Document for HUGHES, HELEN v. HARTFORD HEALTHCARE CORPORATION Et Al

ANTI-SLAPP MOTION (SPECIAL CVRI2302760 LEE VS MELENDREZ MOTION TO STRIKE) Tentative Ruling: Hearing is off calendar.

Case Number: 22TRCV00890 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B BARBARA CLARK, by and through her guardian ad litem, KEVIN CLARK, Plaintiff, Case No.: 22TRCV00890 vs. [Tentative] RULING PRIME HEALTHCARE CENTINELA, LLC DBA CENTINELA HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Moving Parties: Defendant Parkwest Rehabilitation Center, LLC dba Parkwest Healthcare Center Responding Party: Plaintiff Barbara Clark (1) Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint (2) Motion to Strike Portions of SAC The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers. RULING The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first and second causes of action in the SAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant Parkwest is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. BACKGROUND On October 3, 2023, plaintiff Barbara Clark, by and through her guardian ad litem, Kevin Clark, filed a complaint against Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC dba Centinela Hospital Medical Center, Dignity Community Care dba Northridge Hospital Medical Center, Parkwest Rehabilitation Center, LLC dba Parkwest Healthcare Center for (1) elder abuse and neglect, (2) violation of Resident Rights under Health & Safety Code 1430(b), and (3) negligence. On December 12, 2023, the Court sustained with leave to amend defendants demurrer to the first and second causes of action and overruled it as to the third cause of action. The Court granted the motion to strike with leave to amend as to the prayer under the first and second causes of action and denied it as to costs. On January 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a FAC. On March 12, 2024, the Court sustained defendant Dignity Community Care dba Northridge Hospital Medical Centers demurrer with leave to amend as to the first cause of action for elder abuse in the FAC. On April 2, 2024, plaintiff filed a SAC. On April 9, 2024, defendant Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC dba Centinela Hospital Medical Center filed an answer to the SAC. On May 2, 2024, defendant Dignity Community Care filed an answer to the SAC. LEGAL AUTHORITY Demurrer When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228. A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747. Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal. App. 2d 636, 643-44. Strike The court may, upon a motion . . ., or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP §436(b). CCP §431.10 states: (a) A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense. (b) An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: (1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. (3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (c) An immaterial allegation means irrelevant matter as that term is used in Section 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP §437. DISCUSSION Demurrer Defendant Parkwest Rehabilitation Center, LLC dba Parkwest Healthcare Center (Parkwest) demurs to the first cause of action for elder abuse and the second cause of action for violation of resident rights in the SAC on the grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and are uncertain. The SAC alleges that plaintiff Barbara Clark was born on October 5, 1936. SAC, ¶8. In the fall of 2021, Clark was 85 years old and was living independently. She had a history of atrial fibrillation and latent tuberculosis but was otherwise mobile and alert. On October 17, 2021, she suffered a stroke and was admitted to Centinela Hospital. The stroke resulted in right sided hemiplegia, and she required a g-tube and PEG placement for feedings. Id., ¶38. As a result of Clarks physical condition, while she was in the care and custody of Centinela Hospital, she required skilled, medical, and custodial care in addition to assistance with all activities of daily living, including maintaining her personal hygiene, continence care, transferring, and repositioning in bed, transferring in and out of bed and chair, eating, drinking, and managing her medication. Id., ¶39. Centinela Hospital failed to effectively assess Clarks care needs and because of the failure to assess, Centinela Hospital failed to develop, implement, and modify care plans designed to meet Clarks individualized care needs as to wound care, food and fluid, infection, and hygiene. Id., ¶41. When Clark became a patient at Centinela Hospital, her skin was intact and she was clear of skin breakdown. There is no documentation that Clark developed any skin breakdown during her admission to Centinela Hospital. Her hospitalization was complicated as she also became septic, developed a urinary tract infection, and pneumonia. She also had dysphagia status-post PEG placement. Id., ¶42. The SAC further alleges that on October 30, 2021, despite these complications, case managers at Centinela Hospital decided Clark was safe to be discharged to a skilled nursing facility for continued rehabilitation. It was arranged for her to be transferred to Windsor Terrace Healthcare Center via ambulance. When she arrived, she was not there for more than ten minutes as she had developed acute respiratory failure and was hypoxic. She was immediately transferred to the nearest emergency room, Northridge Hospital. Id., ¶43. Centinela Hospital knew, or should have known, Clark required 24-hour hospitalization until she was stable from the stroke and related sequelae. Instead of retaining her, they made the financial decision to discharge her to a lower level of care at a skilled nursing facility knowing she required a higher level of care. As a result of the premature discharge, Clark suffered needlessly as she developed acute respiratory failure and became hypoxic enroute and had to be transferred immediately back to the hospital. Id., ¶44. The SAC alleges that on admission to Northridge Hospital, it is documented for the first time that Clark had a pressure injury on her right and left buttock, right elbow, and left ankle. Centinela Hospital concealed the existence, nature, and severity of these wounds from Clark and her family. Id., ¶45. Nursing staff of Northridge Hospital failed to implement a care plan for Clarks wound care that satisfied the requirements of Clark based on her high risk for pressure wounds. Id., ¶47. On several occasions during her hospitalization at Northridge, nursing staff maintained Clark supine in her