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DOCKET NO.: (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S : SUPERIOR COURT
NANCY BURTON : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET
vs. : AT WATERBURY
DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL. : MARCH 8, 2024
TOWN DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The defendants, Town of Redding (the “Town”), First Selectman Julia Pemberton, and Chief
Mark O’Donnell (collectively, the “Town Defendants”), hereby reply to plaintiff’s Objection to their
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed piecemeal on February 23 and 26, 2024. [Docs. 502.00-507.00].
I. THE TOWN DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Plaintiff does not challenge the Town Defendants’ asserted entitlement to qualified and/or
governmental immunity, as applicable, set forth in their Memorandum of Law [Doc. 492.00] (“Defs’
Mem.”), at 12-13, 21-23, 36-38. This Court should deem these issues uncontested, and award
governmental and/or qualified immunity to the individual and entity defendants, as follows.
A. THE INDIVIDUAL TOWN DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY ON COUNTS THREE, FOUR AND FIVE
Counts Three, Four and Five purport to assert against the Town Defendants claims of federal
constitutional violations, as enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pl’s Sub. Fifth Am. Compl.
[Doc. 398.00] (“Compl.”), at 24-28. Municipal officials sued in their individual capacities for federal
constitutional violations arising out of conduct performed within the scope of their official duties are
entitled to qualified immunity from lawsuit or liability, however, when their actions either did not
1
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
violate clearly established law defining the particular right claimed to be violated, or when their actions
were objectively reasonable such that at least one reasonable official in their position, faced with the
same facts, could conclude that their actions were lawful. Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 745 (2014);
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). Notably, with respect to Fourth
Amendment false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure claims, the existence of arrest and/or
search warrants duly issued by a neutral magistrate confers a presumption of probable cause and, thus,
qualified immunity on the official executing that warrant. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 155-56 (2d
Cir. 2007); see also Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 214–15 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming decision of
district court dismissing plaintiff’s malicious prosecution, unreasonable search and seizure, and First
Amendment retaliation claims where “defendants had probable cause to believe [the plaintiff]
committed animal cruelty”).
The search and seizure occurring on March 10, 2021, was authorized by a duly issued search
warrant obtained by the State of Connecticut’s Department of Agriculture, and plaintiff’s arrest on April
30, 2020, was similarly procured by duly issued arrest warrant obtained by the Redding Police
Department (the “Department”). Thus, to the extent plaintiff claims that Chief O’Donnell and First
Selectman Pemberton are individually liable for Fourth Amendment false arrest and unlawful search and
seizure, they are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity on these claims based on the presumptive
existence of probable cause and the absence of admissible evidence in opposition. Simms v. Village of
Albion, 115 F.3d 1098, 1106 (2d Cir. 1997); Santos v. Zabbara, 984 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116-17 (E.D.N.Y.
2013). This immunity applies notwithstanding plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of these warrants,
2
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
because even the existence of arguable probable cause entitles these defendants to qualified immunity.
Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2014). The existence of arguable probable cause here is
evidenced by the determination of probable cause by the judicial magistrates issuing the subject
warrants. Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and general “§ 1983
claim” as alleged against the individual Town Defendants in Counts Three, Four and Five fail as a
matter of law, and should be dismissed.
B. CHIEF O’DONNELL IS ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ON
COUNT SEVEN
In Count Seven, plaintiff alleges that Chief O’Donnell engaged in negligent infliction of
emotional distress (“NIED”) when the Department arrested her pursuant to duly issued warrant on April
30, 2020. In their Memorandum of Law, the Town Defendants argued, inter alia, that Chief O’Donnell
is entitled to governmental immunity under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) for the
discretionary decision to arrest plaintiff, assuming, arguendo, that he was in any way personally
involved in procuring that arrest. “[As] a general rule, [p]olice officers are protected by discretionary
act immunity when they perform the typical functions of a police officer.” Adesokan v. Town of
Bloomfield, No. CV196116877S, 2021 WL 2929720, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2021); see also
Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 348 (2009).
Plaintiff has not materially challenged Chief O’Donnell’s assertion of governmental immunity as
to Count Seven. Instead, she devotes a significant portion of her filings to disparaging Chief O’Donnell,
referencing and misrepresenting the circumstances related to police incidents occurring nearly four years
3
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
prior to the events at issue, and occurring prior to then-Captain O’Donnell’s promotion to Chief. Pl’s
Supp. Aff., 2/23/24 [Doc. 504.00]; Pl’s Aff., 2/23/24 [Doc. 502.00], at 2, 9-10; Pl’s Op., at 2, 8, 10-13.
