Preview
SYDNEY CHASE, ESQ., State Bar No. 330043
TENDERLOIN HOUSING CLINIC, INC.
710 Van Ness Ave., 2"! Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102 ELECTRONICALLY
Telephone: (415) 771-9850 FILED
Facsimile: (415) 771-1287 ‘Superior Court of California,
County of San Francisco
E-mail: sydney @thclinic.org
04/12/2023
Clerk of the Court
Attorney for Defendant BY: VERA MU
Deputy Clerk
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO — UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION
10 CEDRIC BERMOND, Case No. CUD-23-671276
11 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
Plaintiff,
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
12
DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO
Vv.
13 COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER
14 JOSE TORRES, and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Date: April 19, 2023
15 Time: 9:30 a.m.
Defendants. Dept.: 501
16
17
REPLY MEMORANDUM
18
This demurrer is made because Plaintiff failed to strictly comply with the state
19
and local laws pertaining to eviction actions. The California Supreme Court in Dr.
20
Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center clearly reiterated that a landlord’s failure
21 to strictly comply with the statutes authorizing the eviction, precluded its unlawful
22 detainer action. (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474.)
23 As demonstrated in the opening papers, Plaintiff failed to strictly comply with
24 the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. This reply addresses Plaintiff's opposition
25 arguments.
26
27
28
{00189091;1) 1
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
I Strict Compliance with the Rent Ordinance Reporting Provision
Authorized by the Ellis Act is Required.
Plaintiff argues that, although this is an unlawful detainer action, and that strict
compliance is required in unlawful detainer actions, strict compliance is not required in
an unlawful detainer based on a notice of termination of tenancy under the Ellis Act.
Plaintiff argues that Gov. Code § 7060.6 expresses a legislative intent that in unlawful
detainers brought to evict tenants after withdrawal, strict compliance is not required.
Gov. Code § 7060.6 states:
If an owner seeks to displace a tenant or lessee from
accommodations withdrawn from rent or lease
10 pursuant to this chapter by an unlawful detainer
11 proceeding, the tenant or lessee may appear and
answer or demur pursuant to Section 1170 of the
12 Code of Civil Procedure and may assert by way of
defense that the owner has not complied with the
13
applicable provisions of this chapter, or statutes,
14 ordinances, or regulations of public entities adopted
to implement this chapter, as authorized by this
15 chapter.
16
(Gov. Code § 7060.6.)
17
Plaintiff argues that because this section does not insert the word “strictly”
18
before “complied,” that the Legislature must have intended to displace the body of
19
jurisprudence requiring strict compliance with the notice requirements in unlawful
20
detainers for Ellis Act evictions. Plaintiff provides no legislative history or other
21
support for this argument.
22
Plaintiff is correct that the Legislature is “presumed to know about existing case
23
law when it enacts or amends a statute” (Busse v. United PanAm Fin. Corp. (2014) 222
24
Cal.App.4"" 1028, 1038), but that principle argues in favor of applying the doctrine of
25
strict compliance. Precedent instructs that the Court should “assume that the Legislature
26
was aware” of the principle of strict compliance and maintain it unless the Legislature
27
28
{00189091;1} 2
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
signals an intent to supersede the holdings establishing this principle. (See In re W.B.
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57.)
“Furthermore, courts do not presume the Legislature intended to overthrow long-
established principles of law unless it makes its intention to do so clear, either by
express declaration or necessary implication. . . . [W]e do presume the Legislature is
aware of existing law when it amends a statute. Therefore, when the Legislature does
not change a statute in a particular respect but does change it in other respects, we infer
an intent to leave the statute as it stands in the aspects of the statute that were not
amended. (Reidy v. City & Cty. of San Francisco (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-92,
10 as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 23, 2004)
11 (internal citations omitted).)
12 If the Legislature had wanted to create a new standard of compliance governing
13 Ellis Act unlawful detainer actions, it would have clearly stated this intent. Government
14 Code § 7060.7 states in pertinent part:
15 It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this
16 chapter to supersede any holding or portion of any
holding in Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal.3d
17 97 to the extent that the holding, or portion of the
holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit
18
landlords to go out of business. However, this act is
19 not otherwise intended to do any of the following: . .
