Party Discovery: LENNEHAN, WILLIAM v. INTERSTATE AVIATION, INC. Et Al

On September 20, 2023 a Party Discovery was filed involving a dispute between William Lennehan, and Brook Haven Properties, Llc, Interstate Aviation, Inc., Textron Aviation, Inc., for V20 - Vehicular - Airplanes in the District Court of Hartford County.

Preview
DOCKET NO. X07-HHB-CV-23-617279-S

JAKE O'LEARY & JULIA O'LEARY AS CO-
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF SUPERIOR COURT
WILLIAM O'LEARY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
HARTFORD
Plaintiffs, CIVIL DIVISION
COMPLEX LITIGATION
-against- DOCKET

INTERSTATE AVIATION, INC., BROOK HAVEN
PROPERTIES, LLC, and TEXTRON AVIATION,
INC., February 9, 2024

Defendants.

DOCKET NO. X07-HHD-CV-23-6177278-S

CRAIG SYLVESTER, as Personal Representative of
the Estates of COURTNEY HAVILAND and SUPERIOR COURT
WILLIAM SHRAUNER, deceased, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
HARTFORD
Plaintiff, CIVIL DIVISION
COMPLEX LITIGATION
-against- DOCKET

INTERSTATE AVIATION, INC., BROOK HAVEN
PROPERTIES, LLC, and TEXTRON AVIATION,
INC.,
February 9, 2024
Defendants.

DOCKET NO. X07-HHB-CV-23-6173497-S

THE INSURANCE COMPANY STATE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, SUPERIOR COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
Plaintiff, HARTFORD
CIVIL DIVISION
-against- COMPLEX LITIGATION
DOCKET
INTERSTATE AVIATION, INC., BROOK HAVEN
PROPERTIES, LLC, and TEXTRON AVIATION,
INC.,
February 9, 2024
Defendants.
DOCKET NO. X07-HHD-CV-23-6177275-S

WILLIAM LENNEHAN,
SUPERIOR COURT
Plaintiff, JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
HARTFORD
-against- CIVIL DIVISION
COMPLEX LITIGATION
INTERSTATE AVIATION, INC., BROOK HAVEN DOCKET
PROPERTIES, LLC, and TEXTRON AVIATION,
INC.,

Defendants. February 9, 2024

DOCKET NO. X07-HHD-CV-23-6177276-S

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT & POWER
COMPANY, SUPERIOR COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
Plaintiff, HARTFORD
CIVIL DIVISION
-against- COMPLEX LITIGATION
DOCKET
INTERSTATE AVIATION, INC., BROOK HAVEN
PROPERTIES, LLC, and TEXTRON AVIATION,
INC.,
February 9, 2024
Defendants.

DOCKET NO. X07-HHD-CV-23-6173735-S

STEPHEN JOHNSON, ROBYN JOHNSON, and
PARKER JOHNSON, SUPERIOR COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
Plaintiff, HARTFORD
CIVIL DIVISION
-against- COMPLEX LITIGATION
DOCKET
INTERSTATE AVIATION, INC., BROOK HAVEN
PROPERTIES, LLC, TEXTRON AVIATION, INC.,
JAKE & JULIA O'LEARY CO-ADMINISTRATOR
ESTATE OF WILLIAM O'LEARY, DUNJA
MORROW ADMINISTRATOR ESTATE OF MARK
MORROW, and TIMOTHY HAVILAND & NANCY
HAVILAND, February 9, 2024
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ JOINT RESPONSES TO TEXTRON AVIATION INC.’S OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTIFFS’ COMBINED FIRST REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANT TEXTRON AVIATION INC. RELATING TO
PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Plaintiff Craig Sylvester, as Personal Representative of the Estates of Courtney Haviland

and William Shrauner, Plaintiff Jake O'Leary & Julia O'Leary as Co-Administrators of the Estate

of William O'Leary, Plaintiff William Lennehan, Plaintiffs Stephen Johnson, Robyn Johnson and

Parker Johnson, Plaintiff the Insurance Company State of Pennsylvania, and Plaintiff the

Connecticut Light & Power Company, in accordance with the Court’s order to provide thorough

and reasoned responses to Defendant Textron Aviation Inc.’s (“TAI”) objections to their Combined

Requests for Production of Documents, hereby serve their Responses to TAI’s Objections to

Plaintiffs’ Combined First Request for Production of Documents to Defendant TAI Relating to

Personal Jurisdiction pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book Sections 13-2 and 13-9, as well as

applicable precedent regarding the proper scope of jurisdictional discovery.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs respond to TAI’s preface to its Objections whereby it

states that it “spent considerable time and effort” to craft the motions to dismiss in each of the

consolidated cases and its claim that the information presented in those motions represent “the

majority of the evidence in TAI’s possession which is relevant to the personal jurisdiction inquiry.”