Plaintiff does not, and cannot, prove that any actions or omissions of Chief O’Donnell occurred during
his performance of a ministerial duty related to the claims in this case; rather, she questions the quality
of Chief O’Donnell’s judgment, generally, to try and overcome his entitlement to immunity in these
particularized circumstances. Ibid. Plaintiff cites no authority to support her challenge to the
applicability of governmental immunity, nor has she cited evidence to prove that any of the alleged
actions or omissions giving rise to her NIED claim were taken outside the scope of Chief O’Donnell’s
duties. Adesokan v. Town of Bloomfield, No. CV196116877S, 2021 WL 2929720, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 16, 2021); City of Derby v. Garofalo, No. CV085004821S, 2010 WL 1565520, at *11 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2010) (Bellis, J.). Accordingly, judgment on Count Seven should enter in favor of
Chief O’Donnell as a matter of law based on the applicability of governmental immunity.
C. THE TOWN IS ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ON COUNTS
SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT AND NINE AND IS NOT LIABLE UNDER MONELL ON
COUNTS THREE, FOUR OR FIVE
As discussed, the Town cannot be held liable for the negligent actions or omissions alleged
against it in Count Six with respect to the particular actions of Chief O’Donnell described therein.
Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(2)(B), “a political subdivision of the state shall
not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . negligent acts or omissions which require
the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly
granted by law.” Therefore, plaintiff’s NIED claim premised on the alleged actions of the Department
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
in procuring her arrest on April 30, 2020, should be dismissed based on the Town’s entitlement to
governmental immunity for the discretionary conduct of Department employees.
Municipalities are also entitled to governmental immunity for damages caused by the intentional
acts or omissions of their agents or employees. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)(A). Thus, because
Counts Six (IIED), Eight (Conversion) and Nine (Spoliation) allege state law intentional tort claims,
summary judgment is proper on each claim as alleged against the Town. Plaintiff has not challenged the
Town’s entitlement to governmental immunity in this respect, further supporting the appropriateness of
summary judgment on these claims.
Finally, with respect to the federal constitutional violations alleged against it in Counts Three,
Four and Five, the Town cannot be liable because plaintiff has neither alleged nor proven with
admissible evidence the existence of a viable Monell claim. For the reasons set forth in the Town’s
Memorandum of Law, therefore, all federal constitutional claims against it must be dismissed as a
matter of law. Defs’ Mem., at 23-27.
II. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE
DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO ANY OF HER CLAIMS
A. ALLEGATIONS BASED “UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF” ARE NOT
PROPERLY SUBSTANTIATED AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE
It is well settled that inadmissible hearsay cannot generate a genuinely disputed material fact for
purposes of surviving summary judgment. Instead, a plaintiff seeking to overcome a summary judgment
motion must show, through the submission of admissible evidence, that such a genuine dispute of
material fact exists. “It is not enough . . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact
and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the Court under Practice Book [§ 17-45].”
State of Conn. v. Sebben, 201 Conn. App. 376, 383 (2020); see also Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Bldg.
Supply, Inc., 174 Conn. 512, 515 (1978).
In addition, our courts have specifically held that testimonial assertions based “on information
and belief” are not admissible and, in fact, effectively negate any personal knowledge. Unifoods, S.A.
de C.V. v. Magallanes, No. FST-CV20-6047191-S, 2022 WL 17959350, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.
20, 2022). Accordingly, insofar as plaintiff relies “upon information and belief” to create genuine
disputes of material fact as to any of her claims, such reliance is insufficient at this evidentiary stage
and, in the absence of tangible, admissible evidence independently substantiating the allegedly disputed
material facts, 1 this Court should deem these facts undisputed. See, e.g., Pl’s Op., ¶¶ 11, 12, 15, 18(b)
and (f), and 21(u)(i)(g)(i).
B. PLEADINGS ARE NOT EVIDENCE
Plaintiff also argues that the contents of her operative complaint establish genuinely disputed
material facts in this case. See, e.g., Pl’s Motion in Opposition, 2/23/24 (“Pl’s Mot.”) [Doc. 51.00], at 3
(“These facts and the other facts alleged in the complaint support a finding that the Town Defendants . . .
1
Of the twenty-five (25) exhibits offered by plaintiff, sixteen (16) have no bearing on the allegations against the Town
Defendants, and concern only communications between plaintiff’s neighbor and State Senator Will Haskell; legal
proceedings against State ACO Charles DellaRocco; news articles from more than a decade ago related to plaintiff’s anti-
nuclear advocacy; and other publicly available filings from different cases involving or prosecuted by plaintiff. See Pl’s Exs.
2-5, 7-13, 15, 20, 22-23 and 25. The remaining eleven (11) exhibits either directly involve or indirectly reference First
Selectman Pemberton, Chief O’Donnell, or other Town or Department personnel. See Pl’s Exs. 1, 6, 14, 16-19, 21 and 24.
However, none of plaintiff’s exhibits tends to make any fact or issue more or less likely to be proven, nor does any exhibit
evidence the existence of a genuinely disputed material fact requiring presentation to a jury.
