Preview
FILED
10/26/2023 10:43 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Debra Clark DEPUTY
CAUSE NO. DC-23-08796
Jrmar “JJ” Jefferson § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
§
§
§
§
§
CONTESTANT § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
v. §
§
Kardal Coleman § 134TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
§
CONTESTEE §
══════════════════════════════════════
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A
══════════════════════════════════════
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
I. Introduction
Contestant, Jrmar "JJ" Jefferson, a candidate for the Dallas County Chair Race,
brings forth allegations of procedural irregularities, violations of state election law, breaches
of party rules, and infringement of constitutional rights in the recent Dallas County
Democratic Party (DCDP) election. Your Honor, I wish to underscore a critical aspect of this
election contest: the absence of specific provisions within the Texas Election Code for the
dismissal of such cases, as distinct from the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that pertain to
civil cases. Jurisdiction has been established per Tex. Elec. Code § 221.002, and Contestant
has raised various claims regarding election irregularities, which must be examined to
1
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
uphold the integrity of the electoral process and constitutional rights.
II. Background
Election contests are governed by a distinct framework, meticulously outlined in the
Texas Election Code, entirely separate from the procedural rules applicable to civil litigation.
The Texas Election Code provides a comprehensive and exclusive framework for initiating
and resolving election contests. Within the realm of election contests, the final judgment is
typically rendered by the tribunal or court based on the presentation of evidence and
arguments by the involved parties. The Texas Election Code provides the procedural
framework governing this determination.
Furthermore, the Code explicitly prohibits default judgments in election contests,
aligning with the legislative intent for a thorough examination of election matters. Judges are
prohibited from making arbitrary alterations to election procedures, as public officials are
mandated to adhere to election standards and practices mandated by law or rule, as expressly
authorized by the Code. It is imperative to maintain clear distinctions between the legislative
and judicial branches' roles. This ensures that legislative matters are handled within the
legislative sphere, preserving democratic governance principles and preventing undue
judicial influence.
Factual Background
Transition in Election Strategy: The Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP) held their 1st
attempted election in person. However, they shifted their strategy, deciding to utilize a
virtual platform via Zoom on the 2nd election attempt. This decision appears to be in direct
contradiction to stipulations set forth in the Texas Election Code and the regulations of the
2
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
Texas Democratic Party (TDP) bylaws.
1. Disregard for Advisories: Despite receiving specific advisories that highlighted the
importance and legal requirement of holding the election in person, the DCDP
proceeded with their choice of a Zoom-based format.
2. Candidate Registration: Among all potential contenders for the position, only
Kardel Coleman and Jrmar "JJ" Jefferson successfully completed their candidacy
registration, ensuring their names would appear on the ballot for the Dallas County
Democratic Chair election.
3. Unfair Exclusion of Contestant: A particular contestant found themselves unjustly
and inexplicably barred from the election process. This act not only violated their
inherent rights as a legitimate candidate but also raises questions about the
transparency and fairness of the election process.
4. Commitment of Campaign Resources: Anticipating a transparent and equitable
election process, this unfairly excluded contestant had already committed substantial
resources towards their campaign. As a result, they faced various financial outlays
and accrued campaign-related debts.
5. Breach of Neutrality by DCDP Staff: The DCDP's own guidelines dictate a stance
of neutrality during the election process. However, certain members of the DCDP
staff seemed to overtly support a specific candidate, directly contravening these
neutrality guidelines.
6. Vendor Participation and Implications: The election process witnessed the
involvement of specific vendors. Given that these vendors had clear financial stakes
in the outcome, their active participation casts a shadow over the integrity, neutrality,
and overall trustworthiness of the election process.
By altering the format and ignoring established guidelines, the DCDP's actions have
brought up concerns regarding the legitimacy, fairness, and impartiality of the Dallas County
Democratic Chair election process.
III. Legal Grounds
In accordance with Tex. Elec. Code § 221.012, the tribunal's duty is to declare the
3
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
election's outcome if it can ascertain the true result and to declare the election void if it
cannot. Nowhere in the legislative intent is the provision to dismiss a case based on
unfounded claims related to election fraud, irregularities, or mistakes. The legislators
intended for a comprehensive and impartial examination of such claims within the
framework of the election contest.
Examination of Legal Claims and Implications:
Therefore, prematurely dismissing an election contest, particularly based on
unfounded claims, would not only prejudice the contestant but also constitute a departure
from legislative intent. Such an action would be ripe for judicial review due to the potential
for judicial error. It is essential to acknowledge that an election contest is a unique legislative
proceeding, distinct from civil or criminal cases. Judges do not possess the discretion to
create new rules or procedures that contravene the Texas Election Code. Instead, they are
entrusted with applying the law as written.
Fundamental Legal Contention:
In summary, the Texas Election Code does not provide for the dismissal of election
contest cases in the manner prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for civil cases.
It establishes a specific and comprehensive framework for the conduct and resolution of
election contests, reflecting the legislative intent to ensure a full scope of inquiry into
election matters while preserving the contestant's rights.
A. Violation of Texas Election Code § 276.019: The DCDP's decision to modify the
election.
B. Election Rules, Regulations, and Adherence:
C. Ambiguity and Non-compliance with Election Rules:
4
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
D. The DCDP and TDP appear to have faltered in creating a crystal-clear set of rules
governing their election process. Section 163.004 of the Texas Election Code
specifies that only the state convention or state executive committee has the power to
draft and enact election-related rules. The clear directive seems to be aimed at
centralizing rule-making authority, thereby ensuring consistent and unbiased election
processes. The deviation by DCDP and TDP from this established protocol not only
goes against the statute but also leaves room for potential biases and inconsistencies
in the electoral process.
Public Disclosure of Rules:
E. Transparency is fundamental to the integrity of any election. Sec. 163.005 reinforces
this by mandating public disclosure of all ratified election rules. Without this public
display, voters and candidates alike are left in the dark about the criteria guiding the
election. Non-disclosure, as reportedly done by the DCDP, can lead to skepticism
about the fairness and integrity of the election process.
Enforceability of Election Rules:
F. The weight of the rule of law is cemented in Section 163.007. By equating election
rules with other legislative statutes, it underscores their importance. A writ of
mandamus, a court order directing a governmental body or official to undertake a
specific act, serves as a remedy ensuring these rules are observed.
II. Examination of Legal Claims and Implications:
Character of Votes:
G. Votes are the bedrock of a democratic election. Any vote that bypasses the
established rules can distort the will of the electorate, thereby undermining the
election's validity. The complainant's contention here underscores the significance of
rule-abiding voting.
