Document for Marasco, William J. vs. Maria Marasco Trustee for the Rose Marie Morasco Living Trust et al

CV-20-004851 – LATTA, ERNEST, JR vs WYNNE, SHARON – a) Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions - GRANTED, unopposed; b) Defendant/Cross-Complainant Sharon Wynne’s Motion to Deem Request for Admissions, Set Two, Admitted – GRANTED, unopposed. a) GRANTED, unopposed. The Court finds that Plaintiff over two years later, has willfully failed to comply with the Court’s order of February 24, 2022, requiring Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s Requests for Production within twenty (20) days of said order, or be liable to have his complaint dismissed, and with the Court’s order of November 17, 2021, compelling responses to said Requests for Production. (Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004), 117 Cal.App.4th 913) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is granted. Plaintiff’s complaint dated November 20, 2020, is hereby dismissed. (Code of Civil Proc, §2023.010, §2023.030; Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell ((2017) 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 727, rehearing denied, review denied; Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc. (2007), 149 Cal.App.4th 285; Fred Howland Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 605; Jerry's Shell v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, (2005) 134 Cal. App. 4th 1058). b) GRANTED, unopposed. The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant’s Request for Admissions, Set Two, propounded on Plaintiff on May 23, 2022, without substantial justification. Defendant’s motion is hereby granted. Accordingly, all objections to said discovery by Plaintiff are waived. (Code of Civil Procedure §.2033.280(a). Furthermore, Request for Admissions Numbers 1-6 in Defendant’s Request for Admissions, Set Two, are hereby deemed admitted by Plaintiff for all purposes including trial. (Civ Proc. Code §§.2033.010, 2033.020, 2033.250, 2033.280; St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762).    Monetary sanctions of $310 are hereby imposed against Plaintiff. 

Case Number: 23STCV00514 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 39 TENTATIVE RULING DEPARTMENT 39 HEARING DATE July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER 23STCV00514 MOTION Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint MOVING PARTY Plaintiff 58th St Industrial LLC OPPOSING PARTY Defendant Evanston Insurance Company MOTION Plaintiff 58th St Industrial LLC (Plaintiff) moves for leave to amend its complaint. After Plaintiff filed this motion, Plaintiff stipulated with all other parties in this litigation to continue the motion until after the scheduled August 29, 2024 mediation. (See Joint Stipulation to Stay Litigation, filed July 8, 2024.) Accordingly, the court continues the motion for leave to amend the complaint to October 30, 2024. The parties are to file a joint status report no later than October 23, 2024 to advise the court whether the parties have resolved any issues relating to this motion. The August 6, 2024 trial date is advanced to July 18, 2024 and, along with the July 18, 2024 final status conference date, are vacated. A post-mediation and trial setting conference will be held on October 30, 2024 as well. Plaintiff is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of same.

Case Number: 21NWCV00227 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Ortegon vs. Cortazar, et al. CASE NO.: 21NWCV00227 HEARING: July 19, 2024 @ 9:30 AM #2 Tentative Ruling 1. Plaintiffs Motion for Terminating Sanctions against Defendant Carolina Cortazar is GRANTED. The Motion for Evidentiary and Monetary Sanctions and the Motion to Compel Response to Form Interrogatories (Set Two) are MOOT. 2. Plaintiffs Motions to Compel Response to Form Interrogatories (Set Two) as to Defendants Steven Mitchell and Carlos Sandoval are GRANTED. Sanctions are imposed upon Defendant Steven Mitchell and Carlos Sandoval, and counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount $1050.00, payable within 60 days. Plaintiff to give notice. Background This is a landlord-tenant dispute between Plaintiff Javier Ortegon (Plaintiff) and Defendants Carolina Cortazar, Steven Mitchell, and Carlos Sandoval (collectively Defendants). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unlawfully entered the leased property on several occasions, threatened Plaintiff, removed Plaintiffs personal property, and wrongfully evicted Plaintiff. Plaintiff moves to compel response to Form Interrogatories, Set Two, as to each Defendant. As to Defendant Carolina Cortazar only, Plaintiff also moves for an order for terminating, issue, and monetary sanctions on the grounds that Defendant Cortazar has been misusing the discovery process. The motions are unopposed as of July 12, 2024. Motion for Terminating Sanctions If a party fails to comply with a court order compelling discovery responses or attendance at a deposition, the court may impose monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2025.450, subd. (h); § 2030.290, subd. (c); § 2031.300, subd. (c).) "To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method ... the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose ... monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating) sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process... " (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2030.030.) "Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: ... (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery... (g) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery .... " (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 2030.010.) Plaintiffs motion for terminating sanctions is based upon Defendant Cortazars failure to comply with this Courts March 24, 2022, order compelling Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs Demand for Inspection of Premises, Set One; February 21, 2023 order compelling Defendant to respond without objections to Plaintiffs Demand for Inspection of Tangible Things, Set One; December 12, 2023, order compelling Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs Demand for Production of Documents, Set One; March 6, 2024, order compelling Defendant comply with Plaintiffs Inspection of Premises, Set One; and the issuance of monetary sanctions. (DAmico Decl., ¶¶2-10.) 1) Terminating Sanctions Generally, [a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. ( Los Defensores v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390.) Here, it appears that Defendant previously served responses to Demand for Inspection of Tangible Things, Set One on October 25, 2022. (See March 6, 2024 Minute Order.) However, those responses were not supported by competent evidence because they lacked foundation; further, they contained objections. ( Id .) Defendants counsel also stated that he communicated to Plaintiffs counsel that he believed the premises could not be inspected because a new tenant was leasing it. ( Id .) However, that communication was unresponsive to Plaintiffs discovery. ( Id .) As to the Request for Production of Documents, the Amended Responses that Defendants counsel did serve do not comply with the Courts December 12, 2023 Order. (DAmico Dec. ¶ 7.) Moreover, Defendant has continued to fail to provide the premises for inspection. (DAmico Dec. ¶ 8, Ex. 4). Plaintiffs counsel engaged in several email communications and a 37-minute telephone conversation with Defendants counsel on March 26, 2024 regarding Defendants non-compliance, but Defendant has still failed to comply as of April 4, 2024, the date the instant motion was filed. This Court already imposed monetary sanctions against Defendant Cortazar for failure to comply with discovery orders. Moreover, Defendant was served with notice of the instant motion and did not file an opposition. The Court denied Plaintiffs previous motion for terminating sanctions on March 6, 2024, finding that Defendant Cortazar had participated in discovery proceedings brought before the Court. By now, however, it is clear that Defendant Cortazar is disinterested in litigating this case. Accordingly, the Motion for Terminating Sanctions against Defendant Cortazar is GRANTED. The Court strikes Defendant Cortazars Answer, and default judgment against Defendant Cortazar is entered. Motions to Compel Response to Form Interrogatories, Set Two A party may make a demand for production of documents and propound interrogatories without leave of court at any time 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, the party to whom the demand is directed, whichever occurs first. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.020, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.020, subd. (b).) If a party fails to timely respond to a request for production or interrogatories, the party to whom the request is directed waives any right to exercise the option to produce writings under Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230, and waives any objection, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) The party who propounded the discovery request may bring a motion to compel and the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for production of documents or interrogatories, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.300, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).) On July 25, 2023, Plaintiff served his second set of form interrogatories upon each Defendant individually. (DAmico Dec. ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) As of the dates the motions were filed (February 20, 2024 and February 21, 2024), Plaintiff Javier Ortegon has received no response to these interrogatories. (DAmico Dec. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs Motions to Compel Response to Form Interrogatories, Set Two, are GRANTED as to Defendants Steven Mitchell and Carlos Sandoval. Plaintiff submits three requests for sanctions, each in the amount of $2,524.37 (4.5 hours for the preparation of each motion, including an additional 2.5 hours anticipated for reviewing and replying to any opposition and appearing at the hearing of each motion at $350.00 per hour, plus $74.37 for costs of filing this motion). The requests for sanctions are GRANTED in part. Sanctions are imposed upon Defendants Steven Mitchell and Carlos Sandoval, and counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount $1050.00, payable within 60 days. The Court finds that the fees requested by counsel are excessinve. The motions are substantially similar to each other, and they are relatively simple. Lastly, the motions are unopposed.