(TAI Objections, p. 3). Plaintiffs feel that these clearly self-serving claims should carry little

weight in determining the scope of jurisdictional discovery in this matter. The fact that TAI may

have produced some relevant material does not relieve it from its duty to respond to Plaintiffs’

requests for additional documents and information relevant to personal jurisdiction. TAI

acknowledges this to some extent by not opposing Plaintiffs’ right to jurisdictional discovery in
the first instance. Second, as addressed in more detail below, TAI’s claims are predicated upon its

overly restrictive view of the scope of jurisdictional discovery based on an improper reading of

existing precedent.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that “it is clear that discovery may be had to

establish facts pertaining to personal jurisdiction.” Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48,

57, 459 A.2d 503, 508 (1983). Any document requests that relate to either the statutory or

constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction “could lead to admissible evidence and therefore are

permissible under Practice Book § 13-2.” Colon v. Rose Associates, Inc., No. FBTCV196081720S,

2019 WL 4667206, at *2 (Conn. Super. Mar. 27, 2019).

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO DEFINITION NO. 10

OBJECTION: TAI objects to plaintiffs’ proposed definition of “Subject Model

Cessna Aircraft” as overbroad and unduly burdensome, and in its current form, it is not

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence pertaining to the question

of personal jurisdiction over TAI. For ease of reference, the definition is repeated here:

10. “Subject Model Cessna Aircraft” means the family of the Cessna
Citation Jet model aircraft including the following model number
and all variants of same: 500, 510, 525, 550, and 560 model aircraft.

The proposed definition extends well beyond the Cessna Citation 560XLS+ which is the

only Cessna model aircraft involved in the subject accident. The rationale plaintiffs rely upon is

based simply on plaintiffs’ belief that the other models listed have a similar parking brake system

to that of the subject Cessna Citation 560XLS+, and plaintiffs’ potential claims of other similar

incidents in other states or countries. But that is not the relevant question as it relates to the

determination of personal jurisdiction and the scope of jurisdictional discovery here in

Connecticut. Rather, plaintiffs must establish not only that the other models have a connection
to the forum, but also that the connections between the other models and the forum are

sufficiently related to plaintiffs’ specific claims against TAI. Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy

their burden in that regard.

The “Subject Model Cessna Aircraft” definition (specifically the multiple different aircraft

models included within that definition) proposed by plaintiffs is not relevant or reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence (Conn. Prac. Book § 13-2) on the sole

specific personal jurisdiction issue of whether plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of or are related to”

TAI’s contacts with the state of Connecticut. It is anticipated that plaintiffs’ efforts to demonstrate

personal jurisdiction over TAI will be focused on the “related to” standard governing the

connection required between TAI’s contacts with the forum and plaintiffs’ specific claims. That

required connection should serve to limit the excessively broad scope of discovery sought by

plaintiffs in connection with this definition.

The controlling cases governing the relevance of the relationship between a defendant’s

contacts and plaintiffs’ claims are Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct.

1017 (2021) and Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co., 345 Conn. 312 (2022). The U.S.

Supreme Court in Ford determined that while the “related to” prong does not require evidence

of causality between the contacts and the claims, “[t]hat does not mean anything goes.” Ford

Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). The approach

taken in many of the Interrogatories and Requests for Production ignore that admonition from

the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court boiled this admonition down by stating that

“[t]he only issue is whether those contacts are related enough to the plaintiffs’ suits.” Ford Motor

Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1031 (emphasis added). Yet, outside of the Model 560, the remaining

model aircraft included within the definition are not related at all. Justice Alito’s concurrence
summarized the restriction by stating that “[t]o rein in this phrase, limits must be found, and the

Court assures us that ‘relate to,’ as it now uses the concept, ‘incorporates real limits.’” Ford

Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1033.

The Connecticut Supreme Court in Adams provided further direction for this analysis

following the Ford decision, preferring “the term ‘case linkage’ to ‘relatedness,’ a term used by

many other courts, because the former is more descriptive and less abstract.” Adams v. Aircraft

Spruce & Specialty Co., 345 Conn. 312, 326 at FN 10 (2022). The Adams court determined that:

whereas the purposeful availment element of specific jurisdiction
focuses exclusively on whether the defendant has a sufficiently
meaningful affiliation with the forum, the case-linkage element focuses
on whether the plaintiff's specific claim is sufficiently connected to
the defendant's forum contacts. The case-linkage element therefore
considers only those forum contacts of the defendant that have a
connection to the specific claim brought by the plaintiff.

