Party Notice: Surgicore Surgical Center, Llc v. Travelers Indemnity Company

S-CV-0052424 Saulus, Marijati vs. American Honda Motor Company ** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouraged NOTE: Defendant has not paid advance jury fees pursuant to CCP § 631. Trial Date & Length: 11/17/25 6 day Non Jury Trial (Please contact Master Calendar (916) 408-6061 on the business day prior to the scheduled trial date to find courtroom availability.) Civil Trial Conference: 11/07/25 (heard at 8:30 am in Dept. 3) Mandatory Settlement Conference: 10/31/25 (heard at 8:30am; report to Jury Services) NO APPEARANCE REQUIRED UNLESS REQUESTED BY PARTY BY 3PM ON THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO HEARING DATE. REQUESTS FOR APPEARANCE MUST BE FAXED TO THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT, ATTN: CMC CLERK AT (916) 408-6275, AND TO ALL OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES WITHOUT ATTORNEYS BY 3:00 PM THE THURSDAY PRIOR TO THE CASE MANAGEMENT DATE. SEE LOCAL RULE 20.1.7.

Case Number: 23LBCV02290 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Complaint Plaintiff, Miraleste Canyon Estates filed this action against Defendant, Robert Beliveau for breach of CC&Rs, breach of contract, nuisance, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff filed its complaint on 12/01/23. Plaintiff filed proof of service of the summons and complaint on Defendant on 4/05/24. Defendant responded to the complaint by filing a special motion to strike on 5/31/24. 2. Motion to Strike a. Procedural History of Motion Defendant filed this special motion to strike on 5/31/24, setting it for hearing on 7/11/24. Plaintiff filed timely opposition papers on 6/27/24. On the same day, Defense Counsel substituted out of the action and Defendant commenced representing himself in these proceedings. Defendant has not, to date, filed a reply to Plaintiffs opposition. Defendant did, however, file additional declarations relating to the motion on 7/05/24, 7/08/24, and 7/09/24. b. Law Governing Anti-SLAPP Motions Pursuant to Navellier v. Sletten, (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88 89, Section 425.16 posits instead a two-step process for determining whether an action is a SLAPP. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e) (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1043). If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see generally Quilon, supra, 29 Cal. 4th at p. 67.)" Pursuant to Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn., (2006) 136 Cal. App. 4th 464, 476, In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)), a plaintiff responding to an anti SLAPP motion must state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity[, supra,] 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123, quoting Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412.) Put another way, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. c. First Prong of Analysis Defendant has the moving burden to establish the first prong of the analysis, which is that the complaint arises out of protected activity under the statute. Defendant contends the complaint arises out of his protected free speech and petitioning activity, including emailing public agencies to inform them of Plaintiffs embezzlement, defamation, assault, and extortion. Plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, contends the free speech and petitioning activity is merely incidental to the complaint, which is primarily based on Defendants verbal and physical intimidation and harassment of Plaintiff. The Court need not determine, in connection with this motion, whether Defendant established the first prong of the test. This is so because, as will be discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff met its burden of showing a probability of success on the merits, and therefore the threshold issue of whether the statute applies need not be determined. d. Second Prong, Probability of Success on the Merits i. Law re: Second Prong The probability of prevailing is tested by the same standard governing a motion for summary judgment, nonsuit or directed verdict. I.e., in opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, it is plaintiff's burden to make a prima facie showing of facts that would support a judgment in plaintiff's favor. Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714. The court does not weigh credibility or the comparative strength of the evidence. The court considers defendant's evidence only to determine if it defeats plaintiff's showing as a matter of law. Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291. ii. Plaintiffs Burden of Proof With respect to its nuisance cause of action, Plaintiff provides evidence that Defendant uses profanity-laced verbal assaults at HOA meetings, up-ended a table during a meeting, and has engaged in violent and conflictive behavior with neighbors, including throwing their childrens toys and intentionally over-watering and leaving puddles in front of units. Plaintiff also provides evidence that Defendant has sent hundreds of emails to the Association using derogatory and defamatory attacks toward the Board and other Owners, referencing their sexual orientation. With respect to the breach of CC&Rs and breach of contract causes of action, Plaintiff provides evidence that the parties entered into a 2017 stay away agreement, which Defendant breached through the foregoing conduct. Plaintiff provides evidence that the CC&Rs prevent nuisances, which Defendants conduct, detailed above, would violate. Finally, Plaintiff shows that the claim for declaratory relief can succeed on its merits, as it rises and falls with the other claims. Defendant, in his reply declarations, disputes each of Plaintiffs showings. This serves, however, to show that there are triable issues of material fact concerning Plaintiffs claims. As discussed above, the Court does not weigh the evidence at this stage of the proceedings, and decides the matter using a summary judgment standard. The motion is therefore denied. e. Attorneys Fees Plaintiff seeks to recover its attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $5076.65. CCP §425.16(c)(1) permits a plaintiff who prevails on an anti-slapp motion to recover fees if and only if the Court finds the motion was frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. Because the action does involve Defendants rights to petition and speak, the Court finds the motion was neither frivolous nor solely intended to cause delay. The request for fees is denied. 3. Motion for Sanctions On 6/12/24, the Court held an OSC re: sanctions for failure to prosecute. The Court noted Plaintiff had filed a brief in opposition to the OSC, and set the matter for hearing as a motion on 7/11/24. The Court has read Plaintiffs attorneys 6/11/24 declaration and discharges the OSC re: sanctions, finding Plaintiff has taken steps to prosecute the case such that imposition of sanctions is not appropriate. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org . If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar . If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If the parties do not submit on the tentative, they should arrange to appear remotely.

CREEKSIDE LOGGING VS. APPLIED UNDERWRITERS Case Number: CVCV16-0185312 This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. No status report has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to provide the Court with an update regarding the status of the injunction against litigation.

Case Number: 23STCV09558 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Case Name: Gary R. Belz, et al. v. Cyber 1 LLC, et al. Case No.: 23STCV09558 Motion: Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication Moving Party: Plaintiff Gary R. Belz, et al. Responding Party: Defendants Cyber 1, LLC, Norman Kravetz and Douglas Jacobsen Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Based on the undisputed facts, (1) Defendants defaulted on their obligations under the Note and personal guarantees; and (2)there is currently an outstanding balance of $4,883,666.77. Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff is also the owner of the collateral pledged as security for the personal guarantees executed by Defendants Kravetz and Jacobsen. No triable issues of fact remain as to any of the causes of action alleged in the complaint. I. Background Plaintiff Gary R. Belz, as representative for the benefit of himself and Gary Belz Family LP (collectively, Lender) provided a single credit facility of $4,550,000 evidenced by a Promissory Note (the Note) executed by Defendant Cyber 1 LLC (Cyber 1). The Note was personally guaranteed by Defendants Norman Kravetz and Douglas Jacobsen. It is undisputed that Cyber 1 failed to make a principal payment amount on February 1, 2023 in the amount of $450,000. Cyber 1 has also failed to pay three months of interest on the Note. Under the Note, Lender is entitled to the entirety of the remaining principal balance, plus interest and attorneys fees. On April 26, 2023, Lender filed a complaint against Defendants Cyber 1, Kravetz and Jacobsen alleging (1) breach of contract Note; (2) breach of contract Personal Guarantees; and (3) declaratory relief. II. Evidentiary Objections Defendants Objection to paragraph 4 of the Gurvitz Declaration is overruled. (Evid. Code, §§1221 and 1222.) III. Defendants Request for Judicial Notice Defendants RJN of the White House announcement passing HR Bill 2617 on December 29, 2022 and HR Bill 2882 on March 23, 2024 is granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c)(official acts of the&executive&departments of the United States&). IV. Discussion A. Legal Standard A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (p)(1).) A party is entitled to summary judgment only if it meets its initial burden of showing there are no triable issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This is true even if the opposing party fails to file any opposition. The court's assessment of whether the moving party has carried its burdenand therefore caused a shiftoccurs before the court's evaluation of the opposing party's