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
engaged in a fraudulent conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of her [rights] . . . .”). Pleadings and complaint
allegations are, fundamentally, not evidence. Cupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574,
587 (1996) (“The plaintiff’s conclusory statements, in the affidavit and elsewhere, that he and the
hospital had entered into an ‘employment contract’ do not constitute evidence sufficient to establish the
existence of disputed material facts.”); Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240, 250 (1992)
(“[E]ven with respect to questions of motive, intent and good faith, the party opposing summary
judgment must present a factual predicate for [her] argument in order to raise a genuine issue of fact.”).
Thus, in those instances where plaintiff’s arguments in opposition rely on the unproven assertions
alleged in her complaint, such arguments fail to satisfy her burden to show with admissible evidence that
any genuine dispute of material fact exists.
III. EVEN IF HER ARGUMENTS WERE PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE, PLAINTIFF HAS STILL FAILED TO SATISFY HER BURDEN
A. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MATERIALLY CHALLENGED THE LACK OF
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT BY THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
It is well established that personal involvement of a defendant is a prerequisite to a finding of
individual liability for alleged constitutional violations. McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d
Cir. 1977); Banks v. Annucci, 48 F. Supp. 3d 394, 416 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Where a defendant
is a supervisory official, a mere ‘linkage’ to the unlawful conduct through the ‘chain of command’ (i.e.,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior) is insufficient to show his or her personal involvement in that
unlawful conduct.” (citations omitted)).
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that either First Selectman Pemberton or Chief O’Donnell were
personally involved in the particular occurrences underlying her claims. She relies only on conjecture to
substantiate her assertions. See, e.g., Pl’s Op., at 18 (“[T]he entire operation took place under [Chief
O’Donnell’s] strategizing and, communications with [state officials and First Selectman Pemberton]
identified as co-conspirators in the operative complaint (See, e.g., Exhibit 26).”) Notably, plaintiff has
not submitted an “Exhibit 26,” and her theory on personal involvement, thus, remains entirely
speculative. But even assuming, arguendo, that her assertions are true, they do not prove that Chief
O’Donnell or First Selectman Pemberton were personally involved to the extent required to confer
liability. Hawthorne by Hawthorne v. Cnty. of Putnam, 492 F. Supp. 3d 281, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6,
2020) (“Mere knowledge and acquiescence to unconstitutional conduct, or mere failure to act on a
complaint, without more, fails to state a claim under Section 1983.”); Mateo v. Fischer, 682 F. Supp. 2d
423, 430 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2010) (“[T]he receipt of letters or grievances, by itself, does not amount to
personal involvement.”). Accordingly, the claims against the individual Town Defendants are
vulnerable to summary judgment because it is not genuinely disputed that neither was personally
involved in the events at issue in this case.
B. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTIONS OF
PROBABLE CAUSE ESTABLISHED BY THE APPLICABLE WARRANTS
In addition to entitling the individual Town Defendants to qualified immunity, the presumptive
existence of probable cause to arrest plaintiff for suspected animal cruelty and, thereafter, to search her
property, prevents her from overcoming summary judgment on either of her Fourth Amendment claims.
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
To overcome a presumption of probable cause, a plaintiff must show that “the [warrant] affiant
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement in his
affidavit and that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Golino
v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff
who argues that a warrant was issued on less than probable cause faces a heavy burden.” Rivera v.
United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602 (2d Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff’s efforts to overcome the probable cause presumptions in this case are insufficient to
meet her burden. Specifically, she argues that the search and seizure warrant lacked probable cause
because, inter alia, the issuing magistrate was not a “neutral magistrate,” and that the warrant – obtained
and executed by the State Dep’t of Agriculture, not the Town – lacked “material facts that would have
required the judicial authority to deny the application. . . .” Pl’s Aff., at 13; see also Pl’s Op., at 16
(“The warrant applicant omits to state the facts known to [State ACO] DellaRocco . . . .”). Actions or
omissions of State employees cannot confer liability on the Town Defendants, and there is no evidence
to prove that the Department or its officers had any reason not to rely on the legal determinations of their
State counterparts. See Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1288 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Absent significant
indications to the contrary, an officer is entitled to rely on his fellow officer’s determination” regarding
the constitutional permissibility of an action.).
Similarly, plaintiff argues that the warrant authorizing her arrest for suspected animal cruelty
following the Air Horn Incident lacked probable cause because “Officer DeLuca was obviously
pressured to fill out [the Suspected Animal Abuse Report] following the April 30, 2020 incident to
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
assign culpability to [plaintiff].” Pl’s Aff., at 12. This unsupported speculation, in the absence any of
tangible evidence in the record to support her position, further renders her Fourth Amendment claims
impotent. See Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Bldg. Supply, Inc., 174 Conn. 512, 515 (1978); State of
Conn. v. Sebben, 201 Conn. App. 376, 383 (2020). Accordingly, plaintiff’s constitutional claims arising
out of her April 30, 2020 arrest and the March 10, 2021 search of her property are substantively fatally
flawed, and summary judgment should enter in favor of the Town Defendants therefor.
