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DOCKET NO.: FST-CV23-6064368-S : SUPERIOR COURT
:
ARTHUR-PAUL PETROSINELLI : J.D. OF STAMFORD-NORWALK
:
VS. : AT STAMFORD
:
JENNIFER PETROSINELLI : JANUARY 15, 2024
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO QUASH,
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, AND SANCTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli (“Arthur-Paul”) objects to the Motion to Quash and for
Protective Order and Sanctions, dated December 29, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 107.00) (the
“Motion”) filed by Defendant Jennifer Petrosinelli (“Jennifer”) as to the Foreign Subpoena
issued by this Court on December 19, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 106.00) (the “Subpoena”),
through which Arthur-Paul seeks to compel the production of documents and deposition of
Jennifer in connection with a civil partition action captioned The Irrevocable Trust of Eric A.
Petrosinelli, dated Nov. 16, 2004, Et Al. v. Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli, Docket No. NC-2021-0409,
currently pending in the Newport County Superior Court in the State of Rhode Island (the
“Foreign Action”).
As set forth more fully below, the Court should deny Jennifer’s Motion, in its entirety,
because the discovery sought by Arthur-Paul through the Subpoena is reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in the Foreign Action and Jennifer has failed to
demonstrate good cause such that warrants the entry of a protective order.1
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1
To the extent that Jennifer’s Motion requests the Court to hear testimony in connection with the instant
proceeding, the Court should deny such request. Testimony is unnecessary, as this matter concerns a simple
discovery dispute and there are no factual issues to be resolved by this Court pertaining thereto.
1
Jennifer is the wife of Eric Petrosinelli (“Eric”). Eric is the settlor of the Irrevocale Trust
of Eric A. Petrosinelli, dated November 16, 2004 (the “Trust”) suing Arthur-Paul in the Foreign
Action. The property at the center of the action, 32 Coulter Drive, Jamestown, Rhode Island (the
“Property”), has sold for $4.26 million. The parties now dispute how to divide the proceeds.
The Trust maintains that Arthur-Paul fraudulently used Trust funds to purchase and build
the Property and claims “that Arthur-Paul is entitled to nothing.” See Ex. A at 2 (emphasis in
original). Arthur-Paul responds that he used his own resources to purchase the land, but accepted
funds from Eric to build the Property when, after a domestic violence incident (the “Incident”),
Eric sought to render his assets illiquid. See Petrosinelli v. Dept. of Children & Families, Docket
No. CV-10-6009354-S, Superior Court of New Britain at New Britain, available at
www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914e2e7add7b049348f5fb0. The Trust has denied the
Incident, and Arthur-Paul now seeks to question Jennifer regarding the Incident and obtain
document discovery from her regarding her knowledge of the Property and Arthur-Paul’s alleged
misrepresentations to Eric and their Children.
On or about December 6, 2019, Arthur-Paul conveyed the Property to himself and Eric
such that each held a 50% interest. On or about May 13, 2021, Arthur-Paul and Eric conveyed
the Property to Arthur-Paul and Anthony Petrosinelli, as Trustee of the Trust such that each held
a 50% interest. Members of the Petrosinelli family, including Jennifer and her children, Domenic
and Siena Petrosinelli (collectively, the “Children”), have used and enjoyed the Property on a
seasonal basis since Arthur-Paul first purchased the Property in 2009 up until October 2022, at
which time the Property was sold pursuant to an order by the Rhode Island Superior Court. The
proceeds are currently held by a court appointed commissioner. As stated in the Trust instrument
2
and admitted by the Trust’s own allegations in the Foreign Complaint, Jennifer’s Children are
beneficiaries of the Trust. See Ex. A at 3, ¶ 9.
Through the Foreign Action, the Trust seeks a court order that the Trust is entitled to the
entirety of the proceeds from the sale of the Property based on meritless allegations, inter alia,
that Arthur-Paul could not possibly have contributed any funds to acquisition of the Property
unless he stole them from the Trust without the knowledge and consent of the Trust’s
beneficiaries. A copy of the Trust’s Second Amended Complaint in the Foreign Action dated
December 6, 2023 (the “Foreign Complaint”) is attached hereto as Exhibit A (“Ex. A”). Arthur-
Paul thereafter filed a counterclaim against the Trust (the “Foreign Counterclaim”), seeking 55%
of the proceeds held by the commissioner. A copy of the Foreign Counterclaim is attached hereto
as Exhibit B (“Ex. B”).
On December 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023, Arthur-Paul, by and through the
undersigned Connecticut counsel, filed an application for issuance of the Subpoena seeking to
compel the production of documents and deposition of Jennifer. See Docket Entry Nos. 100.30-
100.31. The Subpoena was issued by the Court on December 19, 2023. See Docket Entry No.
106.00. The Subpoena was served upon Jennifer at her usual place of abode on or about
December 28, 2023. A copy of the return of service as to Jennifer is attached hereto as Exhibit C
(“Ex. C”). On December 29, 2023, Jennifer filed her Motion, requesting that the Court enter a
protective order and quash the Subpoena. See Docket Entry No. 107.00. The undersigned
counsel participated in a conference call with Jennifer’s counsel and all appearing counsel in the
Foreign Action on January 5, 2024 in an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute and agree upon
a mutually convenient date for Jennifer’s deposition and production of documents within 60 days
3
of the Court’s issuance of the Subpoena. However, Jennifer refused and continues to refuse to
submit to any discovery whatsoever as to the Foreign Action.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Connecticut Practice Book § 13-2 broadly provides that “[d]iscovery shall be permitted if
the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action and if it
can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially greater facility than it could
otherwise be obtained by the party seeking disclosure.” (emphasis added). See also Mackay v.
Kwon, No. KNLCV136016884S, 2015 WL 467145, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015)2 (“This
rule liberally permits discovery of information material to the subject matter involved in the
pending action . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). The rules of discovery are meant to serve the
ends of justice by “facilitating an intensive search for the truth through accuracy and fairness,
provid[ing] procedural mechanisms designed to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”
Picketts v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 508 (1990).
It is well-established that “information is discoverable if it appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc.,
196 Conn. 134, 139 (1985). The standard governing the permissibility of discovery is notably
broader and less discerning than “the test of materiality for admissibility at trial.” See William
Pitt Real Est., LLC v. MF2013, LLC, No. LLICV185011376S, 2019 WL 2314555, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2019). “It is the burden of the party seeking to quash a subpoena to show that
there is no reasonable basis for requiring him to comply with the subpoena.” Mackay, 2015 WL
467145, at *2 (emphasis added). Similarly, the party seeking a protective order bears the burden
2
Copies of all unreported decisions are attached hereto.
4
of making a “threshold showing that there is ‘good cause’ that the protective order issue.”
Clarkson v. Greentree Toyota Corp., No. 31 18 23, 1993 WL 137566, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 20, 1993). “Connecticut courts have defined “[g]ood cause . . . as a sound basis or
legitimate need to take judicial action.” Vasquez v. Panas Realty, LLC, No.
HHDCV206131424S, 2021 WL 6335265, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2021). Such
“showing must involve a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from
stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Clarkson, 1993 WL 137566, at *2.
“The use of protective orders and the extent of discovery is within the discretion” of the
court. See William Pitt Real Est., LLC, 2019 WL 2314555, at *3 (citing Coss v. Steward, 126
Conn. App. 30, 46 (2011)). However, “[t]hat discretion is limited . . . by the provisions of the
rules pertaining to discovery . . . especially the mandatory provision that discovery shall be
permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the
action . . .” Id. (citing Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57-60 (1983)) (emphasis
added). “A complete denial of discovery . . . is seldom within the court’s discretion . . .” Id.
IV. ARGUMENT
a. The Court Should Deny Jennifer’s Motion Because the Discovery Sought
through the Subpoena is Reasonably Calculated to Lead to the Discovery of
Admissible Evidence.
As referenced above, there are factual issues to be resolved by the Rhode Island court in
the Foreign Action regarding: 1) the use and ownership of the Property, and 2) the circumstances
surrounding Eric’s contribution of funds toward the construction and improvement of the
Property. The Foreign Complaint contains numerous allegations regarding, inter alia, Arthur-
Paul’s alleged conduct toward and representations to Jennifer’s husband and Children, including
but not limited to the following:
5
Ex. A at 7, ¶ 31 (“Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the residence
without the Beneficiaries’ (or their legal guardian, Eric’s) prior knowledge or
consent.”) (emphasis added);
Ex. A at 7, ¶ 35 (“From 2010 to 2019, Arthur-Paul repeatedly represented to Eric and
the Beneficiaries that the Property was owned solely by the Trust and that Arthur-Paul
had no ownership interest in the Property or the residence.”) (emphasis added); and
Ex. A at 13, ¶ 75 (“Arthur-Paul made false statements to Eric and the Beneficiaries
regarding the Property’s ownership with the intent to induce Eric and the Beneficiaries to
rely on Arthur-Paul’s fraudulent statements.”) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Foreign Complaint contains numerous allegations regarding alleged damages
suffered by Jennifer’s Children as beneficiaries of the Trust due to Arthur-Paul’s alleged
misconduct, including but not limited to the following:
Ex. A at 1 (“[F]or a period of almost ten (10) years … the Beneficiaries of the Trust . . .
were never able to meaningfully access or use the Property.”) (emphasis added);
Ex. A at 13, ¶ 76 (“The Beneficiaries reasonably and justifiably relied on Arthur-Paul’s
false statements with respect to the ownership of the Property to their own detriment.”)
