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HHB-CV22-6076363-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:
MATTHEW OLSON : JUDICIAL DISTRICT
: OF NEW BRITAIN
:
: AT NEW BRITAIN
V. :
:
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION :
COMMISSION : JANUARY 5, 2023
BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an administrative appeal from a decision of the Freedom of Information (“FOI”)
Commission (“FOIC” or “Commission”) brought pursuant to Gen. Stat. §§ 4-183(c) and 1-
206(b)(6).1 The plaintiff, Matthew Olson (“Olson”), seeks reversal of the Commission’s final
decision in PRVR #4, City of Stamford v. Mathew Olson (Nov. 23, 2023) (“PRVR #4”), wherein
the Commission concluded that Olson is a vexatious requester within the meaning of § 1-
206(b)(6). R. 1385-1416.
The Commission hereby submits this brief in opposition to Olson’s administrative appeal.
Olson argues that: the Commission “misinterpreted the term vexatious requester”; § 1-206(b)(6)
is “unconstitutionally vague as applied to him”; and the Commission violated Olson’s free
speech rights under Article First, § 5 of the Connecticut constitution.2 However, with the
enactment of § 1-206(b)(6), the legislature sought to protect public agencies from conduct,
1
Formerly, § 1-206(b)(5). Section 1-206 was amended after the filing of this appeal, but the relevant statutory
language is identical. See Senate Bill No. 1221, 2023 Sess.; Public Act 23-200 § 1 (eff. October 1, 2023).
2
Olson does not address many of the claims of error raised in his complaint, and in his brief, he writes that “[t]he
only claims that [he] pursues … are his claims pertaining to the statutory definition of vexatious requester, his
vagueness claims, and his free speech claims.” Pl. Br. p. 6. The Commission requests that this Court deem
abandoned all claims of error which have not been briefed. See Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Dept. of
Public Utility, 266 Conn. 108, 120–21 (2003)(“[W]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief ... Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failing to brief the issue properly.”)
through Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act related activities, that is harassing, burdensome,
abusive, and that interferes with the operation of public agency business. The record supports the
Commission’s conclusion that Olson has a vexatious history of requests with the City of
Stamford and therefore is a vexatious requester. The statute is constitutionally sound on its face
and as applied, and Olson’s speech rights have not been impeded or impugned in any way.
Therefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the appeal.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 30, 2021, the City of Stamford, its public officials, and departments (“City
of Stamford” or “City”), filed with the Commission a Petition for Relief from Vexatious
Requester pursuant to § 1-206(b)(6). The City of Stamford alleged that Olson is a vexatious
requester, and detailed examples of FOI Act requests and conduct that it believed demonstrate
that Olson engaged in a pattern of conduct that amounted to an abuse of the right to access
information under the FOI Act and interfered with the City’s operations, within the meaning of
§ 1-206(b)(6). Specifically, the City alleged that Olson inundated its employees with numerous
FOI requests that required review of a high volume of records. Further, Olson’s requests were
accompanied by a stream of email communications that, in conjunction with the requests, were
distressing and harassing, abused the right to access information, and interfered with the City’s
ability to conduct its business. The City of Stamford sought, inter alia, an order from the
Commission that it need not comply with Olson’s FOI requests for a period of one year. R. 1-93.
After conducting the review required by § 1-206(b)(6), the Executive Director of the
Commission issued a Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause on the Petition. R. 119-121.
The Commission held a contested case hearing which spanned four separate dates.3 The City of
3
As explained below, Olson’s conduct before the Commission was abusive of its administrative process and
interfered with its ability to bring this matter to a conclusion. See part IV.C., infra.
2
Stamford presented evidence demonstrating the vexatious nature of Olson’s requests,
communications, and interactions with the City of Stamford, and presented two witnesses who
testified in support of the Petition: Michael Toma, the Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City
of Stamford (“Toma”), and Kathryn Emmett, Special Counsel and former Director of Legal
Affairs and Corporation Counsel for the City of Stamford (“Emmett”). Olson disputed that he
was a vexatious requester. However, he did not testify, nor did he present any witnesses. On the
final hearing date of October 13, 2022, which convened, in part, to afford Olson the opportunity
to present his case, he abandoned the proceedings before presenting evidence. R. 1410, ¶¶ 111 –
112. After a short recess, Olson did not return upon the reconvening of the hearing. Building
security notified the hearing officer that Olson had informed him that he was leaving the building
and that he did not plan to return. R. 1715-16.
The hearing officer subsequently issued a hearing officer’s report (or “proposed final
decision”) to the parties. The hearing officer concluded that the City of Stamford met its burden
to establish that Olson is a vexatious requester, recommended that the Commission grant the
petition, and that it issue an order providing that the City need not comply with public records
requests from Olson for a period of one year. R. 1348-78. The Commission considered the
hearing officer’s proposed decision at its November 23, 2022 special meeting. After hearing
argument from the parties, the Commission unanimously adopted the hearing officer’s report as
its final decision. R. 1722-78, 1383-1416.
On December 8, 2022, Olson appealed to this Court and requested an order reversing the
Commission’s final decision. Entry No. 110.30. The City of Stamford subsequently intervened.
With this filing, the Commission submits its brief in opposition to the administrative appeal.
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (“UAPA”), § 4-166, et seq., the scope
of judicial review of an agency decision is "very restricted.” Lash v. FOI Commission, 300
Conn. 511, 517 (2011). Section 4-183(j) provides:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court
shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that
substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of
law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]n agency's factual and discretionary
determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.” Longley v. State
Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149, 163 (2007). With respect to the
Commission’s factual findings, courts “are required to defer to the subordinate facts found by the
[C]ommission, if there is substantial evidence to support those findings…. Substantial evidence
exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue
can be reasonably inferred.” Braasch v. FOI Commission, 218 Conn. App. 488, 498 (2023).
With respect to conclusions of law,
The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the
evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily,
illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. ... [Thus] [c]onclusions of
law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court
determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law
to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from
such facts. ...
4
City of Meriden v. FOI Commission, 338 Conn. 310, 318-319 (2021). Additionally, “when a
state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial
scrutiny... the agency is not entitled to special deference.” Dept. of Public Safety v. FOI
Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 716 (2010). Finally, the plaintiff in an administrative appeal
carries the burden of proof when challenging a decision of an administrative agency. Keiser v.
Conservation Commission of Town of Redding, 41 Conn. App. 39, 41 (1996).
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Commission properly construed the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6)
Olson first argues that the Commission misconstrued the term “vexatious” and in doing
so reached the erroneous conclusion that he is a vexatious requester. Pl. Br. p. 6. Olson also asks
this Court to reject the Commission’s construction and instead to adopt the “vexatious litigation”
standard set forth in § 52-568. However, Olson is incorrect on all fronts. In determining the
meaning of the term “vexatious,” the Commission adhered to longstanding principles of statutory
construction. The term was properly construed and, in applying § 1-206(b)(6) to the evidence,
the Commission reasonably concluded that Olson is a vexatious requester. As set forth below,
the “vexatious litigation” standard simply does not apply to § 1-206(b)(6).
i. In determining the meaning of the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6), the
Commission adhered to longstanding principles of statutory construction
The Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6) has not been
subject to judicial scrutiny, nor has it been applied by the Commission over a long period of
time. The Commission first interpreted the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6) in PRVR #1;
David Godbout v. Town of East Lyme; and East Lyme Board of Education (Feb. 26, 2020)
(“PRVR #1”) (Attached hereto as Exhibit 1). See Godbout v. FOI Commission, Superior Court,
judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-20-5027250-S (Aug. 3, 2021, Farley, J.)
5
(dismissing Godbout’s appeal as moot). Thus, whether the Commission has properly construed
the term “vexatious” is a question over which this Court’s review is plenary. Nevertheless, the
Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious” should be adopted by this Court.
In determining the meaning of the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6), the Commission is
guided by longstanding principles of statutory construction:
When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature....
In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the
meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the]
case, including the question of whether the language actually does
apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes §
1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its
relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and
considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be
considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we
also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and
circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it
was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing
legislation and common law principles governing the same general
subject matter ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted. Internal
citations omitted).
City of Meriden v. FOI Commission, 191 Conn. App. 648, 655–56 (2019), aff'd, 338 Conn. 310,
320-21 (2021).
In construing the term vexatious in accordance with the above-referenced framework, the
Commission began by examining the FOI Act itself. It is well settled that the overarching
legislative policy of the FOI Act is one that favors the open conduct of government and free
public access to government records. Glastonbury Education Assn. v. FOI Commission, 234
Conn. 704, 712 (1995). However, the FOI Act is not without limitations, and “does not … confer
an absolute right to all government information.” Commissioner v. FOI Commission, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-14-6027085-S, 2019 WL 4201551, *7
6
(Aug. 20, 2019, Huddleston, J.). The legislature has recognized that the right to provide the
public with access must be “counterbalanced by an equally strong public policy against
harassment of public agencies by individuals whose motivation is purposeless and abusive of the
statutes providing for access.” Mozzochi v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of
Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. 93-0525360-S, 1995 WL 542107, *1 (Sept. 5, 1995, Freed, J.)
aff'd, 44 Conn. App. 463, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 919, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 967 (1997).
