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  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
  • CHRISTINA  ALLEN  vs.  CBA N DALLAS, LLC, et alCNTR CNSMR COM DEBT document preview
						
                                

Preview

FILED 12/12/2023 8:40 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Brandon Keys DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-22-16415 CHRISTINA ALLEN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § V § 44TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § CBA N DALLAS, LLC. D/B/A CHRISTIAN § BROTHERS AUTOMOTIVE-NORTH DALLAS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANT’S REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OBJECTION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE COMES NOW the Defendant CBA N DALLAS, LLC. D/B/A CHRISTIAN BROTHERS AUTOMOTIVE-NORTH DALLAS and present their Reply Brief to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Traditional and No‐Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence pursuant to Rules 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and in support thereof, would respectfully show the Court as follows: I. OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE The same evidentiary standards that apply in trials also control the admissibility of evidence in summary-judgment proceedings, the rules of error preservation also apply.1 The Defendant hereby makes the following objections to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence: Plaintiff’s Exhibit A – Affidavit of Christina Allen. Defendant objects to the Plaintiff’s affidavit pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166(f), which provides in relevant part, “Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” 1 Fieldturf United States v. Pleasant Grove Indep. Sch. Dist., 642 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2022); Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 163-64 (Tex. 2018). Defendants’ Reply Brief and Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence Pg. 1 The Plaintiff’s affidavit is full of hearsay and conclusory statements. Summary judgment affidavits may not be based on hearsay2. Conclusory statements do not inform the fact finder of the underlying facts and amount to little more than the witness choosing sides on the case outcome.3 In Paragraph 13 of the affidavit, the Plaintiff refers to hearsay statements of a tow driver. In Paragraph 14, the Plaintiff refers to a hearsay statement by a Mr. Wiginton and Mercedes-Benz employees. Plaintiff makes conclusory statements in Paragraphs 11, 12, and 16. Furthermore, Defendant objects to the affidavit of Christina Allen insofar as the witness is not qualified as an expert and the witness cannot make statements regarding the mechanical operation of the vehicle in questions because she is not qualified by knowledge, skill experience training or education as required by Texas Rules of Evidence 702 and has not been designated as an expert pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 194.3 and 195.2. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A1 – Mercedes-Benz Operator’s Manual. Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s Exhibit A1 as it is not properly authenticated pursuant to Texas Rules of Evidence 901. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A2 – November 22, 2022 Email. Pursuant to Texas Rules of Evidence 408 and 411, Defendant object to the email as summary judgment evidence. Texas Rules of Evidence 408 provides, (a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim: (1) furnishing, promising, or offering — or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept — a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and (2) conduct or statements made during compromise negotiations about the claim. 2 Welch v. Doss Aviation, 978 S.W.2d 215, (Tex.App.-Amarillo, 1998); Einhorn v. LaChance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tex.App.-Houston,1992). 3 Hock v. Salaices, 982 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, 1998); GE Capital Corp. v. Hunt County Appraisal Dist., 2000 Tex. App. Lexis 2210 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 2000). Defendants’ Reply Brief and Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence Pg. 2 (b) Permissible Uses. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a party’s or witness’s bias, prejudice, or interest, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. Texas Rules of Evidence 411 provides, Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice or, if disputed, proving agency, ownership, or control. Plaintiff’s Exhibit A2 does not meet the permissible use exception according to Texas Rule of Evidence 408 or any exception under Rule 411. Therefore, the Defendant request the Court to sustain the Defendant’s objection. III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY A. Plaintiff’s DTPA Claim and Arguments. The Plaintiff claims the Texas Supreme Court in the Cameron4 case, it overruled the Dallas Court of Appeals decision in Exxon Corp.5. To be clear, the Texas Supreme Court did not overrule the Exxon decision and the Cameron decision is distinguishable. In Cameron, the Plaintiff purchased a home and sued the seller and seller’s agent. The Texas Supreme Court decided the seller’s agent was subject to the DTPA although there was no direct privity between the buyer and the seller’s agent. In the Plaintiff’s claim before the Court, the Defendant only performed an inspection of the Plaintiff’s vehicle and did not charge her for those services. Therefore, the Dallas Court of Appeals decision in Exxon Corp. is still a binding, and the Court should grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Plaintiff’s DTPA claim. 4 Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981) 5 Exxon v. Dunn, 581 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 1979) Defendants’ Reply Brief and Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence Pg. 3 B. Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim and Arguments. The Plaintiff’s Response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract claim does not address the allegations made in her Petition, “Plaintiff performed her obligations under the contract by making the required payments for the repairs to the Vehicle”. The summary judgment evidence clearly establishes no payments were made. The elements for breach of contract are (1) the existence of a valid contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or tendered performance, (3) the defendant’s breach of the contract, and (4) damages as a result of the breach.6 The elements of an enforceable contract are: (1) an offer; (2) an acceptance in strict compliance with terms of offer; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) a communication that each party consented to the terms of the contract; (5) execution and delivery of the contract with an intent it become mutual and binding on both parties; and (5) consideration.7 The summary judgment evidence clearly establishes there was no enforceable contract based on an inspection performed by the Defendant. Therefore, the Court should grant the Defendant’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. C. Common Law Fraud, Fraud by Nondisclosure and Negligent Misrepresentation The Plaintiff’s Response fails to provide any summary judgment evidence the Defendant knew the representation was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion.8 Claims for fraud by nondisclosure and negligent misrepresentation are considered a subcategory of common law fraud. The elements for all three claims require the Plaintiff to provide evidence of intent or knowledge. 6 Paragon General Contractors, Inc. v. Larco Constr., Inc., 227 S.W.3d 876 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 2007) 7 Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse, 165 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex.App.-Houston, 2005). 8 Blankinship, 399 S.W.3d at 308; Hall v. Douglas, 380 S.W.3d 860 (Tex.App-Dallas, 2012) Defendants’ Reply Brief and Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence Pg. 4 Since there is no summary judgment evidence to meet this element, the Defendant is entitled to a no evidence summary judgment as to the Plaintiff’s claims for common law fraud, fraud by nondisclosure and negligent misrepresentation. D. Causation and Expert Testimony Causation is an essential element of causes of action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and DTPA violations.9 In circumstances involving mechanical maintenance, the Texas Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals have held expert testimony is required to prove breach of the applicable standard of care caused the plaintiff’s injury.10 The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Mack Trucks11 provides us with a clear requirement expert testimony is required for matters dealing with mechanical engines. The issue of the Def fluid in the Plaintiff’s Mercedes-Benz diesel fuel tank is not within the common understanding of the jury. Therefore, the Court should grant the Defendant’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Causation in this matter. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER Defendant CBA N Dallas, LLC respectfully request the Court to sustain the Defendant’s Objections to the Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence and grant their Traditional and No- Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Plaintiff’s claims and causation. 9 See Casa Del Mar Ass'n v. Gossen Livingston Assocs., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. App.-Houston, 2014); see, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006) (holding breach-of-warranty claims require proof of causation-in-fact); S. Elec. Servs. Inc. v. City of Houston, 355 S.W.3d 319, 323-24 (Tex. App.-Houston, 2011) (discussing elements of breach-of-contract claim and stating that "the absence of a causal connection between the alleged breach and the damages sought will preclude recovery"); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (allowing recovery under DTPA where violation constitutes "a producing cause" of damages ) 10 FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2004); Simmons v. Briggs Equip. Tr., 221 S.W.3d 109, 114-15 (Tex. App.-Houston, 2006) (holding expert testimony required to establish whether condition, if any, of hydraulic hose in rail-car mover should have been detected or repaired before fire as part of obligation to provide "operational maintenance" and whether defendant actually did or failed to do anything to cause fire); see also Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2004) (observing Texas courts "have consistently required competent expert testimony and objective proof that a defect caused" unintended acceleration of car). 11 Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006). Defendants’ Reply Brief and Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence Pg. 5 Respectfully submitted, EUGENE KIM SBN: 24046210 LAW OFFICE OF JAMES A. LAWRENCE 105 Decker Court, Suite 150 Irving, TX 75062-2211 Phone: (972) 536-1480 Fax: (855) 717-5349 Email: kime11@nationwide.com ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CBA N. DALLAS, LLC D/B/A CHRISTIAN BROTHERS AUTOMOTIVE-NORTH DALLAS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On this date, December 12, 2023, a true and correct copy of this document was served in accordance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure via E-Service/E-Mail to: Selim H. Taheerzadeh Taherzadeh, PLLC 15851 N. Dallas Parkway, Suite 410 Addison, Texas 75001 469-729-6800 469-828-2772: Fax st@taherzlaw.com: eService ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF EUGENE KIM Defendants’ Reply Brief and Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence Pg. 6 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Eugene Kim on behalf of Eugene Kim Bar No. 24046210 kime11@nationwide.com Envelope ID: 82511138 Filing Code Description: Response Filing Description: DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDNAT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Status as of 12/13/2023 11:37 AM CST Associated Case Party: CHRISTINA ALLEN Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Michael Linke ml@taherzlaw.com 12/12/2023 8:40:56 PM SENT Estefania VilchezGarcia Estefania@taherzlaw.com 12/12/2023 8:40:56 PM SENT SELIM TAHERZADEH st@taherzlaw.com 12/12/2023 8:40:56 PM SENT Heather Buller heather@taherzlaw.com 12/12/2023 8:40:56 PM SENT Associated Case Party: CBA N DALLAS, LLC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Eugene Y.Kim kime11@nationwide.com 12/12/2023 8:40:56 PM SENT