Preview
1 Ryan Levihn-Coon
Lena Giron
2 3360 N. San Fernando Rd.
#1070
3 Los Angeles, CA 90065
Email: HELP@justiceoverviolence.com
4
5
6
7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
9
10
RYAN LEVIHN-COON, an individual, and Case No.:
11
LENA GIRON, an individual, Date of Filing: 29 February 2024
12
Plaintiffs,
13
COMPLAINT FOR:
14 v.
1. Assault
15 2. Forcible Entry
16 MARK ANDREW LARINTO, individually and in 3. Forcible Detainer
his official capacity as co-owner, managing partner
17 4. Trespass
and employee of SCENIC EXPRESSIONS, INC.,
18 5. Physical Invasion of Privacy (Cal. Civ. Code §
1708.8) – Intrusion Upon Seclusion
19
TYLER VINCENT LARINTO, individually and in 6. Trespass to Chattels
20 his official capacity as manager and employee of 7. Conversion
SCENIC EXPRESSIONS, INC.,
21 8. Violations of Statutory Duties Under
California Vehicle Code
22
9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
23 SCENIC EXPRESSIONS, INC., a California
corporation, and 10. Negligence: Negligent Infliction of
24 Emotional Distress
25 11. Breach of Contract, Express
DOES 1-100, inclusive, 12. Breach of Contract, Implied
26
13. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
27 Defendants,
Dealing (Cal. Civ. Code § 1927)
28 14. Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision
1
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 15. Violations of City of Los Angeles Tenant
Anti-Harassment Ordinance/LAMC Article
2
5.3, Section 45.30 et seq.
3 16. Violations of LACC § 8.52.130 et seq/Los
Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant
4
Protections Resolution
5
17. Violations of LAMC § 49.99.2 (Prohibition
6 on Residential Evictions)
18. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
7
(Cal. Civ. Code § 1927)
8
19. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civil Code §
9 1940.2(3) – Menacing Conduct
20. Violations of Los Angeles Civil Harassment
10
Ordinance
11 21. Violations of Los Angeles Civil and Human
12 Rights Law
22. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civil Code §
13
789.3 -Termination of Utilities
14 23. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civil Code §
15 1946.8(a)(4)
24. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 1954
16
25. FEHA Violations – Disparate
17 Treatment/Discrimination
18 26. Statutory Violations of CCP 527.6 & 527.8;
Civil Harassment Restraining Order
19
27. Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentation
20
28. Fraud – Negligent Misrepresentation
21
29. Wrongful Eviction
22 30. Conspiracy – Aid & Abet
23 31. Negligence – Personal Injury
24 32. Statutory Violations of Tom Banes Civil
Rights Act
25
33. Nuisance
26
27 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
28
2
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1
2
3
4 I.
5 INTRODUCTION
6 It has been nearly 150 years since the Supreme Court of California, in the case of Jones v. Shay, (50 Cal.
508), found that a tenant-at-will, who had no lease and paid no rent, could bring an action against the property
7 owner for forcible entry upon the property, which he merely occupied, and recover for actual and treble punitive
damages. In the century and a half since the decision, California courts have developed abundant case law that
8 clarifies the essential questions concerning the nature of property, possession, and the landlord-tenant relationship.
These questions include the following: What are the elements that define tenancy? Who qualifies to bring action
9
before the courts for damages when the rights bestowed on the tenant are violated? And what may a landlord do
10 and what must he not do when he wishes to terminate a tenancy?
In delivering answers to these questions, the courts have made abundantly clear two essential tenets 1) the
11
primary rights of a tenant are afforded to an immense and broad class of individuals under the law and 2) the
12 legislature and courts of a civilized society abhor the use of “self-help” by landlords who seek to terminate a
tenancy, and therefore provide remedies and relief to plaintiffs accordingly. These two concepts of abhorrence of
13 extrajudicial self-help methods and liberal application of who has standing intersect often in practice as cases often
arise from disputes about whether a certain set of circumstances is in fact a tenancy for which judicial process is
14 required or whether the circumstances in fact involve trespass, licensing, or something else.
15 California civil society’s long-standing prohibition against self-help evictions and behavior associated with
a landlord’s desire to evict is illustrated in a multitude of court cases. These judicial decisions in turn have
16 interpreted the overwhelmingly clear legislative intent of the statutes. The courts have made abundantly clear
through time what the people of California hold as unequivocally true: the self-help actions by a landlord or
17
other person who claims legal right or title to a property against a person who is in peaceable possession of
18 the property is in nearly all circumstances unlawful. Their prohibition extends, for example, to trespass: “the
cause of action for trespass affords protection for a possessory, not necessarily an ownership interest.” [Allen v.
19 McMillion (198) 82 Cal. App. 3d 211. 218] In their case the court goes on to state that “even one in peaceable
though wrongful possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that possession
20 even in the absence of injury to their person or goods”. Furthermore, “the fact that a defendant may have
title or the right to possession of the land is no defense”.
21
In a multitude of controlling cases, the California courts have made clear that the requirement to have standing
22 for tort recovery in property disputes is that “a person in peaceable possession of real property may recover, in
an action sounding in tort, damages for injuries to their person and goods caused by the forcible entry of
23
one who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor…” [Daluiso v. Boone at p. 486]. The court further
24 holds in their oft-cited case, “the fact that a defendant may have title or right to possession of the land is no
defense in such action”. Recovery includes all consequential damages including infliction of emotional distress,
25 personal injury, property damage and upon a proper showing of “malice”, punitive damages.
26 As will be illustrated in many of the causes of action in the present suit, the Plaintiffs in the present case,
while a tenant at will, is not even required to have tenancy at all in order to petition the court for relief. To sue in
27 tort for compensatory, statutory and punitive damages for breaches of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, infliction
of emotional distress, forcible entry and detainer, negligence, violations of the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance
28 and violations of CC Sections 789.3 and 1940.2, in addition to other causes of action, a Plaintiffs needs mere
“peaceable possession” of property to gain standing. The courts have found that their possessory interest has been
3
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 established in a vast range of circumstances, including cases in which the Plaintiffs entered the property without
permission, the Plaintiffs had an oral agreement, the Plaintiffs paid no rent, and even when the Plaintiffs had
2 possessed the property for less than a day.
3 Because “peaceable possession” is all that is required to seek recovery in these tort and statutory actions, it
is important to understand what exactly is meant by “peaceable possession”. A recent decision in a case by the
4 Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District [Veiseh v. Stapp] and upon information and
belief is alleged to reside, traces the history of California court decisions that have addressed the meaning of
5
“peaceable possession”. In reviewing the case law, the court found that “it is clear that “possession” is
6 synonymous with “occupation” and connotes a subjection of property to one’s will. [Williams v. Goodwin
(1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 496, 508] The court notes that their definition is compatible with the Restatement (Second)
7 of Torts which states a person in possession of land includes one who “is in occupancy of land with intent to
control it.” [Rest.2d Torts 157]
8
There are some decisions and secondary authorities that use the term “lawful possession” instead of
9 “peaceable possession” in the context of a statutory provision conferring a right of recovery for trespass, forceable
entry, forceable detainer, and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Here the court referred to the case of
10 Fisch v. Nice (1909) 12 Cal.App. 60 and stated: “The court held that the words ‘lawful possession’ as contained in
the statute meant only “’peaceable or quiet possession’. The court declared that Plaintiffs’ burden was satisfied
11 by a showing of actual possession.” [Williams, supra 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 508.]
12 Ultimately, the court concludes in Veiseh v. Stapp “that Plaintiffs need not have legal rights in the land. Even
one in peaceable though wrongful possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that
13 possession even in the absence of injury to their person or goods…” [Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood
Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1042 (Spinks), quoting Allen v McMillion (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 211,
14
214, 218]. Accordingly, the term “lawful possession” includes peaceable possession, which can be established by
15 proving actual possession – that is, subjecting the land to one’s will.
It is against such “peaceable” or “actual” possession, that a landlord is prohibited from using self-help
16
methods to evict or endeavor to evict a person in possession of property. A wide variety of actions taken by a
17 person seeking to evict via “self-help” methods, including for example removing personal property, speech
or action intended to influence an occupant to vacate, forcible entry, forcible detainer, and many others
18 create grounds for recovery of damages in tort as well as grounds for injunctive relief. Most poignantly, the class
of individuals who are protected against such “self-help” methods by a landlord is much larger than only “tenants”
19 who have a written lease and who pay rent. Take for example, the class of individuals who have standing to recover
damages for a violation of CC Section 1940.2. This section of the Civil Code describes certain actions a landlord
20
or any person is prohibited from taking “for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling”, including
21 “Use, or threaten to use force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes
with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises…that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable
22 person. Nothing in their paragraph requires a tenant to be actually or constructively evicted in order to obtain
relief”.
