Motion to Strike in DUDLEY, JAKEEM v. ASHWOOD, GABRIEL A.| Trellis.Law

On November 08, 2023 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Jakeem Dudley, and Gabriel A. Ashwood, for V01 - Vehicular - Motor Vehicles - Driver and/or Passenger(s) vs. Driver(s) in the District Court of Fairfield County.

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DOCKET NO.: FBT-CV23-6128812-S : SUPERIOR COURT

JAKEEM DUDLEY : J.D. OF FAIRFIELD

V. : AT BRIDGEPORT

GABRIEL ASHWOOD : JANUARY 16, 2024

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE

The defendant, Gabriel Ashwood, submits this Memorandum of Law in support of his

Motion to Strike the Second Count of the Amended Complaint, dated January 11, 2024, and in

accordance with the provisions of Conn. Prac. Bk. § 10-39(c). The defendant moves to strike on

the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege particularized facts to support a claim of

recklessness.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident which is alleged to have occurred on

May 18, 2022, at approximately 1:37 p.m., on Brooklawn Avenue in Fairfield, Connecticut. In

the Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was traveling south on Brooklawn Avenue when the

defendant, who was traveling south on Brooklawn Avenue hit the plaintiff from behind

(Complaint, ¶¶ 3-5).

The plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint, dated October 30, 2023. The First Count

JACKSON O’KEEFE, LLP • ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
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alleges negligence on the part of the defendant, the Second Count alleges statutory recklessness

under Conn. Gen. Stat. §14-295. The defendant moves to strike the Second Count on the ground

that the plaintiff has failed to allege particularized facts to support a claim of recklessness. The

defendant further seeks to strike the corresponding claim for double/treble damages in the Prayer

for Relief.

The plaintiff alleges:

7. At all times mentioned herein, the Defendant-operator, Gabriel A.
Ashwood, was driving at an excessive speed under the circumstances without due regard
for traffic, was following too close or "tailgating" the vehicle(s) in front of him, was
using a hand-held mobile device and/or by reason of operating while distracted. when he
knew or should have known. that doing so would result in an extremely high likelihood
of causing serious injury. and yet he consciously disregarded that risk thereby causing the
Plaintiff to suffer the injuries and losses more fully set forth below.

(Ct. 2, ¶7).

There are five allegations of statutory violations as to the defendant:

(a) The Defendant deliberately, or with reckless disregard, operated his vehicle
recklessly in violation of C.G.S. § 14-222;
(b) The Defendant deliberately, or with reckless disregard, operated a motor vehicle
while distracted in violation of C.G.S.§ 14 296aa;
(c) The Defendant deliberately, or with reckless disregard, operated a motor vehicle
upon a public road while using a hand-held mobile phone, in violation of C.G.S. §
14-296aa(b)(l );
(d) The Defendant deliberately. or with reckless disregard, was following too closely
in violation C.G.S. § 14-240a: and/or
(e) The Defendant deliberately, or with reckless disregard, travelled too fast for
traffic conditions in violation of C.G.S, § 14-218a.

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(Ct. 2, ¶8).

These are legal conclusions. These are not factual allegations. There are no factual

allegations to support a finding of a reckless violation of any of these statutes. The defendant

was not charged with speeding. There is no allegation that he was operating at any particular

speed or even speed range. There is no allegation as to what the speed limit was. The defendant

was not charged with operating a motor vehicle while using a hand-held device. There is no

unequivocal allegation he was holding a cell phone in his hand.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest ... the legal

sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross claim, or of any one or

more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ....” Practice Book § 10-

39(a). To avoid a motion to strike, “the burden rests on the plaintiff to allege a recognizable

cause of action, and it is not sufficient that a complaint refer to a basis of liability by some

distinctive name.” Research Assoc., Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 157 Conn. 587,

588 (1968).

The complaint “shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action.”

