Preview
3Y
-. » COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
MIDDLESEX, ss. SUPERIOR: COURT
ALICIA CRINITI,
Plaintiff,
C.A. NO: 2181CV00466
Vv,
F.W. WEBB COMPANY,
ROBERT MUCCIARONE and
BRENDAN MONAGHAN. ote
Defendants.
FEB 13 2024
Ov Se
Fly tkatsten) |
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN-LIMENE: NOS ———!
(“CONCERNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES”)
Defendants’ motion seeks to “either bifurcate the trial (reserving all mention, argument,
or evidence of punitive damage) until after a jury verdict in favor of Ms. Criniti or issue an order
in limine prohibiting Ms. Criniti and her counsel from mentioning or adducing any evidence to
support an award of punitive damages until the court rules at the close of evidence whether there
a submissible case for punitive damages.” We address these alternative requests in turn.
I Defendants Have Not Demonstrated That Bifurcation is Appropriate.
Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b), a court may order a separate trial: (1) to further convenience,
(2) to avoid prejudice, or (3) when doing so would be conducive to expedition and economy. As
the moving party, it is Defendants’ burden to make this showing. See Echvarria v. Roach, No. 16-
cv-11118-ADB1, 2022 WL 279609, at *1 (D. Mass. 2022) (allocating the burden of proof under
the analogous Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) to the moving party to show that bifurcation is necessary).
.- The daly “argument” advanced by Defendants ints brief is‘a passing allusion to the
potential for undue prejudice if the issue of punitive damages were not bifurcated. See
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5 Concerning Punitive Damages at 2. But Defendants provide
no developed argument as to what that prejudice would be, or how bifurcation would avoid it.
Instead, Defendants seem to advance a position that prejudice can be presumed.
That is plainly not the law. If it were, bifurcation would be necessary in every case. But
bifurcation is the exception—not the rule—and Defendants have offered no reason why this case
is exceptional.
Nor can they. It is difficult to imagine any evidence in this case that would be presented
to the jury for purposes of punitive damages that would not also be relevant to the issue of
liability. The closet question might be Webb’s financial performance, which is often only
relevant to punitive damages, but that evidence would also be relevant here on the question of
Plaintiff’s damages.
In Farghaly v. Potamkin Cadillac-Buick-Chevrolet-Geo, Ltd., a district court for the
Southern District of New York dealt with a defendant’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), a
close analogue to Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b), to bifurcate trial on the issue of liability for federal and
state anti-discrimination causes of action and the issue of punitive damages. Farghaly, 2021 WL
4267656 at *1; see Fed. R. Civ.-P. 42(b); Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The court began from the
position that bifurcated trials are “generally disfavored” and acknowledged that the preference is
for jurors to hear all evidence in a single proceeding and deliberate over all of the issues at the
same time. See Farghaly, 2021 WL 4267656 at *1 (quoting Falzon v. Johnson, No. 12-CV-674
(CLP), 2016 WL 11430072, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016)). In determining that bifurcation was
not appropriate the court found it important thatthe effect of a bifurcation would be to prolong
2
4
« the trial. See id. Additionally, the court noted that bifurcation would not.be likely.to-prevent -
against juror confusion because juries “routinely” determine punitive damages alongside
liability. See id. at *2.
The same logic holds true here. It is Defendants’ burden to show that bifurcation is
appropriate and, again, they offer no reason why this case should be treated differently than any
other case under 151B.
IL Defendants’ Alternative Request is no Different Than Bifurcation
Alternatively, Defendants seek “an order in limine prohibiting Ms. Criniti and her counsel
from mentioning or adducing any evidence to support an award of punitive damages until the
court rules at the close of evidence whether there a submissible case for punitive damages.”
Functionally, that is no different from bifurcation. Further, it is unclear what Defendants are
referring to by “evidence to support an award of punitive damages” as, again, there is a
significant (if not complete) overlap between the evidence relevant to liability and evidence
relevant to punitive damages.
But again, Defendants have made no showing as to why this exceptional relief would be
appropriate. If there is some particular piece of evidence that Defendants are concerned about,
perhaps some accommodation could be made to address it. But the opaqueness with which
Defendants advance their argument (if you can call it that) makes it simply impossible to grant
the broad relief they have requested.
Il. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendants’ Motion in
Limine No. 5 (“Concerning Punitive Damages”), be denied.
7
‘ 3ay
Respectfully submitted, -
Plaintiff Alicia Criniti,
By her attorneys,
/s/ Patrick J. Hannon
Patrick J. Hannon, BBO# 664958
Hartley Michon Robb Hannon LLP
101 Federal Street, Suite 1810
Boston, MA 02110 P:
(617) 723-8000
phannon@hmrhlaw.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I,.Patrick J. Hannon, hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon
all counsel of record, via E-Mail, on February 7, 2024.
