Preview
FST-CV-08-5027106-S ) SUPERIOR COURT
)
DEUTSCHE BANK, ET AL. ) JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
Plain�ff, )
v. ) STAMFORD/NORWALK
PETER S. LUNDSTEDT )
Defendant. ) FEBRUARY 6, 2024
NOTICE OF EXHIBIT 46 PRESERVATION OF RECORD FOR APPEAL
Defendant hereby provides No�ce of Exhibit 46.
EXHIBIT 46 02/6/2024 Defendant View Exhibit EXHIBIT 46 POST JUDGMENT.
DEFENDANTS’ PRESERVATION OF RECORD FOR APPEAL IN CASE FST CV 5027106-S SHOWING FRAUD ON
THE COURT.
See: Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983 (Pa. 1986). Any misgivings creditors may have
about the technical nature of the requirements should be addressed to Congress or the Federal Reserve
Board, not the courts.
Disclosure requirements for credit sales are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 12 CFR § 226.8(b),
(c). Disclosure requirements for consumer loans are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1639 12 CFR § 226.8(b),
(d). A violator of the disclosure requirements is held to a standard of strict liability. Therefore, a plain�ff
need not show that the creditor in fact deceived him by making substandard disclosures. Since
Transworld Systems Inc. have not cancelled the security interest and return all monies paid by Ms.
Sherrie I. LaForce within the 20 days of receipt of the leter of rescission of October 7, 2009, the lenders
named above are responsible for actual and statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1640(a).Lewis v.
Dodge, 620 F.Supp. 135, 138 (D. Conn. 1985);
1
Non-Represented Pro se Li�gant Plain�ffs’ Rights to a Liberal Reading
As a non-represented li�gant Plain�ff-Appellant, I am en�tled to liberal reading and interpreta�on of my
pleadings; See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971), US Supreme Court; “Court errs if court dismisses
the non-represented li�gant without instruc�on of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair
pleadings.” Platsky v. C.I.A. 953 F.2d. 25., See: Chambers vs. Time Warner 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir.
2002). “The court must take all factual allega�ons in the complaint and its exhibits as true, and cons-rue
all reasonable inferences in the plain�ff’s favor.”
Plain�ff has read and affirms that this complaint is grounded in fact, to the best of Plain�ffs knowledge,
informa�on, belief; and that it is brought in Good Faith.
Respec�ully submited, February 6, 2023
________s________
Peter Lundstedt, Non-Represented Defendant
812 Stonington Road
Stonington, CT 06378
203-733-0311
plundstedt@gmail.com
Cc ZEK
2
PLAINTIFF APPELLANTS RECORD PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
IN CASE FST CV22 5027106 S LUNDSTEDT PETER v DEUTSCHE BANK
FOR NEXT DOCKET NUMBER SEARCH CONVENIENCE A “+” SYMBOL
IS INCLUDED NEXT TO EACH DOCKET DATE
SEARCH FOR NEXT DOCKET NUMBER BY TYPING THE + SYMBOL INTO FIND
Entry No File Date Filed By Description
07/20/2022+ P
SUMMONS
1
07/20/2022+ P
COMPLAINT
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
RETURN DATE:
PETER S. LUNDSTEDT,
NON-REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF,
V.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
CO. AS TRUSTEE FOR LONG BEACH
MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, 2006-10,
DB USA CORPORATION, DEUTSCHE
BANK ET AL.,
REPRESENTED DEFENDANT.
COMPLAINT
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
1
: SUPERIOR COURT
: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
: NEW LONDON
: JUNE 24, 2022
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
PREAMBLE
Plaintiff Peter S. Lundstedt ("Plaintiff Lundstedt" or "Plaintiff') sues Defendant Deutsche
Bank National Trust Co., As Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-10, its US
intermediate holding company, DB USA Corporation, and Deutsche Bank et al. ("DB," "DB
et al.," or the "Bank").
HISTORY
1.
Conclusion of Fact: WaMu ("Mariners Capital" with WaMu's permission, or "WaMu")
issued a defective Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract to Plaintiff in a 9-25-
2006 transaction with procedural and suitability errors. 1
WaMu, foreseeing total collapse, assigned the original 9-25-2006 defective Note and
Security Instrument to DB while it was in default. They canceled that Contract/Note and
replaced it with their own materially modifi~d DB issued Contract/Note. But that modified
DB Contract/ Note was also defective by increasing Plaintiffs' monthly mortgage payment
from $10,352 to $10,622 when Plaintiff could only pay a third of that at most. Instead of
correcting Plaintiffs' first WaMu issued defective Contract/Note, DB just increased it with
their modified Contract/Note that added an anti-liability clause, see EXHIBIT 8, Clause 14
and that caused the DB modified Contract/Note to become a Contract/Note in Adhesion.
1 If the materially modified Note and Security Instrument Issued by Deutsche Bank in 2008 was part of the
2006 original Note, then Deutsche Bank failed to show the court that document. See Nazareth. Furthermore:
"A promissory note and a mortgage deed are deemed parts of the same transaction and must be construed
together as such." Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. John Fitch Court Associates Ltd.
Partnership. 713 719 A.2d 900, 49 Conn. App. 142, certificate denied 719 A.2d 901, 247 Conn. 908.
2
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
2.
Conclusion of Fact: Initially, the 9-25-2006 WaMu issued Note and Security Instrument
was created by the Long Beach Securities Corp. as the Depositor. Long Beach Mortgage
Company was the Seller and Master Servicer. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,
Trustee of the Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 that held the Plaintiffs' original
WaMu issued 9-25-2006 Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract mortgage loan
document that served as collateral for certificates issued by the Trust. Those certificates
paid principal and interest to certificate holders on funds generated by the mortgages. 2
3.
Conclusion of Fact: The certificate holders did not know that their security instrument,
represented by the 9-25-2006 WaMu issued Contract/Note, was canceled and
unenforceable. Nor did they know that a newer defective 5-1-2008 modified Contract/Note
prepared by WaMu and issued by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for
Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10, existed with dramatically different Terms and
Provisions that prejudiced the Plaintiff and the public and was the new controlling
Contract/Note that was not disclosed to the Plaintiff in their improperly served 12-18-2008
complaint , the court, or the Town Land Recordings as required by law to notice the public.
2 See: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 SEC CIK #0001379746 SEC report> See: Long Beach
Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 - RMBS - Residential Mortgage Backed Security - Deal Page (Last Activity: 28
April 2022 03: 15:37}. Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 is incorporated in the state of Delaware. Long
Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 is primarily in the business of asset-backed securities. For financial
reporting, their fiscal year ends on December 31st. This page includes all SEC registration details as well as a
list of all documents (S-1, Prospectus, Current Reports, 8-K, 10K, Annual Reports) filed by Long Beach
2
Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10. Company Details. Reporting File Number 333-131252-08, State of Incorporation
Delaware, Fiscal Year End 12-31Date of Edgar Filing Update 2006-12-29 SIC 6189 [Asset- Backed
Securities] Business Address 1400 South Douglass Road Suite 100 Anaheim CA 92806, Phone 714-939-5200.
3
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
But Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. As Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust,
2006-10, DB et al., and its local and national attorneys did know.
4.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. improperly and purposely misrepresented that the
previously canceled 9-25-2006 WaMu Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract
(WaMu issued transaction Contract/Note 1 ") was enforceable and valid when DB withheld
and did not disclose their later issued Contract/Note that controlled the relationship
between the parties.
5.
Conclusion of Fact: DB concealed and did not disclose their own defective controlling
materially modified 5-1-2008 DB Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract (DB
issued Contract/Note transaction No. 2") that exposed DB to liability causing a fifteen-year
delay, the duration of which severely injured Plaintiff. This court has the authority to review
the alleged wrongful judgment at Dkt. No. 147.55 in FST-CV-08-5009697-S. See: "The
interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding its
making." Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545, 125 Conn. App. 441, cert. denied 12 A.3d 572,
300 Conn. 904.
4
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
1.
This is an action for money damages more than $15,000.
2.
At all times material to this lawsuit, Plaintiff was a resident of Connecticut.
3.
At all times material to this lawsuit, Defendant has offices in Connecticut.
4.
All acts necessary or precedent to the bringing of this lawsuit occurred or accrued in
Connecticut.. Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to establish that the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and over the person of the Defendant where Plaintiff is a
resident in Stonington, CT 06378. Defendant has offices, does business in Connecticut.
5.
Plaintiff and the court have jurisdiction under 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345. (Formerly
Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process. (d) Actions involving
consumer transactions. In all actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be
made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... " 3
3 Plaintiff resides at 812 Stonington Road, No. 113, Stonington, Connecticut 06378 and has since April 1, 2020.
The New London Court in a previous filing erred by allowing the case to be transferred over one hundred miles
from Plaintiffs' residence in what appears to the public as a means of discouraging Plaintive from seeking justice
possibly to protect the bank thereby potentially practicing law from behind the bench.