20
21 (c) Override procedural protections designed to
prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants.
22
(Gov. Code § 7060.7(c).)
23
The strict compliance principle is a procedural protection designed to prevent the abuse
24
of the right to evict tenants. Nowhere in the Ellis Act does it state a landlord in an Ellis
25
Act eviction may fail to strictly comply with procedural protections authorized by the
26
Act in local ordinances.
27
28
{00189091;1} 3
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
The language in Gov. Code § 7060.6 does not express a clear intention to
“overthrow long-established principles of law” regarding strict compliance with the
notice requirements in unlawful detainer actions. Further, the Ellis Act was amended in
2000, and § 7060.6 was not amended at that time. (See Reidy, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at
p. 592.)
Naylor v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4"" Supp. 1, 8, was an Ellis Act
unlawful detainer action. The opinion states that strict compliance is required in an
unlawful detainer based upon the Ellis Act. Nothing in Naylor supports plaintiff's
argument that strict compliance is not required in an unlawful detainer based on an Ellis
10 Act withdrawal, and its reference to the long-established strict compliance principle as a
11 given reaffirms the principle in the Ellis Act context.
12 Furthermore, the Act originally provided for a 60 day notice. (Channing
13 Properties v. City of Berkeley (1992) 11 Cakl.App.4" 88, 95-96.) Since the principle
14 applies to 60 day notice of termination of tenancy generally (Civil Code § 1946.1; Code
15 Civ. Proc. § 1161(1)), and the Act originally contained a similar notice period, the
16 Legislature clearly envisioned the unlawful detainer proceeding referenced in Gov.
17 Code § 7060.6 to be the long-established summary proceeding requiring strict
18 compliance. When the Act’s notice period was extended to 120 days by amendment in
19 2000 (Gov. Code § 7060.4(b)), there was no indication that the Legislature intended to
20 change this long-established principle of law.
21 Nor does Civil Code § 1947.7 (the Petris Act) provide support for plaintiff's
22 argument. The purpose of the Petris Act is to exempt landlords who attempt good faith
23 compliance with a rent control law from fines and penalties. (Richman v. Santa Monica
24 Rent Control Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1465.) Under the Petris Act, the issue of
25 “substantial compliance” only becomes relevant in determining whether or not a
26 landlord may be assessed a penalty or sanction by the Rent Board for noncompliance.
27 (Civil Code § 1947.7(b); Sego v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th
28
{00189091;1) 4
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
250, 261.) Where the Board does not assess a penalty or sanction, the Petris Act is
inapplicable. (Richman, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465.) No sanction or penalty is at
issue here. No authority holds that losing an unlawful detainer lawsuit is a “sanction or
penalty” to which the Petris Act would apply.
Furthermore, the Petris Act only applies to ordinances that require the
“registration of rents.” (Civil Code § 1947.7(b).) It is intended to apply to registration
requirements in ordinances that require a registration of rents because it limits the
remedy for non-compliance to restitution of rent overcharges and payment of
registration and filing fees to the local rent board. (/d.) The San Francisco Rent
10 Ordinance does not require the registration of rents because it never was a vacancy
11 control ordinance. (See Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization and
12 Arbitration Bd. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 505, 510-11.) In sum, Civil Code § 1947.7 does
13 not apply to this unlawful detainer action.
14 Plaintiff is also incorrect when he argues that his failure to strictly comply with
15 the requirements of the Rent Ordinance is of no consequence, because these
16 requirements are not authorized by the Ellis Act. The Gov. Code § 7060.6 non-
17 compliance defense applies to compliance with “the applicable provisions of this
18 chapter, or statutes, ordinances, or regulations of public entities adopted to implement
19 this chapter, as authorized by this chapter.” (Gov. Code § 7060.6.) Rent Ordinance
20 § 37.9A was enacted in order to implement the Ellis Act. (Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(i).)