On June 7, 2018, the Connecticut General Assembly voted unanimously to pass House
Bill 5175 (Public Act 18-95), An Act Concerning Appeals Under the Freedom of Information Act
and Petitions for Relief from Vexatious Requesters, effective October 1, 2018. Public Act 18-95
added the following provisions to the FOI Act (now codified as § 1-206(b)(6)):
. . . a public agency may petition the commission for relief from a
requester that the public agency alleges is a vexatious requester.
Such petition shall be sworn under penalty of false statement, as
provided in section 53a-157b, and shall detail the conduct which
the agency alleges demonstrates a vexatious history of requests,
including, but not limited to: (A) The number of requests filed and
the total number of pending requests; (B) the scope of the requests;
(C) the nature, content, language or subject matter of the requests;
(D) the nature, content, language or subject matter of other oral
and written communications to the agency from the requester; and
(E) a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right to
access information under the Freedom of Information Act or an
interference with the operation of the agency. Upon receipt of
such petition, the executive director of the commission shall
review the petition and determine whether it warrants a hearing. If
the executive director determines that a hearing is not warranted,
the executive director shall recommend that the commission deny
the petition without a hearing. The commission shall vote at its
next regular meeting after such recommendation to accept or reject
such recommendation and, after such meeting, shall issue a written
explanation of the reasons for such acceptance or rejection. If the
executive director determines that a hearing is warranted, the
commission shall serve upon all parties, by certified or registered
mail, a copy of such petition together with any other notice or
order of the commission. The commission shall, after due notice
to the parties, hear and either grant or deny the petition within one
7
year after its filing. Upon a grant of such petition, the commission
may provide appropriate relief commensurate with the vexatious
conduct, including, but not limited to, an order that the agency
need not comply with future requests from the vexatious requester
for a specified period of time, but not to exceed one year. Any
party aggrieved by the commission's granting of such petition may
apply to the superior court for the judicial district of New Britain,
within fifteen days of the commission meeting at which such
petition was granted, for an order reversing the commission's
decision.
At the administrative level, the petitioner carries the burden of proof, under § 1-206(b)(6), G.S.,
to demonstrate that the respondent is a vexatious requester.
A review of the legislative history is instructive in discerning the meaning of the term
“vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6), G.S.:
. . . this is a topic that’s been discussed for a long time here about
freedom of information. We are all in agreement that government
should be readily accessible. There should not be any barriers to
watching what government does. However, there are occasions
where we come across what’s known as a vexatious requester.
And this is probably someone who is requesting numerous,
voluminous freedom of information requests. Is not cooperative
when it comes time to have a hearing with the Freedom of
Information Commission. Is not cooperative with working with
the agency of state government who is trying to comply with the
freedom of information request. And so this bill allows the
Freedom of Information Commission a bit more flexibility in
dealing with such a requester. It still doesn’t shut it down, but
what it does is push back a bit when it is clearly the intent of the
requester to be more troublesome in a great way, hence the
terminology vexatious, that we need to have more cooperation
from the requester. . . .
61 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 2018 Sess., p. 2709-10, remarks of Senator Michael McLachlan. (Emphasis
added). (Attached hereto as Exhibit 2). Similarly, Representative Aresimowicz remarked:
. . . Connecticut has tremendous FOI laws, which we should all be
very proud of. In recent years, we have seen increased instances of
individuals kind of using their rights to burden the municipalities
and public agencies. All this bill does is allow a public agency. . .
8
to petition the Freedom of Information Commission for temporary
relief after due process. . . .
(Emphasis added.) 61 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 2018 Sess., p. 3539, remarks of Representative Joe
Aresimowicz. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 3). Thus, legislative history underlying § 1-206(b)(6)
makes clear that, while the legislature reaffirmed the FOI Act’s bedrock principle that
government information should be readily accessible, it was never the intention of the FOI Act
that requesters would use the law to harass, distress, or burden public agencies, officials, or their
employees in complying with FOI requests.
With the aforementioned framework in mind, in PRVR #1, the Commission determined
the meaning of the term “vexatious,” by using the common dictionary definition of the term. See
City of Meriden, supra, 191 Conn. App. at 657–58 (In the absence of defined statutory terms, the
Commission may “presume… that the legislature intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning
in the English language, as gleaned from the context of its use.... Under such circumstances, it is
appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.”)
(Internal quotation marks omitted.); see also § 1-1(a) (“In the construction of the statutes, words
and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and
technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in
the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.”).4 Therefore, the Commission adopted
the following definition of the term “vexatious” for purposes of § 1-206(b)(6): causing vexation:
distressing; intended to harass. Ex. 1, p. 14 (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
(11th Ed. 2003), available online at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vexatious
(accessed February 5, 2020)).
4
In PRVR #1, the Commission also interpreted the phrases “pattern of conduct”, “abuse of the right to access
information under the [FOI] Act”, and “interference with the operation of the agency.” Ex. 1, p. 14.
9
The Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious” is in accord with the overarching
legislative policy of the FOI Act and the intent of the legislature in enacting § 1-206(b)(6). The
legislature intended to give public agencies needed reprieve from requesters who file numerous,
voluminous requests that are burdensome to the public agency; and who demonstrate a pattern of
conduct that is intended to harass public agencies through the FOI process.
ii. The “vexatious litigation” standard is not applicable to § 1-206(b)(6)
Olson asks this Court to reject the Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious”
and to instead adopt the “vexatious litigation” (or “groundless or vexatious suit”) standard set
forth in § 52-568. However, the “vexatious litigation” standard is clearly inapplicable.
Section 52-568, entitled “Damages for groundless or vexatious suit or defense,” provides
that “[a]ny person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another,
in his own name or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint
commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person
double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and
trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, § 52-568
requires a determination that the claims or defenses lacked probable cause. A person lacks
probable cause if he lacks a reasonable, good faith belief in the facts alleged and the validity of
the claim asserted. DeLaurentis v. City of New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 256 (1991). This means
that there must be a showing that the claim or defense was frivolous.
First, FOI requests do not constitute civil actions, complaints, or defenses. Second, § 1-
206(b)(6) contains no requirement that an FOI request be made “without probable cause” to
reach the conclusion that a requester is vexatious. The standard set forth in § 52-568, therefore, is
clearly not applicable. In crafting § 1-206(b)(6), the legislature unambiguously excluded the
10
phrases “groundless suit,” “vexatious suit,” and “probable cause,” as well as the terms
“frivolous” or “meritless.” There is also nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the
legislature intended the vexatious requester statute to require a determination that an underlying
FOI request be without probable cause. The Commission, therefore, has no reason or basis to
construe the vexatious requester provision in the same manner as the vexatious suit statute. The
Commission, like the court, cannot “read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated.”
Lauer v. Zoning Commission of Town of Redding, 220 Conn. 455, 468 (1991). Absent the use of
technical, legal terms or phrases, the Commission correctly construed the term “vexatious”
according to its ordinary meaning.
Additionally, the legislature has already afforded public agencies the right to obtain relief
from frivolous FOI requests and appeals. Section 1-241, entitled “Injunctive relief from
frivolous, unreasonable or harassing freedom of information appeals” provides that an agency:
may bring an action to the Superior Court against any person who
was denied leave by the [FOI] Commission to have his appeal
heard by the commission under subsection (b) of section 1-206
because the commission determined and found that such appeal or
the underlying request would perpetrate an injustice or would
constitute an abuse of the commission's administrative process.
The action authorized under this section shall be limited to an
injunction prohibiting such person from bringing any further
appeal to the commission which would perpetrate an injustice or
would constitute an abuse of the commission's administrative
process. If, after such an injunction is ordered, the person subject
to the injunction brings a further appeal to the [FOI] Commission
and the commission determines that such appeal would perpetrate
an injustice or would constitute an abuse of the commission's
administrative process, such person shall be conclusively deemed
to have violated the injunction and such agency may seek further
injunctive and equitable relief, damages, attorney's fees and costs,
as the court may order.
11
(Emphasis added). Section 1-241 affords a public agency the right to obtain attorney’s fees and
costs, and damages, when a requester makes frivolous FOI requests or files frivolous appeals to
the Commission.5 Because § 1-241 remedies frivolous FOI requests and appeals, applying a
“vexatious litigation” standard to § 1-206(b)(6) would render § 1-241 meaningless, which is
improper. See City of Meriden, supra, 191 Conn. App. 656 (“It is a basic tenet of statutory
construction that the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... Every word
and phrase [in a statute] is presumed to have meaning, and we do not construe statutes so as to
render certain words and phrases surplusage.”)
iii. The record does not support Olson’s claim that his requests were not frivolous
Assuming, arguendo, that the “vexatious litigation” standard applies to § 1-206(b)(6), the
evidence before the Commission does not establish that Olson’s requests were not frivolous. In
his brief, Olson refers to his quest for information as “public advocacy” and that his records
requests were legitimate. Pl. Br. pp. 10-12. However, there is no support in the record for
Olson’s contention. He was never sworn in as a witness and he abandoned the proceedings when
he was afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of his claims. Although Olson
tries to argue on appeal that his requests were not frivolous, arguments are not evidence upon
which the court may rely to reverse the Commission’s decision. City of New Haven v. FOI
Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 775 (1988).