23
The class of people included as a “tenant” for the purpose of 1940.2 is defined as “all persons who hire
24 dwelling units located within their state including tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers, and others, however
denominated” (CC Section 1940). Moreover, “persons who hire” can include people who don’t pay rent, don’t
25 have a lease, and don’t have permission to occupy the property. Additionally, “dwelling unit” is defined to include
a “part of a structure that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place”. Likewise, actions for recovery stemming
26
from violations of CC Section 789.3, which among other actions, prohibits the removal of an occupant’s personal
27 property in order to take possession of the property or influence the occupant to vacate, breaches of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment and numerous other torts including infliction of emotional distress are available as well as
28 causes of action to individuals who meet the foregoing class of people, which includes “tenants, lessees, boarders,
lodgers, and others, however denominated.” To be clear, in their present case, the question of whether or not the
4
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 property occupied by Plaintiffs was created or is maintained for residential purposes at all has little bearing on
Plaintiffs’ rights related to possession of the property.
2
In the present action, the Plaintiffs are in fact tenants-at-will who were and had been in actual, peaceable
3 exclusive possession of the property in question. A tenant-at-will is a person who at some point had permission to
occupy the property, without an agreement or provision for rent. The only lawful means to evict such a tenant is
4 by the service of 30-days’ Notice, followed by the filing of an unlawful detainer action. In the case of a tenant-at-
will or the case of an occupant in mere possession of property, in any case of entry onto the property by a landlord
5
or anyone else other than by court order, no question of title can be raised. “Under the code, all entries on the actual
6 possession of another are unlawful, and the question of good or bad faith on the part of the defendant no longer
affects the right of recovery” [Voll v. Hollis, 60 Cal. 569].
7 It is apropos to note here that there are innumerable California cases involving police interfering on behalf of
a landlord or their agent when the question of tenancy or lawful possession is disputed. Courts have found in favor
8
of the tenant, occupant, “and others, however denominated” countless times, often severely sanctioning the
9 landlords and property owners who employ “self-help” methods to gain control of the property, with or without
force.
10
Through the long arc of California case law, the importance the State places on due process in the
11 consideration of a person’s right to the property he occupies combined with civil society’s serious and severe
disapproval of taking extrajudicial self-help actions, including acts and threats of violence and physical harm, when
12 the primary right of a person to the peaceful possession of property is in dispute, serve as the essential foundation
for understanding the scope and strength of the rights afforded Plaintiffs to recover damages and seek relief in a
13 case such as the present one before the court.
14
15 Further Case Law Support: Regarding Tenants-at-Will and Unlawful Detainer Actions:
Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244: Their case emphasizes the necessity of following legal
16
procedures for eviction, highlighting the protections afforded to tenants, including tenants-at-will, under California
17 law.
Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597: Reinforces the principle that landlords must adhere to statutory
18 eviction procedures and cannot resort to self-help methods to remove tenants.
19
20 On Unlawful Entries and Possession:
Richardson v. Franc (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 744: Their appellate decision underlines the illegality of
21 landlords making unauthorized entries onto property occupied by tenants and reinforces the tenant's right to quiet
22 enjoyment.
Munoz v. MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 648: Discusses the rights of occupants and the prohibition
23 against landlords taking law into their own hands to reclaim possession.
24
25 Regarding Police Involvement in Landlord-Tenant Disputes:
Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41: Explores the limits of police authority in landlord-
26 tenant disputes, particularly highlighting cases where law enforcement intervention on behalf of landlords without
a court order was deemed inappropriate.
27
Yee v. Superior Court (2017) 220 Cal.App.4th 184: Their case provides insight into how courts view the
28 improper involvement of police in eviction processes, especially in situations where the legal status of occupancy
is contested.
5
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1
On Due Process and Self-Help Evictions:
2
Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 488: By focusing on the rights of lessees and subtenants,
3 their landmark decision underscores the importance of due process and the prohibition of self-help evictions.
4 Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742: Demonstrates the judiciary's disapproval of self-
help tactics and the emphasis on legal procedures to resolve disputes over property rights.
5
6
Plaintiffs RYAN LEVIHN-COON and LENA GIRON are individuals and complain and allege upon their
7
own knowledge with respect to themselves and upon information and belief with respect to all other matters, as
8 follows:
9 II.
10
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. Plaintiffs Ryan Levihn-Coon and Lena Giron (hereafter, “Plaintiffs”) have suffered egregious and ongoing
11
harassment by the Defendants named herein that is still continuing to this day.
12
2. Plaintiffs file their action in order to hold Defendants accountable for the menacing campaign of terror they
13
have perpetuated against Plaintiff, on account of which they suffered the loss of their home, their vehicles,
14 their personal property, their community and their well-being.
15 3. Plaintiffs file their Complaint in order to protect themselves, their family, their home and their property from
16 Defendants and their ongoing campaign of harassment and terror directed at Plaintiffs and to be made whole
from the losses and the damages Defendants caused.
17
18 4. In a multitude of controlling cases, the California courts have made clear that the requirement to have standing
for tort recovery in property disputes is that “a person in peaceable possession of real property may
19
recover, in an action sounding in tort, damages for injuries to their person and goods caused by the
20 forcible entry of one who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor…” [see: Daluiso v. Boone at
21 p. 486].
22 5. The court further holds in their frequently cited case, “the fact that a defendant may have title or right to
23 possession of the land is no defense in such action”. Recovery includes all consequential damages including
infliction of emotional distress, personal injury, property damage and upon a proper showing of malice,
24
punitive damages.
25
6. Plaintiffs were in actual, peaceable and exclusive possession of the property that is the subject of their action,
26
the Residence Premises, when Defendants violently broke down the doors and tore down the walls to
27 Plaintiffs’ Residence Premises.
28
6
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 7. Immediately after causing Plaintiff Giron to be taken to the hospital by ambulance, Defendants and
Defendants’ Co-Conspirators entered Plaintiffs’ bedroom where Plaintiff Levihn-Coon lay in terror in his own
2
bed, fearful for his life. Wearing latex gloves, Co-Conspirators Gregory Toshio Doi, Jr. and Mr. Doi’s
3 accomplices caused Plaintiff Levihn-Coon to flee his own home as Defendants ravaged Plaintiffs’ bedroom
4 while violently searching for Plaintiffs’ security camera video recorder, which they intended to steal to hide
the evidence of their abhorrent actions.
5
6 8. Defendants employed a multitude of threats, including, among other methods and tactics, defective “eviction
notices”, hired thugs, coerced associates, misled employees, menacing conduct, heavy machinery, and
7
physical and verbal threats, physical barriers (e.g. construction of new fencing) and the intentional stealing
8 and keeping of Plaintiffs’ vehicles and personal property in order to forcibly enter and detain Plaintiffs’
9 Residence Premises such that Plaintiffs lost their home, their land, their vehicles and their personal property.
Defendants vandalized, burglarized, stole and destroyed more than $400,000 of Plaintiffs’ personal property.
10
Defendants also stole and destroyed Plaintiffs’ vehicles, causing Plaintiffs’ vehicles to be towed, damaged,
11 and converted.
12
9. Plaintiffs is informed and believes and thereon allege that Defendants were advised by their attorneys that
13 engaging lawful methods through the court if they endeavored to seek the eviction of Plaintiffs and recover
14 possession of the Residence Premises would cost Defendants at least $50,000. Plaintiffs allege on information
and belief that Defendants conspired to dispossess Plaintiffs of their property and Residence Premises, without
15
right, privilege or Plaintiffs’ consent, by using violent self-help methods in order to avoid the financial cost
16 and uncertainty of engaging the court process to resolve their dispute.
17
10. Beginning in 2021, Defendants conducted a relentless course of harassment against Plaintiff, the purpose of
18 which was to influence Plaintiffs to forfeit their rights and their property so that Defendants could increase
19 Defendants’ profits while wrongfully evicting Plaintiffs and converting Plaintiffs’ personal property.
20 11. Defendants continually escalated their attacks upon Plaintiff, ultimately employing heavy machinery,
21 including diesel-powered bucket loaders, industrial forklifts and power saws to cut through Plaintiffs’ front
door, tear down the walls of Plaintiffs’ home, destroy and steal Plaintiffs’ personal property, steal and then
22
dump Plaintiffs’ vehicles and personal property onto City of LA park land and neighbors’ land, and seek to
23 hide and destroy the evidence of Defendants’ actions by spray-painting Plaintiffs’ security cameras, breaking
24 into Plaintiffs’ home while wearing latex gloves in order to steal Plaintiffs’ security camera video recorder,
and threatening Plaintiffs verbally and by their conduct with grave bodily and personal injury if he resisted.
