Motion for Writ in Revenued Llc v. Starfish Title Agency, Llc, Steven Sarkin| Trellis.Law

On December 15, 2023 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Revenued Llc, and Starfish Title Agency, Llc, Steven Sarkin, for Commercial - Contract in the District Court of Nassau County.

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FILED: NASSAU COUNTY CLERK 01/29/2024 10:30 AM INDEX NO. 620375/2023
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 28 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/29/2024

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NASSAU
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REVENUED LLC, Index No. 620375/2023

Plaintiff, Returnable: 01/31/2024

-against-

STARFISH TITLE AGENCY, LLC and
STEVEN SARKIN,

Defendants.
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REVENUED LLC’S REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIMS & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

MURRAY LEGAL PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
170 Old Country Rd., Suite 608
Mineola, New York 11501
Tel: (516) 260-7367
E-Mail: CMurray@MurrayLegalPLLC.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1
I. DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES MUST BE DISMISSED. ....................... 1
II. DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED...................................... 5
III. THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL’S AD HOMINEM
ATTACKS OR ADMONISH DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL AGAINST SUCH
CONDUCT GOING FORWARD. ..................................................................................... 8
IV. DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO REPLEAD .................................. 10
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 10
WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION ............................................................................................ 11

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff, Revenued LLC (“Revenued”), respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum of

Law in further support of its motion to dismiss the counterclaims and affirmative defenses filed by

the Defendants, Starfish Title Agency, LLC (the “Corporate Defendant”), and Steven Sarkin based

upon Defendants' failure to allege facts sufficient to plead a claim or defense. Rather than respond

to any arguments in Plaintiff's motion or address the fact that Defendants’ Answer fails to plead

facts necessary to allege an affirmative defense or counterclaims, Defendants’ brief in opposition

argues summarily that Plaintiff has not met the burden for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims,

while failing to recognize this is not a summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Court should

dismiss the Defendants’ counterclaims and affirmative defenses for the following reasons.

ARGUMENT

I. DEFENDANTS’ AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES MUST BE DISMISSED.

The Defendants’ affirmative defenses must all be dismissed for failure to plead facts

sufficient to allege any affirmative defense. Defendants’ opposition ignores the fact that CPLR

3211(b) provides that “[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the

ground that a defense is not stated or has no merit.” CPLR R 3211(b) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff moved to dismiss the Defendants' affirmative defenses based upon Defendants’

submission of mere legal conclusions, rather than the necessary facts. “[W]here affirmative

defenses ‘merely plead conclusions of law without any supporting facts,’ the affirmative defenses

should be dismissed.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. 414 Midland Ave. Assoc., LLC, 78 A.D.3d 746, 750

(2d Dept. 2010). The “essential facts required to give notice of a claim or defense must generally

appear on the face of the pleading and conclusory allegations will not suffice.” Di Mauro v. Metro.

Suburban Bus Auth., 105 A.D.2d 236, 239 (2d Dept. 1984).

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In opposition, Defendants never dispute that affirmative defenses cannot be pled with

mere legal conclusions and never identify a single affirmative defense pled with facts.

Defendants never dispute that their Answer fails to plead affirmative defenses for the exact

reasons cited in Plaintiff's motion. There is not even a section to Defendants' opposition that

would theoretically respond to this breach of Plaintiff's motion. They simply ignore their

own failure to plead facts and controlling law mandating dismissal.

Rather, Defendants respond only by saying “the plaintiff writes a legal treatise to offer his

opinion why affirmative defenses and counter-claims in the answer are meritless.” However, the

only affirmative defense Plaintiff attacked on this basis was usury, and Plaintiff did not rely upon

“opinion,” but documentary evidence in the form of the undisputed Agreement between the parties

and controlling appellate authority mandating dismissal of their usury defense in this context.