5
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
6.
This Court has jurisdiction.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF FACT
1.
Conclusion of Fact: That the Plaintiff is an adult citizen of Connecticut, and that DB et al.
are licensed by Connecticut to conduct business in Connecticut.
. 2.
Conclusion of Fact: That Plaintiff unknowingly entered an alleged fraudulently originated
loan Contract, it being created then serviced by WAMU who then placed said loan into their
own allegedly fraudulently created SEC regulated security instrument purchased by global
ERISA pension plans and others.
3.
Conclusion of Fact: That DB et al. made a loan to Plaintiff that was allegedly fraudulent
and harassed Plaintiff using injurious and harmful sadistic practices for over five years to
collect on their allegedly and fraudulently created debt, without knowing their client.
4.
Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff had the right to enter into a legally constructed business
agreement free of fraud and a right not to be sent misrepresenting statements and
contacted hundreds of times misrepresenting by asking the same questions on canceled
loan documents stating it was a fact that the canceled loan documents were valid.
6
,.
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
3
5.
Conclusion of Fact: That Plaintiff has been, and is still being, harmed and injured by DB
et al. from DB et al.'s continuing course of conduct to include still not correcting the court
file to reflect the only valid Contract that they issued Plaintiff Lundstedt on 5-1-2008,
including under the theory of the totality of circumstances of all of DB et al.'s actions.
6.
Conclusion of Fact: Because Deutsche Bank broke the law and has refused to disclose or
file the DB et al. Issued Note in Connecticut Superior Court for fifteen years, Plaintiff
Lundstedt motions the court to dismiss the improvident judgment of 9-16-2013 as to
liability. "The interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the circumstances
surrounding its making.'' Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545, 125 Conn. App. 441, cert. denied
12 A.3d 572, 300 Conn. 904.233. Plaintiff is entitled to, and claims title to, relief from
injuries suffered under Conn., U.S. and/or private law.
7.
Conclusion of Fact:. Plaintiff Lundstedt went from running his sole proprietorship equity
portfolio management for a fee only service business and the hope of a reasonable social
life to a world totally dominated by DB et al.'s wrongful foreclosure and wrongful collecting
because they controlled nearly 100% of his net worth, which Deutsche Bank knew before
they Issued their new, not sued on, concealed materially modified 5-1-2008 Contract/Note.
7
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
8.
Conclusion of Fact: Before creating the new materially modified Contract/Note, Deutsche
Bank had duty by law to establish suitability before issuing the new materially modified 5-1-
2008 Contract/Note. This gave DB et al. the duty and foreseeability after Plaintiff Lundstedt
repeatedly demanded they cease and desist their wrongful servicing because it was
injuring him after he realized what they were doing.
9.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. engaged Plaintiff Lundstedt in wrongful pursuit of trying to
enforce an unenforceable canceled WaMu Issued Contract/Note that Deutsche Bank
canceled in order to add a new clause in their materially modified Deutsche Bank Issued
Contract/Note. Even so, Deutsche Bank decided to continue to try to enforce the canceled
original WaMu Issued Contract/Note without telling the court, Plaintiff Lundstedt, the Town
Land Records, or the Investment Trust.
10.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. did not sue on their newer Issued Contract/Note because it
was found to be violative, Prohibited, and defective, so they intentionally just hid it from the
court and the public. DB et al.'s legal department intentionally and improperly used the
canceled WaMu Issued canceled Contract/Note to enforce their ownership interest in
Plaintiffs' entire residence valued at $560,000, but which WaMu valued at $1.4 million.
8
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
11.
Conciusion of Fact: The problem with that is that no one is allowed to sue anyone by
using a discharged terminated Contract/Note Terms and Provisions, at least without telling
the court that a newer Contract/Note existed, especially in their possession.
12.
Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank was the Trustee for the canceled WaMu Issued
canceled Contract/Note AND Trustee of the materially modified Deutsche Bank Issued
Contract/Note that they are still concealing from the court.
13.
Conclusion of Fact: Because DB et al. knowingly wrongly sued Plaintiff Lundstedt on the
canceled WaMu Issued Contract/Note, which makes the court's 9-16-2013 judgment of
strict foreclosure against the canceled WaMu Issued Contract/ Note null and void ab inito,
as if it never existed, because the Contract/Note they sued on was already void. 4
4
~: "Mortgage cannot survive the extinction of debt." Franklin Credit Management Corp. v. Nicholas,
812 A.2d 51, 73 Conn. App. 830, cert. denied 815 A.2d 136,262 Conn. 937 2002. Amresco New England II,
L.P; v. Colossale, 77 4 A.2d 10183, 63 Conn. App. 49.
9
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
14.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. lacked subject matter jurisdiction AND the court lacked
Jurisdiction over the parties because Deutsche Bank was literally suing on nothing. All the
while Deutsche Bank was concealing and suppressing the Deutsche Bank Issued
Contract/Note that was the only document that proved the Terms and Provisions that were
enforceable for the court to consider. But here, there was nothing to consider because the
legal documents submitted to the court were without substance or anything legally
enforceable for the court to enforce.
15.
Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank et al. stacked the deck against the non-represented
4
litigant, Peter S. Lundstedt, ("Plaintiff Lundstedt"), even before their defective complaint
was filed, by suppressing, concealing, and omitting the core document of the entire case,
the materially modified 5-1-2008 Deutsche Bank issued Note and Security Instrument,
("Contract/Note"), that contained the controlling Terms and Provisions between the parties.
16.
Conclusion of Fact: DB intentionally did not sue Plaintiff on a Contract/Note that contained
controlling Terms or Provisions, they conspired to conceal it.
17.
Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank lacked prima facie evidence in their complaint of 12-
18-2008 and their trial of 9-16-2013.
10
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
Rule: "ln·order to establish a prima facie case in a mortgage foreclosure action, the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note
and mortgage, that the defendant mortgager has defaulted on the note and that any
conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note, have been satisfied."
GMAC Mortg. v. Ford. 73 A.3d 742, 144 Conn.App. 165, appeal after remand 175
A.3d 582, 175 Conn.App. 287.
18.
Conclusion of Fact: Here, DB et al. knew exactly what they were doing when they omitted
their issued Contract/Note and concealed it from evidence. This was fraud upon the court.
DB et al.'s Affidavit did not mention the Loan Modification, nor was a copy of the Loan
Modification attached. Here, "Substantive misconduct is and should be subject to less
tolerance before dismissal with prejudice is warranted. "Lying about facts central to the
case, ... simply cannot be tolerated and, frequently, cannot be remedied by any lesser
sanction than dismissal with prejudice." Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 82-83 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1996). See:. "The interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the [totality
of] circumstances surrounding its making." Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545,125 Conn.App.
441, cert. denied 12 A.3d 572, 300 Conn.904. Because of that, I respectfully demand that
the court open and dismiss or erase the 9-16-2013 judgment in FST-CV-08-5009697-S and
take the appropriate action without further delay, and if not, provide an intelligent reason
why you cannot apply the above Rule to this case. See: Wells Fargo Bank. N.A.. Trustee
v. Michael John Melahn Et Al. (AC 34726). Gruendel, Bear and Flynn, Js. Argued
November 12, 2013-officially released February 4, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court,
judicial district of Danbury, Pavia, J.) in EXHIBIT F.
11
I,
.•t
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
19.
Conclusion of Fact: On 4 December 2008, Deutsche Bank or its US intermediate holding
company, or DB USA Corporation, ordered their national counsel, Deutsche Bank, 60 Wall
Street, New York, NY 10005, local counsel, Hunt Liebert, Halloran, and Sage, ZEK.
20.
Conclusion of Fact: Zeichner Ellman & Krause LLP and their Connecticut attorney No.
"408783" were the architects of the grand deception and conspired with Deutsche Bank's
national counsel at 60 Wall Street, New York, NY 10005, and servicers WaMu, then Chase,
and then SPS, Inc., ("DB et al."), to intentionally file illegal foreclosure papers that
misrepresented the facts, with no Contract/Note or valid Terms or Provisions attached (so
that the court and the non-represented Plaintiff Lundstedt would not be able to compare the
two, and to avoid serving and filing false information), in order to wrongfully foreclose on
Plaintiff in the State of Connecticut so as avoid liability for their own 5-1-2008 DB issued
Contract/Note from transaction No. 2 and to create delay that seriously injured Plaintiff. 5
5 See Liberal Virginia Prosecutor Removed from Criminal Case for 'Deliberately Misleading Court' By Katabella
Roberts June 17, 2022, Updated: June 17, 2022. " ... The judge said the representation made by the
Commonwealth was an "overt misrepresentation by omission" and described the filings as "misleading .
representations and entirely inaccurate." The actions "reflect an inability of the Loudoun County ••
Commonwealth's Attorney's Office to properly prosecute this case with the detail and attention required of a
criminal prosecutor and consistent with the professional standards and obligations of a prosecutor,"
Plowman wrote. Plowman then ordered Biberaj be removed and disqualified from further prosecution on
the matter." [Here, Plaintiff Lundstedt motions the court to dismiss DB's counsel and their firms from this case.]