25
26 12. Defendants’ and their Co-Conspirators’ campaign of terror and harassment directed at Plaintiffs also consisted
of such methods as invading Plaintiffs’ privacy by flying surveillance drones over the Residence Premises,
27
scaling nearby rooftops in order to surveil Plaintiffs from above, driving a car at Plaintiff Giron as she walked
28
7
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 across the road alone at night, narrowly sparing her at the last moment, only to yell at her, “your days are
numbered”, before peeling away in a cloud of dust after Plaintiff Giron threatened to call the police.
2
3 13. Not contented with enrichment solely from the ill-gotten personal and real property windfalls of their
campaign of terror, Defendants also commenced an online campaign of disparagement and defamation,
4
sending harassing electronic messages to Plaintiffs and posting disparaging content to online public forums,
5 enlisting family members and paid reviewers to parrot their statements while employing morally-enfeebled
6 thugs and hired muscle to terrorize Plaintiffs offline in the natural world.
7 14. Defendants conducted their campaign of terror, specifically directed at Plaintiffs, in which Defendants sought
8 to intimidate Plaintiffs into abandoning their tenancy and their actual, peaceable and exclusive possession of
the Residence Premises during a global health pandemic and despite state and local eviction moratoriums and
9
other protections for tenants and occupants of real property.
10
15. Without the Court’s action, Defendants will continue to profit from their wrongful possession of Plaintiffs’
11
personal property, wrongful taking and detention of Plaintiffs’ home and land, and be further empowered to
12 perpetuate their malicious acts of oppression.
13
COVID CONTEXT
14
16. Plaintiffs have suffered egregious harassment by Defendant landlords that is still continuing to this day.
15
17. Tenants and residential occupants have long been the target of harassment by unscrupulous landlords. The
16
Housing and Community Investment Department in the city of Los Angeles noted in a 2018 report that the
17 agency investigates some 10,000 complaints of tenant harassment annually. 1 The agency estimated that
18 around 36 percent of those complaints related to illegal evictions while another 20 percent related to a
reduction of housing services. 2
19
20 18. The devastating problem of tenant harassment, which forces tenants to choose between indignity and harm or
leaving their home, has only increased during the COVID-19 pandemic.
21
22 19. In response to their heightened level of harassment occurring during the pandemic, several cities enacted
tenant anti-harassment policies that give tenants a private right of action to challenge landlord behavior. Other
23
California jurisdictions, Los Angeles County included, had already established these sorts of protections
24
25
26
1
Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department, HCIDLA Recommendation on the Adoption of an Anti-
27 Tenant Harassment Ordinance Response to Council Motion 14-0268-S13, Dec. 3, 2018,
28
2
Id.
8
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 before the pandemic started. However, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors through their emergency
powers applied and expanded tenant harassment protections throughout the County, effective September 1,
2
2020, stating that “[t]their Board is dedicated to protecting tenants vulnerable to COVID-19 from undue
3 harassment and retaliation for their actions during the pandemic.” 3 The Board has extended these critical
4 protections through December 31, 2022. 4
5 20. The COVID-19 pandemic hit Los Angeles County especially hard, causing widespread disruptions in civic
6 life. As of March 15, 2022, roughly 2.82 million county residents had tested positive for COVID-19 and over
32,000 people had died of the disease. 5 The so-called “Delta variant” of the virus caused even more
7
devastation in the County, with daily infection rates reaching roughly 2,000 people and hospitalization rates
8 doubling in just two weeks in the month of July. 6
9
21. The Omicron variant was even worse. Starting at just 13 percent of new U.S. infections as of December 11,
10 2021, Omicron jumped to a staggering 73 percent of new U.S. infections as of December 20, 2021, only nine
11 days later! 7 Twice as transmissible as Delta and four times as transmissible as the original COVID-19 strain,
Omicron was spreading in Los Angeles. 8 The subsequent BA.2 subvariant of Omicron was even more
12
transmissible and was poised to become the dominant form of Omicron. For tenants at risk of displacement,
13 the rise of Omicron meant an increased probability of contracting a potentially deadly disease. 9
14
III.
15
THE PARTIES
16
17
18
19 3
Los Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Executive Order for an Eviction Moratorium, (Sept. 1, 2020)
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/148443.pdf
20
4
Los Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Resolution Further Amending and Restating the County of Los Angeles COVID-
21 19 Tenant Protections Resolution (Jan. 25, 2022) https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/165606.pdf
5
Los Angeles Times Staff, Tracking the Coronavirus in Los Angeles County, L.A. Times (Mar. 15, 2022),
22
https://www.latimes.com/projects/california-coronavirus-cases-tracking-outbreak/los-angeles-county
23 6
County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health, COVID-Related Hospitalizations in Los Angeles County Have
Nearly Doubled in Two Weeks; 1,966 New Confirmed Cases of COVID-19 and 4 New Deaths, (July 26, 2021),
24 http://www.publichealth.lacounty.gov/phcommon/public/media/mediapubhpdetail.cfm?prid=3261
25
7
Mike Stobbe, Omicron sweeps across nation, now 73% of US COVID-19 cases, AP News (Dec. 20, 2021)
https://apnews.com/article/omicron-majority-us-cases-833001ef99862bd6ac17935f65c896cf
26 8
Alex Wigglesworth & Rong-Gong Lin II, Omicron variant likely to bring spike in COVID cases, hospitalizations,
officials warn, L.A. Times (Dec. 19, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-12-19/omicron-variant-
27 expected-to-bring-major-spike-in-coronavirus-cases-hospitalizations-officials-warn
28 9 Carl Zimmer & Patrick Lyons, Is the BA.2 version of Omicron worse? Here’s what you need to know, The New York
Times (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/americas/stealth-omicron-ba2-variant.html
9
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 22. Ryan Levihn-Coon (“Plaintiff”) is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a competent adult resident of the
City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, California.
2
3 23. Lena Giron (“Plaintiff”) is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a competent adult resident of the City of
Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, California.
4
5 24. Mr. Levihn-Coon and Ms. Giron are hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs”.
6 25. Scenic Expressions, Inc. is a California corporation registered in the State of California with its principal place
7 of business in Los Angeles County, California.
8 26. Hereinafter, Defendant Scenic Expressions, Inc. is referred to, at times, as “Scenic”.
9
27. Defendant Mark Andrew Larinto (hereinafter, “Mark”) is an individual who, at all times relevant to their
10 action, resided in the County of Los Angeles, California. Mark Larinto is an adult child of the founder and
11 incorporator of Scenic Expressions, Inc., Isadora Larinto.
12 28. Defendant Mark Andrew Larinto, at all times relevant to their action, was a competent adult conducting
13 business in Los Angeles County and upon information and belief is alleged to reside in Los Angeles, County
at 28538 Curtis Alan Place, Santa Clarita, California, 91350 (APN: 2812-063-025) and 20334 Rue Crevier,
14
Unit 617, Santa Clarita, California, 91351 (APN: 2836-040-230).
15
29. Defendant Tyler Vincent Larinto (hereinafter, "Tyler") is, and at all relevant times was, a competent adult
16
conducting business in and around the Chevy Chase Property and residing in Los Angeles County, California.
17
30. Hereinafter, Mark and Tyler, are referred to, collectively, as the “Larinto Defendants”.
18
31. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the Larinto Defendants, and each of them, were
19
principals, managers and employees of Defendant Scenic Expressions, Inc.
20
32. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, on such basis, allege that all acts and omissions of each employee,
21
each associate, and each contractor of the Scenic and Larinto Defendants, including Does 1-100 as hereinafter
22 alleged were authorized or ratified by the owner(s) and/or managing agents of Scenic and Larinto Defendants.
23
33. At all relevant times, Defendants, and each of them, ratified each and every act or omission complained of
24 herein. At all relevant times, Defendants, and each of them, aided and abetted the acts and omissions of each
25 and all the other Defendants to proximately cause the damages as alleged herein.
26 34. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise of Defendants Does 1
27 through 100 are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs
is informed and believes and thereon allege that each of the Defendants designated herein as a Doe defendant
28
is legally responsible in some manner for the acts, conduct, occurrences, events, happenings and damages
10
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 alleged in the Complaint giving rise to liability to Plaintiffs in the causes of action contained herein, and
directly or proximately caused or contributed to the injuries and damages of the Plaintiffs as herein alleged.
2
3 35. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that each and all of the acts and omissions alleged herein were
performed by, or are attributable to, Defendants each acting as the agent, employee, alter ego, joint-venturer,
4
and/or Co-Conspirator of, or working in concert with, each of the other Defendants and were acting within
5 the course and scope of such agency, employment, joint venture, conspiracy, or concerted activity with full
6 legal authority to act on the others' behalf. The acts of any and all Defendants represent and were in accordance
with Defendants' official or de facto policies or plans under said agency, employment, alter-ego, joint-venture,
7
conspiracy, and/or concerted activity relationship(s).