papers. Therefore, the burden on the motion does not initially shift as a result of what is, or is not, contained in the opposing papers. ( Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 417, 434435 (landlords failure to address issue of whether they were aware of their tenants marijuana growing operation was not grounds to grant summary judgment where moving party failed to satisfy its initial burden as to the issue); Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1086-1087 (court cannot grant summary judgment based merely on lack of opposition; court must first determine if the moving party has satisfied its burden). In addition, the evidence and affidavits of the moving party are construed strictly, while those of the opponent are liberally read. ( Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 100.) All doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion (whether there is any issue of material fact [Code of Civil Procedure] § 437c) are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion (i.e., a denial of summary judgment). ( Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 497, 502.) B. No triable issues of fact remain as to the 1 st cause of action for breach of contract and 2 nd cause of action for breach of personal guarantees Lender moves for summary judgment of its entire complaint. Lender alleges three causes of action for breach of contract based on three separate agreements: (1) the Note with Cyber 1; (2) the personal guaranty of the Note executed by Kravetz; and (3) the personal guaranty of the Note executed by Belz. To prevail on Lenders claims for breach of the Note against Cyber 1 Lender must establish: (1) existence of the contract; (2) Lender's performance; (3) Cyber 1s breach; and (4) damages. ( First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Recce (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 731, 745.) To prevail on Lenders claims for breach of Kravetzs and Jacobsens personal guarantees, Lender need only establish that (1) Kravetz and Jacobsen executed an agreement assuming liability for Cyber 1s debt under the Note; (2) Cyber 1, the principal debtor, defaulted on its underlying obligations; and (3) Kravetz and Jacobsen breached their obligation to pay upon default of the Cyber 1. (Civ. Code, §2807; R.P. Richards, Inc. v. Chartered Const. Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 146, 154.) Lender establishes that Cyber 1 executed a Promissory Note on February 15, 2022 whereby Cyber 1 borrowed $4,550,000 from Lender subject to certain explicit repayment obligations. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No.1; Belz Dec., ¶2, Ex. 1.) Lender provided the credit facility as reflected in the Note. (Belz Dec., ¶2.) Lender establishes that under the Note, Cyber 1 was required to pay the principal balance of $4,550,000 in four annual installments: (1) $450,000 on February 1, 2023; (2) $600,000 on February 1, 2024; (3) $1,000,000 on February 1, 2025; and (4) the remaining principal balance on February 1, 2026. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 2; Belz Dec., Ex. 1, ¶1.) On February 15, 2022, Kravetz and Jacobsen also executed separate personal guarantees guaranteeing the Note. (Plaintiffs SSUMF Nos. 9 and 10; Belz Dec., Exs. 2 and 3.) Under their guarantees, Kravetz and Jacobsen promised to pay all principal and interest whenever it became due, including any accelerated balance, upon Cyber 1s failure to pay. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 12; Bezl Dec., Exs. 2-3, Section 1.) In addition, Kravetz and Jacobsen pledged 7.5% each of their outstanding membership interests in Equity Orchestration LLC as collateral for the guarantees. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 14, Ex. 4, Section 1.) Cyber 1 failed to make the first payment due under the Note in the amount of $450,000 on or before February 1, 2023. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 16; Belz Dec., ¶4.) Cyber 1 failed to tender any interest payments from February 2023 to the present. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 18.; Belz Dec., ¶¶6, 9.) On March 21, 2023, Lender sent notice to Defendants of Cyber 1s breach of its obligation to pay the first installment by February 1, 2023 in the amount of $450,000. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 21, Gurvitz Dec., Ex. 5 (Lenders March 21, 2023 Written Notice).) On April 3, 2023, Defendants informed Lender that they could not make the required payments and cure their breach. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 22; Gurvitz Dec., ¶4.) Kravetz and Jacobsen have also refused to tender the collateral as required by the Pledge Agreement in support of their personal guarantees. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 23; Belz Dec., ¶10.) Plaintiff submits evidence that the full amount of the Note ($4,550,000) is due. Plaintiff also submits evidence that there is currently $333,666.77 due in interest. (Plaintiffs SSUMF No. 19; Belz Dec., ¶¶6-9.) Lender therefore establishes (1) the existence of the Note with Cyber 1 and the personal guarantees with Kravetz and Jacobsen; (2) Lender performance of its obligations by providing Cyber 1 with the $4,550,000 credit facility; (3) Defendants breach of the Note and the personal guarantees based on their failure to make the first payment due on February 1, 2023 and the failure to pay interest within 10 days of receiving notice of their default; and (4) the damages suffered as a result of the breach ($4,550,000 + $333,666.77 = $4,883,66.77). The burden therefore shifts to Defendants to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the first and second causes of action for breach of contract. (CCP §437c(p)(1).) Defendants fail to do so. Defendants fail to raise a triable issue of fact or establish an affirmative defense to the causes of action. i. Defendants defenses based on course of conduct and commercial impracticability fail to raise a triable issue of fact as to the breach element of Plaintiffs first and second causes of action for breach of the Note and breach of the personal guarantees Defendants concede that they failed to make the first principal payment due under the Note and the personal guarantees or interest payments from February 1, 2023 onward. (Defendants Responses to SSUMF Nos. 16-23.) However, they claim they are not in breach due to the parties course of dealing and commercial impracticability. Course of dealing . According to Defendants, in prior dealings involving short term obligations, Plaintiff adjusted these obligations to avoid default. (Defendants Additional Material Fact (AMF) No. 28, Kravetz Dec., ¶11, Ex. C.) Defendants contend they made monthly interest payments until January 2023 on the Note and the personal guarantees, which was consistent with the parties prior course of conduct. (Defendants AMF No. 32; Kravetz Dec., ¶¶38-43; Jacobsen Dec., ¶¶10-15.) Defendants testify that Lenders current actions of putting them in default and filing this lawsuit contradicts Lenders prior course of conduct. (Defendants AMF No. 34; Belz Depo., Ex. M, pp. 44, 49-50; Kravetz Dec., ¶¶2-43; Jacobsen Dec., ¶¶2-15.) Defendants fail to establish that the Note or the personal guarantees were uncertain or indefinite, such that the Court must resort to the parties course of dealing to interpret the contract and determine the obligations thereunder. Defendants rely on California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474 as authority for the proposition that they are not in breach of the Note or personal guarantees based on the parties course of dealing in connection with prior transactions that are entirely unrelated to the Note. California Lettuce Growers is inapposite. In California Lettuce Growers , the defendant argued it was not obligated under the parties agreement to purchase beets delivered to it by plaintiff, because the parties agreement did not specify a price, time and place of delivery and was therefore unenforceable as illusory and void. ( California Lettuce Growers , supra , 45 Cal.2d at 481. Here, Defendants do not argue that the Note or the personal guarantees are illusory and void. The court in California Lettuce Growers resorted to the parties and the industrys course of dealing to fill in the unstated terms of price, time and place of delivery. ( Id. at 483.) Defendants provide no authority for their attempt to use course of dealing to amend clear and definite obligations in an agreement. Commercial impracticability . [W]here performance remains possible, the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability excuses performance of a contractual obligation when performance is impossible or extremely impracticable. A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost. Circumstances that may make performance more difficult or costly than contemplated when the agreement was executed do not constitute impossibility. A party cannot avoid performance simply because it is more costly than anticipated or results in a loss. ( KB Salt Lake III, LLC v. Fitness Intern., LLC (2023) 95 Cal.App.5 th 1032, 1058-1059 (affirming summary judgment of landlords unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent; defendant failed to present any evidence that cost of paying rent as obligated under the lease could only have been done at an excessive and unreasonable cost due to COVID shutdown).) Defendants submit evidence that they suffered a number of financial setbacks due to the COVID shutdown. (Kravetz Dec., ¶35.) Such arguments have been rejected. ( KB Salt Lake III, LLC, supra, 95 Cal.App.5 th at 1058-1059; SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness International, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5 th 882, 895-896 (impracticability did not apply to excuse lessee from lease payments on health club even though COVID shutdown prevented it from operating the health club, which it maintained was the purpose of the lease).) Defendants fail to establish based on the evidence presented that repaying the Note in accordance with the schedule could only have been done at excessive and unreasonable cost. Defendants do not present