Preview
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
* a” Thursday, J anuary 4, 2024 3:54:17 PM
CASE NUMBER: 2024 CV00077 Docket ID: 391364108
iN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF FRSA MONTGOMERY COUNTY OHIO
CIVIL — NEW COMPLAINT
SAroo.s Danan yeu Case No
Plaintiff Judge
——
wh dog Jule Rive
“ally usc Pleading
What do you want from the Court?
Gee Abwals
What do you want to happen?
Soo BL acu.
MANDATORY CONTACT INFORMATION
Name
Address
Address
Phone number (3-3 181s 2D,
COURT
wv ONRIEAS COURT OF MON EOMeRtousrs ouio
IN‘TH
e\in
CIVIL DIVISION
OuRTS
ew
ty iO wy oni
STATE EX REL
IN RE
DIAMON DAMIEN GLENN
DOB 11/21/2007
Robin Mapp
Biological Parent
3420 Lehman Dr
Cincinnati Ohio 45205
Me
Vs ra
oo
0
mH
Montgomery County Sheriff cp
h
Rob Streck ho
345 W 2nd St 3
Dayton, OH 45422
Se5
=oO
Judge Julie Bruns
380 W 2nd St
Dayton, OH 45422
Prosecuting Attorney
Kelly Madzey
380 W 2nd St,
Dayton, OH 45422
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WITH ATTACHED NOTICE OF CONFINEMENT
AND THE ENTIRE FILE AS ATTACHMENT A
Now come the mother Robin Mapp and files her petition for writ of habeas corpus to
any available Magistrate, Judge, or Justice or Associate Justices of this division and
request the Court to take a look at her son whom is_a juvenile and has been
remanded to jail in violation of the 5‘ and 14 ents to the U.S.
Constitution and the Ohio Consts. Art. I-164" SS Wi
HOPE K. WOODOhio
Sosorm toe and sobsecityed tv t ~\ pres sence sos
td] Notary Public, State of
Se
ae
My Commission Expires
Minis \5ts doy of Recerntoer, LOTS 19 January 19, 2028
Yi ha 4
Hani Hom, Cou my, Stofe. o ¢ Ohio Ow
oberg Tsp ¥ We: ok —————$$__—______.
HAMILTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
“hoo Pn
Plaintiff phe caseno. DIA x DUS O09
-Vs- AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY
Wob Streak,
Defendant
After being duly cautioned and sworn, I hereby state the following information is true to the best of my
knowledge and belief. I understand I am subject to criminal charges for providing false information.
I. INCOME Net Monthly Pay
1, Employer Q. Yrs, Qe uh
Position I ff V
Spouse’s employer / | / Lf
the
2. Alimony/cl hijasuy nt fecey
3. Public ben ‘its re ivéd (AIDC, 8S, SSI, WC, etc.)
4. Other income (pension, interest, etc.)
TOTAL INCOME
IL ASSETS
1. Cash on hand
Cash in b: y. |(oh
7A.ZSS Te
Cash at PTTL | TOTAL CASH s_Q
2. O ps
3-"Own niotor home,
YP P Value $_
Make
4, Other pr Yay
Value §_G
Value $_ iq
Tl. MAJOR “AY M ones Payments
§
$ @
IV. FAMILY COMPOSITION
1. Number of persons you are required to support *
2. Ages of above
3. Their relationship to you (spouse, child, parent, etc.)
I further state I am indigent at this time and unable to pay the expungement application fee in the within
a
matter.
(Le he
PRN, PUS Plaintiff 7
Sworn to rt)
aol es. Tibed ins PRS this york day of. Decenber 20_22
se Notary Public, State of Ohio
My Commission Expires
danuary 19, 2028 Hoe
Notark Public
Koon God
Si Zé
C0
IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
JULVENILE DIVISION
IN RE DIAMON GLENN TRIAL CASE NO. 2023-003115-01.02
DOB 11/21/2007
Judge Julie Bruns
Robin Mapp
3420 Lehman Dr.
Cincinnati Ohio 45205
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGES ORDER DUE TO
INEFFECTIVNESS OF COUNSEL
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE CHARGES
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS HAVE RUN
DEMAND FOR RECUSAL OR VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION
OF THE TRIAL JUDGE PURSUANT TO R.C. 2703.01
Now come the mother Robin Mapp having made changes to her motion as amended by Juv.
R. 10 and B.C, 2151.233 having terminated trial counsel Randall Stump on 12/12/2023 and
now moves the trial Judge for her voluntary recusal because at this time you are not forced
to step down but you are given it by choice look at this way as the voluntary agreement or
decision and once it has been accomplished you or the Ohio Supreme Court under
Rule 1 7 for reassignment of the matter and have the new judge to enter a full
dismissal of above captained case and terminate the matter from the record due to 1.
Tneffectiveness of Counsel Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 2. The Statute of
limitation have run out pursuant to 2945.71.
Held:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel, and the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
Randall Stump trial counsel really a guardian ad litem has no business handling a
criminal case of this magnitude he and attorney Mike Peffit knew and was well
aware that the case had time barred itself even though he asked for a psychological
evaluation and then asked for a second competency evaluation but the motions did
not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to 2945.72 because the juvenile
defendant was still in custody and the Court confirmed on December 12, 2028 that
she was not releasing him to probation regardless of the evaluations or if he took a
plea deal this indicates that the trial Judge has an vested interest in violation of
cannon codes of judicial conduct .
Cannon Codes of Judicial Conduct
3. The trial Judge has a vested interest in violation of cannon codes of judicial conduct
and she must step down and recuse herself for cruel and unusual punishment of a
minor.
In determining whether a judge's conduct is consistent with these Canons and
standards, the judge should consider three questions:
(1) Will the action or inaction threaten the judge’s impartiality?
(2) Will the action or inaction harm public trust in the fairness of the
judiciary?
(8) Will the action or inaction harm the efficient and effective delivery of
justice?
The trial Judge confirmed that the juvenile defendant would not be released by her
under any circumstances but she confirmed that he will sit whether or not he took
the plea deal and counsel already confirmed ineffective and showed gross negligence
during the proceeding because he refused and completely failed to challenge the
trial Judge.
Trial counsel Randall Stump waited until the hearing and stated before the Court
that the mother wanted him to order her to release her son to probating well that
statement was far from the truth what it was asked of the attorney if could file
motions to dismiss and if the Court denied it then and only then we would have an
appealable issue because without the denial in writing the Court of appeals would
have no possible assignment of error to consider, I believe that’s a fair run down of
what occurred on December 12, 2023.
Switching Roles
The trial Judge acting as though she was the prosecution she confirmed over and
over that the juvenile defendant would not be released for any of reasons mentioned
regardless of the outcome or guilty or innocent findings but she did state if he were
to take the plea deal the gun speculations would be dropped and he would then be
transferred to Hamilton County for sentencings this also sustains that she has an
interest in the outcome of the matter.
8. This also indicates that the Court acted outside of its jurisdiction by attempting to
send a Montgomery County defendant to another County for the sentencing phase
indicting that the State has no case no prosecuting witness no weapon to present to
a jury no DNA on a weapon no finger prints on the weapon as stated the
prosecutions key witnessed are none existent and must be brought to Court to
testify on the States behalf.
TIME FOR TRIAL UNDER THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF THE CHARGES
Instead, Randall Stump moving for a pro se nolle que under 2945.73 he continues
with filing of several unauthorized motions attempting to waive the three days per
day rule under division D. under 2945.71 as confirmed time for trial under the
highest degree of the charges which are two counts of robbery with a gun
specification but it’s not established who was the second robbery made against
according to trial counsel the original alleged victim was with his brother and
apparently the State decided to add charges and now we see why no motion to
quash was filed and no motion to suppress was filed by either attorney because they
do not have the clients best interest at heart.
Attomey -Client
10,The same principle applies here as does to a capital sentencing proceeding -- such as
the one provided by Florida law - that is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial
format and in the existence of standards for decision that counsel's role in the
proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial. Pp. 466 U. S. 684-687.
11, The case has time barred itself the time for trial was over 90 days into the
incarceration and the mother of the juvenile defendant should not have to recite the
laws to trial counsel. See 2945.71.01.
Facts State v. Dunlap
12.A complaint was filed with the police department against Dunlap on October 27,
1999. The complaint alleged that Dunlap, who contracted with the victim to perform
roofing services to the victim's house, stole over $1,000 from the victim and did not
perform any work on the victim's house.
13.0n February 24, 2000, Dunlap was arrested and charged with felony theft, R.C.
2918.02(B)(2). On February 25, 2000, Dunlap waived his U.S. and Ohio
constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights, including the time period in which
to have a preliminary hearing. That same day, Dunlap was arraigned in Struthers
Municipal Court.
14.0n December 18, 2000, upon the state's motion, the trial court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice. However, later that same day the state refiled the
charges, R.C, 2913.02(B)(2). The trial court set a preliminary hearing for December
22, 2000.
15.0n December 22, 2000, Dunlap waived his right to a preliminary hearing. An
indictment was issued on January 18, 2001. Dunlap failed to appear at the
scheduled arraignment on February 6, 2001. A bench warrant was issued the next
day. On May 15, 2001, Dunlap was arraigned. Trial was set for May 23, 2001.
16.0n the day of trial, Dunlap filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial
rights. On July 10, 2001, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The trial
court held that Dunlap's waiver of his speedy trial rights was invalid. The court
stated that Dunlap was not represented by counsel at the time he executed the
waiver, therefore, the waiver was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered into.
17.The trial court went further to state that even if the waiver was valid, the ten-
month period from the time of the arrest to the preliminary hearing is unreasonable
and a violation of Dunlap's speedy trial rights. The state timely appeals the
decision.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. ONE
The state raises two assignments of error. The first of which contends:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT FOR A
SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION AFTER A WRITTEN WAIVER OF UNLIMITED
DURATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
REVOCATION OF THAT WAIVER OR A FORMAL WRITTEN DEMAND FOR
TRIAL.”
18.The state argues that despite the dismissal of the first charge, the waiver that was
executed in response to that charge is valid as to the re-filing of the identical
charge. The state claims that Dunlap’s waiver of the time limits to the preliminary
hearing are valid and the state did not violate Dunlap's rights.
19.The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed to every person who is
charged with an offense for which he may be deprived of his liberty or
property. State v. Carter (Mar. 31, 1998), 10th Dist. No. 97APA08-976; Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. The
courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and do not acquiesce in the loss of fundamental rights. State v.
Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, citing Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458.
20.The Ohio Supreme Court has held that an appellant's waiver of his right to a
speedy trial as to the initial charge cannot be construed as a knowing and
intelligent waiver of such a right as to any additional charges arising from the same
set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the
waiver. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, syllabus (Adams was charged with violating R.C.
4511,19(A)@).
Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67:
21.That charge was dismissed and Adams was then charged with B.C. 4511,19(A)(1).
The waiver that was executed prior to the dismissal of the first charge was invalid
as to the second charge.).
22.However, when a subsequent charge is identical to the originally dismissed charge,
the waiver executed as to the original charge generally retains its validity and is
applicable to the succeeding second charge. State v. Luff(1993), 85 Ohio App.3d
7 85, 797; State v. Clark (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 141, 152-153.
23.In Luff, appellant was indicted and executed a valid waiver of his speedy trial
rights. Two months later, appellant was indicted again. The second indictment was
identical to the first indictment in all respects except that the second indictment
added an additional death specification and an additional count of aggravated
robbery. The two indictments were joined and the court entered a nolle prosequi for
the first indictment because the re-indictment contained the same charges.
24,Later appellant filed speedy trial violations. The trial court held that the waiver
was valid as to the charges that were included in the first indictment but not as to
the charges that were added in the second indictment. Therefore, the trial court
dismissed the additional death specification and the aggravated robbery charge for
violation of speedy trial rights. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate
court followed the reasoning in Adams. In Adams, the court stated that the first
indictment and the second indictment contained two different distinct
charges. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 69-70.
25.The court held that two different charges have the possibility of different defenses
at trial. Id. "A knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be made until all the facts are
known by the accused, which includes knowing the exact nature of the crime he is
charged with." Id. at 70. Therefore, a waiver is only valid as to the charges that
were in effect at the time of the waiver. Luff 85 Ohio App.3d at 797; Clark, 107
Ohio App.3d at 152-153; State v. Sain (Aug. 23, 1993), 2nd Dist. No. 13493,
unreported. Re-filing the identical charges, B.C. 2913,02(B)() in the case at hand,
did not destroy the waiver.
26.In this matter it took 4 weeks to bring an additional amended charge of the two-gun
specs but as confirmed we have no complaining witnesses to even carry such a
charge.
Prosecuting Attorney
27.Kelly Madzey knew of the malicious prosecution but still allowed the State to
proceed she knew the statue of limitations had expired
Back to Strickland v Washington Pp. 466 U.S. 687-696.
28. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the
defendant show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.
29.This is exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court has described here. As stated Randall
Stump is only guardian ad litem and is not experienced criminal defense lawyer.
693 F.2d 1243, reversed.
30.0'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and
WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p.
466 U.S. 701. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 466 U. S. 706.
31.Defense counsel not. only failed to enforce the statute of limitations here but he
never planned to call 1. Any medical experts. 2. Counsel was ineffective because he
failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric
report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence
investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and
to investigate the medical examiner's reports.
32.There was no effort to cross-examine the medical experts because he never planned
as stated planned to call one, he only filed for a psych evaluation to delay and keep
the juvenile defendant incarcerated.
33.Trial counsel never supported his client he never submitted affidavits from friends,
neighbors, and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so. He
also submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological report stating that
respondent, though not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional.
disturbance, was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic
dilemma" at the time of his crimes.
34.Let’s further apply applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by
the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court
concluded that respondent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any
substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that
was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.
35.The court here confirmed that if the juvenile defendant plead guilty to felony
robberies they would dismiss the case, then send it to the Hamilton County
Juvenile Court for sentencing knowing full well he was facing substantial jail time
until he was 18 years old then then they would continue with the incarceration as
an adult.
