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Wendy M. Thomas (SBN 268695) Betty Huynh (SBN 315880) TADJEDIN THOMAS & ENGBLOOM LAW Group LLP 6101 West Centinela Avenue, Suite 270 Culver City, CA 90230 T: (310) 362-4970 E: wendyt@ttelawgroup.com E: justinr@ttelawgroup.com Attorneys for FRINJ Coffee, Inc., John A. “Jay” Ruskey, Andy Donald Mullins, and Kari Shafer SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA 10 11 PAIGE GESUALDO Case No. 23CV05305 12 Plaintiff, (Assigned for all purposes to the Honorable Colleen K. Sterne, Department 5) 13 Vv. 14 JOHN A. “JAY” RUSKEY, an individual; DEFENDANT ANDY MULLINS’ NOTICE ANDY DONALD MULLINS, an individual; OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO 15 KARI SHAFER, an individual; FRINJ COFFEE. PLAINTIFF PAIGE GESUALDO’S INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1-25, COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF 16 inclusive, POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF WENDY M. THOMAS 17 Defendants. (Filed concurrently with [Proposed] Order) 18 19 Date: TBD Time: 10:00 a.m. 20 Dept.: 5 Judge: Hon. Colleen K. Sterne 21 Action filed: December 1, 2023 22 Trial date: None set 23 24 25 26 27 28 DEFENDANT ANDY MULLINS’ NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF PAIGE GESUALDO’S COMPLAINT TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD HEREIN: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on TBD at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as this matter may be heard by the Honorable Colleen K. Sterne in Department 5 of the above-entitled Court. located at 1100 Anacapa Street, Santa Barbara, California 93101, Defendant Andy Mullins (“Mullins” or “Defendant”) will and hereby does demur to Plaintiff Paige Gesualdo’s (“Plaintiff) Complaint This Demurrer is brought on the grounds that: (a) Plaintiff failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as to her third cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud (see Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)) As explained in the Declaration of Wendy M. Thomas, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 10 section 430.41, subdivision (a)(2), the parties met and conferred but were unable to reach an agreement 11 concerning Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ Complaint 12 This Demurrer is based on this notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the 13 Declaration of Wendy M. Thomas and exhibits attached thereto, all pleadings and papers filed in this 14 action, and such additional papers and arguments as may be presented at or in connection with the hearing 15 on this Demurrer. 16 Respectfully submitted. 17 Dated: February 5, 2024 mame Tyoyfis & ENGBLOOM LAw Group LLP 18 19 By: Wns Wendy M, Thomas 20 Betty Huyah — Attorneys for FRINJ Coffee, Inc., John A. “Jay Ruskey, 21 Andy Donald Mullins, and Kari Shafer 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES DEMURRER Defendant ANDY MULLINS (‘Mullins or “Defendant”) hereby demurs to Plaintiff PAIGE GESUALDO’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint as follows: DEMURRER TO THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD —- AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD BASED ON FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION The cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud fails because Plaintiff failed to state specific facts sufficient to support the claim that Defendant made a material misrepresentation of fact with knowledge of its falsity and intent to deceive that caused Plaintiff's damages. (See Code of Civil Proc., § 430.10 (e).) 10 11 Respectfully submitted, 12 Dated: February 5, 2024 ‘TapseDin THomAS & ENGBLOOM LAW Group LLP | \ / 13 \ 14 | KkUiwa27 By: Wendy M. Thomas 15 Betty Huynh 16 Attorneysfor FRINJ Coffee, Inc., John A. “Jay” Ruskey, Andy Donald Mullins, and Kari Shafer 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Paige Gesualdo (‘Plaintiff’) alleges a cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud against Defendant Andy Mullins (“Mullins” or “Defendant”) arising out of the allegation that Defendant prepared certain documents which contain misrepresentations about FRINJ Coffee, Inc. (“Frinj’”) to induce Plaintiff's investment. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant prepared the “Slide Deck” and “Geisha Model” which contained misrepresentations about Frinj’s operations and its financial information. As shown below, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to meet the heightened standard required for pleading fraud. There are no actual facts pleaded in the Complaint to show what 10 specific statements were made to the Plaintiff, and that the statements are material and are false. Instead, 11 Plaintiff's Complaint contains vague contentions and general conclusions such as the Slide Deck and 12 Geisha Model “materially overstated Frinj’s grower network,” “made material misrepresentations” 13 relating to Frinj’s research and coffee program, and “overstated Frinj’s income.” All that Plaintiff has 14 done in her Complaint with respect to the aiding and abetting fraud claim against Defendant is make 15 baseless contentions, without supporting facts. In ruling on a demurrer, while the Court must accept as 16 true properly pleaded material facts, the Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions 17 of fact or law. Plaintiff's Complaint is devoid of properly pleaded facts and would fail to state a claim 18 for aiding and abetting fraud even under a normal pleading standard, much less under the heightened 19 pleading standard required for fraud. Defendant requests that the Court sustain Defendant’s Demurrer. 