evidence as to what they would have had to do to satisfy the payments under the Note. They only state that they suffered severe financial setbacks due to COVID policy. Defendants fail to establish that they were discharged from their obligations under the Note and the personal guarantees due to impracticability. ii. Defendants fail to raise a triable issue as to damages based on offset Defendants argue there are triable issues of fact as to damages, because they are entitled to an offset for the collateral pledged as security for the Pledge Agreement. However, Defendants present no evidence as to the value of the collaterala 15% membership interest in Equity Orchestration LLCnor may the Court assume that the value of such an interest is greater than zero. Defendants therefore fail to raise a triable issue of fact as to the first and second causes of action for breach of contract based on offset. C. No triable issues of fact remain as to Plaintiffs declaratory relief claim and summary adjudication is properly granted as to the third cause of action for declaratory relief In Lenders third cause of action for declaratory relief, Lender seeks an order declaring that Defendants Kravetz and Jacobsen have no right to the Equity Orchestration membership interests and that these interests are the sole and exclusive property of the Lender. (Complaint, ¶40.) Lender contends that, upon Defendants default, right to ownership of the Equity Orchestration LLC membership interests transferred to Lender based on Section 5 of the Pledge Agreement. (Complaint, ¶38.) Lender does not seek a declaratory order regarding the value of the 15% interest in Equity Ownership pledged as collateral for the personal guarantees. Lender establishes that Kravetz and Jacobsen pledged their respective 7.5% membership interests in Equity Orchestration LLC in the Pledge Agreement executed in connection with the personal guarantees on February 15, 2022. (Plaintiffs Separate Statement, Issue No. 3, SSUMF No. 14,. Belz Dec., Ex. 4, Section 1.) As discussed above, Defendants failed to make the first principal payment due under the Note, nor did they pay any interest due from February 1, 2023 onward. (Plaintiffs SSUMF Nos. 17-18; Belz Dec., ¶¶6-9, Ex. 2-3, Section 1.) Lender provided notice of the default to Defendants on March 21, 2023 and Defendants confirmed on April 3, 2023 that they were unable to make the payments. (Plaintiffs SSUMF Nos. 21-22, Gurvitz Dec., ¶4; Ex. 5 (Lenders March 21, 2023 Written Notice).) Kravetz and Jacobsen have also refused to tender their interests as required under the Pledge Agreements. (Plaintiffs SSUMF NO. 23.) However, section 5 of the Pledge Agreement does not automatically grant Lender rights in the membership interests upon Default, nor does it create any obligation on Defendants to voluntarily transfer the membership interests to Lender. (Belz Dec., Ex. 4, Section 5.) Instead, section 5 states as follows: If a Pledgor shall default in payment of any Obligations or be in violation of any provision hereunder or under any promissory note or other document, instrument or agreement evidencing or relating to the Obligations, in each case, after giving effect to any applicable cure period (any such default, a Default), the Pledgee will have all rights and remedies of a secured party after default under the UCC and other applicable law . ( Id. ) Based on the Pledge Agreement, Defendants were not obligated to voluntarily sign over their interests. As Defendants point out in their response to SSUMF No. 24, Lender was entitled to all rights and remedies of a secured party after default under the UCC and other applicable law. Lender filed this action and sought a declaratory order declaring its ownership of the collateral, which it was entitled to do under Section 5. Defendants acknowledge that Lenders action for declaratory relief is a proper exercise of its rights to file an action for judicial foreclosure. (Defendants SSUMF No. 24.) As discussed above, there are no triable issues of fact remaining as to the issue of breach. The undisputed facts establish that (1) Defendants are in default under the Note and the personal guarantees and (2) Lender has exercised its rights under the law to ownership of the collateral based on Defendants default per section 5 of the Pledge Agreement. As such, based on the undisputed facts, Lender is entitled to an order declaring it the owner of the collateral pledge under the Pledge Agreement, a total 15% interest in Equity Ownership LLC. Conclusion Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Based on the undisputed facts, (1) Defendants defaulted on their obligations under the Note and the personal guarantees; and (2) there is currently an outstanding balance of $4,883,666.77. Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff is also the owner of the collateral pledged as security for the personal guarantees executed by Defendants Kravetz and Jacobsena 15% membership interest in Equity Orchestration LLC. No triable issues of fact remain as to any of the causes of action alleged in the complaint.