21 The specific provisions of the Ordinance that plaintiff did not comply with are
22 authorized by the Act. First, the Act expressly exempts from its preemptive reach
23 guestrooms or efficiency units in residential hotels that did not invoke the Act prior to
24 January 1, 2004. (Gov. Code § 7060(a).) By requiring that the units not be residential
25 hotel units, Rent Ordinance § 37.9(a)(13) explicitly limits the ground for eviction to that
26 ground permitted under the Act. It is therefore authorized by the Act.
27 With regard to the defect in failing to report vacancy under § 37.9A(h), this
28
{00189091;1) 5
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
provision is authorized by the Act as well. Gov. Code § 7060.1(c) provides:
Notwithstanding Section 7060, nothing in this
chapter does any of the following: .. .
(c) Diminishes or enhances any power in any public
entity to mitigate any adverse impact on persons
displaced by reason of the withdrawal from rent or
lease of any accommodations.
(Gov. Code § 7060.1.)
Section 7060.1(c) authorizes the Rent Ordinance to include additional reporting
requirements to ensure Plaintiff continues to comply with the withdrawal procedure.
When enacting Section 7060.1 and amending it to eliminate the reference to residential
10
hotels in the previous version, Section 7060.1(c) “clearly contemplates that public
11
entities have some such power under existing law.” (/d.) Therefore, by expressly
12
permitting reporting requirements through withdrawal under the Act, the Act authorized
13
the requirements in Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(h).
14 i. Statutory Construction supports Defendant’s contentions
15 regarding Plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with notice
requirements
16
17 The remedial purpose of Rent Ordinance section 37.9A(h) is to notify the Rent
18 Board that Plaintiff has continued to comply with Rent Ordinance 37.9(a)(13) This
19 Notice informs that Rent Board whether the withdrawn units are vacant, demolished, or
20 in use. Rent Ordinance section 37.9A(h) requires an owner to provide notice to the Rent
21 Board every three and six months of the current status of the property to ensure that an
22 owner has not re-rented a unit in violation of the Rent Ordinance.
23 In California, the pertinent rules of statutory interpretation were specified in
24 Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 279-282, as follows: “We begin as always ‘with
25 the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
26 effectuate legislative intent.’ (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4" 556, 562.) To
27 discover that intent we first look to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and
28 ordinary meaning. (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744; DaFonte
{00189091;1}
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601.) “In construing the words of a statute. . . to
discern its purpose, the provisions should be read together; an interpretation which
would render terms surplusage should be avoided, and every word should be given
some significance, leaving no part useless or devoid of meaning.” (Channing Properties
v. City of Berkeley, et al. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4" 89, at p.99 citing City & County of San
Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54.) “[E]very statute should be construed
with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be
harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]” (/d.)
“The words must be construed in context and in light of the nature and obvious
10 purpose of the statute where they appear. The statute must be given a reasonable and
11 common sense interpretation consistent with the legislative body’s apparent purpose
12 and intention. The interpretation should be practical, not technical, and should result in
13 wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.” (Valley Vista Services, Inc. v. City of
14 Monterey Park (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 881, 888.) Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(h)(1) is
15 intended notify the Rent Board that the landlord has complied with Rent Ordinance
16 § 37.9(a)(13). The only way the purpose of Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(h)(1) can be met is
17 by requiring Plaintiff to regularly notify the Rent Board the of the status of the
18 residential units.
19 Giving the pertinent section of the Rent Ordinance, its plain meaning, intent, and
20 purpose (i.e. to notify the Rent Board whether or not the units are vacant or in use), it is
21 clear Plaintiff completely failed to comply with Rent Ordinance sections 37.9A(h)(1).
22 In other words, Plaintiff did not file any mandatory reports with the Rent Board.
23
CONCLUSION
24 For the reasons stated above, defendant respectfully requests that the Court
25 sustain his demurrer without leave to amend.