Adams, 345 Conn. at 337 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, plaintiffs’ discovery

requests should be limited to the establishment of case-linkage. See Colon v. Rose Associates,

Inc., No. FBT-CV-196081720S, 2019 WL 4667206, at *1 (Conn. Super. Mar. 27, 2019) (personal

jurisdiction requests involving “defendant's business practices and operations are limited to those

conducted in Connecticut or purposefully directed toward residents in Connecticut.”).

The Court should exercise its authority to rein in requests which are not aimed at

establishing the required case-linkage between the information sought and plaintiffs’ specific

product design and warning claims. See Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57, 459

A.2d 503 (1983); Colon, 2019 WL 4667206, at *1 (recognizing that trial courts have discretion

to limit the scope of jurisdictional discovery).

Specifically relevant to TAI’s objection to plaintiffs’ attempt to expand jurisdictional

discovery into other aircraft models, the Adams court addressed whether and when attempts
to point to other or similar models from the same defendant manufacturer are relevant to the

analysis of specific personal jurisdiction. The Adams court, again discussing Ford Motor Co.

and its progeny, recognized that a “few” courts in other jurisdictions have allowed for an

extension of the Ford Motor Co. holding, permitting reference to other, similar models produced

by the defendant manufacturer in the personal jurisdiction review. Adams, 345 Conn. at 340.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. found it relevant to the personal jurisdiction

discussion that Ford Motor Co. marketed its brand—encompassing numerous Ford models—

within the forum. Id. at 338-339. The Adams court reflected that “[t]hese courts have indicated

that forum activity relating to other models of the same product type could provide support for

personal jurisdiction if there is no basis to conclude that there is a material difference between

the models.” Id. at 340-41 (emphasis added).

Here, by contrast, there is no indication of any forum activity relating to the other models

included in the definition beyond the Model 560. Plaintiffs appear to simply rely on their belief

that the additional models of aircraft listed are similar regardless of the lack of any connection

between those other models and Connecticut, much less a connection that is related to plaintiffs’

claims. Based on the lack of connection or forum activity, the definition of the Subject Model

Cessna Aircraft should be limited to the Cessna Model 560. The situation here is also unlike Ford

because there is no allegation that TAI had in-state dealers trying to sell or market the other models

listed in the definition, or that in-state sales or marketing of aircraft have any connection to this

accident.

Beyond the fact that plaintiffs fail to establish that the extraneous models have a connection

to the forum which is related to their claims, the proposed Subject Model Cessna Aircraft definition

even extends beyond the aircraft models which are included on the same FAA approved Type
Certificate authorizing the design and manufacture of the Citation 560XLS+. For purposes of

background, “certification” is how the FAA manages risk through safety assurance.

https://www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/certification. Type certification is the approval of

the design of the aircraft and all component parts and associated manuals. Id. Certification

provides the FAA confidence that a proposed product or operation will meet FAA safety

expectations to protect the public. Id. Certification affirms that FAA requirements have been met.

Id. When aircraft models are sufficiently similar, often because they are based on the same

aerodynamic design and structure, they may be included on the same Type Certificate and listed

together on a resource called a Type Certificate Data Sheet.

Here, the FAA certificated the Model 560 for production in 1989 and included it on the

existing Type Certificate which now covers Models 500, 550, S550, 560 and the 560XL. (Type

Certificate No. A22CE, Ex. 1). While each of these aircraft models have significant differences,

all three are dual pilot aircraft with similar aerodynamic design and structure. The Model 510 and

525, both capable of flight with only one pilot, were not included on the 560’s Type Certificate

considering that they were not based on the same model; instead, the models were placed on their

own Type Certificate Data Sheets. At the very least, plaintiffs’ definition is overbroad to the extent

it includes models that are not even on the same Type Certificate as the Model at issue in this case.

Because plaintiffs’ definition of “Subject Model Cessna Aircraft” extends beyond what

could be relevant to the applicable personal jurisdiction relatedness test, the proposed definition

would cause the requests below to be overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, the proposed definition would cause the respective

requests to be unduly burdensome as it would multiply the burden of coordinating searches through

numerous product lines which are not at issue in this case or linked to plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, TAI
objects to the definition of “Subject Model Cessna Aircraft” to the extent it seeks jurisdictional

discovery that is unrelated to the Model 560 (inclusive of the Model 560XLS+), the only Model

at issue in this case.