bed, applying unnecessary pressure to her sacral area. This occurred several times including October 31-November 5, 2021 and December 28, 2021-January 1, 2022. Id., ¶48. Clark was hospitalized at Northridge Hospital from October 30, 2021 to November 5, 2021, where, in addition to treatment for her acute respiratory failure and hypoxia, she required would care treatment. Id., ¶49. Northridge Hospital failed to effectively assess Clarks care needs and because of the failure to assess, Northridge Hospital failed to develop, implement, and modify care plans designed to meet Clarks individualized care needs. Id., ¶50. As a result, Clarks wounds worsened. Id., ¶51. On November 5, 2021, case managers at Northridge Hospital decided Clark was safe to be discharged to a skilled nursing facility for continued rehabilitation. It was arranged for her to be transferred to Lake Balboa Care Center via ambulance. She was at Lake Balboa Care for only a day before she had to be brought back to the nearest hospital. This time she was transferred to Valley Presbyterian. Id., ¶52. The SAC further alleges that on admission to Valley Presbyterian on November 6, 2021, Clarks oxygen saturation was down to 85%, she had a fever of 102 degrees, and was documented as having multiple pressure injuries on admission. The right and left buttock wound merged to form a sacral wound that was at a State III. Her left and right ankle were classified as unstageable. Id., ¶54. The SAC further alleges that on December 1, 2021, Clark was transferred to Parkwest Healthcare, which failed to effectively assess Clarks care needs and because of the failure to assess, Parkwest Healthcare failed to develop, implement, and modify care plans designed to meet Clarks individualized care needs as to wound care, food and fluid, infection, and hygiene. Id., ¶56(a)-(d). Over the near month long stay at Parkwest Healthcare, Clark was neglected to such a degree that the failures noted above caused her to suffer a UTI, sepsis, and the deterioration of two of her wounds to stage IV. Id., ¶57. She was also documented as having malnutrition. On admission, Clark was required to receive 1680kcal nutrition daily, but she was not provided this required amount of nutrition. Id., ¶58. Nursing staff failed to transfer Clark to a higher level of care. On December 7, 2021, Clark was transferred to Northridge Hospital. Her son advocated for her transfer out of concern that she had pneumonia. At the hospital, she was diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and sepsis. It was also discovered Clarks wounds had worsened. She now had a left buttock that was classified as a Stage IV and coccyx wound classified as a Stage IV. Id., ¶59. The SAC further alleges that over the next several months, Clark had a series of transfers between hospitals and skilled nursing facilities to attempt to heal her wounds. The complications of these mismanaged wounds further complicated her ability to recover from her respiratory conditions. Id., ¶60. 1 st cause of action for elder abuse In order to state a cause of action under the Elder Abuse Act, a plaintiff must allege conduct essentially equivalent to conduct that would support recovery of punitive damages. Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 771, 789. Neglect is defined in section 15610.57 as (a). . . . (1) The negligent failure of any person having the care or custody of an elder . . . to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. . . .(b) Neglect includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1) Failure to assist in personal hygiene, or in the provision of food, clothing, or shelter. (2) Failure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs. . . . (4) Failure to prevent malnutrition or dehydration. . . . It is true that statutory elder abuse includes 'neglect as defined in Section 15610.57,' which in turn includes negligent failure of an elder custodian 'to provide medical care for [the elder's] physical and mental health needs' (§ 15610.57(b)(2)). . . . '[N]eglect' within the meaning of [section 15610.57] covers an area of misconduct distinct from 'professional negligence.' As used in the Act, neglect refers not to the substandard performance of medical services but, rather, to the 'failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations.' Thus, the statutory definition of 'neglect' speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide medical care. Notably, the other forms of abuse, as defined in the Act--physical abuse and fiduciary abuse [§15657]--are forms of intentional wrongdoing also distinct from 'professional negligence.'" Covenant Care, Inc. , supra, at 783. [T]he facts constituting the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury must be pleaded with particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims. Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley (2011) 198 Cal. App. 4 th 396, 407 (citing Covenant Care ). Allegations of misconduct directed against one defendant . . . do not state a cause of action against another defendant against whom the allegations of misconduct are not directed. Id. at 410 (citation omitted). [W]hen a plaintiff asserts a claim against a health care provider on a legal theory other than professional negligence, courts must determine whether the claim is nonetheless based on the health care providers professional negligence . Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal. App. 4 th 336, 347 (citation omitted). Citing to the content of the definition of neglect in Welf. and Inst. Code 15610.57(b), the Supreme Court stated, [w]hat they each seem to contemplate is the existence of a robust caretaking or custodial relationshipthat is, a relationship where a certain party has assumed a significant measure of responsibility for attending to one or more of an elders basic needs that an able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance. Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal. 4 th 148, 58. What seems beyond doubt is that the Legislature enacted a scheme distinguishing between and decidedly not lumping together claims of professional negligence and neglect. Id. at 159. Defendant Parkwest argues that the allegations fail to meet the heightened pleading requirement of specificity or particularity as to moving defendant. Defendant contends that while the SAC provides a medical chronology of plaintiffs health conditions, the alleged wrongful conduct that purportedly led to plaintiffs health decline is described generally. Further, defendant argues, the allegations are insufficient to demonstrate egregious abuse or that defendant acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Also, defendant argues, the SAC does not allege facts showing that an officer, director, or managing agent of defendant was involved in the abuse, authorized the abuse, ratified the abuse, or hired the person who did the abuse with advance knowledge of the persons unfitness. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the allegations are sufficient. The Court finds that the allegations are sufficient to meet the elements for elder abuse against Parkwest. The allegations are pled with the requisite particularity and support reckless neglect, including the statutory definition of neglect. See Welf. & Inst. Code §15610.57(b)(1), (2), (4). The allegations as to corporate ratification are also sufficient. See SAC, ¶¶30-33, 79. The demurrer is OVERRULED. 2 nd cause of action for violation of Residents Rights Under Health & Safety Code §1430(b)(1), A current or former resident or patient, or the legal representative, personal representative, or successor in interest of a current or former resident or patient, of a skilled nursing facility, . . . may bring a civil action against the licensee of a facility who violates any rights of the resident or patient as set forth in Section 72527 or 73523 of Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations, or any other right provided for by federal or state law or regulation. . . . Section 72527 provides a list of 26 specific rights. Defendant argues that the allegations are conclusory and merely reference the regulations in boilerplate fashion and mirror the language in the statute rather than any fact. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the allegations are sufficient. The Court finds that the allegations are sufficient as plaintiff alleges facts to support the elements. Plaintiff incorporates the above allegations under the first cause of action, including that defendant permitted Clark to suffer infection, severe wounds, malnutrition and neglect; failed to assess, develop and follow care plans that matched Clarks individual needs; failed to notify Clarks family of changes in her condition and hiding her condition; failed to properly note nutrition and intake of Clark, wound notes, and other medical records deficiencies; and failed to have sufficient staff to meet Clarks supervision and care needs, which violated Clarks statutory rights. The demurrer is thus OVERRULED. Motion to Strike Defendant Parkwest requests that the Court strike page 50, lines 9 (general damages) and 10 (punitive damages), 11-12 (prejudgment and post judgment interest), 13 (costs of suit), and 15 (attorneys fees per Welf. & Inst. Code §15657) in the SAC. Punitive damages Civil Code §3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . . The Court in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95, found that [s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Civil Code §3294(c)(1). As the Court noted in College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 713, Section 3294 was amended in 1987 to require that, where malice is based on a defendants conscious disregard of a plaintiffs rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. The Court in College Hospital held further that despicable conduct refers to circumstances that are base, vile, or contemptible. Id. at 725 (citation omitted). In order to be entitled to the heightened remedies set forth in the Elder Abuse Act, Welfare & Institutions Code §15657, the plaintiff must establish recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of this abuse by clear and convincing evidence. As stated above, the Court finds that the allegations are sufficient as to the first cause of action for elder abuse, including reckless misconduct. Attorneys fees In light of the ruling on the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action, there is no basis to strike the prayer for attorneys fees. General damages In light of the ruling on the demurrer as to the first cause of action, there is no basis to strike the prayer for attorneys fees. Prejudgment and post judgment interest and costs of suit Defendant does not address in the memorandum of points and authorities. Further, in light of the ruling on the demurrer, there is no basis to strike the prayer for interest and costs. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED. ORDER The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first and second causes of action in the SAC. The motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant Parkwest is ordered to file an answer within twenty days. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Case Number: 24STCV05330 Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 Dept: 55 NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS : BACKGROUND RODOLFO PUEY QUINONES, JR. (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint for Defamation against Claire Contreras aka Maharlika (Defendant), alleging that Defendant made defamatory statements about Plaintiffs business and connections with the Philippines government on her YouTube channel. See Complaint, ¶ 31 (listing alleged statements). Defendant brings a SLAPP motion requesting an order striking the Complaint, or any of the alleged statements. Plaintiff opposes the motion. LEGAL STANDARD As to motions made under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (SLAPP), courts first decide whether moving parties have made a prima facie showing that the attacked claims arise from a protected activity, including defendants right of petition, or free speech, under a constitution, in connection with issues of public interest. E.g., Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 5. In determining that first step, judges are not limited to considering pleadings, but also may consider the moving and opposing parties filed evidence to ascertain the conduct or communications upon which liability is allegedly based. All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic and Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1200 (determination of whether the SLAPP statute applies is based primarily on reviewing the complaint, but also documents filed in opposition to the extent that they might give meaning to the words in the complaint.). In determining whether the SLAPP statute applies, courts consider whether a defendantthrough public or private speech or conductparticipated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest. FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc . (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 154. An issue need not be significant one in which the public takes an interest in order to be protected by the SLAPP statute. Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (finding public interest in prominent businessman and celebrity, among the Finnish public). [C]onsumer information that goes beyond a particular interaction between the parties and implicates matters of public concern that can affect many people is generally deemed to involve an issue of public interest for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1366. The SLAPP statute applies to defamation cases involving an issue of public interest. Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Org. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 464-65. "Consumer information ..., at least when it affects a large number of persons, also generally is viewed as information concerning a matter of public interest." Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898. If moving parties successfully have shifted the burden, then opposing parties must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the complaint. Equilon Ent., LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc . (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67. To establish such a probability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts, which, if credited by the trier of fact, is sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist . (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1435; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88. In the context of an anti-SLAPP suit, courts must consider the pertinent burden of proof in ascertaining whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing which analyses turn upon the burdens applicable as to the elements of the particular causes of action. Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1578. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS AND REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE The Court sustains Plaintiffs evidentiary objections to the Declarations of Claire Contreras, Jeffrey Lewis, Charlyn Bjerg, and Anna Maurera. The Court sustains Defendants objections to the Declaration of Rodolfo Puey Quinones. The Court grants Plaintiffs request for judicial notice of the complaint filed in another plaintiffs federal case against the same defendant. Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 228 (waiver by no objection to judicial notice). ANALYSIS 1. First Step Defendant contends that a certified translated transcript of the video at issue proves that Defendant did not make the statements alleged in the Complaint. E.g., Reply, 2:3-4. Alternatively, Defendant argues that (1) the statements were made in a public forum, (2) the statements concerning Plaintiffs involvement in public corruption in the Philippines is a matter of public interest, (3) and Defendant is engaged in news gathering that is protected activity. In contrast, Plaintiff filed a declaration stating that he personally observed the alleged statements made in the subject video. Also, Plaintiff asserts that, as a fashion designer whose only association with politics is that some of his clients happen to be politicians or married to politicians, does not fall within the scope of the SLAPP statute. In determining whether the first step has been established, i.e. the arising from element of the anti-SLAPP statute, a court must consider the pleadings and any supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which alleged liability is based. Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 443-444. A showing that a defendant did not do an alleged activity is not a showing that the alleged activity is a protected activity. Ibid ., at 446. When compared to the allegations and Plaintiffs declaration, Defendants certified transcript more convincingly shows that the Complaint is not made upon any protected communications, because Defendant never said the statements. Therefore, the Court determines that Defendants admission that the alleged statements never happened means that Defendant failed to meet the initial burden of SLAPP step 1 to show protected statements. Second Step A court need not reach the second prong of the SLAPP analysis if the first prong (arising from protected conduct) was not satisfied. Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 790, 801. Nevertheless, the Court considers the second step of the SLAPP analysis. The elements of a claim of a claim for defamation are: Intentional publication by defendant; of statement of fact; that is false; defamatory; unprivileged; and has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damages. E.g ., Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720. Defendant reasons that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second step of the SLAPP analysis, because (1) as a public figure Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proving actual malice for a defamation claim (i.e., that Defendant harbored doubt as to truth of the statements), (2) the statements are truthful opinions, (3) Plaintiff failed to timely request a retraction in order to recover presumed damages, and (4) Plaintiff is libel-proof due to a bad reputation discovered by counsels Google search of links on the Internet. Public Figure Malice Plaintiff contends he is not a limited public figure, as a clothing designer who sometimes sells clothes to government members. Alternatively, Plaintiff asserts that there is no evidence that Defendant made any effort to verify or investigate her statements, which constitutes malice. For SLAPP motions involving a defamation claim, public figures must prove by clear and convincing evidence that statements were made with knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for truth. Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577. Dicta in an opinion indicates that parties opposing SLAPP motions need not evidence malice, where parties being a public figure is not established as a matter of law or is in dispute. See Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 988, fn.7. A limited public figure (one voluntarily injected, or drawn into, a public controversy for a limited range of issues) suing for defamation must show the defendants knowledge of falsity, or reckless disregard for truth to the extent the communication relates to the figures role in a public controversy. McGarry v. Univ. Of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-114 (McGarry). See also Khawar v. Globe Internat . (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 263, 265 (involuntary limited public figure must have purposefully engaged in activity inviting criticism, or have acquired substantial media access in relation to the controversy); Annette F. v. Sharon S . (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1164 (possible to become a public figure by being drawn into a particular public controversy without purposeful action & for an individual who & has acquired such public prominence in relation to the controversy as to permit media access sufficient to effectively counter media-published defamatory statements.); Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 88, 90 (gross negligence is not actual malice, but instead defendants must have had knowledge of falsity or doubt of the truth, and failures to investigate must be purposeful avoidance of truth or of knowledge of facts which could confirm probable falsity); Collins v. Waters (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 70, 80 (In the context of a special motion to strike,& plaintiffs & must establish only a probability they can produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.). Here, the Court determines that that Plaintiff is at least an involuntary, limited public figure involved in the clothing designing business in connection with high-ranking government officials, and that Defendant acted with malice in the sense of Defendants lack of effort to obtain information as to the truth or falsity of the asserted facts that Defendant declares she never made. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff satisfied the burden to show sufficient merit of the claim for defamation against a limited public figure. Truthful Opinions Plaintiff contends that admissible evidence shows the falsity of statements of fact, via his declaration. See Plaintiffs decl. ¶¶ 8-13. Opinions are protected communications unless a reasonable fact finder could find, under the totality of circumstances, that they imply a provably false assertion of fact. Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 789, 798. See also Paterno v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1356 (in determining opinion, question is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.); Krinsky v. Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1175 (comments impliedly based upon undisclosed facts, may constitute actionable assertions of fact and not pure opinion, depending upon all of the circumstances, but the particular comments such as "crook" found to constitute mere opinion in the context of "juvenile name-calling"); Wong v. Tai Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1372 (in determining libel, judges consider insinuations and implications reasonably drawn from the communications). Here, the Court decides that, under all the alleged, and evidenced, circumstances, Plaintiff met the burden to prove that the statements containing some opinions are actionable, because the whole context of the video contains statements or implications of asserted facts made in support of the opinions that Plaintiff has declared are false. Hence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff met the burden to show actionable opinions. Timely Retraction and Damages Plaintiff argues that slander per se is actionable without proof of special damage, and general damages are presumed as a matter of law (citing Moranville v. Aletto (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 667, 672). Alternatively, Plaintiff states that both damage types are shown by Plaintiffs declaration. Case law is fairly clear that YouTube postings are not covered by Civil Code Section 48a. A close examination of the cases reveals the scope of section 48a is determined by the type of media involved, and not upon specific content. Therefore we cannot conclude the statute only applies to visual and sound broadcasting which is engaged in the business of rapid and immediate dissemination of the news. The language of the statute clearly applies to all types of television shows. Kalpoe v. Superior Court (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 206, 217. It is not the intent of the Legislature that Section 48a of the Civil Code should apply to periodicals that publish at longer than weekly intervals, nor is it the intent of the Legislature that Section 48a of the Civil Code should apply to casual postings on a social networking Internet Web site, chat room, electronic bulletin board, discussion group, online forum, or other related Internet Web site. Stats. 2015, ch. 343, § 1. The correction statute provides that in an action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper or of a slander by radio broadcast, the plaintiff, in order to be permitted to seek more than special damages, must serve & a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that they be corrected. This notice and demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge&. 6A Cal. Jur. 3d Assault and Other Willful Torts § 240. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Civil Code Section 48a does not apply to YouTube videos of livestreams. Therefore, Plaintiff meets the burden to show recoverability of at least presumed, general damages, notwithstanding the Court sustaining evidentiary objections to proffered proof of damages such as to Plaintiffs business. Ultimately, that means that the defamation claim does not fail for lack of damages. See, e.g., McGarry v. Univ. Of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112 (statements that charge directly without a need for explanation are libelous per se, as to which pleading and proving special damages is not required). Libel-Proof Evidence Plaintiff states that California law does not recognize any libel proof doctrine. Further, Plaintiff contends that counsels declaration is not competent evidence of Plaintiffs reputation. Defendant relies upon cites to nongoverning federal cases in asserting a libel-proof defense. Federal case law is not binding upon California courts and may be only persuasive in some circumstances. Alameida v. State Personnel Bd . (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 46, 61. Additionally, Defendants attorney declaration, setting forth Google search results, does not constitute competent evidence of Defendants reputation. In sum, the Court reasons that there is no libel-proof defense applicability here. CONCLUSION Therefore, the Court denies the motion based upon Defendants burden failure as to step 1, or alternatively, Plaintiffs burden success as to step 2.