12
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
21.
Conclusion of Fact: Because DB et al., with forethought, deceived Plaintiff Lundstedt, the
court, and the Town Land Records, (i.e., the Public), and because Plaintiff Lundstedt relied
on DB et al. to, not only issue him a suitable DB et al. Issued Note and Security Instrument
that was intended to modify the defective and illegal WaMu Issued Note assigned to them,
and because the court relied on DB et al. to be procedurally correct in filing a proper
foreclosure complaint with all documents attached, and because the Town of Greenwich,
CT relied on DB et al. to record all changes to the Note and Security Instrument and
5
mortgage in the record as well as relying on DB et al. to properly Certify their Foreclosure
on the DB et al. Issued Note, rather than just the canceled and voided WaMu issued Note,
DB et al. should be held liable for knowingly concealing and omitting required disclosable
proof of Note and Security Instrument ownership, since the WaMu Issued Note was
extinguished and unenforceable. DB et al. did not properly serve its 12-18-2008 complaint
with required attachments on Plaintiff Lundstedt who now motions the court to dismiss the
FST-CV-08-5009697-S judgment of strict foreclosure with prejudice. Because of that, I
respectfully demand that the court open and dismiss or erase the 9-16-2013 judgment in
FST-CV-08-5009697-S and take the appropriate action without further delay, and if not,
provide an intelligent reason why you cannot apply the above Rule to this case. See also:
Wells Fargo Bank. N.A.. Trustee v. Michael John Melahn Et Al. (AC 34726). Gruendel,
Bearand Flynn, Js. Argued November 12, 2013-officially released February 4, 2014
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Pavia, J.) in EXHIBIT F.
13
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
22.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. knowingly filed a false Foreclosure Certification that
excluded the omitted and concealed Deutsche Bank Issued materially modified
Contract/Note because it was because it had illegal adhesion Terms and Provisions such
as increasing Plaintiff Lundstedts' monthly payment to which he could not pay, just to put in
Clause No. 14 in the new Contract/Note, EXHIBIT A, which was neither filed nor disclosed
with the court, that tried to "adhesion-ly," if you will, eliminate all of their liability from the
original WaMu Issued Contract/Note, and from wrongfully collecting and suing.
23.
Conclusion of Fact: Because of the unreasonable duration of delay, Plaintiff was severely
injured and his ability to effectively generate an income and live a lifestyle that he was
acclimated to for over 20 years was damaged beyond repair. There is no way he will ever
be able to recover to where he would have been had DB not prejudiced him and delayed
his professional and personal life for fifteen years, opportunities lost, including
discrimination and prejudicial interference against his interstate commerce clause rights.
24.
Conclusion of Fact: This case involves consumer transactions where the consumer,
Plaintiff Lundstedt, resides in New London County. The New London Superior Court of
Connecticut cannot transfer this case to Stamford. The New London Superior Court caused
injury to Plaintiff Lundstedt by violating the following Rule: 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345.
(Formerly Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process. (d) Actions involving
consumer transactions. In all actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be
14
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... ," by making Plaintiff
travel over two hundred miles round trip when they transferred the case to another district.
See: "Interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding
its making." Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545, 125 Conn. App. 441, cert. denied 12 A.3d 572,
300 Conn. 904. Plaintiff Demands a Jury Trial and Motions for Equitable Relief by Jury. 6
25.
Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff Lundstedt choses trial to be in New London Superior Court
Judicial District. "All actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be made
returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides" Under CGS SEC 51-345. 7
26.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. broke the law by refusing to disclose and file their own
newer 5-1-2008 Deutsche Bank Issued Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract
in Superior Court and the Greenwich, CT Town Land Records for fifteen years. I demand
that the court take the appropriate action without further delay, and if not, provide an
intelligent reason the court cannot apply the above Rule to this case.
6 CGS Sec. 52-218. Jury may try issues of fact in equitable action. Upon the application of either party, the
court may order any issue or issues of fact in any action demanding equitable relief to be tried by a jury of six.
(1949 Rev., S. 7937; 1953, S. 3179d; 1971, P.A. 40, S. 6).
7 This case cannot be transferred one hundred miles away at Stamford unless Plaintiff Lundstedt waives his
right. Here, Plaintiff Lundstedt has resided at 812 Stonington Road, Stonington, CT 06378 since 3-3-2020, over
two years, and is registered to vote in the Town of Stonington, CT.] See: 2005 Connecticut Code - Sec. 51-
345. (Formerly Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process. l.dJ Actions involving
"consumer transactions. In all actions involving consumer transactions. civil process shall be made
returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... "
15
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
27.
Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff Lundstedt alleges, inter alta, that the errors committed by DB
and WaMu together in overseeing his loan modification documents were errors relating to
servicing of a mortgage loan, and, consequently, were subject to the provisions of RESPA
and Regulation X. DB ignored Plaintiffs' request for RESPA accountability before the
foreclosure. See:
6
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Opinions. Naimoli v. Ocwen Loan
·Servicing, LLC Docket: 20-1683, Opinion Date: January 7, 2022, Judge: B.D. Parker,
Areas of Law: Banking, Consumer Law. "The Second Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA), alleging that Ocwen's failure to record her mortgage instruments and its
actions in losing key mortgage documents constituted covered errors under the catchall
provision of Regulation X (RESPA's implementing regulation). In this case,
plaintiff alleged that the errors committed by Ocwen in handling her loan
modification documents were errors relating to servicing of a mortgage loan,
and, consequently, were subject to the provisions of RESPA and Regulation X.
The court concluded that plaintiffs' asserted errors are covered by the catch-all
provision of Regulation X, which includes the terms "any other errors". and "relating
• to." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings."
28.
Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff claims here that DB et al. violated Regulation X and this
injured and damaged the Plaintiff. Plaintiff Lundstedt motions the court to dismiss or erase
the null judgment at Dkt. No. 147.55 as t.o liability in case FST-CV-08-5009697-S.
16
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
29.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al., including loan servicers, permanently shut Plaintiff
Lundstedt down after 2008 for fifteen years because he could not get back what he lost in
his business and health. Here, "the circumstances" include the theory of the Totality of
Circumstances of all of DB et al.'s behavior to include the fifteen-year totality of all of DB et
al.'s thousands of individual inflictions of emotional, physical, and financial distress events
and microaggression intrusions inflicted upon Plaintiff. It held him down by big corporations.
30.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. refused to cease and desist wrongful foreclosure and
wrongful collection on the invalid Contract and misrepresenting and sending false account
statements after his repeated cease and desist demands, which caused an unreasonable
duration of delay. Neither Contract/Note contained a no-damages-for-delay clause. The
duration of this delay caused Plaintiff Lundstedt to slowly withdraw from society after 2008
for years as shown where his credit score declined to the number four. The totality of
circumstances combined prevented Plaintiff Lundstedt from effectively defending himself
against DB et al.'s wrongful servicing and wrongful foreclosure over his repeated
objections, violating his civil rights and preventing other meaningful pursuits for 15 years, a
duration that no ordinary consumer could bear.
31.
Conclusion of Fact: Because of that, I respectfully demand that the court take the
appropriate action without further delay, and if not, provide an intelligent reason why you
cannot apply the above Rule to this case. DB et al.'s pattern of concealing, suppressing,
17
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
and omitting core loan documents, while wrongfully foreclosing, wrongful servicing, and a
pattern of disrespect for the court, the consumer, for the Plaintiff, the court, the consumer,
and the public, caused injury to Plaintiff Lundstedt and the integrity of the judicial system by
ignoring and or violating the following - Rule: Motion to Dismiss for invalid complaint
service and Memorandum of Law. 8
8 CT Gen Stat§ 49-17 (2013) - "When any mortgage is foreclosed by the person entitled to receive the money
secured thereby, but to whom the legal title to the mortgaged premises has never been conveyed, the title to
such premises shall vest in him ... provided the person so foreclosing shall forthwith cause the decree of
foreclosure, to be recorded in the land records in the town in which the land lies. (1949 Rev., S. 7198.)"
"The lesson to be learned from Nazareth should be clear: Plaintiffs' counsel about to initiate a foreclosure
should be doubly careful that the status of the loan documentation be in order." ... "Any omission in both of
these regards, especially after Nazareth, is an open invitation to the Defendant to raise valid defenses
to the action." Fleet Nat'/ Bank v. Nazareth, 75 Conn. App. 791 (2003).See: CT PB 23-18. See: "Creditors
counsel would be wise to review the decision of the U. S. Bankr. Judge Rosenthal of Mass. in Nosek v.