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-91. Practice Book § 10-1, entitled “Fact Pleading,” requires that “[e]ach

pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader

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relies….” As the Appellate Court has recently reaffirmed:

A complaint ‘shall contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of
action ....’ Practice Book § 10-20. ‘The purpose of the complaint is to limit the issues to
be decided at the trial of a case and is calculated to prevent surprise.... It is fundamental
in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover is limited to the allegations in his
complaint.... A plaintiff may not allege one cause of action and recover on another.’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Criscuolo v. Mauro Motors, Inc., 58 Conn. App. 537,
544–45, 754 A.2d 810 (2000). ‘Conclusions of law, absent sufficient alleged facts to
support them, are subject to a motion to strike.’ Fortini v. New England Log Homes, Inc.,
4 Conn. App. 132, 134–35, 492 A.2d 545, cert. dismissed, 197 Conn. 801, 495 A.2d 280
(1985).

A.C. Consulting, LLC v. Alexion Pharms., Inc., 194 Conn. App. 316, 329, 220 A.3d 890, 898

(2019) (affirming striking of complaint for failure to meet fact pleading requirements as to

breach of contract claim).

While recognizing that Connecticut follows the “modern rules of pleading,” the

Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that this “does not mean … that the trial court is obligated

to read into pleadings factual allegations that simply are not there or to substitute a cognizable

legal theory that the facts, as pleaded, might conceivably support for the non-cognizable theory

that was actually pleaded.” Pane v. Danbury, 267 Conn. 669, 677 (2004).

When deciding a motion to strike, “the court is limited to the facts alleged in the

complaint.” Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580 (1997). “Conclusions

of law, absent sufficient alleged facts to support them, are subject to a motion to strike.” Fortini

v. New England Log Homes, Inc., 4 Conn. App. 132, 134-35, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 801

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(1985). “For the purpose of ruling upon a motion to strike, the facts alleged in a complaint,

though not the legal conclusions it may contain, are deemed to be admitted. A motion to strike is

properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the

facts alleged.” Hughes v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Waterbury, 221 Conn. App. 325, 329, 300 A.3d

1209, 1214 (2023) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted); see also, Mingachos v. CBS,

Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108 (1985); Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179

Conn. 541, 545 (1980).

ARGUMENT

Our courts have stated that to claim recklessness, the plaintiff must show that the

defendant engaged in conduct that that was highly unreasonable and a departure from ordinary

care.

Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of
one's acts ... It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence ... there must be
something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid
danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them ... Reckless
conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme
departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent ...
[S]uch aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from
inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or
inadvertence, or simply inattention ... " (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 64 Conn.App. 699, 720-21, 781 A.2d 440 (2001), aff’d, 262
Conn. 312,813 A.2d 1003 (2003). "It is well established that causes of action for
negligence and [recklessness] are separate and distinct causes of action. There is a
substantial difference between negligence and [reckless] conduct ... " Warner v. Leslie -
Elliot Constructors. Inc., 194 Conn. 129,138,479 A.2d 231 (1984 “In order to establish

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that the defendants' conduct was ... reckless, ... the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the
defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences
of one's acts ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or
safety of others or of the consequences of the action ... [In sum, such] conduct tends to
take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from
ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Elliott v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 415, 715 A .2d 27 (1998).

Fuori v. Delima, et al, Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury, Docket No. DBD CV

216038517S, 2021 WL 2592600 (Conn.Super.Ct. Jun. 4, 2021).

“To state a claim of recklessness ... the [plaintiff] must allege facts demonstrating both

egregious conduct and the requisite state of mind....” Connolly v. Reels, No. 4004013, 2006 WL

1391230, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 2006) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted) (citing Petner v. Electrical Contractors, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New

London, Docket No. CV 04 0569450 (March 18, 2005, Jones, J.)).

1. The plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts to support an allegation of
speeding.

There is nothing in Paragraphs 1 through 6 of the First Count, which have been

incorporated into the Second Count, to support the conclusory allegation that the defendant was

speeding. The plaintiff alleges, “the Defendant, Gabriel A. Ashwood, . . . was traveling directly

behind the Plaintiff’s vehicle on Brooklawn Avenue in Fairfield,” and “Suddenly and without

warning, the Defendant. . . failed to stop for slowing traffic in front of him and struck the

plaintiff’s vehicle . . .” (Complaint ¶¶4 and 5). The facts as plead do not support an allegation of

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speeding.

The court in Schalla v. Bove, No. KNLCV126012695S, 2015 WL 5314891, at *1 (Conn.

Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2015), granted the defendant’s motion to strike because the plaintiff did not

plead anything specific to the defendant’s speed. The court asked, “How close were the cars?

How heavy was the traffic? Approximately how fast was [the defendant] actually going?

Approximately how fast was [the plaintiff] going?” Id., at *3.

Additional factual allegations are necessary to transform a claim of negligence to one of

recklessness. Kallaugher v. Basile, No. CV010804191S, 2001 WL 1429239, at *1 (Conn. Super.

Ct. Oct. 31, 2001). Connecticut rules of practice require fact pleading. See, Prac. Bk. § 10-1. It

is not enough to plead acts according to their legal effect. The pleading must fairly apprise the

adverse party of the facts which underlie the claim. P.B. § 10-2. See also, Nyzio v. Olivia, No.

CV01007629S, 2002 WL 652820 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2002).

Here, the plaintiff does not plead any facts which support the claim of speeding. As

noted, the defendant was not charged with speeding. Without sufficient facts alleged in the

complaint to support the allegation of speeding, the Second Count must be stricken, and is not a

basis to support a claim for recklessness.

2. The plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts to support an allegation of
operating a motor vehicle while using a hand-held device.

As stated, there are no sufficient facts in paragraphs 1 through 6 to support a claim of

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speeding, nor are there sufficient facts to support a claim of operating while using a hand-held

device. The defendant was not charged with operation of a motor vehicle while using a hand-

held device. Without sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to support the allegation of using a

hand-held device, the Second Count must be stricken, and is not a basis to support a claim for

recklessness.

3. The defendant did have the requisite state of consciousness with reference to
his actions.

“[R]ecklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge

of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose

this danger to any reasonable [person], and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a

risk substantially greater ... than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.... More

recently, we have described recklessness as a state of consciousness with reference to the

consequences of one's acts.” Williams v. Hous. Auth. of City of Bridgeport, 159 Conn. App.

679, 693–94, 124 A.3d 537, 546 (2015) (emphasis by Court). “In order to establish that the

defendants’ conduct was ... reckless, ... the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the

existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts….”

Webster v. Bell, No. 5000865, 2006 WL 2865724, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2006).

The plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the defendant had the requisite state of

consciousness with reference to the consequences of his actions. The plaintiff provided no

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insight as to why the defendant “failed to stop for slowing traffic in front of him.” (Complaint,

¶5). The defendant must recognize that his actions involved a “risk substantially greater than that

which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” Williams, supra. Absent a showing of the

“existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts,” the

defendant is negligent, not reckless.

Because the defendant did not have the “existence of a state of consciousness with

reference to the consequences of one's acts” as required, Count Two as a whole, must be

stricken.

CONCLUSION

Because the plaintiff has failed to allege facts upon which to predicate a claim of

recklessness, the defendant respectfully submits that this Motion to Strike the Second Count of

the Complaint, as well as the claim for double/treble damages set forth in the Prayer for Relief,

must be granted as the claim is legally insufficient.

DEFENDANT:
GABRIEL ASHWOOD

By: /s/ 413185
Joseph M. Busher, Jr.
Jackson O’Keefe, LLP
433 Silas Deane Highway
Wethersfield, CT 06109-2123
(860) 278-4040
pleadings@jacksonokeefe.com

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the foregoing was mailed or will immediately be mailed or
delivered electronically or non-electronically on January 16, 2024, to all counsel and self-
represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from
all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically
served:

Sent via email to: Brad@sorrentinolegal.com
Bradley Sorrentino, Esq.
Sorrentino Legal
185 Plains Road
Milford, CT 06461-2473