Case Number: 21STCV18525 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 78 DEPT: 78 HEARING DATE: 07/17/2024 CASE NAME/NUMBER : 21STCV18525 GERARDO PINEDA, et al. vs YANNEL FREGOSO, et al. PETITION TO APPROVE COMPROMISE OF PENDING ACTION OF A MINOR Jaemmy G. Pineda Cach , Age 9; Jade G. Pineda Cach , Age 5; Gerardo Pineda Cach, Jr. , Age 17. RECOMMENDATION: GRANT TENTATIVE ¿ The Court excuses the personal appearance of Claimant s and the ir guardian ad litem. Counsel may appear by telephone or video conference call. Plaintiff s agreed to settle their claims against Defendant s for the total amount of $ 260,000 , with $ 20,000 being apportioned to Jaemmy G. Pineda Cach ( Jaemmy ) , $20,000 being apportioned to Jade G. Pineda Cach ( Jade ) , and $30,000 being apportioned to Gerardo Pineda Cach, Jr. ( Gerardo ) ( collectively, Claimant s ). If the settlement is approved for Jaemmy , $ 6,600 will be used for attorneys fees . The net balance of $ 13,400 will be deposited into a blocked account. If the settlement is approved for Jade , $ 6,600 will be used for attorneys fees . The net balance of $ 13,400 will be deposited into a blocked account. If the settlement is approved for Gerardo , $ 9 , 9 00 will be used for attorneys fees . The net balance of $ 20 , 1 00 will be deposited into a blocked account. The Court reviews the settlement and finds it fair and reasonable.¿The Court also finds the attorneys fees fair and reasonable, in that counsel has supported the request for 33 % of Claimants settlement. Based on the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Court sets an OSC Re Proof of Deposit on ___________________in Department 78 of Stanley Mosk Courthouse at 8:30 AM. No appearance required if receipt is filed in advance. Moving party is ordered to give notice.

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 17, 2024 line 10. PLAINTIFF CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO BY AND THROUGH THE SAN FRANCISCO PORT COMMISSION Notice Of Motion To Have Requests For Admission Deemed Admitted And To Compel Responses To Discovery And Request For Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED, subject to opposition. Admissions are deemed admitted. Defendants to provide complete verified responses without objections to First Set of Form Interrogatories, First Set of Requests for Production, First Set of Special Interrogatories within 5 days of notice of entry of order. Sanctions granted in the amount of $900. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Case Number: 23TRCV00741 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: B Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Southwest District Torrance Dept. B FRANCISCO BRIGIDO NAVA, Plaintiff, Case No.: 23TRCV00741 vs. [Tentative] RULING MARIA GOMEZ RUIZ, Defendant. Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Moving Parties: Attorney Hector C. Perez, for defendant and cross-complainant Greg Jara Responding Party: None Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel The Court considered the moving papers. RULING The motion is DENIED without prejudice. Rule of Court 3.1362(c). BACKGROUND On March 15, 2023, plaintiffs Francisco Brigido Nava and Maria Gomez Ruiz filed a complaint against Greg Jara for (1) negligence, (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability, (3) wrongful eviction, and (4) fraud. On May 1, 2023, defendant Greg Jara filed a cross-complaint against plaintiffs for (1) abuse of elder person and (2) IIED. LEGAL STANDARD The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal. App. 2d 398. CRC Rule 3.1362 (Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel) requires (1) notice of motion and motion to be directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion and declaration on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) the proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). DISCUSSION Defendant and cross-complainant Greg Jaras attorney, Hector C. Perez, seeks to be relieved as counsel. Rule of Court 3.1362(c) states: The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-052 ). (Bold added.) Counsel states in his declaration that his client advised him that he did not want counsel to work on the matter anymore and that his client is in the process of hiring another attorney. The motion is DENIED without prejudice as the declaration is not on the mandatory form MC-052. ORDER The motion is DENIED without prejudice. Moving counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Case Number: 23TRCV03015 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: M LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHWEST DISTRICT Honorable Gary Y. Tanaka Thursday, July 18, 2024 Department M Calendar No. 18 PROCEEDINGS Stephanie Gauss v. David De Wispelaere, et al. 23TRCV03015 1. David De Wispelaere (Wispelaere), Annie Maes (Maes) and Maes Capitals Demurrer to First Amended Complaint 2. David De Wispelaere (Wispelaere), Annie Maes (Maes) and Maes Capitals Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint 3. David De Wispelaere (Wispelaere), Annie Maes (Maes) and Maes Capitals Motion to Augment Bond TENTATIVE RULING David De Wispelaere (Wispelaere), Annie Maes (Maes) and Maes Capitals Demurrer to First Amended Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend, sustained without leave to amend, in part, and overruled, in part. David De Wispelaere (Wispelaere), Annie Maes (Maes) and Maes Capitals Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint is deemed moot. David De Wispelaere (Wispelaere), Annie Maes (Maes) and Maes Capitals Motion to Augment Bond is continued to August 26, 2024. Background Plaintiffs Complaint was filed on September 12, 2023. Plaintiff alleges the following facts. In September 2020, Plaintiff purchased real property commonly known as 8301 Wiley Post Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90045 (8301 Wiley Post). Plaintiff made a down payment of 25% of the purchasing price and obtained a loan for the balance with FCI Lender Services, Inc. Plaintiff decided to build a duplex. Plaintiff obtained a loan from David De Wispelaere for $1,500,000.00. The duplex has common addresses: 8303 and 8305 Wiley Post Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90045. As part of the loan, De Wispelaere was to pay off the existing FCI loan. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, De Wispelaere changed the lender from himself to Defendant Annie Maes (Maes). The loan amount was also changed. DeWispelaere and Maes are not licensed to accept consumer loans. During the loan origination process, Plaintiff was never asked to complete a 1003 Loan Application or provide a copy of her credit report, or income or asset verification. Plaintiff alleges that the loan is in violation of federal lending laws and that the loan charges usurious interest. In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following causes of action: 1. Violations of the Truth in Lending Act; 2. Violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; 3. Violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; 4. Usury; 5. Violations of Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq; 6. Financial Abuse of Elder; 7. Injunctive Relief; 8. Negligence. On March 14, 2024, Defendants demurrer was overruled in part and sustained with leave to amend in part. On April 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. The FAC included the first six causes of action, omitted the seventh and eighth causes of action, and added new causes of action for Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Fraud, and IIED. Meet and Confer Defendants set forth a meet and confer declaration in sufficient compliance with CCP § 430.41. (Decl. Jacoby Perez.) Demurrer A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law and raises only questions of law. ( Schmidt v. Foundation Health (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1706.) In testing the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must assume the truth of (1) the properly pleaded factual allegations; (2) facts that can be reasonably inferred from those expressly pleaded; and (3) judicially noticed matters. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.App.4th 634, 638.) Because a demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the plaintiff must show that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. ( Rakestraw v. California Physicians Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Where the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, courts should sustain the demurrer. (C.C.P., § 430.10(e); Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1126.) Sufficient facts are the essential facts of the case "with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficiently specific to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source, and extent of his cause of action. ( Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643-644.) "Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." ( Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609610.) Under Code Civil Procedure § 430.10(f), a demurrer may also be sustained if a complaint is uncertain. Uncertainty exists where a complaints factual allegations are so confusing they do not sufficiently apprise a defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet. ( Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Defendants demur to the second, third, sixth, and seventh through tenth causes of action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. CCP § 430.10(e). As to the demurrer brought by Defendants David De Wispelaere and Maes Capital, the demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend, in part, and without leave to amend, in part. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient factual allegations against these Defendants. The factual allegations are related to alleged aspects and wrongdoing concerning the subject loan. Plaintiff has specifically alleged that these demurring Defendants were not the lenders, but that only Defendant Annie Maes was the lender. Thus, Defendants David De Wispelaere and Maes Capitals demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the second, third, sixth, and eighth causes of action. The demurrer to the seventh, ninth, and tenth causes of action is sustained without leave to amend. As to Defendant Annie Maes, the Court makes the following ruling. Second Cause of Action for Violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Defendants argue that RESPA applies only to federally related mortgage loans as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 2602. For purposes of RESPA, a federally related mortgage loan is one involving any loan that is secured by a mortgage on residential real estate where the proceeds are used to pay an existing loan secured by the same property and the loan is made by a federally-insured lender or another agency of the federal government through an housing or urban development program. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2602(1)(A),(B). Miller & Starr § 6:15. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 2 Cal. Real Est. § 6:15 (4th ed.) Here, Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts to demonstrate that this particular loan would, in fact, qualify as a federally related loan. Curiously, in Plaintiffs opposition, Plaintiff refers to allegations set forth in paragraphs 61 to 63 which are allegations set forth in the first cause of action, and not the second cause of action. Plaintiff also states that allegations to support the conclusion of federally related mortgage loan was set forth in paragraph 87. However, that section refers to TILA not RESPA. PLAINTIFF is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that both the Loan and DEFENDANTS are subject to TILA[. . .] (FAC, ¶ 87). In any event, if that was a typographical error, the allegation is made on information and belief. [P]laintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true and thus a pleading made on information and belief is insufficient if it merely assert[s] the facts so alleged without alleging such information that lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true. Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 11581159 (internal citations and quotations are omitted; emphasis in original.) As to the allegation made on information and belief, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts that would support the contention that the belief is true. Defendants demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Third Cause of Action for Violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The ECOA makes it unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction [] on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract) 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). In the original Complaint, Plaintiff failed to allege any facts to show that she was discriminated against due to any protected class as defined in the statute. In the FAC, Plaintiff has now alleged that she is female, of Asian ancestry, born in Korea, uses English as a second language, and was over 62 years of age at the time in question. (FAC, 92.) However, Plaintiff alleged no facts that she was discriminated against due to these protected categories. The allegations are sheer conclusions without any supporting facts. Defendants demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Sixth Cause of Action for Financial Abuse of Elder Defendants demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30 states, in relevant part: (a) Financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following: (1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 15610.70. Pleading a claim for elder abuse requires specific facts of intentional or, at a minimum, reckless conduct. See, Worsham v. OConnor Hospital (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 331, 338. To state the statutory cause of action for Financial Elder Abuse, Plaintiff must plead specific facts. See, Covenant Care v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790. Plaintiff has failed to state the requisite specific facts to state a cause of action. Plaintiff attempts to allege an elder abuse cause of action based on financial abuse. However, there are no facts to show that demurring Defendant herein took, secreted, appropriated, obtained, or retained real or personal property, or assisted in doing so. Plaintiff attempts to satisfy the taking requirement by alleging that Defendant withheld loan proceeds, charged interest on loans, clouded title, and destroyed Plaintiffs credit. (FAC, ¶¶ 116-118.) None of these facts demonstrate an actual taking of Plaintiffs personal property. Eighth Cause of Action for Breach of Contract Defendants demurrer is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to plaintiff. Coles v. Glaser (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 384, 391(internal quotations omitted). [T]he complaint must indicate on its face whether the contract is written, oral, or implied by conduct. [...] If the action is based on an alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written instrument must be attached and incorporated by reference. Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 452, 45859. Plaintiffs must either: (a) set forth the terms of the contract verbatim, (b) attach a copy of the contract and incorporate it by reference, or (c) plead its legal effect. McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489. First, Plaintiff has failed to specify the contract. Plaintiff makes reference to the Agreement and Loan Documents. (FAC, 132.) The Agreement was previously defined as the loan agreement. It appears that the Agreement was attached as Exhibit 2. It is unclear what other document or documents that Plaintiff also considers to be a contract. Plaintiff alleges a series of breaches, but it is unclear how these activities are to be considered a breach of the contract. Again, as to the loan agreement that was attached as Exhibit 2, none of these allegations appear to be encompassed within the written agreement. Plaintiff has failed to allege her own performance or excuse for non-performance. Plaintiff has failed to allege resulting damages. Seventh Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Ninth Cause of Action for Fraud Tenth Cause of Action for IIED The demurrer to the seventh, ninth, and tenth causes of action is sustained without leave to amend. Generally, upon the sustaining of the demurrer, the scope of leave to amend is to amend the existing causes of action and not to add new causes of action. See, People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Wks. v. Clausen (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 770, 785. Addition of a new cause of action may be proper, however, when it directly responds to the court's reason for sustaining the earlier demurrer. Patrick v. Alacer Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 995, 1015. The Court notes that these causes of action for Constructive Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty were not set forth in the First Amended Complaint. The scope of leave to amend, upon the sustaining of the demurrer, was not to add new causes of action that were not previously raised. In the prior demurrer, the Court noted in sustaining the demurrer to the negligence cause of action that upon amendment Plaintiff may add a new cause of action for Breach of Contract. However, the seventh, ninth, and tenth causes of action were not mentioned as causes of action that could be added in the amended pleading. Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP § 436(b). The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. CCP § 436. The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. CCP § 437. Defendants move to strike the following: 1. Paragraphs 123-130 in their entirety, constituting the seventh cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 2. Paragraphs 133-137, in their entirety, constituting the ninth cause of action for Fraud; 3. Paragraph 138-143, in their entirety, constituting the tenth cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 4. The prayer for relief pertaining to the seventh cause of action, located on Page 29, lines 11-15 of the FAC; 5. The prayer for relief pertaining to the ninth cause of action for Fraud, located on Page 28, lines 20-25, of the FAC. 6. The prayer for relief pertaining to the tenth cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, located on Page 29 of the FAC, lines 26-28, and continuing through lines 1 through 5 of page 30 of the FAC. The motion to strike is moot upon the sustaining of the demurrer without leave to amend as to the seventh, ninth, and tenth causes of action. Motion to Augment Bond Code Civ. Proc., § 996.010 states: (a) If a bond is given in an action or proceeding, the court may determine that the bond is or has from any cause become insufficient because the sureties are insufficient or because the amount of the bond is insufficient. (b) The court determination shall be upon motion supported by affidavit or upon the court's own motion. The motion shall be deemed to be an objection to the bond. The motion shall be heard and notice of motion shall be given in the same manner as an objection to the bond. (c) Upon the determination the court shall order that a sufficient new, additional, or supplemental bond be given within a reasonable time not less than five days. The court order is subject to any limitations in the statute providing for the bond. (d) If a sufficient bond is not given within the time required by the court order, all rights obtained by giving the original bond immediately cease and the court shall upon ex parte motion so order. Defendants move to increase the amount of the undertaking from $25,000 to $570,510.23. Defendants contend that, at the time of the original preliminary injunction hearing, the Court relied upon an appraisal evaluation of the property of $2.9 million. Defendants argue that the Court should, instead, utilize its own appraisal of $2.4 million. In addition, Defendants state that their anticipated costs and fees that were evaluated at the original hearing were too low and that this amount exceeds $240,000. Defendants motion to augment bond is continued to August 26, 2024. Defendants submitted additional evidence, in the form of the supplemental declarations of David De Wispelaere and Olivier J. Labarre, with the Reply. The Court has discretion to consider new evidence in reply papers in ruling on a motion provided the other party has notice and an opportunity to respond. See, Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 449-50. Plaintiff is provided the opportunity to respond to the new evidence. Any supplemental opposition and reply are to solely address the new evidence submitted by moving party and any issues that arise therefrom. Any supplemental opposition is to be filed and served under the time requirements of CCP § 1005(b). The supplemental opposition shall be no more than 5 pages in length. The supplemental reply shall be no more than 3 pages in length and no new evidence is authorized with the Reply. Defendants are ordered to give notice of this ruling.

23CV02337 COX v. MROCZEK, et al. CONFIRMATION OF 6/28/24 ORDER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT AND OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS The court has reviewed plaintiff’s Notification of Objection to and Disapproval of Any Proposed Order or Other Order: 1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Complaint; or 2) Striking Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s objections merely go to the process by which parties engage on proposed orders; CRC 3.1312 has no impact on the power of the court to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss this action. The court’s previous order of 6/28/24 granting defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s amended complaint is confirmed, as is dismissal of this action. Defendants are ordered to submit a formal dismissal order for the court’s signature. Page 1 of 2 Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal order incorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating the tentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, in accordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative is simply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition of sanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2