In opposition to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants’ affirmative defenses are all

insufficiently plead, Defendants complain broadly that “[t]he defendant has the absolute right to

defend itself with all legal defenses to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining judgment.” NYSCEF

Doc. 25, at 4. This assertion is non-objectionable in that it is utterly generic, but is, in any event,

not accurate because there are many defenses a party may not assert to a claim for a nearly infinite

number of reasons. What Plaintiff is objecting to is that Defendants have simply thrown twelve

conclusory defenses against the wall in the hope that something sticks, without offering an iota of

factual allegations necessary to plead how they could apply in this case – a strategy not permitted

by the CPLR. Defendants further claim that “[i]t is well settled that there is an absolute bar and

prohibition from using a 3211(b) motion to shield the plaintiff from all affirmative defenses.

[Riland v. Frederick S. Todman & Co., 56 A.D.2d 350, 393 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1st Dep't 1977)].” But,

unsurprisingly, that is not what Riland says. Rather, Riland states merely that “the defense of

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failure to state a cause of action may be inserted in an answer as an affirmative defense. The

pleading of that defense is, however, surplusage, as it may be asserted at any time even if not

pleaded.” Riland v Frederick S. Todman & Co., 56 AD2d 350, 352 (1st Dept 1977) (internal

citations omitted). Which is to say: the defense of failure to state a cause of action is not really a

‘defense’ at all, it is mere surplusage (it is, properly construed, the basis for a motion to dismiss).

Riland thus does not speak whatsoever to the argument that the other affirmative defenses plead

are utterly deficient. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants could “challenge the elements for

breach of contract.” But, of course, that is something to address on a summary judgment motion,

not a motion to dismiss counterclaims and affirmative defenses. The Defendants’ ‘wall of words’

pleading strategy is now defended with an attempt to disguise their pleadings’ defects with a mass

of nonsensical verbiage and misrepresentations of case law. This is unsurprising, given that the

Answer is a form document that Defendants’ counsel files regularly without regard to the specific

facts of a given case and Defense counsel files the same opposition in case after case with no

meaningful alterations. But this answer and opposition strategy do not suffice, because “under the

Civil Practice Law and Rules, the statements in pleadings are still required to be factual, that is,

the essential facts required to give “notice” must be stated…” Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60,

63 (1st Dept. 1964). Where affirmative defenses in a pleading are not substantiated with factual

allegations, New York Courts hold that the affirmative defenses must be dismissed. Katz v. Miller,

120 A.D.3d 768, 769-770 (2d Dept. 2014); Commrs. Of the State Ins. Fund v. Ramos, 63 A.D.3d

453 (1st Dept. 2009). Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court should demand more than

Defendants’ have offered and dismiss the defective affirmative defenses.

With regard to Plaintiff’s argument that usury allegations and any defenses and

counterclaims based on them – which is, at bottom, all of them – must be dismissed, the Defendants

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assert summarily that “despite plaintiff’s claim, the affirmative defense and allegation that the

Merchant Cash Agreement here is usurious cannot be dismissed pursuant to 3211(b) as a matter

of law,” citing to LG Funding, LLC v United Senior Props. of Olathe, LLC, 181 AD3d 664, 666

(2d Dept 2020). Unsurprisingly, LG Funding says no such thing, and, in fact, stands for precisely

the opposite proposition. In LG Funding, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion, which were

based on the theory that the underlying agreement was actually a usurious loan. On appeal, the

Second Department affirmed in part and reversed in part. Critically, the Second Department’s

decision affirmed the denial of the motion based on an analysis of the actual provisions of the

Agreement, deciding that they created factual issues as to the absence of risk, the hallmark of a

loan. But courts do regularly hold, upon analysis of such agreements, that they satisfy the three-

factor test as a matter of law and dismiss defenses and claims for usury at every stage of litigation.

See, e.g., Champion Auto Sales, LLC v. Pearl Beta Funding, LLC, 159 A.D.3d 507, 507 (1st Dept.