Case Number: 23CHCV01244 Hearing Date: July 9, 2024 Dept: F51 JULY 8, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 23CHCV01244 Motion Filed: 4/17/24 JURY TRIAL: 8/5/24 MOVING PARTY: Defendants Christopher Johnson; and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (collectively, Defendants) RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Maryam Haidari (Plaintiff) NOTICE: OK RELIEF REQUESTED: An order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on Plaintiffs complaint. TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is denied. BACKGROUND This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff alleges that on 5/29/22, while riding her bicycle, she was injured in a collision with Defendant Johnsons vehicle at the intersection of Oso Avenue and Saticoy Street, Los Angeles, California. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleges that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment with Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. at the time of the subject collision. ( Id. at ¶¶ 78.) On 4/28/23, Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants, alleging a sole cause of action for Negligence. On 6/27/23, Defendants filed their answers. On 4/17/24, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On 6/25/24, Plaintiff filed her opposition. On 7/3/23, Defendants filed their reply. ANALYSIS The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp . (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 65, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 15191520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. ( Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ( Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. ¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) A. Evidentiary Objections The court has reviewed the evidentiary objections submitted by the parties. While all objections have been considered, due to their extensive nature, the Court will not address each objection individually in this tentative ruling. Instead, the Court's analysis will focus on the substance of the objections raised and their relevance to the determination of the motion at hand. B. Negligence Plaintiffs sole cause of action against Defendants is Negligence. To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) the existence of a legal duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in an injury. ( McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Here, Defendants argue that they are not liable to Plaintiff under a Motor Vehicle Negligence theory because it is Plaintiff who caused the incident as a matter of law by running a red light and driving on the wrong side of the roadway, and Defendant Johnson, in stark contrast, drove through the intersection pursuant to a green light after looking both ways, exercising due care. (MSJ 8:1417.) Defendants contend that Johnson, exercising due care in driving through the intersection, was legally stopped at his red stoplight, and when the light turned green, saw that the intersection was clear to proceed through, and only first saw Plaintiff at the moment just before impact. ( Id. at 4:1216, 5:69.) 1. Plaintiffs Comparative Negligence Defendants argue that Plaintiff ran a red light, on the wrong side of the roadway, as corroborated by four independent third party witnesses and the police report. (MSJ 10:611:14.) Defendants therefore contend that Plaintiffs act of running a red light caused the impact, which caused Plaintiffs physical injuries. Had Plaintiff not run a red light, she would not have been in the roadway with oncoming traffic coming towards her, and no impact or injury would have occurred. ( Id. at 11:1619.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that in comparative negligence cases (such as this one), a plaintiffs purported negligence cannot, as a matter of law, obliviate Defendants own negligence. (Pl.s Opp. 1:89.) Plaintiff further asserts that this case presents material factual disputes that must necessarily be decided by a jury to appropriately apportion liability: (1) whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe Plaintiff in the crosswalk and (2) whether Plaintiff had the right of way under Vehicle Code § 21451. ( Id. at 6:47.) Courts are very reluctant to uphold a summary judgment in comparative negligence cases. & Ordinarily, issues of negligence are jury questions and the court may rarely decide comparative negligence questions without submitting them to the jury. & In short, negligence is a question of fact if different conclusions can be rationally drawn from the evidence. ( Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 186 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Plaintiff argues that whether or not a vehicle with a green light [has the right of way] depends upon whether another vehicle or pedestrian was lawfully in the intersection previously. (Pl.s Opp. 7:2426, citing Veh. Code § 21451, subd. (a); People v. Hahn (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d Supp. 841, 843844; Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 459.) Here, Plaintiff proffers her own deposition testimony, and an expert declaration (albeit lacking foundation in many areas) and surveillance camera footage purporting to show that Plaintiff began crossing the intersection during her green light, while Defendant was stopped at his red light, turned around to retrieve a sweater she had dropped, before again proceeding to cross the intersection while her light was still green. (Ex. 1 to Decl. of Colleen M. Mullen, 52:2056:9; Exs. 410 to Decl. of Jon B. Landerville, MSME, P.E.) Plaintiff therefore contends that here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff, who lawfully entered the intersection with a green light, had the right of way pursuant to Vehicle Code § 21451(a). (Pl.s Opp. 8:45.) The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to Plaintiffs own potential comparative negligence, as different conclusions as to whether Plaintiff ran a red light can be rationally drawn from the evidence. 