26
Dated: April 12, 2023 As. Cree
27 Sydney Chase, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
28
{00189091;1} 7
REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Preview
SYDNEY CHASE, ESQ., State Bar No. 330043 TENDERLOIN HOUSING CLINIC, INC. 710 Van Ness Ave., 2"! Floor San Francisco, CA 94102 ELECTRONICALLY Telephone: (415) 771-9850 FILED Facsimile: (415) 771-1287 ‘Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco E-mail: sydney @thclinic.org 04/12/2023 Clerk of the Court Attorney for Defendant BY: VERA MU Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO — UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION 10 CEDRIC BERMOND, Case No. CUD-23-671276 11 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS Plaintiff, AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 12 DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO Vv. 13 COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER 14 JOSE TORRES, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Date: April 19, 2023 15 Time: 9:30 a.m. Defendants. Dept.: 501 16 17 REPLY MEMORANDUM 18 This demurrer is made because Plaintiff failed to strictly comply with the state 19 and local laws pertaining to eviction actions. The California Supreme Court in Dr. 20 Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center clearly reiterated that a landlord’s failure 21 to strictly comply with the statutes authorizing the eviction, precluded its unlawful 22 detainer action. (Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474.) 23 As demonstrated in the opening papers, Plaintiff failed to strictly comply with 24 the San Francisco Rent Ordinance. This reply addresses Plaintiff's opposition 25 arguments. 26 27 28 {00189091;1) 1 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER I Strict Compliance with the Rent Ordinance Reporting Provision Authorized by the Ellis Act is Required. Plaintiff argues that, although this is an unlawful detainer action, and that strict compliance is required in unlawful detainer actions, strict compliance is not required in an unlawful detainer based on a notice of termination of tenancy under the Ellis Act. Plaintiff argues that Gov. Code § 7060.6 expresses a legislative intent that in unlawful detainers brought to evict tenants after withdrawal, strict compliance is not required. Gov. Code § 7060.6 states: If an owner seeks to displace a tenant or lessee from accommodations withdrawn from rent or lease 10 pursuant to this chapter by an unlawful detainer 11 proceeding, the tenant or lessee may appear and answer or demur pursuant to Section 1170 of the 12 Code of Civil Procedure and may assert by way of defense that the owner has not complied with the 13 applicable provisions of this chapter, or statutes, 14 ordinances, or regulations of public entities adopted to implement this chapter, as authorized by this 15 chapter. 16 (Gov. Code § 7060.6.) 17 Plaintiff argues that because this section does not insert the word “strictly” 18 before “complied,” that the Legislature must have intended to displace the body of 19 jurisprudence requiring strict compliance with the notice requirements in unlawful 20 detainers for Ellis Act evictions. Plaintiff provides no legislative history or other 21 support for this argument. 22 Plaintiff is correct that the Legislature is “presumed to know about existing case 23 law when it enacts or amends a statute” (Busse v. United PanAm Fin. Corp. (2014) 222 24 Cal.App.4"" 1028, 1038), but that principle argues in favor of applying the doctrine of 25 strict compliance. Precedent instructs that the Court should “assume that the Legislature 26 was aware” of the principle of strict compliance and maintain it unless the Legislature 27 28 {00189091;1} 2 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER signals an intent to supersede the holdings establishing this principle. (See In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 57.) “Furthermore, courts do not presume the Legislature intended to overthrow long- established principles of law unless it makes its intention to do so clear, either by express declaration or necessary implication. . . . [W]e do presume the Legislature is aware of existing law when it amends a statute. Therefore, when the Legislature does not change a statute in a particular respect but does change it in other respects, we infer an intent to leave the statute as it stands in the aspects of the statute that were not amended. (Reidy v. City & Cty. of San Francisco (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-92, 10 as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 23, 2004) 11 (internal citations omitted).) 