5
The Commission also notes that § 52-568 previously included subsection (b), which allowed public agencies to
seek injunctive relief against those who “frivolously,” “without reasonable grounds,” and “principally for the
purpose of harassing the agency” brought appeals to the Commission. However, with the enactment of Public Act
93-191, subsection (b) was deleted, and the FOI Act was amended to include the language now codified at § 1-241
(previously § 1-211). See Mozzochi v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain,
Docket No. 93-0525360-S (1995 WL 542107, *4) (Sept. 5, 1995) aff'd, 44 Conn. App. 463, cert. denied, 241 Conn.
919, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 967 (1997).
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B. The Commission properly applied the law to the record evidence and reasonably
concluded that Olson is a vexatious requester, within the meaning of
§ 1-206(b)(6)
In determining whether Olson is a vexatious requester, the Commission applied each of
the factors set forth in § 1-206(b)(6) to the evidence before it. To guide it, the Commission relied
on its final decision in PRVR #1, as well as several court decisions considering the
Commission’s application of similar factors under §§ 1-206(b)(2) and (3). See generally Smith v.
FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-16-5017349-
S, 2016 WL 4498174 (July 19, 2016, Schuman, J.) (hereinafter, “Smith”); Godbout v. FOI
Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-14-5016057-S,
2015 WL 4380266 (June 18, 2015, Schuman, J.) (hereinafter, “Godbout 2015”); Godbout v.
FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-5017046-
S, 2016 WL 4708550 (August 9, 2016, Schuman, J.) (hereinafter, “Godbout 2016”); Godbout v.
FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-19-5025125-
S, 2019 WL 5172357 (September 23, 2019, Huddleston, J.); aff’d, 202 Conn. App. 908 (2021),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 936 (2021) (hereinafter, “Godbout 2019”); and Lowthert v. FOI
Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-18-6047447-S,
2021 WL 4394404, *6 (Sept. 1, 2021, Wiese, J), aff'd, 220 Conn. App. 48 (2023).
Section 1-206(b)(2) of the FOI Act authorizes the Executive Director of the Commission
to decline to schedule an appeal for a hearing when she has reason to believe that doing so would
constitute an abuse of the Commission’s administrative process. Section 1-206(b)(3) provides
that the Commission may consider, inter alia, “the nature, content, language or subject matter”
of the request and appeal (including prior requests and appeals), and communications of the
requester. Because the factors that the Commission considers under §§ 1-206(b)(2) and (3)
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significantly overlap with those that the Commission considers under § 1-206(b)(6), the
Commission turned to the court’s review of its decisions in those matters for guidance. Upon
application of the law to the facts, the evidence presented in PRVR #4 supported the
Commission’s factual findings, and its conclusion, that Olson is a vexatious requester, within the
meaning of § 1-206(b)(6). Therefore, the final decision of the Commission must be affirmed.
The Commission began its analysis with the first factor, namely, the number of requests
filed by Olson. Gen. Stat. § 1-206(b)(6)(A). The Commission found that, for a period of just over
two years, Olson made at least thirty-two requests to the City of Stamford. R. 1389, ¶ 16, and
1411, ¶115. In comparison, in PRVR #1, Godbout filed 350 FOI Act requests with the petitioner
in a two year period. Ex. 1, p. 9. Although the number of requests filed by Olson is far less than
the number of requests filed by Godbout in PRVR #1, thirty-two requests over a two-year period
to the same public agency is significant and tends to support a history of vexatious requests and
an abuse of the right to access information under the FOI Act. See Lowthert v. FOI Commission,
Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-18-6047447-S, 2021 WL
4394404, *6 (Sept. 1, 2021), aff'd, 220 Conn. App. 48 (2023) (citing Smith) (“the fact that the
plaintiff filed thirty-two complaints with the commission in the past two years in and of itself
represents an abuse of the system.”) (Emphasis added.)
The Commission next considered the scope of Olson’s requests, as authorized by § 1-
206(b)(6)(B). The Commission found that the thirty-two requests spanned “a very broad scope of
records.” R. 1411 ¶ 116 (see e.g., requests for all documents pertaining to federal funding for
which the City of Stamford applied and/or received in calendar years 2017, 2018 and 2019
(Third Request); all electronic communications (email, instant messaging, network logs, system
logs, VPN and remote access logs, browser history, building access logs), as well all files, logs
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or records which the city retains related to employees Gaudett and Cooney from November 7 -
November 14, 2019 (Eleventh Request); all records related to all reimbursable expenses,
including but not limited to, travel, meals and entertainment for all City employees, contractors,
elected officials, or any other individual requesting reimbursement from the City for the calendar
year 2019 (Thirteenth Request); all records related to the Legal Affairs Department's activities
for 2019 (Fourteenth and Fifteenth Request); and browser history, operating system logs etc., for
Attorneys Emmett, Toma and Rosenburg for 2021 (Twenty-Third Request)). The City’s
witnesses testified that many of Olson’s requests were voluminous in nature (insofar as they
required review of hundreds to thousands of pages of records), and that complying with Olson’s
requests was time-consuming and burdensome. R. 1411, ¶ 117 (see, e.g., R. 1197, 1201, 1535-
1541, and 1593-97).
The Commission next considered “the nature, content, language or subject matter” of
Olson’s requests and communications to the City of Stamford, as permitted by §§ 1-206(b)(6)(C)
and 1-206(b)(6)(D). The Commission found that Olson’s communications, in conjunction with
his requests to the City of Stamford, contained “unfounded accusations of bias and racism,
hyperbolic reactions and misrepresentations of various events.” R. 1411, ¶ 122 (see, e.g., R.
1392, ¶ 26 (Olson sending six emails in a single day to Acting Chief of Police and other city
employees stating, inter alia, that “a ‘rich white woman’ called the police on him and caused him
tremendous emotional pain, and put his and his family’s lives in danger.”); R. 1392, ¶ 28 (email
alleging that the Acting Chief “deployed a body armor clad, armed-like-he’s-in-a-warzone-
officer . . . [who] lied about parking ordinances and threatened to steal [Olson’s] vehicle.”); R.
1395, ¶ 40 (various emails alleging that the Police Department demonstrated a pattern of
silencing parties through force and intimidation, warning that he was recovering from a very
15
serious heart condition and “would not likely survive an assault and/or incarceration.”); R. 1399-
1400, ¶ 59 (various emails relating to Olson’s FOI requests wherein he makes remarks to the
City of Stamford and its departments, including “[c]an’t wait to find out what 4th Amendment
violations you may have committed[;]” and “[i]n the midst of Trump’s rhetoric about ‘Mexicans’
being rapists and murderers, if you think calling an upstanding Hispanic resident a criminal is
acceptable, I’ve got reality for you. Each and every one of you are despicable racists.”))
The Commission also found that Olson’s communications accompanying his FOI
requests “were almost universally disrespectful, demeaning, distressing, taunting, badgering, and
harassing.” R. 1412, ¶ 123 (see, e.g., ¶¶ 20-24, 26-29, 32-33, 35-37, 40, 42, 44, 46, 49, 53, 55,
59-60, 62, 66-68, and 70-71 of the final decision). Attorney Toma noted that in his 20 year
history of serving as counsel for the City of Stamford, he had never been on the receiving end of
such unrelenting vitriol from a requester. R. 1588-89. Attorney Emmett characterized Olson’s
communications as threatening, intimidating, taunting, antagonistic, and insulting. R. 1197-1209.
Finally, the Commission considered whether the evidence demonstrated “a pattern of
conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right to access information under the [FOI] Act or an
interference with the operation of the agency,” within the meaning of § 1-206(b)(6)(E). In PRVR
#1, the Commission noted that the respondent’s conduct toward the public agency petitioners
was consistent with the conduct that the courts had already concluded was abusive of the
Commission’s administrative process. See Ex. 1, p. 16. For example, in Godbout 2016, the court
held that the Commission properly denied the plaintiff a hearing on the ground that his complaint
would constitute an abuse of the Commission’s administrative process. Godbout 2016, supra,
2016 WL 4708550, *5. The court highlighted several instances where the plaintiff made
disparaging remarks and attacks on the Commission and its Executive Director. Id., *6. Such
16
remarks included characterizing the Commission as an “evil agency that must be eliminated [,]”
and ruminating that the Commission should give “serious consideration to ending [the Executive
Director’s] employment with the commission.” Id. The plaintiff’s requests and remarks made it
clear that “the plaintiff’s real purpose is not to seek relief under the [FOI] act but rather to seek
some sort of vendetta against the executive director and to eliminate the commission.” Id. The
court determined that “the commission need not tolerate the improper use of the act as a means
of targeting one of its officers or challenging the commission’s very existence. The commission
properly denied the plaintiff a forum to further this ulterior motive.” See Id.; see also Smith,
supra, 2016 WL 4498174, *4-5 (finding that the plaintiff’s personal attacks against the public
agency’s executive director, unsupported requests for civil penalties, and repeated complaints
raising identical issues evidenced the plaintiff’s intent to harass the Commission and public
agency, neither of which are required to tolerate such abuse.).