5
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
Claims of Attorney Representing Kardel Coleman:
H. Chad Baurch's emphasis on his credentials, while potentially persuasive in some
contexts, is not substantive evidence. The Trinsey v. Pagliaro case serves as a
precedent highlighting those mere assertions, especially those based on hearsay, lack
the rigor needed for legal admissibility.
Extent of Examination:
I. An exhaustive examination is the cornerstone of ensuring electoral integrity. Tex.
Elec. Code § 221.003 mandates this comprehensive review, emphasizing that
election contest tribunals must validate election results. Unauthorized votes or
administrative lapses can skew results, making this in-depth examination paramount.
Procedural Deficiencies in the Motion:
J. Legal procedures have specific benchmarks for a reason – to ensure fairness and
thoroughness. Kardel Coleman's motion's failure to adhere to Rule 91a.2's
prerequisites jeopardizes its validity.
III. Fundamental Legal Contentions:
Violation of Texas Election Code § 276.019:
K. The Election Code serves as a guiding framework. Any deviations, like the DCDP's
reported alteration of election procedures, challenge the election's authenticity and
trustworthiness.
Duty to Uphold Transparent Elections:
L. Every democratic body is bound by a duty to uphold transparent and unbiased
elections. This duty, embedded in both the Texas Election Code and TDP bylaws, is
non-negotiable. Any breaches erode public trust and can have lasting repercussions
on the party's reputation and efficacy.
6
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
Breach of Internal Party Guidelines:
M. Internal party guidelines serve to ensure that all members and officials maintain a
consistent, fair stance. Endorsements from DCDP staff members directly contradict
these guidelines and can introduce biases into what should be a neutral process.
Infringement of First Amendment Rights:
N. The First Amendment protects, among other things, an individual's right to freedom
of association. By preventing the Contestant from participating in the electoral
process, the DCDP might have inadvertently infringed upon these constitutional
protections. Such actions could have broader implications, extending beyond party
politics to constitutional law debates.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION
Detailed Examination of Kardel Coleman's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 91a.
7. Kardel Coleman's motion to dismiss contends that Jefferson's claims lack legal merit. Yet,
the motion does not conform to Rule 91a.2's requirements. The act of dismissing a case
shouldn't be undertaken lightly, especially when considering the stringent criteria that guide
such a decision. The Contestee's motion to dismiss is fraught with procedural defects.
8. Alleged Breaches by the DCDP: There's an assertion that the Dallas County Democratic
Party (DCDP) has deviated from the established elections code.
9. According to the stipulations within "91a.2 Contents of Motion", for a motion to dismiss to
hold water, it: Should unambiguously declare its foundation in Rule 91a.Needs to pinpoint
each cause of action it intends to challenge.
10. Must methodically list out the reasons indicating the absence of a legal or factual basis for
the cause of action, or both.
7
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
11. Given this backdrop, Plaintiff Jrmar "JJ" Jefferson finds it necessary to formally oppose
Defendant Kardel Coleman's Motion to Dismiss. This opposition, grounded in the Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, is not mere contradiction but is supported by cogent arguments
countering the motion's premises.
12. JRMAR “JJ” JEFFERSON, a candidate for the Dallas County Chair, has alleged causes of
action related to the recent Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP) election. Specifically,
he has alleged election fraud, irregularities, mistakes, and civil rights violations. These
allegations imply potential non-compliance with the procedures set forth in the Texas
Election Code and the guidelines of the Texas Democratic Party.
CAUSE OF ACTON
Your Honor, Contestee Kardel Coleman has made claims and Contestant objects to
and denies each and every allegation made by Coleman in the response. Contestant
specifically denies the truth, accuracy, and validity of the claims put forth by Coleman and
demands strict proof thereof. Contestant reserves the right to assert affirmative defenses and
counterclaims as deemed necessary upon further examination of the facts and legal issues in
this matter.
Contestant Jrmar 'JJ' Jefferson has raised valid causes of action in this election
contest. According to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) & TCRP Rule 571. It states
that “Pleadings of pro se parties should be liberally construed.
Cause of Action 1: Election fraud encompassing allegations of illegal conduct, disinformation,
and the counting of illegal votes
Cause of Action 2: Use of Uncertified Voting Systems and Machines in Violation of TX
Election Code § 122.001 and TX Administrative Code, Rule § 81.60
Cause of Action 3: Lack of Legislative Authorization for Online Elections, neither authorized
by legislative action nor party bylaws.
Cause of Action 4: Violations of Party Rules in Conducting the Dallas County Chairs Election
8
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
Cause of Action 5: Improper Switching of In-Person Elections to Unauthorized Online
Elections with Made-Up Suggested Rules
Cause of Action 6: Denial of Participation in the Electoral Process through Disqualification
Cause of Action 7: Dissemination of False Information by Various Parties
Cause of Action 8: Voter Deception, Falsifying Records, and Providing False
Statements deprives eligible candidates and the public of their constitutional rights.
Cause of Action 9: Violation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 through the use of
uncertified voting machines
Cause of Action 10: Use of Uncertified Voting Machines in Recording Votes, Lacking
Certification of Accreditation
I. Claim 1: "Threadbare" and "Conclusory" Claims: Coleman argues that Jefferson's claims
in the case are lacking in substance and specificity, characterized as "threadbare" and
"conclusory."Contestee contends that the claims are based on general legal conclusions
and do not provide enough factual detail to support a legal remedy.
Response 1: In response to this claim, Contestant vehemently disputes Coleman's
characterization of the claims as "threadbare" and "conclusory." Contestant asserts that
claims are well-founded in established legal principles. Key precedents such as Marbury
v. Madison (1803), Smith v. Cherry (1973), and Piotrowski v. City of Houston (2001)
underscore the fundamental importance of protecting political expression and
participation as a constitutional right. Contestant argues that these claims are firmly
rooted in recognized legal principles, challenging Coleman's assertion of lack of
specificity and factual foundation.
II. Claim 2: Citations to Legal Precedents: Coleman cites two legal cases, Legend Natural
Gas III, LP and Montoya v. San Angelo Comm. Med. Ctr., to make the point that the
court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions presented by Jefferson. Essentially,
Coleman is arguing that Jefferson must provide specific and well-founded legal
arguments based on applicable precedents.
9
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
III. Response 2: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's reliance on legal precedents to
challenge Jefferson's claims. However, Contestant contends that the cited precedents do
not apply directly to the constitutional principles underpinning Jefferson's claims. While
the court may not be obligated to accept legal conclusions, Contestant emphasizes that
Jefferson's claims are not mere conclusions but are firmly grounded in constitutional
principles, as established by Marbury v. Madison (1803), Smith v. Cherry (1973), and
Piotrowski v. City of Houston (2001). These cases reinforce the fundamental importance
of political expression and participation as constitutionally protected rights.