2018) (granting motion to dismiss usury allegations based upon documentary evidence in the form

of the agreement); Principis Capital, LLC v I Do, Inc., 201 AD3d 752, 754-55 (2d Dept 2022)

(dismissing usury allegations on summary judgment because the agreement satisfied the three-

factor test); Cloudfund, LLC v SPS Constr. LLC, 2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 502 (Sup. Ct. Queens

Cnty. 2023) (usury allegations dismissed as a matter of law based upon documentary evidence and

the application of the three-factor test). As argued extensively in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law

in Support (NYSCEF Doc. 22, Section III), the documentary evidence – the parties’ Agreement –

conclusively proves as a matter of law that the Agreement is not a loan, which requires dismissal

of the affirmative defenses and the counterclaims. Principis Capital, 201 AD3d at 754-755 (2d

Dept 2022). Defendants’ opposition does not contest that the Agreement is the controlling

document and they do not submit any different material suggesting the existence of a different

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contract. The Defendants’ failure to plead any facts giving rise to any affirmative defenses in their

pleading is fatal to each and every one of their affirmative defenses. Consequently, the Court must

dismiss all of the Defendants’ affirmative defenses pursuant to CPLR 3211(b).

II. DEFENDANTS’ COUNTERCLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED.

Defendants’ arguments with regard to their individual counterclaims are equally defective.

Defendants claim "[t]he plaintiff has not offered any admissible evidence to support the dismissal

of affirmative defenses and counter-claims (sic) contained in the answer." NYSCEF Doc. 25, p.4.

Defendants' argument that Plaintiff did not meet the burden for summary judgment is

irrelevant because Plaintiff did not move for summary judgment. Rather, Plaintiff moved to

dismiss the Defendants' counterclaims for failure to plead facts sufficient to state a claim pursuant

to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

Ultimately, the closest thing to a response is Defendants’ counsel’s wholly unsupported

assertion that “Defendants have pleaded affirmative defenses and counter-claims (sic) which

correspond to the allegations in the summons and complaint.” NYSCEF Doc. 25, p.4.

At no point do the Defendants address the fact a conclusory assertion of performance is

insufficient to state a claim without pleading facts. NYSCEF Doc. 22, pp.3-4. Similarly,

Defendants ignore their failure to plead facts about their actual receivables or that estimated

payments were not accurate, that they sustained a reduction or increase in receivables, or any fact

allegations at all about their receivables. Id. As explained in Plaintiff's motion, “conclusory

allegations--claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity--are insufficient

to survive a motion to dismiss.” Godfrey v Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358, 373 (2009); Wonder Works

Constr. Corp. v 421 Kent Dev., LLC, 2018 N.Y. Slip. Op. 32189[U], *3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.

2018)(explaining that “bare, conclusory allegation” that a party “performed ‘extra work’” was

insufficient to plead a claim); Ganieva v Ivywise, 2021 NY Slip Op 31218[U], *9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.

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Cnty. 2021). Furthermore, Defendants never respond to the fact that they failed to plead facts

tending to show any actual injuries. Boilerplate allegations of damage have long been found to be

insufficient to plead a breach of contract claim. Gordon v Dino De Laurentiis Corp., 141 A.D.2d

435, 436 (1st Dept. 1988).

There is not a single reference to Defendants’ Answer anywhere in Defendants’ opposition

papers. Defendants cite no paragraphs or pages and make no reference to any allegations.

Defendants’ pleading was undisputedly a string of legal conclusions couched as facts and binding

appellate authority holds that such pleadings are insufficient to state a claim. The only part of

Defendants’ opposition that appears to reference this case is the caption; the remainder of their

brief is boilerplate that have nothing to do with this case. Finally, contrary to Defendants’ counsel’s

apparent contention, there is no authority holding that Plaintiff must demonstrate an entitlement to

summary judgment on its own claims against Defendants as a pre-requisite to seek dismissal of

the Defendants’ counterclaims for failure to plead facts.

