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Filing # 194863210 E-Filed 03/26/2024 04:26:20 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION
ERIC KRANSAINT,
individually and on behalf
of those similarly situated,
CLASS REPRESENTATION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.:
vs.
METRO FORD, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
________________________________________________________________________
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF REPAIR ESTIMATE CLASS
_________________________________________________________________________
Respectfully submitted by:
ROGER D. MASON, II, P.A.
/s/ Autumn D. Carty
Roger D. Mason, II, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 0504793
Autumn D. Carty, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 1018990
551 5th Ave. N.
Saint Petersburg, Florida 33701
Telephone: (813) 304-2131
rmason@flautolawyer.com
acarty@flautolawyer.com
admin@flautolawyer.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1
A. Facts Applicable to All Putative Class Members ..............................................1
B. Facts Applicable to Plaintiff ..............................................................................2
III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES EACH OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
CLASS CERTIFICATION ............................................................................................3
A. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(a).........................4
1. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied. ............................................4
2. The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied ..........................................7
3. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied................................................8
4. The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied ................................................9
B. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b) ......................10
1. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1) ......10
2. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2) ......11
3. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3) ......12
a) Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate .................12
b) The Class Action Mechanism is Superior................................13
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........................................................................................15
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
I. Florida Supreme Court Cases:
A. Johnson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship,
641 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1994)...................................................................................4
B. Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co.,
73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011)........................................................................... passim
II. Florida Court of Appeals Cases:
A. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher,
898 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ...............................................................13
B. City of Tampa v. Addison,
979 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ...................................................................9
C. Estate of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp.,
563 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990 ....................................................................6
D. InPhyNet Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Soria,
33 So.3d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ....................................................................6
E. Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss,
981 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) .................................................................5
F. Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master Ass’n, Inc.,
847 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ................................................................6
G. Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell,
827 So.2d 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ..................................................................9
III. United States District Court Cases:
A. Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc.,
8:13-CV-1204-T-33TBM, 2013 WL 5177865 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013). ......9
B. Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co.,
269 F.R.D. 663 (M.D. Fla. 2010).....................................................................13
IV. Florida Rules and Statutes
A. Rule 1.220, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure .......................................... passim
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Plaintiff, Eric Kransaint, by and through his undersigned counsel, respectfully moves the
Court for an order certifying this case as a class action pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
1.220 and states:
I. INTRODUCTION
The Class Complaint states a claim on behalf of the “Repair Estimate Class” (the “Class”)
which is defined as:
a. All persons or entities who had a motor vehicle repair performed by the Repair
Shop;
b. during the four-year period prior to the filing of this action through class
certification;
c. whose motor vehicle repair costs exceeded $100.00; and
d. were not provided a written motor vehicle repair estimate in compliance with Fla.
Stat. § 559.905 or who were charged an amount exceeding the written estimate.
As discussed below, the Class meets the certification requirements, and Mr. Kransaint
requests that the Court (1) certify the Class; (2) appoint Plaintiff as representative for the Class;
and (3) appoint Roger D. Mason, II of the law firm Roger D. Mason, II, P.A. as counsel for the
Class.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts Applicable to All Putative Class Members
Mr. Kransaint and the putative Shop Supply Fee Class members each had motor vehicle
repairs performed by Metro Ford, Inc. (the “Repair Shop”).
Prior to performing such repairs for Mr. Kransaint and the putative Repair Estimate Class
members, the Repair Shop failed to provide a written repair estimate disclosing the estimated cost
of repairs to Mr. Kransaint and the Repair Estimate Class for motor vehicle repairs exceeding
$100.00 or were charged amounts exceeding the estimate.
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B. Facts Applicable to Plaintiff
In March of 2020, Mr. Kransaint took his 2015 Ford Transit 250 Cargo bearing the Vehicle
Identification Number 1FTNR2XG1FKA01939 (“Vehicle”) to the Repair Shop for inspection and
repair. The Repair Shop did not provide any written notice disclosing the estimated cost of repair.
The Repair Shop performed services on the Vehicle and on March 26, 2020, presented Mr.
Kransaint with an invoice in the amount of $1,292.55, which included a “SHOP SUPPLIES” fee
of $50.00, which was paid in full. A true and correct copy of the invoice is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
Mr. Kransaint’s circumstances and resulting claims place him squarely within each of the
Class definitions and meet all of the requirements for certification of the Class.
III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES EACH OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION.
Rule 1.220, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the requirements for class
certification. A class must meet all of the Rule 1.220(a) prerequisites and the requirements of at
least one subsection of Rule 1.220(b). See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220. As stated by the Florida Supreme
Court “[a] trial court should resolve doubts with regard to certification in favor of certification.”
Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 105 (Fla. 2011). “The purpose of the class action
is to provide litigants who share common questions of law and fact with an economically viable
means of addressing their needs in court.” Johnson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 641 So.
2d 58, 60 (Fla. 1994).
As discussed in further detail below, Mr. Kransaint meets A) each of the Rule 1.220(a)
prerequisites and B) the requirements under each of subsection of Rule 1.220(b)(1). Since Mr.
Kransaint satisfies the Rule 1.220 requirements, the Court should grant certification of the Class.
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A. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(a).