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE: TAI’s objection to the scope of “Subject Model Cessna

Aircraft” to include the Cessna Citation 500, 510, 525, 550 and 560 series aircraft, in addition to

the Cessna Citation 560 XLS+ model directly at issue is poorly reasoned. TAI attempts to obscure

and confuse clear precedent that allows for jurisdictional discovery relating to similar model

products, which has been interpreted by this court to mean “other products with the same alleged

defects”, Green v. United Steel Corp., LLC, No. X07HHDCV226158732S, 2023 WL 4577154,

at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 14, 2023), and its claim that Plaintiff cannot establish that there was

any forum-specific conduct for the other models is illogical when the whole purpose of Plaintiffs’

requests to establish just that. TAI’s objection should be overruled and Plaintiffs should be

allowed discovery regarding all the different series of aircraft included in its definition of “Subject

Model Cessna Aircraft”.

Plaintiffs agree with TAI that the controlling precedent relating to TAI’s contacts and

Plaintiffs’ claims are the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.

Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision

in Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co., 345 Conn. 312, 323-24 (2022). TAI’s conception

of what Plaintiff must show to satisfy due process under the Ford and Adams holdings, however,

is much more restrictive than the actual holdings in those cases, and this Court should allow

Plaintiff jurisdictional discovery relating to all steps TAI takes to facilitate sale, marketing,

service and support of all the models of Cessna Citation business defined as “Subject Model

Cessna Aircraft” in Connecticut.
In order to meet the due process requirements for specific jurisdiction, a Plaintiff must

show that the defendant has contacts in the forum state and that Plaintiff’s claims “arise out of ore

relate to” those contacts, or what TAI refers to as “case-linkage”. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025-26. For

years this was interpreted to mean that there must be a causal relationship whereby defendant’s in-

state contacts gave rise to Plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 1026. In Ford, however, the Supreme Court

recognized that a causal relationship between defendant’s in-state contacts and a plaintiff’s claim

is not required in certain products liability claims. Id. The Court held that Ford could be subject

to jurisdiction in states where its products injured individuals even though they had not sold the

cars at issue in those states, when it had engaged in systematic efforts to serve the market of that

state by marketing, sales and servicing the same products in those states. Id. at 1028.

In Adams, the Connecticut Supreme Court, applied the principles of Ford in the context of

Connecticut law. While the Court in Adams found that there was not personal jurisdiction, it did

so because the requirements set out in Ford had not been met. Plaintiff claimed a defective

carburetor sold by Defendant parts dealer caused the aircraft accident at issue, but failed to present

evidence or even allegation “that the defendant distributed, sold, marketed, or otherwise placed

into the stream of commerce any similarly defective products in this state.” Adams, 345 Conn. 312,

342.

TAI is correct that in Adams the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that other courts “had

indicated that forum activity relating to other models of the same product type could provide

support for specific jurisdiction, if there is no basis to conclude that there is a material difference

between the models.” Adams, 345 Conn. 312, 340-41. TAI, conveniently leaves out the reasoning

behind this statement that the other courts reached this conclusion because “in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, other models of the same product type that were produced by the
defendant manufacturer could or would share the same design defect, manufacturing defect, or

defective warnings as the particular model at issue in the litigation.” Id. at 340-41. The Court,

however, did not, as TAI implies, reject this reasoning. It only determined that it did not apply in

the case at hand because Plaintiff was seeking to obtain jurisdiction through the defendant dealer’s

sale, marketing and service not of similar products from the same manufacturer, but sale, marketing

and service of similar products by a different manufacturer – a concept the Connecticut Supreme

Court found not supported by any court that has interpreted Ford. Id. at 341.

Subsequent cases in this Court applying the principles of Ford to Connecticut law as laid

out in Adams, have found that Plaintiffs can satisfy the case-linkage requirement with evidence

that “[(1)] other products with the same alleged defects were marketed or sold in Connecticut, [(2)]

that the subject product was used in Connecticut, and [(3)] that the injury was allegedly caused by

the defective product occurred in Connecticut.” Green v. United Steel Corp., LLC, No.

X07HHDCV226158732S, 2023 WL 4577154, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 14, 2023) (Noble, J.)

(emphasis added). Courts in other states have similarly explicitly rejected the product-specific

interpretation of what evidence can be used to establish case-linkage. See, e.g., Downing v. Losvar,

21 Wash. App. 2d 635, 660-662, 507 P.3d 894, 909, review denied sub nom. Downing v. Textron

Aviation, Inc, 200 Wash. 2d 1004, 516 P.3d 384 (2022) (“Textron Aviation argues that we should

assess its contacts with Washington State by limiting our review only to the model of airplane

relevant to this suit, the Cessna T182T Skylane. In other words, Textron Aviation advocates a

product specific test. We reject such a test…. [I]n its promotion of sales and service, Textron