Ameriquest, 386 RR 374 (Bankr. Mass. 2007). The court issued a show cause order to have national and local
counsel for Ameriquest explain why they had asserted in various pleadings that Ameriquest was the holder of
the Note the court imposed a $750,000 sanction against lenders and their counsel." [Here, why has this court
not addressed Deutsche Bank et al. 's concealment and omissions in this case but not in others? Plaintiff
Lundstedt has suffered prejudice and Motions to Dismiss the judgment. See also: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Trustee v. Michael John Melahn Et Al. (AC 34726). Gruendel, Bear and Flynn, Js. Argued November 12,
2013-officially released February 4, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Pavia, J.)
in EXHIBIT F.]
18
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
32.
Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank did not disclose the problem documents of their
issued modified Note that replaced WaMu's Note which is insufficient to grant it standing
and the foreclosure judgment must be dismissed. 9
7
9 Article Ill of the Constitution restricts the power of the federal courts to hear only "cases" and "controversies."
The "case" or "controversy" limitation on the federal judicial power is expressed via the standing doctrine, which
requires a plaintiff to have a personal stake in a case. The standing doctrine requires every plaintiff to show
that: i) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; ii) the
plaintiff's injury was likely caused by the defendant; and iii) the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-531 (1992).
19
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
CAUSES OF ACTION
1.
COUNT ONE
WRONGFUL SERVICE OF FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual
allegations and Conclusions of Fact.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. agreed that the original 9-25-2006 WaMu issued Note and
Security Instrument Installment Contract ("Contract/Note" or "Contract" or "Note") was
defective. See EXHIBIT B, Clauses 14 and 6. DB replaced it with their own modified Note
but failed to disclose that Contract with four corners to the court and never noticed Plaintiff
that they intended to Not sue on the controlling Contract/Note. See Memorandum of Law.
2.
COUNT TWO
INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION
Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual
allegations and Conclusions of Fact.
Conclusions of Fact: (1.) A false representation was made by DB et al. as a statement of
fact when DB et al. falsely represented as a statement of fact that the Note sued upon was
a valid Contract when in fact it had been canceled and replaced BY DB seven months prior
to the wrongful service of their 12-18-2008 complaint.
Conclusions of Fact: (2) DB's representation was untrue and known to be untrue by DB et
al. making it.
20
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
Conclusions of Fact: (3) DB's misrepresentation was made to induce the Plaintiff, the
court, and the Town Hall Land Records to act upon it, rather than getting fined. That was
thei.r gamble.
Conclusions of Fact: (4) "The other party did so act upon the false representation to his
injury." Plaintiff was unaware of the deception. Otherwise, he would have complained. The
duration of the delay caused Plaintiff injury and damage. Furthermore, the court acted on
the falsely served complaint information and issued an invalid judgment of strict foreclosure
on the already canceled original Contract to the detriment of the Plaintiff and the Public.
Rule: "Intentional misrepresentation is synonymous with fraudulent misrepresentation."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heller v. LaPorte & Associates, Superior Court,
judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket CV-02-0079784-S (November 10, 2003,
Scholl, J.). See Memorandum of Law
3.
COUNT THREE
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual
allegations and Conclusions of Fact.
"Negligent Misrepresentation by Nondisclosure - "[Our Supreme Court] has long .
recognized liabjlity for negligent misrepresentation. The governing principles [of negligent
misrepresentation] are set forth in similar terms in §552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1977): as "One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment.
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is·
21
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - SE:!c. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information. As a result, [the court has] held that even an innocent
misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing,
ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth." (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 143-44, 2 A.3d 859
(2010). See Memorandum of Law.
4.
COUNT FOUR
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
AND CUTPA
Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual
allega_tions and Conclusions of Fact.
Conclusion of Fact: DB et al.'s practice of lying to the Plaintiff and the court was unlawful,
offends public policy, immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous. DB issued Plaintiff a
8
materially modified Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract on 5-1-2008. DB had
a duty to provide a product that was suitable and legal to the Plaintiff. DB et al. breached
their fiduciary duty. DB could also foresee damages to Plaintiff because they admitted it in
their own Contract/Note that they issued Plaintiff. See EXHIBIT B, Clause 14.
See.Memorandum of Law.
22
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
OBJECTION
Objection. This case cannot be transferred. 10 See RULE: § 52-259b (c) - "Waiver of fees
and payment of the cost of service of process for indigent party. (c) Nothing in this section
shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the
criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the
cost of service of process. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or
..
the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the
applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.
Here, in a previous filing, Judge Young disregarded the equity that 52-259 ( c) available to
Plaintiff above. c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a
person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) ... That means that even
though Plaintiffs' income is over 125% of the poverty line, the court can still grant fee
waiver. That is what Judge Calmar did properly.
10 By objecting: "If the judge does not do what is right (and your objection is correct) you will have created an
entry in the court record for an appellate court to review. Why must you object? To stop a mistake (or trick) of
your opponent. To stop a mistake (or intentional error) of the judge. To give the judge an opportunity to do
what is right. To create a record for appeal if the judge does wrong. It is not the mistakes or tricks of your
opponent that can be appealed. You give the judge an opportunity to do what is right by making an objection.
Then, if the judge makes errors harmful to your case, you have created a record for the appellate court to review
- and the judge has no excuse! Whose rules do we go by? Rules of Evidence. Rules of Procedure. Plaintiff
objects to give the judge an opportunity to correct the violation. If the violation is by someone else, the
judge will be without excuse on appeal if he does not do what is right and put a stop to the violation. If the
violation is by the judge himself, he will again be without excuse on appeal if he does not correct himself at
once and enforce the rules for everyone involved. Get that? Plaintiff makes an objection! If the court refuses to
rule on your objection (neither sustaining or overruling) you object again and move the _court to rule on your
objection ... and if the judge still refuses to rule object once again for good measure so there is no doubt for the
appellate tribunal that you gave the judge every possible opportunity to do "what's right". You object to put the
judge on notice you are preparing for appeal. Make a record of every harmful judicial error. Show the appellate
tribunal how the judge abused the essential requirements of justice. When the judge sees you making your
record for appeal and realizes the appellate tribunal will see how he is ignoring his duty, he will back off and
start favoring you, instead of your opponent."
23
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County
determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere.
Furthermore, Plaintiff objects to one judge high jacking Plaintiffs case when the court is
supposed alternate judges, or at least chosen randomly. Here, Judge Young was not a
disinterested party. Plaintiff Lundstedt is entitled to the experience of the full court, not just
Judge Young who covets this case.
NATURE OF ACTION 11
11 Non-Represented Litigant Plaintiffs' Right to A Liberal Reading. Conclusion of Fact: I am Plaintiff
Lundstedt. As a non-represented litigant Plaintiff, I am entitled to liberal reading and interpretation of my
pleadings; See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971), US Supreme Court, that: "non-represented litigant
pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys, "however in-artfully
pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt' that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Estelle, Corrections Director. Et Al. V. Gamble 29 U.S.
97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Platsky v. C.I.A. 953 F.2d. 25, that - "court errs if court dismisses
the pro se litigant without instruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings." The instant
New London Court has waived Plaintiff Lundstedts' court and service fees. See: Motion for Waiver Result:
Granted 11/16/2021 Hon Harry Calmar. On 11-16-2021, Hon. Harry Calmar Granted Plaintiffs' Motion for
Waiver of fees. Judge Young then improperly transferred the case 100 miles away and violated Sec. 51-345,
when Plaintiff could not afford the transfer, he had to withdraw his case and resubmitted it in New London, again
with a Motion for Waiver of Fee's. But here, a random judge was not afforded to Plaintiff on his next filing.
Instead, JD Young denied Plaintiff Lundstedts' motion for fee waiver, even though he erred by transferring it to
another district. Argument: Having already declared Plaintiff Lundstedt indigent, how can the court justify
making Plaintiff Lundstedt, a 70% disabled US Veteran with three back fractures, with severe sciatica from L4
and LS stenosis and a painful right shoulder that must be totally replaced, afford traveling to and from and
housing expenses 100 miles away for each hearing and each day in trial and each visit to the clerk's office?
That would be impossible to pay. Plaintiff Lundstedt lacks the income for service and court fee for this complaint
and motions the court to waive these fees, and certainly cannot prosecute his case from two hundred miles
away (back and forth) and has lived in the New London District for over two years at 812 Stonington Road,
Stonington, CT 06378. The New London Court cannot guarantee that the Stamford Court will not require Plaintiff
Lundstedts' physical appearance in Stamford as COVID recedes. Furthermore, Plaintiff Lundstedt would be
further prejudiced due to his service-related disabilities that include extremely painful L4 and LS fractured
vertebra spinal stenosis and requiring a right total shoulder replacement. Transferring the case to Stamford
9
New London would also violate Plaintiff Lundstedts' ADA rights], see: See VA Diagnosis in EXHIBIT E. See
RULE: § 52-259b. - Waiver of fees and payment of the cost of service of process for indigent party. (c) Nothing
in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria
of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process. If
an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court
clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application." Plaintiff Lundstedt
Motions for Hearing if denied his objection to transferring the case to another district. See: 2005
Connecticut Code - Sec. 51-345. (Formerly Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process.