C. PLAINTIFF’S INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS ARE UNSUBSTANTIATED
Plaintiff relies on her arguments that the subject search and seizure lacked probable cause in
defense of her invasion of privacy claims. Pl’s Op., at 7. Specifically, she argues that “[r]egarding the
seizure of the goats, there was an absence of probable cause; in the absence of probable cause, the arrest
was invalid. The false light invasion of privacy, premised upon such falsehood, negates the Defendants’
argument.” Id. This theory finds no support from case law or other recognized authority. And, plaintiff
has not actually presented any arguments in direct opposition to those made by the Town regarding her
false light/intrusion upon seclusion invasion of privacy claims, particularly with respect to whether a
reasonable person would find the conduct at issue to be objectively, highly offensive. See id. (“No
reasonable person could fail to conclude that the claimed intrusion on Plaintiff’s seclusion was highly
offensive in nature.”); cf. Defs’ Mem., at 14-19. Because plaintiff does not point to any genuine
disputes of material fact related to whether either variety of invasion of privacy can be proven, therefore,
her claims should be dismissed at summary judgment.
10
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
D. PLAINTIFF’S FALSE ARREST CLAIM REMAINS PREMATURE
At the time the Town Defendants filed their subject Motion for Summary Judgment – and as of
the date of this filing – plaintiff’s criminal charges remained pending and awaiting trial on the criminal
docket. See State v. Burton, Docket No. D03D-CR20-0190471-S, Danbury GA 3. 2 Accordingly, and in
the absence of any argument in opposition, plaintiff’s false arrest claim should be dismissed as unripe.
See Krug v. County of Rensselaer, 559 F. Supp. 2d 223, 243 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (“the
circumstances underlying probable cause to arrest [plaintiff] are the primary basis of [the] prosecution of
him. Thus, success on a false arrest claim . . . would necessarily imply the invalidity of any potential
conviction on the currently pending prosecution . . . and therefore must be dismissed under Heck[v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)] and Covington[v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999)]”).
E. NONE OF PLAINTIFF’S OTHER STATE LAW TORT OR STATUTORY
CLAIMS CAN SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
For the reasons enumerated in their Memorandum of Law, this Court should grant the Town
Defendants summary judgment on plaintiff’s other state law tort and statutory claims in Counts Eight,
Nine and Ten. Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to summary judgment do not address the
insufficiencies identified by the Town Defendants in their Memorandum; Defs’ Mem., at 40-45; or as
confirmed by this Court in its Order [Doc. 287.00] granting the Town Defendants’ Motion to Strike
[Doc. 157.00]. At this evidentiary stage, plaintiff’s regurgitation of her rejected theories do not amount
2
In their Memorandum of Law, the Town Defendants inadvertently provided the docket number for plaintiff’s other pending
criminal charges, brought by the Connecticut State Police after the seizure of evidence during the subject search of her home.
See State v. Burton, Docket No. D03D-CR21-0191750-S, Danbury GA 3, as cited at page 33 of the Town Defendants’
Memorandum.
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
to the demonstration of any genuine dispute of material fact that would require presentation to a jury.
Accordingly, the Town Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on plaintiff’s state law tort and
statutory claims alleged in Counts Eight, Nine and Ten.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, including those reasons set forth in their Memorandum of Law
[Doc. 492.00], the Town of Redding, First Selectman Julia Pemberton, and Chief Mark O’Donnell
respectfully move this Court to enter summary judgment in their favor on all Counts remaining against
them in plaintiff’s Substituted Fifth Amended Complaint.
DEFENDANTS, TOWN OF REDDING, JULIA
PEMBERTON, AND MARK O’DONNELL
BY/ss/James N. Tallberg
James N. Tallberg
Kimberly A. Bosse
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC
500 Enterprise Drive, Suite 4B
Rocky Hill, CT 06067
T: (860)233-5600
F: (860)233-5800
jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com
kbosse@kt-lawfirm.com
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Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was provided by US Mail, postage pre-paid, or
electronic mail pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 on March 8, 2024, to the following pro se parties and
counsel of record:
Nancy Burton, Pro Se David B. Stanhill
154 Highland Avenue Michael D. Riseberg
Rowayton, CT 06853 Christine N. Parisi
(203) 313-1510 53 State Street
NancyBurtonCT@aol.com Boston, MA 02109
(667) 330-7102
dstanill@rubinrudman.com
mriseberg@rubinrudman.com
cparise@rubinrudman.com
Daniel Salton, Esq. Steve Stafstrom, Esq.
Matthew Levine, Esq. Pullman & Comley, LLC
Carole Briggs, Esq. 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006
AG-Environmental Bridgeport, CT 06601
165 Capitol Avenue, 5th Floor sstafstrom@pullcom.com
Hartford, CT 06106
(860) 808-5172
Daniel.Salton@ct.gov
Matthew.Levine@ct.gov
Carole.Briggs@ct.gov
Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq.
