Motion for Summary Judgment in FARAH GOHARI et al vs MCDONALD?S CORPORATION et al| Trellis.Law

On June 20, 2016 a Motion-Secondary was filed involving a dispute between Farah Gohari, Gohari Farah, and Mcdonald?S Corporation, Mcdonald?S Fran. O?Hare T, Mcdonald?S Fran. O'Hare T, for Class Actions in the District Court of Cook County.

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FILED
1/11/2023 1:40 PM
IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
CIRCUIT CLERK
COOK COUNTY, IL
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 2016CH08261
Calendar, 9
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION 20997981
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

FARAH GOHARI as the Named )
Class Representative Plaintiff, and all )
others similarly situated, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 2016 CH 08261
v. )
)
McDONALD’S CORPORATION, ) Hon. Cecilia A. Horan
LOTT #1, INC., McDonald’s franchise at )
O’Hare Airport, Terminal 1, Concourse C, )
and LOTT #1, INC., McDonald’s franchise )
at O’Hare Airport, Terminal 1, Concourse B, )
)
Defendants. )

DEFENDANT McDONALD’S CORPORATION’S REPLY
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The admissions in Plaintiff’s Response defeat her only remaining claim in this case.

Plaintiff admits that “[s]he saw the Steak & Egg meal price listed on the digital menu board at

$4.80, prior to her purchase,” and “each time she added an additional item the total seemed

excessive.” (Resp. at 4). Ignoring these excessive totals—and numerous other facts that showed

she was being charged more than the posted price for her husband’s breakfast meal—Plaintiff

handed over her money. Under the undisputed facts, Plaintiff was not “actually deceived” by the

menu board price at the McDonald’s restaurant she visited. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish the

element of proximate cause on her Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim, and McDonald’s is

entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiff devotes most of her Response to red herrings. For example, she complains about

the scope of the erroneous menu board pricing even though these complaints are entirely

irrelevant to the sole basis for McDonald’s motion—the element of proximate cause. She also
spends much of her argument discussing the voluntary payment doctrine even though

McDonald’s does not cite this doctrine or rely upon it in any way.
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

In the few pages Plaintiff devotes to the relevant issue of proximate cause, she sidesteps

damaging facts she cannot explain, ignores the reasonable consumer standard that governs the

question of actual deception, and cites irrelevant negligence and Federal Trade Commission Act

cases that have nothing to do with the ICFA. In the end, Illinois law is clear. In determining

whether a plaintiff was “actually deceived” for purposes of an ICFA claim, a court must assess

whether a reasonable consumer would have been deceived in light of all the information

available to her. And here—where Plaintiff saw the inaccurate breakfast meal price, was told

multiple times the menu price was wrong, repeatedly complained about the totals at the register,

demanded an explanation for why the restaurant would not honor the posted price, took a photo

of the menu board thinking she had been overcharged, and received a receipt that disclosed the

pricing discrepancy at the heart of her claim—Plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT

I. The Court Should Reject Plaintiff’s Attempt to Distract the Court With Irrelevant
Facts

As noted above, McDonald’s summary judgment motion is directed exclusively at the

proximate cause element of Plaintiff’s ICFA claim. Yet, Plaintiff spends most of her Response

discussing irrelevant facts like McDonald’s supposed intent and whether advertising an

erroneous price can constitute a deceptive practice under the ICFA. (See Resp. at 1, 4, 19-21).

Plaintiff also includes irrelevant sections in her brief like, “McDonald’s and Lott #1, Inc.’s Two

Month Long Continuing Fraud,” and “McDonald’s Fraud Occurred Beyond Just O’Hare, and For

Additional Products.” (Id. at 6-8). None of these arguments about the nature, length, and scope

of McDonald’s conduct is relevant to the issue of proximate case.

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Moreover, as the Court has recognized, whether other consumers may have been

confused by McDonald’s digital menu board pricing does not matter. To survive summary
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

judgment, Plaintiff must show that she has a viable ICFA claim. And to prevail on that claim,

Plaintiff must prove that a reasonable consumer in her position would have been “actually

deceived.” Thus, Plaintiff’s arguments about McDonald’s purported knowledge and the scope of

the inaccurate menu board pricing should be ignored in deciding McDonald’s motion.