12 If the Legislature had wanted to create a new standard of compliance governing 13 Ellis Act unlawful detainer actions, it would have clearly stated this intent. Government 14 Code § 7060.7 states in pertinent part: 15 It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this 16 chapter to supersede any holding or portion of any holding in Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal.3d 17 97 to the extent that the holding, or portion of the holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit 18 landlords to go out of business. However, this act is 19 not otherwise intended to do any of the following: . . 20 21 (c) Override procedural protections designed to prevent abuse of the right to evict tenants. 22 (Gov. Code § 7060.7(c).) 23 The strict compliance principle is a procedural protection designed to prevent the abuse 24 of the right to evict tenants. Nowhere in the Ellis Act does it state a landlord in an Ellis 25 Act eviction may fail to strictly comply with procedural protections authorized by the 26 Act in local ordinances. 27 28 {00189091;1} 3 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER The language in Gov. Code § 7060.6 does not express a clear intention to “overthrow long-established principles of law” regarding strict compliance with the notice requirements in unlawful detainer actions. Further, the Ellis Act was amended in 2000, and § 7060.6 was not amended at that time. (See Reidy, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 592.) Naylor v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4"" Supp. 1, 8, was an Ellis Act unlawful detainer action. The opinion states that strict compliance is required in an unlawful detainer based upon the Ellis Act. Nothing in Naylor supports plaintiff's argument that strict compliance is not required in an unlawful detainer based on an Ellis 10 Act withdrawal, and its reference to the long-established strict compliance principle as a 11 given reaffirms the principle in the Ellis Act context. 12 Furthermore, the Act originally provided for a 60 day notice. (Channing 13 Properties v. City of Berkeley (1992) 11 Cakl.App.4" 88, 95-96.) Since the principle 14 applies to 60 day notice of termination of tenancy generally (Civil Code § 1946.1; Code 15 Civ. Proc. § 1161(1)), and the Act originally contained a similar notice period, the 16 Legislature clearly envisioned the unlawful detainer proceeding referenced in Gov. 17 Code § 7060.6 to be the long-established summary proceeding requiring strict 18 compliance. When the Act’s notice period was extended to 120 days by amendment in 19 2000 (Gov. Code § 7060.4(b)), there was no indication that the Legislature intended to 20 change this long-established principle of law. 21 Nor does Civil Code § 1947.7 (the Petris Act) provide support for plaintiff's 22 argument. The purpose of the Petris Act is to exempt landlords who attempt good faith 23 compliance with a rent control law from fines and penalties. (Richman v. Santa Monica 24 Rent Control Bd. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1465.) Under the Petris Act, the issue of 25 “substantial compliance” only becomes relevant in determining whether or not a 26 landlord may be assessed a penalty or sanction by the Rent Board for noncompliance. 27 (Civil Code § 1947.7(b); Sego v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 28 {00189091;1) 4 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER 250, 261.) Where the Board does not assess a penalty or sanction, the Petris Act is inapplicable. (Richman, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465.) No sanction or penalty is at issue here. No authority holds that losing an unlawful detainer lawsuit is a “sanction or penalty” to which the Petris Act would apply. Furthermore, the Petris Act only applies to ordinances that require the “registration of rents.” (Civil Code § 1947.7(b).) It is intended to apply to registration requirements in ordinances that require a registration of rents because it limits the remedy for non-compliance to restitution of rent overcharges and payment of registration and filing fees to the local rent board. (/d.) The San Francisco Rent 10 Ordinance does not require the registration of rents because it never was a vacancy 11 control ordinance. (See Mosser Companies v. San Francisco Rent Stabilization and 12 Arbitration Bd. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 505, 510-11.) In sum, Civil Code § 1947.7 does 13 not apply to this unlawful detainer action. 14 Plaintiff is also incorrect when he argues that his failure to strictly comply with 15 the requirements of the Rent Ordinance is of no consequence, because these 16 requirements are not authorized by the Ellis Act. The Gov. Code § 7060.6 non- 17 compliance defense applies to compliance with “the applicable provisions of this 18 chapter, or statutes, ordinances, or regulations of public entities adopted to implement 19 this chapter, as authorized by this chapter.” (Gov. Code § 7060.6.) Rent Ordinance 20 § 37.9A was enacted in order to implement the Ellis Act. (Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(i).) 