36.Trial counsel failed to file a motion to quash the indictment. 2 failed to file a motion
to suppress as mentioned above he failed to file numerous motions and affidavits
indicating that he is ineffective and tried to get his client to plead guilty without
testing the prosecution’s case.
Question
37.What standard should be applied to determine whether a convicted person's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has been violated so as to require reversal of a
conviction or to set aside a death sentence?
Conclusion
38.The Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2)
the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the
majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance,
the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an
“objective standard of reasonableness.”
39.The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is
a "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel
was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was
unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr.
Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence.
40.Justice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr.
Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately,
dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make
a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless.
Barker vy. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS.
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus:
41.Petitioner was not brought to trial for murder until more than five years after he
had been arrested, during which time the prosecution obtained numerous
continuances, initially for the purpose of first trying petitioner's alleged accomplice
so that his testimony, if conviction resulted, would be available at petitioner's trial.
Before the accomplice was finally convicted, he was tried six times. Petitioner made
no objection to the continuances until three and one-half years after he was
arrested.
42.After the accomplice was finally convicted, petitioner, after further delays because
of a key prosecution witness’ illness, was tried and convicted. In this habeas corpus
proceeding, the Court of Appeals, concluding that petitioner had waived his right to
a speedy trial for the period prior to his demand for trial, and, in any event, had not
been prejudiced by the delay, affirmed the District Court's judgment against
petitioner.
‘Held:
43.A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be established by any
inflexible rule, but can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis in which
the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. The couzt
should assess such factors as the length of and reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
44.In this case, the lack of any serious prejudice to petitioner and the fact, as disclosed
by the record, that he did not want a speedy trial outweigh opposing considerations,
and compel the conclusion that petitioner was not deprived of his due process right
to a speedy trial. Pp. 407 U.S. 519-536.
442 F.2d 1141, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. WHITE, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 407 U.S. 536.
Page 407 U.S. 515 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
8
45.Although a speedy trial is guaranteed the accused by the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution, [Footnote 1] this Court has dealt with that right on infrequent
occasions. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U. S. 77 (1905); Pollard v. United States,
352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 (1966); United States v.
Marion, 404 U, S. 307 (1971). See also United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D.
Md.), aff'd, 30 U.S. 857 (1955). The Court's opinion in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 218 (1967), established that the right to a speedy trial is "fundamental," and is
imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States.
[Footnote 2] See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 (1969); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.
30 (1070), As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN
Page 407 U.S. 516
46.The denial of due process has been established under the 5, 8, 14 Amendments to
the US Constitution calling for a complete recall of this order and recall the entire
case and release and return the mothers biological son and end this entire matter.
Sigy ofanother
fel, ee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The biologic: mother Robin Mapp hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing
paperwork was filed and served to the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Kelly Madzey
380 West Second Street Juvenile Justice Center Dayton, OH 45422 and trial
counsel Randall Stump Attorney at Law 1200 Talbot Tower Dayton Ohio 45402
on this 14th day of Decembgr 2023.
Signature of mother.
Robin Mapp
3420 Lehman Dr.
Cincinnati Ohio 45205
Assistant Prosecuting Attomey
Kelly Madzey
380 West Second Street
Juvenile Justice Center
Dayton, OH 45422
Randall Stump
Attormey at Law
1200 Talbot Tower
Dayton Ohio 45402
IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
JULVENILE DIVISION
IN RE DIAMON GLENN TRIAL CASE NO. 2023-003115-01.02
DOB 11/21/2007
Judge Julie Bruns
Robin Mapp
3420 Lehman Dr.
Cincinnati Ohio 45205
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGES ORDER DUE TO
INEFFECTIVNESS OF COUNSEL
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE CHARGES
MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS HAVE RUN
DEMAND FOR RECUSAL OR VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION
OF THE TRIAL JUDGE PURSUANT TO R.C. 2703.01
Now come the mother Robin Mapp having made changes to her motion as amended by Juv.
R. 10 and B.C, 2151.233 having terminated trial counsel Randall Stump on 12/12/2023 and
now moves the trial Judge for her voluntary recusal because at this time you are not forced
to step down but you are given it by choice look at this way as the voluntary agreement or
decision and once it has been accomplished you or the Ohio Supreme Court under
Rule 1 7 for re-assignment of the matter and have the new judge to enter a full
dismissal of above captained case and terminate the matter from the record due to 1.
Tneffectiveness of Counsel Strickland v, Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 2. The Statute of
limitation have run out pursuant to 2945.71.
Held:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel, and the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
Randall Stump trial counsel really a guardian ad litem has no business handling a
criminal case of this magnitude he and attorney Mike Peffit knew and was well
aware that the case had time barred itself even though he asked for a psychological
evaluation and then asked for a second competency evaluation but the motions did
not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to 2945.72 because the juvenile
defendant was still in custody and the Court confirmed on December 12, 2023 that
she was not releasing him to probation regardless of the evaluations or if he took a
plea deal this indicates that the trial Judge has an vested interest in violation of
cannon codes of judicial conduct .
Cannon Codes of Judicial Conduct
3. The trial Judge has a vested interest in violation of cannon codes of judicial conduct
and she must step down and recuse herself for cruel and unusual punishment of a
minor.
In determining whether a judge’s conduct is consistent with these Canons and
standards, the judge should consider three questions:
(1) Will the action or inaction threaten the judge’s impartiality?
(2) Will the action or inaction harm public trust in the fairness of the
judiciary?
8) Will the action or inaction harm the efficient and effective delivery of
justice?
The trial Judge confirmed that the juvenile defendant would not be released by her
under any circumstances but she confirmed that he will sit whether or not he took
the plea deal and counsel already confirmed ineffective and showed gross negligence
during the proceeding because he refused and completely failed to challenge the
trial Judge.
Trial counsel Randall Stump waited until the hearing and stated before the Court
that the mother wanted him to order her to release her son to probating well that
statement was far from the truth what it was asked of the attorney if could file
motions to dismiss and if the Court denied it then and only then we would have an
appealable issue because without the denial in writing the Court of appeals would
have no possible assignment of error to consider, I believe that’s a fair ron down of
what occurred on December 12, 2023.
Switching Roles
The trial Judge acting as though she was the prosecution she confirmed over and
over that the juvenile defendant would not be released for any of reasons mentioned
regardless of the outcome or guilty or innocent findings but she did state if he were
to take the plea deal the gun speculations would be dropped and he would then be
transferred to Hamilton County for sentencings this also sustains that she has an
interest in the outcome of the matter.
8. This also indicates that the Court acted outside of its jurisdiction by attempting to
send a Montgomery County defendant to another County for the sentencing phase
indicting that the State has no case no prosecuting witness no weapon to present to
ajury no DNA on a weapon no finger prints on the weapon as stated the
prosecutions key witnessed are none existent and must be brought to Court to
testify on the States behalf.
TIME FOR TRIAL UNDER THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF THE CHARGES
Instead, Randall Stump moving for a pro se nolle que under 2945.73 he continues
with filing of several unauthorized motions attempting to waive the three days per
day rule under division D. under 2945.71 as confirmed time for trial under the
highest degree of the charges which are two counts of robbery with a gun
specification but it’s not established who was the second robbery made against
according to trial counsel the original alleged victim was with his brother and
apparently the State decided to add charges and now we see why no motion to
quash was filed and no motion to suppress was filed by either attorney because they
do not have the clients best interest at heart.