IV. Claim 3: Election Code Does Not Apply to Internal Party Elections: Coleman argues that
the election code should not be applied to internal elections conducted by political
parties. He asserts that political parties have the authority to establish their own rules for
internal elections, which may differ from the general election code.
Response 3: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's argument regarding the application of
the election code to internal party elections. However, Contestant contends that relevant
statutes, including Tex. Elec. Code § 1.0015 and Tex. Elec. Code § 122.001(a)(1), set the
standard for electoral processes, including party elections. Contestant asserts that when
party rules conflict with state law, the law should prevail to uphold the integrity of the
electoral process, as per Tex. Elec. Code § 163.003. While political parties have
autonomy, they must still adhere to fundamental election laws.
V. Claim 4: Reference to Rule 91a for Dismissal: Coleman references Rule 91a, which
allows for the dismissal of claims that lack a basis in law or fact. He suggests that
Jefferson's claims should be dismissed under this rule because they do not have a valid
legal or factual foundation.
Response 4: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's reference to Rule 91a. and However,
Contestant maintains that Jefferson's challenge to the constitutionality of the "Zoom
Voting System" is firmly rooted in Texas Election Code provisions, including Tex. Elec.
Code § 1.0015 and Tex. Elec. Code § 122.001(a)(1), which require the maintenance of
the secrecy of the ballot. Constitutional principles, particularly the right to a secret ballot,
10
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
further support this argument. Contestant believes that a thorough examination of this
claim is warranted before considering dismissal.
VI. Claim 5: Rules Cited by Jefferson Do Not Apply to Party Chair Election: Coleman argues
that the rules mentioned by Jefferson in the case do not apply to the election for party
chair. He asserts that there may be specific rules or regulations governing this type of
election that should be considered instead.
VII. Response 5: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's assertion regarding the relevance of the
mentioned rules. However, Contestant contends that allegations of favoritism, partiality,
and compromised electoral integrity within DCDP headquarters are of paramount
importance. Tex. Elec. Code Section 1.0015 mandates fair and impartial election
administration, as emphasized in Smith v. Cherry (1973). These allegations should be
thoroughly investigated to ensure that the election process adheres to the highest
standards of fairness, regardless of specific rule interpretations.
VIII. Claim 6: Use of Voting Machines: Coleman maintains that the political party is not
obligated to use voting machines, and that the relevant statutes only require the use of
certified machines if they are used at all. This challenges Jefferson's claims related to the
use of voting machines in the election process.
Response 6: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's argument regarding the optional use of
voting machines. However, Contestant contends that allegations of election fraud
encompassing illegal conduct and the counting of illegal votes are of grave concern. Tex.
Elec. Code § 276.013 outlines offenses related to election fraud, including the provision
of false information to election officials and voters. Contestant's reliance on legal
precedents, such as Logan v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass'n and Young v. Red Clay Consol. Sch.
Dist, supports the legitimacy of these concerns. Election integrity is a cornerstone of
democratic processes and should be vigorously safeguarded.
IX. Claim 7: Texas Democratic Party Rules on Secret Ballots: Coleman references the Texas
Democratic Party rules, which forbid secret ballots in connection with the election of a
local party chair. This is presented to counter Jefferson's arguments regarding the use of
secret ballots.
11
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
X. Response 7: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's reference to Texas Democratic Party
rules. However, Contestant argues that the claim regarding the lack of legislative
authorization for online elections and violation of party rules is grounded in Tex. Elec.
Code § 163.003, which mandates that party rules align with state law. Contestant's
reliance on Texas Democratic Party (TDP) and Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP)
bylaws that prohibit electronic voting underscores the case for a violation of party rules.
This matter demands a thorough examination of the legality of online elections and
adherence to party rules.
XI. Claim 8: Violation of Internal Party Rules: Coleman argues that Jefferson fails to allege
any violation of internal party rules, which he contends are the rules governing the
election. This suggests that any violations should be based on the party's internal rules
rather than external statutes.
Response 8: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's concern regarding the alleged violation
of internal party rules. However, Contestant asserts that claims of deprivation of
constitutional rights, including the First Amendment rights to political expression and
participation, are of utmost importance. Marbury v. Madison (1803), Smith v. Cherry
(1973), and Piotrowski v. City of Houston (2001) establish the foundational importance
of protecting these rights. Deprivation of these rights due to unjust actions by Deana
Tollerton requires a comprehensive assessment to ensure the preservation of
constitutional liberties.
XII. Claim 9: Alleged Violation of Statutes Governing Elections for Political Office: Coleman
argues that Jefferson's claims only relate to statutes governing elections for political
office, not to the actual rules governing the specific election in question. He suggests that
Jefferson's claims are not relevant to the case at hand.
Response 9: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's argument regarding the relevance of
statutes. However, Contestant asserts that Contestant's constitutional rights, particularly
the First Amendment rights and the right to equal protection under the law (U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1), are founded on constitutional principles and case law. Contestant's
reference to Young v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist (2017) reinforces the importance of
12
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
equal protection in electoral processes. Any actions that infringe upon these rights should
be thoroughly examined to ensure compliance with constitutional standards.
XIII. Zoom Election System
Allegation: The Contestant alleges that the voting machine systems were not compliant with
the safety, efficiency, accuracy, or standards set by the Election Assistance Commission.
Contestee Argument: Contestees argue that this cause of action has no basis in fact.
Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Nonetheless, the Contestant asserts that this failure to respond does not diminish the alleged
violation of voting system standards. The Contestant will present evidence during the
proceedings to establish the factual basis for all claim.
XIV. Violation of TX Administrative Code, Rule § 81.60 VOTING SYSTEM
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES:
Allegation: It is alleged that the Secretary of State did not receive a copy of all qualified
software/firmware and source codes for the voting system 45 days prior to examination.
Contestee Argument: Contestees argue lack of factual basis.
Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Nevertheless, the Contestant maintains that there is a factual basis for this claim and will
present evidence and arguments during the proceedings to substantiate it.
XV. Condition for Approval of Electronic Voting Systems under TX Administrative
Code, Rule § 81.61:
Allegation: Allegations suggest the electronic voting systems used did not align with the
certification and performance standards required.
Contestee Argument: Contestees claim of no factual basis is premature since evidence will
be presented during the proceedings.
Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
However, the Contestant will address the issue of factual basis during the proceedings by
presenting evidence and legal arguments to support Contestant cause of action.
13
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
XVI. Violation of Constitutional Rights:
Allegation: Alleged infringements of First Amendment rights related to political expression
and participation, citing landmark cases such as Marbury v. Madison, Smith v. Cherry, and
Piotrowski v. City of Houston.
Contestee Argument: Contestees argue legal insufficiency.
Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Nevertheless, the Contestant asserts that their right to association was infringed upon and
will present arguments and evidence to substantiate Contestant claim during the proceedings.
XVII. Denial of Services:
Allegation: Claims that the DCDP did not abide by the Texas Election Code, leading to an
unfair election.
Contestee Argument: Contestees argue legal insufficiency.
Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
However, the Contestant will address this issue during the proceedings by presenting
evidence and legal arguments to demonstrate the merit of their claim.
Contestant will continue with the remaining causes of action in subsequent responses.
XVIII. Misrepresentation of Information and Election Fraud:
Allegation: Accusations that Deana Tollerton disseminated misleading information
distinguishing between a DCDP meeting and a DCDP election.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the allegations
made by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the
proceedings to substantiate Contestant claim of misrepresentation and election fraud.
XIX. Failure to Comply with Election Laws:
Allegation: Allegations that Deana Tollerton neglected her obligations and undertook actions
beyond her authority.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
14
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not negate the alleged violation of election
laws. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to
demonstrate that Deana Tollerton acted beyond her authority, which necessitates a thorough
examination.
XX. Failure to Fulfill Ministerial Duties:
Allegation: Allegations that Deana Tollerton, despite multiple formal notices, did not
conduct her mandated duties, hindering a fair and democratic election.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the allegations
made by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the
proceedings to substantiate Contestant claim of failure to fulfill ministerial duties.
XXI. Favoritism and Breach of Impartiality:
Allegation: Claims that Mary Leyendecker and DCDP staff exhibited biases during the
election process.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not negate the alleged favoritism and breach of
impartiality. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to
demonstrate that bias existed in the election process.
XXII. Voting Machine Malfunctions, Denial of Voting Opportunities, and Compromised
Accessibility:
Allegation: Allegations of widespread malfunctioning of voting machines leading to voting
denials and other issues.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the significance of the alleged
15
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
voting machine malfunctions and accessibility issues. The Contestant will present arguments
and evidence during the proceedings to substantiate these claims.
XXIII. Challenge to the Constitutionality of the "Zoom Voting System":
Allegation: Concerns over the confidentiality of ballots within the Zoom voting system.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the importance of the
constitutional challenge raised by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and
evidence during the proceedings to support Contestant claim regarding the constitutionality
of the Zoom voting system.
XXIV. Violation of the Texas Constitution:
Allegation: Arguments suggesting that the integration of the electronic Zoom voting
machine system with secret ballots compromises the sanctity of the ballot box.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not negate the alleged violation of the Texas
Constitution. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to
support Contestant claim that the use of secret ballots compromised the sanctity of the ballot
box.
XXV. Request to Void Election:
Allegation: Based on the referenced Alvarez v. Espinoza and Rogers v. Holder cases, this
cause of action alleges the election should be nullified due to the neglect of election laws and
potential fraud.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the request to
void the election. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the
proceedings to support his claim that election laws were neglected, and potential fraud
16
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
occurred.
XXVI. CAUSE OF ACTION ASSERTING AN ELECTION CONTEST:
Allegation: This particular cause of action is centered around the belief that the true
outcome of the contested election is indeterminable due to the non-certification of voting
systems and the existence of fraudulent activities and voting irregularities.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the need for an election contest.
The Contestant will argue that an election contest is necessary to address the alleged
violations of election laws and allegations of Election fraud. Contestant will emphasize that
these issues cast doubt on the true outcome of the contested election and require thorough
examination.
XXVII. Abuse of Position:
Allegation: Accusations against various individuals for allegedly leveraging their positions
to sway election results.
Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not
respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2.
Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the allegations
made by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the
proceedings to substantiate Contestant claim of abuse of position.
In summary, Contestant's claims are well-founded in constitutional principles, statutory
provisions, and relevant case law. These claims demand a thorough examination to safeguard the
integrity of the electoral process and protect the fundamental rights of all participants.
XXVIII. Conclusion and Contention
The Contestant, JRMAR “JJ” JEFFERSON, Contestant firmly upholds the original
law and the presumption of constitutionality enshrined in both the U.S. and Texas
Constitutions, should not be compromised by legislative or judicial actions that may infringe
17
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
upon fundamental rights.
Contestant alleges serious transgressions in the electoral process. Contestant
contends that fraudulent actions have been taken and rules for electronic elections were
manufactured by staff without democratic approval by the CEC. In light of these allegations,
the contestant argues that the elections should be annulled, Contestee Kardel Coleman, the
opposing candidate, should be disqualified due to alleged violation of Texas Election code,
TDP & DCDP party bylaws, election interreference & election fraud. Furthermore, it is
emphasized that political parties must adhere to the ELECTION CODE and its legislative
intent, referencing the Texas Electric Code Section 1.003, which mandates a strict
interpretation by officials.
Due to Kardel Coleman's alleged failure to comply with the conditions set forth in
Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.2 and the significant allegations raised by Jefferson about the Dallas
County Democratic Party's (DCDP) conduct of the election; it is asserted that Coleman's
motion to dismiss should be denied as a matter of law and equity.
In summary, the Texas Election Code does not provide for the dismissal of election
contest cases in the manner prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for civil cases.
It establishes a specific and comprehensive framework for the conduct and resolution of
election contests, reflecting the legislative intent to ensure a full scope of inquiry into
election matters while preserving the contestant's rights.
In contestant Jefferson's case, the issue arises from the transfer of certain legislative functions
to the judicial branch, specifically related to a judge's role as the finder of fact regarding
legislative intent in special legislative proceedings. Key points defining the separation of powers
issue include:
18
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
• Special Legislative Proceedings: Typically, under the legislative branch's domain, these
proceedings involve bill drafting, committee hearings, investigations, and debates.
• Judicial Involvement: The involvement of the judiciary in these proceedings raises
concerns about the separation of powers when judges are tasked with interpreting
legislative intent.
• Conflict of Interest: The presence of a judge with potential bias and opposing counsel
representing the judge's interests compromises the judicial process's impartiality.
• Lack of Legislative Participation: Involvement in special legislative proceedings within
the judicial branch can raise constitutional concerns.
To address this separation of powers issue, it is imperative to maintain clear distinctions between
the legislative and judicial branches' roles. This ensures that legislative matters are handled
within the legislative sphere, preserving democratic governance principles and preventing undue
judicial influence.
In summary, the Texas Election Code does not provide for the dismissal of election
contest cases in the manner prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for civil cases. It
establishes a specific and comprehensive framework for the conduct and resolution of election
contests, reflecting the legislative intent to ensure a full scope of inquiry into election matters
while preserving the contestant's rights.