21 The specific provisions of the Ordinance that plaintiff did not comply with are 22 authorized by the Act. First, the Act expressly exempts from its preemptive reach 23 guestrooms or efficiency units in residential hotels that did not invoke the Act prior to 24 January 1, 2004. (Gov. Code § 7060(a).) By requiring that the units not be residential 25 hotel units, Rent Ordinance § 37.9(a)(13) explicitly limits the ground for eviction to that 26 ground permitted under the Act. It is therefore authorized by the Act. 27 With regard to the defect in failing to report vacancy under § 37.9A(h), this 28 {00189091;1) 5 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER provision is authorized by the Act as well. Gov. Code § 7060.1(c) provides: Notwithstanding Section 7060, nothing in this chapter does any of the following: .. . (c) Diminishes or enhances any power in any public entity to mitigate any adverse impact on persons displaced by reason of the withdrawal from rent or lease of any accommodations. (Gov. Code § 7060.1.) Section 7060.1(c) authorizes the Rent Ordinance to include additional reporting requirements to ensure Plaintiff continues to comply with the withdrawal procedure. When enacting Section 7060.1 and amending it to eliminate the reference to residential 10 hotels in the previous version, Section 7060.1(c) “clearly contemplates that public 11 entities have some such power under existing law.” (/d.) Therefore, by expressly 12 permitting reporting requirements through withdrawal under the Act, the Act authorized 13 the requirements in Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(h). 14 i. Statutory Construction supports Defendant’s contentions 15 regarding Plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with notice requirements 16 17 The remedial purpose of Rent Ordinance section 37.9A(h) is to notify the Rent 18 Board that Plaintiff has continued to comply with Rent Ordinance 37.9(a)(13) This 19 Notice informs that Rent Board whether the withdrawn units are vacant, demolished, or 20 in use. Rent Ordinance section 37.9A(h) requires an owner to provide notice to the Rent 21 Board every three and six months of the current status of the property to ensure that an 22 owner has not re-rented a unit in violation of the Rent Ordinance. 23 In California, the pertinent rules of statutory interpretation were specified in 24 Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 279-282, as follows: “We begin as always ‘with 25 the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and 26 effectuate legislative intent.’ (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4" 556, 562.) To 27 discover that intent we first look to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and 28 ordinary meaning. (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744; DaFonte {00189091;1} REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601.) “In construing the words of a statute. . . to discern its purpose, the provisions should be read together; an interpretation which would render terms surplusage should be avoided, and every word should be given some significance, leaving no part useless or devoid of meaning.” (Channing Properties v. City of Berkeley, et al. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4" 89, at p.99 citing City & County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54.) “[E]very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. [Citations.]” (/d.) “The words must be construed in context and in light of the nature and obvious 10 purpose of the statute where they appear. The statute must be given a reasonable and 11 common sense interpretation consistent with the legislative body’s apparent purpose 12 and intention. The interpretation should be practical, not technical, and should result in 13 wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.” (Valley Vista Services, Inc. v. City of 14 Monterey Park (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 881, 888.) Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(h)(1) is 15 intended notify the Rent Board that the landlord has complied with Rent Ordinance 16 § 37.9(a)(13). The only way the purpose of Rent Ordinance § 37.9A(h)(1) can be met is 17 by requiring Plaintiff to regularly notify the Rent Board the of the status of the 18 residential units. 19 Giving the pertinent section of the Rent Ordinance, its plain meaning, intent, and 20 purpose (i.e. to notify the Rent Board whether or not the units are vacant or in use), it is 21 clear Plaintiff completely failed to comply with Rent Ordinance sections 37.9A(h)(1). 22 In other words, Plaintiff did not file any mandatory reports with the Rent Board. 23 CONCLUSION 24 For the reasons stated above, defendant respectfully requests that the Court 25 sustain his demurrer without leave to amend. 26 Dated: April 12, 2023 As. Cree 27 Sydney Chase, Esq. Attorney for Defendant 28 {00189091;1} 7 REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER