Preview
S
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
THE TRIAL COURT
SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT
MIDDLESEX, ss CIVIL ACTION NO. 244 Ev | |
JOHN DOE.
Plaintiff IN THE pee OF TRE
Vv. pontine OF EOURTS:
THE GOUNTY OF HIDDLESEX
HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL SAN 2 4 2024
90 GS Ze
Defendant
| alr SX
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM
Plaintiff John Doe submits this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed
under Pseudonym.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was a former student at Defendant Harvard Medical School (HMS). In August
2011, while still a student, Plaintiff was falsely charged with abusing his infant daughter. When
Plaintiff notified HMS of the charges, HMS suspended him pending their resolution.
In May 2016, a jury found Plaintiff not guilty on two of the charges and the District
Attorney's Office declined to prosecute the third charge. As a result, Plaintiff was acquitted on all
of the charges filed against him. He then notified HMS of his acquittal and asked HMS for
permission to resume his studies
But instead of allowing Plaintiff to resume his studies, the school’s Probation and Review
Board (the "PRB") decided to conduct its own investigation and appointed a Boston law firm to
serve as an independent fact finder. After conducting a thorough and comprehensive
-l-
investigation, the fact finder submitted a written report to HMS which concluded that Plaintiff
had:
not failed to meet HMS’s standards for integrity, character, and
faithfulness in meeting the obligations of a medical career with
reference to the totality of the circumstances relating to the two
charges of assault and battery on a child with substantial injury and
the single charge of reckless endangerment of a child. More
specifically, we find that the evidence does not support a
conclusion that it is more probable than not that [Plaintiff]
engaged in illegal, unethical, or behavior inappropriate to the
medical profession, as set forth in Section 4.08 of the HMS
Student Handbook.
Despite the findings and conclusions of its own independent fact finder, HMS still refused to
allow Plaintiff to resume his studies. Instead, it gave him the “choice” of voluntarily withdrawing
from HMS or be involuntarily withdrawn. Plaintiff subsequently exhausted his rights to appeal
the PRB’s decision without success, utilizing the procedures set forth in HMS’ Student
Handbook.
Knowing it could not force Plaintiff to withdraw from HMS because he had been falsely
accused of committing crimes, HMS went in search of reasons to support a decision it had
already made. Then, when its independent fact finder failed to provide HMS with the support
was hoping for, HMS conducted a sham disciplinary process that ultimately led to its
predetermined decision to require Plaintiff to withdraw or being involuntarily withdrawn.
ARGU! IT
Mass. R. Civ. P. 10(a) states in relevant part that "the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties."
2-
Nevertheless, Massachusetts courts have allowed plaintiffs to prosecute complaints using
a pseudonym when the plaintiff "has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the ‘customary
and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings." Singer v.
Rosenkranz, 453 Mass. 1012 (2009) (citations omitted). See also Doe v. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs.,
162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995) (federal courts have discretion under federal rules of
procedure to allow plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously). Federal courts routinely allow
“plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in cases involving social stigmatization . . or where the
injury litigated against would occur as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity.” Doe
y. Bell Atl., 162 F.R.D. at 420 (emphasis added)
Here, the facts weigh heavily in favor of allowing Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously.
More specifically, he has a substantial privacy right in not disclosing his identity which
outweighs the customary presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. In contrast, the public
has a minimal interest in knowing his true identity. Plaintiff is not a public figure. Having his
identity publicly disclosed would serve as a deterrent in asserting his rights in this action and
might also have a chilling effect on others who are similarly situated.
Plaintiff has been admitted to another medical school and intends to pursue a career in
medicine after he graduates. Although he was acquitted of the criminal charges which led to his
suspension from HMS, the mere fact that HMS forced him to withdraw from the school or be
involuntarily withdraw could potentially harm his professional reputation and future career
prospects if that information becomes widely known. Forcing Plaintiff to litigate this case using
his true name could lead to such a result and deter and dissuade other students and individuals
from filing meritorious lawsuits.
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In Doe v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 485 Mass. 554 (2020), a licensed physician
“was arrested and charged with a single misdemeanor count of engaging in sexual conduct for a
fee.” Id. at 555, After admitting to sufficient facts, Doe’s case was continued without a finding
and then subsequently dismissed. Doe then applied to the District Court to seal his criminal
record, and the Court did so. Id. at 555-556 (his subsequent appeal concerned actions taken by
the Board of Registration in Medicine). The facts in Doe v. Board of Registration in Medicine are
similar to the situation presented in the instant case.
Massachusetts courts routinely allow plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in other situations,
expressly or impliedly finding that the plaintiffs’ privacy rights outweigh the public interest in
knowing their true names. See, e.g.., Lexington Public Schools v. KS, 489 Mass. 309 (2022)
(juvenile plaintiff); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 356315 V. Sorb, 99 Mass. App. Ct.