Likewise, in Godbout 2019, the court determined that the Commission was justified in
refusing to schedule a hearing in the plaintiff’s case. Godbout 2019, supra, 2019 WL 5172357,
*7. The court noted that “the commission properly considered the nature, content, language or
subject matter” of the plaintiff’s current appeal as well as his prior requests and appeals under §
1-206(b)(3). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. To this end, the court stated that “[t]he
plaintiff is entitled to his opinions about the commission, and he has every right to express those
opinions to the legislature, to public officials, and to the public at large. He does not, however,
have a right to use the commission’s administrative process as a vehicle for expressing his
views.” (Emphasis added.) Id., *8.
Like Godbout, Olson misused the right to access information under the FOI Act. The
record supports the Commission’s findings that Olson was leveraging the FOI Act for improper
17
purposes. Olson used the rights afforded to him under the FOI Act as a vehicle to pursue his
vendetta against the City of Stamford. R. 1390, ¶ 17 (finding that Olson’s FOI requests and
related conduct began as a reaction to an incident in 2019 when a Stamford police officer
questioned Olson about his parked vehicle and instructed him to move it. This interaction set
Olson “on a quest to determine who contacted the police about his vehicle and, when he did not
receive the responses he sought, he responded by bombarding City departments with numerous
and voluminous FOI requests and emails.”)
Olson then used his FOI requests and related communications as a platform to air a litany
of complaints, accusations, and allegations against various departments, employees, and officials
in the City, which were often interspersed with additional FOI requests. See e.g., R. 1390 – 91,
¶ 22 – 24, R. 1392, ¶ 26, R. 1395, ¶ 40, R. 1398, ¶ 55. Moreover, Olson used his FOI requests
and related communications to disparage and attack City departments, officials, and
representatives. See e.g., R. 1392, ¶ 26 (Olson accusing the Acting Chief of Police of being
dishonest and blaming the Acting Chief for “people fleeing this state in droves.”); R. 1395, ¶ 40
(Olson calling the Police Department a “criminal enterprise.”); R 1392, ¶ 29 (Olson accusing the
City’s Director of Legal Affairs as having “absolutely no respect for the taxpayer or the rule of
law.”); R. 1400, ¶¶ 62 – 63 (Olson posting a Google Business review for witness and Attorney
David Atkins, calling him a “common thief,” after Attorney Atkins testified for the City in one of
Olson’s pending complaints before the FOI Commission.). Olson also used the FOI request
process to dialogue with the City to air his perceived grievances, rather than to obtain public
records. In doing so, he made a mockery of the right to access and treated the FOI process as if it
were a game. R. 1411, ¶ 121. Olson’s requests and communications were also designed to
intimidate and were retaliatory. R. 1412, ¶ 124. For example, Olson repeatedly threatened to file
18
grievances and sue the City’s attorneys, and would include various City officials, such as the
mayor, and members of the press, on communications alleging non-compliance with his
requests. See, e.g., R. 558, 570, 578, 1199-1200, 1203-04, 1206.
The record also supports the Commission’s conclusion that Olson interfered with the
City’s operations. Throughout Olson’s campaign against the City and its various departments,
Olson used the FOI process to interfere with the City’s operations through an overwhelming
volume of bad faith records requests and communications. Of Olson’s thirty-two records
requests, a significant number were extremely broad and designed to inundate the City. See e.g.,
R. 1394, ¶ 37 (request for “all documents pertaining to federal funding for which the City of
Stamford applied and/or received in calendar years 2017, 2018, and 2019.); R. 1396-98, ¶ 48
(various requests for records including “[a]ll communications, remote access logs, and browser
history regarding the Director of 911 Communications;” and “ all records related to all
reimbursable expenses for all of the City of Stamford employees, contractors, elected officials, or
any other individuals requesting reimbursement from the City for 2019); R. 1397, ¶ 52 (various
requests for records including “[a]ll records related to the Legal Affairs Department’s activities”
for 2019; and “[a]ll records in the Legal Affairs Department’s matter management system.”)
In view of all the above, the City of Stamford met its burden of proof before the FOI
Commission to show that Olson is a vexatious requester within the meaning of § 1-206(b)(6).
While the Commission agrees wholeheartedly with the legislature’s pronouncement that
“Connecticut has tremendous FOI laws,” no public officials or employees should be harassed,
unduly burdened, or caused distress to the degree evidenced by the record in this matter.
Accordingly, the Commission asks this Court to uphold its decision.
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C. Olson’s conduct before the Commission in this matter was abusive of the
Commission’s administrative process and interfered with the Commission’s
ability to bring this matter to a conclusion
Olson’s conduct during the Commission’s proceedings was similarly abusive. The
Commission found that the record “demonstrates a pattern of conduct by Respondent Olson,
which was intended to avoid, disrupt, and/or delay the Commission’s timely adjudication of the
Petition, as well as to use the process as an arena to disparage and harangue, the Petitioner, its
attorneys, the Commission, its staff, and the designated hearing officer. . . .” R. 1412-13, ¶¶ 126-
131. The court has already determined that similar conduct is an abuse of the administrative
process. See Godbout, supra, 2015 WL 4380266, at *3 (Godbout’s behavior before the
Commission, e.g., filing meritless motions, ignoring the Commission’s rules, and disrupting the
Commission’s orderly process, constituted an abuse of the administrative process).
During the proceedings before the Commission, Olson regularly filed meritless motions,
briefs, and objections. See, e.g., R. 1404, ¶¶ 78-80; R. 1406, ¶ 89; R. 1407, ¶ 91; R. 1409, ¶ 105;
R. 1410, ¶¶ 110, 113, 114; R. 1412, ¶ 126. He also failed to comply with the orders of the
Commission. See, e.g., R. 1408, ¶¶ 102-104, 109. Olson interrupted the proceedings with
protracted speaking objections, and long-winded admonishment of the hearing officer when he
disapproved of his rulings. See e.g., R. 1403, ¶¶ 74-77; R. 1682-1696; R. 1704-1714. Olson
frequently asked to adjourn scheduled hearing dates early, to postpone agreed upon hearing dates
for various reasons, and suggested incessantly that he would decline to appear and participate in
the proceeding. See, e.g., R. 1402, ¶ 73; R. 1405, ¶¶ 81-84; R. 1406, ¶¶ 85-88; R. 1407 ¶ 90;
1407-1408, ¶¶ 93-97; R. 1409, ¶ 106. Ultimately, Olson abandoned the proceedings without
presenting his case in support of his contention that he is not a vexatious requester. R. 1410, ¶¶
111 – 112.
20
Rather than comply with the orders of the Commission and defend against the allegations
made by the City in its petition, Olson used the Commission’s administrative process to express
his dissatisfaction with the Commission, and levy attacks against the Commission and its staff,
and the designated hearing officer. See, e.g., R. 1402-03, ¶ 73 (Olson stating, “Had George Floyd
been killed by police in Waterbury or Bridgeport, the witness video would have been confiscated
and this Commission would have diligently performed its duty in preventing its release, along
with body cam footage.”); R. 1408, ¶ 98 (Olson accusing the Commission and hearing officer,
without any basis, of being corrupt and stating “[f]olks, this is Corrupticut at its very finest.
[Commissioner] Hankins, [Executive Director] Murphy, [Managing Director] Schwind,
[Chairman] Eagen – please, take a bow!”); R. 1410, ¶ 113 (Olson filing a “Statement” with the
Commission wherein he asserted that the hearing officer was “pissing” on the integrity of his
son, and that Olson refused to “stand before any person and allow him/her to impugn the
character of his son or belittle the needs and motivations of military families.”); R. 1410, ¶ 114
(Olson filing a screenshot with the Commission which purports to be from Olson’s Twitter
account, wherein he recently tweeted “FOIC Commissioner Hankins is a literal [sic] piece of dog
shit” and shared such tweet with the Twitter accounts of several State officials, including the
Governor, the Connecticut House Democrats, the Connecticut Senate Democratic Caucus and
Republican Caucus.).