(d) Actions involving "consumer transactions." In all actions involving consumer transactions. civil
process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... "
24
Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in
Preview
FST-CV-08-5027106-S ) SUPERIOR COURT ) DEUTSCHE BANK, ET AL. ) JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF Plain�ff, ) v. ) STAMFORD/NORWALK PETER S. LUNDSTEDT ) Defendant. ) FEBRUARY 6, 2024 NOTICE OF EXHIBIT 46 PRESERVATION OF RECORD FOR APPEAL Defendant hereby provides No�ce of Exhibit 46. EXHIBIT 46 02/6/2024 Defendant View Exhibit EXHIBIT 46 POST JUDGMENT. DEFENDANTS’ PRESERVATION OF RECORD FOR APPEAL IN CASE FST CV 5027106-S SHOWING FRAUD ON THE COURT. See: Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983 (Pa. 1986). Any misgivings creditors may have about the technical nature of the requirements should be addressed to Congress or the Federal Reserve Board, not the courts. Disclosure requirements for credit sales are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (c). Disclosure requirements for consumer loans are governed by 15 U.S.C.S. § 1639 12 CFR § 226.8(b), (d). A violator of the disclosure requirements is held to a standard of strict liability. Therefore, a plain�ff need not show that the creditor in fact deceived him by making substandard disclosures. Since Transworld Systems Inc. have not cancelled the security interest and return all monies paid by Ms. Sherrie I. LaForce within the 20 days of receipt of the leter of rescission of October 7, 2009, the lenders named above are responsible for actual and statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1640(a).Lewis v. Dodge, 620 F.Supp. 135, 138 (D. Conn. 1985); 1 Non-Represented Pro se Li�gant Plain�ffs’ Rights to a Liberal Reading As a non-represented li�gant Plain�ff-Appellant, I am en�tled to liberal reading and interpreta�on of my pleadings; See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971), US Supreme Court; “Court errs if court dismisses the non-represented li�gant without instruc�on of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings.” Platsky v. C.I.A. 953 F.2d. 25., See: Chambers vs. Time Warner 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002). “The court must take all factual allega�ons in the complaint and its exhibits as true, and cons-rue all reasonable inferences in the plain�ff’s favor.” Plain�ff has read and affirms that this complaint is grounded in fact, to the best of Plain�ffs knowledge, informa�on, belief; and that it is brought in Good Faith. Respec�ully submited, February 6, 2023 ________s________ Peter Lundstedt, Non-Represented Defendant 812 Stonington Road Stonington, CT 06378 203-733-0311 plundstedt@gmail.com Cc ZEK 2 PLAINTIFF APPELLANTS RECORD PRESERVED FOR APPEAL IN CASE FST CV22 5027106 S LUNDSTEDT PETER v DEUTSCHE BANK FOR NEXT DOCKET NUMBER SEARCH CONVENIENCE A “+” SYMBOL IS INCLUDED NEXT TO EACH DOCKET DATE SEARCH FOR NEXT DOCKET NUMBER BY TYPING THE + SYMBOL INTO FIND Entry No File Date Filed By Description 07/20/2022+ P SUMMONS 1 07/20/2022+ P COMPLAINT Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. RETURN DATE: PETER S. LUNDSTEDT, NON-REPRESENTED PLAINTIFF, V. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST CO. AS TRUSTEE FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, 2006-10, DB USA CORPORATION, DEUTSCHE BANK ET AL., REPRESENTED DEFENDANT. COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 1 : SUPERIOR COURT : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF : NEW LONDON : JUNE 24, 2022 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. PREAMBLE Plaintiff Peter S. Lundstedt ("Plaintiff Lundstedt" or "Plaintiff') sues Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., As Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-10, its US intermediate holding company, DB USA Corporation, and Deutsche Bank et al. ("DB," "DB et al.," or the "Bank"). HISTORY 1. Conclusion of Fact: WaMu ("Mariners Capital" with WaMu's permission, or "WaMu") issued a defective Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract to Plaintiff in a 9-25- 2006 transaction with procedural and suitability errors. 1 WaMu, foreseeing total collapse, assigned the original 9-25-2006 defective Note and Security Instrument to DB while it was in default. They canceled that Contract/Note and replaced it with their own materially modifi~d DB issued Contract/Note. But that modified DB Contract/ Note was also defective by increasing Plaintiffs' monthly mortgage payment from $10,352 to $10,622 when Plaintiff could only pay a third of that at most. Instead of correcting Plaintiffs' first WaMu issued defective Contract/Note, DB just increased it with their modified Contract/Note that added an anti-liability clause, see EXHIBIT 8, Clause 14 and that caused the DB modified Contract/Note to become a Contract/Note in Adhesion. 1 If the materially modified Note and Security Instrument Issued by Deutsche Bank in 2008 was part of the 2006 original Note, then Deutsche Bank failed to show the court that document. See Nazareth. Furthermore: "A promissory note and a mortgage deed are deemed parts of the same transaction and must be construed together as such." Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. John Fitch Court Associates Ltd. Partnership. 713 719 A.2d 900, 49 Conn. App. 142, certificate denied 719 A.2d 901, 247 Conn. 908. 2 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 2. Conclusion of Fact: Initially, the 9-25-2006 WaMu issued Note and Security Instrument was created by the Long Beach Securities Corp. as the Depositor. Long Beach Mortgage Company was the Seller and Master Servicer. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee of the Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 that held the Plaintiffs' original WaMu issued 9-25-2006 Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract mortgage loan document that served as collateral for certificates issued by the Trust. Those certificates paid principal and interest to certificate holders on funds generated by the mortgages. 2 3. Conclusion of Fact: The certificate holders did not know that their security instrument, represented by the 9-25-2006 WaMu issued Contract/Note, was canceled and unenforceable. Nor did they know that a newer defective 5-1-2008 modified Contract/Note prepared by WaMu and issued by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10, existed with dramatically different Terms and Provisions that prejudiced the Plaintiff and the public and was the new controlling Contract/Note that was not disclosed to the Plaintiff in their improperly served 12-18-2008 complaint , the court, or the Town Land Recordings as required by law to notice the public. 2 See: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 SEC CIK #0001379746 SEC report> See: Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 - RMBS - Residential Mortgage Backed Security - Deal Page (Last Activity: 28 April 2022 03: 15:37}. Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 is incorporated in the state of Delaware. Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10 is primarily in the business of asset-backed securities. For financial reporting, their fiscal year ends on December 31st. This page includes all SEC registration details as well as a list of all documents (S-1, Prospectus, Current Reports, 8-K, 10K, Annual Reports) filed by Long Beach 2 Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-10. Company Details. Reporting File Number 333-131252-08, State of Incorporation Delaware, Fiscal Year End 12-31Date of Edgar Filing Update 2006-12-29 SIC 6189 [Asset- Backed Securities] Business Address 1400 South Douglass Road Suite 100 Anaheim CA 92806, Phone 714-939-5200. 3 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. But Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. As Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust, 2006-10, DB et al., and its local and national attorneys did know. 4. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. improperly and purposely misrepresented that the previously canceled 9-25-2006 WaMu Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract (WaMu issued transaction Contract/Note 1 ") was enforceable and valid when DB withheld and did not disclose their later issued Contract/Note that controlled the relationship between the parties. 5. Conclusion of Fact: DB concealed and did not disclose their own defective controlling materially modified 5-1-2008 DB Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract (DB issued Contract/Note transaction No. 2") that exposed DB to liability causing a fifteen-year delay, the duration of which severely injured Plaintiff. This court has the authority to review the alleged wrongful judgment at Dkt. No. 147.55 in FST-CV-08-5009697-S. See: "The interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding its making." Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545, 125 Conn. App. 441, cert. denied 12 A.3d 572, 300 Conn. 904. 4 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS 1. This is an action for money damages more than $15,000. 2. At all times material to this lawsuit, Plaintiff was a resident of Connecticut. 3. At all times material to this lawsuit, Defendant has offices in Connecticut. 4. All acts necessary or precedent to the bringing of this lawsuit occurred or accrued in Connecticut.. Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to establish that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the person of the Defendant where Plaintiff is a resident in Stonington, CT 06378. Defendant has offices, does business in Connecticut. 5. Plaintiff and the court have jurisdiction under 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345. (Formerly Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process. (d) Actions involving consumer transactions. In all actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... " 3 3 Plaintiff resides at 812 Stonington Road, No. 113, Stonington, Connecticut 06378 and has since April 1, 2020. The New London Court in a previous filing erred by allowing the case to be transferred over one hundred miles from Plaintiffs' residence in what appears to the public as a means of discouraging Plaintive from seeking justice possibly to protect the bank thereby potentially practicing law from behind the bench. 5 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 6. This Court has jurisdiction. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF FACT 1. Conclusion of Fact: That the Plaintiff is an adult citizen of Connecticut, and that DB et al. are licensed by Connecticut to conduct business in Connecticut. . 