By: /s/ 413185
Joseph M. Busher, Jr.
Jackson O’Keefe, LLP
433 Silas Deane Highway
Wethersfield, CT 06109-2123
(860) 278-4040
pleadings@jacksonokeefe.com

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Connolly v. Reels, Not Reported in A.2d (2006)

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal
2006 WL 1391230 sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). “In ruling on a
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the
Superior Court of Connecticut, complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner
Judicial District of New London. v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d
293 (1997). “The role of the trial court [is] to examine the
Dennis M. CONNOLLY [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine
v. whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient
Thomas REELS. cause of action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Szczapa
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 56 Conn.App. 325, 328, 743
No. 4004013. A.2d 622, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 950, 748 A.2d 299 (2000).
|
May 2, 2006. In their motion to strike, the defendants argue that count two
of the plaintiff's complaint does not allege sufficient facts to
Attorneys and Law Firms
support a claim for common-law recklessness. In opposition,
Trebisacci Hall & Associates LLC, Pawcatuck, for Dennis the plaintiff claims that he has alleged facts sufficient to
Connolly. support a claim for recklessness.

Noble Spector Young & O'Connor P.C., Hartford, for Thomas “Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to
Reels. the consequences of one's acts.... [Such conduct] is more than
negligence, more than gross negligence ... The state of mind
Opinion
amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct.
D. MICHAEL HURLEY, JTR. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than
a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness
*1 By way of a two-count complaint filed on August 8, to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions
2005, the plaintiff, Dennis Connolly, alleges that he suffered to avoid injury to them ... Wanton misconduct is reckless
injuries when the vehicle he was driving was struck from misconduct ... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless
behind by a vehicle operated by the defendant, Thomas Reels, disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the
and owned by the defendant, Sun Prezioso. 1 Count one of the consequences of the action ...
complaint alleges negligence and count two alleges common-
law recklessness. “While we have attempted to draw definitional distinctions
between the terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice the
On October 12, 2005, the defendants filed a motion to strike three terms have been treated as meaning the same thing.
count two of the complaint, accompanied by a memorandum The result is that wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to
of law in support. In their motion, the defendants move to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving
strike count two for failure to state a claim upon which relief an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation
can be granted. Specifically, the defendants argue that the where a high degree of danger is apparent ... It is at least
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint do not rise to the level clear ... that such aggravated negligence must be more than
of recklessness. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement,
opposition to the motion to strike on October 17, 2005. The or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or
motion to strike is presently before the court. inadvertence, or simply inattention.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342-43,
813 A.2d 1003 (2003).
DISCUSSION

*2 “Although there is a difference between negligence and a
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges in count two that the
reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint
defendant, Thomas Reels, operated his motor vehicle in a
is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough
reckless manner by driving a commercial dump truck on a
to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence
road heavily traveled by motorists while he was so tired that
and reckless misconduct are being asserted.” Craig v. he was falling asleep at the wheel, thereby posing a great risk
Driscoll, supra, 262 Conn. at 343. “[A] brief reference to of serious injury or death to all upon the roadway. Construing
recklessness, contained within a count which otherwise is the plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him, as
clearly limited to ordinary negligence is [not] sufficient to the court is required to do, the court finds that the plaintiff
raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. Simply has sufficiently alleged conduct that constitutes an extreme
using the word ‘reckless' or ‘recklessness' is not enough ... departure from ordinary care in a situation that involves a high
Some additional factual allegations are necessary to alter
degree of danger. Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 262 Conn. at
the nature of the conduct complained of from an action for
343.
negligence to an action for wilful and wanton conduct ... If
the plaintiff merely reiterates the facts from the negligence
count and inserts the word ‘reckless,’ a motion to strike is
properly granted ... If, however, the factual allegations in CONCLUSION
the negligence count are detailed and specific enough to
support a claim of recklessness, the motion to strike may be Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendants'
denied ... To state a claim of recklessness ... the [plaintiff] motion to strike count two is denied.
must allege facts demonstrating both egregious conduct and
the requisite state of mind ...” (Citations omitted; internal
All Citations
quotation marks omitted.) Petner v. Electrical Contractors,
Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket Not Reported in A.2d, 2006 WL 1391230
No. CV 04 0569450 (March 18, 2005, Jones, J.).