Aviation did not distinguish between the various models of planes. Textron Aviation promoted

itself holistically as a worldwide manufacturer and servicer of aircraft.”).
Outside the context of jurisdictional discovery, Connecticut Courts have endorsed a broad

view of discovery in products liability cases given “the complex nature of the considerable proof

required in order successfully to maintain this type of action.” Picketts v. International Playtex

Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 508, 576 A.2d 518 (1990) (citation omitted). Courts in Connecticut and

elsewhere have granted discovery of information relating to similar model products made by a

defendant manufacturer in a products liability case that share the feature the plaintiff has claimed

to be defective. See, e.g., Napolitano v. Synthes, Inc., No. 3:09CV828 TLM, 2013 WL 1798790,

at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 29, 2013) citing Culligan v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 110 F.R.D. 122, 126

(S.D.N.Y.1986) (“[D]iscovery of similar, if not identical, models is routinely permitted in product

liability cases.”); In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., Oct. 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295, 306

(N.D.Ill.1997) (“[Discovery] of other accidents involving similar products is relevant in products

liability cases to show notice to defendants of the danger and cause of the accident.”); Fine v. Facet

Aerospace Products Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 441 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (“Generally, different models of a

product will be relevant if they share with the accident-causing model those characteristics

pertinent to the legal issues raised in the litigation.”); Schaap v. Executive Industries, Inc., 130

F.R.D. 384, 387 (N.D.Ill.1990) (holding information concerning similar models that have the same

component parts to be discoverable); Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 70–71

(E.D.Pa.1974) (allowing discovery of information on subsequent vehicle model with a similar

subject system); Uitts v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.R.D. 450, 451 (E.D.Pa.1972) (permitting

discovery on all models with the same subject component plaintiffs claim to be defective).

TAI does not present any evidence to refute the contention that all the Cessna Citation 500,

510, 525, 550 and 560 series aircraft share the defective conditions with the Cessna 560 XLS+

aircraft that Plaintiffs have claimed to be defective. That is because just like the 560 XLS+ aircraft,
each of the other series of aircraft (1) lack a Takeoff Configuration Warning System (“TOCWS”)

that alerts pilots when the parking brake is engaged prior to takeoff, (2) have a Pilot’s Operating

Handbook (“POH”) that does not direct pilots to specifically check the parking brake in the takeoff

checklist items, and (3) have parking brakes designed such that they can be partially engaged.

More importantly, as TAI alluded to in is objection, these other models of aircraft have

been involved in similar incidents where pilots attempted to take off, or even actually took off,

with the parking brake engaged, precisely because they share these defective conditions with 560

XLS+ aircraft at issue in this case:

• Cessna Citation 560 – In 2003, pilot in command of a Cessna Citation 560
aircraft left the parking brake engaged during takeoff from Copenhagen and
subsequently deflated the tires of the aircraft during landing at Edinburgh
Airport in Scotland because the parking brake remained partially engaged
at landing. (AAIB Incident Report, Ref. # EW/G2003/04/20, attached
hereto as Exhibit A).

• Cessna Citation 525 – In 2011, the pilot in command of a Cessna Citation
525 aircraft departing an airport in Switzerland, left the parking brake
engaged, which retarded acceleration during takeoff and prevented the
aircraft from achieving lift necessary for takeoff even after the aircraft
reached rotation speed, resulting in a runway overrun. (Final Report No.
2156 of the Swiss Accident Investigation Board, attached hereto as Exhibit
B).

• Cessna Citation 550 – In 2015, the pilot in command of a Cessna Citation
550 aircraft departing an airport in Australia left the parking brake engaged,
which retarded acceleration during takeoff and prevented the aircraft from
achieving lift necessary for takeoff even after rotation speed was reached,
resulting in a runway overrun and substantial damage to the aircraft.
(Australian Transport Safety Report, Aviation Occurrence Investigation
AO-2015-114, Final – 25 July 2016, attached hereto as Exhibit C).

• Cessna Citation 560 XL – On August 21, 2019, pilot in command of a
Cessna Citation 560 XL aircraft departing from an airport near Oroville,
California, left the parking brake engaged, which retarded acceleration
during takeoff and prevented the aircraft from achieving lift necessary for
takeoff even after rotation speed was reached, resulting in a runway overrun
and the aircraft being consumed in a post-crash fire. (NTSB Aviation
Investigation Final Report, Accident No. WPR19LA247, attached hereto as
Exhibit D).

• Cessna Citation 510 – On August 31, 2019, the pilot in command of a
Cessna Citation 510 departing from an airport in El Monte, California, left
the parking brake engaged, which retarded acceleration during takeoff and
prevented the aircraft from achieving lift necessary for takeoff even after
the aircraft reached rotation speed, resulting in a runway overrun where the
aircraft struck the airport perimeter fence. (NTSB Aviation Investigation
Final Report, Accident No. WPR19FA230, attached hereto as Exhibit E).