Olson’s pattern of conduct before the Commission in this matter was remarkably
consistent with the pattern of conduct previously described by the court as abusive of the
21
administrative process.6 R. 1412-13, ¶¶ 126-131. Olson’s pattern of conduct in interacting with
the Commission was also remarkably like his pattern of conduct when interacting with the City
of Stamford. Olson’s behavior before the Commission corroborated the evidence brought
forward by the City, and served to further support the Commission’s conclusion that he is a
vexatious requester.
D. The Commission was not persuaded that Olson’s “record” before it
demonstrates that he is not a vexatious requester.
Olson argues that his “record” before the Commission should have weighed in favor of a
determination that he is not vexatious requester. In this regard, Olson claims that he has “largely
been successful” before the Commission and that in three out of five cases, the Commission
found that Olson was not vexatious. Pl. Br. p. 11. First, in the three matters in which Olson
prevailed, insofar as the Commission found a violation against the City of Stamford, the
Commission made no determination regarding whether Olson was a vexatious requester. Second,
as explained in the final decisio
Preview
HHB-CV22-6076363-S : SUPERIOR COURT : MATTHEW OLSON : JUDICIAL DISTRICT : OF NEW BRITAIN : : AT NEW BRITAIN V. : : FREEDOM OF INFORMATION : COMMISSION : JANUARY 5, 2023 BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This is an administrative appeal from a decision of the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Commission (“FOIC” or “Commission”) brought pursuant to Gen. Stat. §§ 4-183(c) and 1- 206(b)(6).1 The plaintiff, Matthew Olson (“Olson”), seeks reversal of the Commission’s final decision in PRVR #4, City of Stamford v. Mathew Olson (Nov. 23, 2023) (“PRVR #4”), wherein the Commission concluded that Olson is a vexatious requester within the meaning of § 1- 206(b)(6). R. 1385-1416. The Commission hereby submits this brief in opposition to Olson’s administrative appeal. Olson argues that: the Commission “misinterpreted the term vexatious requester”; § 1-206(b)(6) is “unconstitutionally vague as applied to him”; and the Commission violated Olson’s free speech rights under Article First, § 5 of the Connecticut constitution.2 However, with the enactment of § 1-206(b)(6), the legislature sought to protect public agencies from conduct, 1 Formerly, § 1-206(b)(5). Section 1-206 was amended after the filing of this appeal, but the relevant statutory language is identical. See Senate Bill No. 1221, 2023 Sess.; Public Act 23-200 § 1 (eff. October 1, 2023). 2 Olson does not address many of the claims of error raised in his complaint, and in his brief, he writes that “[t]he only claims that [he] pursues … are his claims pertaining to the statutory definition of vexatious requester, his vagueness claims, and his free speech claims.” Pl. Br. p. 6. The Commission requests that this Court deem abandoned all claims of error which have not been briefed. See Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Dept. of Public Utility, 266 Conn. 108, 120–21 (2003)(“[W]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief ... Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failing to brief the issue properly.”) through Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act related activities, that is harassing, burdensome, abusive, and that interferes with the operation of public agency business. The record supports the Commission’s conclusion that Olson has a vexatious history of requests with the City of Stamford and therefore is a vexatious requester. The statute is constitutionally sound on its face and as applied, and Olson’s speech rights have not been impeded or impugned in any way. Therefore, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court dismiss the appeal. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On November 30, 2021, the City of Stamford, its public officials, and departments (“City of Stamford” or “City”), filed with the Commission a Petition for Relief from Vexatious Requester pursuant to § 1-206(b)(6). The City of Stamford alleged that Olson is a vexatious requester, and detailed examples of FOI Act requests and conduct that it believed demonstrate that Olson engaged in a pattern of conduct that amounted to an abuse of the right to access information under the FOI Act and interfered with the City’s operations, within the meaning of § 1-206(b)(6). Specifically, the City alleged that Olson inundated its employees with numerous FOI requests that required review of a high volume of records. Further, Olson’s requests were accompanied by a stream of email communications that, in conjunction with the requests, were distressing and harassing, abused the right to access information, and interfered with the City’s ability to conduct its business. The City of Stamford sought, inter alia, an order from the Commission that it need not comply with Olson’s FOI requests for a period of one year. R. 1-93. After conducting the review required by § 1-206(b)(6), the Executive Director of the Commission issued a Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause on the Petition. R. 119-121. The Commission held a contested case hearing which spanned four separate dates.3 The City of 3 As explained below, Olson’s conduct before the Commission was abusive of its administrative process and interfered with its ability to bring this matter to a conclusion. See part IV.C., infra. 2 Stamford presented evidence demonstrating the vexatious nature of Olson’s requests, communications, and interactions with the City of Stamford, and presented two witnesses who testified in support of the Petition: Michael Toma, the Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Stamford (“Toma”), and Kathryn Emmett, Special Counsel and former Director of Legal Affairs and Corporation Counsel for the City of Stamford (“Emmett”). Olson disputed that he was a vexatious requester. However, he did not testify, nor did he present any witnesses. On the final hearing date of October 13, 2022, which convened, in part, to afford Olson the opportunity to present his case, he abandoned the proceedings before presenting evidence. R. 1410, ¶¶ 111 – 112. After a short recess, Olson did not return upon the reconvening of the hearing. Building security notified the hearing officer that Olson had informed him that he was leaving the building and that he did not plan to return. R. 1715-16. The hearing officer subsequently issued a hearing officer’s report (or “proposed final decision”) to the parties. The hearing officer concluded that the City of Stamford met its burden to establish that Olson is a vexatious requester, recommended that the Commission grant the petition, and that it issue an order providing that the City need not comply with public records requests from Olson for a period of one year. R. 1348-78. The Commission considered the hearing officer’s proposed decision at its November 23, 2022 special meeting. After hearing argument from the parties, the Commission unanimously adopted the hearing officer’s report as its final decision. R. 1722-78, 1383-1416. On December 8, 2022, Olson appealed to this Court and requested an order reversing the Commission’s final decision. Entry No. 110.30. The City of Stamford subsequently intervened. With this filing, the Commission submits its brief in opposition to the administrative appeal. 3 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (“UAPA”), § 4-166, et seq., the scope of judicial review of an agency decision is "very restricted.” Lash v. FOI Commission, 300 Conn. 511, 517 (2011). Section 4-183(j) provides: The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.” Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149, 163 (2007). With respect to the Commission’s factual findings, courts “are required to defer to the subordinate facts found by the [C]ommission, if there is substantial evidence to support those findings…. Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.” Braasch v. FOI Commission, 218 Conn. App. 488, 498 (2023). With respect to conclusions of law, The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. ... [Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. ... 4 City of Meriden v. FOI Commission, 338 Conn. 310, 318-319 (2021). Additionally, “when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny... the agency is not entitled to special deference.” Dept. of Public Safety v. FOI Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 716 (2010). Finally, the plaintiff in an administrative appeal carries the burden of proof when challenging a decision of an administrative agency. Keiser v. Conservation Commission of Town of Redding, 41 Conn. App. 39, 41 (1996). IV. ARGUMENT A. The Commission properly construed the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6) Olson first argues that the Commission misconstrued the term “vexatious” and in doing so reached the erroneous conclusion that he is a vexatious requester. Pl. Br. p. 6. Olson also asks this Court to reject the Commission’s construction and instead to adopt the “vexatious litigation” standard set forth in § 52-568. However, Olson is incorrect on all fronts. In determining the meaning of the term “vexatious,” the Commission adhered to longstanding principles of statutory construction. The term was properly construed and, in applying § 1-206(b)(6) to the evidence, the Commission reasonably concluded that Olson is a vexatious requester. As set forth below, the “vexatious litigation” standard simply does not apply to § 1-206(b)(6). i. In determining the meaning of the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6), the Commission adhered to longstanding principles of statutory construction The Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6) has not been subject to judicial scrutiny, nor has it been applied by the Commission over a long period of time. The Commission first interpreted the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6) in PRVR #1; David Godbout v. Town of East Lyme; and East Lyme Board of Education (Feb. 26, 2020) (“PRVR #1”) (Attached hereto as Exhibit 1). See Godbout v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-20-5027250-S (Aug. 3, 2021, Farley, J.) 5 (dismissing Godbout’s appeal as moot). Thus, whether the Commission has properly construed the term “vexatious” is a question over which this Court’s review is plenary. Nevertheless, the Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious” should be adopted by this Court. In determining the meaning of the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6), the Commission is guided by longstanding principles of statutory construction: When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted. Internal citations omitted). City of Meriden v. FOI Commission, 191 Conn. App. 648, 655–56 (2019), aff'd, 338 Conn. 310, 320-21 (2021). In construing the term vexatious in accordance with the above-referenced framework, the Commission began by examining the FOI Act itself. It is well settled that the overarching legislative policy of the FOI Act is one that favors the open conduct of government and free public access to government records. Glastonbury Education Assn. v. FOI Commission, 234 Conn. 704, 712 (1995). However, the FOI Act is not without limitations, and “does not … confer an absolute right to all government information.” Commissioner v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-14-6027085-S, 2019 WL 4201551, *7 6 (Aug. 20, 2019, Huddleston, J.). The legislature has recognized that the right to provide the public with access must be “counterbalanced by an equally strong public policy against harassment of public agencies by individuals whose motivation is purposeless and abusive of the statutes providing for access.” Mozzochi v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. 