Footnotes

1 The present case has been consolidated with a case entitled Saporita v. Reels, Superior Court, judicial district
of New London, Docket No. CV 05 5000218. The Saporita case stems from the same accident. The court,
Hurley, J., granted the defendants' motion to consolidate on January 5, 2006.

unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from
2021 WL 2592600 ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. apparent ... [S]uch aggravated negligence must be more than
any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. inadvertence, or simply inattention ...” (Citations omitted;

Superior Court of Connecticut, internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 64
Judicial District of Danbury at Danbury. Conn.App. 699, 720-21, 781 A.2d 440 (2001), aff'd, 262
Conn. 312, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). “It is well established
Tyler FUORI that causes of action for negligence and [recklessness] are
v. separate and distinct causes of action. There is a substantial
Celio DELIMA et al. difference between negligence and [reckless] conduct ...”

DBDCV216038517S Warner v. Leslie-Elliot Constructors, Inc., 194 Conn. 129,
| 138, 479 A.2d 231 (1984). “Our Superior [C]ourts have held
June 4, 2021 that the reiteration of facts previously asserted to support
a cause of action in negligence, without more, cannot be
Opinion transformed into a claim of reckless misconduct [by mere]
nomenclature.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
D'ANDREA, Robert A., Judge omitted). Fuda v. Calabrese, 2013 WL 4734823 at *3. The
plaintiff has merely restated the same negligence claims in
*1 The defendants, Celio Delima and Roberta Pereira-
count one as grounds for recklessness in count two. The
Rochariberro (“defendants”) filed a March 30, 2021 motion
plaintiff has failed to allege any additional supporting facts
to strike (#104.00) counts two and three of the plaintiff
that raise these allegations to the level of recklessness.
Tyler Fuori's (“plaintiff”) complaint dated January 23, 2021.
The second count alleges common-law recklessness, and the
third count alleges statutory recklessness, and the defendants'
claims that the allegations of the two counts are legally DEFENDANT'S POSITION AS TO
insufficient and must be stricken. The plaintiff filed an STATUTORY RECKLESSNESS
April 14, 2021 objection to the defendants' motion to
strike (#108.00) asserting that the two counts properly and In the third count, the plaintiff attempts to set forth a claim
sufficiently set forth a cause of action for both common-law for statutory recklessness under General Statutes § 14-295,
and statutory recklessness. which provides in relevant part: “In any civil action to recover
damages resulting from personal injury ... the trier of fact
may award double and treble damages if the injured party has
DEFENDANTS' POSITION AS TO specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with
COMMON-LAW RECKLESSNESS reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of
section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234,
The defendants allege that second count is legally insufficient 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a
because the plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to
showing recklessness above and beyond mere negligence, property.” The plaintiff has failed to allege any specific facts
as the allegations in the second count are no more than showing recklessness whatsoever, but for the simple legal
those alleged in the first count. “Recklessness is a state conclusions that the statutes were violated.
of consciousness with reference to the consequences of
one's acts ... It is more than negligence, more than gross *2 There is a split of authority regarding the pleading
negligence ... there must be something more than a failure to
requirement under § 14-295. Some courts hold that a
exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger
claim for statutory recklessness is legally sufficient so long
to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to
as it alleges that the defendant deliberately or with reckless
them ... Reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly
disregard violated one of the statutes listed in § 14-295