8
36. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, and each of them, negligently hired, trained, and
9
supervised their employees and agents regarding the proper management and maintenance of the subject
10 businesses, properties, buildings (including, without limitation, all reasonable action required to properly
11 repair, remedy, and abate the alleged habitability, quiet enjoyment, and other tenancy violations within a
reasonable period) and otherwise maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition at all relevant times.
12
13 37. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that each of said Defendants is in some manner fraudulently,
maliciously, oppressively, intentionally, negligently, and/or otherwise responsible for the acts, omissions,
14
occurrences, and transactions alleged herein.
15
38. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, based upon such information and belief, allege that, at all times herein
16
mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants, employees, partners, and alter egos of
17 the remaining Defendants, that the acts complained of herein were done within the course and scope of said
18 agency, service, employment, and partnership, and that the acts by each Defendant was ratified, approved and
adopted by each of the remaining Defendants.
19
20 39. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants knew or should
have known that they owed legal duties to Plaintiffs regarding the Residence Premises and Plaintiffs’ rights
21
to privacy and peace in Plaintiffs’ home, Plaintiffs’ personal rights and Plaintiffs’ property rights but
22 Defendants’ despicably, illegally, intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, oppressively, outrageously,
23 wrongfully, recklessly, and/or negligently violated and breached those duties in order to increase Defendants'
profits to Plaintiffs’ injury and detriment.
24
25 40. The actions and/or any failure to act alleged in the Complaint were done by Defendants and/or agents and
employees of Defendants, acting within the scope of their employment/agency, and with Defendants’
26
permission and consent.
27
41. Unless otherwise specified, reference to Defendants shall refer to acts or omissions of Defendants by and
28
through its employees and agents.
11
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 The Co-Conspirators and The Defendants
2 42. The following individuals and entities are Co-Conspirators of Defendants and are, or will be, named parties
in a separate civil action filed by Plaintiffs:
3
4 a. Gonzalez Towing and Transport is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a towing operation doing
business in the City of Los Angeles with its principal place of business located in the City of Los
5
Angeles;
6
b. Employees, Managers, Agents and Owners of Gonzalez Towing and Transport are competent adults
7
living and working in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles, California; and
8
c. Gregory Toshio Doi, Jr. and their accomplices, Doi Accomplice Doe 1, and Filmmaker Accomplice
9
Doe 2, are competent adults living and working in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles,
10 California.
11
43. Gonzalez Towing and Transport Defendants operate their impound yard, towing operations and auto park out
12 of a parcel and property located in the City of Los Angeles, California.
13
44. Plaintiffs is informed and believes and, on that basis, allege that Gonzalez Towing and Transport and their
14 employees, managers, agents and owners, at all times relevant to their action, worked and operated tow trucks
15 and a towing operation in the City of Los Angeles, California as a rogue towing operation and rogue tow truck
operators, unlicensed by the State of California to operate a tow truck in California pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code
16
§ 2430.1 and § 12520, unpermitted to work in the City of Los Angeles as a tow truck driver, pursuant to Los
17 Angeles Police Commission (the “Commission”) Regulations and Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) §
18 103.204 and § 103.204.1 and, unlicensed by the State of California to operate a commercial vehicle or any
motor vehicle, and unlicensed by the State of California to operate a tow truck pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code §
19
12520(a).
20
21
IV.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
22
45. As each Defendant’s principal place of business and/or residence is in the County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles
23 Superior Court is a proper venue for their matter. Further, the Court has personal authority over Defendants
24 on the grounds that Defendants conduct or transact business, reside in, or are employed within the State of
California and thus have purposely availed themselves of the laws and privileges thereof.
25
46. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matters alleged herein, and the venue is proper because all
26
of the alleged acts and omissions occurred in and around the real property that is the subject matter of the
27
Complaint, located in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, including, without
28 limitation, Plaintiffs’ Residence Premises and its curtilage.
12
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 Plaintiffs’ Special Vulnerabilities and Defendants’ Special Duties
2 47. Plaintiffs are members of a protected class due to their disabilities, which substantially impair one or more of
Plaintiffs’ major life activities. In addition, their condition also places them at higher risk for contracting and
3
developing complications from COVID.
4
48. Furthermore, as tenants-at-will of Defendants at all times relevant to their action, Defendants owed a special
5
duty of care to Plaintiffs.
6
49. The landlord-tenant relationship established between Plaintiffs and Defendant is recognized under California
7
law as a special relationship that imposes specific obligations on the landlord, including but not limited to, the
8 duty to provide a habitable living environment, maintain the premises in a safe condition, and conduct repairs
9 in a timely manner.
10 50. A multitude of California appellate decisions offer broad support for the special relationship and duties of care
11 owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs, and elucidate the extent and nature of the obligations imposed on landlords
towards their tenants, including:
12
13 a. Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185: This case affirms that landlords owe a duty of care
to their tenants and outlines the scope of their duty, including the maintenance of common areas and
14
the provision of adequate security measures.
15
b. Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108: Although primarily addressing the duty of care owed to
16
invitees, their landmark decision is foundational in understanding the broader principles of negligence
17 that apply to landlord-tenant relationships.
18
c. Hinson v. Delis (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 62: In this case, the court held that landlords have a duty to
19 inspect the premises before leasing to discover latent defects and thereafter to maintain the premises
20 by conducting necessary repairs and ensuring the property is safe for tenants.
21 d. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903: This case expanded on the landlord's liability for
22 failing to provide safe premises, specifically in the context of criminal acts by third parties, highlighting
the landlord's obligation to take reasonable security measures.
23
24 e. Werner v. Knoll (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 474: This case discusses the landlord's general duty of care to
tenants, emphasizing the importance of maintaining safe and habitable premises.
25
f. Knight v. Hallsthammar (1981) 29 Cal.3d 46: Clarifies the scope of the implied warranty of habitability
26
and a landlord's duty to repair defects that exist at the inception of the tenancy.
27
28
13
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 g. Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493: Discusses a landlord's obligations under the implied
warranty of habitability and the consequences of failing to address hazardous conditions on the
2
property.
3
4 STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Residence Premises and Plaintiffs’ Arrival
5
51. On or about May 20, 2021, Plaintiffs drove their Casita, personal automobile, Utility Trailer and Cardinal
6
Trailer to the east side of Verdant Street, south of the intersection of Verdant Street and Chevy Chase Drive,
7 which is the certain west part of the Chevy Chase Property, as identified in Exhibit A of this Complaint,
8 including its curtilage, adjacent parking area, concrete foundation, structures, buildings, walls, utilities,
cultivated grounds, landscaping, fixtures, appurtenances, amenities and space above and below the land, and
9
which are referred to hereinafter as the “Residence Premises”. Plaintiffs entered unobstructed onto the
10 Residence Premises by simply driving onto the unoccupied and unmaintained and overgrown land
11 immediately outside a wire fence located directly west of the Warehouse located to the east of Verdant Street.
12 52. The location of the Residence Premises can additionally be described as being bordered on the west by Verdant
13 Street and North Atwater Park (“Park”), on the south by 3949 East Verdant Street (APN: 5594016004), on
the north by 3990 Chevy Chase Drive (APN# 5594016001), and along the east by the warehouse building of
14
the former Albert Van Luit Wallpaper Factory (the “Warehouse”). (See Maps Identifying Residence
15 Premises, Exhibit A)
16
53. Since on or about May 20th, 2021, Plaintiffs continuously resided on a part of the real property and parcel
17 located at 4000 Chevy Chase Drive, Los Angeles, California, 90039, such property recorded by the Los
18 Angeles County as Tax Assessor Parcel Number 5594015019 and/or Parcel APN# 5594-016-015 ("Chevy
Chase Property").
19
20 54. Plaintiffs lived, worked, and were at all times relevant to their action in actual, peaceable and exclusive
possession of the Residence Premises.
21
22 55. At all relevant times, the Residence Premises and Chevy Chase Property were private real property as a matter
of law.