93-0525360-S, 1995 WL 542107, *1 (Sept. 5, 1995, Freed, J.) aff'd, 44 Conn. App. 463, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 919, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 967 (1997). On June 7, 2018, the Connecticut General Assembly voted unanimously to pass House Bill 5175 (Public Act 18-95), An Act Concerning Appeals Under the Freedom of Information Act and Petitions for Relief from Vexatious Requesters, effective October 1, 2018. Public Act 18-95 added the following provisions to the FOI Act (now codified as § 1-206(b)(6)): . . . a public agency may petition the commission for relief from a requester that the public agency alleges is a vexatious requester. Such petition shall be sworn under penalty of false statement, as provided in section 53a-157b, and shall detail the conduct which the agency alleges demonstrates a vexatious history of requests, including, but not limited to: (A) The number of requests filed and the total number of pending requests; (B) the scope of the requests; (C) the nature, content, language or subject matter of the requests; (D) the nature, content, language or subject matter of other oral and written communications to the agency from the requester; and (E) a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right to access information under the Freedom of Information Act or an interference with the operation of the agency. Upon receipt of such petition, the executive director of the commission shall review the petition and determine whether it warrants a hearing. If the executive director determines that a hearing is not warranted, the executive director shall recommend that the commission deny the petition without a hearing. The commission shall vote at its next regular meeting after such recommendation to accept or reject such recommendation and, after such meeting, shall issue a written explanation of the reasons for such acceptance or rejection. If the executive director determines that a hearing is warranted, the commission shall serve upon all parties, by certified or registered mail, a copy of such petition together with any other notice or order of the commission. The commission shall, after due notice to the parties, hear and either grant or deny the petition within one 7 year after its filing. Upon a grant of such petition, the commission may provide appropriate relief commensurate with the vexatious conduct, including, but not limited to, an order that the agency need not comply with future requests from the vexatious requester for a specified period of time, but not to exceed one year. Any party aggrieved by the commission's granting of such petition may apply to the superior court for the judicial district of New Britain, within fifteen days of the commission meeting at which such petition was granted, for an order reversing the commission's decision. At the administrative level, the petitioner carries the burden of proof, under § 1-206(b)(6), G.S., to demonstrate that the respondent is a vexatious requester. A review of the legislative history is instructive in discerning the meaning of the term “vexatious” in § 1-206(b)(6), G.S.: . . . this is a topic that’s been discussed for a long time here about freedom of information. We are all in agreement that government should be readily accessible. There should not be any barriers to watching what government does. However, there are occasions where we come across what’s known as a vexatious requester. And this is probably someone who is requesting numerous, voluminous freedom of information requests. Is not cooperative when it comes time to have a hearing with the Freedom of Information Commission. Is not cooperative with working with the agency of state government who is trying to comply with the freedom of information request. And so this bill allows the Freedom of Information Commission a bit more flexibility in dealing with such a requester. It still doesn’t shut it down, but what it does is push back a bit when it is clearly the intent of the requester to be more troublesome in a great way, hence the terminology vexatious, that we need to have more cooperation from the requester. . . . 61 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 2018 Sess., p. 2709-10, remarks of Senator Michael McLachlan. (Emphasis added). (Attached hereto as Exhibit 2). Similarly, Representative Aresimowicz remarked: . . . Connecticut has tremendous FOI laws, which we should all be very proud of. In recent years, we have seen increased instances of individuals kind of using their rights to burden the municipalities and public agencies. All this bill does is allow a public agency. . . 8 to petition the Freedom of Information Commission for temporary relief after due process. . . . (Emphasis added.) 61 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 2018 Sess., p. 3539, remarks of Representative Joe Aresimowicz. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 3). Thus, legislative history underlying § 1-206(b)(6) makes clear that, while the legislature reaffirmed the FOI Act’s bedrock principle that government information should be readily accessible, it was never the intention of the FOI Act that requesters would use the law to harass, distress, or burden public agencies, officials, or their employees in complying with FOI requests. With the aforementioned framework in mind, in PRVR #1, the Commission determined the meaning of the term “vexatious,” by using the common dictionary definition of the term. See City of Meriden, supra, 191 Conn. App. at 657–58 (In the absence of defined statutory terms, the Commission may “presume… that the legislature intended [a word] to have its ordinary meaning in the English language, as gleaned from the context of its use.... Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.”) (Internal quotation marks omitted.); see also § 1-1(a) (“In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.”).4 Therefore, the Commission adopted the following definition of the term “vexatious” for purposes of § 1-206(b)(6): causing vexation: distressing; intended to harass. Ex. 1, p. 14 (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003), available online at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vexatious (accessed February 5, 2020)). 4 In PRVR #1, the Commission also interpreted the phrases “pattern of conduct”, “abuse of the right to access information under the [FOI] Act”, and “interference with the operation of the agency.” Ex. 1, p. 14. 9 The Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious” is in accord with the overarching legislative policy of the FOI Act and the intent of the legislature in enacting § 1-206(b)(6). The legislature intended to give public agencies needed reprieve from requesters who file numerous, voluminous requests that are burdensome to the public agency; and who demonstrate a pattern of conduct that is intended to harass public agencies through the FOI process. ii. The “vexatious litigation” standard is not applicable to § 1-206(b)(6) Olson asks this Court to reject the Commission’s construction of the term “vexatious” and to instead adopt the “vexatious litigation” (or “groundless or vexatious suit”) standard set forth in § 52-568. However, the “vexatious litigation” standard is clearly inapplicable. Section 52-568, entitled “Damages for groundless or vexatious suit or defense,” provides that “[a]ny person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another, in his own name or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, § 52-568 requires a determination that the claims or defenses lacked probable cause. A person lacks probable cause if he lacks a reasonable, good faith belief in the facts alleged and the validity of the claim asserted. DeLaurentis v. City of New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 256 (1991). This means that there must be a showing that the claim or defense was frivolous. First, FOI requests do not constitute civil actions, complaints, or defenses. Second, § 1- 206(b)(6) contains no requirement that an FOI request be made “without probable cause” to reach the conclusion that a requester is vexatious. The standard set forth in § 52-568, therefore, is clearly not applicable. In crafting § 1-206(b)(6), the legislature unambiguously excluded the 10 phrases “groundless suit,” “vexatious suit,” and “probable cause,” as well as the terms “frivolous” or “meritless.” There is also nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended the vexatious requester statute to require a determination that an underlying FOI request be without probable cause. The Commission, therefore, has no reason or basis to construe the vexatious requester provision in the same manner as the vexatious suit statute. The Commission, like the court, cannot “read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated.” Lauer v. Zoning Commission of Town of Redding, 220 Conn. 455, 468 (1991). Absent the use of technical, legal terms or phrases, the Commission correctly construed the term “vexatious” according to its ordinary meaning. Additionally, the legislature has already afforded public agencies the right to obtain relief from frivolous FOI requests and appeals. Section 1-241, entitled “Injunctive relief from frivolous, unreasonable or harassing freedom of information appeals” provides that an agency: may bring an action to the Superior Court against any person who was denied leave by the [FOI] Commission to have his appeal heard by the commission under subsection (b) of section 1-206 because the commission determined and found that such appeal or the underlying request would perpetrate an injustice or would constitute an abuse of the commission's administrative process. The action authorized under this section shall be limited to an injunction prohibiting such person from bringing any further appeal to the commission which would perpetrate an injustice or would constitute an abuse of the commission's administrative process. If, after such an injunction is ordered, the person subject to the injunction brings a further appeal to the [FOI] Commission and the commission determines that such appeal would perpetrate an injustice or would constitute an abuse of the commission's administrative process, such person shall be conclusively deemed to have violated the injunction and such agency may seek further injunctive and equitable relief, damages, attorney's fees and costs, as the court may order. 