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FILED
1/26/2024 11:58 AM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Jenifer Trujillo DEPUTY
CAUSE NO. DC-23-08825
ELIZABETH JONES BOYCE, as Trustee of § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
THE VIVIAN JONES MANAGEMENT TRUST, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 134th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
QUALITYF&M, LLC, 6787RE, LLC, and §
BRYAN GARVEY, §
§
Defendants. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S TRADITIONAL MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY
TO THE HONORABLE COURT:
Defendants QualityF&M, LLC, 6787RE, LLC and Bryan Garvey (taken together
“Defendants”), file their Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (the “Motion”) filed by Elizabeth Jones Boyce, as Trustee of The Vivian Jones
Management Trust (“Plaintiff”), and respectfully state as follows:
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. Plaintiff’s performance under the Lease between Plaintiff and Defendant Quality
F&M.
2. Plaintiff’s breach of the Lease between Plaintiff and Defendant Quality F&M.
3. The duration/termination of the Lease.
4. Damages sustained by Plaintiff as a result of a breach by Defendant Quality F&M,
including Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate any such damages.
5. Defendants’ removal or wrongful possession of secured property and exercise of
control over secured property that was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s rights, if any, as
well as the market value of any such property.
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 of 7
These disputed issues of material facts preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, the
Court must deny Plaintiff’s Motion.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
This Response is based upon the pleadings and competent summary judgment evidence
herein, as well as matters for which the Court may take judicial notice, including, without
limitation:
a. Plaintiff’s Original Petition filed on June 28, 2023;
b. Defendants’ Original Answer filed on July 31, 2023;
c. Defendants’ First Amended Answer filed on January 26, 2024;
d. The Affidavit of Bryan Garvey dated January 26, 2024 and its exhibits, filed
contemporaneously herewith (the “Garvey Affidavit”);
e. This Response; and
f. Any matter over which the Court may take judicial under the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure or Texas Rules of Evidence.
OBJECTIONS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE
Simultaneously with the filing of this Response, Defendants have filed the following:
• Objections to and Motion to Strike Declaration of Elizabeth Jones Boyce (the
“Boyce Declaration”).
RESPONSE
A. Applicable Standard – Summary Judgment
To obtain a summary judgment, each element of a claim or defense must be conclusively
proved.1 The movant must establish its entitlement to a summary judgment on the issues expressly
1
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2 of 7
presented to the trial court by conclusively establishing all essential elements of his cause of action
or defense as a matter of law.2
More than a scintilla of evidence exists “if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis
for differing conclusions by reasonable minds” about a vital fact’s existence. 3 In considering
motions for summary judgment, Courts consider all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true,
indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the non-movant’s favor.4
Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract or conversion claims
because there are genuine issues of material fact as to one or more of the elements of Plaintiff’s
claims.
Plaintiff is also not entitled to summary judgment of his claims because Defendant can
establish the affirmative defenses of prior material breach and failure to mitigate.
B. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim (Defendant QF&M)
The elements of a breach of contract are (1) the existence of a valid contract, (2)
performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach of the contract by the defendant,
and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach.5
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim first fails as a result of Plaintiff’s own breach of the
Lease. A breach of contract occurs when a party fails to perform an act it has explicitly or
impliedly promised to perform.6 Specifically, despite representing to Defendant QF&M that it
approved of a sublease procured by Defendant QF&M, Plaintiff ultimately and unreasonably failed
2
Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1983).
3
Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)
4
Randall’s Food Market, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); Bangert v. Baylor
College of Med., 881 S.W.2d 564, 565 – 566 (Tex. 1994).
5
See Rice v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 324 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).
6
Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 299 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 of 7
to execute the sublease because it wanted to “re-trade” the deal with the sublease tenant vis-à-vis
a direct lease.7 Plaintiff’s actions constitute a material breach under Article Ten of the Lease,8 and
such breach excuses any further performance, including payment of rent, by Defendant QF&M
under the Lease.9
Furthermore, Defendant QF&M did not abandon the Premises, so there was no breach in
that regard. Even if not excused by Plaintiff’s breach, Defendant coordinated with and had
Plaintiff’s permission to vacate the premises.10 In fact, Plaintiff had arranged for contractors to
start work on the Premises immediately after Defendant vacated, specifically to engage in
remodeling of the Premises.11 After remodeling the Premises, Plaintiff raised the rent to a much
higher rate than Defendant QF&M had paid under the Lease.12
As to the plumbing leak that Plaintiff alleges constitutes a breach, it was not discovered
until QF&M was moving out of the Premises, the leak was outside of the tenant space, and
accordingly it was the Landlord’s obligation to repair it, not the tenant.13
Defendant QF&M also could not be in breach of the Lease when the Lease itself had been
terminated.14
Finally, Plaintiff does not have damages that stem from a breach by Defendant QF&M as
Defendant’s performance was excused by (i) Plaintiff’s material breach, (ii) Plaintiff’s failure to
7
Garvey Affidavit at ¶¶ 5-6, 9.