23
24 Plaintiffs’ Improvements and Additions to Residence Premises
56. Plaintiffs continuously maintained all landscaping, structures and buildings on the Residence Premises and its
25
curtilage. Plaintiffs substantially improved the land through irrigation, cultivation and landscaping. Plaintiffs
26
were at all times responsible for the new construction on the Premises, including the erection of permanent
27 walls that fully enclosed the interior yard of the Residence Premises, as well as kitchen and dining facilities,
guest room, dining and living areas and Plaintiffs’ workshop. Plaintiffs constructed the walled enclosure and
28
other construction, cultivation and landscaping of the Residence Premises in plain view of their neighbors,
14
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief
1 including the employees, managers and owners of Scenic, who on a regular, often daily basis, walked and/or
drove along
Preview
1 Ryan Levihn-Coon Lena Giron 2 3360 N. San Fernando Rd. #1070 3 Los Angeles, CA 90065 Email: HELP@justiceoverviolence.com 4 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 9 10 RYAN LEVIHN-COON, an individual, and Case No.: 11 LENA GIRON, an individual, Date of Filing: 29 February 2024 12 Plaintiffs, 13 COMPLAINT FOR: 14 v. 1. Assault 15 2. Forcible Entry 16 MARK ANDREW LARINTO, individually and in 3. Forcible Detainer his official capacity as co-owner, managing partner 17 4. Trespass and employee of SCENIC EXPRESSIONS, INC., 18 5. Physical Invasion of Privacy (Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8) – Intrusion Upon Seclusion 19 TYLER VINCENT LARINTO, individually and in 6. Trespass to Chattels 20 his official capacity as manager and employee of 7. Conversion SCENIC EXPRESSIONS, INC., 21 8. Violations of Statutory Duties Under California Vehicle Code 22 9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 23 SCENIC EXPRESSIONS, INC., a California corporation, and 10. Negligence: Negligent Infliction of 24 Emotional Distress 25 11. Breach of Contract, Express DOES 1-100, inclusive, 12. Breach of Contract, Implied 26 13. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 27 Defendants, Dealing (Cal. Civ. Code § 1927) 28 14. Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision 1 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 15. Violations of City of Los Angeles Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance/LAMC Article 2 5.3, Section 45.30 et seq. 3 16. Violations of LACC § 8.52.130 et seq/Los Angeles County COVID-19 Tenant 4 Protections Resolution 5 17. Violations of LAMC § 49.99.2 (Prohibition 6 on Residential Evictions) 18. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 7 (Cal. Civ. Code § 1927) 8 19. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civil Code § 9 1940.2(3) – Menacing Conduct 20. Violations of Los Angeles Civil Harassment 10 Ordinance 11 21. Violations of Los Angeles Civil and Human 12 Rights Law 22. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civil Code § 13 789.3 -Termination of Utilities 14 23. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civil Code § 15 1946.8(a)(4) 24. Statutory Violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 1954 16 25. FEHA Violations – Disparate 17 Treatment/Discrimination 18 26. Statutory Violations of CCP 527.6 & 527.8; Civil Harassment Restraining Order 19 27. Fraud – Intentional Misrepresentation 20 28. Fraud – Negligent Misrepresentation 21 29. Wrongful Eviction 22 30. Conspiracy – Aid & Abet 23 31. Negligence – Personal Injury 24 32. Statutory Violations of Tom Banes Civil Rights Act 25 33. Nuisance 26 27 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 28 2 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 2 3 4 I. 5 INTRODUCTION 6 It has been nearly 150 years since the Supreme Court of California, in the case of Jones v. Shay, (50 Cal. 508), found that a tenant-at-will, who had no lease and paid no rent, could bring an action against the property 7 owner for forcible entry upon the property, which he merely occupied, and recover for actual and treble punitive damages. In the century and a half since the decision, California courts have developed abundant case law that 8 clarifies the essential questions concerning the nature of property, possession, and the landlord-tenant relationship. These questions include the following: What are the elements that define tenancy? Who qualifies to bring action 9 before the courts for damages when the rights bestowed on the tenant are violated? And what may a landlord do 10 and what must he not do when he wishes to terminate a tenancy? In delivering answers to these questions, the courts have made abundantly clear two essential tenets 1) the 11 primary rights of a tenant are afforded to an immense and broad class of individuals under the law and 2) the 12 legislature and courts of a civilized society abhor the use of “self-help” by landlords who seek to terminate a tenancy, and therefore provide remedies and relief to plaintiffs accordingly. These two concepts of abhorrence of 13 extrajudicial self-help methods and liberal application of who has standing intersect often in practice as cases often arise from disputes about whether a certain set of circumstances is in fact a tenancy for which judicial process is 14 required or whether the circumstances in fact involve trespass, licensing, or something else. 15 California civil society’s long-standing prohibition against self-help evictions and behavior associated with a landlord’s desire to evict is illustrated in a multitude of court cases. These judicial decisions in turn have 16 interpreted the overwhelmingly clear legislative intent of the statutes. The courts have made abundantly clear through time what the people of California hold as unequivocally true: the self-help actions by a landlord or 17 other person who claims legal right or title to a property against a person who is in peaceable possession of 18 the property is in nearly all circumstances unlawful. Their prohibition extends, for example, to trespass: “the cause of action for trespass affords protection for a possessory, not necessarily an ownership interest.” [Allen v. 19 McMillion (198) 82 Cal. App. 3d 211. 218] In their case the court goes on to state that “even one in peaceable though wrongful possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that possession 20 even in the absence of injury to their person or goods”. Furthermore, “the fact that a defendant may have title or the right to possession of the land is no defense”. 21 In a multitude of controlling cases, the California courts have made clear that the requirement to have standing 22 for tort recovery in property disputes is that “a person in peaceable possession of real property may recover, in an action sounding in tort, damages for injuries to their person and goods caused by the forcible entry of 23 one who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor…” [Daluiso v. Boone at p. 486]. The court further 24 holds in their oft-cited case, “the fact that a defendant may have title or right to possession of the land is no defense in such action”. Recovery includes all consequential damages including infliction of emotional distress, 25 personal injury, property damage and upon a proper showing of “malice”, punitive damages. 26 As will be illustrated in many of the causes of action in the present suit, the Plaintiffs in the present case, while a tenant at will, is not even required to have tenancy at all in order to petition the court for relief. To sue in 27 tort for compensatory, statutory and punitive damages for breaches of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, infliction of emotional distress, forcible entry and detainer, negligence, violations of the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance 28 and violations of CC Sections 789.3 and 1940.2, in addition to other causes of action, a Plaintiffs needs mere “peaceable possession” of property to gain standing. The courts have found that their possessory interest has been 3 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 established in a vast range of circumstances, including cases in which the Plaintiffs entered the property without permission, the Plaintiffs had an oral agreement, the Plaintiffs paid no rent, and even when the Plaintiffs had 2 possessed the property for less than a day. 3 Because “peaceable possession” is all that is required to seek recovery in these tort and statutory actions, it is important to understand what exactly is meant by “peaceable possession”. A recent decision in a case by the 4 Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District [Veiseh v. Stapp] and upon information and belief is alleged to reside, traces the history of California court decisions that have addressed the meaning of 5 “peaceable possession”. In reviewing the case law, the court found that “it is clear that “possession” is 6 synonymous with “occupation” and connotes a subjection of property to one’s will. [Williams v. Goodwin (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 496, 508] The court notes that their definition is compatible with the Restatement (Second) 7 of Torts which states a person in possession of land includes one who “is in occupancy of land with intent to control it.” [Rest.2d Torts 157] 8 There are some decisions and secondary authorities that use the term “lawful possession” instead of 9 “peaceable possession” in the context of a statutory provision conferring a right of recovery for trespass, forceable entry, forceable detainer, and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Here the court referred to the case of 10 Fisch v. Nice (1909) 12 Cal.App. 60 and stated: “The court held that the words ‘lawful possession’ as contained in the statute meant only “’peaceable or quiet possession’. The court declared that Plaintiffs’ burden was satisfied 11 by a showing of actual possession.” [Williams, supra 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 508.] 12 Ultimately, the court concludes in Veiseh v. Stapp “that Plaintiffs need not have legal rights in the land. Even one in peaceable though wrongful possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that 13 possession even in the absence of injury to their person or goods…” [Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1042 (Spinks), quoting Allen v McMillion (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 211, 14 214, 218]. Accordingly, the term “lawful possession” includes peaceable possession, which can be established by 15 proving actual possession – that is, subjecting the land to one’s will. It is against such “peaceable” or “actual” possession, that a landlord is prohibited from using self-help 16 methods to evict or endeavor to evict a person in possession of property. A wide variety of actions taken by a 17 person seeking to evict via “self-help” methods, including for example removing personal property, speech or action intended to influence an occupant to vacate, forcible entry, forcible detainer, and many others 18 create grounds for recovery of damages in tort as well as grounds for injunctive relief. Most poignantly, the class of individuals who are protected against such “self-help” methods by a landlord is much larger than only “tenants” 19 who have a written lease and who pay rent. Take for example, the class of individuals who have standing to recover damages for a violation of CC Section 1940.2. This section of the Civil Code describes certain actions a landlord 20 or any person is prohibited from taking “for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling”, including 21 “Use, or threaten to use force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises…that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable 22 person. Nothing in their paragraph requires a tenant to be actually or constructively evicted in order to obtain relief”. 