(emphasis added);
Ex A. at 13, ¶ 77 (“Had the Beneficiaries been aware that the Property was not owned
by the Trust, the Beneficiaries would have asserted their rights to the Property at a
much earlier date.”) (emphasis added); and
Ex. A at 16, ¶ 90 (“For a period of more than ten (10) years, the Property was owned
solely by Arthur-Paul and not the Trust, and the Beneficiaries had no right whatsoever
to the use and enjoyment of the Property.”) (emphasis added).
As further alleged by the Trust in the Foreign Complaint, the Property was acquired and
constructed when Jennifer’s Children were minors. See Ex. A at 1-2 (“[T]he Beneficiaries of the
Trust – who lived in Connecticut . . . were minors at the time of Arthur-Paul’s malfeasance.”);
Ex. A at 7, ¶ 30 (“At the time that Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the
residence thereon, the Beneficiaries were minors.”) As such, Arthur-Paul has the right to explore
Jennifer’s knowledge regarding, inter alia, her and her Children’s use of the Property from the
6
date of its construction; whether and to what extent she and her Children were denied access to
the Property by Arthur-Paul; whether Arthur-Paul ever made any representations to her regarding
the use and ownership of the Trust; and whether she is aware of any misrepresentations or
statements made by Arthur-Paul to her husband and Children – particularly while her Children
were minors. It cannot reasonably be argued that Jennifer possesses no relevant knowledge
regarding such topics.
Furthermore, the Trust alleges that Arthur-Paul misappropriated Trust funds to construct
the Property without Eric’s knowledge or consent. Arthur-Paul maintains – both through his
defense against the Foreign Complaint and the allegations of his Foreign Counterclaim – that
Eric contributed such funds of his own volition following the Incident, intending to render his
assets illiquid and shield them from any proceedings that might arise following the Incident. See
Ex. B, at ¶¶ 12-14 (“As a result of the domestic incident, Eric moved out of his house . . . Fearing
that his situation would worsen, Eric sought to render his assets illiquid and urged [Arthur-Paul]
to use them to build a home on the Property.”) The Trust outright denies the Incident and the
arrangement alleged by Arthur-Paul in the Foreign Counterclaim with respect to the funds Eric
contributed toward the Property. As such, Arthur-Paul has the right to conduct discovery
regarding, inter alia, the Incident and Jennifer’s awareness of any financial arrangements made
by her husband in the wake of such Incident. Such information would certainly be of assistance
in Arthur-Paul’s prosecution of the Foreign Counterclaim, and it cannot reasonably be argued
that any person other than Jennifer could provide it with substantially greater facility than
Jennifer herself. Because the discovery sought from Jennifer is permissible for the reasons set
forth herein, the Court should reject Jennifer’s request that sanctions be imposed against Arthur-
Paul, his Connecticut Counsel, or his Rhode Island counsel.
7
Furthermore, Jennifer’s assertion that Arthur-Paul “has not and cannot shown [sic] good
cause as to why testimony from [Jennifer] is necessary” mischaracterizes the standard for
permissible discovery and improperly shifts the burden applicable to the instant proceeding onto
Arthur-Paul. See Motion at 4, ¶ 17. The burden is not on Arthur-Paul to demonstrate that
Jennifer’s testimony is “necessary.” Indeed, Connecticut’s discovery rules mandate that
discovery be liberally permitted so long as such discovery would be “of assistance in the
prosecution or defense of the action.” See Conn. Practice Book § 13-2. The burden is on Jennifer
to show that there is “no reasonable basis for requiring [her] to comply with the subpoena” and
that “good cause” exists for the entry of a protective order – a burden, which Jennifer has failed
to meet in this case.3 See Mackay, 2015 WL 467145, at *2.
Because the scope of the Subpoena relates directly to the Foreign Action and the
allegations made by both parties thereto, Jennifer cannot and has not established any basis to
quash the Subpoena or otherwise restrict Arthur-Paul’s ability to conduct the discovery sought
through the entry of a protective order. See William Pitt Real Est., LLC, 2019 WL 2314555, at *3
(citing Coss, 126 Conn. App. at 46). See also Shannon v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., No. FBT CV
20-6097929, 2023 WL 7539830, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2023) (permitting discovery
where the discovery sought was “directly related to the cause of action.”)
b. The Court Should Deny Jennifer’s Motion Because the Discovery Sought
through the Subpoena is Not Protected by Spousal Privilege.
In her Motion, Jennifer vaguely references “spousal privilege” as a basis to quash the
Subpoena and/or for the entry of a protective order concerning her deposition testimony.
3
Jennifer’s conclusory allegations regarding Arthur-Paul’s alleged noncompliance with discovery in the
Foreign Action are unfounded and, in any event, entirely irrelevant. The central and limited inquiry before this Court
concerns whether the discovery sought by Arthur-Paul from Jennifer through the Subpoena is proper under
Connecticut’s discovery rules.
8
Notably, the Motion is devoid of any legal authority to support such assertion of privilege.
Nevertheless, the Court should deny Jennifer’s Motion because the documents and disclosures
sought through the Subpoena are not protected by any marital privilege.
“The basis of the [marital] privilege is to prevent testimony that may be adverse to the
spouse and may be properly asserted at the time of deposition.” Zelle v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC,
No. FSTX08CV094019435S, 2011 WL 2177193, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2011)
(emphasis added). For a communication to be protected under the marital privilege, as codified
in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-84b, the communication must be: “(1) made to a spouse during a
marriage; (2) confidential; and (3) induced by the affection, confidence, loyalty and integrity of
the marital relationship.” State v. Davalloo, 320 Conn. 123, 142 (2016). All three elements must
be met. Id. at 140 (noting that the third element was added by the legislature to narrow the scope
of the privilege). However, “conversations between spouses relating to ordinary matters of
business” are not confidential. Henry v. Imbruce, 2017 WL 2539386, at 3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
11, 2017), citing G-Fours, Inc. v. Miele, 496 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1974); Spitz's Appeal, 56 Conn.
184 (1887). Furthermore, to be protected, the marital conversation “must be brought about or
caused by the affection, confidence, loyalty and integrity of the marital relationship.”
Davalloo, 320 Conn. at 142 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Statements
“influenced by precisely the opposite” do not qualify as privileged marital communications. See
id.
The Subpoena does not seek discovery concerning Jennifer’s marriage to Eric. Exhibit A
to the Subpoena requests documents regarding: 1) the Property, and 2) Arthur-Paul from the date
on which the Property was purchased to the present. See Docket Entry No. 106.00. Furthermore,
to the extent that Arthur-Paul intends to question Jennifer regarding the Incident or its aftermath,
9
the marital privilege simply does not apply. As set forth herein, the Incident involves violent acts
perpetrated by Eric against Jennifer, which certainly cannot be considered marital conversation
“brought about or caused by the affection, confidence, loyalty, and integrity of the marital
relationship.” See Davalloo, 320 Conn. at 142 (internal quotations omitted). In any event,
Jennifer’s assertion of spousal privilege does not justify an outright denial of discovery. See
Zelle, 2011 WL 2177193, at *1 (“The deponent has a right to state an objection to any questions
that invade the marital privilege but cannot utilize the privilege to avoid a deposition.”)
(emphasis added). Rather, Jennifer may properly assert such privilege at the time of deposition in
the event that the inquiring attorney asks a question subject to such privilege. See id.