Given the fact that Plaintiff has pointed out that Defendants’ pleading and opposition

papers are unresponsive boilerplate, one would expect some directly on point authority and an

effort by Defendants to try and distinguish said authority. While Defendants make no attempt to

respond, there is directly on point authority:

Plaintiff brings this motion to dismiss Defendants' two counterclaims, pursuant to
CPLR 3211 (a) (7), for failure to state a cause of action, and to dismiss Defendants'
affirmative defenses, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b), on the ground that such defenses
are either insufficiently stated, or have no merit. "On a motion to dismiss a
counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must accept as true the facts as
alleged in the pleading, accord the pleader the benefit of every possible favorable
inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable
legal theory" (Wand, Powers & Goody, LLP v Yuliano, 144 AD3d 1017, 1018, 42
N.Y.S.3d 229 [2d Dept 2016]; see Shah v Mitra, 171 AD3d 971, 98 N.Y.S.3d 197
[2d Dept 2019]). "[H]owever, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions ... are
not entitled to any such consideration" (Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52, 968
N.E.2d 459, 945 N.Y.S.2d 222 [2012]; [*3] see Doe v Hauppauge Union Free Sch.

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Dist., 213 AD3d 809, 184 N.Y.S.3d 150 [2d Dist 2023]). "Dismissal of the
[counterclaim] is warranted if the [counterclaimant] fails to assert facts in support
of an element of the [counterclaim], or if the factual allegations and inferences to
be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery" (Shah v
Mitra, 171 AD3d at 973; quoting Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29
NY3d 137, 142, 53 N.Y.S.3d 598, 75 N.E.3d 1159 [2017]; see Mera v New York
City Health & Hospitals Corporation, AD3d , 2023 NY Slip Op. 04975 [2d
Dept 2023]).

In the case at bar, both of Defendants' "Counter-Claims," asserting "Breach of
Contract by Plaintiff as to Corporate Defendant," and "as against the Individual
Defendants," consisted of strictly conclusory allegations, i.e., "Plaintiff denied
Defendants request for reconciliation," "Plaintiff did not perform pursuant to the
contract by denying the Defendant a reconciliation of the specified amount," and
"Defendant has suffered money damages as a result of Plaintiffs breach of the
agreement." Such bare, conclusory, unsubstantiated assertions, devoid of factual
support, fall woefully short of the requirements for a counterclaim (see
Connaughton v Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 NY3d 137, 53 N.Y.S.3d 598, 75
N.E.3d 1159; Mera v New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, 2023 NY
Slip Op. 04975; Doe v Hauppauge Union Free Sch. Dist., 213 AD3d 809, 184
N.Y.S.3d 150; Shah v Mitra, 171 AD3d at 973). Defendants has failed to proffer
evidence, or even mere allegations, of when and how Defendants requested any
"reconciliation," or any inkling of how, and how much, [*4] "money damages"
were sustained by Defendants. As Plaintiff considered Defendants in default of the
Agreement, for alleged non-payment of the percentage of daily receipts on "April
6, 2023," Defendants' counterclaim is without merit if any "request for
reconciliation" occurred after that date. As such, Defendants' mere conclusory
allegations are insufficient to state a proper counterclaim herein.