Furthermore, the separation of powers issue in this case stems from the transfer of
legislative functions to the judicial branch, potential bias or conflicts of interest, and the need to
uphold the integrity of each branch's functions within the framework of democratic governance.
The contestant contends that a jury trial is necessary to ensure a fair and impartial resolution of
this matter, given the complexity of the constitutional questions and legislative intent
interpretation involved. Jurisdiction has been established per Tex. Elec. Code § 221.002, and the
19
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
contestant has raised various claims regarding election irregularities, which must be examined to
uphold the integrity of the electoral process and constitutional rights. This comprehensive
approach ensures that the contestant's rights are protected and that the court can fulfill its duty to
maintain the integrity of elections in accordance with the law.
Legal Provisions for Election Procedures
• Jefferson's Assertion: Election processes for party roles were highlighted, referencing
the Texas Election Code.
• Texas Electric Code Sections: Detailed explanations of the Texas Electric Code
Section 1.003 ("Code Construction"), Section 1.0015 ("Legislative Intent"), and other
related sections are provided to substantiate the claims.
• Local Government Code Section 22.005: Mention of the formal oath required by
elected or appointed municipal officers before commencing official duties.
• Texas Democratic Party's 2022-2024 Platform & Guiding Principles: Outlined are
the fundamental principles and platform of the Texas Democratic Party, emphasizing
representation, equality, and fairness.
Personal Experience and Grievances
My name is Jrmar “JJ” Jefferson, I am a heterosexual Indigenous Negro American
and believer in YHWH the creator, I ran for County Chair of the Democratic Party, and I
feels I was treated indifferently in the elections process. I was denied the right to speak as a
candidate, the right to vote as a precent chair and I personally saw Violation of Texas
Election Code.
Internal Party Rules and Regulatory Compliance guidelines and rules for SDEC
20
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
meetings as set by the Texas Democratic Party are highlighted. It's emphasized that no
provisions exist for elections to be held electronically or via platforms such as Zoom.
XXIX. Prayer to Deny Motion to Dismiss under Rule 91a
The Contestant firmly contend that the Contestee has failed to adhere to the procedural
requirements outlined in Rule 91a(b) of the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. Their attempt to
invoke Rule 91a to dismiss my cause of action appears to lack substantial merit, as they have
not effectively demonstrated that my claims lack a legal or factual basis, a fundamental
prerequisite mandated by the rule. In contrast, I have credible evidence and supporting
documentation, such as affidavits, statutes, emails, witness statements, and forthcoming
video evidence, to substantiate my claims.
The Contestee's failure to meet Rule 91a's specific requirements and the potential
repercussions of non-compliance with the rule, as evidenced by cases like Iles v. Walker and
Thompson v. Willis, further weaken their motion to dismiss. My case, prepared
meticulously, is poised to challenge the Contestee's motion during the upcoming hearing,
supported by relevant case law, thus strengthening my position. Contestee respectfully
requests the Court to reject the Contestee's Motion to Dismiss in accordance with Rule 91a.
The basis for this request lies in the factual and legal reasons presented, indicating a genuine
dispute concerning material facts. The claims of the Contestant are rooted in both law and
reality.
Relief Requested
In response to the grievances mentioned:
1. Denial of Mr. Kardel Coleman's motion to dismiss.
2. A tribunal-led determination reflecting the accurate outcome of the election, as per
21
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
Tex. Elec. Code § 221.012.
3. In the event the true result remains undetermined, the Contestant calls for the election
to be declared null and void due to the alleged procedural discrepancies and breaches.
4. The Contestant further appeals for any additional suitable and fair relief to which
they might be entitled.
Respectfully submitted on this 26 th day of OCTOBER 2023.
_________________________
Jrmar ‘JJ’ Jefferson
3700 Reese Dr.
Dallas, TX 75210
903-650-0069
jrmarjefferson@gmail.com
PRO SE PLAINTIFF
22
AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE
91A.
DECLARATION OF JRMAR JEFFERSON
I, Jrmar Jefferson, residing at 3700 Reese Drive, Dallas, Texas 75210, hereby make
the following declaration: I confirm the accuracy of the factual allegations presented in
the preceding document titled " OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. "
To the best of my knowledge and recollection, the information contained therein is true
and correct. I solemnly affirm that the aforementioned statement is true and correct, and I
acknowledge that it would serve as my testimony if I were under oath in a court of law, subject to
the penalty of perjury.
Date: OCTOBR 26, 2023
____________________________________
Jrmar “JJ” Jefferson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing " OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO
MOTION TO DISMISS UN
Preview
FILED 10/26/2023 10:43 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Debra Clark DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-23-08796 Jrmar “JJ” Jefferson § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § § § § § § CONTESTANT § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS v. § § Kardal Coleman § 134TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § § CONTESTEE § ══════════════════════════════════════ AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A ══════════════════════════════════════ TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: I. Introduction Contestant, Jrmar "JJ" Jefferson, a candidate for the Dallas County Chair Race, brings forth allegations of procedural irregularities, violations of state election law, breaches of party rules, and infringement of constitutional rights in the recent Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP) election. Your Honor, I wish to underscore a critical aspect of this election contest: the absence of specific provisions within the Texas Election Code for the dismissal of such cases, as distinct from the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that pertain to civil cases. Jurisdiction has been established per Tex. Elec. Code § 221.002, and Contestant has raised various claims regarding election irregularities, which must be examined to 1 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. uphold the integrity of the electoral process and constitutional rights. II. Background Election contests are governed by a distinct framework, meticulously outlined in the Texas Election Code, entirely separate from the procedural rules applicable to civil litigation. The Texas Election Code provides a comprehensive and exclusive framework for initiating and resolving election contests. Within the realm of election contests, the final judgment is typically rendered by the tribunal or court based on the presentation of evidence and arguments by the involved parties. The Texas Election Code provides the procedural framework governing this determination. Furthermore, the Code explicitly prohibits default judgments in election contests, aligning with the legislative intent for a thorough examination of election matters. Judges are prohibited from making arbitrary alterations to election procedures, as public officials are mandated to adhere to election standards and practices mandated by law or rule, as expressly authorized by the Code. It is imperative to maintain clear distinctions between the legislative and judicial branches' roles. This ensures that legislative matters are handled within the legislative sphere, preserving democratic governance principles and preventing undue judicial influence. Factual Background Transition in Election Strategy: The Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP) held their 1st attempted election in person. However, they shifted their strategy, deciding to utilize a virtual platform via Zoom on the 2nd election attempt. This decision appears to be in direct contradiction to stipulations set forth in the Texas Election Code and the regulations of the 2 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. Texas Democratic Party (TDP) bylaws. 1. Disregard for Advisories: Despite receiving specific advisories that highlighted the importance and legal requirement of holding the election in person, the DCDP proceeded with their choice of a Zoom-based format. 