2. Conclusion of Fact: That Plaintiff unknowingly entered an alleged fraudulently originated loan Contract, it being created then serviced by WAMU who then placed said loan into their own allegedly fraudulently created SEC regulated security instrument purchased by global ERISA pension plans and others. 3. Conclusion of Fact: That DB et al. made a loan to Plaintiff that was allegedly fraudulent and harassed Plaintiff using injurious and harmful sadistic practices for over five years to collect on their allegedly and fraudulently created debt, without knowing their client. 4. Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff had the right to enter into a legally constructed business agreement free of fraud and a right not to be sent misrepresenting statements and contacted hundreds of times misrepresenting by asking the same questions on canceled loan documents stating it was a fact that the canceled loan documents were valid. 6 ,. Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 3 5. Conclusion of Fact: That Plaintiff has been, and is still being, harmed and injured by DB et al. from DB et al.'s continuing course of conduct to include still not correcting the court file to reflect the only valid Contract that they issued Plaintiff Lundstedt on 5-1-2008, including under the theory of the totality of circumstances of all of DB et al.'s actions. 6. Conclusion of Fact: Because Deutsche Bank broke the law and has refused to disclose or file the DB et al. Issued Note in Connecticut Superior Court for fifteen years, Plaintiff Lundstedt motions the court to dismiss the improvident judgment of 9-16-2013 as to liability. "The interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding its making.'' Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545, 125 Conn. App. 441, cert. denied 12 A.3d 572, 300 Conn. 904.233. Plaintiff is entitled to, and claims title to, relief from injuries suffered under Conn., U.S. and/or private law. 7. Conclusion of Fact:. Plaintiff Lundstedt went from running his sole proprietorship equity portfolio management for a fee only service business and the hope of a reasonable social life to a world totally dominated by DB et al.'s wrongful foreclosure and wrongful collecting because they controlled nearly 100% of his net worth, which Deutsche Bank knew before they Issued their new, not sued on, concealed materially modified 5-1-2008 Contract/Note. 7 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 8. Conclusion of Fact: Before creating the new materially modified Contract/Note, Deutsche Bank had duty by law to establish suitability before issuing the new materially modified 5-1- 2008 Contract/Note. This gave DB et al. the duty and foreseeability after Plaintiff Lundstedt repeatedly demanded they cease and desist their wrongful servicing because it was injuring him after he realized what they were doing. 9. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. engaged Plaintiff Lundstedt in wrongful pursuit of trying to enforce an unenforceable canceled WaMu Issued Contract/Note that Deutsche Bank canceled in order to add a new clause in their materially modified Deutsche Bank Issued Contract/Note. Even so, Deutsche Bank decided to continue to try to enforce the canceled original WaMu Issued Contract/Note without telling the court, Plaintiff Lundstedt, the Town Land Records, or the Investment Trust. 10. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. did not sue on their newer Issued Contract/Note because it was found to be violative, Prohibited, and defective, so they intentionally just hid it from the court and the public. DB et al.'s legal department intentionally and improperly used the canceled WaMu Issued canceled Contract/Note to enforce their ownership interest in Plaintiffs' entire residence valued at $560,000, but which WaMu valued at $1.4 million. 8 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 11. Conciusion of Fact: The problem with that is that no one is allowed to sue anyone by using a discharged terminated Contract/Note Terms and Provisions, at least without telling the court that a newer Contract/Note existed, especially in their possession. 12. Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank was the Trustee for the canceled WaMu Issued canceled Contract/Note AND Trustee of the materially modified Deutsche Bank Issued Contract/Note that they are still concealing from the court. 13. Conclusion of Fact: Because DB et al. knowingly wrongly sued Plaintiff Lundstedt on the canceled WaMu Issued Contract/Note, which makes the court's 9-16-2013 judgment of strict foreclosure against the canceled WaMu Issued Contract/ Note null and void ab inito, as if it never existed, because the Contract/Note they sued on was already void. 4 4 ~: "Mortgage cannot survive the extinction of debt." Franklin Credit Management Corp. v. Nicholas, 812 A.2d 51, 73 Conn. App. 830, cert. denied 815 A.2d 136,262 Conn. 937 2002. Amresco New England II, L.P; v. Colossale, 77 4 A.2d 10183, 63 Conn. App. 49. 9 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 14. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. lacked subject matter jurisdiction AND the court lacked Jurisdiction over the parties because Deutsche Bank was literally suing on nothing. All the while Deutsche Bank was concealing and suppressing the Deutsche Bank Issued Contract/Note that was the only document that proved the Terms and Provisions that were enforceable for the court to consider. But here, there was nothing to consider because the legal documents submitted to the court were without substance or anything legally enforceable for the court to enforce. 15. Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank et al. stacked the deck against the non-represented 4 litigant, Peter S. Lundstedt, ("Plaintiff Lundstedt"), even before their defective complaint was filed, by suppressing, concealing, and omitting the core document of the entire case, the materially modified 5-1-2008 Deutsche Bank issued Note and Security Instrument, ("Contract/Note"), that contained the controlling Terms and Provisions between the parties. 16. Conclusion of Fact: DB intentionally did not sue Plaintiff on a Contract/Note that contained controlling Terms or Provisions, they conspired to conceal it. 17. Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank lacked prima facie evidence in their complaint of 12- 18-2008 and their trial of 9-16-2013. 10 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. Rule: "ln·order to establish a prima facie case in a mortgage foreclosure action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgager has defaulted on the note and that any conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note, have been satisfied." GMAC Mortg. v. Ford. 73 A.3d 742, 144 Conn.App. 165, appeal after remand 175 A.3d 582, 175 Conn.App. 287. 18. Conclusion of Fact: Here, DB et al. knew exactly what they were doing when they omitted their issued Contract/Note and concealed it from evidence. This was fraud upon the court. DB et al.'s Affidavit did not mention the Loan Modification, nor was a copy of the Loan Modification attached. Here, "Substantive misconduct is and should be subject to less tolerance before dismissal with prejudice is warranted. "Lying about facts central to the case, ... simply cannot be tolerated and, frequently, cannot be remedied by any lesser sanction than dismissal with prejudice." Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 82-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). See:. "The interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the [totality of] circumstances surrounding its making." Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545,125 Conn.App. 441, cert. denied 12 A.3d 572, 300 Conn.904. Because of that, I respectfully demand that the court open and dismiss or erase the 9-16-2013 judgment in FST-CV-08-5009697-S and take the appropriate action without further delay, and if not, provide an intelligent reason why you cannot apply the above Rule to this case. See: Wells Fargo Bank. N.A.. Trustee v. Michael John Melahn Et Al. (AC 34726). Gruendel, Bear and Flynn, Js. Argued November 12, 2013-officially released February 4, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Pavia, J.) in EXHIBIT F. 11 I, .•t Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 19. Conclusion of Fact: On 4 December 2008, Deutsche Bank or its US intermediate holding company, or DB USA Corporation, ordered their national counsel, Deutsche Bank, 60 Wall Street, New York, NY 10005, local counsel, Hunt Liebert, Halloran, and Sage, ZEK. 20. Conclusion of Fact: Zeichner Ellman & Krause LLP and their Connecticut attorney No. "408783" were the architects of the grand deception and conspired with Deutsche Bank's national counsel at 60 Wall Street, New York, NY 10005, and servicers WaMu, then Chase, and then SPS, Inc., ("DB et al."), to intentionally file illegal foreclosure papers that misrepresented the facts, with no Contract/Note or valid Terms or Provisions attached (so that the court and the non-represented Plaintiff Lundstedt would not be able to compare the two, and to avoid serving and filing false information), in order to wrongfully foreclose on Plaintiff in the State of Connecticut so as avoid liability for their own 5-1-2008 DB issued Contract/Note from transaction No. 2 and to create delay that seriously injured Plaintiff. 5 5 See Liberal Virginia Prosecutor Removed from Criminal Case for 'Deliberately Misleading Court' By Katabella Roberts June 17, 2022, Updated: June 17, 2022. " ... The judge said the representation made by the Commonwealth was an "overt misrepresentation by omission" and described the filings as "misleading . representations and entirely inaccurate." The actions "reflect an inability of the Loudoun County •• Commonwealth's Attorney's Office to properly prosecute this case with the detail and attention required of a criminal prosecutor and consistent with the professional standards and obligations of a prosecutor," Plowman wrote. Plowman then ordered Biberaj be removed and disqualified from further prosecution on the matter." [Here, Plaintiff Lundstedt motions the court to dismiss DB's counsel and their firms from this case.] 12 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 21. Conclusion of Fact: Because DB et al., with forethought, deceived Plaintiff Lundstedt, the court, and the Town Land Records, (i.e., the Public), and because Plaintiff Lundstedt relied on DB et al. to, not only issue him a suitable DB et al. Issued Note and Security Instrument that was intended to modify the defective and illegal WaMu Issued Note assigned to them, and because the court relied on DB et al. to be procedurally correct in filing a proper foreclosure complaint with all documents attached, and because the Town of Greenwich, CT relied on DB et al. to record all changes to the Note and Security Instrument and 5 mortgage in the record as well as relying on DB et al. to properly Certify their Foreclosure on the DB et al. Issued Note, rather than just the canceled and voided WaMu issued Note, DB et al. should be held liable for knowingly concealing and omitting required disclosable proof of Note and Security Instrument ownership, since the WaMu Issued Note was extinguished and unenforceable. DB et al. did not properly serve its 12-18-2008 complaint with required attachments on Plaintiff Lundstedt who now motions the court to dismiss the FST-CV-08-5009697-S judgment of strict foreclosure with prejudice. Because of that, I respectfully demand that the court open and dismiss or erase the 9-16-2013 judgment in FST-CV-08-5009697-S and take the appropriate action without further delay, and if not, provide an intelligent reason why you cannot apply the above Rule to this case. See also: Wells Fargo Bank. N.A.. Trustee v. Michael John Melahn Et Al. (AC 34726). Gruendel, Bearand Flynn, Js. Argued November 12, 2013-officially released February 4, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Pavia, J.) in EXHIBIT F. 13 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 22. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. knowingly filed a false Foreclosure Certification that excluded the omitted and concealed Deutsche Bank Issued materially modified Contract/Note because it was because it had illegal adhesion Terms and Provisions such as increasing Plaintiff Lundstedts' monthly payment to which he could not pay, just to put in Clause No. 14 in the new Contract/Note, EXHIBIT A, which was neither filed nor disclosed with the court, that tried to "adhesion-ly," if you will, eliminate all of their liability from the original WaMu Issued Contract/Note, and from wrongfully collecting and suing. 23. Conclusion of Fact: Because of the unreasonable duration of delay, Plaintiff was severely injured and his ability to effectively generate an income and live a lifestyle that he was acclimated to for over 20 years was damaged beyond repair. There is no way he will ever be able to recover to where he would have been had DB not prejudiced him and delayed his professional and personal life for fifteen years, opportunities lost, including discrimination and prejudicial interference against his interstate commerce clause rights. 24. Conclusion of Fact: This case involves consumer transactions where the consumer, Plaintiff Lundstedt, resides in New London County. The New London Superior Court of Connecticut cannot transfer this case to Stamford. The New London Superior Court caused injury to Plaintiff Lundstedt by violating the following Rule: 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345. (Formerly Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process. (d) Actions involving consumer transactions. In all actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be 14 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... ," by making Plaintiff travel over two hundred miles round trip when they transferred the case to another district. See: "Interpretation of a court order or judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding its making." Stechel v. Foster, 8 A.3d 545, 125 Conn. App. 441, cert. denied 12 A.3d 572, 300 Conn. 904. Plaintiff Demands a Jury Trial and Motions for Equitable Relief by Jury. 6 25. Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff Lundstedt choses trial to be in New London Superior Court Judicial District. "All actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides" Under CGS SEC 51-345. 7 26. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. broke the law by refusing to disclose and file their own newer 5-1-2008 Deutsche Bank Issued Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract in Superior Court and the Greenwich, CT Town Land Records for fifteen years. I demand that the court take the appropriate action without further delay, and if not, provide an intelligent reason the court cannot apply the above Rule to this case. 6 CGS Sec. 52-218. Jury may try issues of fact in equitable action. Upon the application of either party, the court may order any issue or issues of fact in any action demanding equitable relief to be tried by a jury of six. (1949 Rev., S. 7937; 1953, S. 3179d; 1971, P.A. 40, S. 6). 7 This case cannot be transferred one hundred miles away at Stamford unless Plaintiff Lundstedt waives his right. Here, Plaintiff Lundstedt has resided at 812 Stonington Road, Stonington, CT 06378 since 3-3-2020, over two years, and is registered to vote in the Town of Stonington, CT.] See: 2005 Connecticut Code - Sec. 51- 345. (Formerly Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process. l.dJ Actions involving "consumer transactions. In all actions involving consumer transactions. civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... " 15 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 27. Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff Lundstedt alleges, inter alta, that the errors committed by DB and WaMu together in overseeing his loan modification documents were errors relating to servicing of a mortgage loan, and, consequently, were subject to the provisions of RESPA and Regulation X. DB ignored Plaintiffs' request for RESPA accountability before the foreclosure. See: 6 US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Opinions. Naimoli v. Ocwen Loan ·Servicing, LLC Docket: 20-1683, Opinion Date: January 7, 2022, Judge: B.D. Parker, Areas of Law: Banking, Consumer Law. "The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that Ocwen's failure to record her mortgage instruments and its actions in losing key mortgage documents constituted covered errors under the catchall provision of Regulation X (RESPA's implementing regulation). In this case, plaintiff alleged that the errors committed by Ocwen in handling her loan modification documents were errors relating to servicing of a mortgage loan, and, consequently, were subject to the provisions of RESPA and Regulation X. The court concluded that plaintiffs' asserted errors are covered by the catch-all provision of Regulation X, which includes the terms "any other errors". and "relating • to." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings." 28. Conclusion of Fact: Plaintiff claims here that DB et al. violated Regulation X and this injured and damaged the Plaintiff. Plaintiff Lundstedt motions the court to dismiss or erase the null judgment at Dkt. No. 147.55 as t.o liability in case FST-CV-08-5009697-S. 16 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 29. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al., including loan servicers, permanently shut Plaintiff Lundstedt down after 2008 for fifteen years because he could not get back what he lost in his business and health. Here, "the circumstances" include the theory of the Totality of Circumstances of all of DB et al.'s behavior to include the fifteen-year totality of all of DB et al.'s thousands of individual inflictions of emotional, physical, and financial distress events and microaggression intrusions inflicted upon Plaintiff. It held him down by big corporations. 30. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. refused to cease and desist wrongful foreclosure and wrongful collection on the invalid Contract and misrepresenting and sending false account statements after his repeated cease and desist demands, which caused an unreasonable duration of delay. Neither Contract/Note contained a no-damages-for-delay clause. The duration of this delay caused Plaintiff Lundstedt to slowly withdraw from society after 2008 for years as shown where his credit score declined to the number four. The totality of circumstances combined prevented Plaintiff Lundstedt from effectively defending himself against DB et al.'s wrongful servicing and wrongful foreclosure over his repeated objections, violating his civil rights and preventing other meaningful pursuits for 15 years, a duration that no ordinary consumer could bear. 31. Conclusion of Fact: Because of that, I respectfully demand that the court take the appropriate action without further delay, and if not, provide an intelligent reason why you cannot apply the above Rule to this case. DB et al.'s pattern of concealing, suppressing, 17 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. and omitting core loan documents, while wrongfully foreclosing, wrongful servicing, and a pattern of disrespect for the court, the consumer, for the Plaintiff, the court, the consumer, and the public, caused injury to Plaintiff Lundstedt and the integrity of the judicial system by ignoring and or violating the following - Rule: Motion to Dismiss for invalid complaint service and Memorandum of Law. 8 8 CT Gen Stat§ 49-17 (2013) - "When any mortgage is foreclosed by the person entitled to receive the money secured thereby, but to whom the legal title to the mortgaged premises has never been conveyed, the title to such premises shall vest in him ... provided the person so foreclosing shall forthwith cause the decree of foreclosure, to be recorded in the land records in the town in which the land lies. (1949 Rev., S. 7198.)" "The lesson to be learned from Nazareth should be clear: Plaintiffs' counsel about to initiate a foreclosure should be doubly careful that the status of the loan documentation be in order." ... "Any omission in both of these regards, especially after Nazareth, is an open invitation to the Defendant to raise valid defenses to the action." Fleet Nat'/ Bank v. Nazareth, 75 Conn. App. 791 (2003).See: CT PB 23-18. See: "Creditors counsel would be wise to review the decision of the U. S. Bankr. Judge Rosenthal of Mass. in Nosek v. Ameriquest, 386 RR 374 (Bankr. Mass. 2007). The court issued a show cause order to have national and local counsel for Ameriquest explain why they had asserted in various pleadings that Ameriquest was the holder of the Note the court imposed a $750,000 sanction against lenders and their counsel." [Here, why has this court not addressed Deutsche Bank et al. 's concealment and omissions in this case but not in others? Plaintiff Lundstedt has suffered prejudice and Motions to Dismiss the judgment. See also: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee v. Michael John Melahn Et Al. (AC 34726). Gruendel, Bear and Flynn, Js. Argued November 12, 2013-officially released February 4, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Pavia, J.) in EXHIBIT F.] 18 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. 32. Conclusion of Fact: Deutsche Bank did not disclose the problem documents of their issued modified Note that replaced WaMu's Note which is insufficient to grant it standing and the foreclosure judgment must be dismissed. 