Rule 1.220(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that:
(i) the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all individual class members is
impracticable (numerosity);
(ii) that there are common questions of law and fact amongst class members
(commonality);
(iii) that the proposed representative’s claims are typical of those of the class
(typicality); and
(iv) that both the named representative and his counsel have and will continue to
adequately represent the interests of the class (adequacy of representation).
Mr. Kransaint meets each of these prerequisites, discussed in turn below.
1. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied.
The first requirement of Rule 1.220(a) is met when “the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impractical.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(1). “Courts have generally held that this
rule imposes two distinct, but related requirements for class certification. First, the class definition
must permit the court to reasonably ascertain whether or not any particular individual is a member
of the class.” Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss, 981 So.2d 515, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) approved
sub nom. Sosa, 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011). “If [the first] threshold is satisfied, the Rule requires that
the class be so numerous that separate joinder of each member is impracticable. ‘Impracticable’
does not mean impossible, and numerosity is satisfied if it would be difficult to join all the
members of the class.” Id. No specific number and no precise count are needed to sustain the
numerosity requirement. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 114.
First, the Class definitions permit the Court to easily ascertain whether or not any particular
person or entity is a member of the Class. Specifically, the Court need only look at the estimate
and invoice of each customer within the relevant time period to determine whether the Repair Shop
disclosed the cost of the repair prior to performing any work which ultimately exceeded $100 or
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if the final charge exceeded the estimate. If so, then that customer is a member of the Repair
Estimate Class. If a customer was charged less than $100 or waived its right to receive a written
estimate, then that customer is not a member of the Repair Estimate Class. Thus, the first
numerosity threshold is satisfied for the Repair Estimate Class.
“If [the first] threshold is satisfied, the Rule requires that the class be so numerous that
separate joinder of each member is impracticable. ‘Impracticable’ does not mean impossible, and
numerosity is satisfied if it would be difficult to join all the members of the class.” Id. No specific
number and no precise count are needed to sustain the numerosity requirement. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at
114.
Plaintiff has a reasonable belief that the number of individual consumers who had work
performed which ultimately exceeded $100, the cost of which was not disclosed to the customer
prior to the Repair Shop performing any repairs, is in the thousands and, in any event, is well above
the numerosity threshold.
However, Plaintiff cannot precisely state the exact number of putative class members
without completing class discovery. The exact number of class members can be readily ascertained
from the Repair Shop’s records, especially given that the Repair Shop is required by Florida law
to maintain these records.
As such, Plaintiff requests that, in the event the Court is not presently able to certify the
class, the Court delay ruling on this Motion until class discovery has been completed and this
section can be supplemented. 1
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Several federal courts have held that filing this request for certification along with the Class
Complaint and a request that the Court delay ruling on the Motion until completion of discovery
is necessary to avoid Defendant’s ability to pick-off class representatives through an offer of
judgment. See, e.g. Krzykwa v. Phusion Projects, LLC 920 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (dismissing a class complaint based on a Rule 68 offer to an individual class representative
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The number of class members is believed to be more than enough to satisfy the numerosity
requirement. See Estate of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp., 563 So. 2d 739, 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
(“We note that classes as small as 25 have fulfilled the numerosity requirement”); InPhyNet
Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Soria, 33 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (affirming that 120 class
members was sufficient to establish numerosity); Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums
Master Ass'n, Inc., 847 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (finding that 100 class members
was sufficient to establish numerosity) approved sub nom. Sosa, 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011).
Accordingly, the numerosity requirement is satisfied in this case.
2. The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied.
Next, Rule 1.220(a) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2). “The threshold of the commonality requirement is not high.” Sosa, 73
So. 3d at 107. “A mere factual difference between class members does not necessarily preclude
satisfaction of the commonality requirement [and] [i]ndividualized damage inquiries will also not
preclude class certification.” Id. “[T]he commonality prong only requires that resolution of a class
action affect all or a substantial number of the class members, and that the subject of the class
action presents a question of common or general interest.” Id. “Furthermore, the commonality
requirement is satisfied if the common or general interest of the class members is in the object of
the action, the result sought, or the general question implicated in the action.” Id. (emphasis in
original). “This core of the commonality requirement is satisfied if the questions linking the class
and stating in support of this decision that “a plaintiff could easily avoid this situation by
simultaneously filing a motion for class certification” and “[e]ven if [Plaintiff] needed additional
time to conduct limited discovery about the class, this Court could have stayed its determination
on the [class certification] motion until [Plaintiff] concluded discovery”); Jeffrey M. Stein, D.D.S.,
M.S.D., P.A. v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership, 8:13-cv-02136-SDM-AEP (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24,
2013)(same). Discovery, including class discovery, has been or will be served.
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members are substantially related to the resolution of the litigation, even if the individuals are not
identically situated.” Id.
The commonality element is quite simple: Mr. Kransaint and each of the putative class
members had repairs performed on their vehicles by the Repair Shop. Mr. Kransaint contends that
the Repair Shop failed to disclose in writing the cost of such repairs to its customers which
exceeded $100 or did provide an estimate but the final charges exceeded the amount. As a result,
the Repair Shop violated the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act (hereinafter “FMVRA”) and the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (hereinafter the “FDUTPA”). The truth or
falsity of Mr. Kransaint’s contention that the Repair Shop’s failure to disclose in writing the cost
of repairs exceeding $100 is determinative for Mr. Kransaint’s and each of the putative Class
members. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint’s claim and the putative Class’s claims depend on a
common contention.