/s/ Patrick J. Hannon
Patrick J. Hannon
Preview
3Y -. » COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT MIDDLESEX, ss. SUPERIOR: COURT ALICIA CRINITI, Plaintiff, C.A. NO: 2181CV00466 Vv, F.W. WEBB COMPANY, ROBERT MUCCIARONE and BRENDAN MONAGHAN. ote Defendants. FEB 13 2024 Ov Se Fly tkatsten) | PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN-LIMENE: NOS ———! (“CONCERNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES”) Defendants’ motion seeks to “either bifurcate the trial (reserving all mention, argument, or evidence of punitive damage) until after a jury verdict in favor of Ms. Criniti or issue an order in limine prohibiting Ms. Criniti and her counsel from mentioning or adducing any evidence to support an award of punitive damages until the court rules at the close of evidence whether there a submissible case for punitive damages.” We address these alternative requests in turn. I Defendants Have Not Demonstrated That Bifurcation is Appropriate. Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b), a court may order a separate trial: (1) to further convenience, (2) to avoid prejudice, or (3) when doing so would be conducive to expedition and economy. As the moving party, it is Defendants’ burden to make this showing. See Echvarria v. Roach, No. 16- cv-11118-ADB1, 2022 WL 279609, at *1 (D. Mass. 2022) (allocating the burden of proof under the analogous Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) to the moving party to show that bifurcation is necessary). .- The daly “argument” advanced by Defendants ints brief is‘a passing allusion to the potential for undue prejudice if the issue of punitive damages were not bifurcated. See Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5 Concerning Punitive Damages at 2. But Defendants provide no developed argument as to what that prejudice would be, or how bifurcation would avoid it. Instead, Defendants seem to advance a position that prejudice can be presumed. That is plainly not the law. If it were, bifurcation would be necessary in every case. But bifurcation is the exception—not the rule—and Defendants have offered no reason why this case is exceptional. Nor can they. It is difficult to imagine any evidence in this case that would be presented to the jury for purposes of punitive damages that would not also be relevant to the issue of liability. The closet question might be Webb’s financial performance, which is often only relevant to punitive damages, but that evidence would also be relevant here on the question of Plaintiff’s damages. In Farghaly v. Potamkin Cadillac-Buick-Chevrolet-Geo, Ltd., a district court for the Southern District of New York dealt with a defendant’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), a close analogue to Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b), to bifurcate trial on the issue of liability for federal and state anti-discrimination causes of action and the issue of punitive damages. Farghaly, 2021 WL 4267656 at *1; see Fed. R. Civ.-P. 42(b); Mass. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The court began from the position that bifurcated trials are “generally disfavored” and acknowledged that the preference is for jurors to hear all evidence in a single proceeding and deliberate over all of the issues at the same time. See Farghaly, 2021 WL 4267656 at *1 (quoting Falzon v. Johnson, No. 12-CV-674 (CLP), 2016 WL 11430072, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016)). In determining that bifurcation was not appropriate the court found it important thatthe effect of a bifurcation would be to prolong 2 4 « the trial. See id. Additionally, the court noted that bifurcation would not.be likely.to-prevent - against juror confusion because juries “routinely” determine punitive damages alongside liability. See id. at *2. The same logic holds true here. It is Defendants’ burden to show that bifurcation is appropriate and, again, they offer no reason why this case should be treated differently than any other case under 151B. IL Defendants’ Alternative Request is no Different Than Bifurcation Alternatively, Defendants seek “an order in limine prohibiting Ms. Criniti and her counsel from mentioning or adducing any evidence to support an award of punitive damages until the court rules at the close of evidence whether there a submissible case for punitive damages.” Functionally, that is no different from bifurcation. Further, it is unclear what Defendants are referring to by “evidence to support an award of punitive damages” as, again, there is a significant (if not complete) overlap between the evidence relevant to liability and evidence relevant to punitive damages. But again, Defendants have made no showing as to why this exceptional relief would be appropriate. If there is some particular piece of evidence that Defendants are concerned about, perhaps some accommodation could be made to address it. But the opaqueness with which Defendants advance their argument (if you can call it that) makes it simply impossible to grant the broad relief they have requested. Il. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5 (“Concerning Punitive Damages”), be denied. 7 ‘ 3ay Respectfully submitted, - Plaintiff Alicia Criniti, By her attorneys, /s/ Patrick J. Hannon Patrick J. Hannon, BBO# 664958 Hartley Michon Robb Hannon LLP 101 Federal Street, Suite 1810 Boston, MA 02110 P: (617) 723-8000 phannon@hmrhlaw.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I,.Patrick J. Hannon, hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing document upon all counsel of record, via E-Mail, on February 7, 2024. /s/ Patrick J. Hannon Patrick J. Hannon