There can be no dispute that the other model aircraft share the defective conditions

Plaintiffs alleged in the subject aircraft, and as a result, evidence that TAI facilitated sale,

marketing, service and/or support of such products by conduct directed to Connecticut is clearly

relevant evidence that can be used to establish case-linkage required under Ford and Adams.

TAI seems to be arguing that Plaintiffs have to show that there is some connection between

these other aircraft models and Connecticut in order for there to be relevance to the case-linkage

requirement. Plaintiffs agree with that. Somewhat nonsensically, however, TAI then argues that

because Plaintiffs cannot show any connection between the other model aircraft and Connecticut,

they are not entitled to the discovery that would uncover information relating to how TAI has

facilitated sale, marketing and/or service of those other model aircraft through activity directed to

Connecticut. Not to be crass, but that is why Plaintiffs need the discovery they seek: to show that

TAI has taken steps to facilitate sales, marketing, service and/or support of the similar model

aircraft that share the defective conditions claimed in the subject aircraft in Connecticut. The

whole point of Plaintiffs requests is to obtain that evidence. To say that Plaintiffs are not entitled

to such information not because it is not relevant, but because they don’t already have it is simply

baffling.

TAI also seems to imply in its objections that Plaintiffs would only be entitled to service

information relating to work done on the parking brakes of other 560 XLS+ model aircraft in
Connecticut. TAI does not cite to any caselaw to support this position, and Plaintiffs are aware of

no court who has taken such a narrow view of what evidence can be used to establish case-linkage.

There is no reference in the Ford decision to the specific defects claimed by plaintiffs or any

requirement set forth requiring that a defendant’s service of vehicles in the state have anything to

do with the feature claimed to be defective in order to be relevant to the issue of case-linkage. To

the contrary Ford, Adams and all other cases interpreting them speak generally about sale,

marketing, service and support of the product alleged to be defective, or similar products from the

same manufacturer that share the defective condition, without any requirement that the service or

support address the specific defective condition claimed by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Ford, 141 S.

Ct. at 1023, 1029-30 (2021) (addressing case-linkage in detail without any discussion of the

specific defects at issue nonetheless a statement that service or support within the forum need be

related to the specific defect); Adams, 345 Conn. at 318-19, 338-43(discussing the nature of the

defect only in the context of its relevance to determining whether activity related to similar

products with that defect is relevant without discussion of whether the activity itself within the

forum must be related to the same defect); Green, 2023 WL 4577154, at *3-5 (same).

When courts applying Ford to TAI have drawn any distinction about what sales,

marketing, service and support activity can be used to support case-linkage (and, mind you, some

have not), 1 they have nearly universally focused on the difference between activities relating to

small piston engine aircraft manufactured by TAI brands 2 and the larger Cessna Citation business

jets since Cessna’s activities relating to the former is small compared to its extensive marketing,

1
See, e.g., Downing v. Losvar, 21 Wash. App. 2d 635, 662, 507 P.3d 894, 909, review denied sub
nom. Downing v. Textron Aviation, Inc, 200 Wash. 2d 1004, 516 P.3d 384 (2022).
2
In addition to Cessna brand aircraft, TAI manufactures Beechcraft and Hawker aircraft.
https://txtav.com/
service and support of the latter. See, e.g., Craig v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 2022 Cal. Super. LEXIS

15781, at *5 (Feb. 28, 2022) ("Although Textron may sell and service newer models of aircraft

in California, and has a website that lists representatives who serve California, Plaintiffs have not

sufficiently demonstrated how these contacts are related to Plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit.”)

(emphasis added); LNS Enterprises LLC v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 864 (9th Cir. 2022)

(finding Plaintiff had not shown case-linkage in a case involving the crash of a Columbia brand

piston engine aircraft because “[t]here is no allegation in this case that Textron's single Arizona

service center ever serviced Plaintiffs' aircraft, nor is there any indication that this service center

even services the same type of Columbia aircraft at issue in this case.”). While courts have not

explicitly stated so, it is reasonable to draw such a distinction because the aircraft at issue are so

different that they could not share the conditions claimed to be defective. Notably, Plaintiffs here

are not seeking disclosure relating to the sale, marketing, service and support of Citation business

jets to obtain jurisdiction over TAI relating to the crash of a small piston-engine aircraft that TAI

does not service or support in Connecticut. This crash involves the kind of Cessna Citation

business jet TAI eagerly supports across the country, including Connecticut. TAI even admits

that it sent a mobile service unit into Connecticut to service the subject aircraft.