20 IL. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 21 Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case on December 1, 2023, against defendants FRINJ Coffee, 22 Inc., John A “Jay” Ruskey (“Ruskey”), Andy Mullins, and Kari Shafer (“Shafer”). (Declaration of Wendy 23 Thomas (“Thomas Dec.”), Exhibit 1: Plaintiff's Complaint [“Ex. 1’’].) The Complaint alleges in pertinent 24 part as follows: Plaintiff alleges that Ruskey is the founder, CEO, and controlling shareholder of Frinj. 25 (Thomas Dec., Ex. 1, ¥ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Mullins is a co-founder of Frinj, and was the Chief 26 Operations Officer from 2017 until late 2021 or early 2022. (/d, at 4 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Shafer is the 27 Vice President of Finance and Controller at Frinj. (/d., at § 7.) 28 Plaintiff alleges that Frinj was incorporated in May 2017 and is headquartered at Good Land 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Organics (“GLO”), a farm that was founded in 1992 by Ruskey’s family. (Thomas Dec., § 2, Ex. 1, § 13.) Plaintiff alleges that GLO is the heart, headquarters and flagship farm of Frinj Coffee, and Frinj has its own website separate from GLO. (/d., at § 13.) Plaintiff alleges that she was introduced to Ruskey on April 9, 2021. (d., at § 14.) Plaintiff alleges that to induce her to invest, Ruskey made representations to Plaintiff about Frinj, and showed her a powerpoint slide deck (the “Slide Deck”) which contained material misrepresentations about Frinj’s operations and value. (Thomas Dec., § 2, Ex. 1, § 17.) In particular, Plaintiff alleges: Among other things, the Slide Deck materially overstated FRINJ’s grower network, the number of its coffee-producing trees, its average sales price, and the company’s fixed target for Seed Round funding. The Slide Deck also made material misstatements relating to the existence of Frinj’s research and development program, its coffee breeding 10 program, and the members of its executive team. (Thomas Dec., 4 2, Ex. 1, 18.) 11 Plaintiff alleges that the Slide Deck made no mention of GLO, and did not indicate that Frinj paid 12 for GLO’s expenses or operations. (Thomas Dec., § 2, Ex. 1, § 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Ruskey also 13 showed her unspecified documents relating to Project Geisha (the “Geisha Model”). (Thomas Dec., § 2, 14 Ex. 1, { 19.) Plaintiff alleges that the Geisha Model “was based on incomplete and inaccurate financial 15 records that did not account for all of Frinj’s liabilities, understated Frinj’s operating costs, overstated 16 Frinj’s net income, excluded the cost of supporting GLO and fraudulently overstated Frinj’s value and 17 projected future earnings.” (Thomas Dec., § 2, Ex. 1, § 82, bulletpoint no. 11.) 18 Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud against Mullins. (Thomas Dec., { 19 2, Ex. 1, p. 18.) Plaintiff alleges that Mullins had actual knowledge of the fraudulent and deceitful conduct 20 of Ruskey and Frinj, as Mullins was a Frinj executive and generated the documents that were relied upon. 21 (d., at §§ 101-102.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “Mullins was involved in developing the Geisha 22 Model, Frinj’s Slide Deck, and overseeing Frinj’s operating costs. In so doing, Mullins gave substantial 23 assistance and encouragement to Frinj and Ruskey.” (Thomas Dec., J 2, Ex. 1, § 103.) 24 Til. DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH THE MEET AND CONFER REQUIREMENTS 25 On January 29, 2024, Defendant’s counsel called Plaintiff's counsel to discuss Defendant’s 26 demurrer to Plaintiff's complaint. (Thomas Dec., §] 3.) This same day, Defendant’s counsel followed up 27 by sending Plaintiff a meet and confer letter which detailed the grounds for Defendant’s demurrer. 28 (Thomas Dec., § 4, Ex. 2.) The parties further met and conferred by phone conference on January 30, 4 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2024, but were unable to resolve their dispute with respect to the Complaint. (Thomas Dec., { 5.) Iv. LEGAL AUTHORITY Among the purposes of the complaint in a civil action are framing and limiting the issues and apprising the defendant of the grounds on which the plaintiff seeks to recover. (Committee on Children’s Television v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211-212, citations omitted.) Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) permits a party against whom a complaint has been filed to demur to a complaint on the ground that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879 [Cantu].) In ruling on a demurrer, the 10 trial court may consider all material facts properly pleaded in the complaint, it may not consider 11 contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 12 220; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).) Allegations in the pleading must be factual 13 and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (App. 2 Dist. 200) 14 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44.) General and indefinite contentions of liability will not satisfy the pleading rules; 15 “Tflacts, not conclusions, must be pleaded.” (Zumbrun v. Univ. of Calif (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 8.) 16 Moreover, if the defendant negates any essential element of a particular cause of action, the demurrer 17 should be sustained as to that cause of action. (Cantu, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 880, citation omitted.) 18 V. ARGUMENTS 19 A The Complaint Fails to Allege Facts Sufficient to State a Cause of Action for Aiding 20 nd Abetting Fraud 21 A claim for aiding and abetting the commission of an intentional tort requires a showing that the 22 defendant (a) knows the other's conduct constitutes the intentional tort and gives substantial assistance or 23 encouragement to the other to so act or (b) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a 24 tortious result and the person's own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the 25 third person.’ [Citations].” (Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144.) “In the 26 civil arena, an aider and abettor is called a cotortfeasor. To be held liable as a cotortfeasor, a defendant 27 must have knowledge and intent.... A defendant can be held liable as a cotortfeasor on the basis of acting 28 in concert only if he or she knew that a tort had been, or was to be, committed, and acted with the intent 5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES of facilitating the commission of that tort.” (Gerard v. Ross (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 968, 983.) An aider and abettor must have “actual knowledge of the primary violation.” (Casey, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 1148.) Importantly, there can be no aiding and abetting liability absent the commission of an underlying tort. (Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 344 ; Richard B. LeVine, Inc. v. Higashi (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 566, 574.) Thus, the Complaint must allege facts sufficient to show the underlying fraud. The essential elements of a claim for fraud are (1) a misrepresentation, (2) with knowledge of its falsity, (3) with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the misrepresentation, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 10 1150, 1166.) The misrepresentation must pertain to a past or existing material fact. (Apollo Capital Fund, 11 LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 243.) Unless the facts can state a claim 12 for promissory fraud, representations about future actions are generally not actionable. (Miles v. Deutsche 13 Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 402 (Miles); Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 14 Cal.App.4th 816, 835.) Expressions of opinion are also not treated as representations of fact, and thus are 15 not grounds for a misrepresentation cause of action. (Neu-Visions Sports, Inc. v. Soren/McAdam/Bartells 16 (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 303, 308.) 17 Crucially, to plead fraud, every element “we must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts 18 constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow [the] defendant to understand 19 fully the nature of the charge made.’ ” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73 (Stansfield), 20 quoting Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109.) “In California, 21 fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Lazar v. Superior 22 Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645 (Lazar).) This specificity requirement applies to any and all actions 23 sounding in fraud. (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 803; Small v. Fritz 24 Co. ’s Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) Thus “ ‘the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings ... will 25 not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.’ [Citation.] This 26 particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by 27 what means the representations were tendered.’ ” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645, 28 italics in original; see Stansfield, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 73.) Trial courts are to enforce this pleading 6 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES requirement for fraud claims. (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993.) Here, Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to plead each element of fraud. The basis of Plaintiff's fraud claim against Defendant arises out of alleged misrepresentations contained in the Slide Deck and Geisha Model that Defendant allegedly prepared. Despite this, the Complaint is devoid of any facts to show what statements were actually contained in the Slide Deck and the Geisha Model that constituted a misrepresentation. With respect to the first element, none of Plaintiff’s allegations about the Slide Deck constitute facts to show that it contained any misrepresentations. Instead, all of Plaintiffs allegations are vague contentions and general conclusions. For example, if Plaintiff contends that the Slide Deck materially overstated the number of Frinj’s coffee producing trees, a pleading of facts would mean that 10 Plaintiff state what was the actual number of Frinj’s coffee producing trees, and what was the statement 11 that was made to Plaintiff about this number. This is the only way it can be shown that there was an actual 12 misstatement that was made to the Plaintiff about the trees. If Plaintiff contends that the Slide Deck 13 misrepresented the members of Frinj’s executive team, a pleading of facts would require Plaintiff to 14 allege who are the actual members of the executive team, and what was represented to Plaintiff, to show 15 that the statement was false. Plaintiff makes vague claims that the Slide Deck contains misstatements 16 about Frinj’s research and development program and coffee breeding program, but there is nothing in the 17 Complaint to show what statements were actually made, and why they are false. Likewise, there are no 18 facts pleaded to show what statements were made to the Plaintiff about the grower network or average 19 sales price, and how these statements constitute misrepresentations. 20 Plaintiff alleges that the Slide Deck falsely represented that Frinj’s Seed Round target was fixed 21 when the target was repeatedly increased by Frinj and Ruskey. (Thomas Dec., J] 2, Ex. 1, § 82, bulletpoint 22 no. 7.) This allegation is not sufficient to state fraud because a misrepresentation must pertain to a past 23 or existing fact; alleged subsequent conduct by Ruskey or Frinj is inadequate to state the claim that prior 24 statements about the Seed Round target made in the Slide Deck was false at the time that the statement 25 was made (i.e. when Mullins allegedly generated the Slide Deck). (Apollo, supra,158 Cal.App.4th 226, 26 243; Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 437 (“[a] representation generally is not 27 actionable unless it is about ‘past or existing facts. oo (citation omitted).) As alleged, the Complaint is 28 devoid of any facts to show what statements were made in the Slide Deck, and why those statements are 7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES false. Similarly with the Geisha Model, Plaintiff does not allege what this model is, or what specific statements were contained in the Geisha Model that constitute misrepresentations. Instead, Plaintiff generally claims that the model “was based on incomplete and inaccurate financial records,” and overstated Frinj’s operating costs and overstated Frinj’s net income. These are contentions, not facts. The Complaint does not contain any facts that would show, with sufficient specificity under the heightened pleading standard of fraud, what statements were made to the Plaintiff and how these statements are false. All that Plaintiff has done is make conclusory contentions that the Slide Deck and Geisha Model contain misrepresentations about certain categories, without supporting facts. Such vague and general 10 contentions are not accepted as true for purposes of a demurrer, and are insufficient to plead the element 11 of misrepresentation. 12 In addition, Plaintiff failed to plead facts to show the elements of knowledge of falsity, materiality, 13 and reasonable reliance. Fraud requires specific intent to make a misrepresentation that is material, on 14 which the Plaintiff reasonably relied. (Daniels, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 1166.) Many of Plaintiffs 15 allegations are cursory and vague without any details to show that they are material. For example, 16 Plaintiff contends that the Slide Deck made material misstatements about “the members of its executive 17 team.” In addition to being insufficient to show a misrepresentation, this allegation fails to show why this 18 information is material to the Plaintiff and what misrepresentation was made that Plaintiff reasonably 19 relied on. Likewise, Plaintiff claims that the Geisha Model contains misrepresentations, but there is 20 nothing to show what the Geisha Model is, why it is material, or that Plaintiff relied on it. 21 Plaintiff's claim that the Slide Deck failed to disclose that Frinj was paying for GLO’s costs and 22 expenses fails to properly plead fraud for several reasons. First, this is a claim rooted in concealment, not 23 misrepresentation. “The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or 24 suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the 25 defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the 26 plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the 27 concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or 28 suppression of the fact. [Citation.]” (Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 8 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Cal.App.4th 124, 162.) The Complaint must contain allegations sufficient to establish a duty to disclose. (Hambrick, 238 Cal.App.4th at 163.) There are “ ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539 (LiMandri ).) To state a cause of action for fraudulent concealment, the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose some fact to the plaintiff. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 745.) 10 With respect to duty to disclose, Plaintiff's Complaint is devoid of facts to make a showing that 11 the Slide Deck, which was allegedly a powerpoint presentation, was required to contain all of Frinj’s 12 financial information and liabilities such that its relationship with GLO was required to be disclosed in 13 the Slide Deck, and that the absence of this disclosure constituted actionable concealment. Plaintiff's 14 Complaint fails to allege any facts to show that Mullins, as chief operating officer, had a duty to disclose 15 any information to Plaintiff with respect to her investment, or that he had any knowledge concerning 16 what information was or not previously disclosed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that 17 Mullins had any interactions with her relating to her investment, that he made any representations to the 18 Plaintiff directly, or that he even knew that the Slide Deck or Geisha Model were presented to the 19 Plaintiff. As alleged, Plaintiff's Complaint is wholly defective in establishing a claim that Mullins’ 20 alleged preparation of the Slide Deck at some undefined time, and the subsequent presentation of the 21 Slide Deck to Plaintiff at a later time by Ruskey shows that Mullins aided and abetted fraudulent 22 concealment of information. 23 Plaintiff's allegation with respect to GLO also fails to establish the elements of misrepresentation 24 and materiality. Plaintiff does not allege that GLO is a separate third party entity. Instead Plaintiff alleges 25 that GLO is the “heart, headquarters, and flagship farm of FRINJ coffee” (Thomas Dec., 2, Ex. 1, § 13). 26 Plaintiff's contention that Frinj has a separate website from GLO is immaterial and has no bearing on 27 whether GLO and Frinj are separate entities. The Complaint does not allege any facts to establish why it 28 is a material and fraudulent omission that Frinj did not disclose it was paying for the costs of its “heart, 9 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES headquarters, and flagship farm.” There are also no allegations to establish that this information is material, as the Complaint does not allege any facts to show what, if any, costs or expenses were actually paid, or the value of such costs that it would constitute a material fact. There is a marked difference between paying for hundreds of dollars in GLO’s alleged costs versus hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleading, and the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. (Rakestraw, supra, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d at 356.) Allegations in the pleading must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (/bid.) In ruling on a demurrer, the trial court may consider all material facts properly 10 pleaded in the complaint, but it may not consider contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. 11 (Young, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at 220.) Plaintiff's allegations would fail even under a normal pleading 12 standard, much less under the heightened pleading standard required for fraud. Procedural due process 13 requires that a defendant be given notice of the specific claims and relief which is sought against him in 14 a complaint. (Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1520.) Where a complaint is drafted 15 in such a manner that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., the defendant cannot determine what 16 issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant, a demurrer on the 17 ground that the pleading is uncertain should be sustained. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 18 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Defendant cannot respond to a fraud claim that fails to even identify the specific 19 misrepresentations that were allegedly made by him, and why those statements are false. 20 VI CONCLUSION 21 Defendant requests that the Court sustain Defendant ‘Pome: to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 22 Dated: February 5, 2024 TapsEDIN THOMAS & ENGBLOOM LAw Group LLP wre 23 24 By: Wendy M.\Thomas Betty Huynh— 25 Attorneys for FRINJ Coffee, Inc., John A. “Jay Ruskey, Andy Donald Mullins, and Kari Shafer 26 27 28 10 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES DECLARATION OF WENDY M. THOMAS I, Wendy M. Thomas, declare that I am an attorney at law admitted to practice in state and federal courts in California, including this Court. I am a partner at Tadjedin Thomas & Engbloom Law Group LLP, attorneys of record for Defendant Andy Mullins (“Defendant”). I testify to these facts of my own personal knowledge and, if called as a witness, could and would testify competently thereto under oath. 1 I submit this declaration in support of Defendant Andy Mullins’ Demurrer to Plaintiff Paige Gesualdo’s (‘Plaintiff’) Complaint regarding my compliance with the meet and confer requirements imposed by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 before any demurrer may be filed 10 with the court. 11 2 On or about December 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case against 12 Defendant. The Complaint was served on Defendant on or about January 6, 2024. Attached hereto as 13 Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Complaint. 14 3 On January 29, 2024, I spoke to Plaintiff’s counsel by phone regarding the Demurrer 15 that Defendant intended to file to Plaintiff's Complaint. 16 4 Later this same day, I emailed a meet and confer letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel which 17 detailed the grounds for Defendant’s Demurrer. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct 18 copy of pertinent pages of the email correspondence, with the attached meet and confer letter that I 19 sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel on January 29, 2024. 20 5 On January 30, 2024, the parties further met and conferred by phone conference 21 regarding the demurrer, but the parties were unable to resolve their disputes concerning Defendant’s 22 objections to the Complaint. 23 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing 24 is true and correct. 25 Executed this 5th day of February, 2024 in Marina Ds Rey, California. 26 Yu WW. 27 Wendy M. Thomas” 28 1 DECLARATION OF WENDY M. THOMAS RE MEET AND CONFER COMPLIANCE EXHIBIT 1 (Page 1 of 50) ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California County of Santa Barbara Darrel E. Parker, Executive Officer JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELI, LP 12/1/2023 5:21 ANDREW I. SHADOFF (Bar No. 272319) By: Narzralli Baksh , Deputy ashadoy jmbm.com SHAVON HENRY (Bar No. 326855) shenry@jmbm.com. RAFF J. COGAN (Bar No. 317060) reogan@jmbm.com 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067-4308 Telephone: (310) 203-8080 Facsimile: (310) 203-0567 Attorneys for Plaintiff PAIGE GESUALDO SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA 10 ANACAPA DIVISION 23CV05305 11 PAIGE GESUALDO, Case No. os 12 Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR: BE $a 13 Vv. (1) FRAUD; 2 (2) NEGLIGENT sa u JOHN A. “JAY” RUSKEY, an individual; MISREPRESENTATION; ANDY DONALD MULLINS, an individual; (3) AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD, 15 KARI SHAFER, an individual, FRINJ COFFEE, INC., a California corporation: and (4) CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN 16 DOES 1-25 inclusive, INSTRUMENTS; (5) FAILURE TO PAY WAGES; 17 Defendants. (6) FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES; 18 (7) FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEAL 19 PERIODS AND PAY MEAL PERIOD PENALTIES; 20 (8) FATLURE TO AUTHORIZE AND PERMIT REST BREAKS AND PAY REST 21 BREAK PENALTIES; (9) FAILURE TO PAY TIMELY WAGES; 22 (10) FAILURE TO PROVIDE 23 ACCURATE, ITEMIZED WAGE STATEMENTS; 24 (1) FAILURE TO PROVIDE WAGES AT SEPARATION; 25 (12) FAILURE TO REIMBURSE NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSES; 26 (13) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA 27 LABOR CODE §§ 970 AND 972; (14) BREACH OF CONTRACT, 28 COMPLAINT (Page 2 of 50) (15) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S EQUAL PAY ACT; (16) DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF GOVT. CODE §§ 12940 ET SEQ.; (17) RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF GOVT. CODE §§ 12940 ET SEQ; (18) FATLURE TO PRE NT DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF GOVT. CODE § 12940(K); (19) WRONGFUL / CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE; AND (20) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE §§ 17200 ET SEQ. 10 For her Complaint against Defendants John A. “Jay” Ruskey (“Ruskey”), Andy Donald 11 Mullins (“Mullins”), Kari Shafer (“Shafer”), Frinj Coffee, Ine. (“Frinj”), and DOES 1 through 25 as 12 BE inclusive (collectively, “Defendants”), Plaintiff Paige Gesualdo (“Gesualdo”) alleges as follows: $a 13 2= THE PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE sa u 1 Plaintiff Gesualdo is, and at all times relevant hereto was, an individual residing in 15 the State of California. 16 2. Gesualdo is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant Ruskey is, 17 and at all times relevant hereto was, an individual residing in the State of California, County of 18 Santa Barbara. 19 3 Gesualdo is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant Mullins is, 20 and at all times relevant hereto was, an individual residing in the State of California, County of 21 Riverside. 22 4 Gesualdo is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant Shafer is. 23 and at all times relevant hereto was, an individual residing in the State of California, County of 24 Santa Barbara. 25 5 Defendant Frinj is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a California corporation 26 with its principal place of business in Goleta, California. Ruskcy is, and at all times relevant 27 hereto was, the founder, CEO, and controlling shareholder of Frinj. 28 COMPLAINT (Page 3 of 50) 6 Mullins is a. co-founder of Fring. Gesnaldo is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, from at least 2017 until approximately late 2021 or early 2022, Mullins was the Chief Operations Officer of Frinj. 7. Gesualdo is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Shafer is, and at all times relevant hereto was, the Vice President of Finance and Controller of Frinj. 8. Plaintiff is unaware of the true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of defendants DOES 1 through 25, inclusive. Plaintiff therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to show the true names or capacities of those DOE defendants when the same have been ascertained. Frinj and DOES 1 10 through 25, inclusive, are referred to herein as “Defendants.” Plaintiff is informed and believes and 11 thereon alleges that, at all times mentioned herein, each of the defendants was the agent, employee, at 12 and/or alter ego of each of the other defendants, respectively, and each was at all times herein acting oo BE $a 13 within the scope of said agency and employment and was acting within the permission and consent Ze sa u of the other defendants. 15 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over any and all causcs of action asserted 16 herein pursuant to Article VI, Section 10 of the California Constitution and California Code of Civil 17 Procedure Sections 88 and 410.10 because this is a civil action in which the matter in controversy, 18 not including attorneys’ tees, interests, and costs, exceeds $25,000, and hecanse each canse of action 19 arises under the laws of the State of California or is subject to adjudication in the courts of the State 20 of California. 21 10. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants have 22 caused injuries in the County of Santa Barbara and State of California through their acts, and by 23 their violations of California law. 24 11 Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 25 395(a) because Defendant Frinj is located in Santa Barbara County, Defendants Ruskey and Shafer 26 reside in Santa Barbara County, and Defendants do business in Santa Barbara County. 27 28 3 COMPLAINT (Page 4 of 50) ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO CAUSES OF ACTION 1 THROUGH 4 In April 2021, Gesualdo was Introduced to Ruskey and Frinj 12. Frinj was incorporated in May 2017. 13. Trinj is headquartered at Good Land Organics (“GLO”), a farm that was founded in 1992 by Ruskey’s family. GLO explains on its website that “[w]hat started as a coffee program at Good Land Organics in 2012 became FRINJ Coffee, Inc. in 2018.[...] Today, Good Land Organics is the heart, headquarters and flagship farm of FRINJ Coffee.” Frinj has its own website that is separate from GLO’s website. 14, On April 9, 2021, after being introduced by a third party, Gesualdo met Ruskey at 10 GLO because she was seeking out a California coffee farm to utilize for her own California-grown 11 coffee business venture (the “Initial Meeting”). 12 15. During the Initial Meeting, Ruskey told Gesualdo that his family trust owned the PE $a 13 property on which Frinj operated and that he controlled the trust (and, therefore, the land on which Ze sa u Frinj operated). This was a lie. Ruskey was not then and has not ever controlled the trust that 15 owns the property on which Frinj has operated. Rather, Ruskey’s father controlled and controls 16 that trust and therefore the land on which Frinj has operated. Ruskey concealed from Gesualdo 17 the fact that Frinj operated subject to a lease agreement with a third party over which he had no 18 control. 19 16. During the Initial Meeting, Ruskey also told Gesualdo that Frinj’s Seed Round of 20 investor financing was underway. Calling Frinj the “future of California coffee,” and likening its 21 potential to California’s wine industry, Ruskey pitched Gesualdo on investing in Frinj. 22 TZ, To induce Gesualdo to invest, Ruskey showed Gesualdo a PowerPoint slide deck 23 (the “Slide Deck’’), which purported to accurately reflect Frinj’s business operations. The Slide 24 Deck contained material misrepresentations about Frinj’s operations and value. 25 18. Among other things, the Slide Deck materially overstated Frinj’s grower network, 26 the number of its coffce-producing trees, its average sales price, and the company’s fixed target 27 for Seed Round funding. The Slide Deck also made material misstatements relating to the 28 existence of Frinj*s research and development program, its coffee breeding program, and the 4 COMPLAINT (Page 5 of 50) memhers of its executive team 19, Notably, the Slide Deck made no mention of GLO, and did not indicate that Frinj paid for GLO’s expenses or operations. 20. To further induce Gesualdo to invest, Ruskey also showed Gesualdo financial documents purporting to contain an accurate overview of Frinj’s financial situation. Ruskey provided Gesualdo with the following documents: Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Equity as of December 31, 2019; Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Equity as of June 30, 2020: Quarterly Revenue & Expenses Summary, January —June 2020; and Project Geisha (“Geisha Model”). 21. These financial documents were incomplete, inaccurate, significantly overstated 10 Frinj’s income, and significantly understated Frinj’s liabilities and operating costs. In particular, 11 Frinj owed significant backpay and reimbursements to its emplovees, owed past due bills at a at 12 plant growth nursery called Por La Mar, and owed ongoing monthly payments for an undisclosed oo BE $a