2. Candidate Registration: Among all potential contenders for the position, only Kardel Coleman and Jrmar "JJ" Jefferson successfully completed their candidacy registration, ensuring their names would appear on the ballot for the Dallas County Democratic Chair election. 3. Unfair Exclusion of Contestant: A particular contestant found themselves unjustly and inexplicably barred from the election process. This act not only violated their inherent rights as a legitimate candidate but also raises questions about the transparency and fairness of the election process. 4. Commitment of Campaign Resources: Anticipating a transparent and equitable election process, this unfairly excluded contestant had already committed substantial resources towards their campaign. As a result, they faced various financial outlays and accrued campaign-related debts. 5. Breach of Neutrality by DCDP Staff: The DCDP's own guidelines dictate a stance of neutrality during the election process. However, certain members of the DCDP staff seemed to overtly support a specific candidate, directly contravening these neutrality guidelines. 6. Vendor Participation and Implications: The election process witnessed the involvement of specific vendors. Given that these vendors had clear financial stakes in the outcome, their active participation casts a shadow over the integrity, neutrality, and overall trustworthiness of the election process. By altering the format and ignoring established guidelines, the DCDP's actions have brought up concerns regarding the legitimacy, fairness, and impartiality of the Dallas County Democratic Chair election process. III. Legal Grounds In accordance with Tex. Elec. Code § 221.012, the tribunal's duty is to declare the 3 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. election's outcome if it can ascertain the true result and to declare the election void if it cannot. Nowhere in the legislative intent is the provision to dismiss a case based on unfounded claims related to election fraud, irregularities, or mistakes. The legislators intended for a comprehensive and impartial examination of such claims within the framework of the election contest. Examination of Legal Claims and Implications: Therefore, prematurely dismissing an election contest, particularly based on unfounded claims, would not only prejudice the contestant but also constitute a departure from legislative intent. Such an action would be ripe for judicial review due to the potential for judicial error. It is essential to acknowledge that an election contest is a unique legislative proceeding, distinct from civil or criminal cases. Judges do not possess the discretion to create new rules or procedures that contravene the Texas Election Code. Instead, they are entrusted with applying the law as written. Fundamental Legal Contention: In summary, the Texas Election Code does not provide for the dismissal of election contest cases in the manner prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for civil cases. It establishes a specific and comprehensive framework for the conduct and resolution of election contests, reflecting the legislative intent to ensure a full scope of inquiry into election matters while preserving the contestant's rights. A. Violation of Texas Election Code § 276.019: The DCDP's decision to modify the election. B. Election Rules, Regulations, and Adherence: C. Ambiguity and Non-compliance with Election Rules: 4 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. D. The DCDP and TDP appear to have faltered in creating a crystal-clear set of rules governing their election process. Section 163.004 of the Texas Election Code specifies that only the state convention or state executive committee has the power to draft and enact election-related rules. The clear directive seems to be aimed at centralizing rule-making authority, thereby ensuring consistent and unbiased election processes. The deviation by DCDP and TDP from this established protocol not only goes against the statute but also leaves room for potential biases and inconsistencies in the electoral process. Public Disclosure of Rules: E. Transparency is fundamental to the integrity of any election. Sec. 163.005 reinforces this by mandating public disclosure of all ratified election rules. Without this public display, voters and candidates alike are left in the dark about the criteria guiding the election. Non-disclosure, as reportedly done by the DCDP, can lead to skepticism about the fairness and integrity of the election process. Enforceability of Election Rules: F. The weight of the rule of law is cemented in Section 163.007. By equating election rules with other legislative statutes, it underscores their importance. A writ of mandamus, a court order directing a governmental body or official to undertake a specific act, serves as a remedy ensuring these rules are observed. II. Examination of Legal Claims and Implications: Character of Votes: G. Votes are the bedrock of a democratic election. Any vote that bypasses the established rules can distort the will of the electorate, thereby undermining the election's validity. The complainant's contention here underscores the significance of rule-abiding voting. 5 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. Claims of Attorney Representing Kardel Coleman: H. Chad Baurch's emphasis on his credentials, while potentially persuasive in some contexts, is not substantive evidence. The Trinsey v. Pagliaro case serves as a precedent highlighting those mere assertions, especially those based on hearsay, lack the rigor needed for legal admissibility. Extent of Examination: I. An exhaustive examination is the cornerstone of ensuring electoral integrity. Tex. Elec. Code § 221.003 mandates this comprehensive review, emphasizing that election contest tribunals must validate election results. Unauthorized votes or administrative lapses can skew results, making this in-depth examination paramount. Procedural Deficiencies in the Motion: J. Legal procedures have specific benchmarks for a reason – to ensure fairness and thoroughness. Kardel Coleman's motion's failure to adhere to Rule 91a.2's prerequisites jeopardizes its validity. III. Fundamental Legal Contentions: Violation of Texas Election Code § 276.019: K. The Election Code serves as a guiding framework. Any deviations, like the DCDP's reported alteration of election procedures, challenge the election's authenticity and trustworthiness. Duty to Uphold Transparent Elections: L. Every democratic body is bound by a duty to uphold transparent and unbiased elections. This duty, embedded in both the Texas Election Code and TDP bylaws, is non-negotiable. Any breaches erode public trust and can have lasting repercussions on the party's reputation and efficacy. 6 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. Breach of Internal Party Guidelines: M. Internal party guidelines serve to ensure that all members and officials maintain a consistent, fair stance. Endorsements from DCDP staff members directly contradict these guidelines and can introduce biases into what should be a neutral process. Infringement of First Amendment Rights: N. The First Amendment protects, among other things, an individual's right to freedom of association. By preventing the Contestant from participating in the electoral process, the DCDP might have inadvertently infringed upon these constitutional protections. Such actions could have broader implications, extending beyond party politics to constitutional law debates. OPPOSITION TO MOTION Detailed Examination of Kardel Coleman's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 91a. 7. Kardel Coleman's motion to dismiss contends that Jefferson's claims lack legal merit. Yet, the motion does not conform to Rule 91a.2's requirements. The act of dismissing a case shouldn't be undertaken lightly, especially when considering the stringent criteria that guide such a decision. The Contestee's motion to dismiss is fraught with procedural defects. 8. Alleged Breaches by the DCDP: There's an assertion that the Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP) has deviated from the established elections code. 9. According to the stipulations within "91a.2 Contents of Motion", for a motion to dismiss to hold water, it: Should unambiguously declare its foundation in Rule 91a.Needs to pinpoint each cause of action it intends to challenge. 10. Must methodically list out the reasons indicating the absence of a legal or factual basis for the cause of action, or both. 7 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. 11. Given this backdrop, Plaintiff Jrmar "JJ" Jefferson finds it necessary to formally oppose Defendant Kardel Coleman's Motion to Dismiss. This opposition, grounded in the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, is not mere contradiction but is supported by cogent arguments countering the motion's premises. 