23 The class of people included as a “tenant” for the purpose of 1940.2 is defined as “all persons who hire 24 dwelling units located within their state including tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers, and others, however denominated” (CC Section 1940). Moreover, “persons who hire” can include people who don’t pay rent, don’t 25 have a lease, and don’t have permission to occupy the property. Additionally, “dwelling unit” is defined to include a “part of a structure that is used as a home, residence, or sleeping place”. Likewise, actions for recovery stemming 26 from violations of CC Section 789.3, which among other actions, prohibits the removal of an occupant’s personal 27 property in order to take possession of the property or influence the occupant to vacate, breaches of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and numerous other torts including infliction of emotional distress are available as well as 28 causes of action to individuals who meet the foregoing class of people, which includes “tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers, and others, however denominated.” To be clear, in their present case, the question of whether or not the 4 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 property occupied by Plaintiffs was created or is maintained for residential purposes at all has little bearing on Plaintiffs’ rights related to possession of the property. 2 In the present action, the Plaintiffs are in fact tenants-at-will who were and had been in actual, peaceable 3 exclusive possession of the property in question. A tenant-at-will is a person who at some point had permission to occupy the property, without an agreement or provision for rent. The only lawful means to evict such a tenant is 4 by the service of 30-days’ Notice, followed by the filing of an unlawful detainer action. In the case of a tenant-at- will or the case of an occupant in mere possession of property, in any case of entry onto the property by a landlord 5 or anyone else other than by court order, no question of title can be raised. “Under the code, all entries on the actual 6 possession of another are unlawful, and the question of good or bad faith on the part of the defendant no longer affects the right of recovery” [Voll v. Hollis, 60 Cal. 569]. 7 It is apropos to note here that there are innumerable California cases involving police interfering on behalf of a landlord or their agent when the question of tenancy or lawful possession is disputed. Courts have found in favor 8 of the tenant, occupant, “and others, however denominated” countless times, often severely sanctioning the 9 landlords and property owners who employ “self-help” methods to gain control of the property, with or without force. 10 Through the long arc of California case law, the importance the State places on due process in the 11 consideration of a person’s right to the property he occupies combined with civil society’s serious and severe disapproval of taking extrajudicial self-help actions, including acts and threats of violence and physical harm, when 12 the primary right of a person to the peaceful possession of property is in dispute, serve as the essential foundation for understanding the scope and strength of the rights afforded Plaintiffs to recover damages and seek relief in a 13 case such as the present one before the court. 14 15 Further Case Law Support: Regarding Tenants-at-Will and Unlawful Detainer Actions: Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244: Their case emphasizes the necessity of following legal 16 procedures for eviction, highlighting the protections afforded to tenants, including tenants-at-will, under California 17 law. Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597: Reinforces the principle that landlords must adhere to statutory 18 eviction procedures and cannot resort to self-help methods to remove tenants. 19 20 On Unlawful Entries and Possession: Richardson v. Franc (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 744: Their appellate decision underlines the illegality of 21 landlords making unauthorized entries onto property occupied by tenants and reinforces the tenant's right to quiet 22 enjoyment. Munoz v. MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 648: Discusses the rights of occupants and the prohibition 23 against landlords taking law into their own hands to reclaim possession. 24 25 Regarding Police Involvement in Landlord-Tenant Disputes: Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41: Explores the limits of police authority in landlord- 26 tenant disputes, particularly highlighting cases where law enforcement intervention on behalf of landlords without a court order was deemed inappropriate. 27 Yee v. Superior Court (2017) 220 Cal.App.4th 184: Their case provides insight into how courts view the 28 improper involvement of police in eviction processes, especially in situations where the legal status of occupancy is contested. 5 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 On Due Process and Self-Help Evictions: 2 Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 488: By focusing on the rights of lessees and subtenants, 3 their landmark decision underscores the importance of due process and the prohibition of self-help evictions. 4 Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742: Demonstrates the judiciary's disapproval of self- help tactics and the emphasis on legal procedures to resolve disputes over property rights. 5 6 Plaintiffs RYAN LEVIHN-COON and LENA GIRON are individuals and complain and allege upon their 7 own knowledge with respect to themselves and upon information and belief with respect to all other matters, as 8 follows: 9 II. 10 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. Plaintiffs Ryan Levihn-Coon and Lena Giron (hereafter, “Plaintiffs”) have suffered egregious and ongoing 11 harassment by the Defendants named herein that is still continuing to this day. 12 2. Plaintiffs file their action in order to hold Defendants accountable for the menacing campaign of terror they 13 have perpetuated against Plaintiff, on account of which they suffered the loss of their home, their vehicles, 14 their personal property, their community and their well-being. 15 3. Plaintiffs file their Complaint in order to protect themselves, their family, their home and their property from 16 Defendants and their ongoing campaign of harassment and terror directed at Plaintiffs and to be made whole from the losses and the damages Defendants caused. 17 18 4. In a multitude of controlling cases, the California courts have made clear that the requirement to have standing for tort recovery in property disputes is that “a person in peaceable possession of real property may 19 recover, in an action sounding in tort, damages for injuries to their person and goods caused by the 20 forcible entry of one who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor…” [see: Daluiso v. Boone at 21 p. 486]. 22 5. The court further holds in their frequently cited case, “the fact that a defendant may have title or right to 23 possession of the land is no defense in such action”. Recovery includes all consequential damages including infliction of emotional distress, personal injury, property damage and upon a proper showing of malice, 24 punitive damages. 25 6. Plaintiffs were in actual, peaceable and exclusive possession of the property that is the subject of their action, 26 the Residence Premises, when Defendants violently broke down the doors and tore down the walls to 27 Plaintiffs’ Residence Premises. 28 6 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 7. Immediately after causing Plaintiff Giron to be taken to the hospital by ambulance, Defendants and Defendants’ Co-Conspirators entered Plaintiffs’ bedroom where Plaintiff Levihn-Coon lay in terror in his own 2 bed, fearful for his life. Wearing latex gloves, Co-Conspirators Gregory Toshio Doi, Jr. and Mr. Doi’s 3 accomplices caused Plaintiff Levihn-Coon to flee his own home as Defendants ravaged Plaintiffs’ bedroom 4 while violently searching for Plaintiffs’ security camera video recorder, which they intended to steal to hide the evidence of their abhorrent actions. 5 6 8. Defendants employed a multitude of threats, including, among other methods and tactics, defective “eviction notices”, hired thugs, coerced associates, misled employees, menacing conduct, heavy machinery, and 7 physical and verbal threats, physical barriers (e.g. construction of new fencing) and the intentional stealing 8 and keeping of Plaintiffs’ vehicles and personal property in order to forcibly enter and detain Plaintiffs’ 9 Residence Premises such that Plaintiffs lost their home, their land, their vehicles and their personal property. Defendants vandalized, burglarized, stole and destroyed more than $400,000 of Plaintiffs’ personal property. 10 Defendants also stole and destroyed Plaintiffs’ vehicles, causing Plaintiffs’ vehicles to be towed, damaged, 11 and converted. 12 9. Plaintiffs is informed and believes and thereon allege that Defendants were advised by their attorneys that 13 engaging lawful methods through the court if they endeavored to seek the eviction of Plaintiffs and recover 14 possession of the Residence Premises would cost Defendants at least $50,000. Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that Defendants conspired to dispossess Plaintiffs of their property and Residence Premises, without 15 right, privilege or Plaintiffs’ consent, by using violent self-help methods in order to avoid the financial cost 16 and uncertainty of engaging the court process to resolve their dispute. 17 10. Beginning in 2021, Defendants conducted a relentless course of harassment against Plaintiff, the purpose of 18 which was to influence Plaintiffs to forfeit their rights and their property so that Defendants could increase 19 Defendants’ profits while wrongfully evicting Plaintiffs and converting Plaintiffs’ personal property. 