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DOCKET NO. NNH-CV23-6131629-S : SUPERIOR COURT
LILIANA JUAREZ-MONTIEL, a minor, : J.D. OF NEW HAVEN
through her guardian and next friend
NADINA JUAREZ-MONTIEL
V. : AT NEW HAVEN
SIOBHAN COMEAU-RUSSELL and : MARCH 28, 2024
KRISTINA COMEAU-RUSSELL
MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE/TESTIMONY
RE: ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTION
Pursuant to Practice Book §15-3, the Defendants, Siobhan Comeau-Russell and Kristina
Comeau-Russell, hereby move in limine to preclude any evidence of, or testimony relating to, any
police/animal control report and/or any enforcement action taken with the subject dog on grounds
that such report contains opinions of the responding officer as to causation and fault for the
underlying incident. First, the defendants have admitted liability. Further, the report contains an
objectionable narrative of the accident facts based solely on inadmissible hearsay. The report, as a
whole, is objectionable and is not admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay
rule.
A trial court may entertain a motion in limine made by either party regarding the admission
or exclusion of anticipated evidence. . . . The judicial authority may grant the relief sought
in the motion or other relief as it may deem appropriate, may deny the motion with or
without prejudice to its later renewal, or may reserve decision thereon until a later time in
LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET
P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308
the proceeding. . . . [T[he motion in limine . . . has generally been used in Connecticut
courts to invoke a trial judge’s inherent discretionary powers to control proceedings,
exclude evidence, and prevent occurrences that might unnecessarily prejudice the rights of
any party to a fair trial.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gardner, 96 Conn. App. 42, 52
(2006).
While a police report is generally admissible as a business record under C.G.S. §52-180,
“[t]o qualify under this statute the report must be based entirely upon the police officer’s own
observations or upon information provided by an observer with a business duty to transmit such
information.” Baughman v. Collins, 56 Conn. App. 34, 37 (citing State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651,
663 (1985) and D’Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 59 (1953)). In the instant matter, officer
arrived after the subject incident had already occurred, and none of the parties hereto could be
classified as an “observer with a business duty to transmit such information.” Given that the police
report is based on conclusions and opinions of the officer drawn from hearsay statements, the
contents of the report constitute hearsay as a result. “[N]ot every statement contained in a
document qualifying as a business record is necessarily admissible . . .” Raio v. Supermarkets
General Corp., 28 Conn. App. 56, 60, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 924 (1992), and hearsay statements
within a police report are inadmissible unless they fall under some hearsay exception, Baughman,
supra, 56 Conn. App. at 39. The report herein contains no “statements,” but rather only the a
LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET
P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308
officer’s summary of his conversations with the parties. And, even if these summaries could be
considered “statements,” none of these statements fall into any hearsay exclusion.
In addition to the foregoing preclusion, the Defendants further move that the Plaintiff be
precluded, should a police or animal control officer or record-keeping representative be present at
trial to testify, from inquiring into matters not actually observed by the officer who responded to
the scene, and that the Plaintiff be precluded from inquiring as to the officer’s opinions regarding
cause or responsibility regarding the subject incident. Mucci v. LeMonte, 157 Conn. 566, 569
(1969) (citing Giamettei v. Dicerbo, 135 Conn. 159 (1948)) (holding that a police officer’s opinions
on causation contained in a police accident report and/or such opinion evidence given on the
witness stand are inadmissible).
Given the inherent lack of reliability associated with the police report, the statements
contained therein and any citations issued would be far more prejudicial to the Defendants than any
probative value from which the Plaintiff would benefit if admitted at the time of trial.
WHEREFORE, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter an Order
granting the relief requested herein, and preclude the Plaintiff from offering or entering any
police/animal control report as evidence in this matter, or inquiring into the facts of the incident or
any causation conclusions made by the police or animal control officer, should said officer or some
representative be present in court to testify at trial.
LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET
P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308
THE DEFENDANTS,
SIOBHAN COMEAU-RUSSELL AND
KRISTINA COMEAU-RUSSELL
By /s/420`66
Stacey Francoline
Law Offices of Meehan, Di Palma, Roberts &
Turret
Tel. # 203-294-7800
Juris # 408308
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that all personal identifying information was redacted pursuant to
Practice Book Section 4-7. This will further certify the foregoing was mailed via U.S. Mail, postage
pre-paid or electronically delivered pursuant to Practice Book Section 10-14 on this 28th day of
March, 2024.
Attorney for Plaintiff
James J. Nugent, Esq.