Accordingly, the Court should deny Jennifer’s Motion because the discovery sought
through the Subpoena is not protected by spousal privilege and, in any event, the assertion of
such privilege cannot be used to entirely avoid a deposition. See id.
c. The Court Should Deny Jennifer’s Motion Because it is Not Unreasonable to
Compel Jennifer to Appear at a Deposition in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
As stated in the Subpoena – notwithstanding the fact that the Foreign Action was brought
in the State of Rhode Island – Jennifer’s deposition is to be held at the law offices of Cohen and
Wolf, P.C., located in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Given that Jennifer resides in Westport,
Connecticut, it cannot reasonably be argued that the location chosen for the subject deposition
poses such a grave inconvenience as to warrant the entry of an order requiring Arthur-Paul to
depose Jennifer remotely. Furthermore, Jennifer’s Motion fails to state any reason for her
unwillingness to attend the deposition in person or otherwise establish good cause to justify the
entry of a protective order changing the location of her deposition. As was expressed to
Jennifer’s counsel during the parties’ January 5, 2024 conference call to no avail, Arthur-Paul is
10
more than willing to agree upon a mutually convenient date to conduct the deposition to
minimize any inconvenience.
Notably, Arthur-Paul’s Rhode Island counsel, based in Providence, Rhode Island, has
undertaken to travel to Connecticut to conduct the depositions of Jennifer and other nonparty
Connecticut residents for the nonparty witnesses’ convenience. Under such circumstances, and
considering that Arthur-Paul has arranged to conduct Jennifer’s deposition in a manner much
more convenient for Jennifer than for Arthur-Paul and his counsel, the Court should decline to
order that Arthur-Paul change the location of Jennifer’s deposition. See Message Ctr. Mgmt., Inc.
v. Shell Oil Prod. Co., No. X03CV970481611S, 2001 WL 357331, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
21, 2001) (denying motion for protective order seeking to change the location of a deposition in
the deponent’s home state, where counsel taking such deposition had agreed to undertake “the
expense and inconvenience” of traveling to the deponent’s home state to conduct such
deposition).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Arthur-Paul respectfully requests that the Court deny
Jennifer’s Motion in its entirety.
THE PLAINTIFF,
ARTHUR-PAUL PETROSINELLI
By: /s/ Kaelyn Mostafa 443087
Kaelyn M. Mostafa, Esq.
Cohen and Wolf, P.C.
1115 Broad Street
Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604
Phone: (203) 337-4147
Fax: (475) 270-5825
Email: kmostafa@cohenandwolf.com
Juris No. 010032
11
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered
electronically or non-electronically on January 15, 2024 to all counsel and self-represented
parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel
and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served.
Tyler Balding, Esq.
Maya Murphy, P.C.
266 Post Road East
Westport, CT 06880
tbalding@mayalaw.com
/s/ Kaelyn Mostafa 443087
Kaelyn M. Mostafa
12
EXHIBIT A
Case Number: NC-2021-0409
Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court
Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM
Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT
NEWPORT COUNTY
THE IRREVOCABLE TRUST OF :
ERIC A. PETROSINELLI, dated :
November 16, 2004, by and through its :
Trustee, ANTHONY S. PETROSINELLI :
Petitioner, : C.A. No. NC-2021-0409
:
v. :
:
ARTHUR-PAUL PETROSINELLI :
Respondent. :
:
PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
NOW COMES the Petitioner/Plaintiff, Anthony S. Petrosinelli, in his capacity as Trustee
of the Irrevocable Trust of Eric A. Petrosinelli (“Petitioner” and/or “Plaintiff”) dated November
16, 2004, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
This is a dispute between the Irrevocable Trust of Eric A. Petrosinelli dated November 16,
2004 (the “Trust”) on the one hand, and Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli (“Arthur-Paul”) on the other,
regarding the ownership and true-up of the net proceeds from the sale of a summer home located
at 32 Coulter Drive in Jamestown, Rhode Island (the “Property”). The Property was sold after a
court-approved public auction on September 14, 2022, and approximately $3.94 million in net
sales proceeds from the closing on the sale of the Property are currently being held in escrow by
the Commissioner pending resolution of the instant dispute.
As an initial matter, the Trust alleges that Arthur-Paul, in his capacity as Trustee for the
Trust, misappropriated substantial Trust assets to purchase the Property and construct a residence
thereon for Arthur-Paul’s sole use and enjoyment. Further, the Trust alleges that for a period of
almost ten (10) years, the Property was owned entirely by Arthur-Paul, and as a result, the
Case Number: NC-2021-0409
Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court
Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM
Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
Beneficiaries of the Trust – who lived in Connecticut and were minors at the time of Arthur-Paul’s
malfeasance – were never able to meaningfully access or use the Property.
In essence, Arthur-Paul’s self-dealing deprived the Beneficiaries of substantial Trust
revenue that was specifically set aside for them and would now be worth millions of dollars.
Because Arthur-Paul used Trust assets to purchase the Property and construct a residence thereon
without the Beneficiaries’ knowledge or consent, the Plaintiff contends that the $3.94 million in
net proceeds attributable to the sale of the Property belongs to the Trust and that Arthur-Paul is
entitled to nothing.
PARTIES
1. The Petitioner, Anthony S. Petrosinelli, is the Trustee of the Irrevocable Trust of
Eric A. Petrosinelli dated November 16, 2004 (the “Trust”).
2. A Declaration and Indenture of Trust was executed on November 16, 2004, by the
Settlor of the Trust, Eric A. Petrosinelli. Anthony S. Petrosinelli became the Successor Trustee of
the Trust effective as of October 17, 2019.
3. Upon information and belief, Respondent Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli (“Arthur-Paul”)
is a resident of North Scituate, Rhode Island.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4. This action is commenced by the Petitioner, and jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-15-1 et seq. and § 8-2-13.
5. Venue is proper in the Superior Court of Newport County under
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-4-2, which requires an action as to real property to be brought in the Superior
Court of the county in which the real property is located, as the property at issue is located in the
Town of Jamestown.
2
Case Number: NC-2021-0409
Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court
Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM
Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
I. Eric establishes the Trust for the sole benefit of his children.
6. On or about November 16, 2004, Eric A. Petrosinelli (“Eric” or the “Settlor”)
executed an Indenture of Trust (“Trust Indenture”) creating the Trust. A true and accurate copy
of the Trust Indenture is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A.
7. The Trust Indenture states, in pertinent part as follows:
The Settlor presently has one child whose name, address and birthdate for purposes
of this trust are set forth in Schedule B attached hereto and made a part hereof.
However, this trust shall also be for the benefit of other children born of the Settlor
and the Settlor’s wife, JENNIFER A. PETROSINELLI, after the date this Trust
Agreement is signed.
(Ex. A at p. 8.)
8. Accordingly, by its terms, the Trust was established for the sole benefit of Eric and
Jennifer Petrosinelli’s children.
9. At present, Eric and Jennifer Petrosinelli have three (3) children: Anthony,
Domenic, and Siena Petrosinelli (collectively, the “Beneficiaries”).
10. One of the Beneficiaries, Anthony (born in 1999), was a minor at the time that Eric
executed the Trust Indenture. The other two Beneficiaries, Domenic (born in 2005) and Siena
(born in 2007), had not yet been born when Eric executed the Trust Indenture.
11. The Trust Indenture designates Eric’s brother, Arthur-Paul, as the sole Trustee for
the Trust. (Ex. A at p. 1.)
12. During his time as Trustee for the Trust, Arthur-Paul had certain fiduciary
obligations to the Trust and its Beneficiaries, including, inter alia: (1) a duty to administer the
Trust in accordance with its terms and applicable law; (2) a duty of prudence; (3) a duty of loyalty;
(4) a duty of impartiality; (5) a duty to furnish information; and (6) a duty to segregate and identify
Trust property.
3
Case Number: NC-2021-0409
Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court
Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM
Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
II. Eric makes substantial contributions to the Trust.
13. Between December 2004 and July 2009, Eric, as the Settlor of the Trust, sent
approximately $750,613.00 in checks to Arthur-Paul as custodian for the Beneficiaries of the Trust
in his capacity as Trustee of the Trust.
14. It was understood between Eric and Arthur-Paul that Arthur-Paul was to deposit
the $750,613.00 in checks into the Trust’s bank account located at Citizens Bank.
15. During the same period of time, Eric, as the Settlor of the Trust, deposited an
additional approximately $345,911.76 into the Trust’s investment account with Fidelity
Investments that Arthur-Paul as Trustee managed and maintained.
16. In total, between December 2004 and July 2009, Eric, as Settlor of the Trust,
contributed approximately $1,096,524.76 to the corpus of the Trust.
17. In addition, from December 2004 to July 2009, Eric’s $1,096,524.76 contribution
accrued interest and returns that were intended for the Beneficiaries’ sole benefit. Such interest
and returns are estimated to be over $100,000.00.
III. Arthur-Paul misappropriates Eric’s contributions to the Trust to purchase the
Property.
18. In or around July 29, 2009, Arthur-Paul purchased a vacant lot located at 32 Coulter
Drive in the Town of Jamestown, Rhode Island for $1,050,000.00.
19. Upon information and belief, Arthur-Paul misappropriated a majority of the funds
that Eric had contributed to the Trust up to that point to acquire the Property.