As a result, the commonality element is satisfied.
3. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied.
Typicality, the next requirement under Rule 1.220, requires that Mr. Kransaint’s claims be
typical of those of the other putative class members. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(3). “The key inquiry
for a trial court when it determines whether a proposed class satisfies the typicality requirement is
whether the class representative possesses the same legal interest and has endured the same legal
injury as the class members.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 114. “The test for typicality is not demanding and
focuses generally on the similarities between the class representative and the putative class
members.” Id. Mere factual differences between the class representative's claims and the claims of
the class members will not defeat typicality. Id. Rather, the typicality requirement is satisfied when
there is a strong similarity in the legal theories upon which those claims are based and when the
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claims of the class representative and class members are not antagonistic to one another. Id. at 114-
115.
In this case, Mr. Kransaint and the putative class members were each subject to
Defendant’s common course of conduct and, thus, have identical claims based upon identical legal
theories. Mr. Kransaint and the putative Class were all subjected to the same or substantially
similar situation in which they were not provided written disclosures of the cost to repair their
vehicles exceeding $100 prior to the Repair Shop beginning such repairs or were charged more
than their written estimate. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint and the putative class members were each
subject to Defendant’s same violation of FMVRA and FDUTPA.
Additionally, the claims or defenses of Mr. Kransaint and the putative class members arise
from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory.
Accordingly, the typicality element is satisfied.
4. The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied.
Finally, Rule 1.220(a) requires that the representative parties have and will continue to
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(4). “This inquiry
serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the presumptive class representative and the class
he or she seeks to represent.” Id. at 115 (citing Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 261,
268 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)). “A trial court's inquiry concerning whether the adequacy requirement
is satisfied contains two prongs. The first prong concerns the qualifications, experience, and ability
of class counsel to conduct the litigation. The second prong pertains to whether the class
representative's interests are antagonistic to the interests of the class members.” Id. (citing City of
Tampa v. Addison, 979 So.2d 246, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)).
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First, Mr. Kransaint is represented by counsel experienced with the handling of consumer
claims, especially consumer claims involving motor vehicle Repair Shops, and counsel is
experienced with and capable of handling class actions. Counsel for Mr. Kransaint has also been
found to be adequate class counsel previously. See Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc., 8:13-CV-1204-T-
33TBM, 2013 WL 5177865 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013) (stating that “[t]he Court likewise
determines that Plaintiff's counsel [Roger D. Mason, II] are adequate representatives for
prosecuting this action on a class-wide basis”). Mr. Mason has also ruled as adequate class counsel
in the cases of Miller v. Florida Auto Exchange Co., Pinellas County Circuit Court Case No.: 16-
003275, Order (February 21, 2017); Ortega v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., Hillsborough County
Court Case 18-CA-001311, Order (Jan. 21, 2019); and Adams v. Value First Auto Sales, LLC,
Pinellas County Court Case 18-1921-CI, Order (Feb. 6, 2019). Euzena v. Mk Auto Broker LLC,
Miami-Dade County Court Case 18-CC-18433, Order (Oct. 19, 2021). Roger D. Mason, II, P.A,
has agreed to advance the costs of the class litigation and has the financial ability to do so.
Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint meets the first adequacy of representation prong.
Second, Mr. Kransaint understands his obligations as class representative and does not
have any interests antagonistic to the other putative class members. In this case, Mr. Kransaint and
the putative Class seek damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief as a result of Defendant’s
unlawful actions. Given the identical nature of the claims between Mr. Kransaint and the Class,
there is no potential for conflicting interests in this action. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint meets the
second adequacy prong.
As both prongs are met, the Rule 1.220(a)(4) adequacy of representation requirement has
been satisfied.
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B. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b).
In addition to the Rule 1.220(a) requirements, Mr. Kransaint must also meet at least one of
the three Rule 1.220(b) subsection requirements. Here, Mr. Kransaint seeks certification of the
proposed Class under subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3).
1. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1).
In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(1), a plaintiff must show that prosecuting
separate actions by individual members of proposed class would either (1) create the risk of
inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant or (2) create the risk of adjudications with respect
to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the individual adjudications. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(1).
In this case, Mr. Kransaint and each of the putative class members had repairs performed
on their Vehicles by the Repair Shop. Mr. Kransaint contends that the Repair Shop failed to
disclose the cost of repairs to his Vehicle in writing which exceeded $100 before the repair work
was begun or charged more than that provided in the written estimate. The identical situation
occurred with the putative class members that had repairs performed by the Repair Shop.
Accordingly, the Class’s claims depend on a common contention and the truth or falsity of Mr.
Kransaint’s contention that the Repair Shop violated the FMVRA and FDUTPA.
As a result, if it is determined that the Repair Shop violated FMVRA or FDUTPA by failing
to disclose the cost of repair in writing to Mr. Kransaint prior to beginning the repair or charged
him amounts more than the estimate, Mr. Kransaint and the putative Class members will all prevail.
If it is determined that the practice is not a violation of FMVRA or FDUTPA, then Mr. Kransaint
and the rest of the putative Class members will all not prevail.