12. JRMAR “JJ” JEFFERSON, a candidate for the Dallas County Chair, has alleged causes of action related to the recent Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP) election. Specifically, he has alleged election fraud, irregularities, mistakes, and civil rights violations. These allegations imply potential non-compliance with the procedures set forth in the Texas Election Code and the guidelines of the Texas Democratic Party. CAUSE OF ACTON Your Honor, Contestee Kardel Coleman has made claims and Contestant objects to and denies each and every allegation made by Coleman in the response. Contestant specifically denies the truth, accuracy, and validity of the claims put forth by Coleman and demands strict proof thereof. Contestant reserves the right to assert affirmative defenses and counterclaims as deemed necessary upon further examination of the facts and legal issues in this matter. Contestant Jrmar 'JJ' Jefferson has raised valid causes of action in this election contest. According to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) & TCRP Rule 571. It states that “Pleadings of pro se parties should be liberally construed. Cause of Action 1: Election fraud encompassing allegations of illegal conduct, disinformation, and the counting of illegal votes Cause of Action 2: Use of Uncertified Voting Systems and Machines in Violation of TX Election Code § 122.001 and TX Administrative Code, Rule § 81.60 Cause of Action 3: Lack of Legislative Authorization for Online Elections, neither authorized by legislative action nor party bylaws. Cause of Action 4: Violations of Party Rules in Conducting the Dallas County Chairs Election 8 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. Cause of Action 5: Improper Switching of In-Person Elections to Unauthorized Online Elections with Made-Up Suggested Rules Cause of Action 6: Denial of Participation in the Electoral Process through Disqualification Cause of Action 7: Dissemination of False Information by Various Parties Cause of Action 8: Voter Deception, Falsifying Records, and Providing False Statements deprives eligible candidates and the public of their constitutional rights. Cause of Action 9: Violation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 through the use of uncertified voting machines Cause of Action 10: Use of Uncertified Voting Machines in Recording Votes, Lacking Certification of Accreditation I. Claim 1: "Threadbare" and "Conclusory" Claims: Coleman argues that Jefferson's claims in the case are lacking in substance and specificity, characterized as "threadbare" and "conclusory."Contestee contends that the claims are based on general legal conclusions and do not provide enough factual detail to support a legal remedy. Response 1: In response to this claim, Contestant vehemently disputes Coleman's characterization of the claims as "threadbare" and "conclusory." Contestant asserts that claims are well-founded in established legal principles. Key precedents such as Marbury v. Madison (1803), Smith v. Cherry (1973), and Piotrowski v. City of Houston (2001) underscore the fundamental importance of protecting political expression and participation as a constitutional right. Contestant argues that these claims are firmly rooted in recognized legal principles, challenging Coleman's assertion of lack of specificity and factual foundation. II. Claim 2: Citations to Legal Precedents: Coleman cites two legal cases, Legend Natural Gas III, LP and Montoya v. San Angelo Comm. Med. Ctr., to make the point that the court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions presented by Jefferson. Essentially, Coleman is arguing that Jefferson must provide specific and well-founded legal arguments based on applicable precedents. 9 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. III. Response 2: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's reliance on legal precedents to challenge Jefferson's claims. However, Contestant contends that the cited precedents do not apply directly to the constitutional principles underpinning Jefferson's claims. While the court may not be obligated to accept legal conclusions, Contestant emphasizes that Jefferson's claims are not mere conclusions but are firmly grounded in constitutional principles, as established by Marbury v. Madison (1803), Smith v. Cherry (1973), and Piotrowski v. City of Houston (2001). These cases reinforce the fundamental importance of political expression and participation as constitutionally protected rights. IV. Claim 3: Election Code Does Not Apply to Internal Party Elections: Coleman argues that the election code should not be applied to internal elections conducted by political parties. He asserts that political parties have the authority to establish their own rules for internal elections, which may differ from the general election code. Response 3: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's argument regarding the application of the election code to internal party elections. However, Contestant contends that relevant statutes, including Tex. Elec. Code § 1.0015 and Tex. Elec. Code § 122.001(a)(1), set the standard for electoral processes, including party elections. Contestant asserts that when party rules conflict with state law, the law should prevail to uphold the integrity of the electoral process, as per Tex. Elec. Code § 163.003. While political parties have autonomy, they must still adhere to fundamental election laws. V. Claim 4: Reference to Rule 91a for Dismissal: Coleman references Rule 91a, which allows for the dismissal of claims that lack a basis in law or fact. He suggests that Jefferson's claims should be dismissed under this rule because they do not have a valid legal or factual foundation. Response 4: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's reference to Rule 91a. and However, Contestant maintains that Jefferson's challenge to the constitutionality of the "Zoom Voting System" is firmly rooted in Texas Election Code provisions, including Tex. Elec. Code § 1.0015 and Tex. Elec. Code § 122.001(a)(1), which require the maintenance of the secrecy of the ballot. Constitutional principles, particularly the right to a secret ballot, 10 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. further support this argument. Contestant believes that a thorough examination of this claim is warranted before considering dismissal. VI. Claim 5: Rules Cited by Jefferson Do Not Apply to Party Chair Election: Coleman argues that the rules mentioned by Jefferson in the case do not apply to the election for party chair. He asserts that there may be specific rules or regulations governing this type of election that should be considered instead. VII. Response 5: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's assertion regarding the relevance of the mentioned rules. However, Contestant contends that allegations of favoritism, partiality, and compromised electoral integrity within DCDP headquarters are of paramount importance. Tex. Elec. Code Section 1.0015 mandates fair and impartial election administration, as emphasized in Smith v. Cherry (1973). These allegations should be thoroughly investigated to ensure that the election process adheres to the highest standards of fairness, regardless of specific rule interpretations. VIII. Claim 6: Use of Voting Machines: Coleman maintains that the political party is not obligated to use voting machines, and that the relevant statutes only require the use of certified machines if they are used at all. This challenges Jefferson's claims related to the use of voting machines in the election process. Response 6: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's argument regarding the optional use of voting machines. However, Contestant contends that allegations of election fraud encompassing illegal conduct and the counting of illegal votes are of grave concern. Tex. Elec. Code § 276.013 outlines offenses related to election fraud, including the provision of false information to election officials and voters. Contestant's reliance on legal precedents, such as Logan v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass'n and Young v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist, supports the legitimacy of these concerns. Election integrity is a cornerstone of democratic processes and should be vigorously safeguarded. IX. Claim 7: Texas Democratic Party Rules on Secret Ballots: Coleman references the Texas Democratic Party rules, which forbid secret ballots in connection with the election of a local party chair. This is presented to counter Jefferson's arguments regarding the use of secret ballots. 