20. Upon information and belief, Arthur-Paul lacked the personal funds or assets
needed to acquire the Property himself. In other words, Arthur-Paul could not have purchased the
Property had he not taken assets from the Trust.
4
Case Number: NC-2021-0409
Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court
Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM
Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
21. The deed into Arthur-Paul, a true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein as Exhibit B, describes the Property as follows:
FIRST PARCEL:
NORTHERLY: part by land now or formerly of Raymond M. Harrison and Mary
Louise Harrison, Trustees, partly by land now or formerly of Fritz
E. Attaway and Elizabeth P. Attaway, and partly by land now or
formerly of the Decatur Trust.
EASTERLY: by the waters of Narragansett Bay;
SOUTHERLY: by land now or formerly of Patricia Evangelista; and
WESTERLY: on Coulter Street, so-called.
BE ALL said measurements more or less, or however otherwise the same may be
bounded or described.
BEING all of Lot No. 30 on that certain plat entitled “Plat of Wynwyse Brae”, dated
December 24, 1910, as said plat appears of record in the Land Evidence Records of the
Town of Jamestown.
BEING all of Lot 35 on Jamestown Tax Assessor’s Plat 7, as said plat is presently
constituted.
BEING all of the same premises conveyed to these Grantors herein by deed of Elizabeth
K. Hyman dated July 17, 1998 and recorded in Book 314 at Page 3 of the Jamestown
Land Evidence Records.
SECOND PARCEL (Well Lot):
That certain tract or parcel of land, being the Well Lot, so-called bounded northerly by
a service road, easterly by Lot No. 14, southerly by Lot No. 5 and westerly by Lot No.
6, all said laid out and delineated on that certain plat entitled, “Plat of Wynwyc Brae,
Conanicut Island, R.I., Dec. 25th, 1910”, which plat is recorded in the Office of the Town
Clerk in said Town of Jamestown in Plat Book 1 at Page 44 (and presently being the
Well Lot, so called, bounded northerly by a service road, easterly by Lot No. 42 and
westerly by Lot No. 43, all as laid out and delineated on that certain plat entitled, “Bay
Terrace East Shore Road, Jamestown, R.I., February 1957, A.A. Marcell, C.E.”, which
plat is recorded in the Office of the Town Clerk in said Town of Jamestown in Plat Book
1 at Page 44. Together with all the pumps, machinery, equipment and structures on said
lot and the pipe line running from the well on said lot through the roads, drives and ways
shown on said plat to the respective premises of the users; with the right to maintain and
use said pipe line and the right to dig up, repair, renew and replace said pipe line as
required from time to time, doing as little damage as need be, restoring the premises as
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Case Number: NC-2021-0409
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Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
near as possible to their former condition. The cost of operation and maintenance shall
be shared equally by the owners.
BEING the same premises conveyed to these Grantors by deed of Edward J. Hyman
and Elizabeth K. Hyman dated October 14, 1998 and recorded in Book 319 at Page 20
of the Town of Jamestown Land Evidence Records.
(Ex. B.)
22. Arthur-Paul acquired the Property for the sole purpose of constructing a single-
family summer residence thereon for his personal use and enjoyment.
23. Arthur-Paul did not purchase the Property for the Beneficiaries’ benefit (financial
or otherwise).
24. In furtherance of developing the Property, on or around October 15, 2009, Arthur-
Paul’s attorney, Mark Liberati, Esq., filed a variance application with Zoning Board of Review for
the Town of Jamestown to reduce the side-yard setback requirements for a future residence.
25. On or around February 23, 2010, the Zoning Board of Review granted a variance
for a residence to be constructed on the Property.
26. Thereafter, Arthur-Paul engaged David E. Seymour Engineering, Inc. to prepare
structural engineering plans and specifications for the residence.
27. Construction on the residence commenced in or around June 2010 and was
completed in or around September 2011.
28. Upon information and belief, constructing the residence cost Arthur-Paul between
$641,000.00 and $720,000.00.
29. Arthur-Paul misappropriated all of the remaining funds that Eric had contributed to
the Trust between December of 2004 and July of 2009, and which had not been used for the
purchase of the Property, for the construction of the residence in violation of Arthur-Paul’s
fiduciary duties to the Trust and its Beneficiaries.
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Case Number: NC-2021-0409
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Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM
Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
30. At the time that Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the residence
thereon, the Beneficiaries were minors.
31. Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the residence without the
Beneficiaries’ (or their legal guardian, Eric’s) prior knowledge or consent.
IV. Eric and the Beneficiaries discover that Arthur-Paul misappropriated Trust funds.
32. Eric first became aware that Arthur-Paul misappropriated all of Trust’s assets to
acquire the Property and was constructing a home thereon in or around the Fall of 2010.
33. At that time, rather than pressing charges against his brother or pursuing litigation,
Eric (acting on the Beneficiaries’ behalf) entered into an agreement with Arthur-Paul regarding
the ownership and management of the Property and residence going forward.
34. Pursuant to the terms of Eric and Arthur-Paul’s agreement, the Trust was to own
one hundred percent (100%) of the Property. However, Arthur-Paul would be permitted to use the
Property year-round and would pay the carrying costs for the Property until all of the Beneficiaries
had completed college. Thereafter, Arthur-Paul would no longer be required to pay the carrying
costs for the Property and would be granted limited access to use the residence for certain months
each year.
35. From 2010 to 2019, Arthur-Paul repeatedly represented to Eric and the
Beneficiaries that the Property was owned solely by the Trust and that Arthur-Paul had no
ownership interest in the Property or the residence.
36. Because Arthur-Paul is Eric’s brother – and the uncle of Anthony, Domenic, and
Siena, and because Eric’s attorney at the time, John Manni, Esq., had represented to Eric that the
Trust owned the Property – Eric did not think it was necessary to further investigate Arthur-Paul’s
representations regarding the purported ownership of the Property and the residence.
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Case Number: NC-2021-0409
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Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM
Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
37. In short, Eric trusted that Arthur-Paul’s and his own attorney’s representations that
Arthur-Paul had no ownership interest in the Property were true and correct.
V. Eric discovers that despite prior representations, Arthur-Paul is the one hundred
percent (100%) title owner of the Property.
38. On or around July 17, 2019, Arthur-Paul sent Eric a draft invitation for a political
fundraiser that Arthur-Paul and his wife, Maria Petrosinelli, planned to hold at the Property for
Rhode Island Congressman David Cicilline.
39. The draft invitation stated that the Property was owned by Arthur-Paul and Maria
Petrosinelli and omitted the Trust’s ownership interest in the Property.
40. Eric requested that Arthur-Paul revise the draft invitation to reflect that the Property
was owned entirely by the Trust. Arthur-Paul subsequently revised the draft invitation to reflect
that the “Petrosinelli Family” owned the Property.
41. However, Arthur-Paul’s initial draft of the invitation caused Eric to question
Arthur-Paul’s previous representations that the Property was owned one hundred percent (100%)
by the Trust.
42. In or around September 2019, Eric discovered that the Trust did not have – and to
that point, had never had – a title ownership interest in the Property.
43. Specifically, Eric discovered that from 2010 to 2019 – despite Arthur-Paul’s
repeated representations to the contrary – Arthur-Paul never transferred title to the Property to the
Trust.
44. In short, from 2010 to 2019, Arthur-Paul was the sole title owner of the Property.
45. Had Eric died between 2010 and 2019, Arthur-Paul would have continued to own
one hundred percent (100%) of the Property, and the Beneficiaries would have had no ability to
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Case Number: NC-2021-0409
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Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
recoup the monies that Arthur-Paul took from the Trust without the Beneficiaries’ knowledge or
permission.
46. After it was discovered that Arthur-Paul had, for a period of approximately ten (10)
years, misrepresented the title ownership of the Property to Eric and the Beneficiaries, Arthur-Paul
as Trustee for the Trust effectively resigned as Trustee by refusing to act thereafter as Trustee for
the Trust.
47. Eric also demanded that Arthur-Paul immediately transfer Arthur-Paul’s entire
interest in the Property to the Trust.
48. Despite Eric’s demand, Arthur-Paul declined to transfer his one hundred percent
(100%) title interest in the Property to the Trust.
49. Instead, in December of 2019, Arthur-Paul improperly conveyed a fifty percent
(50%) interest in the Property to Eric, as an individual. A true and accurate copy of the deed
conveying a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Property to Eric is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
50. Eric objected to Arthur-Paul’s conveyance of a fifty percent (50%) interest in the
Property to Eric, individually.
51. At all times relevant, it has been the Trust’s position that the Trust (and not Eric)
holds an ownership interest in the Property as a result of Arthur-Paul’s misappropriation of
substantial Trust funds to purchase the Property and construct a residence thereon.