Finally, sensing that its position is untenable, TAI argues its fallback position that if

Plaintiff is entitled to any jurisdictional discovery relating to models other than the 560 XLS+,

they should only be entitled to discovery relating to models that are on the same type certificate

data sheet: the 500, 550, and 560 series Citation aircraft. After all, only aircraft that the

manufacturer has represented to the FAA have a similar design can appear on the same type

certificate.

First, Plaintiffs note that the inquiry adopted by this court in assessing case-linkage does
not appear based on the overall similarity, but is focused on whether the products share the

condition Plaintiffs allege to be defective. See Green, 2023 WL 4577154, at *5. As addressed

above, the two models capable of single-pilot flight that are not on the same type certificate as

the subject aircraft – the 510 and 525 – share the defective conditions alleged claimed by Plaintiffs

in this case and have been involved in similar incidents where pilots left the parking brake

engaged during takeoff.

Even if this court were to find that the 510 and 525 as single-pilot aircraft are not

sufficiently similar (which it should not), Plaintiff notes that the remaining aircraft series, the

500, 550 and 560 are all sufficiently similar to the 560XLS+ model at issue that discovery

regarding the sale, marketing, service and support of those aircraft is clearly relevant to the case-

linkage inquiry in this case. As TAI admits, the 500, 525, 550 and 560 series aircraft “are dual

pilot aircraft with similar aerodynamic design and structure”, (TAI Objections, p. 8), and as

Plaintiffs have demonstrated above, these models have been involved in similar incidents of pilots

leaving the parking brake engaged.

For these reasons, all of the model aircraft Plaintiff has defined as “Subject Model Cessna

Aircraft” are relevant to the jurisdictional issues at hand and Plaintiff should be entitled to

discovery relating TAI’s efforts to facilitation sale, marketing, service and support of all of them

in Connecticut.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

1. Documents showing a list of a) all Subject Model Cessna Aircraft designed,

manufactured, distributed and/or sold by you that are currently registered with the Federal Aviation

Administration (“FAA”) in the State of Connecticut; and b) all other aircraft designed,

manufactured, distributed and/or sold by you that are currently registered with the FAA in the State
of Connecticut.

OBJECTION: TAI objects that the conduct of third parties in registering aircraft in

Connecticut is generally outside the control or knowledge of TAI and their conduct is not

relevant to personal jurisdiction over TAI. To the extent Textron Aviation Inc. ("TAI") has

any such information relevant to the determination of personal jurisdiction in Connecticut,

see the affidavits and supporting documents filed in support of its Motions to Dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction in these cases. (See, e.g., Affidavit in support of TAI's

Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, filed in the Johnson case

(hereinafter, the "Johnson MTD Aff." and the "Johnson MTD Brief"), attached as Exhibit

2 3.) In its affidavits and supporting exhibits, TAI provided detailed information relating to

TAI's contacts with Connecticut, which TAI submits is sufficient to address the Court's

determination of TAI's Motions to Dismiss.

In addition, TAI objects that because plaintiffs are not claiming the Court has general

personal jurisdiction over TAI, and because TAI is not contesting the purposeful availment

prong of the specific jurisdiction standard, this request is not relevant or reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence (Conn. Prac. Book § 13-2) on the

sole specific personal jurisdiction issue of whether plaintiffs' claims "arise out of or are related

to" TAI's contacts with the state of Connecticut. It is anticipated that plaintiffs' efforts to

demonstrate personal jurisdiction over TAI will be focused on the "related to" standard

governing the connection required between TAI's contacts with the forum and plaintiffs'

specific claims. That required connection should serve to limit the excessively broad scope of

3
Essentially the same affidavit was filed in each of the related cases, for simplicity, the referenced
Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit refer to the ones filed in the Johnson case. The exhibits to the
Affidavit have not been reproduced here; but were provided in support of TAI’s briefing in support
of its Motions to Dismiss.
discovery sought by plaintiffs in their Interrogatories and Requests for Production. As

discussed throughout these Objections, TAI refers to this as its "case linkage" scope

objection.

The controlling cases governing the relevance of the relationship between a

defendant's contacts and plaintiffs' claims are Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist.

Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) and Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co., 345 Conn. 312

(2022). The U.S. Supreme Court in Ford determined that while the "related to" prong does

not require evidence of causality between the contacts and the claims, "[Oat does not mean

anything goes." Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026

(2021). The approach taken in this Request for Production and many of the other

Interrogatories and Requests for Production ignore that admonition from the U.S. Supreme

Court. The U.S. Supreme Court boiled this admonition down by stating that "The only issue

is whether those contacts are related enough to the plaintiffs' suits." Ford Motor Co., 141 S.