11 (Emphasis added). Section 1-241 affords a public agency the right to obtain attorney’s fees and costs, and damages, when a requester makes frivolous FOI requests or files frivolous appeals to the Commission.5 Because § 1-241 remedies frivolous FOI requests and appeals, applying a “vexatious litigation” standard to § 1-206(b)(6) would render § 1-241 meaningless, which is improper. See City of Meriden, supra, 191 Conn. App. 656 (“It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... Every word and phrase [in a statute] is presumed to have meaning, and we do not construe statutes so as to render certain words and phrases surplusage.”) iii. The record does not support Olson’s claim that his requests were not frivolous Assuming, arguendo, that the “vexatious litigation” standard applies to § 1-206(b)(6), the evidence before the Commission does not establish that Olson’s requests were not frivolous. In his brief, Olson refers to his quest for information as “public advocacy” and that his records requests were legitimate. Pl. Br. pp. 10-12. However, there is no support in the record for Olson’s contention. He was never sworn in as a witness and he abandoned the proceedings when he was afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of his claims. Although Olson tries to argue on appeal that his requests were not frivolous, arguments are not evidence upon which the court may rely to reverse the Commission’s decision. City of New Haven v. FOI Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 775 (1988). 5 The Commission also notes that § 52-568 previously included subsection (b), which allowed public agencies to seek injunctive relief against those who “frivolously,” “without reasonable grounds,” and “principally for the purpose of harassing the agency” brought appeals to the Commission. However, with the enactment of Public Act 93-191, subsection (b) was deleted, and the FOI Act was amended to include the language now codified at § 1-241 (previously § 1-211). See Mozzochi v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. 93-0525360-S (1995 WL 542107, *4) (Sept. 5, 1995) aff'd, 44 Conn. App. 463, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 919, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 967 (1997). 12 B. The Commission properly applied the law to the record evidence and reasonably concluded that Olson is a vexatious requester, within the meaning of § 1-206(b)(6) In determining whether Olson is a vexatious requester, the Commission applied each of the factors set forth in § 1-206(b)(6) to the evidence before it. To guide it, the Commission relied on its final decision in PRVR #1, as well as several court decisions considering the Commission’s application of similar factors under §§ 1-206(b)(2) and (3). See generally Smith v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-16-5017349- S, 2016 WL 4498174 (July 19, 2016, Schuman, J.) (hereinafter, “Smith”); Godbout v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-14-5016057-S, 2015 WL 4380266 (June 18, 2015, Schuman, J.) (hereinafter, “Godbout 2015”); Godbout v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-5017046- S, 2016 WL 4708550 (August 9, 2016, Schuman, J.) (hereinafter, “Godbout 2016”); Godbout v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-19-5025125- S, 2019 WL 5172357 (September 23, 2019, Huddleston, J.); aff’d, 202 Conn. App. 908 (2021), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 936 (2021) (hereinafter, “Godbout 2019”); and Lowthert v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-18-6047447-S, 2021 WL 4394404, *6 (Sept. 1, 2021, Wiese, J), aff'd, 220 Conn. App. 48 (2023). Section 1-206(b)(2) of the FOI Act authorizes the Executive Director of the Commission to decline to schedule an appeal for a hearing when she has reason to believe that doing so would constitute an abuse of the Commission’s administrative process. Section 1-206(b)(3) provides that the Commission may consider, inter alia, “the nature, content, language or subject matter” of the request and appeal (including prior requests and appeals), and communications of the requester. Because the factors that the Commission considers under §§ 1-206(b)(2) and (3) 13 significantly overlap with those that the Commission considers under § 1-206(b)(6), the Commission turned to the court’s review of its decisions in those matters for guidance. Upon application of the law to the facts, the evidence presented in PRVR #4 supported the Commission’s factual findings, and its conclusion, that Olson is a vexatious requester, within the meaning of § 1-206(b)(6). Therefore, the final decision of the Commission must be affirmed. The Commission began its analysis with the first factor, namely, the number of requests filed by Olson. Gen. Stat. § 1-206(b)(6)(A). The Commission found that, for a period of just over two years, Olson made at least thirty-two requests to the City of Stamford. R. 1389, ¶ 16, and 1411, ¶115. In comparison, in PRVR #1, Godbout filed 350 FOI Act requests with the petitioner in a two year period. Ex. 1, p. 9. Although the number of requests filed by Olson is far less than the number of requests filed by Godbout in PRVR #1, thirty-two requests over a two-year period to the same public agency is significant and tends to support a history of vexatious requests and an abuse of the right to access information under the FOI Act. See Lowthert v. FOI Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-18-6047447-S, 2021 WL 4394404, *6 (Sept. 1, 2021), aff'd, 220 Conn. App. 48 (2023) (citing Smith) (“the fact that the plaintiff filed thirty-two complaints with the commission in the past two years in and of itself represents an abuse of the system.”) (Emphasis added.) The Commission next considered the scope of Olson’s requests, as authorized by § 1- 206(b)(6)(B). The Commission found that the thirty-two requests spanned “a very broad scope of records.” R. 1411 ¶ 116 (see e.g., requests for all documents pertaining to federal funding for which the City of Stamford applied and/or received in calendar years 2017, 2018 and 2019 (Third Request); all electronic communications (email, instant messaging, network logs, system logs, VPN and remote access logs, browser history, building access logs), as well all files, logs 14 or records which the city retains related to employees Gaudett and Cooney from November 7 - November 14, 2019 (Eleventh Request); all records related to all reimbursable expenses, including but not limited to, travel, meals and entertainment for all City employees, contractors, elected officials, or any other individual requesting reimbursement from the City for the calendar year 2019 (Thirteenth Request); all records related to the Legal Affairs Department's activities for 2019 (Fourteenth and Fifteenth Request); and browser history, operating system logs etc., for Attorneys Emmett, Toma and Rosenburg for 2021 (Twenty-Third Request)). The City’s witnesses testified that many of Olson’s requests were voluminous in nature (insofar as they required review of hundreds to thousands of pages of records), and that complying with Olson’s requests was time-consuming and burdensome. R. 1411, ¶ 117 (see, e.g., R. 1197, 1201, 1535- 1541, and 1593-97). The Commission next considered “the nature, content, language or subject matter” of Olson’s requests and communications to the City of Stamford, as permitted by §§ 1-206(b)(6)(C) and 1-206(b)(6)(D). The Commission found that Olson’s communications, in conjunction with his requests to the City of Stamford, contained “unfounded accusations of bias and racism, hyperbolic reactions and misrepresentations of various events.” R. 1411, ¶ 122 (see, e.g., R. 1392, ¶ 26 (Olson sending six emails in a single day to Acting Chief of Police and other city employees stating, inter alia, that “a ‘rich white woman’ called the police on him and caused him tremendous emotional pain, and put his and his family’s lives in danger.”); R. 1392, ¶ 28 (email alleging that the Acting Chief “deployed a body armor clad, armed-like-he’s-in-a-warzone- officer . . . [who] lied about parking ordinances and threatened to steal [Olson’s] vehicle.”); R. 1395, ¶ 40 (various emails alleging that the Police Department demonstrated a pattern of silencing parties through force and intimidation, warning that he was recovering from a very 15 serious heart condition and “would not likely survive an assault and/or incarceration.”); R. 1399- 1400, ¶ 59 (various emails relating to Olson’s FOI requests wherein he makes remarks to the City of Stamford and its departments, including “[c]an’t wait to find out what 4th Amendment violations you may have committed[;]” and “[i]n the midst of Trump’s rhetoric about ‘Mexicans’ being rapists and murderers, if you think calling an upstanding Hispanic resident a criminal is acceptable, I’ve got reality for you. Each and every one of you are despicable racists.”)) The Commission also found that Olson’s communications accompanying his FOI requests “were almost universally disrespectful, demeaning, distressing, taunting, badgering, and harassing.” R. 1412, ¶ 123 (see, e.g., ¶¶ 20-24, 26-29, 32-33, 35-37, 40, 42, 44, 46, 49, 53, 55, 59-60, 62, 66-68, and 70-71 of the final decision). Attorney Toma noted that in his 20 year history of serving as counsel for the City of Stamford, he had never been on the receiving end of such unrelenting vitriol from a requester. R. 1588-89. Attorney Emmett characterized Olson’s communications as threatening, intimidating, taunting, antagonistic, and insulting. R. 1197-1209. Finally, the Commission considered whether the evidence demonstrated “a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right to access information under the [FOI] Act or an interference with the operation of the agency,” within the meaning of § 1-206(b)(6)(E). In PRVR #1, the Commission noted that the respondent’s conduct toward the public agency petitioners was consistent with the conduct that the courts had already concluded was abusive of the Commission’s administrative process. See Ex. 1, p. 16. For example, in Godbout 2016, the court held that the Commission properly denied the plaintiff a hearing on the ground that his complaint would constitute an abuse of the Commission’s administrative process. Godbout 2016, supra, 2016 WL 4708550, *5. The court highlighted several instances where the plaintiff made disparaging remarks and attacks on the Commission and its Executive Director. Id., *6. Such 16 remarks included characterizing the Commission as an “evil agency that must be eliminated [,]” and ruminating that the Commission should give “serious consideration to ending [the Executive Director’s] employment with the commission.” Id. The plaintiff’s requests and remarks made it clear that “the plaintiff’s real purpose is not to seek relief under the [FOI] act but rather to seek some sort of vendetta against the executive director and to eliminate the commission.” Id. The court determined that “the commission need not tolerate the improper use of the act as a means of targeting one of its officers or challenging the commission’s very existence. The commission properly denied the plaintiff a forum to further this ulterior motive.” See Id.; see also Smith, supra, 2016 WL 4498174, *4-5 (finding that the plaintiff’s personal attacks against the public agency’s executive director, unsupported requests for civil penalties, and repeated complaints raising identical issues evidenced the plaintiff’s intent to harass the Commission and public agency, neither of which are required to tolerate such abuse.). Likewise, in Godbout 2019, the court determined that the Commission was justified in refusing to schedule a hearing in the plaintiff’s case. Godbout 2019, supra, 2019 WL 5172357, *7. The court noted that “the commission properly considered the nature, content, language or subject matter” of the plaintiff’s current appeal as well as his prior requests and appeals under § 1-206(b)(3). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. To this end, the court stated that “[t]he plaintiff is entitled to his opinions about the commission, and he has every right to express those opinions to the legislature, to public officials, and to the public at large. He does not, however, have a right to use the commission’s administrative process as a vehicle for expressing his views.” (Emphasis added.) Id., *8. Like Godbout, Olson misused the right to access information under the FOI Act. The record supports the Commission’s findings that Olson was leveraging the FOI Act for improper 17 purposes. Olson used the rights afforded to him under the FOI Act as a vehicle to pursue his vendetta against the City of Stamford. R. 1390, ¶ 17 (finding that Olson’s FOI requests and related conduct began as a reaction to an incident in 2019 when a Stamford police officer questioned Olson about his parked vehicle and instructed him to move it. This interaction set Olson “on a quest to determine who contacted the police about his vehicle and, when he did not receive the responses he sought, he responded by bombarding City departments with numerous and voluminous FOI requests and emails.”) Olson then used his FOI requests and related communications as a platform to air a litany of complaints, accusations, and allegations against various departments, employees, and officials in the City, which were often interspersed with additional FOI requests. See e.g., R. 1390 – 91, ¶ 22 – 24, R. 1392, ¶ 26, R. 1395, ¶ 40, R. 1398, ¶ 55. Moreover, Olson used his FOI requests and related communications to disparage and attack City departments, officials, and representatives. See e.g., R. 1392, ¶ 26 (Olson accusing the Acting Chief of Police of being dishonest and blaming the Acting Chief for “people fleeing this state in droves.”); R. 1395, ¶ 40 (Olson calling the Police Department a “criminal enterprise.”); R 1392, ¶ 29 (Olson accusing the City’s Director of Legal Affairs as having “absolutely no respect for the taxpayer or the rule of law.”); R. 1400, ¶¶ 62 – 63 (Olson posting a Google Business review for witness and Attorney David Atkins, calling him a “common thief,” after Attorney Atkins testified for the City in one of Olson’s pending complaints before the FOI Commission.). Olson also used the FOI request process to dialogue with the City to air his perceived grievances, rather than to obtain public records. In doing so, he made a mockery of the right to access and treated the FOI process as if it were a game. R. 1411, ¶ 121. Olson’s requests and communications were also designed to intimidate and were retaliatory. R. 1412, ¶ 124. For example, Olson repeatedly threatened to file 18 grievances and sue the City’s attorneys, and would include various City officials, such as the mayor, and members of the press, on communications alleging non-compliance with his requests. See, e.g., R. 558, 570, 578, 1199-1200, 1203-04, 1206. The record also supports the Commission’s conclusion that Olson interfered with the City’s operations. Throughout Olson’s campaign against the City and its various departments, Olson used the FOI process to interfere with the City’s operations through an overwhelming volume of bad faith records requests and communications. Of Olson’s thirty-two records requests, a significant number were extremely broad and designed to inundate the City. See e.g., R. 1394, ¶ 37 (request for “all documents pertaining to federal funding for which the City of Stamford applied and/or received in calendar years 2017, 2018, and 2019.); R. 1396-98, ¶ 48 (various requests for records including “[a]ll communications, remote access logs, and browser history regarding the Director of 911 Communications;” and “ all records related to all reimbursable expenses for all of the City of Stamford employees, contractors, elected officials, or any other individuals requesting reimbursement from the City for 2019); R. 1397, ¶ 52 (various requests for records including “[a]ll records related to the Legal Affairs Department’s activities” for 2019; and “[a]ll records in the Legal Affairs Department’s matter management system.”) In view of all the above, the City of Stamford met its burden of proof before the FOI Commission to show that Olson is a vexatious requester within the meaning of § 1-206(b)(6). While the Commission agrees wholeheartedly with the legislature’s pronouncement that “Connecticut has tremendous FOI laws,” no public officials or employees should be harassed, unduly burdened, or caused distress to the degree evidenced by the record in this matter. Accordingly, the Commission asks this Court to uphold its decision. 19 C. Olson’s conduct before the Commission in this matter was abusive of the Commission’s administrative process and interfered with the Commission’s ability to bring this matter to a conclusion Olson’s conduct during the Commission’s proceedings was similarly abusive. The Commission found that the record “demonstrates a pattern of conduct by Respondent Olson, which was intended to avoid, disrupt, and/or delay the Commission’s timely adjudication of the Petition, as well as to use the process as an arena to disparage and harangue, the Petitioner, its attorneys, the Commission, its staff, and the designated hearing officer. . . .” R. 1412-13, ¶¶ 126- 131. The court has already determined that similar conduct is an abuse of the administrative process. See Godbout, supra, 2015 WL 4380266, at *3 (Godbout’s behavior before the Commission, e.g., filing meritless motions, ignoring the Commission’s rules, and disrupting the Commission’s orderly process, constituted an abuse of the administrative process). During the proceedings before the Commission, Olson regularly filed meritless motions, briefs, and objections. See, e.g., R. 1404, ¶¶ 78-80; R. 1406, ¶ 89; R. 1407, ¶ 91; R. 1409, ¶ 105; R. 1410, ¶¶ 110, 113, 114; R. 1412, ¶ 126. He also failed to comply with the orders of the Commission. See, e.g., R. 1408, ¶¶ 102-104, 109. Olson interrupted the proceedings with protracted speaking objections, and long-winded admonishment of the hearing officer when he disapproved of his rulings. See e.g., R. 1403, ¶¶ 74-77; R. 1682-1696; R. 1704-1714. Olson frequently asked to adjourn scheduled hearing dates early, to postpone agreed upon hearing dates for various reasons, and suggested incessantly that he would decline to appear and participate in the proceeding. See, e.g., R. 1402, ¶ 73; R. 1405, ¶¶ 81-84; R. 1406, ¶¶ 85-88; R. 1407 ¶ 90; 1407-1408, ¶¶ 93-97; R. 1409, ¶ 106. Ultimately, Olson abandoned the proceedings without presenting his case in support of his contention that he is not a vexatious requester. R. 1410, ¶¶ 111 – 112. 20 Rather than comply with the orders of the Commission and defend against the allegations made by the City in its petition, Olson used the Commission’s administrative process to express his dissatisfaction with the Commission, and levy attacks against the Commission and its staff, and the designated hearing officer. See, e.g., R. 1402-03, ¶ 73 (Olson stating, “Had George Floyd been killed by police in Waterbury or Bridgeport, the witness video would have been confiscated and this Commission would have diligently performed its duty in preventing its release, along with body cam footage.”); R. 1408, ¶ 98 (Olson accusing the Commission and hearing officer, without any basis, of being corrupt and stating “[f]olks, this is Corrupticut at its very finest. [Commissioner] Hankins, [Executive Director] Murphy, [Managing Director] Schwind, [Chairman] Eagen – please, take a bow!”); R. 1410, ¶ 113 (Olson filing a “Statement” with the Commission wherein he asserted that the hearing officer was “pissing” on the integrity of his son, and that Olson refused to “stand before any person and allow him/her to impugn the character of his son or belittle the needs and motivations of military families.”); R. 1410, ¶ 114 (Olson filing a screenshot with the Commission which purports to be from Olson’s Twitter account, wherein he recently tweeted “FOIC Commissioner Hankins is a literal [sic] piece of dog shit” and shared such tweet with the Twitter accounts of several State officials, including the Governor, the Connecticut House Democrats, the Connecticut Senate Democratic Caucus and Republican Caucus.). Olson’s pattern of conduct before the Commission in this matter was remarkably consistent with the pattern of conduct previously described by the court as abusive of the 21 administrative process.6 R. 1412-13, ¶¶ 126-131. Olson’s pattern of conduct in interacting with the Commission was also remarkably like his pattern of conduct when interacting with the City of Stamford. Olson’s behavior before the Commission corroborated the evidence brought forward by the City, and served to further support the Commission’s conclusion that he is a vexatious requester. D. The Commission was not persuaded that Olson’s “record” before it demonstrates that he is not a vexatious requester. Olson argues that his “record” before the Commission should have weighed in favor of a determination that he is not vexatious requester. In this regard, Olson claims that he has “largely been successful” before the Commission and that in three out of five cases, the Commission found that Olson was not vexatious. Pl. Br. p. 11. First, in the three matters in which Olson prevailed, insofar as the Commission found a violation against the City of Stamford, the Commission made no determination regarding whether Olson was a vexatious requester. Second, as explained in the final decisio