52. Despite Eric’s objection, and with the onset of COVID in March of 2020, Arthur-
Paul waited until May 19, 2021, to record a deed conveying a fifty percent (50%) interest in the
Property to the Trust. A true and accurate copy of the deed into Arthur-Paul and the Trust as joint
owners for the Property is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
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Case Number: NC-2021-0409
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Envelope: 4396455
Reviewer: Dianna J.
53. On or around November 14, 2021, Eric appointed his son, A
Preview
DOCKET NO.: FST-CV23-6064368-S : SUPERIOR COURT : ARTHUR-PAUL PETROSINELLI : J.D. OF STAMFORD-NORWALK : VS. : AT STAMFORD : JENNIFER PETROSINELLI : JANUARY 15, 2024 OBJECTION TO MOTION TO QUASH, FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, AND SANCTIONS I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli (“Arthur-Paul”) objects to the Motion to Quash and for Protective Order and Sanctions, dated December 29, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 107.00) (the “Motion”) filed by Defendant Jennifer Petrosinelli (“Jennifer”) as to the Foreign Subpoena issued by this Court on December 19, 2023 (Docket Entry No. 106.00) (the “Subpoena”), through which Arthur-Paul seeks to compel the production of documents and deposition of Jennifer in connection with a civil partition action captioned The Irrevocable Trust of Eric A. Petrosinelli, dated Nov. 16, 2004, Et Al. v. Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli, Docket No. NC-2021-0409, currently pending in the Newport County Superior Court in the State of Rhode Island (the “Foreign Action”). As set forth more fully below, the Court should deny Jennifer’s Motion, in its entirety, because the discovery sought by Arthur-Paul through the Subpoena is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in the Foreign Action and Jennifer has failed to demonstrate good cause such that warrants the entry of a protective order.1 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 To the extent that Jennifer’s Motion requests the Court to hear testimony in connection with the instant proceeding, the Court should deny such request. Testimony is unnecessary, as this matter concerns a simple discovery dispute and there are no factual issues to be resolved by this Court pertaining thereto. 1 Jennifer is the wife of Eric Petrosinelli (“Eric”). Eric is the settlor of the Irrevocale Trust of Eric A. Petrosinelli, dated November 16, 2004 (the “Trust”) suing Arthur-Paul in the Foreign Action. The property at the center of the action, 32 Coulter Drive, Jamestown, Rhode Island (the “Property”), has sold for $4.26 million. The parties now dispute how to divide the proceeds. The Trust maintains that Arthur-Paul fraudulently used Trust funds to purchase and build the Property and claims “that Arthur-Paul is entitled to nothing.” See Ex. A at 2 (emphasis in original). Arthur-Paul responds that he used his own resources to purchase the land, but accepted funds from Eric to build the Property when, after a domestic violence incident (the “Incident”), Eric sought to render his assets illiquid. See Petrosinelli v. Dept. of Children & Families, Docket No. CV-10-6009354-S, Superior Court of New Britain at New Britain, available at www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914e2e7add7b049348f5fb0. The Trust has denied the Incident, and Arthur-Paul now seeks to question Jennifer regarding the Incident and obtain document discovery from her regarding her knowledge of the Property and Arthur-Paul’s alleged misrepresentations to Eric and their Children. On or about December 6, 2019, Arthur-Paul conveyed the Property to himself and Eric such that each held a 50% interest. On or about May 13, 2021, Arthur-Paul and Eric conveyed the Property to Arthur-Paul and Anthony Petrosinelli, as Trustee of the Trust such that each held a 50% interest. Members of the Petrosinelli family, including Jennifer and her children, Domenic and Siena Petrosinelli (collectively, the “Children”), have used and enjoyed the Property on a seasonal basis since Arthur-Paul first purchased the Property in 2009 up until October 2022, at which time the Property was sold pursuant to an order by the Rhode Island Superior Court. The proceeds are currently held by a court appointed commissioner. As stated in the Trust instrument 2 and admitted by the Trust’s own allegations in the Foreign Complaint, Jennifer’s Children are beneficiaries of the Trust. See Ex. A at 3, ¶ 9. Through the Foreign Action, the Trust seeks a court order that the Trust is entitled to the entirety of the proceeds from the sale of the Property based on meritless allegations, inter alia, that Arthur-Paul could not possibly have contributed any funds to acquisition of the Property unless he stole them from the Trust without the knowledge and consent of the Trust’s beneficiaries. A copy of the Trust’s Second Amended Complaint in the Foreign Action dated December 6, 2023 (the “Foreign Complaint”) is attached hereto as Exhibit A (“Ex. A”). Arthur- Paul thereafter filed a counterclaim against the Trust (the “Foreign Counterclaim”), seeking 55% of the proceeds held by the commissioner. A copy of the Foreign Counterclaim is attached hereto as Exhibit B (“Ex. B”). On December 8, 2023 and December 19, 2023, Arthur-Paul, by and through the undersigned Connecticut counsel, filed an application for issuance of the Subpoena seeking to compel the production of documents and deposition of Jennifer. See Docket Entry Nos. 100.30- 100.31. The Subpoena was issued by the Court on December 19, 2023. See Docket Entry No. 106.00. The Subpoena was served upon Jennifer at her usual place of abode on or about December 28, 2023. A copy of the return of service as to Jennifer is attached hereto as Exhibit C (“Ex. C”). On December 29, 2023, Jennifer filed her Motion, requesting that the Court enter a protective order and quash the Subpoena. See Docket Entry No. 107.00. The undersigned counsel participated in a conference call with Jennifer’s counsel and all appearing counsel in the Foreign Action on January 5, 2024 in an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute and agree upon a mutually convenient date for Jennifer’s deposition and production of documents within 60 days 3 of the Court’s issuance of the Subpoena. However, Jennifer refused and continues to refuse to submit to any discovery whatsoever as to the Foreign Action. III. LEGAL STANDARD Connecticut Practice Book § 13-2 broadly provides that “[d]iscovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action and if it can be provided by the disclosing party or person with substantially greater facility than it could otherwise be obtained by the party seeking disclosure.” (emphasis added). See also Mackay v. Kwon, No. KNLCV136016884S, 2015 WL 467145, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015)2 (“This rule liberally permits discovery of information material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). The rules of discovery are meant to serve the ends of justice by “facilitating an intensive search for the truth through accuracy and fairness, provid[ing] procedural mechanisms designed to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.” Picketts v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 215 Conn. 490, 508 (1990). It is well-established that “information is discoverable if it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 139 (1985). The standard governing the permissibility of discovery is notably broader and less discerning than “the test of materiality for admissibility at trial.” See William Pitt Real Est., LLC v. MF2013, LLC, No. LLICV185011376S, 2019 WL 2314555, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2019). “It is the burden of the party seeking to quash a subpoena to show that there is no reasonable basis for requiring him to comply with the subpoena.” Mackay, 2015 WL 467145, at *2 (emphasis added). Similarly, the party seeking a protective order bears the burden 2 Copies of all unreported decisions are attached hereto. 4 of making a “threshold showing that there is ‘good cause’ that the protective order issue.” Clarkson v. Greentree Toyota Corp., No. 31 18 23, 1993 WL 137566, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 1993). “Connecticut courts have defined “[g]ood cause . . . as a sound basis or legitimate need to take judicial action.” Vasquez v. Panas Realty, LLC, No. HHDCV206131424S, 2021 WL 6335265, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2021). Such “showing must involve a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Clarkson, 1993 WL 137566, at *2. “The use of protective orders and the extent of discovery is within the discretion” of the court. See William Pitt Real Est., LLC, 2019 WL 2314555, at *3 (citing Coss v. Steward, 126 Conn. App. 30, 46 (2011)). However, “[t]hat discretion is limited . . . by the provisions of the rules pertaining to discovery . . . especially the mandatory provision that discovery shall be permitted if the disclosure sought would be of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action . . .” Id. (citing Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 57-60 (1983)) (emphasis added). “A complete denial of discovery . . . is seldom within the court’s discretion . . .” Id. IV. ARGUMENT a. The Court Should Deny Jennifer’s Motion Because the Discovery Sought through the Subpoena is Reasonably Calculated to Lead to the Discovery of Admissible Evidence. As referenced above, there are factual issues to be resolved by the Rhode Island court in the Foreign Action regarding: 1) the use and ownership of the Property, and 2) the circumstances surrounding Eric’s contribution of funds toward the construction and improvement of the Property. The Foreign Complaint contains numerous allegations regarding, inter alia, Arthur- Paul’s alleged conduct toward and representations to Jennifer’s husband and Children, including but not limited to the following: 5 Ex. A at 7, ¶ 31 (“Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the residence without the Beneficiaries’ (or their legal guardian, Eric’s) prior knowledge or consent.”) (emphasis added); Ex. A at 7, ¶ 35 (“From 2010 to 2019, Arthur-Paul repeatedly represented to Eric and the Beneficiaries that the Property was owned solely by the Trust and that Arthur-Paul had no ownership interest in the Property or the residence.”) (emphasis added); and Ex. A at 13, ¶ 75 (“Arthur-Paul made false statements to Eric and the Beneficiaries regarding the Property’s ownership with the intent to induce Eric and the Beneficiaries to rely on Arthur-Paul’s fraudulent statements.”) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Foreign Complaint contains numerous allegations regarding alleged damages suffered by Jennifer’s Children as beneficiaries of the Trust due to Arthur-Paul’s alleged misconduct, including but not limited to the following: Ex. A at 1 (“[F]or a period of almost ten (10) years … the Beneficiaries of the Trust . . . were never able to meaningfully access or use the Property.”) (emphasis added); Ex. A at 13, ¶ 76 (“The Beneficiaries reasonably and justifiably relied on Arthur-Paul’s false statements with respect to the ownership of the Property to their own detriment.”) (emphasis added); Ex A. at 13, ¶ 77 (“Had the Beneficiaries been aware that the Property was not owned by the Trust, the Beneficiaries would have asserted their rights to the Property at a much earlier date.”) (emphasis added); and Ex. A at 16, ¶ 90 (“For a period of more than ten (10) years, the Property was owned solely by Arthur-Paul and not the Trust, and the Beneficiaries had no right whatsoever to the use and enjoyment of the Property.”) (emphasis added). As further alleged by the Trust in the Foreign Complaint, the Property was acquired and constructed when Jennifer’s Children were minors. See Ex. A at 1-2 (“[T]he Beneficiaries of the Trust – who lived in Connecticut . . . were minors at the time of Arthur-Paul’s malfeasance.”); Ex. A at 7, ¶ 30 (“At the time that Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the residence thereon, the Beneficiaries were minors.”) As such, Arthur-Paul has the right to explore Jennifer’s knowledge regarding, inter alia, her and her Children’s use of the Property from the 6 date of its construction; whether and to what extent she and her Children were denied access to the Property by Arthur-Paul; whether Arthur-Paul ever made any representations to her regarding the use and ownership of the Trust; and whether she is aware of any misrepresentations or statements made by Arthur-Paul to her husband and Children – particularly while her Children were minors. It cannot reasonably be argued that Jennifer possesses no relevant knowledge regarding such topics. Furthermore, the Trust alleges that Arthur-Paul misappropriated Trust funds to construct the Property without Eric’s knowledge or consent. Arthur-Paul maintains – both through his defense against the Foreign Complaint and the allegations of his Foreign Counterclaim – that Eric contributed such funds of his own volition following the Incident, intending to render his assets illiquid and shield them from any proceedings that might arise following the Incident. See Ex. B, at ¶¶ 12-14 (“As a result of the domestic incident, Eric moved out of his house . . . Fearing that his situation would worsen, Eric sought to render his assets illiquid and urged [Arthur-Paul] to use them to build a home on the Property.”) The Trust outright denies the Incident and the arrangement alleged by Arthur-Paul in the Foreign Counterclaim with respect to the funds Eric contributed toward the Property. As such, Arthur-Paul has the right to conduct discovery regarding, inter alia, the Incident and Jennifer’s awareness of any financial arrangements made by her husband in the wake of such Incident. Such information would certainly be of assistance in Arthur-Paul’s prosecution of the Foreign Counterclaim, and it cannot reasonably be argued that any person other than Jennifer could provide it with substantially greater facility than Jennifer herself. Because the discovery sought from Jennifer is permissible for the reasons set forth herein, the Court should reject Jennifer’s request that sanctions be imposed against Arthur- Paul, his Connecticut Counsel, or his Rhode Island counsel. 7 Furthermore, Jennifer’s assertion that Arthur-Paul “has not and cannot shown [sic] good cause as to why testimony from [Jennifer] is necessary” mischaracterizes the standard for permissible discovery and improperly shifts the burden applicable to the instant proceeding onto Arthur-Paul. See Motion at 4, ¶ 17. The burden is not on Arthur-Paul to demonstrate that Jennifer’s testimony is “necessary.” Indeed, Connecticut’s discovery rules mandate that discovery be liberally permitted so long as such discovery would be “of assistance in the prosecution or defense of the action.” See Conn. Practice Book § 13-2. The burden is on Jennifer to show that there is “no reasonable basis for requiring [her] to comply with the subpoena” and that “good cause” exists for the entry of a protective order – a burden, which Jennifer has failed to meet in this case.3 See Mackay, 2015 WL 467145, at *2. Because the scope of the Subpoena relates directly to the Foreign Action and the allegations made by both parties thereto, Jennifer cannot and has not established any basis to quash the Subpoena or otherwise restrict Arthur-Paul’s ability to conduct the discovery sought through the entry of a protective order. See William Pitt Real Est., LLC, 2019 WL 2314555, at *3 (citing Coss, 126 Conn. App. at 46). See also Shannon v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., No. FBT CV 20-6097929, 2023 WL 7539830, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2023) (permitting discovery where the discovery sought was “directly related to the cause of action.”) b. The Court Should Deny Jennifer’s Motion Because the Discovery Sought through the Subpoena is Not Protected by Spousal Privilege. In her Motion, Jennifer vaguely references “spousal privilege” as a basis to quash the Subpoena and/or for the entry of a protective order concerning her deposition testimony. 3 Jennifer’s conclusory allegations regarding Arthur-Paul’s alleged noncompliance with discovery in the Foreign Action are unfounded and, in any event, entirely irrelevant. The central and limited inquiry before this Court concerns whether the discovery sought by Arthur-Paul from Jennifer through the Subpoena is proper under Connecticut’s discovery rules. 8 Notably, the Motion is devoid of any legal authority to support such assertion of privilege. Nevertheless, the Court should deny Jennifer’s Motion because the documents and disclosures sought through the Subpoena are not protected by any marital privilege. “The basis of the [marital] privilege is to prevent testimony that may be adverse to the spouse and may be properly asserted at the time of deposition.” Zelle v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, No. FSTX08CV094019435S, 2011 WL 2177193, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2011) (emphasis added). For a communication to be protected under the marital privilege, as codified in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-84b, the communication must be: “(1) made to a spouse during a marriage; (2) confidential; and (3) induced by the affection, confidence, loyalty and integrity of the marital relationship.” State v. Davalloo, 320 Conn. 123, 142 (2016). All three elements must be met. Id. at 140 (noting that the third element was added by the legislature to narrow the scope of the privilege). However, “conversations between spouses relating to ordinary matters of business” are not confidential. Henry v. Imbruce, 2017 WL 2539386, at 3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 11, 2017), citing G-Fours, Inc. v. Miele, 496 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1974); Spitz's Appeal, 56 Conn. 184 (1887). Furthermore, to be protected, the marital conversation “must be brought about or caused by the affection, confidence, loyalty and integrity of the marital relationship.” Davalloo, 320 Conn. at 142 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Statements “influenced by precisely the opposite” do not qualify as privileged marital communications. See id. The Subpoena does not seek discovery concerning Jennifer’s marriage to Eric. Exhibit A to the Subpoena requests documents regarding: 1) the Property, and 2) Arthur-Paul from the date on which the Property was purchased to the present. See Docket Entry No. 106.00. Furthermore, to the extent that Arthur-Paul intends to question Jennifer regarding the Incident or its aftermath, 9 the marital privilege simply does not apply. As set forth herein, the Incident involves violent acts perpetrated by Eric against Jennifer, which certainly cannot be considered marital conversation “brought about or caused by the affection, confidence, loyalty, and integrity of the marital relationship.” See Davalloo, 320 Conn. at 142 (internal quotations omitted). In any event, Jennifer’s assertion of spousal privilege does not justify an outright denial of discovery. See Zelle, 2011 WL 2177193, at *1 (“The deponent has a right to state an objection to any questions that invade the marital privilege but cannot utilize the privilege to avoid a deposition.”) (emphasis added). Rather, Jennifer may properly assert such privilege at the time of deposition in the event that the inquiring attorney asks a question subject to such privilege. See id. Accordingly, the Court should deny Jennifer’s Motion because the discovery sought through the Subpoena is not protected by spousal privilege and, in any event, the assertion of such privilege cannot be used to entirely avoid a deposition. See id. c. The Court Should Deny