Ct. at 1031 (emphasis added). Yet, the request here is not related at all. Justice Alito's

concurrence summarized the restriction by stating that "No rein in this phrase, limits must

be found, and the Court assures us that 'relate to,' as it now uses the concept, 'incorporates

real limits.'" Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1033.

The Connecticut Supreme Court in Adams provided further direction for this analysis

following the Ford decision, preferring "the term 'case linkage' to 'relatedness,' a term used

by many other courts, because the former is more descriptive and less abstract." Adams v.

Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co., 345 Conn. 312, 326 at FN 10 (2022). The Adams court

determined that:

whereas the purposeful availment element of specific jurisdiction
focuses exclusively on whether the defendant has a sufficiently
meaningful affiliation with the forum, the case-linkage element focuses
on whether the plaintiff's specific claim is sufficiently connected to the
defendant's forum contacts. The case-linkage element therefore
considers only those forum contacts of the defendant that have a
connection to the specific claim brought by the plaintiff.

Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co., 345 Conn. at 337 (emphasis added) (internal

citations omitted). Thus, with purposeful availment not at issue, plaintiffs' discovery requests

should be limited to the establishment of case-linkage.

The Court should exercise its authority to rein in requests which are not aimed at

establishing the required case-linkage between the information sought and plaintiffs' specific

product design and warning claims. Any potential jurisdictional discovery requests must be

limited in scope to "facts pertaining to personal jurisdiction." Standard Tallow Corp. V.

Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57, 459 A.2d 503 (1983); Colon v. Rose Associates, Inc„ No.

FBTCV196081720S, 2019 WL 4667206, at *1 (Conn. Super. Mar. 27, 2019) (recognizing that

trial courts have discretion to limit the scope of jurisdictional discovery). Like all discovery

requests, jurisdictional discovery requests are also subject to specific objections and

reasonable limits. See generally Practice Book §§ 13-2, 13-5. The granting or denial of specific

discovery requests rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. See Barry v. Quality Steel

Products, Inc., 280 Conn. 1, 17, 905 A. 2d 55 (2006).

A. Here, there is no reasonable connection between the contacts which are the

subject matter of the request and the specific claims brought by plaintiffs—that the Citation

560XLS+ should have been designed and manufactured with an alert to notify the pilots that

the parking brake has not been released, and that the aircraft's flight manual and checklists

should have further addressed the release of the parking brake before takeoff. Here, the

request for registration records for any aircraft in Connecticut is not sufficiently tied to the

case-linkage requirement so as to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence.
B. Plaintiffs can access this publicly available information from the FAA as easily

as TAI can, making the request unduly burdensome in addition to being overbroad.

C. This request is outside the scope of the agreed upon time limitation for

jurisdictional discovery—January 1, 2017 to April 1, 2023 4.

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE: With due respect to TAI’s objection that its motions to dismiss

and supporting affidavits have provided “sufficient to address the Court’s determination of TAI’s

Motions to Dismiss”, they are not the arbiter of such matters. Earlier in its objections it

characterizes what it has provided as “the majority of the evidence in TAI’s possession which is

relevant to the personal jurisdiction inquiry,” (TAI Objections, p. 3), which is pointedly not the

same as all relevant evidence. Plaintiffs disagree that what TAI has provided is sufficient, and,

under Connecticut law, Plaintiffs can issue document requests that relate to either the statutory or

constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction so long as they “could lead to admissible evidence

and therefore are permissible under Practice Book § 13-2.” Colon v. Rose Associates, Inc., No.

FBTCV196081720S, 2019 WL 4667206, at *2 (Conn. Super. Mar. 27, 2019).

The fact that TAI may have produced some relevant material does not relieve it from its

duty to respond to Plaintiffs’ requests for additional documents and information relevant to

personal jurisdiction. TAI acknowledges this to some extent by not opposing Plaintiffs’ right to

jurisdictional discovery in the first instance.

4
Counsel for the parties have agreed upon limitation of the temporal scope of the discovery requests
to the range of time between January 1, 2017 and April 1, 2023; provided that plaintiffs have reserved
their rights to seek extension of this period in the event that some additional information is uncovered
suggesting the existence of specific additional relevant information outside of the agreed upon date
range, to which defendants may individually object. With the agreement on temporal scope reached
with plaintiffs, TAI will not restate the time-limitation objection for the remaining requests and,
instead, will treat those requests as conforming to the agreement reached between the parties.
Furthermore, TAI’s claims are predicated upon its overly restrictive view of the scope of

jurisdictional discovery based on an excessively narrow view of the evidence that can be used to

show case-linkage under Ford and Adams.

In order to meet the due process requirements for specific jurisdiction, a Plaintiff must