8
A copy of the Lease is attached as Exhibit A-1 to the Motion.
9
Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam);
Compass Bank v. MFP Fin. Servs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
10
Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 10.
11
Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 11.
12
Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 11.
13
Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 13.
14
Garvey Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-8.
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4 of 7
execute the sublease and instead try to re-trade the deal with the sublease tenant, (iii) Plaintiff’s
failure to mitigate her damages, instead opting to remodel the Premises and re-list at a much higher
rate, and (iv) the termination of the Lease itself.
Accordingly, at a minimum, there exists fact issues as to the term of the Lease, and breaches
of the Lease by Plaintiff, as well as Defendant QF&M. There also exists a material fact issue as to
whether Plaintiff’s alleged damages can be attributed to Defendant QF&M, and whether Plaintiff
failed to mitigate any such damages. As such, summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim must be denied.
C. Plaintiff’s Conversion Claim (Defendants QF&M and Garvey)
The elements of a conversion claim are (1) the plaintiff owned or had possession of the
property or entitlement to possession; (2) the defendant unlawfully and without authorization
assumed and exercised control over the property to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the
plaintiff’s rights as an owner; (3) the plaintiff demanded return of the property; and (4) the
defendant refused to return the property.15
Ownership of the property at the time of the conversion is material as bearing on the issue
of conversion – the party claiming a conversion must first prove that the property allegedly
converted belongs to her.16 Here, given Plaintiff’s breach and the termination of the Lease, there
is a fact issue as to whether Plaintiff did have a security interest in the equipment and the time of
the alleged conversion.
15
See Cypress Creek EMS v. Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d 673, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
pet. denied).
16
Branham v. Prewitt, 636 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982), writ ref'd n.r.e., 643
S.W.2d 122 (Tex.1983).
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 5 of 7
Furthermore, in cases of conversion of property, the establishment of the market value of
the property at the place and on the day of conversion is essential to a recovery.17 There has been
so no such establishment by Plaintiff. In fact, the equipment at issue was taken out of use and
given to scrap for the cost of removal.18 Accordingly, it had no value and there were no proceeds
of sale of the equipment in which Plaintiff could assert a lien under Article 12 of the Lease.
Furthermore, Plaintiff never demanded that Defendant QF&M return the equipment19, as
such, there could be no refusal by Defendant QF&M.
Accordingly, there exists fact issues as to whether Defendants exercised control over the
equipment to the exclusion of Plaintiff’s rights (if any), the market value of the equipment, and
whether Plaintiff demanded, and Defendants refused, to return the equipment. As such, summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s conversion claim must be denied.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray judgment of this Court as follows:
1. That judgment shall be entered for Defendants and against Plaintiff on all her
claims;
2. That Defendants recover all costs and expenses incurred in this action; and
3. That Defendants be granted such other and further relief to which they may be justly
entitled.
17
Id.
18
Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 12.
19
Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 12.
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 6 of 7
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C.
Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C.
State Bar No. 00796596
HOGE & GAMEROS, L.L.P.
6116 N. Central Expressway, Suite 1400
Dallas, Texas 75206
Telephone: (214) 765-6002
Telecopier: (214) 559-4905
E-Mail: BGameros@LegalTexas.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
QUALITYF&M, LLC, 6787RE, LLC AND
BRYAN GARVEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on counsel of
record as shown below on this 26th day of January 2024.
VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE
Jeffrey Cook
Adam Barela
Sullivan & Cook, LLC
600 E. Las Colinas Blvd., Suite 1300
Irving, Texas 75039
Telephone: (214) 520-7494
Facsimile: (214) 528-6925
E-Mail: jcook@sullivancook.com
abarela@sullivancook.com
/s/Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C.
Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C.
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 7 of 7
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
LuCretia Milam on behalf of Charles Gameros, Jr.
