishing the case from Barton Plumbing Co. v. Johnson, 285 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1955, writ ref?d), where an expert medical witness was a stockholder and director of Defendants’ automobile liability insurance carrier, the court in Mendoza stated that: Tn the present case, however, the witness had no direct interest in the outcome of the litigation, as would an agent, owner or employee of the Defendant’s insurer. While it is true that a large judgment against any doctor will probably affect the insurance rates of other DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 5 of 22 physicians, this interest is remote, and any proof of bias based upon the interest is outweighed by the prejudice by informing the jury of the Defendants’ insurance protection. Mendoza, 563 S.W.2d at 649; see also Waddell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 660, 66163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ) (improper argument on potential effect of judgment on insurance premiums). Any inquiry by Plaintiffs’ counsel about liability insurance would be highly prejudicial to Defendant. TEx. R. Evip. 403. Sustained Denied Modified 6. Financial Wealth From mentioning, referring to, or asking questions regarding Defendant’s financial status, or regarding the assets, property, liabilities, or wealth of Defendant for the reason that such collateral financial matters are not relevant to any material issue in this lawsuit and would be brought up solely for the purpose of prejudice and inflammation of the jury. Any reference to Defendant’s finances, ability to pay, or other matters relating to their financial status would constitute an effort to “compare the wealth” of the parties and can only serve the purpose of creating prejudice against Defendant, thereby causing the jury to reach a verdict based on emotion, rather than fact, and would, in all probability, have such effect. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011 (Vernon 1997); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cordova, 856 S.W.2d 768, 774 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied); Murphy v. Waldrip, 692 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. Bauert, 622 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); First Nat’l Bank of Marshall v. Beavers, 619 S.W.2d 288, 289-90 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wilmoth v. Limestone Prods. Co., 255 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Sustained Denied Modified 7. Damages Received Any reference to the fact that Plaintiffs may not receive the full amount awarded because of attorney’s fees, expenses, and taxes. Such collateral matters are irrelevant and not necessary to determine the existence or extent of liability, injury, or damage in this case. Therefore, such information is inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. TEX. R. EvID. 401-403. Sustained Denied Modified 8. Reference to Income Taxes Any reference to income taxes, income tax consequences, or any failure to adjust any opinions, testimony, or calculations for any income tax issues. DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 6 of 22 Sustained Denied Modified 9. Alteration of or Tampering with Records Any reference to, mention of, or comment regarding alteration of or tampering with records, as same is irrelevant, immaterial and highly inflammatory, and would result in unfair prejudice to Defendant, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. TEX. R. Evip. 401-403. Sustained Denied. Modified 10. Conspiracy of Silenc: Mention of the so-called “conspiracy of silence” between medical personnel, or any other direct or indirect references, statements, or inferences suggestive to the jury that medical expert witnesses, or any other form of testimony or access to witnesses, is less available to Plaintiffs in this case than any other party to the case, for the reason that such would be wholly improper, would be a reference to the proposed or alleged attempts of Plaintiffs to enlist witnesses in the case, which would be matters of hearsay not subject to proof in the trial of this matter and not material or relevant to any of Plaintiffs’ issues in the case. In addition, such matters would be solely for the purpose of unfair prejudice and inflammation of the jury. TEX. R. EVID. 401-403, 801-804. Sustained Denied Modified 11. Privileged Communications To refrain from mentioning, suggesting, or inquiring regarding any supposed investigation, inquiries, hearings, or conversations or communications between or among Defendant and/or his agents, servants, representatives, and/or employees subsequent to the occurrence in issue, for the reason that whether such investigation, inquiries, hearings, conversations, or communications did or did not occur is not a matter subject to discovery and is not a matter which would be admissible as evidence in this case, that a suggestion to the inquiry by Plaintiff that a thorough inquiry was not conducted would be just as harmful as would a suggestion to the jury that such matters had been conducted, or did transpire, but that the jury had not been advised of the results, accomplishments, contents, or conclusions thereof. All such matters would be matters specifically exempted from admissibility by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as communications passing between agents and employees of Defendant, regardless of the occurrence upon which Plaintiffs’ suit is based, or would be exempt from discovery under Chapters 160, 164, and 300 of the Texas Occupations Code, Chapter 161 of the Texas Health & Safety Code, and 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq., or would be matters of hearsay, or would be wholly irrelevant and immaterial to any issue before the jury in this case and would be mentioned solely for the purpose of prejudicing the jury against this Defendant regarding matters which are not discoverable or admissible into evidence. TEX. R. EvID). 