Jennifer’s Motion Because it is Not Unreasonable to Compel Jennifer to Appear at a Deposition in Bridgeport, Connecticut. As stated in the Subpoena – notwithstanding the fact that the Foreign Action was brought in the State of Rhode Island – Jennifer’s deposition is to be held at the law offices of Cohen and Wolf, P.C., located in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Given that Jennifer resides in Westport, Connecticut, it cannot reasonably be argued that the location chosen for the subject deposition poses such a grave inconvenience as to warrant the entry of an order requiring Arthur-Paul to depose Jennifer remotely. Furthermore, Jennifer’s Motion fails to state any reason for her unwillingness to attend the deposition in person or otherwise establish good cause to justify the entry of a protective order changing the location of her deposition. As was expressed to Jennifer’s counsel during the parties’ January 5, 2024 conference call to no avail, Arthur-Paul is 10 more than willing to agree upon a mutually convenient date to conduct the deposition to minimize any inconvenience. Notably, Arthur-Paul’s Rhode Island counsel, based in Providence, Rhode Island, has undertaken to travel to Connecticut to conduct the depositions of Jennifer and other nonparty Connecticut residents for the nonparty witnesses’ convenience. Under such circumstances, and considering that Arthur-Paul has arranged to conduct Jennifer’s deposition in a manner much more convenient for Jennifer than for Arthur-Paul and his counsel, the Court should decline to order that Arthur-Paul change the location of Jennifer’s deposition. See Message Ctr. Mgmt., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prod. Co., No. X03CV970481611S, 2001 WL 357331, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2001) (denying motion for protective order seeking to change the location of a deposition in the deponent’s home state, where counsel taking such deposition had agreed to undertake “the expense and inconvenience” of traveling to the deponent’s home state to conduct such deposition). V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, Arthur-Paul respectfully requests that the Court deny Jennifer’s Motion in its entirety. THE PLAINTIFF, ARTHUR-PAUL PETROSINELLI By: /s/ Kaelyn Mostafa 443087 Kaelyn M. Mostafa, Esq. Cohen and Wolf, P.C. 1115 Broad Street Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Phone: (203) 337-4147 Fax: (475) 270-5825 Email: kmostafa@cohenandwolf.com Juris No. 010032 11 CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the above was or will immediately be mailed or delivered electronically or non-electronically on January 15, 2024 to all counsel and self-represented parties of record and that written consent for electronic delivery was received from all counsel and self-represented parties of record who were or will immediately be electronically served. Tyler Balding, Esq. Maya Murphy, P.C. 266 Post Road East Westport, CT 06880 tbalding@mayalaw.com /s/ Kaelyn Mostafa 443087 Kaelyn M. Mostafa 12 EXHIBIT A Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT NEWPORT COUNTY THE IRREVOCABLE TRUST OF : ERIC A. PETROSINELLI, dated : November 16, 2004, by and through its : Trustee, ANTHONY S. PETROSINELLI : Petitioner, : C.A. No. NC-2021-0409 : v. : : ARTHUR-PAUL PETROSINELLI : Respondent. : : PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT NOW COMES the Petitioner/Plaintiff, Anthony S. Petrosinelli, in his capacity as Trustee of the Irrevocable Trust of Eric A. Petrosinelli (“Petitioner” and/or “Plaintiff”) dated November 16, 2004, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby states as follows: INTRODUCTION This is a dispute between the Irrevocable Trust of Eric A. Petrosinelli dated November 16, 2004 (the “Trust”) on the one hand, and Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli (“Arthur-Paul”) on the other, regarding the ownership and true-up of the net proceeds from the sale of a summer home located at 32 Coulter Drive in Jamestown, Rhode Island (the “Property”). The Property was sold after a court-approved public auction on September 14, 2022, and approximately $3.94 million in net sales proceeds from the closing on the sale of the Property are currently being held in escrow by the Commissioner pending resolution of the instant dispute. As an initial matter, the Trust alleges that Arthur-Paul, in his capacity as Trustee for the Trust, misappropriated substantial Trust assets to purchase the Property and construct a residence thereon for Arthur-Paul’s sole use and enjoyment. Further, the Trust alleges that for a period of almost ten (10) years, the Property was owned entirely by Arthur-Paul, and as a result, the Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. Beneficiaries of the Trust – who lived in Connecticut and were minors at the time of Arthur-Paul’s malfeasance – were never able to meaningfully access or use the Property. In essence, Arthur-Paul’s self-dealing deprived the Beneficiaries of substantial Trust revenue that was specifically set aside for them and would now be worth millions of dollars. Because Arthur-Paul used Trust assets to purchase the Property and construct a residence thereon without the Beneficiaries’ knowledge or consent, the Plaintiff contends that the $3.94 million in net proceeds attributable to the sale of the Property belongs to the Trust and that Arthur-Paul is entitled to nothing. PARTIES 1. The Petitioner, Anthony S. Petrosinelli, is the Trustee of the Irrevocable Trust of Eric A. Petrosinelli dated November 16, 2004 (the “Trust”). 2. A Declaration and Indenture of Trust was executed on November 16, 2004, by the Settlor of the Trust, Eric A. Petrosinelli. Anthony S. Petrosinelli became the Successor Trustee of the Trust effective as of October 17, 2019. 3. Upon information and belief, Respondent Arthur-Paul Petrosinelli (“Arthur-Paul”) is a resident of North Scituate, Rhode Island. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 4. This action is commenced by the Petitioner, and jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 34-15-1 et seq. and § 8-2-13. 5. Venue is proper in the Superior Court of Newport County under R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-4-2, which requires an action as to real property to be brought in the Superior Court of the county in which the real property is located, as the property at issue is located in the Town of Jamestown. 2 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS I. Eric establishes the Trust for the sole benefit of his children. 6. On or about November 16, 2004, Eric A. Petrosinelli (“Eric” or the “Settlor”) executed an Indenture of Trust (“Trust Indenture”) creating the Trust. A true and accurate copy of the Trust Indenture is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A. 7. The Trust Indenture states, in pertinent part as follows: The Settlor presently has one child whose name, address and birthdate for purposes of this trust are set forth in Schedule B attached hereto and made a part hereof. However, this trust shall also be for the benefit of other children born of the Settlor and the Settlor’s wife, JENNIFER A. PETROSINELLI, after the date this Trust Agreement is signed. (Ex. A at p. 8.) 8. Accordingly, by its terms, the Trust was established for the sole benefit of Eric and Jennifer Petrosinelli’s children. 9. At present, Eric and Jennifer Petrosinelli have three (3) children: Anthony, Domenic, and Siena Petrosinelli (collectively, the “Beneficiaries”). 10. One of the Beneficiaries, Anthony (born in 1999), was a minor at the time that Eric executed the Trust Indenture. The other two Beneficiaries, Domenic (born in 2005) and Siena (born in 2007), had not yet been born when Eric executed the Trust Indenture. 11. The Trust Indenture designates Eric’s brother, Arthur-Paul, as the sole Trustee for the Trust. (Ex. A at p. 1.) 12. During his time as Trustee for the Trust, Arthur-Paul had certain fiduciary obligations to the Trust and its Beneficiaries, including, inter alia: (1) a duty to administer the Trust in accordance with its terms and applicable law; (2) a duty of prudence; (3) a duty of loyalty; (4) a duty of impartiality; (5) a duty to furnish information; and (6) a duty to segregate and identify Trust property. 3 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. II. Eric makes substantial contributions to the Trust. 13. Between December 2004 and July 2009, Eric, as the Settlor of the Trust, sent approximately $750,613.00 in checks to Arthur-Paul as custodian for the Beneficiaries of the Trust in his capacity as Trustee of the Trust. 14. It was understood between Eric and Arthur-Paul that Arthur-Paul was to deposit the $750,613.00 in checks into the Trust’s bank account located at Citizens Bank. 15. During the same period of time, Eric, as the Settlor of the Trust, deposited an additional approximately $345,911.76 into the Trust’s investment account with Fidelity Investments that Arthur-Paul as Trustee managed and maintained. 16. In total, between December 2004 and July 2009, Eric, as Settlor of the Trust, contributed approximately $1,096,524.76 to the corpus of the Trust. 17. In addition, from December 2004 to July 2009, Eric’s $1,096,524.76 contribution accrued interest and returns that were intended for the Beneficiaries’ sole benefit. Such interest and returns are estimated to be over $100,000.00. III. Arthur-Paul misappropriates Eric’s contributions to the Trust to purchase the Property. 18. In or around July 29, 2009, Arthur-Paul purchased a vacant lot located at 32 Coulter Drive in the Town of Jamestown, Rhode Island for $1,050,000.00. 19. Upon information and belief, Arthur-Paul misappropriated a majority of the funds that Eric had contributed to the Trust up to that point to acquire the Property. 20. Upon information and belief, Arthur-Paul lacked the personal funds or assets needed to acquire the Property himself. In other words, Arthur-Paul could not have purchased the Property had he not taken assets from the Trust. 