Attorney -Client
10.The same principle applies here as does to a capital sentencing proceeding ~- such as
the one provided by Florida law -- that is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial
format and in the existence of standards for decision that counsel's role in the
proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial. Pp. 466 U. S. 684-687.
11.The case has time barred itself the time for trial was over 90 days into the
incarceration and the mother of the juvenile defendant should not have to recite the
laws to trial counsel. See 2945.71.01.
Facts State v. Dunlap
12.A complaint was filed with the police department against Dunlap on October 27,
1999. The complaint alleged that Dunlap, who contracted with the victim to perform
roofing services to the victim's house, stole over $1,000 from the victim and did not
perform any work on the victim's house.
13.0n February 24, 2000, Dunlap was arrested and charged with felony theft, R.C.
2913.02(B)@). On February 25, 2000, Dunlap waived his U.S. and Ohio
constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights, including the time period in which
to have a preliminary hearing. That same day, Dunlap was arraigned in Struthers
Municipal Court.
14.0n December 18, 2000, upon the state's motion, the trial court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice. However, later that same day the state refiled the
charges, R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). The trial court set a preliminary hearing for December
22, 2000.
15.0n December 22, 2000, Dunlap waived his right to a preliminary hearing. An
indictment was issued on January 18, 2001. Dunlap failed to appear at the
scheduled arraignment on February 6, 2001. A bench warrant was issued the next
day. On May 15, 2001, Dunlap was arraigned. Trial was set for May 28, 2001.
16.0On the day of trial, Dunlap filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial
rights. On July 10, 2001, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The trial
court held that Dunlap's waiver of his speedy trial rights was invalid. The court
stated that Dunlap was not represented by counsel at the time he executed the
waiver, therefore, the waiver was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered into.
17.The trial court went further to state that even if the waiver was valid, the ten-
month period from the time of the arrest to the preliminary hearing is unreasonable
and a violation of Dunlap's speedy trial rights. The state timely appeals the
decision.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. ONE
The state raises two assignments of error. The first of which contends:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT FOR A
SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION AFTER A WRITTEN WAIVER OF UNLIMITED
DURATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
REVOCATION OF THAT WAIVER OR A FORMAL WRITTEN DEMAND FOR
TRIAL."
18.The state argues that despite the dismissal of the first charge, the waiver that was
executed in response to that charge is valid as to the re-filing of the identical
charge. The state claims that Dunlap's waiver of the time limits to the preliminary
hearing are valid and the state did not violate Dunlap's rights.
19.The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed to every person who is
charged with an offense for which he may be deprived of his liberty or
property. State v. Carter (Mar. 31, 1998), 10th Dist. No. 97APA08-976; Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. The
courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and do not acquiesce in the loss of fundamental rights. State v.
Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, citing Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458.
20.The Ohio Supreme Court has held that an appellant's waiver of his right to a
speedy trial as to the initial charge cannot be construed as a knowing and
intelligent waiver of such a right as to any additional charges arising from the same
set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the
waiver. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, syllabus (Adams was charged with violating R.C.
4511,19(A)(3).
Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67:
21.That charge was dismissed and Adams was then charged with R.C. 4511.19(A)(1).
The waiver that was executed prior to the dismissal of the first charge was invalid
as to the second charge.).
22,.However, when a subsequent charge is identical to the originally dismissed charge,
the waiver executed as to the original charge generally retains its validity and is
applicable to the succeeding second charge. State v. Luff(1993), 85 Ohio App.3d
7 85, 797; State v. Clark (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 141, 152-153.
23.In Luff appellant was indicted and executed a valid waiver of his speedy trial
rights. Two months later, appellant was indicted again. The second indictment was
identical to the first indictment in all respects except that the second indictment
added an additional death specification and an additional count of aggravated
robbery. The two indictments were joimed and the court entered a nolle prosequi for
the first indictment because the re-indictment contained the same charges.
24.Later appellant filed speedy trial violations. The trial court held that the waiver
was valid as to the charges that were included in the first indictment but not as to
the charges that were added in the second indictment. Therefore, the trial court
dismissed the additional death specification and the aggravated robbery charge for
violation of speedy trial rights. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate
court followed the reasoning in Adams. In Adams, the court stated that the first
indictment and the second indictment contained two different distinct
charges. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 69-70.
25.The court held that two different charges have the possibility of different defenses
at trial. Id. "A knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be made until all the facts are
known by the accused, which includes knowing the exact nature of the crime he is
charged with." Id. at 70. Therefore, a waiver is only valid as to the charges that
were in effect at the time of the waiver. Luff 85 Ohio App.3d at 797; Clark, 107
Ohio App.3d at 152-153; State v. Sain (Aug. 23, 1993), 2nd Dist. No. 13493,
unreported. Re-filing the identical charges, B.C, 2913.02(B)@) in the case at hand,
did not destroy the waiver.
26.In this matter it took 4 weeks to bring an additional amended charge of the two-gun
specs but as confirmed we have no complaining witnesses to even carry such a
charge.
Prosecuting Attorney
27.Kelly Madzey knew of the malicious prosecution but still allowed the State to
proceed she knew the statue of limitations had expired
Back to Strickland v Washington Pp. 466 U.S. 687-696
28, A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the
defendant show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.
29,This is exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court has described here. As stated Randall
Stump is only guardian ad litem and is not experienced criminal defense lawyer.
693 F.2d. 1243, reversed.
30.0'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and
WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p
466 U.S. 701. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 466 U.S. 706
31.Defense counsel not only failed to enforce the statute of limitations here but he
never planned to call 1. Any medical experts. 2. Counsel was ineffective because he
failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric
report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence
investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and
to investigate the medical examiner's reports
32.There was no effort to cross-examine the medical experts because he never planned.
as stated planned to call one, he only filed for a psych evaluation to delay and keep
the juvenile defendant incarcerated.
33.Trial counsel never supported his client he never submitted affidavits from friends,
neighbors, and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so. He
also submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological report stating that
respondent, though not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic
dilemma” at the time of his crimes.
34.Let’s further apply applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by
the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court
concluded that respondent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any
substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that
was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.
35.The court here confirmed that if the juvenile defendant plead guilty to felony
robberies they would dismiss the case, then send it to the Hamilton County
Juvenile Court for sentencing knowing full well he was facing substantial jail time
until he was 18 years old then then they would continue with the incarceration as
an adult.
36.Trial counsel failed to file a motion to quash the indictment. 2 failed to file a motion
to suppress as mentioned above he failed to file numerous motions and affidavits
indicating that he is ineffective and tried to get his client to plead guilty without
testing the prosecution’s case.
Question
37.What standard should be applied to determine whether a convicted person's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has been violated so as to require reversal of a
conviction or to set aside a death sentence?
Conclusion
38.The Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2)
the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the
majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance,
the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an
“objective standard of reasonableness.”
39.The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is
"reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel
was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was
unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr.
Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence.
40.Justice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr.
Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately,
dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make
a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus:
41.Petitioner was not brought to trial for murder until more than five years after he
had been arrested, during which time the prosecution obtained numerous
continuances, initially for the purpose of first trying petitioner's alleged accomplice
so that his testimony, if conviction resulted, would be available at petitioner's trial.
Before the accomplice was finally convicted, he was tried six times. Petitioner made
no objection to the continuances until three and one-half years after he was
arrested.
42. After the accomplice was finally convicted, petitioner, after further delays because
of a key prosecution witness’ illness, was tried and convicted. In this habeas corpus
proceeding, the Court of Appeals, concluding that petitioner had waived his right to
a speedy trial for the period prior to his demand for trial, and, in any event, had not
been prejudiced by the delay, affirmed the District Court's judgment against
petitioner.
‘Held:
43.A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be established by any
inflexible rule, but can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis in which
the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. The court
should assess such factors as the length of and reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
44,In this case, the lack of any serious prejudice to petitioner and the fact, as disclosed.
by the record, that he did not want a speedy trial outweigh opposing considerations,
and compel the conclusion that petitioner was not. deprived of h
Preview
ELECTRONICALLY FILED COURT OF COMMON PLEAS * a” Thursday, J anuary 4, 2024 3:54:17 PM CASE NUMBER: 2024 CV00077 Docket ID: 391364108 iN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF FRSA MONTGOMERY COUNTY OHIO CIVIL — NEW COMPLAINT SAroo.s Danan yeu Case No Plaintiff Judge —— wh dog Jule Rive “ally usc Pleading What do you want from the Court? Gee Abwals What do you want to happen? Soo BL acu. MANDATORY CONTACT INFORMATION Name Address Address Phone number (3-3 181s 2D, COURT wv ONRIEAS COURT OF MON EOMeRtousrs ouio IN‘TH e\in CIVIL DIVISION OuRTS ew ty iO wy oni STATE EX REL IN RE DIAMON DAMIEN GLENN DOB 11/21/2007 Robin Mapp Biological Parent 3420 Lehman Dr Cincinnati Ohio 45205 Me Vs ra oo 0 mH Montgomery County Sheriff cp h Rob Streck ho 345 W 2nd St 3 Dayton, OH 45422 Se5 =oO Judge Julie Bruns 380 W 2nd St Dayton, OH 45422 Prosecuting Attorney Kelly Madzey 380 W 2nd St, Dayton, OH 45422 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH ATTACHED NOTICE OF CONFINEMENT AND THE ENTIRE FILE AS ATTACHMENT A Now come the mother Robin Mapp and files her petition for writ of habeas corpus to any available Magistrate, Judge, or Justice or Associate Justices of this division and request the Court to take a look at her son whom is_a juvenile and has been remanded to jail in violation of the 5‘ and 14 ents to the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Consts. Art. I-164" SS Wi HOPE K. WOODOhio Sosorm toe and sobsecityed tv t ~\ pres sence sos td] Notary Public, State of Se ae My Commission Expires Minis \5ts doy of Recerntoer, LOTS 19 January 19, 2028 Yi ha 4 Hani Hom, Cou my, Stofe. o ¢ Ohio Ow oberg Tsp ¥ We: ok —————$$__—______. HAMILTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO “hoo Pn Plaintiff phe caseno. DIA x DUS O09 -Vs- AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY Wob Streak, Defendant After being duly cautioned and sworn, I hereby state the following information is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand I am subject to criminal charges for providing false information. I. INCOME Net Monthly Pay 1, Employer Q. Yrs, Qe uh Position I ff V Spouse’s employer / | / Lf the 2. Alimony/cl hijasuy nt fecey 3. Public ben ‘its re ivéd (AIDC, 8S, SSI, WC, etc.) 4. Other income (pension, interest, etc.) TOTAL INCOME IL ASSETS 1. Cash on hand Cash in b: y. |(oh 7A.ZSS Te Cash at PTTL | TOTAL CASH s_Q 2. O ps 3-"Own niotor home, YP P Value $_ Make 4, Other pr Yay Value §_G Value $_ iq Tl. MAJOR “AY M ones Payments § $ @ IV. FAMILY COMPOSITION 1. Number of persons you are required to support * 2. Ages of above 3. Their relationship to you (spouse, child, parent, etc.) I further state I am indigent at this time and unable to pay the expungement application fee in the within a matter. (Le he PRN, PUS Plaintiff 7 Sworn to rt) aol es. Tibed ins PRS this york day of. Decenber 20_22 se Notary Public, State of Ohio My Commission Expires danuary 19, 2028 Hoe Notark Public Koon God Si Zé C0 IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO JULVENILE DIVISION IN RE DIAMON GLENN TRIAL CASE NO. 2023-003115-01.02 DOB 11/21/2007 Judge Julie Bruns Robin Mapp 3420 Lehman Dr. Cincinnati Ohio 45205 MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGES ORDER DUE TO INEFFECTIVNESS OF COUNSEL MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE CHARGES MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAVE RUN DEMAND FOR RECUSAL OR VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE PURSUANT TO R.C. 2703.01 Now come the mother Robin Mapp having made changes to her motion as amended by Juv. R. 10 and B.C, 2151.233 having terminated trial counsel Randall Stump on 12/12/2023 and now moves the trial Judge for her voluntary recusal because at this time you are not forced to step down but you are given it by choice look at this way as the voluntary agreement or decision and once it has been accomplished you or the Ohio Supreme Court under Rule 1 7 for reassignment of the matter and have the new judge to enter a full dismissal of above captained case and terminate the matter from the record due to 1. Tneffectiveness of Counsel Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 2. The Statute of limitation have run out pursuant to 2945.71. Held: The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Randall Stump trial counsel really a guardian ad litem has no business handling a criminal case of this magnitude he and attorney Mike Peffit knew and was well aware that the case had time barred itself even though he asked for a psychological evaluation and then asked for a second competency evaluation but the motions did not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to 2945.72 because the juvenile defendant was still in custody and the Court confirmed on December 12, 2028 that she was not releasing him to probation regardless of the evaluations or if he took a plea deal this indicates that the trial Judge has an vested interest in violation of cannon codes of judicial conduct . Cannon Codes of Judicial Conduct 3. The trial Judge has a vested interest in violation of cannon codes of judicial conduct and she must step down and recuse herself for cruel and unusual punishment of a minor. In determining whether a judge's conduct is consistent with these Canons and standards, the judge should consider three questions: (1) Will the action or inaction threaten the judge’s impartiality? (2) Will the action or inaction harm public trust in the fairness of the judiciary? (8) Will the action or inaction harm the efficient and effective delivery of justice? The trial Judge confirmed that the juvenile defendant would not be released by her under any circumstances but she confirmed that he will sit whether or not he took the plea deal and counsel already confirmed ineffective and showed gross negligence during the proceeding because he refused and completely failed to challenge the trial Judge. Trial counsel Randall Stump waited until the hearing and stated before the Court that the mother wanted him to order her to release her son to probating well that statement was far from the truth what it was asked of the attorney if could file motions to dismiss and if the Court denied it then and only then we would have an appealable issue because without the denial in writing the Court of appeals would have no possible assignment of error to consider, I believe that’s a fair run down of what occurred on December 12, 2023. Switching Roles The trial Judge acting as though she was the prosecution she confirmed over and over that the juvenile defendant would not be released for any of reasons mentioned regardless of the outcome or guilty or innocent findings but she did state if he were to take the plea deal the gun speculations would be dropped and he would then be transferred to Hamilton County for sentencings this also sustains that she has an interest in the outcome of the matter. 8. This also indicates that the Court acted outside of its jurisdiction by attempting to send a Montgomery County defendant to another County for the sentencing phase indicting that the State has no case no prosecuting witness no weapon to present to a jury no DNA on a weapon no finger prints on the weapon as stated the prosecutions key witnessed are none existent and must be brought to Court to testify on the States behalf. TIME FOR TRIAL UNDER THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF THE CHARGES Instead, Randall Stump moving for a pro se nolle que under 2945.73 he continues with filing of several unauthorized motions attempting to waive the three days per day rule under division D. under 2945.71 as confirmed time for trial under the highest degree of the charges which are two counts of robbery with a gun specification but it’s not established who was the second robbery made against according to trial counsel the original alleged victim was with his brother and apparently the State decided to add charges and now we see why no motion to quash was filed and no motion to suppress was filed by either attorney because they do not have the clients best interest at heart. Attomey -Client 10,The same principle applies here as does to a capital sentencing proceeding -- such as the one provided by Florida law - that is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial. Pp. 466 U. S. 684-687. 