Nor should the Court be distracted by Plaintiff’s attempt to paint McDonald’s in a bad

light by frequently referencing its supposed “overcharging” of customers and its acceptance of

“ill-gotten” gains. (See Resp. at 1-2, 4). As a factual matter, Plaintiff was not “overcharged”

when she visited a McDonald’s restaurant on May 28, 2016. To the contrary, she was charged

the correct price the franchisee had entered into McDonald’s point-of-sale software for her

husband’s Steak & Egg McMuffin meal. As explained in an affidavit Plaintiff cites throughout

her Response, a computer glitch caused by a software migration resulted in two O’Hare

restaurants posting a digital menu board price for the Steak & Egg McMuffin meal that did not

include the price of the drink. (Resp. Ex. 2 ¶¶ 5-6). When the register attendant rang up

Plaintiff’s order, Plaintiff was charged exactly what she should have been charged for her

husband’s meal—the meal price in the system of $6.20 (that included a coffee and hash browns),

not the incorrect menu board price of $4.80 (that did not capture the cost of the drink). 1 But

1
A discerning customer may have noticed that the digital menu board price for a Steak & Egg McMuffin
sandwich was $4.55. (McD’s Mem., Ex. C). The meal price ($4.80) was only 25 cents more. For the
three breakfast items listed directly above the Steak & Egg McMuffin, the difference between the
sandwich price and the meal price was $1.60. (Id.). This is a much more sensible difference than 25
cents because it accounts for the inclusion of a coffee and hash browns in the meal. Although the record
evidence does not reveal whether Plaintiff observed these differences between the sandwich and meal
prices, this is one of many facts that should have caused her to realize that the posted price of her
husband’s meal was incorrect.

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regardless, Plaintiff’s references to McDonald’s purported wrongdoing are not relevant to

McDonald’s dispositive motion, and the Court should disregard them.
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

II. Plaintiff Either Ignores or Mischaracterizes Evidence That Defeats Her Claim

When discussing facts that actually are relevant to the element of proximate cause,

Plaintiff either misstates the evidence or ignores it altogether.

For example, Plaintiff downplays the significance of the email she sent McDonald’s

immediately after her visit to the restaurant. According to Plaintiff, the email does not state that

McDonald’s “informed her of the prices,” and her testimony regarding the email “merely

confirms what was written.” (Resp. at 6). But her testimony does much more than that. As

McDonald’s explained in its Opening Memorandum, the email contains a detailed account of

Plaintiff’s visit and her frustration with the prices she was quoted at the register. It states that she

initially ordered an egg biscuit and “breakfast meal 4.75” and, upon hearing the total for her

order, “asked why the menu price was 4.75 and you charge 6.70.” (See McD’s Mem., Exhibit

D). At the January 17, 2020 hearing, Plaintiff testified that what she referred to in the email as

“breakfast meal 4.75” was her husband’s Steak & Egg McMuffin meal. (Tr. at 79:10-23).

Therefore, her sworn testimony proves that when Plaintiff ordered that meal three times that

morning, she knew that the price of the meal on the menu board did not match the price at the

Plaintiff also ignores other evidence she cannot explain. For example, in its Opening

Memorandum, McDonald’s quoted Plaintiff’s testimony about her conversation with the

manager at the restaurant. (McD’s Mem. at 6). During this exchange, Plaintiff told the manager

that she tried to change her order a couple times because she was being charged four dollars for

an egg biscuit. (Tr. at 56:19-24). The manager responded that this wasn’t the problem; the

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problem was that McDonald’s had an issue with its pricing display. (Id. at 57:1-3) Plaintiff

replied, “Are you going to honor me the price that I’m supposed to get?” (Id. at 57:4-6). When
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

told “no,” that she would have to pay the register price, Plaintiff asked, “You’re not going to

honor the price I’m supposed to get?” (Id. at 57:9-20). And after again being told “no,” Plaintiff

said “That’s fine,” and paid for her order. (Id. at 57:24-58:1).

This exchange shows that Plaintiff knowingly acquiesced in paying a higher price at the

the price of the egg biscuit she initially ordered was not on the digital menu board; only the price

of her husband’s Steak & Egg McMuffin meal was. (Tr. at 50:9-10 (“I could not find the egg

biscuit on the menu.”)). So, the discussion she had with the manager about a conflict between

Significantly, Plaintiff’s testimony is entirely consistent with the following allegation in her

complaint: “Defendants misrepresented the true price of the items for sale, and when confronted

with the wrong price, refused to correct the wrong price.” (Resp. Ex. 12, First Am. Compl., ¶

53 (emphasis added)). Plaintiff simply ignores this testimony in her Response.