Case Number: 23STCV13260 Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: July 11, 2024 TRIAL DATE: NOT SET CASE: Le Cui v. HicksLander LLC, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV13260 MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE MOVING PARTY : Defendant Michael Perry. RESPONDING PARTY(S) : Plaintiff Lei Cui CASE HISTORY : · 06/09/23: Complaint filed. · 05/06/24: First Amended Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an action for breach of contract concerning Defendants failure to repay and guarantee a loan agreement codified in two promissory notes dated March 5, 2020 and June 7, 2020. Defendant Michael Perry moves to transfer this action to the Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Michael Perrys Motion to Transfer Venue to the Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino is GRANTED. DISCUSSION: Defendant Michael Perry moves to transfer this action to the Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino on the basis that venue is not proper in the County of Los Angeles. // Legal Standard for Mandatory Transfer of Venue Code of Civil Procedure section 396b(a) provides: (a)¿Except as otherwise provided in Section 396a, if an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, other than the court designated as the proper court for the trial thereof, under this title , the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced, unless the defendant, at the time he or she answers, demurs, or moves to strike, or, at his or her option, without answering, demurring, or moving to strike and within the time otherwise allowed to respond to the complaint, files with the clerk, a notice of motion for an order transferring the action or proceeding to the proper court, together with proof of service, upon the adverse party, of a copy of those papers. Upon the hearing of the motion the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the action or proceeding transferred to the proper court . (Code Civ. Proc. § 396b(a), bold emphasis and underlining added.) Thus, transfer is mandatory under section 396b(a) if the action was not filed in the proper court. On determining the proper court in which to file an action, Code of Civil Procedure section 395(a) provides: (a) ¿Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action. If the action is for injury to person or personal property or for death from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs or the injury causing death occurs or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court for the trial of the action. . . . Subject to subdivision (b), if a defendant has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, the superior court in the county where the obligation is to be performed, where the contract in fact was entered into, or where the defendant or any defendant resides at the commencement of the action is a proper court for the trial of an action founded on that obligation, and the county where the obligation is incurred is the county where it is to be performed, unless there is a special contract in writing to the contrary. . . . (Code Civ. Proc. § 395(a) (bold emphasis added).) An action against a corporate defendant may be brought where its principal place of business is located. (Code Civ. Proc. § 395.5.) The burden is on the moving party to establish that the plaintiffs venue selection is not proper under any statutory grounds. ( Fontaine v. Superior Court. (Cashcall, Inc.) (2009) 175 Cal.App.4 th , 830, 836.) Whether Venue is Proper in Los Angeles Defendant Perry contends that venue is not proper in the County of Los Angeles. The First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants Perry and Mao are residents of San Bernardino County (FAC ¶¶ 3-4), that Defendant Chao is a resident of Orange County (¶ 5), and that Defendant HicksLanders, LLC has its principal place of business located in Chino, CA, which is in San Bernardino County. (¶ 2.) The First Amended Complaint alleges that venue is proper in the County of Los Angeles because the contracts at issue in the pleadings were entered into and were to be performed in Los Angeles. (FAC ¶ 10.) However, Defendant contends that the claims in the First Amended Complaint are transitory, with particular reference to Plaintiffs second cause of action for fraud and third cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Defendant relies on Nelson v. Crocker National Bank , a 1975 appellate opinion that addressed, inter alia , the nature of an action to cancel a promissory note and deed of trust for fraud for purposes of venue. Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 395, the Court of Appeal reasoned that an action to cancel or reform a promissory note secured by a deed of trust is a transitory action and must follow the person of the defendant. ( Nelson v. Crocker National Bank (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 536, 541.) Thus, Defendant argues that venue on the claims asserted in the second cause of action for fraud, third cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, and fifth cause of action for recission for fraudulent inducement must follow the Defendants to San Bernardino County or to Orange County. Plaintiff does not address this argument in opposition, instead contending that the motion was not timely brought because Defendant Perry failed to timely respond to the original Complaint. Plaintiffs sole authority for this proposition is Story v. Christin , a 1934 appellate opinion relying on statutes which have since been repealed and replaced. (See generally Story v. Christin (1934) 137 Cal.App. 484.) Moreover, even if that opinion remained good law, the Court of Appeal expressly stated that the then-operative statute required a motion to transfer to be brought at the time the defendant appears and answers or demurs. ( Story v. Christin, supra, 137 Cal.App. at 486.) As Defendant Perry was defaulted on September 5, 2023, he did not appear as a matter of law before the First Amended Complaint