401-404, 503, 513, 802; TEX. R. Civ, P. DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 7 of 22 192.5; see also TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 160.006(a), (c); 160.007(a), (e); 164.007(c); 300.007 (Vernon 2001); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.032(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001); 42 US.C. § 11101 et seq. Sustained Denied Modified 12. Settlement Negotiation: Any evidence of or any reference to any compromise and/or settlement demands, offers, discussions, or negotiations, any invocations of the Stowers doctrine, or any final settlements between any of the parties to this lawsuit. TEX. R. EVID. 408; see Laviage v. Laviage, 647 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ); Siegler v. Telco Leasing, Inc., 593 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1* Dist.] 1980, no writ); see also Brannan v. Texas Employers Ins. Assoc., 248 $.W.2d 118, 119-20 (Tex. 1952). Sustained Denied Modified 13. Hearsay Statements Any mention or statement to the jury concerning what Plaintiffs have been told by any doctor, nurse, health care provider, or any medical witness as to the cause of their injuries, or of the probable testimony or statements of a witness who is absent, unavailable, or not called to testify in this case. Such matters are clearly hearsay and inadmissible. TEX. R. EviD. 801-804; see Brown v. Bettinger, 882 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ) (doctor’s discussion with patient regarding surgical procedures hearsay); Lopez v. Link, 757 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. App.- Houston [1* Dist.] 1988, no writ) (doctor’s out-of-court statement to Plaintiffs as to her condition and diagnosis in-admissible hearsay); Massey v. Aztec Life Ins. Co., 532 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ) (statements by a doctor to the Plaintiff's inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony). This would include email communications from nonparties including American Staffing and Delta Locums. Plaintiffs have a list of affidavits, letters, and other court proceedings that are used for the sole purpose of prejudice to inflame the jury against Dr. Mandava. Same is not only hearsay statements; it is also irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. Sustained Denied Modified 14. Failure to Call Equally Available Witnesse: Any reference to or mention of Defendant’s failure to call to testify any witness equally wailable to all parties in this cause. Cf Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 240 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Texas Power & Light Co. v. Walker, 559 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ); Sanders v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 429 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.). DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 8 of 22 Sustained Denied Modified 15. Testimony or Comments of Absent Witnes: Any reference to, reading from, offer of, tender of, or exhibit of any ex parte statements or reports from any witness who is absent, unavailable, or not called to testify and thereby subject to examination by Defendant’s counsel, or the mention of or reference to the probable testimony of such witness, or any suggestion of what would have been the testimony of any witness not actually called. See Grogan v. Santos, 617 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ); Texas Power & Light Co. v. Walker, 559 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ); Sanders v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 429 S.W.2d 516, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ ref’d m.r.e.). Sustained Denied Modified. 16. Comment on Discovery Any reference to the fact that Defendant or his attorneys sought to prevent discovery of any documentation, information, or evidence during the pretrial discovery, or after the trial began, through the assertion of objections, motions for protection, instructions from counsel, or privileges. The fact that Defendant made or filed objections and refused to answer questions until such objections were brought before this Court for a ruling, and Defendant’s claims of privilege in this proceeding or upon prior occasion are meaningless, irrelevant, and immaterial to any issue in this case, and such matters would be referred to only for the purpose of prejudicing the jury against Defendant. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403, 513; TEX. R. Civ. P. 192; see also Goode v. Slionkfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex. 1997). Sustained Denied Modified 17. Demands or Requests from Defendant’s File: To refrain from making any demands or requests before the jury for matters found or contained in the files of Defendant or Defendant’s attorneys, which would include statements, pleadings, photographs, or other documents or tangible things, and from making any reference to the location of Defendant’s files, Defendant’s willingness to produce his files for inspection, or any other reference to such files. Such matters are privileged or potentially privileged from disclosure to Plaintiff under the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. TEX. R. Evib. 401-403, 503; TEX. R. CIv. P. 192.5; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 863 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. 1993). Sustained Denied Modified DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 9 of 22 18. Request for Stipulation in Jury’s Presence Requesting Defendant or Defendant’s attorneys to stipulate to the admissibility of any evidence or to any facts or matters in front of the jury. TEX. R. EVID. 401-403. Sustained Denied Modified 19. Questioning Defendant’s Attorneys and Representative: Making any statement or argument personalizing any of the issues in this case with regard to counsel for the Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiffs should be restrained from making any statements or arguments or asking questions calling upon any of Defendant’s attorneys, or any agent, representative, or employee of Defendant, to respond as to how they would react or what they may desire if they were in a position similar to the Plaintiffs in this action. Same would not be proper as evidence and would be highly inappropriate jury argument. TEX. R. Evip. 401-403. Sustained Denied Modified 20. Attorneys’ Comments in Deposition Any reading of or reference to comments or statements by an attorney, other than questions to witnesses, contained in any deposition taken in this case because such constitutes unsworn testimony or statements and is not relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 401-403, 801-802. Sustained Denied Modified 21. Reference to Deposition Questions with a Sustained Orde: Any reference to questions asked in depositions to which the Court sustained objections, as such matters are irrelevant, immaterial, nonresponsive, improper, without proper predicate, and/ or privileged, and it would be prejudicial to Defendant to refer to such questions and objections in the presence of the jury. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403. Sustained Denied Modified 22. Reference to Document Requests during a Deposition Any reference to any remarks made to Defendant or counsel for Defendant in any deposition or otherwise for the production of any documents and tangible items. Such is not relevant to any issue which would be presented for jury determination. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403. DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 10 of 22 Sustained Denied Modified 23. Opinion Testimony by Unqualified Witnesse: That Plaintiffs or any of Plaintiffs’ witnesses who are not specifically qualified health care practitioners have any opinion as to whether the events made the basis of this lawsuit were in accordance with the applicable standard of care and/or supposedly caused any of the results or medical problems, diseases, injuries, or conditions for which Plaintiffs seek to recover in their case, for the reason that the existence of such opinions or the substance of such opinions would be wholly inadmissible, would relate testimony about matters that require medical expertise, and/ or must be established with reasonable medical probability by the medical opinion of medical doctors. TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE §74.401 (VERNONS 2003); TEX. R. EvID. 401-403, 701-702; see also Daniels v. Yancey, 175 S.W.3d 889, 893 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Merrell Dow Pharnns., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711-12 (Tex. 1997); Broders v. Heise, 924 §.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Tex. 1996); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex. 1977); Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Tex. App.-Houston [14" Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Shook v. Herman, 759 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); Ortiz v. Santa Rosa Hosp., 702 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.t.e.). The EMT in this case has made assertions without knowledge of Dr. Mandava’s conduct prior to arrival and the Director of Nursing that was present refutes said statements. The EMT is not qualified, and Plaintiffs seek to use his testimony solely to inflame the jury. This testimony is irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. Sustained Denied Modified 24. Jury Questions Any statement by Plaintiffs’ attorneys calculated to inform the jury of the effect of their answer to jury questions. See Waddell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 473 S.W.2d 660, 66163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ) (improper argument on potential effect of judgment on insurance premiums); Cooper v. Argonaut, 430 S.