III. Plaintiff’s Discussion of the Voluntary Payment Doctrine is a Red Herring

Plaintiff’s argument regarding proximate cause centers largely on her attempt to dispute

that the voluntary payment doctrine defeats her claim. (Resp. at 2, 9-13). This argument misses

the mark because McDonald’s does not cite or discuss the voluntary payment doctrine in its

Memorandum, nor does McDonald’s motion rely on the doctrine in any way.

“The common-law voluntary payment doctrine embodies the ancient and ‘universally

recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment and with

knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the

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ground that the claim was illegal.’” McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., 2019 IL

123626, ¶ 22 (citing Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Tel. Co., 234 Ill. 535, 541 (1908)). The
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

doctrine often applies in tax cases to preclude recovery of an erroneous tax that was paid

voluntarily and then remitted by a retailer to a taxing authority. Id. ¶¶ 25, 34.

This is not a tax case, and McDonald’s does not argue that the voluntary payment

doctrine bars Plaintiff’s ICFA claim. Instead, McDonald’s argues that Plaintiff cannot establish

the proximate cause element of her claim because the menu board pricing that allegedly deceived

her did nothing of the sort. Plaintiff knew the pricing was wrong, she complained about it, she

was told that the restaurant would not honor the menu board price, and she responded, “that’s

fine” and paid the total the cash register attendant requested. Thus, the harm Plaintiff claims she

suffered—a supposed $1.40 “overcharge”—was not the product of her having been actually

deceived by an erroneous meal price; it was the product of her decision to pay for her order

knowing that there was a discrepancy between the register price and the menu board price.

McDonald’s cited a dozen ICFA cases in its summary judgment memorandum, and the

only one that even mentions the voluntary payment doctrine is the McIntosh case cited above. In

McIntosh, a consumer alleged that a retailer had wrongfully collected a bottled water tax on the

sale of beverages that were exempt from the tax. See 2019 IL 123626, ¶ 7. The retailer cited the

voluntary payment doctrine as an affirmative defense to the consumer’s ICFA claim, and the

Illinois Supreme Court held that: (1) the voluntary payment doctrine applied to ICFA claims; and

(2) the consumer did not plead sufficient facts to assert the fraud exception to the doctrine. Id. ¶¶

31, 41. In so holding, the Court made two observations that are highly relevant here. First,

“[w]here the nature and amount of a charge is fully disclosed, the plaintiff cannot successfully

assert that he or she was operating under a mistake of fact with respect to the charge.” Id. ¶ 36.

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And, second, “an accurate receipt is one of the factors that indicates there was no deception by

the retailer.” Id.
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

These legal principles contribute to the inescapable conclusion that Plaintiff’s ICFA

claim fails as a matter of law. She knew the amount she was being charged, and she received a

receipt that—by her own admission—allowed her instantly to “figure[] out” that the price she

was charged at the counter for her husband’s breakfast meal did not match the price on the

digital menu board. (Resp. at 1). But, unlike the retailer in McIntosh, McDonald’s has not

asserted the voluntary payment doctrine as an affirmative defense. It has merely challenged

Plaintiff’s ability to prove an element of her claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s citation to a law review

article on the voluntary payment doctrine and her discussion of the many exceptions to the

doctrine are not relevant to McDonald’s motion. 2

IV. Under the Reasonable Consumer Standard, Plaintiff’s ICFA Claim Fails as a
Matter of Law

Plaintiff argues that she was actually deceived for purposes of the ICFA because, while

she knew certain prices on McDonald’s menu board were inaccurate, she did not realize which of

the two products she ordered was mispriced until she returned to her gate moments after making

her purchase. (Resp. at 1 (stating that she “figured it out, post-purchase, from the receipt”)). But

even if the Court accepts this version of events, Plaintiff’s ICFA claim still fails because

Plaintiff’s focus on her subjective understanding is misplaced.