20 11. Defendants continually escalated their attacks upon Plaintiff, ultimately employing heavy machinery, 21 including diesel-powered bucket loaders, industrial forklifts and power saws to cut through Plaintiffs’ front door, tear down the walls of Plaintiffs’ home, destroy and steal Plaintiffs’ personal property, steal and then 22 dump Plaintiffs’ vehicles and personal property onto City of LA park land and neighbors’ land, and seek to 23 hide and destroy the evidence of Defendants’ actions by spray-painting Plaintiffs’ security cameras, breaking 24 into Plaintiffs’ home while wearing latex gloves in order to steal Plaintiffs’ security camera video recorder, and threatening Plaintiffs verbally and by their conduct with grave bodily and personal injury if he resisted. 25 26 12. Defendants’ and their Co-Conspirators’ campaign of terror and harassment directed at Plaintiffs also consisted of such methods as invading Plaintiffs’ privacy by flying surveillance drones over the Residence Premises, 27 scaling nearby rooftops in order to surveil Plaintiffs from above, driving a car at Plaintiff Giron as she walked 28 7 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 across the road alone at night, narrowly sparing her at the last moment, only to yell at her, “your days are numbered”, before peeling away in a cloud of dust after Plaintiff Giron threatened to call the police. 2 3 13. Not contented with enrichment solely from the ill-gotten personal and real property windfalls of their campaign of terror, Defendants also commenced an online campaign of disparagement and defamation, 4 sending harassing electronic messages to Plaintiffs and posting disparaging content to online public forums, 5 enlisting family members and paid reviewers to parrot their statements while employing morally-enfeebled 6 thugs and hired muscle to terrorize Plaintiffs offline in the natural world. 7 14. Defendants conducted their campaign of terror, specifically directed at Plaintiffs, in which Defendants sought 8 to intimidate Plaintiffs into abandoning their tenancy and their actual, peaceable and exclusive possession of the Residence Premises during a global health pandemic and despite state and local eviction moratoriums and 9 other protections for tenants and occupants of real property. 10 15. Without the Court’s action, Defendants will continue to profit from their wrongful possession of Plaintiffs’ 11 personal property, wrongful taking and detention of Plaintiffs’ home and land, and be further empowered to 12 perpetuate their malicious acts of oppression. 13 COVID CONTEXT 14 16. Plaintiffs have suffered egregious harassment by Defendant landlords that is still continuing to this day. 15 17. Tenants and residential occupants have long been the target of harassment by unscrupulous landlords. The 16 Housing and Community Investment Department in the city of Los Angeles noted in a 2018 report that the 17 agency investigates some 10,000 complaints of tenant harassment annually. 1 The agency estimated that 18 around 36 percent of those complaints related to illegal evictions while another 20 percent related to a reduction of housing services. 2 19 20 18. The devastating problem of tenant harassment, which forces tenants to choose between indignity and harm or leaving their home, has only increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. 21 22 19. In response to their heightened level of harassment occurring during the pandemic, several cities enacted tenant anti-harassment policies that give tenants a private right of action to challenge landlord behavior. Other 23 California jurisdictions, Los Angeles County included, had already established these sorts of protections 24 25 26 1 Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department, HCIDLA Recommendation on the Adoption of an Anti- 27 Tenant Harassment Ordinance Response to Council Motion 14-0268-S13, Dec. 3, 2018, 28 2 Id. 8 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 before the pandemic started. However, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors through their emergency powers applied and expanded tenant harassment protections throughout the County, effective September 1, 2 2020, stating that “[t]their Board is dedicated to protecting tenants vulnerable to COVID-19 from undue 3 harassment and retaliation for their actions during the pandemic.” 3 The Board has extended these critical 4 protections through December 31, 2022. 4 5 20. The COVID-19 pandemic hit Los Angeles County especially hard, causing widespread disruptions in civic 6 life. As of March 15, 2022, roughly 2.82 million county residents had tested positive for COVID-19 and over 32,000 people had died of the disease. 5 The so-called “Delta variant” of the virus caused even more 7 devastation in the County, with daily infection rates reaching roughly 2,000 people and hospitalization rates 8 doubling in just two weeks in the month of July. 6 9 21. The Omicron variant was even worse. Starting at just 13 percent of new U.S. infections as of December 11, 10 2021, Omicron jumped to a staggering 73 percent of new U.S. infections as of December 20, 2021, only nine 11 days later! 7 Twice as transmissible as Delta and four times as transmissible as the original COVID-19 strain, Omicron was spreading in Los Angeles. 8 The subsequent BA.2 subvariant of Omicron was even more 12 transmissible and was poised to become the dominant form of Omicron. For tenants at risk of displacement, 13 the rise of Omicron meant an increased probability of contracting a potentially deadly disease. 9 14 III. 15 THE PARTIES 16 17 18 19 3 Los Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Executive Order for an Eviction Moratorium, (Sept. 1, 2020) http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/148443.pdf 20 4 Los Angeles Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Resolution Further Amending and Restating the County of Los Angeles COVID- 21 19 Tenant Protections Resolution (Jan. 25, 2022) https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/165606.pdf 5 Los Angeles Times Staff, Tracking the Coronavirus in Los Angeles County, L.A. Times (Mar. 15, 2022), 22 https://www.latimes.com/projects/california-coronavirus-cases-tracking-outbreak/los-angeles-county 23 6 County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health, COVID-Related Hospitalizations in Los Angeles County Have Nearly Doubled in Two Weeks; 1,966 New Confirmed Cases of COVID-19 and 4 New Deaths, (July 26, 2021), 24 http://www.publichealth.lacounty.gov/phcommon/public/media/mediapubhpdetail.cfm?prid=3261 25 7 Mike Stobbe, Omicron sweeps across nation, now 73% of US COVID-19 cases, AP News (Dec. 20, 2021) https://apnews.com/article/omicron-majority-us-cases-833001ef99862bd6ac17935f65c896cf 26 8 Alex Wigglesworth & Rong-Gong Lin II, Omicron variant likely to bring spike in COVID cases, hospitalizations, officials warn, L.A. Times (Dec. 19, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-12-19/omicron-variant- 27 expected-to-bring-major-spike-in-coronavirus-cases-hospitalizations-officials-warn 28 9 Carl Zimmer & Patrick Lyons, Is the BA.2 version of Omicron worse? Here’s what you need to know, The New York Times (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/americas/stealth-omicron-ba2-variant.html 9 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 22. Ryan Levihn-Coon (“Plaintiff”) is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a competent adult resident of the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, California. 2 3 23. Lena Giron (“Plaintiff”) is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a competent adult resident of the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, California. 4 5 24. Mr. Levihn-Coon and Ms. Giron are hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs”. 6 25. Scenic Expressions, Inc. is a California corporation registered in the State of California with its principal place 7 of business in Los Angeles County, California. 8 26. Hereinafter, Defendant Scenic Expressions, Inc. is referred to, at times, as “Scenic”. 9 27. Defendant Mark Andrew Larinto (hereinafter, “Mark”) is an individual who, at all times relevant to their 10 action, resided in the County of Los Angeles, California. Mark Larinto is an adult child of the founder and 11 incorporator of Scenic Expressions, Inc., Isadora Larinto. 12 28. Defendant Mark Andrew Larinto, at all times relevant to their action, was a competent adult conducting 13 business in Los Angeles County and upon information and belief is alleged to reside in Los Angeles, County at 28538 Curtis Alan Place, Santa Clarita, California, 91350 (APN: 2812-063-025) and 20334 Rue Crevier, 14 Unit 617, Santa Clarita, California, 91351 (APN: 2836-040-230). 15 29. Defendant Tyler Vincent Larinto (hereinafter, "Tyler") is, and at all relevant times was, a competent adult 16 conducting business in and around the Chevy Chase Property and residing in Los Angeles County, California. 17 30. Hereinafter, Mark and Tyler, are referred to, collectively, as the “Larinto Defendants”. 18 31. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the Larinto Defendants, and each of them, were 19 principals, managers and employees of Defendant Scenic Expressions, Inc. 20 32. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, on such basis, allege that all acts and omissions of each employee, 21 each associate, and each contractor of the Scenic and Larinto Defendants, including Does 1-100 as hereinafter 22 alleged were authorized or ratified by the owner(s) and/or managing agents of Scenic and Larinto Defendants. 23 33. At all relevant times, Defendants, and each of them, ratified each and every act or omission complained of 24 herein. At all relevant times, Defendants, and each of them, aided and abetted the acts and omissions of each 25 and all the other Defendants to proximately cause the damages as alleged herein. 26 34. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise of Defendants Does 1 27 through 100 are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs is informed and believes and thereon allege that each of the Defendants designated herein as a Doe defendant 28 is legally responsible in some manner for the acts, conduct, occurrences, events, happenings and damages 10 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 alleged in the Complaint giving rise to liability to Plaintiffs in the causes of action contained herein, and directly or proximately caused or contributed to the injuries and damages of the Plaintiffs as herein alleged. 2 3 35. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that each and all of the acts and omissions alleged herein were performed by, or are attributable to, Defendants each acting as the agent, employee, alter ego, joint-venturer, 4 and/or Co-Conspirator of, or working in concert with, each of the other Defendants and were acting within 5 the course and scope of such agency, employment, joint venture, conspiracy, or concerted activity with full 6 legal authority to act on the others' behalf. The acts of any and all Defendants represent and were in accordance with Defendants' official or de facto policies or plans under said agency, employment, alter-ego, joint-venture, 7 conspiracy, and/or concerted activity relationship(s). 8 36. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, and each of them, negligently hired, trained, and 9 supervised their employees and agents regarding the proper management and maintenance of the subject 10 businesses, properties, buildings (including, without limitation, all reasonable action required to properly 11 repair, remedy, and abate the alleged habitability, quiet enjoyment, and other tenancy violations within a reasonable period) and otherwise maintain the property in a safe and habitable condition at all relevant times. 12 13 37. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that each of said Defendants is in some manner fraudulently, maliciously, oppressively, intentionally, negligently, and/or otherwise responsible for the acts, omissions, 14 occurrences, and transactions alleged herein. 15 38. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and, based upon such information and belief, allege that, at all times herein 16 mentioned, Defendants, and each of them, were the agents, servants, employees, partners, and alter egos of 17 the remaining Defendants, that the acts complained of herein were done within the course and scope of said 18 agency, service, employment, and partnership, and that the acts by each Defendant was ratified, approved and adopted by each of the remaining Defendants. 19 20 39. On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants knew or should have known that they owed legal duties to Plaintiffs regarding the Residence Premises and Plaintiffs’ rights 21 to privacy and peace in Plaintiffs’ home, Plaintiffs’ personal rights and Plaintiffs’ property rights but 22 Defendants’ despicably, illegally, intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, oppressively, outrageously, 23 wrongfully, recklessly, and/or negligently violated and breached those duties in order to increase Defendants' profits to Plaintiffs’ injury and detriment. 24 25 40. The actions and/or any failure to act alleged in the Complaint were done by Defendants and/or agents and employees of Defendants, acting within the scope of their employment/agency, and with Defendants’ 26 permission and consent. 27 41. Unless otherwise specified, reference to Defendants shall refer to acts or omissions of Defendants by and 28 through its employees and agents. 11 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 The Co-Conspirators and The Defendants 2 42. The following individuals and entities are Co-Conspirators of Defendants and are, or will be, named parties in a separate civil action filed by Plaintiffs: 3 4 a. Gonzalez Towing and Transport is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a towing operation doing business in the City of Los Angeles with its principal place of business located in the City of Los 5 Angeles; 6 b. Employees, Managers, Agents and Owners of Gonzalez Towing and Transport are competent adults 7 living and working in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles, California; and 8 c. Gregory Toshio Doi, Jr. and their accomplices, Doi Accomplice Doe 1, and Filmmaker Accomplice 9 Doe 2, are competent adults living and working in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles, 10 California. 11 43. Gonzalez Towing and Transport Defendants operate their impound yard, towing operations and auto park out 12 of a parcel and property located in the City of Los Angeles, California. 13 44. Plaintiffs is informed and believes and, on that basis, allege that Gonzalez Towing and Transport and their 14 employees, managers, agents and owners, at all times relevant to their action, worked and operated tow trucks 15 and a towing operation in the City of Los Angeles, California as a rogue towing operation and rogue tow truck operators, unlicensed by the State of California to operate a tow truck in California pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code 16 § 2430.1 and § 12520, unpermitted to work in the City of Los Angeles as a tow truck driver, pursuant to Los 17 Angeles Police Commission (the “Commission”) Regulations and Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) § 18 103.204 and § 103.204.1 and, unlicensed by the State of California to operate a commercial vehicle or any motor vehicle, and unlicensed by the State of California to operate a tow truck pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 19 12520(a). 20 21 IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 22 45. As each Defendant’s principal place of business and/or residence is in the County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles 23 Superior Court is a proper venue for their matter. Further, the Court has personal authority over Defendants 24 on the grounds that Defendants conduct or transact business, reside in, or are employed within the State of California and thus have purposely availed themselves of the laws and privileges thereof. 25 46. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matters alleged herein, and the venue is proper because all 26 of the alleged acts and omissions occurred in and around the real property that is the subject matter of the 27 Complaint, located in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, including, without 28 limitation, Plaintiffs’ Residence Premises and its curtilage. 12 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 Plaintiffs’ Special Vulnerabilities and Defendants’ Special Duties 2 47. Plaintiffs are members of a protected class due to their disabilities, which substantially impair one or more of Plaintiffs’ major life activities. In addition, their condition also places them at higher risk for contracting and 3 developing complications from COVID. 4 48. Furthermore, as tenants-at-will of Defendants at all times relevant to their action, Defendants owed a special 5 duty of care to Plaintiffs. 6 49. The landlord-tenant relationship established between Plaintiffs and Defendant is recognized under California 7 law as a special relationship that imposes specific obligations on the landlord, including but not limited to, the 8 duty to provide a habitable living environment, maintain the premises in a safe condition, and conduct repairs 9 in a timely manner. 10 50. A multitude of California appellate decisions offer broad support for the special relationship and duties of care 11 owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs, and elucidate the extent and nature of the obligations imposed on landlords towards their tenants, including: 12 13 a. Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185: This case affirms that landlords owe a duty of care to their tenants and outlines the scope of their duty, including the maintenance of common areas and 14 the provision of adequate security measures. 15 b. Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108: Although primarily addressing the duty of care owed to 16 invitees, their landmark decision is foundational in understanding the broader principles of negligence 17 that apply to landlord-tenant relationships. 18 c. Hinson v. Delis (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 62: In this case, the court held that landlords have a duty to 19 inspect the premises before leasing to discover latent defects and thereafter to maintain the premises 20 by conducting necessary repairs and ensuring the property is safe for tenants. 21 d. Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903: This case expanded on the landlord's liability for 22 failing to provide safe premises, specifically in the context of criminal acts by third parties, highlighting the landlord's obligation to take reasonable security measures. 23 24 e. Werner v. Knoll (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 474: This case discusses the landlord's general duty of care to tenants, emphasizing the importance of maintaining safe and habitable premises. 25 f. Knight v. Hallsthammar (1981) 29 Cal.3d 46: Clarifies the scope of the implied warranty of habitability 26 and a landlord's duty to repair defects that exist at the inception of the tenancy. 27 28 13 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 g. Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493: Discusses a landlord's obligations under the implied warranty of habitability and the consequences of failing to address hazardous conditions on the 2 property. 3 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS The Residence Premises and Plaintiffs’ Arrival 5 51. On or about May 20, 2021, Plaintiffs drove their Casita, personal automobile, Utility Trailer and Cardinal 6 Trailer to the east side of Verdant Street, south of the intersection of Verdant Street and Chevy Chase Drive, 7 which is the certain west part of the Chevy Chase Property, as identified in Exhibit A of this Complaint, 8 including its curtilage, adjacent parking area, concrete foundation, structures, buildings, walls, utilities, cultivated grounds, landscaping, fixtures, appurtenances, amenities and space above and below the land, and 9 which are referred to hereinafter as the “Residence Premises”. Plaintiffs entered unobstructed onto the 10 Residence Premises by simply driving onto the unoccupied and unmaintained and overgrown land 11 immediately outside a wire fence located directly west of the Warehouse located to the east of Verdant Street. 12 52. The location of the Residence Premises can additionally be described as being bordered on the west by Verdant 13 Street and North Atwater Park (“Park”), on the south by 3949 East Verdant Street (APN: 5594016004), on the north by 3990 Chevy Chase Drive (APN# 5594016001), and along the east by the warehouse building of 14 the former Albert Van Luit Wallpaper Factory (the “Warehouse”). (See Maps Identifying Residence 15 Premises, Exhibit A) 16 53. Since on or about May 20th, 2021, Plaintiffs continuously resided on a part of the real property and parcel 17 located at 4000 Chevy Chase Drive, Los Angeles, California, 90039, such property recorded by the Los 18 Angeles County as Tax Assessor Parcel Number 5594015019 and/or Parcel APN# 5594-016-015 ("Chevy Chase Property"). 19 20 54. Plaintiffs lived, worked, and were at all times relevant to their action in actual, peaceable and exclusive possession of the Residence Premises. 21 22 55. At all relevant times, the Residence Premises and Chevy Chase Property were private real property as a matter of law. 23 24 Plaintiffs’ Improvements and Additions to Residence Premises 56. Plaintiffs continuously maintained all landscaping, structures and buildings on the Residence Premises and its 25 curtilage. Plaintiffs substantially improved the land through irrigation, cultivation and landscaping. Plaintiffs 26 were at all times responsible for the new construction on the Premises, including the erection of permanent 27 walls that fully enclosed the interior yard of the Residence Premises, as well as kitchen and dining facilities, guest room, dining and living areas and Plaintiffs’ workshop. Plaintiffs constructed the walled enclosure and 28 other construction, cultivation and landscaping of the Residence Premises in plain view of their neighbors, 14 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief 1 including the employees, managers and owners of Scenic, who on a regular, often daily basis, walked and/or drove along