Bar No. 00796596
LMilam@LegalTexas.com
Envelope ID: 83835276
Filing Code Description: Amended Answer - Amended General Denial
Filing Description: 1ST
Status as of 1/28/2024 10:01 AM CST
Associated Case Party: ELIZABETH JONES BOYCE
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Adam Barela abarela@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Tiffany Castenada tcastenada@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Jeff Cook jcook@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Kim Jones kjones@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: QUALITYF&M, LLC
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Charles Gameros 796596 bgameros@legaltexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Jennifer Noelle Rauch 24033108 jrauch@legaltexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Douglas Wade Carvell 796316 wcarvell@legaltexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
LuCretia Milam LMilam@LegalTexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Francine Ly fly@dallascourts.org 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT
Preview
FILED 1/26/2024 11:58 AM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Jenifer Trujillo DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-23-08825 ELIZABETH JONES BOYCE, as Trustee of § IN THE DISTRICT COURT THE VIVIAN JONES MANAGEMENT TRUST, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § 134th JUDICIAL DISTRICT § QUALITYF&M, LLC, 6787RE, LLC, and § BRYAN GARVEY, § § Defendants. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S TRADITIONAL MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY TO THE HONORABLE COURT: Defendants QualityF&M, LLC, 6787RE, LLC and Bryan Garvey (taken together “Defendants”), file their Response in Opposition to the Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) filed by Elizabeth Jones Boyce, as Trustee of The Vivian Jones Management Trust (“Plaintiff”), and respectfully state as follows: ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1. Plaintiff’s performance under the Lease between Plaintiff and Defendant Quality F&M. 2. Plaintiff’s breach of the Lease between Plaintiff and Defendant Quality F&M. 3. The duration/termination of the Lease. 4. Damages sustained by Plaintiff as a result of a breach by Defendant Quality F&M, including Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate any such damages. 5. Defendants’ removal or wrongful possession of secured property and exercise of control over secured property that was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s rights, if any, as well as the market value of any such property. DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 of 7 These disputed issues of material facts preclude summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court must deny Plaintiff’s Motion. SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE This Response is based upon the pleadings and competent summary judgment evidence herein, as well as matters for which the Court may take judicial notice, including, without limitation: a. Plaintiff’s Original Petition filed on June 28, 2023; b. Defendants’ Original Answer filed on July 31, 2023; c. Defendants’ First Amended Answer filed on January 26, 2024; d. The Affidavit of Bryan Garvey dated January 26, 2024 and its exhibits, filed contemporaneously herewith (the “Garvey Affidavit”); e. This Response; and f. Any matter over which the Court may take judicial under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure or Texas Rules of Evidence. OBJECTIONS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE Simultaneously with the filing of this Response, Defendants have filed the following: • Objections to and Motion to Strike Declaration of Elizabeth Jones Boyce (the “Boyce Declaration”). RESPONSE A. Applicable Standard – Summary Judgment To obtain a summary judgment, each element of a claim or defense must be conclusively proved.1 The movant must establish its entitlement to a summary judgment on the issues expressly 1 City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2 of 7 presented to the trial court by conclusively establishing all essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law.2 More than a scintilla of evidence exists “if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable minds” about a vital fact’s existence. 3 In considering motions for summary judgment, Courts consider all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the non-movant’s favor.4 Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract or conversion claims because there are genuine issues of material fact as to one or more of the elements of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff is also not entitled to summary judgment of his claims because Defendant can establish the affirmative defenses of prior material breach and failure to mitigate. B. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim (Defendant QF&M) The elements of a breach of contract are (1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach of the contract by the defendant, and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach.5 Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim first fails as a result of Plaintiff’s own breach of the Lease. A breach of contract occurs when a party fails to perform an act it has explicitly or impliedly promised to perform.6 Specifically, despite representing to Defendant QF&M that it approved of a sublease procured by Defendant QF&M, Plaintiff ultimately and unreasonably failed 2 Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. 1983). 3 Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983) 4 Randall’s Food Market, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); Bangert v. Baylor College of Med., 881 S.W.2d 564, 565 – 566 (Tex. 1994). 5 See Rice v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 324 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). 6 Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 299 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 of 7 to execute the sublease because it wanted to “re-trade” the deal with the sublease tenant vis-à-vis a direct lease.7 Plaintiff’s actions constitute a material breach under Article Ten of the Lease,8 and such breach excuses any further performance, including payment of rent, by Defendant QF&M under the Lease.9 Furthermore, Defendant QF&M did not abandon the Premises, so there was no breach in that regard. Even if not excused by Plaintiff’s breach, Defendant coordinated with and had Plaintiff’s permission to vacate the premises.10 In fact, Plaintiff had arranged for contractors to start work on the Premises immediately after Defendant vacated, specifically to engage in remodeling of the Premises.11 After remodeling the Premises, Plaintiff raised the rent to a much higher rate than Defendant QF&M had paid under the Lease.12 As to the plumbing leak that Plaintiff alleges constitutes a breach, it was not discovered until QF&M was moving out of the Premises, the leak was outside of the tenant space, and accordingly it was the Landlord’s obligation to repair it, not the tenant.13 Defendant QF&M also could not be in breach of the Lease when the Lease itself had been terminated.14 Finally, Plaintiff does not have damages that stem from a breach by Defendant QF&M as Defendant’s performance was excused by (i) Plaintiff’s material breach, (ii) Plaintiff’s failure to 7 Garvey Affidavit at ¶¶ 5-6, 9. 