and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing absence of further specificity, the allegations in the [statutory
the plaintiff's injuries. Other courts have required that, in recklessness] count do not elevate the plaintiff's claim to the
addition to pleading reckless violation of one or more of level of conduct required to survive a motion to strike ... A
the enumerated statutes, the plaintiff must also allege facts
plaintiff seeking treble damages under Conn. Gen. Stat.
sufficient to support a claim of common-law recklessness.
14-295 must plead facts sufficient to appraise the court and
the defendant of the specific reckless conduct and how the
“Our Superior [C]ourts have held that the reiteration of
defendant is alleged to have violated the enumerated statutes.”
facts previously asserted to support a cause of action in
Id. at *8.
negligence, without more, cannot be transformed into a
claim of reckless misconduct [by mere] nomenclature ...
Count three does not plead any facts as to how the alleged
To allow a plaintiff to simply allege reckless disregard of
statutes were violated. These allegations are mere conclusions
a statutory provision would enable any negligence claim
of law. See Martin, supra (“simply to allege ... that the
to be brought as a recklessness claim and thereby make it
defendant violated a statute would be a classic conclusion of
subject to double and treble damages. Furthermore, [c]ourts
law”). Id. at *3. The plaintiff concludes that the defendant was
taking the minority position have also emphasized the
reckless without providing factual support. He fails to assert
importance of fact pleading. [T]he majority view—to plead
specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants
only the bare bones of the statute—would lead to anemic
acted deliberately or with reckless disregard for the safety of
pleading ... Connecticut remains a fact pleading jurisdiction ...
others violated the statutes. There is no allegation to support
The majority view would judicially take us to a notice
a claim of reckless behavior. The third count of the plaintiff's
pleading posture.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
complaint should be stricken, as the plaintiff has failed to state
marks omitted). Fuda at *3. Thus, under this view, “a § a legally cognizable claim for recklessness in counts two and
14-295 claim must specifically allege the conduct that the three, and they are legally insufficient.
defendant ‘deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a
motor vehicle in violation’ of at least one of the nine statutes
enumerated in § 14-295.” Martin v. LaQuerre, 2013 WL PLAINTIFF'S POSITION AS TO
6989509 at *2. COMMON-LAW RECKLESSNESS

“Recklessness is a state of consciousness with reference to *3 The complaint contains three counts applicable to
the consequences of one's acts ... It is more than negligence, the defendants, the first count sounds in negligence, the
more than gross negligence ... there must be something second and third counts sound in common-law and statutory
more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of recklessness, respectively. The common-law recklessness
watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable claim states that “[t]he collision and the resulting injuries,
precautions to avoid injury to them ... Reckless conduct damages, and losses sustained by the plaintiff were caused by
tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, the reckless misconduct of the defendant in that the defendant
involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a knew or should have known that the defendant's conduct in
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent ... [S]uch suddenly attempting to change lanes without first making
aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake sure it was safe to do so, without the use of a turn signal,
resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and at a high rate of speed, would result in a high degree of
more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply risk of serious harm, and despite knowledge of that risk
inattention ...” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks and the harm that would result from such conduct, acted
omitted.) Craig at 720-21. recklessly in one or more of the following respects: ...” The
basis for the statutory recklessness claim states that “[t]he
In Rogers v. Dellop, 2013 WL 2350620 [56 Conn. L. defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a
Rptr. 152], the court struck a statutory recklessness claim, motor vehicle in violation of one or more of the following
where the plaintiff had merely restated his negligence claims sections of General Statutes § 14-295 and such violation(s)
and relabeled the alleged statutory violations as reckless, was a substantial factor in causing the collision and the
without any additional facts to support that claim. In striking injuries, damages, and losses sustained by the plaintiff ...” as
the statutory recklessness claim, the court stated, “in the