292 ( 2021) (plaintiff challenging classification as sex offender); .KJ v. Superintendent of
Bridgewater State Hospital, 488 Mass. 362 (2021) (pretrial detainee committed due to mental
illness); White v. Gurnon, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 622 (2006) (female students seeking redress for
sexual harassment); Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 140-141 (1996)
(sexual assault victim).
Federal courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously when their cases
involve private and sensitive matters, See, e.g., Doe v. Williams College, Doe, 530 F. Supp. 3d 92
(D. Mass. 2021); Doe v. Brandeis University, 177 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mass. 2016);.D.M. v.
County of Berks, 929 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (allowing parents to proceed
anonymously in case alleging parents were falsely accused of child sexual abuse); Doe v.
Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing plaintiff to proceed
4.
using a fictitious name where disclosure of plaintiffs bipolar disorder would risk stigmatization
in his community and career); Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 175-76 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (plaintiff
allowed to proceed pseudonymously in case alleging sexual assault by former state trooper); Roe
y. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (allowing use of fictitious name in case
alleging false allegations of child sexual abuse).
If Plaintiff's only recourse to the judicial system requires public disclosure of his identity,
there is a strong likelihood that his professional reputation, job prospects and future career as a
physician will be irreparably harmed. This is precisely the type of harm which Plaintiff is trying
to prevent through litigating this case. There is also a significant public interest allowing Plaintiff
to proceed anonymously while seeking legal redress against HMS.
In contrast, the factors weighing against the use of a pseudonym are correspondingly
weak. Plaintiff is not a public figure. Although the public may have an interest in the subject
matter of his case, it does not have a strong interest in knowing Plaintiff's true identity.
Plaintiff is seeking redress for HMS’ flawed handling the disciplinary process through
which he sought to resume his studies. His goal to restore his personal and professional
reputation and his future career and employment prospects. If Plaintiff is forced to prosecute the
case under his own name; the disclosure of his true identify could exacerbate the very harm is
seeking to avoid.
5.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff John Doe requests that this Court grant his Motion for
Permission to Proceed under a Pseudonym.
JOHN DOE
By his attorney,
January 22, 2024 /s/ Robert Scarino
Robert Scarino (BBO NO. 444340)
Law Office of Robert Scarino
57 Obery Street, Suite 1
Plymouth, MA 02360
Tel. (508) 296-9292
bob@rslawoffice.com
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Preview
S COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS THE TRIAL COURT SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT MIDDLESEX, ss CIVIL ACTION NO. 244 Ev | | JOHN DOE. Plaintiff IN THE pee OF TRE Vv. pontine OF EOURTS: THE GOUNTY OF HIDDLESEX HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL SAN 2 4 2024 90 GS Ze Defendant | alr SX MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM Plaintiff John Doe submits this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed under Pseudonym. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff was a former student at Defendant Harvard Medical School (HMS). In August 2011, while still a student, Plaintiff was falsely charged with abusing his infant daughter. When Plaintiff notified HMS of the charges, HMS suspended him pending their resolution. In May 2016, a jury found Plaintiff not guilty on two of the charges and the District Attorney's Office declined to prosecute the third charge. As a result, Plaintiff was acquitted on all of the charges filed against him. He then notified HMS of his acquittal and asked HMS for permission to resume his studies But instead of allowing Plaintiff to resume his studies, the school’s Probation and Review Board (the "PRB") decided to conduct its own investigation and appointed a Boston law firm to serve as an independent fact finder. After conducting a thorough and comprehensive -l- investigation, the fact finder submitted a written report to HMS which concluded that Plaintiff had: not failed to meet HMS’s standards for integrity, character, and faithfulness in meeting the obligations of a medical career with reference to the totality of the circumstances relating to the two charges of assault and battery on a child with substantial injury and the single charge of reckless endangerment of a child. More specifically, we find that the evidence does not support a conclusion that it is more probable than not that [Plaintiff] engaged in illegal, unethical, or behavior inappropriate to the medical profession, as set forth in Section 4.08 of the HMS Student Handbook. Despite the findings and conclusions of its own independent fact finder, HMS still refused to allow Plaintiff to resume his studies. Instead, it gave him the “choice” of voluntarily withdrawing from HMS or be involuntarily withdrawn. Plaintiff subsequently exhausted his rights to appeal the PRB’s decision without success, utilizing the procedures set forth in HMS’ Student Handbook. Knowing it could not force Plaintiff to withdraw from HMS because he had been falsely accused of committing crimes, HMS went in search of reasons to support a decision it had already made. Then, when its independent fact finder failed to provide HMS with the support was hoping for, HMS conducted a sham disciplinary process that ultimately led to its predetermined decision to require Plaintiff to withdraw or being involuntarily withdrawn. ARGU! IT Mass. R. Civ. P. 10(a) states in relevant part that "the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties." 2- Nevertheless, Massachusetts courts have allowed plaintiffs to prosecute complaints using a pseudonym when the plaintiff "has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the ‘customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings." Singer v. Rosenkranz, 453 Mass. 1012 (2009) (citations omitted). See also Doe v. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995) (federal courts have discretion under federal rules of procedure to allow plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously). Federal courts routinely allow “plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in cases involving social stigmatization . . or where the injury litigated against would occur as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity.” Doe y. Bell Atl., 162 F.R.D. at 420 (emphasis added) Here, the facts weigh heavily in favor of allowing Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously. More specifically, he has a substantial privacy right in not disclosing his identity which outweighs the customary presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. In contrast, the public has a minimal interest in knowing his true identity. Plaintiff is not a public figure. Having his identity publicly disclosed would serve as a deterrent in asserting his rights in this action and might also have a chilling effect on others who are similarly situated. Plaintiff has been admitted to another medical school and intends to pursue a career in medicine after he graduates. Although he was acquitted of the criminal charges which led to his suspension from HMS, the mere fact that HMS forced him to withdraw from the school or be involuntarily withdraw could potentially harm his professional reputation and future career prospects if that information becomes widely known. Forcing Plaintiff to litigate this case using his true name could lead to such a result and deter and dissuade other students and individuals from filing meritorious lawsuits. -3- In Doe v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 485 Mass. 554 (2020), a licensed physician “was arrested and charged with a single misdemeanor count of engaging in sexual conduct for a fee.” Id. at 555, After admitting to sufficient facts, Doe’s case was continued without a finding and then subsequently dismissed. Doe then applied to the District Court to seal his criminal record, and the Court did so. Id. at 555-556 (his subsequent appeal concerned actions taken by the Board of Registration in Medicine). The facts in Doe v. Board of Registration in Medicine are similar to the situation presented in the instant case. Massachusetts courts routinely allow plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in other situations, expressly or impliedly finding that the plaintiffs’ privacy rights outweigh the public interest in knowing their true names. See, e.g.., Lexington Public Schools v. KS, 489 Mass. 309 (2022) (juvenile plaintiff); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 356315 V. Sorb, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 292 ( 2021) (plaintiff challenging classification as sex offender); .KJ v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 488 Mass. 362 (2021) (pretrial detainee committed due to mental illness); White v. Gurnon, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 622 (2006) (female students seeking redress for sexual harassment); Doe v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 140-141 (1996) (sexual assault victim). Federal courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously when their cases involve private and sensitive matters, See, e.g., Doe v. Williams College, Doe, 530 F. Supp. 3d 92 (D. Mass. 2021); Doe v. Brandeis University, 177 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mass. 2016);.D.M. v. County of Berks, 929 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (allowing parents to proceed anonymously in case alleging parents were falsely accused of child sexual abuse); Doe v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing plaintiff to proceed 4. using a fictitious name where disclosure of plaintiffs bipolar disorder would risk stigmatization in his community and career); Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 175-76 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (plaintiff allowed to proceed pseudonymously in case alleging sexual assault by former state trooper); Roe y. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (allowing use of fictitious name in case alleging false allegations of child sexual abuse). If Plaintiff's only recourse to the judicial system requires public disclosure of his identity, there is a strong likelihood that his professional reputation, job prospects and future career as a physician will be irreparably harmed. This is precisely the type of harm which Plaintiff is trying to prevent through litigating this case. There is also a significant public interest allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously while seeking legal redress against HMS. In contrast, the factors weighing against the use of a pseudonym are correspondingly weak. Plaintiff is not a public figure. Although the public may have an interest in the subject matter of his case, it does not have a strong interest in knowing Plaintiff's true identity. Plaintiff is seeking redress for HMS’ flawed handling the disciplinary process through which he sought to resume his studies. His goal to restore his personal and professional reputation and his future career and employment prospects. If Plaintiff is forced to prosecute the case under his own name; the disclosure of his true identify could exacerbate the very harm is seeking to avoid. 5. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff John Doe requests that this Court grant his Motion for Permission to Proceed under a Pseudonym. JOHN DOE By his attorney, January 22, 2024 /s/ Robert Scarino Robert Scarino (BBO NO. 444340) Law Office of Robert Scarino 57 Obery Street, Suite 1 Plymouth, MA 02360 Tel. (508) 296-9292 bob@rslawoffice.com -6-