Plaintiff's motion also seeks dismissal of all of the alleged Affirmative Defenses in
Defendants' answer. CPLR 3211 (b) provides that "[a] party may move for
judgment dismissing one or more defenses, on the ground that a defense is not
stated or has no merit." The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that
the affirmative defenses "are without merit as a matter of law because they either
do not apply under the factual circumstances of (the) case, or fail to state a defense"
(Bank of Am. N.A, v 414 Midland Ave. Assoc., LLC, 78 AD3d 746, 748, 911
N.Y.S.2d 157 [2d Dept 2010]; see Lewis v U.S. Bank N.A., 186 AD3d 694, 130
N.Y.S.3d 22 [2d Dept 2020]; Shah v Mitra, 171 AD3d 971, 98 N.Y.S.3d 197;
Edwards v Walsh, 169 AD3d 865, 94 N.Y.S.3d 629 [2d Dept 2019]). "On a motion
pursuant to CPLR 3211 (b), the court should apply the same standard it applies to
a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), and the factual assertions of the
defense will be accepted as true" (Shah v Mitra, 171 AD3d at 974, quoting Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v Rios, 160 AD3d 912, 913, 74 N.Y.S.3d 321 [2d Dept 2018]).
An affirmative defense should not be stricken where there exist questions of fact
requiring a trial of the issue ( [*5] see Jacob Marion LLC v Jones, 168 AD3d 1043,

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93 N.Y.S.3d 120 [2d Dept 2019]; Atlas Feather Corp. v Pine Top Ins. Co., 128
AD2d 578, 512 N.Y.S.2d 844 [2d Dept 1987]).

Cloudfund LLC v Golden W. Pool Repair & Spa Care Inc., 2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9512

(Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Oct. 23, 2023). See, also Cloudfund LLC v Broughton Constr. Co. LLC,

2023 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 23043 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Dec. 4, 2023). For the foregoing reasons,

the Court must dismiss the Defendants' counterclaims pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).

III. THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL’S AD
HOMINEM ATTACKS OR ADMONISH DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL
AGAINST SUCH CONDUCT GOING FORWARD.

Defendants’ opposition papers make wholly unsubstantiated accusations of Plaintiff’s

counsel of attacking Defendants’ counsel and use it as a justification to attack Plaintiff’s counsel.

Defendants’ counsel included the following section in their opposition:

Here, the plaintiff writes a legal treatise to offer his opinion
regarding why affirmative defenses and counter-claims (sic)
contained in the answer are meritless. In addition, for some reason,
the plaintiff's counsel attacks the defense counsel's legal acumen
amongst other things. Nevertheless, the plaintiff does not offer any
evidence in admissible form to dismiss any affirmative defense or
counter-claim (sic).

Plaintiff's counsel's affirmation may be an adequate answer to a law
school essay. However, in the real world, there is nothing in
admissible form to strike any affirmative defense or counter-claims
(sic). Plaintiff's counsel's opinion isn't enough.

NYSCEF Doc. 25, p.4.

While Defendants’ counsel claims “the plaintiff's counsel attacks the defense counsel’s

legal acumen amongst other things,” that statement is objectively false. Neither Plaintiff’s

affirmation, nor Plaintiff’s memorandum of law attacked Defense counsel’s perceived “legal

acumen.” Indeed, Defendants' counsel cites to nothing. Why are they unable to cite to anything

while making outlandish attacks? The answer is that Defendants’ counsel files the same boilerplate

response to motions without ever considering whether the response is even appropriate. Indeed,

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Defendants’ counsel filed the same unresponsive boilerplate opposition papers with these attacks

and accusations in Cloudfund LLC v Golden W. Pool Repair & Spa Care Inc., Cloudfund LLC v

Broughton Constr. Co. LLC, and Lendr.Online, LLC v. Professional Corporation Salt River

Builders Inc et al.

Similarly, Defendants’ counsel's accusation that Plaintiff filed a “legal treatise” with

“[Plaintiff's counsel’s] opinion regarding why affirmative defenses and counter-claims (sic)

contained in the answer are meritless” is nonsense. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law contains pages

of legal argument addressing specific defects in Defendants’ Answer and cites to Defendants’

pleading and the applicable law. Similarly, Plaintiff’s counsel's affirmation, which Defendants’

counsel derisively refers to as a “law school essay” is barely two pages long and was submitted to

annex the pleadings to Plaintiff's motion to dismiss and a composite exhibit of multiple boilerplate

forms filed by Defense counsel in case after case. It contains no legal arguments and contains

nothing improper for an affirmation. Nowhere in Defendants’ motion papers do they cite a single

instance of ad hominem attacks from Plaintiff's counsel anywhere in the docket, let alone Plaintiff's

motion. They cite to nothing because no instances exist.

Defense counsel’s unilateral attacks and misrepresentations in response to a meritorious

motion on the pleadings, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s continued courtesies are incredibly out of line.

Rule 3.3(f) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits attorneys from engaging in

undignified or discourteous conduct and prohibit conduct that is intended to disrupt the tribunal.

22 NYCRR 1200.0, Rule 3.3(f)(2) and (4). New York Courts have previously held that

“unsubstantiated, personal attacks on [opposing] counsel are neither relevant to this litigation nor

ethically permissible.” Brook v. Peconic Bay Med. Ctr., 2016 NY Slip Op 31977(U), *35 (Sup.

Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2016). “[L]eveling unprofessional and vituperative personal attacks against

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[opposing counsel] in Court documents” is a clear violation of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. In re Raskin, 217 A.D.2d 187, 189-90 (2d Dept. 1995).

Where an attorney’s submissions “have deteriorated into an attack on counsel,” it is

reasonable for the Court to admonish that attorney that “[t]he Court expects a quick return to

civility.” Melcher v Apollo Med. Fund Mgt. LLC, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8563, *17 (Sup. Ct.

N.Y. Cnty. 2007). Although this is the fourth time Defendants’ counsel has resorted to lobbing

these boilerplate ad hominem attacks, sanctions may not yet be appropriate. Instead, the Court

should first admonish defense counsel and “stress[] the need for civility and adherence to the

ethical rules that govern attorneys within the State of New York.” Barrier Assoc. Inc v Eagle Eye

Advance LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 51313[U], *42 (Sup. Ct. Orange Cnty. 2022). In all likelihood a

simple warning to Mr. Jacovetti would be sufficient.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court should admonish Defendants' counsel to make a swift

return to civility.

IV. DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO REPLEAD

Defendants’ Opposition closes by requesting “leave to replead its affirmative defenses” “if

this Court finds that more facts are required.” NYSCEF Doc. 25, p.6. Plaintiff respectfully submits

that this request must be denied, as Defendants have not made any motion nor demonstrated any

entitlement to such leave, and, to the extent that this single paragraph may be construed as a motion

for leave to amend, it must be denied independently because, based on the arguments herein and

in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support (NYSCEF Doc. 22), any such amendment would

be clearly devoid of merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Defendants’ affirmative defenses

pursuant to CPLR 3211(b).

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WHEREFORE, Revenued respectfully requests that this honorable court enter an Order:

1) Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), dismissing the Defendants’ counterclaims for failure

to plead facts sufficient to state a claim;

2) Pursuant to CPLR 3211(b), dismissing all of the Defendants’ affirmative defenses

for failure to plead with facts and dismissing the Defendants’ usury defenses based

upon documentary evidence; and

3) Granting Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 29, 2024
/s/ Joseph M. Jackling
Joseph M. Jackling, Esq.
Murray Legal, PLLC
170 Old Country Rd., Suite 608
Mineola, New York 11501
Tel: (516) 260-7367
E-Mail: jjackling@murraylegalpllc.com
To via NYSCEF:
Counsel for Defendants

WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION

I certify that, excluding the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, signature block,

and this certification, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law contains 3,563 words and complies with

the word count limits imposed by the rules of this Court. The foregoing word counts were

calculated by Microsoft Word.

Dated: January 29, 2024
/s/ Joseph M. Jackling
Joseph M. Jackling, Esq.

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Case Info

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Eileen C Daly-Sapraicone Track Judge’s New Case

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Document Filed Date

January 29, 2024

Case Filing Date

December 15, 2023

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Motion-Secondary: Revenued Llc v. Starfish Title Agency, Llc, Steven Sarkin

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