2
Adding to the confusion, Plaintiff claims that she paid for her order “under protest” and even goes so far
as to label her complaint a “Payment Under Protest Complaint.” (Resp. at 5-6, 10). Making a payment
under protest can be a viable exception to the voluntary payment doctrine, but, again, McDonald’s has not
invoked this doctrine. Further, in order for Plaintiff to have paid for her husband’s Steak & Egg
McMuffin meal “under protest,” she would have had to know that the register price exceeded the menu
price for that meal when she bought it (which Plaintiff disputes).

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When analyzing misrepresentation claims under the ICFA, the “test for the deceptiveness

of a representation is keyed to a reasonable consumer, and deceptiveness is evaluated specifically
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

in light of all the information available to the consumer.” See, e.g., Fuchs v. Menard, Inc., 2017

WL 4339821, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[i]f other

information disclosed or available to the consumer dispels any tendency to deceive, there is no

deception.” See Trujillo v. Apple Computer, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 935, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2008).

Although Plaintiff acknowledges that the reasonable consumer test applies to her claim,

she cites only one case that actually employs it—Bell v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 982 F.3d

468 (7th Cir. 2020). (Resp. at 17-18). In Bell, consumers complained that a food packaging

label fooled them into thinking that grated Parmesan cheese sold in shaker tubes was “100%

cheese.” The defendants countered that a reasonable consumer would have rotated the tube, read

the ingredient list, and learned that the products contained a small amount of cellulose; thus, the

plaintiffs should have realized that the 100% label was not entirely accurate. The district court

agreed and dismissed the 100% claims, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that an accurate

fine-print ingredient list on food packaging does not foreclose as a matter of law a claim that an

ambiguous front label could deceive a reasonable consumer. 982 F.3d at 476.

Notably, Bell was decided at the dismissal stage. The courts did not have the benefit of

the plaintiffs’ testimony regarding their purchasing experiences. Here, in contrast, we have Ms.

Gohari’s sworn testimony and email to McDonald’s the morning of her visit, both of which show

that she believed every step of the way that she was being charged “excessive” prices, that she

was told the digital menu board pricing was incorrect, that she complained that McDonald’s

would not honor the posted prices, that she received a receipt at the point of sale that accurately

listed the prices of the two items she bought, and that she collected photographic evidence of the

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menu board’s erroneous pricing before she left the restaurant. The question before the Court is

not whether an inaccurate menu price theoretically could deceive a consumer. It is whether in
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

this case, under these facts, Plaintiff was “actually deceived” by the menu price of her husband’s

Steak & Egg McMuffin meal for purposes of an ICFA claim. And clearly she was not.

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish another pricing case against McDonald’s—Killeen—on

the ground that the menu board pricing in that case was not alleged to be inaccurate. (Resp. at

12). In doing so, Plaintiff fails to grasp the legal significance of that case. As Judge Bucklo

explained, even when advertising has a tendency to deceive consumers, “Illinois law is clear that

where other information is available to dispel that tendency, there is no possibility for

deception.” Killeen v. McDonald’s Corp., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 2018). In

Killeen, the menu board prices revealed the discrepancy between the meal and a la carte pricing

underlying the plaintiff’s ICFA claim. Whether the plaintiff actually realized this when she

visited the restaurant was irrelevant. Similarly, here, Plaintiff’s exchange with restaurant

personnel and her customer receipt revealed the discrepancy between the menu and register

pricing underlying her claim. And whether she actually realized this at the time is irrelevant.

Indeed, Killeen and many other cases McDonald’s cites—such as Batson, Fuchs, and

Tudor—completely destroy the theory articulated in Plaintiff’s Response. Plaintiff’s main

argument for surviving summary judgment is premised on the notion that she did not realize that

the register price of her husband’s Steak & Egg McMuffin meal was higher than the menu board

price of the meal until after she had received her food and reviewed her receipt at the gate. But

in Killeen, the customer did not realize that the meal price of her items exceeded the a la carte

price until after she left the restaurant. In Batson, the court dismissed a concertgoer’s ICFA

claim even though he argued that “he was not informed of the existence of [a hidden parking

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charge] until after he purchased a nonrefundable ticket and saw [the $9 charge] on its face.”

Batson v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 833 (7th Cir. 2014). In Fuchs, the
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

plaintiffs did not learn that the lumber they had purchased was smaller than advertised until after

they got home and measured it. And in Tudor, the plaintiffs did not realize they had been

charged more at the checkout counter for groceries than the prices advertised on store shelves

until after they had made their purchases. In all of these cases, what the consumers realized at

the point of sale was not dispositive.