Nugent & Bryant
234 Church Street
7th Floor
New Haven, CT 06510
SENT VIA EMAIL: Jim@NugentLawyers.com
/s/420166
Stacey Francoline
Commissioner of the Superior Court
LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET
P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308
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DOCKET NO. NNH-CV23-6131629-S : SUPERIOR COURT LILIANA JUAREZ-MONTIEL, a minor, : J.D. OF NEW HAVEN through her guardian and next friend NADINA JUAREZ-MONTIEL V. : AT NEW HAVEN SIOBHAN COMEAU-RUSSELL and : MARCH 28, 2024 KRISTINA COMEAU-RUSSELL MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE/TESTIMONY RE: ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTION Pursuant to Practice Book §15-3, the Defendants, Siobhan Comeau-Russell and Kristina Comeau-Russell, hereby move in limine to preclude any evidence of, or testimony relating to, any police/animal control report and/or any enforcement action taken with the subject dog on grounds that such report contains opinions of the responding officer as to causation and fault for the underlying incident. First, the defendants have admitted liability. Further, the report contains an objectionable narrative of the accident facts based solely on inadmissible hearsay. The report, as a whole, is objectionable and is not admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. A trial court may entertain a motion in limine made by either party regarding the admission or exclusion of anticipated evidence. . . . The judicial authority may grant the relief sought in the motion or other relief as it may deem appropriate, may deny the motion with or without prejudice to its later renewal, or may reserve decision thereon until a later time in LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308 the proceeding. . . . [T[he motion in limine . . . has generally been used in Connecticut courts to invoke a trial judge’s inherent discretionary powers to control proceedings, exclude evidence, and prevent occurrences that might unnecessarily prejudice the rights of any party to a fair trial. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gardner, 96 Conn. App. 42, 52 (2006). While a police report is generally admissible as a business record under C.G.S. §52-180, “[t]o qualify under this statute the report must be based entirely upon the police officer’s own observations or upon information provided by an observer with a business duty to transmit such information.” Baughman v. Collins, 56 Conn. App. 34, 37 (citing State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 663 (1985) and D’Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 59 (1953)). In the instant matter, officer arrived after the subject incident had already occurred, and none of the parties hereto could be classified as an “observer with a business duty to transmit such information.” Given that the police report is based on conclusions and opinions of the officer drawn from hearsay statements, the contents of the report constitute hearsay as a result. “[N]ot every statement contained in a document qualifying as a business record is necessarily admissible . . .” Raio v. Supermarkets General Corp., 28 Conn. App. 56, 60, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 924 (1992), and hearsay statements within a police report are inadmissible unless they fall under some hearsay exception, Baughman, supra, 56 Conn. App. at 39. The report herein contains no “statements,” but rather only the a LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308 officer’s summary of his conversations with the parties. And, even if these summaries could be considered “statements,” none of these statements fall into any hearsay exclusion. In addition to the foregoing preclusion, the Defendants further move that the Plaintiff be precluded, should a police or animal control officer or record-keeping representative be present at trial to testify, from inquiring into matters not actually observed by the officer who responded to the scene, and that the Plaintiff be precluded from inquiring as to the officer’s opinions regarding cause or responsibility regarding the subject incident. Mucci v. LeMonte, 157 Conn. 566, 569 (1969) (citing Giamettei v. Dicerbo, 135 Conn. 159 (1948)) (holding that a police officer’s opinions on causation contained in a police accident report and/or such opinion evidence given on the witness stand are inadmissible). Given the inherent lack of reliability associated with the police report, the statements contained therein and any citations issued would be far more prejudicial to the Defendants than any probative value from which the Plaintiff would benefit if admitted at the time of trial. WHEREFORE, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter an Order granting the relief requested herein, and preclude the Plaintiff from offering or entering any police/animal control report as evidence in this matter, or inquiring into the facts of the incident or any causation conclusions made by the police or animal control officer, should said officer or some representative be present in court to testify at trial. LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308 THE DEFENDANTS, SIOBHAN COMEAU-RUSSELL AND KRISTINA COMEAU-RUSSELL By /s/420`66 Stacey Francoline Law Offices of Meehan, Di Palma, Roberts & Turret Tel. # 203-294-7800 Juris # 408308 CERTIFICATION This is to certify that all personal identifying information was redacted pursuant to Practice Book Section 4-7. This will further certify the foregoing was mailed via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid or electronically delivered pursuant to Practice Book Section 10-14 on this 28th day of March, 2024. Attorney for Plaintiff James J. Nugent, Esq. Nugent & Bryant 234 Church Street 7th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 SENT VIA EMAIL: Jim@NugentLawyers.com /s/420166 Stacey Francoline Commissioner of the Superior Court LAW OFFICES OF MEEHAN, DI PALMA, ROBERTS & TURRET P.O. BOX 6835, SCRANTON, PA 18505-6840 (203) 294-7800 JURIS NO. 408308