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Thus, if this matter is not allowed to proceed as a class, there will be no opportunity to
conclusively determine whether the Repair Shop’s actions or inactions, of failing to disclose in
writing the cost of a motor vehicle repair, is a violation of Florida law, and the Repair Shop is at
risk to face multiple inconsistent adjudications where its same conduct is considered a violation of
FMVRA and FDUTPA in some cases, but not in others that are identical.
As a result, prosecuting separate actions by Mr. Kransaint and individual members of the
putative class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual putative class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
Repair Shop.
Accordingly, the proposed Class meets the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1).
2. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2).
In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(2), the party moving for class certification
must show that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to all the members of the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or declaratory
relief concerning the class as a whole appropriate.
The claims of the Class allege violations of FMVRA and FDUTPA. FMVRA and
FDUTPA specifically provides for injunctive relief. Fla. Stat. § 559.921(1).
Injunctive and declaratory relief are appropriate on a class-wide basis because (1)
injunctive relief is available under FMVRA and FDUTPA; (2) the actions and inactions of the
Repair Shop are alleged to have violated FMVRA and FDUTPA; and (3) the conduct applies to
Mr. Kransaint and all members of the putative Class he seeks to represent.
Accordingly, the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2).
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3. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3).
Mr. Kransaint also seeks certification of the Class under Rule 1.220(b)(3), which provides
that a class action may be maintained where the questions of law and fact common to members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and the class action
mechanism is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. As discussed below, this case meets both of these requirements.
(a). Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate.
“To meet the requirements of rule 1.220(b)(3), the party moving for class certification must
establish that the class members' common questions of law and fact predominate over individual
class member claims.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 111. “Florida courts have held that common questions
of fact predominate when the defendant acts toward the class members in a similar or common
way.” Id. “More specifically, a class representative establishes predominance if he or she
demonstrates a reasonable methodology for generalized proof of class-wide impact. A class
representative accomplishes this if he or she, by proving his or her own individual case, necessarily
proves the cases of the other class members.” Id. (emphasis in original).
In this case, if Mr. Kransaint is able to prove that the Repair Shop’s practice of failing to
disclose in writing the cost of repairs exceeding $100 prior to beginning repair work or charging
amounts exceeding the estimate are violations of FMVRA and FDUTPA, then Mr. Kransaint
necessarily proves the cases of the other Class members that their identical or similar actions or
inactions violated FMVRA and FDUTPA.
Because of the common nature of the Repair Shop’s conduct, common questions
predominate. The only individual issue is the identification of persons against whom the Repair
Shop engaged in the activity that violates FMVRA and FDUTPA (i.e., the identity of the Class
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members). Since the identity of each class member can be determined from the Repair Shop’s
records, this issue is easily resolved and determined.
Accordingly, because Mr. Kransaint necessarily proves the cases of the other class
members by proving his own individual case, the predominance element is satisfied.
(b). The Class Action Mechanism is Superior to Other Available
Methods for the Litigation of this Matter.
Superiority is based on a determination of whether a class action is the most manageable
and efficient way to resolve the individual claims of each class member. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 116.
“[I]f a district court finds that issues common to all class members predominate over individual
issues, then a class action will likely be more manageable than and superior to individual actions.”
Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 663, 678 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); see Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher, 898 So. 2d 153, 156-57 (Fla.
4th DCA 2005) (stating that [b]ecause Florida's class action rule is based on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, Florida courts may generally look to federal cases as persuasive authority in their
interpretation of rule 1.220). Further, when small individual damages form the basis for the class
claim, an aggrieved individual does not have enough economic incentive to bring the claims, and
in such instance, class actions are appropriate, warranted, and superior for adjudicating the claims.
Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 116.
In this case, there is no better method available for the adjudication of the claims which
might be brought by each individual subjected to the Repair Shop’s failure to comply with the
FMVRA and FDUTPA. As discussed above, issues common to all class members predominate
over individual issues in this case and, as a result, prosecuting this action as a class is presumed to
be more manageable than and superior to individual actions. Moreover, each of the Class
members’ claims is monetarily small, and as a result, the members do not have enough economic
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incentive to bring the claims on an individual basis. Class certification of this action will provide
an efficient and appropriate resolution of the controversy. Accordingly, class treatment of the
claims is appropriate, warranted, and superior.
Accordingly, the proposed Class meets the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Kransaint meets the requirements necessary for certification of the Class. Accordingly,
Mr. Kransaint respectfully requests that the Court: (1) certify the Class; (2) appoint Plaintiff, Eric
Kransaint, as class representative of the Class; (3) appoint Roger D. Mason, II of Roger D. Mason,
II, P.A. as class counsel; and (4) for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and
proper. As an alternative to immediate certification of the Class, Mr. Kransaint requests that the
Court delay ruling on certification until class discovery has been completed and this Motion may
be supplemented.
ROGER D. MASON, II, P.A.
/s/ Autumn D. Carty
Roger D. Mason, II, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 0504793
Autumn D. Carty, Esq.
Florida Bar No 1018990
551 5th Avenue N.
Saint Petersburg, Florida 33701
Telephone: (813) 304-2131
rmason@flautolawyer.com
acarty@flautolawyer.com
admin@flautolawyer.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Putative Class Members
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing was provided to the process server for hand-delivery
along with the Class Complaint and Summons.