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (improper comment to jury on potential dollar amount of award). Sustained Denied Modified 25. Damage Limitation Any reference to or mention of the damage limitations on civil liability contained in Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, and/or the United States or Texas Constitutions, for the reason that such collateral matters are not related to any material issue in this lawsuit and would be inquired into solely for the purpose of prejudice and inflammation of the jury. TEx. R. Evip. 401-403; see Tex. Civ. P. REM. CODE§ 74.301, 74.302, 74.303, (Vernon 2003); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 11 of 22 41.012 (Vernon 1997). Sustained Denied Modified 26. Attorney-Client and Other Claims of Privilege Any matters or communications that have transacted between Defendant’s attorneys, both past and present, and Defendant, including but not limited to the terms and conditions of any and all employment contracts and all transactions connected thereto. In this connection, Defendant claims the lawyer-client privilege under Texas Rule of Evidence 503. Further, to refrain from mentioning, referring to, or asking questions regarding Defendant’s claim of privilege, whether in the present proceeding or upon prior occasion, for the reason that such is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel, and no inference may be drawn therefrom. Rule 513 of the Texas Rules of Evidence states that in jury cases proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury. TEx. R. EviD). 503, 513; see also Bearden v. Boone, 693 S.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ); Foster v. Buchele, 213 S.W.2d 738, 742-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Sustained Denied Modified 27. Production of Privileged Documents To refrain from mentioning, referring to, or suggesting that Defendant, his witnesses, or defense counsel objected to, refused, allegedly refused, or failed to produce or cause to be produced any document, report, statement, or other material or information that is either privileged under the Texas Rules of Evidence, or any other statute including, without limitation, the Texas Medical Practice Act, the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, the Texas Health and Safety Code, the Texas Occupations Code, and any relevant federal statutes or federal or state regulations, when production of same was not required by Court Order, or which production was objected to by Defendant and such objection was not overruled by the Court. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403; TEX. R. Crv. P. 192; see Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 8.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex. 1997). Sustained Denied Modified 28. Prior Court Appearances and Testimony of Defendant Any reference or inference that Defendant, Defendant’s witnesses, or any employee of Defendant has or may have appeared as a witness in a court of law or given testimony in any capacity during a deposition or trial of any other cause of action, for the reason that such collateral matters are not related to any material issue in this lawsuit and would be inquired into solely for the purpose of prejudice and to inflame the jury, and would be highly prejudicial to Defendant. TEX. R. Evip. 401-403. Further, any other lawsuits, trials, testimony, opinions, or outcome of trial for any party or their experts. This is not intended to include the number of times the experts have testified. DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 12 of 22 Specifically, Plaintiffs have raised lawsuit documents with substantiated claims relating to privileges to inflame and prejudice Dr. Mandava. Same is irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. Sustained Denied _ Modified 29, Other Litigation Any reference or inference that either Defendant or any agent or employee of Defendant has been or is involved in any litigation, including but not limited to any court opinion, jury verdict, any verdict for punitive damages, and/or jury finding that Defendant has been found professionally negligent or to have committed medical malpractice. Such collateral matters are not related to any material issue in this lawsuit and would be inquired into solely for the purpose of prejudicing the jury with collateral matters, the merits of which could not possibly be litigated in this suit, and would be highly prejudicial to Defendant. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403; see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 357 S.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 1962); Wright v. Excalibur Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 130, 133-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ). This is intended to include, though is not limited to, Mandava, M.D. v. Howard County General Hospital, Inc., 1992 WL 165804 (D.D.Mar. 1992). Specifically, Plaintiffs have raised lawsuit documents with substantiated claims relating to privileges to inflame and prejudice Dr. Mandava. Same is irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. Sustained Denied Modified 30. Unrelated or Prior Suits, Claims, or Settlements To refrain from mentioning, suggesting, implying, or inquiring about any lawsuits or other types of claims, demands, accusations, charges, inquiries, or investigations that have in the past been filed, made, or conducted or are presently pending against Defendant or any employee, agent, or representative of Defendant, or that Defendant or his employees, agents, or representatives have settled any such claim(s), or the amount(s) of any such settlement(s), for the reason that such matters are wholly irrelevant to the medical issues in the case, and would be mentioned solely for the purpose of prejudicing the jury with collateral matters, the merits of which could not possibly be litigated in this suit. TEX. R. EvID. 401-403; see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphree, 357 S.