4 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. 21. The deed into Arthur-Paul, a true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B, describes the Property as follows: FIRST PARCEL: NORTHERLY: part by land now or formerly of Raymond M. Harrison and Mary Louise Harrison, Trustees, partly by land now or formerly of Fritz E. Attaway and Elizabeth P. Attaway, and partly by land now or formerly of the Decatur Trust. EASTERLY: by the waters of Narragansett Bay; SOUTHERLY: by land now or formerly of Patricia Evangelista; and WESTERLY: on Coulter Street, so-called. BE ALL said measurements more or less, or however otherwise the same may be bounded or described. BEING all of Lot No. 30 on that certain plat entitled “Plat of Wynwyse Brae”, dated December 24, 1910, as said plat appears of record in the Land Evidence Records of the Town of Jamestown. BEING all of Lot 35 on Jamestown Tax Assessor’s Plat 7, as said plat is presently constituted. BEING all of the same premises conveyed to these Grantors herein by deed of Elizabeth K. Hyman dated July 17, 1998 and recorded in Book 314 at Page 3 of the Jamestown Land Evidence Records. SECOND PARCEL (Well Lot): That certain tract or parcel of land, being the Well Lot, so-called bounded northerly by a service road, easterly by Lot No. 14, southerly by Lot No. 5 and westerly by Lot No. 6, all said laid out and delineated on that certain plat entitled, “Plat of Wynwyc Brae, Conanicut Island, R.I., Dec. 25th, 1910”, which plat is recorded in the Office of the Town Clerk in said Town of Jamestown in Plat Book 1 at Page 44 (and presently being the Well Lot, so called, bounded northerly by a service road, easterly by Lot No. 42 and westerly by Lot No. 43, all as laid out and delineated on that certain plat entitled, “Bay Terrace East Shore Road, Jamestown, R.I., February 1957, A.A. Marcell, C.E.”, which plat is recorded in the Office of the Town Clerk in said Town of Jamestown in Plat Book 1 at Page 44. Together with all the pumps, machinery, equipment and structures on said lot and the pipe line running from the well on said lot through the roads, drives and ways shown on said plat to the respective premises of the users; with the right to maintain and use said pipe line and the right to dig up, repair, renew and replace said pipe line as required from time to time, doing as little damage as need be, restoring the premises as 5 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. near as possible to their former condition. The cost of operation and maintenance shall be shared equally by the owners. BEING the same premises conveyed to these Grantors by deed of Edward J. Hyman and Elizabeth K. Hyman dated October 14, 1998 and recorded in Book 319 at Page 20 of the Town of Jamestown Land Evidence Records. (Ex. B.) 22. Arthur-Paul acquired the Property for the sole purpose of constructing a single- family summer residence thereon for his personal use and enjoyment. 23. Arthur-Paul did not purchase the Property for the Beneficiaries’ benefit (financial or otherwise). 24. In furtherance of developing the Property, on or around October 15, 2009, Arthur- Paul’s attorney, Mark Liberati, Esq., filed a variance application with Zoning Board of Review for the Town of Jamestown to reduce the side-yard setback requirements for a future residence. 25. On or around February 23, 2010, the Zoning Board of Review granted a variance for a residence to be constructed on the Property. 26. Thereafter, Arthur-Paul engaged David E. Seymour Engineering, Inc. to prepare structural engineering plans and specifications for the residence. 27. Construction on the residence commenced in or around June 2010 and was completed in or around September 2011. 28. Upon information and belief, constructing the residence cost Arthur-Paul between $641,000.00 and $720,000.00. 29. Arthur-Paul misappropriated all of the remaining funds that Eric had contributed to the Trust between December of 2004 and July of 2009, and which had not been used for the purchase of the Property, for the construction of the residence in violation of Arthur-Paul’s fiduciary duties to the Trust and its Beneficiaries. 6 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. 30. At the time that Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the residence thereon, the Beneficiaries were minors. 31. Arthur-Paul acquired the Property and constructed the residence without the Beneficiaries’ (or their legal guardian, Eric’s) prior knowledge or consent. IV. Eric and the Beneficiaries discover that Arthur-Paul misappropriated Trust funds. 32. Eric first became aware that Arthur-Paul misappropriated all of Trust’s assets to acquire the Property and was constructing a home thereon in or around the Fall of 2010. 33. At that time, rather than pressing charges against his brother or pursuing litigation, Eric (acting on the Beneficiaries’ behalf) entered into an agreement with Arthur-Paul regarding the ownership and management of the Property and residence going forward. 34. Pursuant to the terms of Eric and Arthur-Paul’s agreement, the Trust was to own one hundred percent (100%) of the Property. However, Arthur-Paul would be permitted to use the Property year-round and would pay the carrying costs for the Property until all of the Beneficiaries had completed college. Thereafter, Arthur-Paul would no longer be required to pay the carrying costs for the Property and would be granted limited access to use the residence for certain months each year. 35. From 2010 to 2019, Arthur-Paul repeatedly represented to Eric and the Beneficiaries that the Property was owned solely by the Trust and that Arthur-Paul had no ownership interest in the Property or the residence. 36. Because Arthur-Paul is Eric’s brother – and the uncle of Anthony, Domenic, and Siena, and because Eric’s attorney at the time, John Manni, Esq., had represented to Eric that the Trust owned the Property – Eric did not think it was necessary to further investigate Arthur-Paul’s representations regarding the purported ownership of the Property and the residence. 7 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. 37. In short, Eric trusted that Arthur-Paul’s and his own attorney’s representations that Arthur-Paul had no ownership interest in the Property were true and correct. V. Eric discovers that despite prior representations, Arthur-Paul is the one hundred percent (100%) title owner of the Property. 38. On or around July 17, 2019, Arthur-Paul sent Eric a draft invitation for a political fundraiser that Arthur-Paul and his wife, Maria Petrosinelli, planned to hold at the Property for Rhode Island Congressman David Cicilline. 39. The draft invitation stated that the Property was owned by Arthur-Paul and Maria Petrosinelli and omitted the Trust’s ownership interest in the Property. 40. Eric requested that Arthur-Paul revise the draft invitation to reflect that the Property was owned entirely by the Trust. Arthur-Paul subsequently revised the draft invitation to reflect that the “Petrosinelli Family” owned the Property. 41. However, Arthur-Paul’s initial draft of the invitation caused Eric to question Arthur-Paul’s previous representations that the Property was owned one hundred percent (100%) by the Trust. 42. In or around September 2019, Eric discovered that the Trust did not have – and to that point, had never had – a title ownership interest in the Property. 43. Specifically, Eric discovered that from 2010 to 2019 – despite Arthur-Paul’s repeated representations to the contrary – Arthur-Paul never transferred title to the Property to the Trust. 44. In short, from 2010 to 2019, Arthur-Paul was the sole title owner of the Property. 45. Had Eric died between 2010 and 2019, Arthur-Paul would have continued to own one hundred percent (100%) of the Property, and the Beneficiaries would have had no ability to 8 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. recoup the monies that Arthur-Paul took from the Trust without the Beneficiaries’ knowledge or permission. 46. After it was discovered that Arthur-Paul had, for a period of approximately ten (10) years, misrepresented the title ownership of the Property to Eric and the Beneficiaries, Arthur-Paul as Trustee for the Trust effectively resigned as Trustee by refusing to act thereafter as Trustee for the Trust. 47. Eric also demanded that Arthur-Paul immediately transfer Arthur-Paul’s entire interest in the Property to the Trust. 48. Despite Eric’s demand, Arthur-Paul declined to transfer his one hundred percent (100%) title interest in the Property to the Trust. 49. Instead, in December of 2019, Arthur-Paul improperly conveyed a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Property to Eric, as an individual. A true and accurate copy of the deed conveying a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Property to Eric is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 50. Eric objected to Arthur-Paul’s conveyance of a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Property to Eric, individually. 51. At all times relevant, it has been the Trust’s position that the Trust (and not Eric) holds an ownership interest in the Property as a result of Arthur-Paul’s misappropriation of substantial Trust funds to purchase the Property and construct a residence thereon. 52. Despite Eric’s objection, and with the onset of COVID in March of 2020, Arthur- Paul waited until May 19, 2021, to record a deed conveying a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Property to the Trust. A true and accurate copy of the deed into Arthur-Paul and the Trust as joint owners for the Property is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 9 Case Number: NC-2021-0409 Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior Court Submitted: 12/6/2023 12:09 PM Envelope: 4396455 Reviewer: Dianna J. 53. On or around November 14, 2021, Eric appointed his son, A