11, The case has time barred itself the time for trial was over 90 days into the incarceration and the mother of the juvenile defendant should not have to recite the laws to trial counsel. See 2945.71.01. Facts State v. Dunlap 12.A complaint was filed with the police department against Dunlap on October 27, 1999. The complaint alleged that Dunlap, who contracted with the victim to perform roofing services to the victim's house, stole over $1,000 from the victim and did not perform any work on the victim's house. 13.0n February 24, 2000, Dunlap was arrested and charged with felony theft, R.C. 2918.02(B)(2). On February 25, 2000, Dunlap waived his U.S. and Ohio constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights, including the time period in which to have a preliminary hearing. That same day, Dunlap was arraigned in Struthers Municipal Court. 14.0n December 18, 2000, upon the state's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. However, later that same day the state refiled the charges, R.C, 2913.02(B)(2). The trial court set a preliminary hearing for December 22, 2000. 15.0n December 22, 2000, Dunlap waived his right to a preliminary hearing. An indictment was issued on January 18, 2001. Dunlap failed to appear at the scheduled arraignment on February 6, 2001. A bench warrant was issued the next day. On May 15, 2001, Dunlap was arraigned. Trial was set for May 23, 2001. 16.0n the day of trial, Dunlap filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights. On July 10, 2001, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court held that Dunlap's waiver of his speedy trial rights was invalid. The court stated that Dunlap was not represented by counsel at the time he executed the waiver, therefore, the waiver was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into. 17.The trial court went further to state that even if the waiver was valid, the ten- month period from the time of the arrest to the preliminary hearing is unreasonable and a violation of Dunlap's speedy trial rights. The state timely appeals the decision. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. ONE The state raises two assignments of error. The first of which contends: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION AFTER A WRITTEN WAIVER OF UNLIMITED DURATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REVOCATION OF THAT WAIVER OR A FORMAL WRITTEN DEMAND FOR TRIAL.” 18.The state argues that despite the dismissal of the first charge, the waiver that was executed in response to that charge is valid as to the re-filing of the identical charge. The state claims that Dunlap’s waiver of the time limits to the preliminary hearing are valid and the state did not violate Dunlap's rights. 19.The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed to every person who is charged with an offense for which he may be deprived of his liberty or property. State v. Carter (Mar. 31, 1998), 10th Dist. No. 97APA08-976; Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. The courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and do not acquiesce in the loss of fundamental rights. State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, citing Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458. 20.The Ohio Supreme Court has held that an appellant's waiver of his right to a speedy trial as to the initial charge cannot be construed as a knowing and intelligent waiver of such a right as to any additional charges arising from the same set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, syllabus (Adams was charged with violating R.C. 4511,19(A)@). Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67: 21.That charge was dismissed and Adams was then charged with B.C. 4511,19(A)(1). The waiver that was executed prior to the dismissal of the first charge was invalid as to the second charge.). 22.However, when a subsequent charge is identical to the originally dismissed charge, the waiver executed as to the original charge generally retains its validity and is applicable to the succeeding second charge. State v. Luff(1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 7 85, 797; State v. Clark (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 141, 152-153. 23.In Luff, appellant was indicted and executed a valid waiver of his speedy trial rights. Two months later, appellant was indicted again. The second indictment was identical to the first indictment in all respects except that the second indictment added an additional death specification and an additional count of aggravated robbery. The two indictments were joined and the court entered a nolle prosequi for the first indictment because the re-indictment contained the same charges. 24,Later appellant filed speedy trial violations. The trial court held that the waiver was valid as to the charges that were included in the first indictment but not as to the charges that were added in the second indictment. Therefore, the trial court dismissed the additional death specification and the aggravated robbery charge for violation of speedy trial rights. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court followed the reasoning in Adams. In Adams, the court stated that the first indictment and the second indictment contained two different distinct charges. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 69-70. 25.The court held that two different charges have the possibility of different defenses at trial. Id. "A knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be made until all the facts are known by the accused, which includes knowing the exact nature of the crime he is charged with." Id. at 70. Therefore, a waiver is only valid as to the charges that were in effect at the time of the waiver. Luff 85 Ohio App.3d at 797; Clark, 107 Ohio App.3d at 152-153; State v. Sain (Aug. 23, 1993), 2nd Dist. No. 13493, unreported. Re-filing the identical charges, B.C. 2913,02(B)() in the case at hand, did not destroy the waiver. 26.In this matter it took 4 weeks to bring an additional amended charge of the two-gun specs but as confirmed we have no complaining witnesses to even carry such a charge. Prosecuting Attorney 27.Kelly Madzey knew of the malicious prosecution but still allowed the State to proceed she knew the statue of limitations had expired Back to Strickland v Washington Pp. 466 U.S. 687-696. 28. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 29.This is exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court has described here. As stated Randall Stump is only guardian ad litem and is not experienced criminal defense lawyer. 693 F.2d 1243, reversed. 30.0'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 466 U.S. 701. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 466 U. S. 706. 31.Defense counsel not. only failed to enforce the statute of limitations here but he never planned to call 1. Any medical experts. 2. Counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical examiner's reports. 32.There was no effort to cross-examine the medical experts because he never planned as stated planned to call one, he only filed for a psych evaluation to delay and keep the juvenile defendant incarcerated. 33.Trial counsel never supported his client he never submitted affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so. He also submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological report stating that respondent, though not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional. disturbance, was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma" at the time of his crimes. 34.Let’s further apply applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court concluded that respondent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. 35.The court here confirmed that if the juvenile defendant plead guilty to felony robberies they would dismiss the case, then send it to the Hamilton County Juvenile Court for sentencing knowing full well he was facing substantial jail time until he was 18 years old then then they would continue with the incarceration as an adult. 36.Trial counsel failed to file a motion to quash the indictment. 2 failed to file a motion to suppress as mentioned above he failed to file numerous motions and affidavits indicating that he is ineffective and tried to get his client to plead guilty without testing the prosecution’s case. Question 37.What standard should be applied to determine whether a convicted person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated so as to require reversal of a conviction or to set aside a death sentence? Conclusion 38.The Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2) the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” 39.The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr. Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence. 40.Justice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr. Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately, dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless. Barker vy. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus: 41.Petitioner was not brought to trial for murder until more than five years after he had been arrested, during which time the prosecution obtained numerous continuances, initially for the purpose of first trying petitioner's alleged accomplice so that his testimony, if conviction resulted, would be available at petitioner's trial. Before the accomplice was finally convicted, he was tried six times. Petitioner made no objection to the continuances until three and one-half years after he was arrested. 42.After the accomplice was finally convicted, petitioner, after further delays because of a key prosecution witness’ illness, was tried and convicted. In this habeas corpus proceeding, the Court of Appeals, concluding that petitioner had waived his right to a speedy trial for the period prior to his demand for trial, and, in any event, had not been prejudiced by the delay, affirmed the District Court's judgment against petitioner. ‘Held: 43.A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be established by any inflexible rule, but can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. The couzt should assess such factors as the length of and reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. 44.In this case, the lack of any serious prejudice to petitioner and the fact, as disclosed by the record, that he did not want a speedy trial outweigh opposing considerations, and compel the conclusion that petitioner was not deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial. Pp. 407 U.S. 519-536. 442 F.2d 1141, affirmed. POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 407 U.S. 536. Page 407 U.S. 515 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 8 45.Although a speedy trial is guaranteed the accused by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, [Footnote 1] this Court has dealt with that right on infrequent occasions. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U. S. 77 (1905); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 (1966); United States v. Marion, 404 U, S. 307 (1971). See also United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd, 30 U.S. 857 (1955). The Court's opinion in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 218 (1967), established that the right to a speedy trial is "fundamental," and is imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States. [Footnote 2] See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 (1969); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1070), As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN Page 407 U.S. 516 46.The denial of due process has been established under the 5, 8, 14 Amendments to the US Constitution calling for a complete recall of this order and recall the entire case and release and return the mothers biological son and end this entire matter. Sigy ofanother fel, ee CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The biologic: mother Robin Mapp hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing paperwork was filed and served to the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Kelly Madzey 380 West Second Street Juvenile Justice Center Dayton, OH 45422 and trial counsel Randall Stump Attorney at Law 1200 Talbot Tower Dayton Ohio 45402 on this 14th day of Decembgr 2023. Signature of mother. Robin Mapp 3420 Lehman Dr. Cincinnati Ohio 45205 Assistant Prosecuting Attomey Kelly Madzey 380 West Second Street Juvenile Justice Center Dayton, OH 45422 Randall Stump Attormey at Law 1200 Talbot Tower Dayton Ohio 45402 IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO JULVENILE DIVISION IN RE DIAMON GLENN TRIAL CASE NO. 2023-003115-01.02 DOB 11/21/2007 Judge Julie Bruns Robin Mapp 3420 Lehman Dr. Cincinnati Ohio 45205 MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGES ORDER DUE TO INEFFECTIVNESS OF COUNSEL MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE CHARGES MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAVE RUN DEMAND FOR RECUSAL OR VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE PURSUANT TO R.C. 2703.01 Now come the mother Robin Mapp having made changes to her motion as amended by Juv. R. 10 and B.C, 2151.233 having terminated trial counsel Randall Stump on 12/12/2023 and now moves the trial Judge for her voluntary recusal because at this time you are not forced to step down but you are given it by choice look at this way as the voluntary agreement or decision and once it has been accomplished you or the Ohio Supreme Court under Rule 1 7 for re-assignment of the matter and have the new judge to enter a full dismissal of above captained case and terminate the matter from the record due to 1. Tneffectiveness of Counsel Strickland v, Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 2. The Statute of limitation have run out pursuant to 2945.71. Held: The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Randall Stump trial counsel really a guardian ad litem has no business handling a criminal case of this magnitude he and attorney Mike Peffit knew and was well aware that the case had time barred itself even though he asked for a psychological evaluation and then asked for a second competency evaluation but the motions did not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to 2945.72 because the juvenile defendant was still in custody and the Court confirmed on December 12, 2023 that she was not releasing him to probation regardless of the evaluations or if he took a plea deal this indicates that the trial Judge has an vested interest in violation of cannon codes of judicial conduct . Cannon Codes of Judicial Conduct 3. The trial Judge has a vested interest in violation of cannon codes of judicial conduct and she must step down and recuse herself for cruel and unusual punishment of a minor. In determining whether a judge’s conduct is consistent with these Canons and standards, the judge should consider three questions: (1) Will the action or inaction threaten the judge’s impartiality? (2) Will the action or inaction harm public trust in the fairness of the judiciary? 8) Will the action or inaction harm the efficient and effective delivery of justice? The trial Judge confirmed that the juvenile defendant would not be released by her under any circumstances but she confirmed that he will sit whether or not he took the plea deal and counsel already confirmed ineffective and showed gross negligence during the proceeding because he refused and completely failed to challenge the trial Judge. Trial counsel Randall Stump waited until the hearing and stated before the Court that the mother wanted him to order her to release her son to probating well that statement was far from the truth what it was asked of the attorney if could file motions to dismiss and if the Court denied it then and only then we would have an appealable issue because without the denial in writing the Court of appeals would have no possible assignment of error to consider, I believe that’s a fair ron down of what occurred on December 12, 2023. Switching Roles The trial Judge acting as though she was the prosecution she confirmed over and over that the juvenile defendant would not be released for any of reasons mentioned regardless of the outcome or guilty or innocent findings but she did state if he were to take the plea deal the gun speculations would be dropped and he would then be transferred to Hamilton County for sentencings this also sustains that she has an interest in the outcome of the matter. 8. This also indicates that the Court acted outside of its jurisdiction by attempting to send a Montgomery County defendant to another County for the sentencing phase indicting that the State has no case no prosecuting witness no weapon to present to ajury no DNA on a weapon no finger prints on the weapon as stated the prosecutions key witnessed are none existent and must be brought to Court to testify on the States behalf. TIME FOR TRIAL UNDER THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF THE CHARGES Instead, Randall Stump moving for a pro se nolle que under 2945.73 he continues with filing of several unauthorized motions attempting to waive the three days per day rule under division D. under 2945.71 as confirmed time for trial under the highest degree of the charges which are two counts of robbery with a gun specification but it’s not established who was the second robbery made against according to trial counsel the original alleged victim was with his brother and apparently the State decided to add charges and now we see why no motion to quash was filed and no motion to suppress was filed by either attorney because they do not have the clients best interest at heart. Attorney -Client 10.The same principle applies here as does to a capital sentencing proceeding ~- such as the one provided by Florida law -- that is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial. Pp. 466 U. S. 684-687. 11.The case has time barred itself the time for trial was over 90 days into the incarceration and the mother of the juvenile defendant should not have to recite the laws to trial counsel. See 2945.71.01. Facts State v. Dunlap 12.A complaint was filed with the police department against Dunlap on October 27, 1999. The complaint alleged that Dunlap, who contracted with the victim to perform roofing services to the victim's house, stole over $1,000 from the victim and did not perform any work on the victim's house. 13.0n February 24, 2000, Dunlap was arrested and charged with felony theft, R.C. 2913.02(B)@). On February 25, 2000, Dunlap waived his U.S. and Ohio constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights, including the time period in which to have a preliminary hearing. That same day, Dunlap was arraigned in Struthers Municipal Court. 