Howd & Ludorf, LLC
65 Wethersfield Avenue
Hartford, CT 06114
(860) 249-1361
pnewbury@hl-law.com
/ss/Kimberly A. Bosse
Kimberly A. Bosse
13
Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW
500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030
Preview
DOCKET NO.: (X06) UWY-CV21-5028294-S : SUPERIOR COURT NANCY BURTON : COMPLEX LITIGATION DOCKET vs. : AT WATERBURY DAVID PHILIP MASON, ET AL. : MARCH 8, 2024 TOWN DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT The defendants, Town of Redding (the “Town”), First Selectman Julia Pemberton, and Chief Mark O’Donnell (collectively, the “Town Defendants”), hereby reply to plaintiff’s Objection to their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed piecemeal on February 23 and 26, 2024. [Docs. 502.00-507.00]. I. THE TOWN DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY Plaintiff does not challenge the Town Defendants’ asserted entitlement to qualified and/or governmental immunity, as applicable, set forth in their Memorandum of Law [Doc. 492.00] (“Defs’ Mem.”), at 12-13, 21-23, 36-38. This Court should deem these issues uncontested, and award governmental and/or qualified immunity to the individual and entity defendants, as follows. A. THE INDIVIDUAL TOWN DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ON COUNTS THREE, FOUR AND FIVE Counts Three, Four and Five purport to assert against the Town Defendants claims of federal constitutional violations, as enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pl’s Sub. Fifth Am. Compl. [Doc. 398.00] (“Compl.”), at 24-28. Municipal officials sued in their individual capacities for federal constitutional violations arising out of conduct performed within the scope of their official duties are entitled to qualified immunity from lawsuit or liability, however, when their actions either did not 1 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 violate clearly established law defining the particular right claimed to be violated, or when their actions were objectively reasonable such that at least one reasonable official in their position, faced with the same facts, could conclude that their actions were lawful. Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 745 (2014); Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). Notably, with respect to Fourth Amendment false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure claims, the existence of arrest and/or search warrants duly issued by a neutral magistrate confers a presumption of probable cause and, thus, qualified immunity on the official executing that warrant. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 214–15 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming decision of district court dismissing plaintiff’s malicious prosecution, unreasonable search and seizure, and First Amendment retaliation claims where “defendants had probable cause to believe [the plaintiff] committed animal cruelty”). The search and seizure occurring on March 10, 2021, was authorized by a duly issued search warrant obtained by the State of Connecticut’s Department of Agriculture, and plaintiff’s arrest on April 30, 2020, was similarly procured by duly issued arrest warrant obtained by the Redding Police Department (the “Department”). Thus, to the extent plaintiff claims that Chief O’Donnell and First Selectman Pemberton are individually liable for Fourth Amendment false arrest and unlawful search and seizure, they are nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity on these claims based on the presumptive existence of probable cause and the absence of admissible evidence in opposition. Simms v. Village of Albion, 115 F.3d 1098, 1106 (2d Cir. 1997); Santos v. Zabbara, 984 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116-17 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). This immunity applies notwithstanding plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of these warrants, 2 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 because even the existence of arguable probable cause entitles these defendants to qualified immunity. Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2014). The existence of arguable probable cause here is evidenced by the determination of probable cause by the judicial magistrates issuing the subject warrants. Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2016). Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and general “§ 1983 claim” as alleged against the individual Town Defendants in Counts Three, Four and Five fail as a matter of law, and should be dismissed. B. CHIEF O’DONNELL IS ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ON COUNT SEVEN In Count Seven, plaintiff alleges that Chief O’Donnell engaged in negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) when the Department arrested her pursuant to duly issued warrant on April 30, 2020. In their Memorandum of Law, the Town Defendants argued, inter alia, that Chief O’Donnell is entitled to governmental immunity under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) for the discretionary decision to arrest plaintiff, assuming, arguendo, that he was in any way personally involved in procuring that arrest. “[As] a general rule, [p]olice officers are protected by discretionary act immunity when they perform the typical functions of a police officer.” Adesokan v. Town of Bloomfield, No. CV196116877S, 2021 WL 2929720, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2021); see also Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 348 (2009). Plaintiff has not materially challenged Chief O’Donnell’s assertion of governmental immunity as to Count Seven. Instead, she devotes a significant portion of her filings to disparaging Chief O’Donnell, referencing and misrepresenting the circumstances related to police incidents occurring nearly four years 3 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 prior to the events at issue, and occurring prior to then-Captain