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 1962); Wright v. Excalibur Ins. no., 486 S.W.2d 130,133-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ). Sustained Denied Modified 31. Prior Claims or Lawsuits Against Defendant’s Experts or Other Witnesse: Any reference to prior lawsuits or claims, including malpractice claims or suits, filed against any expert witness or other witness called by Defendant to testify at the trial of this case. Any such DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 13 of 22 reference would be highly prejudicial to Defendant, would lead to confusion of the issues, and would only tend to mislead the jury. TEx. R. EviD. 401-403; see Irwin v. Parc-Oil Well Servicing Co., 349 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (offer of pleadings between a party to the present action and a third party is wholly inadmissible unless admission against interest). Sustained Denied Modified 32. Personal History Any evidence of or reference to the personal history or any character trait of Defendant or any agent, representative, or employee of Defendant, as such would only obscure the issues before the jury and are wholly irrelevant and highly prejudicial to Defendant, as there is no direct evidence that any of these issues affected the care and treatment that Kimberly Ray received by Defendant. TEx. R. EviD. 401-404, 608; see Dudley v. Humana Hosp. Corp., 817 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14" Dist.] 1991, no writ) (“although facts may be established circumstantially, the circumstances themselves must be shown with direct evidence”); Lade v. Keller, 615 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ) (rule is well settled that evidence of a party’s character is not admissible except where it is directly on the issue and is of special importance). Sustained Denied Modified 33. Violation of Laws Any reference to the violation or alleged violation of any law, statute, or ordinance by Defendant, for the reason that such violations, if any, are matters of law for the Court only. Cf Simms y. Southwest Tex. Methodist Hosp., 535 S.W.2d 192, 200-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref’'d n.r.e.). Sustained Denied Modified 34, Predicate for Standard of Care Negligence, and Proximate Cause Testimony Seeking to introduce any purported expert opinion testimony as to standard of care, negligence, or proximate cause from any witness until proper predicate, admissibility, qualifications, and competency have been established. TEX. R. EvID. 701-703, 705; see Daniels v. Yancy, 175 S.W.3d 889, 893 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711-13 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119 (1998); Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996) (not every licensed medical doctor is automatically qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question); /sern v. Watson, 942 S.W.2d 186, 193 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, writ denied). Sustained Denied Modified DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 14 of 22 35. Medical Standard of Care on “Good Medical Practice” Basis Inquiring of any treating physician or expert witness regarding “good medical practice,” “reasonable medical practice, 9 66 ‘prudent medical practice,” “standard medical practice,” or other such inquiries as such is an improper inquiry regarding standard of care, invades the province of the jury as being a mixed question of law and fact, and is otherwise confusing and prejudicial. See Snow v. Bond, 438 8.W.2d 549, 550-51 (Tex. 1969); Guidry v. Phillips, 580 S.W.2d 883, 885-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14" Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Burks v. Meredith, 546 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Killion v. Hyde, 471 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Sustained Denied Modified 36. Grading Defendant or Comment on What Testifying Expert Would Have Done Asking a witness to grade the actions of Defendant (i.e., A, B, C, D, F or otherwise), or asking a witness if Defendant’s actions were “passing” or “failing,” or any reference as to what any witness personally did or would have done under the same or similar circumstances, as such inquiry invades the province of the jury and departs from the proper method of witness questioning regarding compliance with the applicable standard of care. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403; see Milke v. Metni, 658 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ) (conclusory statements of what expert witness would have done, whether he would have done same as Defendant, or whether Defendant was negligent are inadmissible conclusions); see also Coan v. Winters, 646 S.W.2d 655, 657-58 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same); McGrath v. Brown, 622 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (expert opinion inadmissible absent establishment of standard of care); Stanton v. Westbrook, 598 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (testifying expert cannot establish standard of care by testifying as to what he would have done under the same or similar circumstances); Smith v. Guthrie, 557 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ) (testimony of what specialist expert witness would have done inadmissable concerning actions by general practitioner Defendants). Sustained Denied Modified 37. Standard of Care Ask any question, provide any testimony, or otherwise make any reference to any practices, writings, policies, procedures, protocols, guidelines, standards, care plans, or otherwise of Defendant or any other entity as creating or establishing a standard of care in and of themselves without first establishing, outside the presence of the jury, that such was in fact the prevailing standard of care at the time of the incident in question. Hilzendager v. Methodist Hosp., 596 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 Dist.] 1980, no writ). Sustained Denied Modified DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 15 of 22 38. Testimony of Any Witness Not Particularly Disclosed Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure The offering by Plaintiffs of any expert or opinion testimony of any kind or character of any witness who has not been fully, properly, or timely designated by Plaintiffs as an expert or as a person with knowledge of relevant facts in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, Plaintiffs should be precluded from offering any opinion testimony from any witness other than the opinions and conclusions that were timely disclosed pursuant to outstanding discovery requests, particularly concerning the medical standards of care and practice or the reasonably prudent medical care and treatment, or any ultimate negligence or malpractice or causation issues applicable to this case. Any attempt to elicit any testimony from any person not properly, timely, and fully disclosed or designated should be excluded. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403; TEX. R. Clv. P. 192.3(e), 193.5, 193.6, 197, 215.2; see Schein v. American Rest. Group, Inc., 852 $.W.2d 496, 497 (Tex. 1993) (party who fails to comply with discovery request may be prohibited from introducing that evidence at trial); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 363 (Tex. 1987) (op. on reh’g); Morrow v. HEB, Inc., 714 $.W.2d 297, 297-98 (Tex. 1986); Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Ctr., Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243, 246-47 (Tex. 1985); Tinkle v. Henderson, 777 §.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied) (once party fails to timely identify witness, exclusion is automatic). Sustained Denied Modified 39. Rebuttal Testimony Referring to or seeking rebuttal testimony from any person and/or expert not previously identified or disclosed in written discovery by the party presenting such witness without first establishing, outside the presence of the jury, the appropriateness of such testimony. Sustained Denied Modified 40. Matters/Evidence Not Properly Provided in Response to Defendant’s Discovery to Plaintiffs Any matters, testimony, evidence, or documentation, including but not limited to medical/mental health records, expenses or other damages, photographs, publications, slides, and visual representations that have not been timely, properly, and fully supplied or produced by Plaintiffs in response to Defendant’s discovery requests to Plaintiffs, or mention or allusion to any such matters, testimony, evidence, or documentation. TEX. R. EviD. 401-403; TEX. R. Clv. P. 192.3(e), 193.5, 193.6, 197, 215.2; see Schein v. American Rest. Group, Inc., 852 8.W.2d 496, 497 (Tex. 1993) (party who fails to comply with discovery request may be prohibited from introducing that evidence at trial); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 363 (Tex. 1987) (op. on reh’g); Morrow v. HEB, Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 297-98 (Tex. 1986); Yeldell v. DEFENDANT VENKATESWARA RAO MANDAVA, M.D.’S MOTION IN LIMINE Page 16 of 22 Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Ctr. Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243, 246-47 (Tex. 1985); Tinkle v. Henderson, 777 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied) (once party fails to timely identify witness, exclusion is automatic). Sustained Denied Modified 41. Evidence from Records Not Properly Proved and Filed with the Court Any evidence or documentation, including but not limited to Plaintiffs’ medical records and expenses, that has not been properly proved up and filed with the Court in accordance with the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code and the Texas Rules of Evidence. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.001 (Vernon 1997); TEX. R. EVID. 803(6), 902(10). Sustained Denied Modified 42. Presentation of Equipment Presenting to the jury, having in the courtroom, or seeking manipulation of or handling of any equipment or devices without first establishing outside the presence of the jury the relevancy of same and that such equipment and/or device or otherwise establish a foundation for use of same. Sustained Denied Modified 43. Use of Photographs or Motion Pictures Should Plaintiffs wish to introduce any photographs, videotapes, videotaped depositions, movies, motion picture films, day-in-the-life films, computer