9 7 9 Article Ill of the Constitution restricts the power of the federal courts to hear only "cases" and "controversies." The "case" or "controversy" limitation on the federal judicial power is expressed via the standing doctrine, which requires a plaintiff to have a personal stake in a case. The standing doctrine requires every plaintiff to show that: i) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; ii) the plaintiff's injury was likely caused by the defendant; and iii) the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-531 (1992). 19 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. CAUSES OF ACTION 1. COUNT ONE WRONGFUL SERVICE OF FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual allegations and Conclusions of Fact. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al. agreed that the original 9-25-2006 WaMu issued Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract ("Contract/Note" or "Contract" or "Note") was defective. See EXHIBIT B, Clauses 14 and 6. DB replaced it with their own modified Note but failed to disclose that Contract with four corners to the court and never noticed Plaintiff that they intended to Not sue on the controlling Contract/Note. See Memorandum of Law. 2. COUNT TWO INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual allegations and Conclusions of Fact. Conclusions of Fact: (1.) A false representation was made by DB et al. as a statement of fact when DB et al. falsely represented as a statement of fact that the Note sued upon was a valid Contract when in fact it had been canceled and replaced BY DB seven months prior to the wrongful service of their 12-18-2008 complaint. Conclusions of Fact: (2) DB's representation was untrue and known to be untrue by DB et al. making it. 20 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. Conclusions of Fact: (3) DB's misrepresentation was made to induce the Plaintiff, the court, and the Town Hall Land Records to act upon it, rather than getting fined. That was thei.r gamble. Conclusions of Fact: (4) "The other party did so act upon the false representation to his injury." Plaintiff was unaware of the deception. Otherwise, he would have complained. The duration of the delay caused Plaintiff injury and damage. Furthermore, the court acted on the falsely served complaint information and issued an invalid judgment of strict foreclosure on the already canceled original Contract to the detriment of the Plaintiff and the Public. Rule: "Intentional misrepresentation is synonymous with fraudulent misrepresentation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heller v. LaPorte & Associates, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket CV-02-0079784-S (November 10, 2003, Scholl, J.). See Memorandum of Law 3. COUNT THREE NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual allegations and Conclusions of Fact. "Negligent Misrepresentation by Nondisclosure - "[Our Supreme Court] has long . recognized liabjlity for negligent misrepresentation. The governing principles [of negligent misrepresentation] are set forth in similar terms in §552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977): as "One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment. supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is· 21 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - SE:!c. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. As a result, [the court has] held that even an innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 143-44, 2 A.3d 859 (2010). See Memorandum of Law. 4. COUNT FOUR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND CUTPA Plaintiff realleges and restates the foregoing jurisdictional allegations and general factual allega_tions and Conclusions of Fact. Conclusion of Fact: DB et al.'s practice of lying to the Plaintiff and the court was unlawful, offends public policy, immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous. DB issued Plaintiff a 8 materially modified Note and Security Instrument Installment Contract on 5-1-2008. DB had a duty to provide a product that was suitable and legal to the Plaintiff. DB et al. breached their fiduciary duty. DB could also foresee damages to Plaintiff because they admitted it in their own Contract/Note that they issued Plaintiff. See EXHIBIT B, Clause 14. See.Memorandum of Law. 22 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. OBJECTION Objection. This case cannot be transferred. 10 See RULE: § 52-259b (c) - "Waiver of fees and payment of the cost of service of process for indigent party. (c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or .. the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application. Here, in a previous filing, Judge Young disregarded the equity that 52-259 ( c) available to Plaintiff above. c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) ... That means that even though Plaintiffs' income is over 125% of the poverty line, the court can still grant fee waiver. That is what Judge Calmar did properly. 10 By objecting: "If the judge does not do what is right (and your objection is correct) you will have created an entry in the court record for an appellate court to review. Why must you object? To stop a mistake (or trick) of your opponent. To stop a mistake (or intentional error) of the judge. To give the judge an opportunity to do what is right. To create a record for appeal if the judge does wrong. It is not the mistakes or tricks of your opponent that can be appealed. You give the judge an opportunity to do what is right by making an objection. Then, if the judge makes errors harmful to your case, you have created a record for the appellate court to review - and the judge has no excuse! Whose rules do we go by? Rules of Evidence. Rules of Procedure. Plaintiff objects to give the judge an opportunity to correct the violation. If the violation is by someone else, the judge will be without excuse on appeal if he does not do what is right and put a stop to the violation. If the violation is by the judge himself, he will again be without excuse on appeal if he does not correct himself at once and enforce the rules for everyone involved. Get that? Plaintiff makes an objection! If the court refuses to rule on your objection (neither sustaining or overruling) you object again and move the _court to rule on your objection ... and if the judge still refuses to rule object once again for good measure so there is no doubt for the appellate tribunal that you gave the judge every possible opportunity to do "what's right". You object to put the judge on notice you are preparing for appeal. Make a record of every harmful judicial error. Show the appellate tribunal how the judge abused the essential requirements of justice. When the judge sees you making your record for appeal and realizes the appellate tribunal will see how he is ignoring his duty, he will back off and start favoring you, instead of your opponent." 23 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in New London County determines jurisdiction. 2005 Conn. Code - Sec. 51-345, even though the case began in elsewhere. Furthermore, Plaintiff objects to one judge high jacking Plaintiffs case when the court is supposed alternate judges, or at least chosen randomly. Here, Judge Young was not a disinterested party. Plaintiff Lundstedt is entitled to the experience of the full court, not just Judge Young who covets this case. NATURE OF ACTION 11 11 Non-Represented Litigant Plaintiffs' Right to A Liberal Reading. Conclusion of Fact: I am Plaintiff Lundstedt. As a non-represented litigant Plaintiff, I am entitled to liberal reading and interpretation of my pleadings; See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971), US Supreme Court, that: "non-represented litigant pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys, "however in-artfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears "beyond doubt' that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Estelle, Corrections Director. Et Al. V. Gamble 29 U.S. 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Platsky v. C.I.A. 953 F.2d. 25, that - "court errs if court dismisses the pro se litigant without instruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings." The instant New London Court has waived Plaintiff Lundstedts' court and service fees. See: Motion for Waiver Result: Granted 11/16/2021 Hon Harry Calmar. On 11-16-2021, Hon. Harry Calmar Granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Waiver of fees. Judge Young then improperly transferred the case 100 miles away and violated Sec. 51-345, when Plaintiff could not afford the transfer, he had to withdraw his case and resubmitted it in New London, again with a Motion for Waiver of Fee's. But here, a random judge was not afforded to Plaintiff on his next filing. Instead, JD Young denied Plaintiff Lundstedts' motion for fee waiver, even though he erred by transferring it to another district. Argument: Having already declared Plaintiff Lundstedt indigent, how can the court justify making Plaintiff Lundstedt, a 70% disabled US Veteran with three back fractures, with severe sciatica from L4 and LS stenosis and a painful right shoulder that must be totally replaced, afford traveling to and from and housing expenses 100 miles away for each hearing and each day in trial and each visit to the clerk's office? That would be impossible to pay. Plaintiff Lundstedt lacks the income for service and court fee for this complaint and motions the court to waive these fees, and certainly cannot prosecute his case from two hundred miles away (back and forth) and has lived in the New London District for over two years at 812 Stonington Road, Stonington, CT 06378. The New London Court cannot guarantee that the Stamford Court will not require Plaintiff Lundstedts' physical appearance in Stamford as COVID recedes. Furthermore, Plaintiff Lundstedt would be further prejudiced due to his service-related disabilities that include extremely painful L4 and LS fractured vertebra spinal stenosis and requiring a right total shoulder replacement. Transferring the case to Stamford 9 New London would also violate Plaintiff Lundstedts' ADA rights], see: See VA Diagnosis in EXHIBIT E. See RULE: § 52-259b. - Waiver of fees and payment of the cost of service of process for indigent party. (c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application." Plaintiff Lundstedt Motions for Hearing if denied his objection to transferring the case to another district. See: 2005 Connecticut Code - Sec. 51-345. (Formerly Sec. 52-42). "Venue in civil actions. Return of civil process. (d) Actions involving "consumer transactions." In all actions involving consumer transactions. civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides ... " 24 Lundstedt v. DB in New London Superior Court. Consumer Plaintiffs' residence in