O’Donnell’s promotion to Chief. Pl’s Supp. Aff., 2/23/24 [Doc. 504.00]; Pl’s Aff., 2/23/24 [Doc. 502.00], at 2, 9-10; Pl’s Op., at 2, 8, 10-13. Plaintiff does not, and cannot, prove that any actions or omissions of Chief O’Donnell occurred during his performance of a ministerial duty related to the claims in this case; rather, she questions the quality of Chief O’Donnell’s judgment, generally, to try and overcome his entitlement to immunity in these particularized circumstances. Ibid. Plaintiff cites no authority to support her challenge to the applicability of governmental immunity, nor has she cited evidence to prove that any of the alleged actions or omissions giving rise to her NIED claim were taken outside the scope of Chief O’Donnell’s duties. Adesokan v. Town of Bloomfield, No. CV196116877S, 2021 WL 2929720, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2021); City of Derby v. Garofalo, No. CV085004821S, 2010 WL 1565520, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2010) (Bellis, J.). Accordingly, judgment on Count Seven should enter in favor of Chief O’Donnell as a matter of law based on the applicability of governmental immunity. C. THE TOWN IS ENTITLED TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ON COUNTS SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT AND NINE AND IS NOT LIABLE UNDER MONELL ON COUNTS THREE, FOUR OR FIVE As discussed, the Town cannot be held liable for the negligent actions or omissions alleged against it in Count Six with respect to the particular actions of Chief O’Donnell described therein. Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(2)(B), “a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.” Therefore, plaintiff’s NIED claim premised on the alleged actions of the Department 4 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 in procuring her arrest on April 30, 2020, should be dismissed based on the Town’s entitlement to governmental immunity for the discretionary conduct of Department employees. Municipalities are also entitled to governmental immunity for damages caused by the intentional acts or omissions of their agents or employees. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)(A). Thus, because Counts Six (IIED), Eight (Conversion) and Nine (Spoliation) allege state law intentional tort claims, summary judgment is proper on each claim as alleged against the Town. Plaintiff has not challenged the Town’s entitlement to governmental immunity in this respect, further supporting the appropriateness of summary judgment on these claims. Finally, with respect to the federal constitutional violations alleged against it in Counts Three, Four and Five, the Town cannot be liable because plaintiff has neither alleged nor proven with admissible evidence the existence of a viable Monell claim. For the reasons set forth in the Town’s Memorandum of Law, therefore, all federal constitutional claims against it must be dismissed as a matter of law. Defs’ Mem., at 23-27. II. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO ANY OF HER CLAIMS A. ALLEGATIONS BASED “UPON INFORMATION AND BELIEF” ARE NOT PROPERLY SUBSTANTIATED AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE It is well settled that inadmissible hearsay cannot generate a genuinely disputed material fact for purposes of surviving summary judgment. Instead, a plaintiff seeking to overcome a summary judgment motion must show, through the submission of admissible evidence, that such a genuine dispute of material fact exists. “It is not enough . . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a 5 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the Court under Practice Book [§ 17-45].” State of Conn. v. Sebben, 201 Conn. App. 376, 383 (2020); see also Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Bldg. Supply, Inc., 174 Conn. 512, 515 (1978). In addition, our courts have specifically held that testimonial assertions based “on information and belief” are not admissible and, in fact, effectively negate any personal knowledge. Unifoods, S.A. de C.V. v. Magallanes, No. FST-CV20-6047191-S, 2022 WL 17959350, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2022). Accordingly, insofar as plaintiff relies “upon information and belief” to create genuine disputes of material fact as to any of her claims, such reliance is insufficient at this evidentiary stage and, in the absence of tangible, admissible evidence independently substantiating the allegedly disputed material facts, 1 this Court should deem these facts undisputed. See, e.g., Pl’s Op., ¶¶ 11, 12, 15, 18(b) and (f), and 21(u)(i)(g)(i). B. PLEADINGS ARE NOT EVIDENCE Plaintiff also argues that the contents of her operative complaint establish genuinely disputed material facts in this case. See, e.g., Pl’s Motion in Opposition, 2/23/24 (“Pl’s Mot.”) [Doc. 51.00], at 3 (“These facts and the other facts alleged in the complaint support a finding that the Town Defendants . . . 1 Of the twenty-five (25) exhibits offered by plaintiff, sixteen (16) have no bearing on the allegations against the Town Defendants, and concern only communications between plaintiff’s neighbor and State Senator Will Haskell; legal proceedings against State ACO Charles DellaRocco; news articles from more than a decade ago related to plaintiff’s anti- nuclear advocacy; and other publicly available filings from different cases involving or prosecuted by plaintiff. See Pl’s Exs. 2-5, 7-13, 15, 20, 22-23 and 25. The remaining eleven (11) exhibits either directly involve or indirectly reference First Selectman Pemberton, Chief O’Donnell, or other Town or Department personnel. See Pl’s Exs. 1, 6, 14, 16-19, 21 and 24. However, none of plaintiff’s exhibits tends to make any fact or issue more or less likely to be proven, nor does any exhibit evidence the existence of a genuinely disputed material fact requiring presentation to a jury. 6 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 engaged in a fraudulent conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of her [rights] . . . .”). Pleadings and complaint allegations are, fundamentally, not evidence. Cupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 587 (1996) (“The plaintiff’s conclusory statements, in the affidavit and elsewhere, that he and the hospital had entered into an ‘employment contract’ do not constitute evidence sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts.”); Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240, 250 (1992) (“[E]ven with respect to questions of motive, intent and good faith, the party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for [her] argument in order to raise a genuine issue of fact.”). Thus, in those instances where plaintiff’s arguments in opposition rely on the unproven assertions alleged in her complaint, such arguments fail to satisfy her burden to show with admissible evidence that any genuine dispute of material fact exists. III. EVEN IF HER ARGUMENTS WERE PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, PLAINTIFF HAS STILL FAILED TO SATISFY HER BURDEN A. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT MATERIALLY CHALLENGED THE LACK OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT BY THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS It is well established that personal involvement of a defendant is a prerequisite to a finding of individual liability for alleged constitutional violations. McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977); Banks v. Annucci, 48 F. Supp. 3d 394, 416 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Where a defendant is a supervisory official, a mere ‘linkage’ to the unlawful conduct through the ‘chain of command’ (i.e., under the doctrine of respondeat superior) is insufficient to show his or her personal involvement in that unlawful conduct.” (citations omitted)). 7 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that either First Selectman Pemberton or Chief O’Donnell were personally involved in the particular occurrences underlying her claims. She relies only on conjecture to substantiate her assertions. See, e.g., Pl’s Op., at 18 (“[T]he entire operation took place under [Chief O’Donnell’s] strategizing and, communications with [state officials and First Selectman Pemberton] identified as co-conspirators in the operative complaint (See, e.g., Exhibit 26).”) Notably, plaintiff has not submitted an “Exhibit 26,” and her theory on personal involvement, thus, remains entirely speculative. But even assuming, arguendo, that her assertions are true, they do not prove that Chief O’Donnell or First Selectman Pemberton were personally involved to the extent required to confer liability. Hawthorne by Hawthorne v. Cnty. of Putnam, 492 F. Supp. 3d 281, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020) (“Mere knowledge and acquiescence to unconstitutional conduct, or mere failure to act on a complaint, without more, fails to state a claim under Section 1983.”); Mateo v. Fischer, 682 F. Supp. 2d 423, 430 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2010) (“[T]he receipt of letters or grievances, by itself, does not amount to personal involvement.”). Accordingly, the claims against the individual Town Defendants are vulnerable to summary judgment because it is not genuinely disputed that neither was personally involved in the events at issue in this case. B. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTIONS OF PROBABLE CAUSE ESTABLISHED BY THE APPLICABLE WARRANTS In addition to entitling the individual Town Defendants to qualified immunity, the presumptive existence of probable cause to arrest plaintiff for suspected animal cruelty and, thereafter, to search her property, prevents her from overcoming summary judgment on either of her Fourth Amendment claims. 8 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 To overcome a presumption of probable cause, a plaintiff must show that “the [warrant] affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement in his affidavit and that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued on less than probable cause faces a heavy burden.” Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602 (2d Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s efforts to overcome the probable cause presumptions in this case are insufficient to meet her burden. Specifically, she argues that the search and seizure warrant lacked probable cause because, inter alia, the issuing magistrate was not a “neutral magistrate,” and that the warrant – obtained and executed by the State Dep’t of Agriculture, not the Town – lacked “material facts that would have required the judicial authority to deny the application. . . .” Pl’s Aff., at 13; see also Pl’s Op., at 16 (“The warrant applicant omits to state the facts known to [State ACO] DellaRocco . . . .”). Actions or omissions of State employees cannot confer liability on the Town Defendants, and there is no evidence to prove that the Department or its officers had any reason not to rely on the legal determinations of their State counterparts. See Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1288 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Absent significant indications to the contrary, an officer is entitled to rely on his fellow officer’s determination” regarding the constitutional permissibility of an action.). Similarly, plaintiff argues that the warrant authorizing her arrest for suspected animal cruelty following the Air Horn Incident lacked probable cause because “Officer DeLuca was obviously pressured to fill out [the Suspected Animal Abuse Report] following the April 30, 2020 incident to 9 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 assign culpability to [plaintiff].” Pl’s Aff., at 12. This unsupported speculation, in the absence any of tangible evidence in the record to support her position, further renders her Fourth Amendment claims impotent. See Evans Products Co. v. Clinton