was filed on May 6, 2024. As this motion was filed and served on June 3, 2024, less than 30 days later, the motion was made within the time to respond to the amended complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 471.5(a).) Because Plaintiff does not contest Defendants argument that Plaintiffs claims sounding in fraud are transitory and follow the person of the Defendants, the Court finds Defendant has demonstrated that venue is not proper in Los Angeles as to those claims. Under well-settled precedent, when a defendant is entitled to a change of venue as to one cause of action, that Defendant is entitled to transfer of the entire action. ( Ah Fong v. Sternes (1889) 79 Cal. 30, 33; Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 715, 720-21; Johnson v. Superior Court (1965) 232 Cal.App.3d 212, 217.) Defendant Perry has demonstrated that Los Angeles County is not the proper venue for this action as a matter of law, and that he is entitled to transfer of the entire action. Because the First Amended Complaint establishes by its allegations that venue is proper in either the County of Orange or the County of San Bernardino, Defendants request to transfer the action to the County of San Bernardino must be granted. CONCLUSION : Accordingly, Defendant Michael Perrys Motion to Transfer Venue to the Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino is GRANTED. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 11, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Case Number: 23STCV28057 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 IRTH COMMUNICATIONS, LLC , Plaintiff, vs. BIOTRICITY, INC. , et al. , Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV28057 Hearing Date: July 12, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS REQUESTS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT Plaintiff Irth Communications, LLC (Plaintiff) requests entry of default judgment against Defendant Biotricity, Inc. Plaintiff seeks judgment in the total amount of $109,293.45, comprising $97,431.23 in damages, $9,177.22 in interest, $2,100.00 in attorneys fees, and $585.00 in costs. The Court notes that Plaintiff has corrected the defects identified in the Courts May 17, 2024 Order on Plaintiffs prior request for default judgment. However, the Court notes that the Declaration of Andrew William Haag in support of the request indicates, inter alia , that [t]he interest rate calculation is based on the rate of 1.5% per month (or 18% per year) . (Haag Decl., ¶ 33, emphasis added.) Pursuant to LA¿SC rule 3.206¿, [i]f interest is requested in excess of the usury limitations of ¿California Constitution Article XV, Section 1¿, proof must be presented of plaintiffs exemption from the usury limitations unless an exemption has been pleaded in the complaint and admitted by the entry of default. The Complaint does not appear to plead any exemption from the usury limitations and Plaintiff has not provided an explanation for its entitlement to any exemption.¿¿ In addition, Plaintiff seeks interest for the period of November 13, 2023 to May 21, 2024. (Haag Decl., ¶ 33.) Plaintiff states that there are 191 days between these dates. ( Ibid .) However, it appears that there are 190 days between November 13, 2023 and May 21, 2024. Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Plaintiffs request for default judgment without prejudice. The Court will discuss with Plaintiff a schedule for resubmission of the default judgment package. DATED: July 12, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Case Number: 23LBCV02516 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: S27 1. Background Facts Plaintiff, Leslie A. Smith, Trustee of the Leslie A. Smith Trust Dated July 11, 2022 filed this action against Defendant, Anchor Seaport Escrow on 12/29/23. Plaintiffs complaint contains causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. 2. Demurrer On 5/15/24, Defendant filed a demurrer to the negligence cause of action. Defendants demurrer is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration establishing Defense Counsel attempted to email and call Plaintiffs attorney, but received no response. On 7/03/24, Plaintiff filed a response to the demurrer, wherein she indicates negligence is listed in the caption of the complaint, but there is no negligence cause of action pled in the body of the complaint, and she does not intend to pursue a claim for negligence. She indicates she does not object to a ruling striking the reference to negligence in the caption of her complaint. This proceeding demonstrates the importance of participating in meet and confer conversations. The reference to negligence is stricken without leave to amend. Plaintiffs attorney is admonished to fully participate in all meet and confer conversations in the future in connection with this and other actions to avoid unnecessary consumption of judicial and attorney resources. Defendant is ordered to file an answer to the complaint, with the reference to negligence deemed stricken, within ten days. 3. Notice Plaintiffs opposition to the demurrer indicates the hearing date is 6/16/24. It is 7/16/24. Additionally, on 6/04/24, Plaintiff was ordered to give notice that the Court set a CMC and OSC for 7/16/24. Plaintiff did not serve the notice until a month later, on 7/03/24, and noticed the CMC and OSC for 6/16/24, not 7/16/24. The Court admonishes Plaintiffs attorney to give notice promptly in the future in connection with this and other actions, and also admonishes Plaintiffs attorney to ensure dates are correct on all notices. 4. CMC and OSC The parties are reminded that there is a CMC and OSC on calendar concurrently with the hearing on the demurrer. The Court asks Counsel to make arrangements to appear remotely at the CMC, OSC, and hearing on the demurrer.

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Wednesday, July 10, 2024, Line 6. DEFENDANT ROBERT ELAM's Motion For Relief From Default. Continued to July 26, 2024, to be heard by Judge East. =(302/RBU)