well as alleged violations of § 14-218a, § 14-219, § 14-222, defendant disregarded the danger of attempting to execute a
and § 14-234. left turn knowing that traffic was approaching in the opposite
direction”). The second count sufficiently sets forth facts
To support a common-law recklessness count, a plaintiff must that if proven would support a cause of action sounding
allege the requisite state of mind, and that the defendant's in common-law recklessness, as the complaint has alleged
conduct was an extreme departure from ordinary care. wanton, willful, and/or intentional actions on the part of the
defendants. See, Craig at 321. (“If facts provable in the
Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 831-33, 836 A.2d
complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to
822 (2003). The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that:
strike must be denied”).
“[R]ecklessness requires a conscious choice of a course
of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to
others involved in it with knowledge of facts which would
disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor PLAINTIFF'S POSITION AS TO
must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially STATUTORY RECKLESSNESS
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
*4 In light of Connecticut case law, the plaintiff's third
negligent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 829. count is sufficient to state a claim for statutory recklessness
“The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred
from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, which provides
more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from
watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the
precautions to avoid injury to them.” Craig at 342. trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the
injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has
The complaint sufficiently alleges the necessary state of mind deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor
to support a finding of common-law recklessness, as the vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222,
plaintiff alleges that the defendant knew, or should have 14-227a or 14-227m, subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection
known, that the defendant's conduct in suddenly attempting (a) of section 14-227n or section 14-230, 14-234, 14-237,
to change lanes without first making sure it was safe to do so, 14-239, 14-240a or 14-296aa, and that such violation was
without the use of a turn signal, at a high rate of speed, would a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage
result in a high degree of risk of serious harm, and despite to property.” Neither the Connecticut Supreme Court nor the
knowledge of that risk and the harm that would result from Appellate Court have addressed the issue of the pleading
such conduct in one or more of the ways further alleged. As requirements for recklessness under § 14-295, and there is
such, the plaintiff has claimed that the defendant's conscious a split of authority in the superior court.
choice to engage in conduct when the defendant knew, or
should have known, that it would endanger the lives of others The majority view is based on a thorough review of the
on the roadway, while operating a motor vehicle at an unsafe
legislative history of § 14-295 and the statute's plain
speed for road conditions, and while doing so, attempting to
language. Aguirre v. Cammisa, 2014 WL 4413602. In order to
change lanes, in an abrupt/sudden manner, without the use of
a turn signal, certainly constitutes the necessary mental state properly plead a claim for recklessness under § 14-295, the
for purposes of pleading recklessness, and specifically plead plaintiff must simply comply with the pleading requirements
the necessary mental state of mind to sustain a cause of action outlined in that statute. Joyner v. Hamer, 2000 WL 739615.
in recklessness. Matthiessen at 832.
“According to this view, General Statutes § 14-295 does
not require the same specificity of pleading which is required
This conclusion is similar to the one reached in Mozell
to support a cause of action predicated on [common law]
v. Ramos, 2011 WL 1171042, where the court denied the
recklessness ... When the language used by the legislature
defendant's motion to strike a common-law recklessness
is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction
claim under similar circumstances, because the plaintiffs
by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words
had sufficiently set forth a common-law recklessness claim
by alleging that the defendant acted with knowledge and a direct ...” Torres v. Jacovino, 2000 WL 670022 at *3. The
reckless disregard. Id. at *10-*11 (“the plaintiffs allege, the plaintiff is not required to allege how each trigger statute has
been violated, rather the allegations are to be read broadly

to determine if they are legally sufficient. The plaintiff needs *5 The plaintiff alleges violations of one or more
only allege that the defendant violated one or more of the
enumerated statutes in General Statutes § 14-295, and
motor vehicle statutes in § 14-295, and that such violation that such violations were a substantial factor in causing the
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. plaintiff's injuries. As such, count three of the plaintiff's
Santoro v. Topciu, 2000 WL 1229048. complaint is sufficient to state a claim for recklessness
pursuant to § 14-295. A similar conclusion was reached
The minority view requires that “plaintiffs plead the specific
in Luciano v. Hine, 2020 WL 4811586, where the plaintiff
conduct that is reckless, above and beyond what must be
pleaded for mere negligence.” Alibrandi v. Romero, 2008 WL alleged “statutory recklessness, pursuant to General
4926933 at *3. Factual allegations which constitute no more Statutes § 14-295, in that Hine deliberately or with reckless
than simple negligence cannot be transformed into claims disregard of the consequences operated the motor vehicle in
of reckless misconduct merely by labeling them as s

Case Info

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William F. Clark Track Judge’s New Case

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January 16, 2024

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November 08, 2023

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Motion-Secondary: DUDLEY, JAKEEM v. ASHWOOD, GABRIEL A.

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