Plaintiff’s other proximate cause arguments fail as well. As noted above, her invocation

of the voluntary payment doctrine is unavailing. So, too, is her reliance on Federal Trade

Commission Act cases and negligence decisions. (Resp. at 14-16). Plaintiff’s suggestion that

the Court conduct but-for and foreseeability analyses may be appropriate in the wrongful death

cases she cites (see Resp. at 16 n.16), but it is misplaced here, where the dispositive issue is

whether she was “actually deceived” for purposes of an ICFA claim.

Finally, Plaintiff cites Affrunti v. Village Ford Sales, Inc., 232 Ill. App. 3d 704 (3d Dist.

1992) for the proposition that overcharging consumers can give rise to liability under the ICFA.

But Affrunti is an omissions case that does not even mention the element of proximate cause. In

Affrunti, the plaintiff bought a used car. When he arrived at the car lot, he asked a salesman to

tell him the car’s list price, which everyone knows is the starting point for negotiating the price

of a used car. Rather than quote the true list price of $6,995 for the vehicle, the salesman quoted

the plaintiff a price of $8,600. Affrunti, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 706. After buying the car for $8,524,

the plaintiff returned home and saw the actual list price of the car in a newspaper ad. Id. At trial,

the plaintiff was awarded the difference between the list price of the car and the amount he paid

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for it. Id. at 707. The Third District affirmed, finding that “the defendant’s failure to disclose

the advertised sale price constituted deceptive conduct under the [ICFA].” Id.
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

The consumer in Affrunti was completely duped. The defendant concealed the list price

of the car he bought, and no information was present at the point of sale that might have

dispelled the confusion caused by the defendant’s deception. Here, in contrast, Plaintiff was

privy to multiple pieces of information—from the “excessive” register totals, to her customer

receipt, to exchanges with several restaurant workers who told her that items on the menu board

were mispriced—that made it clear there was a discrepancy between the posted price and the

V. Plaintiff Offers No Meaningful Response to McDonald’s Materiality Argument

In its Opening Memorandum, McDonald’s explained that Plaintiff was not genuinely

concerned about the price of her husband’s Steak & Egg McMuffin meal. Plaintiff testified that

her husband dispatched her to buy that specific meal, so she knew she was going to buy it even

before she got in line and looked at the digital menu board. Her testimony makes clear that she

would have bought the Steak & Egg McMuffin meal regardless of whether its price was $4.80 or

$6.20. Thus, she cannot prove that the menu board price of $4.80 caused her to suffer an out-of-

pocket loss. See, e.g., Lehrman v. South Chicago Cable, Inc., 210 Ill. App. 3d 346, 352 (1st Dist.

1991) (“under the Consumer Fraud Act, the misrepresented or omitted fact must have been

material”); Kellerman v. Mar-Rue Realty and Builders, Inc., 132 Ill. App. 3d 300, 306-07 (1st

Dist. 1985) (affirming summary judgment on ICFA claim where “plaintiffs failed to allege they

would have done anything differently,” so “the requisite materiality was lacking”).

Plaintiff does not respond to this argument directly, but she does cite her hearing

testimony for the proposition that “[s]he relied upon the price [of the breakfast meal], it was a

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factor in her purchase, and she decided to purchase the meal at the offered price.” (Resp. at 4).

The testimony she quotes for this assertion, however, is a short passage in which she merely
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

states that she saw the price of the Steak & Egg McMuffin meal on the digital menu board. (Tr.

at 44:11-18). Nowhere in her complaint, email, or hearing testimony does Plaintiff state that the

posted price of $4.80 for her husband’s breakfast meal was material to her purchasing decision.

Stated differently, the fact that Plaintiff saw the price of the Steak & Egg McMuffin meal

on the digital menu board is not in dispute. Nor is the fact that, at least initially, she expected to

be charged that price. The relevant question is whether the discrepancy in price mattered to

her—i.e., was it material in the sense that it actually influenced her purchasing decision. If

Plaintiff would have bought this meal regardless of whether its advertised price was $4.80 or

$6.20, then Plaintiff cannot claim she was “actually deceived” by the menu board price in a way

that contributed to her alleged out-of-pocket loss.