8 A copy of the Lease is attached as Exhibit A-1 to the Motion. 9 Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Compass Bank v. MFP Fin. Servs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). 10 Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 10. 11 Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 11. 12 Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 11. 13 Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 13. 14 Garvey Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-8. DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4 of 7 execute the sublease and instead try to re-trade the deal with the sublease tenant, (iii) Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate her damages, instead opting to remodel the Premises and re-list at a much higher rate, and (iv) the termination of the Lease itself. Accordingly, at a minimum, there exists fact issues as to the term of the Lease, and breaches of the Lease by Plaintiff, as well as Defendant QF&M. There also exists a material fact issue as to whether Plaintiff’s alleged damages can be attributed to Defendant QF&M, and whether Plaintiff failed to mitigate any such damages. As such, summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim must be denied. C. Plaintiff’s Conversion Claim (Defendants QF&M and Garvey) The elements of a conversion claim are (1) the plaintiff owned or had possession of the property or entitlement to possession; (2) the defendant unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised control over the property to the exclusion of, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff’s rights as an owner; (3) the plaintiff demanded return of the property; and (4) the defendant refused to return the property.15 Ownership of the property at the time of the conversion is material as bearing on the issue of conversion – the party claiming a conversion must first prove that the property allegedly converted belongs to her.16 Here, given Plaintiff’s breach and the termination of the Lease, there is a fact issue as to whether Plaintiff did have a security interest in the equipment and the time of the alleged conversion. 15 See Cypress Creek EMS v. Dolcefino, 548 S.W.3d 673, 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). 16 Branham v. Prewitt, 636 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982), writ ref'd n.r.e., 643 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.1983). DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 5 of 7 Furthermore, in cases of conversion of property, the establishment of the market value of the property at the place and on the day of conversion is essential to a recovery.17 There has been so no such establishment by Plaintiff. In fact, the equipment at issue was taken out of use and given to scrap for the cost of removal.18 Accordingly, it had no value and there were no proceeds of sale of the equipment in which Plaintiff could assert a lien under Article 12 of the Lease. Furthermore, Plaintiff never demanded that Defendant QF&M return the equipment19, as such, there could be no refusal by Defendant QF&M. Accordingly, there exists fact issues as to whether Defendants exercised control over the equipment to the exclusion of Plaintiff’s rights (if any), the market value of the equipment, and whether Plaintiff demanded, and Defendants refused, to return the equipment. As such, summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s conversion claim must be denied. PRAYER WHEREFORE, Defendants pray judgment of this Court as follows: 1. That judgment shall be entered for Defendants and against Plaintiff on all her claims; 2. That Defendants recover all costs and expenses incurred in this action; and 3. That Defendants be granted such other and further relief to which they may be justly entitled. 17 Id. 18 Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 12. 19 Garvey Affidavit at ¶ 12. DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 6 of 7 Respectfully submitted, /s/Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C. Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C. State Bar No. 00796596 HOGE & GAMEROS, L.L.P. 6116 N. Central Expressway, Suite 1400 Dallas, Texas 75206 Telephone: (214) 765-6002 Telecopier: (214) 559-4905 E-Mail: BGameros@LegalTexas.com ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS QUALITYF&M, LLC, 6787RE, LLC AND BRYAN GARVEY CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on counsel of record as shown below on this 26th day of January 2024. VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE Jeffrey Cook Adam Barela Sullivan & Cook, LLC 600 E. Las Colinas Blvd., Suite 1300 Irving, Texas 75039 Telephone: (214) 520-7494 Facsimile: (214) 528-6925 E-Mail: jcook@sullivancook.com abarela@sullivancook.com /s/Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C. Charles W. Gameros, Jr., P.C. DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 7 of 7 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. LuCretia Milam on behalf of Charles Gameros, Jr. Bar No. 00796596 LMilam@LegalTexas.com Envelope ID: 83835276 Filing Code Description: Amended Answer - Amended General Denial Filing Description: 1ST Status as of 1/28/2024 10:01 AM CST Associated Case Party: ELIZABETH JONES BOYCE Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Adam Barela abarela@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Tiffany Castenada tcastenada@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Jeff Cook jcook@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Kim Jones kjones@sullivancook.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Associated Case Party: QUALITYF&M, LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Charles Gameros 796596 bgameros@legaltexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Jennifer Noelle Rauch 24033108 jrauch@legaltexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Douglas Wade Carvell 796316 wcarvell@legaltexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status LuCretia Milam LMilam@LegalTexas.com 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT Francine Ly fly@dallascourts.org 1/26/2024 11:58:48 AM SENT