14.0n December 18, 2000, upon the state's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. However, later that same day the state refiled the charges, R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). The trial court set a preliminary hearing for December 22, 2000. 15.0n December 22, 2000, Dunlap waived his right to a preliminary hearing. An indictment was issued on January 18, 2001. Dunlap failed to appear at the scheduled arraignment on February 6, 2001. A bench warrant was issued the next day. On May 15, 2001, Dunlap was arraigned. Trial was set for May 28, 2001. 16.0On the day of trial, Dunlap filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights. On July 10, 2001, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court held that Dunlap's waiver of his speedy trial rights was invalid. The court stated that Dunlap was not represented by counsel at the time he executed the waiver, therefore, the waiver was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into. 17.The trial court went further to state that even if the waiver was valid, the ten- month period from the time of the arrest to the preliminary hearing is unreasonable and a violation of Dunlap's speedy trial rights. The state timely appeals the decision. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. ONE The state raises two assignments of error. The first of which contends: "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATION AFTER A WRITTEN WAIVER OF UNLIMITED DURATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REVOCATION OF THAT WAIVER OR A FORMAL WRITTEN DEMAND FOR TRIAL." 18.The state argues that despite the dismissal of the first charge, the waiver that was executed in response to that charge is valid as to the re-filing of the identical charge. The state claims that Dunlap's waiver of the time limits to the preliminary hearing are valid and the state did not violate Dunlap's rights. 19.The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed to every person who is charged with an offense for which he may be deprived of his liberty or property. State v. Carter (Mar. 31, 1998), 10th Dist. No. 97APA08-976; Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. The courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and do not acquiesce in the loss of fundamental rights. State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, citing Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458. 20.The Ohio Supreme Court has held that an appellant's waiver of his right to a speedy trial as to the initial charge cannot be construed as a knowing and intelligent waiver of such a right as to any additional charges arising from the same set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, syllabus (Adams was charged with violating R.C. 4511,19(A)(3). Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67: 21.That charge was dismissed and Adams was then charged with R.C. 4511.19(A)(1). The waiver that was executed prior to the dismissal of the first charge was invalid as to the second charge.). 22,.However, when a subsequent charge is identical to the originally dismissed charge, the waiver executed as to the original charge generally retains its validity and is applicable to the succeeding second charge. State v. Luff(1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 7 85, 797; State v. Clark (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 141, 152-153. 23.In Luff appellant was indicted and executed a valid waiver of his speedy trial rights. Two months later, appellant was indicted again. The second indictment was identical to the first indictment in all respects except that the second indictment added an additional death specification and an additional count of aggravated robbery. The two indictments were joimed and the court entered a nolle prosequi for the first indictment because the re-indictment contained the same charges. 24.Later appellant filed speedy trial violations. The trial court held that the waiver was valid as to the charges that were included in the first indictment but not as to the charges that were added in the second indictment. Therefore, the trial court dismissed the additional death specification and the aggravated robbery charge for violation of speedy trial rights. In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court followed the reasoning in Adams. In Adams, the court stated that the first indictment and the second indictment contained two different distinct charges. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 69-70. 25.The court held that two different charges have the possibility of different defenses at trial. Id. "A knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be made until all the facts are known by the accused, which includes knowing the exact nature of the crime he is charged with." Id. at 70. Therefore, a waiver is only valid as to the charges that were in effect at the time of the waiver. Luff 85 Ohio App.3d at 797; Clark, 107 Ohio App.3d at 152-153; State v. Sain (Aug. 23, 1993), 2nd Dist. No. 13493, unreported. Re-filing the identical charges, B.C, 2913.02(B)@) in the case at hand, did not destroy the waiver. 26.In this matter it took 4 weeks to bring an additional amended charge of the two-gun specs but as confirmed we have no complaining witnesses to even carry such a charge. Prosecuting Attorney 27.Kelly Madzey knew of the malicious prosecution but still allowed the State to proceed she knew the statue of limitations had expired Back to Strickland v Washington Pp. 466 U.S. 687-696 28, A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. 29,This is exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court has described here. As stated Randall Stump is only guardian ad litem and is not experienced criminal defense lawyer. 693 F.2d. 1243, reversed. 30.0'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p 466 U.S. 701. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 466 U.S. 706 31.Defense counsel not only failed to enforce the statute of limitations here but he never planned to call 1. Any medical experts. 2. Counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical examiner's reports 32.There was no effort to cross-examine the medical experts because he never planned. as stated planned to call one, he only filed for a psych evaluation to delay and keep the juvenile defendant incarcerated. 33.Trial counsel never supported his client he never submitted affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so. He also submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological report stating that respondent, though not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma” at the time of his crimes. 34.Let’s further apply applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court concluded that respondent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. 35.The court here confirmed that if the juvenile defendant plead guilty to felony robberies they would dismiss the case, then send it to the Hamilton County Juvenile Court for sentencing knowing full well he was facing substantial jail time until he was 18 years old then then they would continue with the incarceration as an adult. 36.Trial counsel failed to file a motion to quash the indictment. 2 failed to file a motion to suppress as mentioned above he failed to file numerous motions and affidavits indicating that he is ineffective and tried to get his client to plead guilty without testing the prosecution’s case. Question 37.What standard should be applied to determine whether a convicted person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated so as to require reversal of a conviction or to set aside a death sentence? Conclusion 38.The Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2) the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” 39.The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr. Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence. 40.Justice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr. Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately, dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus: 41.Petitioner was not brought to trial for murder until more than five years after he had been arrested, during which time the prosecution obtained numerous continuances, initially for the purpose of first trying petitioner's alleged accomplice so that his testimony, if conviction resulted, would be available at petitioner's trial. Before the accomplice was finally convicted, he was tried six times. Petitioner made no objection to the continuances until three and one-half years after he was arrested. 42. After the accomplice was finally convicted, petitioner, after further delays because of a key prosecution witness’ illness, was tried and convicted. In this habeas corpus proceeding, the Court of Appeals, concluding that petitioner had waived his right to a speedy trial for the period prior to his demand for trial, and, in any event, had not been prejudiced by the delay, affirmed the District Court's judgment against petitioner. ‘Held: 43.A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be established by any inflexible rule, but can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. The court should assess such factors as the length of and reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. 44,In this case, the lack of any serious prejudice to petitioner and the fact, as disclosed. by the record, that he did not want a speedy trial outweigh opposing considerations, and compel the conclusion that petitioner was not. deprived of h