Bldg. Supply, Inc., 174 Conn. 512, 515 (1978); State of Conn. v. Sebben, 201 Conn. App. 376, 383 (2020). Accordingly, plaintiff’s constitutional claims arising out of her April 30, 2020 arrest and the March 10, 2021 search of her property are substantively fatally flawed, and summary judgment should enter in favor of the Town Defendants therefor. C. PLAINTIFF’S INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIMS ARE UNSUBSTANTIATED Plaintiff relies on her arguments that the subject search and seizure lacked probable cause in defense of her invasion of privacy claims. Pl’s Op., at 7. Specifically, she argues that “[r]egarding the seizure of the goats, there was an absence of probable cause; in the absence of probable cause, the arrest was invalid. The false light invasion of privacy, premised upon such falsehood, negates the Defendants’ argument.” Id. This theory finds no support from case law or other recognized authority. And, plaintiff has not actually presented any arguments in direct opposition to those made by the Town regarding her false light/intrusion upon seclusion invasion of privacy claims, particularly with respect to whether a reasonable person would find the conduct at issue to be objectively, highly offensive. See id. (“No reasonable person could fail to conclude that the claimed intrusion on Plaintiff’s seclusion was highly offensive in nature.”); cf. Defs’ Mem., at 14-19. Because plaintiff does not point to any genuine disputes of material fact related to whether either variety of invasion of privacy can be proven, therefore, her claims should be dismissed at summary judgment. 10 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 D. PLAINTIFF’S FALSE ARREST CLAIM REMAINS PREMATURE At the time the Town Defendants filed their subject Motion for Summary Judgment – and as of the date of this filing – plaintiff’s criminal charges remained pending and awaiting trial on the criminal docket. See State v. Burton, Docket No. D03D-CR20-0190471-S, Danbury GA 3. 2 Accordingly, and in the absence of any argument in opposition, plaintiff’s false arrest claim should be dismissed as unripe. See Krug v. County of Rensselaer, 559 F. Supp. 2d 223, 243 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (“the circumstances underlying probable cause to arrest [plaintiff] are the primary basis of [the] prosecution of him. Thus, success on a false arrest claim . . . would necessarily imply the invalidity of any potential conviction on the currently pending prosecution . . . and therefore must be dismissed under Heck[v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)] and Covington[v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999)]”). E. NONE OF PLAINTIFF’S OTHER STATE LAW TORT OR STATUTORY CLAIMS CAN SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT For the reasons enumerated in their Memorandum of Law, this Court should grant the Town Defendants summary judgment on plaintiff’s other state law tort and statutory claims in Counts Eight, Nine and Ten. Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to summary judgment do not address the insufficiencies identified by the Town Defendants in their Memorandum; Defs’ Mem., at 40-45; or as confirmed by this Court in its Order [Doc. 287.00] granting the Town Defendants’ Motion to Strike [Doc. 157.00]. At this evidentiary stage, plaintiff’s regurgitation of her rejected theories do not amount 2 In their Memorandum of Law, the Town Defendants inadvertently provided the docket number for plaintiff’s other pending criminal charges, brought by the Connecticut State Police after the seizure of evidence during the subject search of her home. See State v. Burton, Docket No. D03D-CR21-0191750-S, Danbury GA 3, as cited at page 33 of the Town Defendants’ Memorandum. 11 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 to the demonstration of any genuine dispute of material fact that would require presentation to a jury. Accordingly, the Town Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on plaintiff’s state law tort and statutory claims alleged in Counts Eight, Nine and Ten. IV. CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, including those reasons set forth in their Memorandum of Law [Doc. 492.00], the Town of Redding, First Selectman Julia Pemberton, and Chief Mark O’Donnell respectfully move this Court to enter summary judgment in their favor on all Counts remaining against them in plaintiff’s Substituted Fifth Amended Complaint. DEFENDANTS, TOWN OF REDDING, JULIA PEMBERTON, AND MARK O’DONNELL BY/ss/James N. Tallberg James N. Tallberg Kimberly A. Bosse Karsten & Tallberg, LLC 500 Enterprise Drive, Suite 4B Rocky Hill, CT 06067 T: (860)233-5600 F: (860)233-5800 jtallberg@kt-lawfirm.com kbosse@kt-lawfirm.com 12 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030 CERTIFICATION This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was provided by US Mail, postage pre-paid, or electronic mail pursuant to Practice Book § 10-13 on March 8, 2024, to the following pro se parties and counsel of record: Nancy Burton, Pro Se David B. Stanhill 154 Highland Avenue Michael D. Riseberg Rowayton, CT 06853 Christine N. Parisi (203) 313-1510 53 State Street NancyBurtonCT@aol.com Boston, MA 02109 (667) 330-7102 dstanill@rubinrudman.com mriseberg@rubinrudman.com cparise@rubinrudman.com Daniel Salton, Esq. Steve Stafstrom, Esq. Matthew Levine, Esq. Pullman & Comley, LLC Carole Briggs, Esq. 850 Main Street, P.O. Box 7006 AG-Environmental Bridgeport, CT 06601 165 Capitol Avenue, 5th Floor sstafstrom@pullcom.com Hartford, CT 06106 (860) 808-5172 Daniel.Salton@ct.gov Matthew.Levine@ct.gov Carole.Briggs@ct.gov Philip T. Newbury, Jr., Esq. Howd & Ludorf, LLC 65 Wethersfield Avenue Hartford, CT 06114 (860) 249-1361 pnewbury@hl-law.com /ss/Kimberly A. Bosse Kimberly A. Bosse 13 Karsten & Tallberg, LLC • ATTORNEYS AT LAW 500 ENTERPRISE DRIVE, SUITE 4B • ROCKY HILL, CT 06067 • (860) 233-5600 • FAX: (860) 233-5800 • JURIS NO. 424030