And that is precisely the case. Plaintiff neither alleged in her complaint nor testified at

the January 2020 hearing that she would have chosen a different meal for her husband if she had

known all along that the meal’s register price was $6.20. She would have perjured herself had

she done so, as all evidence is to the contrary. Plaintiff’s husband was suffering from fatigue and

low blood sugar. (Tr. at 37:3-6). He specifically asked her to buy a Steak & Egg McMuffin meal

for him. (Id. at 38:18-39:4). Plaintiff never had purchased that meal before and, therefore, had

no knowledge of what its price might be. (Id. at 33:1-6). And her husband apparently is a strong

willed person who is not shy about expressing his displeasure when he doesn’t get what he

wants. (See id. at 39:1-2 (“When he wants something, you follow what he wants.”); see also id.

at 47:19-24, 64:23-65:4 (stating that Plaintiff’s husband’s “gets crazy” when he gets hungry).

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Repeatedly during her testimony, Plaintiff explained that she was determined to buy her

husband a Steak & Egg McMuffin meal. She included that meal in all three of her orders
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

because that was the entire purpose of her visit to McDonald’s. (See, e.g., id. at 39:2-4 (“He told

me he wants that egg and steak sandwich meal, and I knew I’m going to buy that for him.”); id.

at 81:15-16 (“I wasn’t even thinking about that price because I was supposed to order that

meal”); id. at 47:23-24 (explaining her delay to her husband by saying, “I just wanted to get your

meal. You wanted the meal.”). Given the above facts—all taken from Plaintiff’s sworn

testimony—it is clear that Plaintiff was intent on buying a Steak & Egg McMuffin meal for her

husband and would have done so regardless of the $1.40 difference in price (or, actually, $.40

difference after the $1.00 discount she received).

In the end, any confusion Plaintiff labored under regarding the price of her husband’s

breakfast meal had no bearing on whether she ultimately was going to buy it. And because she

would not have done anything different had she known the true price of the meal all along, the

erroneous menu price was not material. For this reason and many others, Plaintiff cannot

establish the proximate cause element of her ICFA claim, and summary judgment in McDonald’s

favor is proper.

VI. The Court Should Deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Grant
McDonald’s Motion Instead

Finally, McDonald’s respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion for

summary judgment. McDonald’s will not discuss all of the elements of Plaintiff’s ICFA claim

because there is no point in doing so. McDonald’s submissions to this Court establish that

Plaintiff lacks a triable issue on the proximate cause element of her ICFA claim. As a result, not

only should the Court deny Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, but it should grant

McDonald’s dispositive motion and put an end to this case.

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CONCLUSION

In the end, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the proximate cause element of her ICFA claim
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

because she was not “actually deceived” by the inaccurate menu board price that is the subject of

her complaint. The undisputed evidence shows that there was plenty of information at her

disposal to “dispel[] the deception on which her claims are based.” Killeen, 317 F. Supp. 3d at

1013. Accordingly, McDonald’s respectfully asks this Court to award McDonald’s summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim and to enter final judgment in

McDonald’s favor in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

McDONALD’S CORPORATION

/s/ David J. Doyle
One of its Attorneys

David J. Doyle
William J. Sullivan
FREEBORN & PETERS LLP
311 South Wacker Drive
Suite 3000
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 360-6000
Firm No. 71182

Dated: January 11, 2023

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, an attorney, hereby certifies that on January 11, 2023 he caused a copy
FILED DATE: 1/11/2023 1:40 PM 2016CH08261

of the foregoing McDONALD’S CORPORATION’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served via electronic mail upon the following
individuals:

Clinton A. Krislov
Kenneth T. Goldstein
KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
20 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 1300
Chicago, Illinois 60606
clint@krislovlaw.com
ken@krislovlaw.com

Jessica Burtnett
TRAUB LIEBERMAN STRAUS & SHREWSBERRY LLP
303 W. Madison, Suite 1200
Chicago, Illinois 60606
jburtnett@tlsslaw.com

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-
109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned
certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are
true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on
information and belief and as to such matters the
undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the
same to be true.

/s/ David J. Doyle
David J. Doyle

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Horan, Cecilia A. Track Judge’s New Case

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January 11, 2023

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June 20, 2016

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Motion-Secondary: FARAH GOHARI et al vs MCDONALD?S CORPORATION et al

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