2. Defendants Breach of the Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care The general duty to take ordinary care in the conduct of ones activities & indisputably applies to the operation of a motor vehicle. ( Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774, citing Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) Here, Defendants argue that Johnson exercised reasonable care at all relevant times as he drove through the intersection. (MSJ 12:1619.) Defendants support their contentions with Johnsons deposition testimony, third-party witness declarations, and LAPD Officer Solis deposition testimony. In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that it is for the jury to decide whether the reliance upon anothers due care is reasonable. (Pl.s Opp. 6:2324, citing Hendricks v. Pappas (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 774, 778.) Plaintiff argues that here, there is a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendant Johnson was negligent in failing to observe and account for Plaintiff crossing the intersection when he had a green light. ( Id. at 6:2728.) Plaintiff asserts that there was nothing obstructing Defendants field of vision, and thus his view of the intersection, through which Plaintiff was crossing prior to the collision. ( Id. at 7:13.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff proffers the deposition testimony of both Johnson and LAPD Officer Solis, and her experts declaration. Plaintiff argues that under these circumstances, a jury may find that Defendant Johnsons negligence in failing to observe Plaintiff for over ten seconds in the crosswalk directly in front of him rather than Plaintiffs purported negligence in continuing to cross an intersection she lawfully entered caused Plaintiffs injuries. ( Id. at 9:2225.) The Court agrees. While Defendants dispute the credibility of Plaintiffs expert declaration, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met her responsive evidentiary burden to show that a triable issue exists as to whether Johnson breached his duty of reasonable care, and likewise whether his conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs injuries. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied. C. Vicarious Liability An employer is vicariously liable for the torts of employees committed within the course or scope of their employment. ( Alma W. v. Oakland Unified School District (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 133, 138139.) As the Court finds that triable issues exist as to the nature and degree of each partys comparative negligence, and the parties have not raised any issues regarding whether Johnsons conduct was committed within the scope of his employment, it finds that a triable issue remains as to whether JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is vicariously liable for Johnsons conduct. CONCLUSION The motion is denied.

THE ESTATE OF JIMMIE CHARLES SNEED VS. PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES SHASTA LLC Case Number: 22CV-0199785 This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The Court finds this matter to be exempt from plan designation but intends to set the matter for trial no later than March 18, 2025. Defendant has posted jury fees but Plaintiff has not. Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Guardian Ad Litem to Appear for Deposition by Defendant DAVID SILVA DOE vs PALM SPRINGS -And Joinder CVPS2204948 UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant Palm Springs Unified School District's Joinder to Motions to Compel Appearances at Depositions by Defendant David Silva Tentative Ruling: On the Court’s own motion, this matter is continued to July 12, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. No further briefing may be filed.

Case Number: 23LBCV01880 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiffs, David Cain and Red Ball Fun Zone, Inc. filed this action against Defendants, City of Long Beach, State of California, and Department of Public Health for damages arising out of Covid-19 closure of Plaintiffs business. Plaintiffs allege Defendants misclassified their business as a family entertainment center instead of a fitness center, which resulted in the business remaining closed long after it should have been reopened. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on 10/03/23. Plaintiffs filed proof of service of the summons and complaint on the City on 12/18/23. Plaintiffs dismissed the State and the Department of Public Health on 2/05/24. 2. Demurrer a. Procedural History of Demurrer Defendant scheduled a hearing on a demurrer for 9/26/24. At a CMC on 3/01/24, the Court advanced the hearing on the demurrer to 5/02/24. Defendant filed and served its demurrer papers on 4/18/24; additionally, Defendant served the papers on Plaintiff, in pro per, but Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the time of service. Prior to the 5/02/24 hearing, the Court posted a tentative ruling continuing the hearing on the demurrer to 6/04/24. For reasons that are not clear, Defendant took its demurrer off calendar prior to the hearing, and then re-filed it on 4/30/24, setting it for hearing on 7/11/24. b. Parties Positions The City demurs to the complaint, contending it is barred by Plaintiffs failure to file a timely government tort claim. Plaintiffs, in opposition to the demurrer, contend the demurrer was filed well past the statutory deadline and should be summarily overruled. They contend they will be prejudiced if the demurrer is heard, because the claims statute includes provisions by which Plaintiff could seek relief from untimely filing, but the time to do so under those provisions has now expired. Additionally, they contend the request for judicial notice upon which the demurrer is based is improper. Plaintiffs do not substantively oppose the demurrer, instead choosing to stand solely on the procedural violations. c. Analysis Plaintiffs opposition concedes the Court can hear and rule upon a late-filed demurrer, but contends it should not do so because Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if the Court ruled on the demurrer. Plaintiffs opposition misconstrues the nature of prejudice. The opposition appears to assume that, if the demurrer is overruled, Defendant cannot raise the issue of untimely filing by way of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment motion, or at trial. Plaintiffs cite no authority for this position, and the Court knows of none. Additionally, Plaintiffs appear to erroneously believe their obligation to seek leave to file a late claim only arise upon receipt of Defendants demurrer. Pursuant to Gov Code §911.4(b), if a person fails to file a timely claim, the person must file an application for leave to file a late claim within one year of accrual of the cause of action. Nothing in the Code suggests that the obligation to seek leave only arises if the public entity defendant challenges the original claim by way of a demurrer. Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiffs challenge to Defendants request for judicial notice. The Court finds the tort claim is the proper subject of judicial notice, and grants the RJN. d. Continuance of Hearing While the Court is loathe to continue the hearing a second time, the Court finds the demurrer must be ruled upon on its merits, and therefore continues the hearing to permit Plaintiff to substantively oppose the demurrer. Plaintiff is advised that, at the continued hearing, the Court will consider the judicially noticed document, and will rule on the merits of the claim filing challenge. The hearing is continued for one month, to Tuesday, 8/13/24. Supplemental opposition, which must be substantive, and reply, are due per Code. Defendant is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Case Number: 24STCV06157 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING SPECTRUM HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. LAW OFFICES OF JEFFREY A. SLOTT, APC, et al., Defendants. Case No: 24STCV06157 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Calendar Number: 10 Defendants Law Office of Greg May and Gregory Thomas May (collectively, the May Defendants) move to strike portions of the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Spectrum Holdings and Development, LLC (Plaintiff) relating to punitive damages. The Court GRANTS the motion to strike without leave to amend. If Plaintiff in the future discovers additional facts justifying a claim of punitive damages, it may file a motion to amend at that time. Background This is a legal malpractice case. Plaintiff is a landlord who sued tenants for unlawful detainer. The tenants prevailed after a jury trial. The jury found that the tenants had breached portions of the lease, but that Plaintiff had waived the breach. Plaintiff hired a new attorney, Defendant Jeffrey Slott. Slott filed a Notice of Appeal. The tenants obtained an order for attorneys fees. Slott filed an appeal of the award of attorneys fees. Plaintiff alleges that Slott should have told Spectrum to pay the fees and did not inform Plaintiff of the risks and benefits of appealing the order for attorneys fees. Defendant May is an appellate attorney who was later retained to handle the appeal. There were alleged problems with the designation of record which had been prepared by Scott. Plaintiff moved to augment the record, but the motion was denied. The appeal was dismissed due to alleged problems with the designation of record. The tenants obtained an order for additional attorneys fees for defending the appeal. Plaintiff then filed a contract lawsuit and obtained a judgment against the tenants. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Slott; Law Offices of Jeffrey A. Slott, APC; May; and Law Office of Greg May on March 12, 2024, raising claims for (1) legal malpractice; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) breach of contract. The May Defendants filed this motion to strike on May 21, 2024. Plaintiff filed an opposition and the May Defendants filed a reply. Legal Standard The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) Discussion Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. ( Ibid .) In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. ( Ibid .) Although a plaintiff need only plead ultimate facts, pure conclusions of law are not adequate to survive a motion to strike. ( Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. ( Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. ( Ibid .) In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. ( Ibid .) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. ( Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) [A] breach of a fiduciary duty alone without malice, fraud or oppression does not permit an award of punitive damages. The wrongdoer must act with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights. Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy. The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages. &. Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. ( Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) Plaintiff contends in its opposition that Defendants knowingly concealed material information necessary to make an informed decision. Plaintiff contends that Defendants should have advised Plaintiff that the appeal would have been unsuccessful due to the inadequate designated record, but instead advised Plaintiff to drop the appeal and let it die on its own. (Opposition at p. 2:20-23.) Plaintiff appears to be arguing that Defendants should have advised Plaintiff sooner to abandon the appeal following the designation of record. The Complaint discloses that the May Defendants were retained after Slott filed both of the appeals. (Complaint ¶¶ 20-23.) Then, on December 19, 2022, Defendants filed the motion to augment the record, but allegedly did not inform Plaintiff of the motion or its results. (Complaint ¶ 24.) Defendants then allegedly advised Plaintiff to drop the appeal and let it die on its own. (Complaint ¶ 26.) Defendants allegedly did not inform Plaintiff of the additional attorney fee motion after the appeal and failed to oppose the motion. (Complaint ¶ 31.) Defendants allegedly advised Plaintiff to move for an offset of the attorney fee awards against the later award in the contract case. (Complaint ¶ 26.) Plaintiff moved for an offset in the contract case, but the motion was denied due to non-mutuality of parties. (Complaint ¶¶ 32, 34.) Plaintiff argues that the failure to notify Plaintiff about the impact of the inadequate designation of record on the appeal shows that Defendants knowingly concealed material facts from Plaintiff. That inference does not necessarily follow. There is a broad realm of negligent conduct by an attorney that can result in a lack of adequate communication with a client that does not rise to the level of intentional concealment of information. As discussed above, mere carelessness or ignorance does not support a claim for punitive damages and Plaintiff has not alleged facts above and beyond that. The Court therefore grants the motion to strike. Plaintiff has made no reference to facts it can allege that would remedy the current issues with the punitive damages claim. If Plaintiff discovers additional facts in the future, it may seek to amend at that time.