/s/ Autumn D. Carty
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Putative Class Members
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Exhibit A
Preview
Filing # 194863210 E-Filed 03/26/2024 04:26:20 PM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION ERIC KRANSAINT, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, CLASS REPRESENTATION Plaintiff, CASE NO.: vs. METRO FORD, INC., Defendant. ___________________________________/ ________________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF REPAIR ESTIMATE CLASS _________________________________________________________________________ Respectfully submitted by: ROGER D. MASON, II, P.A. /s/ Autumn D. Carty Roger D. Mason, II, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0504793 Autumn D. Carty, Esq. Florida Bar No. 1018990 551 5th Ave. N. Saint Petersburg, Florida 33701 Telephone: (813) 304-2131 rmason@flautolawyer.com acarty@flautolawyer.com admin@flautolawyer.com Attorneys for Plaintiff i TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 A. Facts Applicable to All Putative Class Members ..............................................1 B. Facts Applicable to Plaintiff ..............................................................................2 III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES EACH OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION ............................................................................................3 A. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(a).........................4 1. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied. ............................................4 2. The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied ..........................................7 3. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied................................................8 4. The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied ................................................9 B. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b) ......................10 1. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1) ......10 2. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2) ......11 3. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3) ......12 a) Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate .................12 b) The Class Action Mechanism is Superior................................13 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........................................................................................15 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES I. Florida Supreme Court Cases: A. Johnson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 641 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1994)...................................................................................4 B. Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011)........................................................................... passim II. Florida Court of Appeals Cases: A. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher, 898 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ...............................................................13 B. City of Tampa v. Addison, 979 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ...................................................................9 C. Estate of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp., 563 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990 ....................................................................6 D. InPhyNet Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Soria, 33 So.3d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ....................................................................6 E. Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss, 981 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) .................................................................5 F. Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master Ass’n, Inc., 847 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ................................................................6 G. Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ..................................................................9 III. United States District Court Cases: A. Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc., 8:13-CV-1204-T-33TBM, 2013 WL 5177865 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013). ......9 B. Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 663 (M.D. Fla. 2010).....................................................................13 IV. Florida Rules and Statutes A. Rule 1.220, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure .......................................... passim iii Plaintiff, Eric Kransaint, by and through his undersigned counsel, respectfully moves the Court for an order certifying this case as a class action pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.220 and states: I. INTRODUCTION The Class Complaint states a claim on behalf of the “Repair Estimate Class” (the “Class”) which is defined as: a. All persons or entities who had a motor vehicle repair performed by the Repair Shop; b. during the four-year period prior to the filing of this action through class certification; c. whose motor vehicle repair costs exceeded $100.00; and d. were not provided a written motor vehicle repair estimate in compliance with Fla. Stat. § 559.905 or who were charged an amount exceeding the written estimate. As discussed below, the Class meets the certification requirements, and Mr. Kransaint requests that the Court (1) certify the Class; (2) appoint Plaintiff as representative for the Class; and (3) appoint Roger D. Mason, II of the law firm Roger D. Mason, II, P.A. as counsel for the Class. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Facts Applicable to All Putative Class Members Mr. Kransaint and the putative Shop Supply Fee Class members each had motor vehicle repairs performed by Metro Ford, Inc. (the “Repair Shop”). Prior to performing such repairs for Mr. Kransaint and the putative Repair Estimate Class members, the Repair Shop failed to provide a written repair estimate disclosing the estimated cost of repairs to Mr. Kransaint and the Repair Estimate Class for motor vehicle repairs exceeding $100.00 or were charged amounts exceeding the estimate. -1- B. Facts Applicable to Plaintiff In March of 2020, Mr. Kransaint took his 2015 Ford Transit 250 Cargo bearing the Vehicle Identification Number 1FTNR2XG1FKA01939 (“Vehicle”) to the Repair Shop for inspection and repair. The Repair Shop did not provide any written notice disclosing the estimated cost of repair. The Repair Shop performed services on the Vehicle and on March 26, 2020, presented Mr. Kransaint with an invoice in the amount of $1,292.55, which included a “SHOP SUPPLIES” fee of $50.00, which was paid in full. A true and correct copy of the invoice is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Mr. Kransaint’s circumstances and resulting claims place him squarely within each of the Class definitions and meet all of the requirements for certification of the Class. III. THE PROPOSED CLASS SATISFIES EACH OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION. Rule 1.220, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the requirements for class certification. A class must meet all of the Rule 1.220(a) prerequisites and the requirements of at least one subsection of Rule 1.220(b). See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court “[a] trial court should resolve doubts with regard to certification in favor of certification.” Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 105 (Fla. 2011). “The purpose of the class action is to provide litigants who share common questions of law and fact with an economically viable means of addressing their needs in court.” Johnson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 641 So. 2d 58, 60 (Fla. 1994). As discussed in further detail below, Mr. Kransaint meets A) each of the Rule 1.220(a) prerequisites and B) the requirements under each of subsection of Rule 1.220(b)(1). Since Mr. Kransaint satisfies the Rule 1.220 requirements, the Court should grant certification of the Class. -2- A. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(a). Rule 1.220(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that: (i) the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all individual class members is impracticable (numerosity); (ii) that there are common questions of law and fact amongst class members (commonality); (iii) that the proposed representative’s claims are typical of those of the class (typicality); and (iv) that both the named representative and his counsel have and will continue to adequately represent the interests of the class (adequacy of representation). Mr. Kransaint meets each of these prerequisites, discussed in turn below. 1. The Numerosity Requirement is Satisfied. The first requirement of Rule 1.220(a) is met when “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(1). “Courts have generally held that this rule imposes two distinct, but related requirements for class certification. First, the class definition must permit the court to reasonably ascertain whether or not any particular individual is a member of the class.” Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss, 981 So.2d 515, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) approved sub nom. Sosa, 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011). “If [the first] threshold is satisfied, the Rule requires that the class be so numerous that separate joinder of each member is impracticable. ‘Impracticable’ does not mean impossible, and numerosity is satisfied if it would be difficult to join all the members of the class.” Id. No specific number and no precise count are needed to sustain the numerosity requirement. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 114. First, the Class definitions permit the Court to easily ascertain whether or not any particular person or entity is a member of the Class. Specifically, the Court need only look at the estimate and invoice of each customer within the relevant time period to determine whether the Repair Shop disclosed the cost of the repair prior to performing any work which ultimately exceeded $100 or -3- if the final charge exceeded the estimate. If so, then that customer is a member of the Repair Estimate Class. If a customer was charged less than $100 or waived its right to receive a written estimate, then that customer is not a member of the Repair Estimate Class. Thus, the first numerosity threshold is satisfied for the Repair Estimate Class. “If [the first] threshold is satisfied, the Rule requires that the class be so numerous that separate joinder of each member is impracticable. ‘Impracticable’ does not mean impossible, and numerosity is satisfied if it would be difficult to join all the members of the class.” Id. No specific number and no precise count are needed to sustain the numerosity requirement. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 114. Plaintiff has a reasonable belief that the number of individual consumers who had work performed which ultimately exceeded $100, the cost of which was not disclosed to the customer prior to the Repair Shop performing any repairs, is in the thousands and, in any event, is well above the numerosity threshold. However, Plaintiff cannot precisely state the exact number of putative class members without completing class discovery. The exact number of class members can be readily ascertained from the Repair Shop’s records, especially given that the Repair Shop is required by Florida law to maintain these records. As such, Plaintiff requests that, in the event the Court is not presently able to certify the class, the Court delay ruling on this Motion until class discovery has been completed and this section can be supplemented. 1 1 Several federal courts have held that filing this request for certification along with the Class Complaint and a request that the Court delay ruling on the Motion until completion of discovery is necessary to avoid Defendant’s ability to pick-off class representatives through an offer of judgment. See, e.g. Krzykwa v. Phusion Projects, LLC 920 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (dismissing a class complaint based on a Rule 68 offer to an individual class representative -4- The number of class members is believed to be more than enough to satisfy the numerosity requirement. See Estate of Bobinger v. Deltona Corp., 563 So. 2d 739, 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (“We note that classes as small as 25 have fulfilled the numerosity requirement”); InPhyNet Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Soria, 33 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (affirming that 120 class members was sufficient to establish numerosity); Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master Ass'n, Inc., 847 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (finding that 100 class members was sufficient to establish numerosity) approved sub nom. Sosa, 73 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 2011). Accordingly, the numerosity requirement is satisfied in this case. 2. The Commonality Requirement is Satisfied. Next, Rule 1.220(a) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(2). “The threshold of the commonality requirement is not high.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 107. “A mere factual difference between class members does not necessarily preclude satisfaction of the commonality requirement [and] [i]ndividualized damage inquiries will also not preclude class certification.” Id. “[T]he commonality prong only requires that resolution of a class action affect all or a substantial number of the class members, and that the subject of the class action presents a question of common or general interest.” Id. “Furthermore, the commonality requirement is satisfied if the common or general interest of the class members is in the object of the action, the result sought, or the general question implicated in the action.” Id. (emphasis in original). “This core of the commonality requirement is satisfied if the questions linking the class and stating in support of this decision that “a plaintiff could easily avoid this situation by simultaneously filing a motion for class certification” and “[e]ven if [Plaintiff] needed additional time to conduct limited discovery about the class, this Court could have stayed its determination on the [class certification] motion until [Plaintiff] concluded discovery”); Jeffrey M. Stein, D.D.S., M.S.D., P.A. v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership, 8:13-cv-02136-SDM-AEP (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2013)(same). Discovery, including class discovery, has been or will be served. -5- members are substantially related to the resolution of the litigation, even if the individuals are not identically situated.” Id. The commonality element is quite simple: Mr. Kransaint and each of the putative class members had repairs performed on their vehicles by the Repair Shop. Mr. Kransaint contends that the Repair Shop failed to disclose in writing the cost of such repairs to its customers which exceeded $100 or did provide an estimate but the final charges exceeded the amount. As a result, the Repair Shop violated the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act (hereinafter “FMVRA”) and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (hereinafter the “FDUTPA”). The truth or falsity of Mr. Kransaint’s contention that the Repair Shop’s failure to disclose in writing the cost of repairs exceeding $100 is determinative for Mr. Kransaint’s and each of the putative Class members. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint’s claim and the putative Class’s claims depend on a common contention. As a result, the commonality element is satisfied. 3. The Typicality Requirement is Satisfied. Typicality, the next requirement under Rule 1.220, requires that Mr. Kransaint’s claims be typical of those of the other putative class members. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(3). “The key inquiry for a trial court when it determines whether a proposed class satisfies the typicality requirement is whether the class representative possesses the same legal interest and has endured the same legal injury as the class members.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 114. “The test for typicality is not demanding and focuses generally on the similarities between the class representative and the putative class members.” Id. Mere factual differences between the class representative's claims and the claims of the class members will not defeat typicality. Id. Rather, the typicality requirement is satisfied when there is a strong similarity in the legal theories upon which those claims are based and when the -6- claims of the class representative and class members are not antagonistic to one another. Id. at 114- 115. In this case, Mr. Kransaint and the putative class members were each subject to Defendant’s common course of conduct and, thus, have identical claims based upon identical legal theories. Mr. Kransaint and the putative Class were all subjected to the same or substantially similar situation in which they were not provided written disclosures of the cost to repair their vehicles exceeding $100 prior to the Repair Shop beginning such repairs or were charged more than their written estimate. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint and the putative class members were each subject to Defendant’s same violation of FMVRA and FDUTPA. Additionally, the claims or defenses of Mr. Kransaint and the putative class members arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory. Accordingly, the typicality element is satisfied. 4. The Adequacy Requirement is Satisfied. Finally, Rule 1.220(a) requires that the representative parties have and will continue to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(4). “This inquiry serves to uncover conflicts of interest between the presumptive class representative and the class he or she seeks to represent.” Id. at 115 (citing Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 261, 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)). “A trial court's inquiry concerning whether the adequacy requirement is satisfied contains two prongs. The first prong concerns the qualifications, experience, and ability of class counsel to conduct the litigation. The second prong pertains to whether the class representative's interests are antagonistic to the interests of the class members.” Id. (citing City of Tampa v. Addison, 979 So.2d 246, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). -7- First, Mr. Kransaint is represented by counsel experienced with the handling of consumer claims, especially consumer claims involving motor vehicle Repair Shops, and counsel is experienced with and capable of handling class actions. Counsel for Mr. Kransaint has also been found to be adequate class counsel previously. See Klewinowski v. MFP, Inc., 8:13-CV-1204-T- 33TBM, 2013 WL 5177865 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2013) (stating that “[t]he Court likewise determines that Plaintiff's counsel [Roger D. Mason, II] are adequate representatives for prosecuting this action on a class-wide basis”). Mr. Mason has also ruled as adequate class counsel in the cases of Miller v. Florida Auto Exchange Co., Pinellas County Circuit Court Case No.: 16- 003275, Order (February 21, 2017); Ortega v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., Hillsborough County Court Case 18-CA-001311, Order (Jan. 21, 2019); and Adams v. Value First Auto Sales, LLC, Pinellas County Court Case 18-1921-CI, Order (Feb. 6, 2019). Euzena v. Mk Auto Broker LLC, Miami-Dade County Court Case 18-CC-18433, Order (Oct. 19, 2021). Roger D. Mason, II, P.A, has agreed to advance the costs of the class litigation and has the financial ability to do so. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint meets the first adequacy of representation prong. Second, Mr. Kransaint understands his obligations as class representative and does not have any interests antagonistic to the other putative class members. In this case, Mr. Kransaint and the putative Class seek damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief as a result of Defendant’s unlawful actions. Given the identical nature of the claims between Mr. Kransaint and the Class, there is no potential for conflicting interests in this action. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint meets the second adequacy prong. As both prongs are met, the Rule 1.220(a)(4) adequacy of representation requirement has been satisfied. -8- B. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b). In addition to the Rule 1.220(a) requirements, Mr. Kransaint must also meet at least one of the three Rule 1.220(b) subsection requirements. Here, Mr. Kransaint seeks certification of the proposed Class under subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). 1. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1). In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(1), a plaintiff must show that prosecuting separate actions by individual members of proposed class would either (1) create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant or (2) create the risk of adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(1). In this case, Mr. Kransaint and each of the putative class members had repairs performed on their Vehicles by the Repair Shop. Mr. Kransaint contends that the Repair Shop failed to disclose the cost of repairs to his Vehicle in writing which exceeded $100 before the repair work was begun or charged more than that provided in the written estimate. The identical situation occurred with the putative class members that had repairs performed by the Repair Shop. Accordingly, the Class’s claims depend on a common contention and the truth or falsity of Mr. Kransaint’s contention that the Repair Shop violated the FMVRA and FDUTPA. As a result, if it is determined that the Repair Shop violated FMVRA or FDUTPA by failing to disclose the cost of repair in writing to Mr. Kransaint prior to beginning the repair or charged him amounts more than the estimate, Mr. Kransaint and the putative Class members will all prevail. If it is determined that the practice is not a violation of FMVRA or FDUTPA, then Mr. Kransaint and the rest of the putative Class members will all not prevail. -9- Thus, if this matter is not allowed to proceed as a class, there will be no opportunity to conclusively determine whether the Repair Shop’s actions or inactions, of failing to disclose in writing the cost of a motor vehicle repair, is a violation of Florida law, and the Repair Shop is at risk to face multiple inconsistent adjudications where its same conduct is considered a violation of FMVRA and FDUTPA in some cases, but not in others that are identical. As a result, prosecuting separate actions by Mr. Kransaint and individual members of the putative class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual putative class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Repair Shop. Accordingly, the proposed Class meets the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(1). 2. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2). In order to certify a class under Rule 1.220(b)(2), the party moving for class certification must show that the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all the members of the class, thereby making final injunctive relief or declaratory relief concerning the class as a whole appropriate. The claims of the Class allege violations of FMVRA and FDUTPA. FMVRA and FDUTPA specifically provides for injunctive relief. Fla. Stat. § 559.921(1). Injunctive and declaratory relief are appropriate on a class-wide basis because (1) injunctive relief is available under FMVRA and FDUTPA; (2) the actions and inactions of the Repair Shop are alleged to have violated FMVRA and FDUTPA; and (3) the conduct applies to Mr. Kransaint and all members of the putative Class he seeks to represent. Accordingly, the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(2). - 10 - 3. The Proposed Class Meets the Requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3). Mr. Kransaint also seeks certification of the Class under Rule 1.220(b)(3), which provides that a class action may be maintained where the questions of law and fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and the class action mechanism is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. As discussed below, this case meets both of these requirements. (a). Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate. “To meet the requirements of rule 1.220(b)(3), the party moving for class certification must establish that the class members' common questions of law and fact predominate over individual class member claims.” Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 111. “Florida courts have held that common questions of fact predominate when the defendant acts toward the class members in a similar or common way.” Id. “More specifically, a class representative establishes predominance if he or she demonstrates a reasonable methodology for generalized proof of class-wide impact. A class representative accomplishes this if he or she, by proving his or her own individual case, necessarily proves the cases of the other class members.” Id. (emphasis in original). In this case, if Mr. Kransaint is able to prove that the Repair Shop’s practice of failing to disclose in writing the cost of repairs exceeding $100 prior to beginning repair work or charging amounts exceeding the estimate are violations of FMVRA and FDUTPA, then Mr. Kransaint necessarily proves the cases of the other Class members that their identical or similar actions or inactions violated FMVRA and FDUTPA. Because of the common nature of the Repair Shop’s conduct, common questions predominate. The only individual issue is the identification of persons against whom the Repair Shop engaged in the activity that violates FMVRA and FDUTPA (i.e., the identity of the Class - 11 - members). Since the identity of each class member can be determined from the Repair Shop’s records, this issue is easily resolved and determined. Accordingly, because Mr. Kransaint necessarily proves the cases of the other class members by proving his own individual case, the predominance element is satisfied. (b). The Class Action Mechanism is Superior to Other Available Methods for the Litigation of this Matter. Superiority is based on a determination of whether a class action is the most manageable and efficient way to resolve the individual claims of each class member. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 116. “[I]f a district court finds that issues common to all class members predominate over individual issues, then a class action will likely be more manageable than and superior to individual actions.” Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 663, 678 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher, 898 So. 2d 153, 156-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (stating that [b]ecause Florida's class action rule is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Florida courts may generally look to federal cases as persuasive authority in their interpretation of rule 1.220). Further, when small individual damages form the basis for the class claim, an aggrieved individual does not have enough economic incentive to bring the claims, and in such instance, class actions are appropriate, warranted, and superior for adjudicating the claims. Sosa, 73 So. 3d at 116. In this case, there is no better method available for the adjudication of the claims which might be brought by each individual subjected to the Repair Shop’s failure to comply with the FMVRA and FDUTPA. As discussed above, issues common to all class members predominate over individual issues in this case and, as a result, prosecuting this action as a class is presumed to be more manageable than and superior to individual actions. Moreover, each of the Class members’ claims is monetarily small, and as a result, the members do not have enough economic - 12 - incentive to bring the claims on an individual basis. Class certification of this action will provide an efficient and appropriate resolution of the controversy. Accordingly, class treatment of the claims is appropriate, warranted, and superior. Accordingly, the proposed Class meets the requirements of Rule 1.220(b)(3). IV. CONCLUSION Mr. Kransaint meets the requirements necessary for certification of the Class. Accordingly, Mr. Kransaint respectfully requests that the Court: (1) certify the Class; (2) appoint Plaintiff, Eric Kransaint, as class representative of the Class; (3) appoint Roger D. Mason, II of Roger D. Mason, II, P.A. as class counsel; and (4) for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. As an alternative to immediate certification of the Class, Mr. Kransaint requests that the Court delay ruling on certification until class discovery has been completed and this Motion may be supplemented. ROGER D. MASON, II, P.A. /s/ Autumn D. Carty Roger D. Mason, II, Esq. Florida Bar No. 0504793 Autumn D. Carty, Esq. Florida Bar No 1018990 551 5th Avenue N. Saint Petersburg, Florida 33701 Telephone: (813) 304-2131 rmason@flautolawyer.com acarty@flautolawyer.com admin@flautolawyer.com Attorneys for Plaintiff and Putative Class Members - 13 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the foregoing was provided to the process server for hand-delivery along with the Class Complaint and Summons. /s/ Autumn D. Carty Attorney for Plaintiff and Putative Class Members - 14 - Exhibit A