11 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. X. Response 7: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's reference to Texas Democratic Party rules. However, Contestant argues that the claim regarding the lack of legislative authorization for online elections and violation of party rules is grounded in Tex. Elec. Code § 163.003, which mandates that party rules align with state law. Contestant's reliance on Texas Democratic Party (TDP) and Dallas County Democratic Party (DCDP) bylaws that prohibit electronic voting underscores the case for a violation of party rules. This matter demands a thorough examination of the legality of online elections and adherence to party rules. XI. Claim 8: Violation of Internal Party Rules: Coleman argues that Jefferson fails to allege any violation of internal party rules, which he contends are the rules governing the election. This suggests that any violations should be based on the party's internal rules rather than external statutes. Response 8: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's concern regarding the alleged violation of internal party rules. However, Contestant asserts that claims of deprivation of constitutional rights, including the First Amendment rights to political expression and participation, are of utmost importance. Marbury v. Madison (1803), Smith v. Cherry (1973), and Piotrowski v. City of Houston (2001) establish the foundational importance of protecting these rights. Deprivation of these rights due to unjust actions by Deana Tollerton requires a comprehensive assessment to ensure the preservation of constitutional liberties. XII. Claim 9: Alleged Violation of Statutes Governing Elections for Political Office: Coleman argues that Jefferson's claims only relate to statutes governing elections for political office, not to the actual rules governing the specific election in question. He suggests that Jefferson's claims are not relevant to the case at hand. Response 9: Contestant acknowledges Coleman's argument regarding the relevance of statutes. However, Contestant asserts that Contestant's constitutional rights, particularly the First Amendment rights and the right to equal protection under the law (U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1), are founded on constitutional principles and case law. Contestant's reference to Young v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist (2017) reinforces the importance of 12 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. equal protection in electoral processes. Any actions that infringe upon these rights should be thoroughly examined to ensure compliance with constitutional standards. XIII. Zoom Election System Allegation: The Contestant alleges that the voting machine systems were not compliant with the safety, efficiency, accuracy, or standards set by the Election Assistance Commission. Contestee Argument: Contestees argue that this cause of action has no basis in fact. Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Nonetheless, the Contestant asserts that this failure to respond does not diminish the alleged violation of voting system standards. The Contestant will present evidence during the proceedings to establish the factual basis for all claim. XIV. Violation of TX Administrative Code, Rule § 81.60 VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES: Allegation: It is alleged that the Secretary of State did not receive a copy of all qualified software/firmware and source codes for the voting system 45 days prior to examination. Contestee Argument: Contestees argue lack of factual basis. Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Nevertheless, the Contestant maintains that there is a factual basis for this claim and will present evidence and arguments during the proceedings to substantiate it. XV. Condition for Approval of Electronic Voting Systems under TX Administrative Code, Rule § 81.61: Allegation: Allegations suggest the electronic voting systems used did not align with the certification and performance standards required. Contestee Argument: Contestees claim of no factual basis is premature since evidence will be presented during the proceedings. Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. However, the Contestant will address the issue of factual basis during the proceedings by presenting evidence and legal arguments to support Contestant cause of action. 13 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. XVI. Violation of Constitutional Rights: Allegation: Alleged infringements of First Amendment rights related to political expression and participation, citing landmark cases such as Marbury v. Madison, Smith v. Cherry, and Piotrowski v. City of Houston. Contestee Argument: Contestees argue legal insufficiency. Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Nevertheless, the Contestant asserts that their right to association was infringed upon and will present arguments and evidence to substantiate Contestant claim during the proceedings. XVII. Denial of Services: Allegation: Claims that the DCDP did not abide by the Texas Election Code, leading to an unfair election. Contestee Argument: Contestees argue legal insufficiency. Response: Contestees failed to respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. However, the Contestant will address this issue during the proceedings by presenting evidence and legal arguments to demonstrate the merit of their claim. Contestant will continue with the remaining causes of action in subsequent responses. XVIII. Misrepresentation of Information and Election Fraud: Allegation: Accusations that Deana Tollerton disseminated misleading information distinguishing between a DCDP meeting and a DCDP election. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the allegations made by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to substantiate Contestant claim of misrepresentation and election fraud. XIX. Failure to Comply with Election Laws: Allegation: Allegations that Deana Tollerton neglected her obligations and undertook actions beyond her authority. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not 14 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not negate the alleged violation of election laws. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to demonstrate that Deana Tollerton acted beyond her authority, which necessitates a thorough examination. XX. Failure to Fulfill Ministerial Duties: Allegation: Allegations that Deana Tollerton, despite multiple formal notices, did not conduct her mandated duties, hindering a fair and democratic election. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the allegations made by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to substantiate Contestant claim of failure to fulfill ministerial duties. XXI. Favoritism and Breach of Impartiality: Allegation: Claims that Mary Leyendecker and DCDP staff exhibited biases during the election process. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not negate the alleged favoritism and breach of impartiality. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to demonstrate that bias existed in the election process. XXII. Voting Machine Malfunctions, Denial of Voting Opportunities, and Compromised Accessibility: Allegation: Allegations of widespread malfunctioning of voting machines leading to voting denials and other issues. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the significance of the alleged 15 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. voting machine malfunctions and accessibility issues. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to substantiate these claims. XXIII. Challenge to the Constitutionality of the "Zoom Voting System": Allegation: Concerns over the confidentiality of ballots within the Zoom voting system. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the importance of the constitutional challenge raised by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to support Contestant claim regarding the constitutionality of the Zoom voting system. XXIV. Violation of the Texas Constitution: Allegation: Arguments suggesting that the integration of the electronic Zoom voting machine system with secret ballots compromises the sanctity of the ballot box. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not negate the alleged violation of the Texas Constitution. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to support Contestant claim that the use of secret ballots compromised the sanctity of the ballot box. XXV. Request to Void Election: Allegation: Based on the referenced Alvarez v. Espinoza and Rogers v. Holder cases, this cause of action alleges the election should be nullified due to the neglect of election laws and potential fraud. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the request to void the election. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to support his claim that election laws were neglected, and potential fraud 16 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. occurred. XXVI. CAUSE OF ACTION ASSERTING AN ELECTION CONTEST: Allegation: This particular cause of action is centered around the belief that the true outcome of the contested election is indeterminable due to the non-certification of voting systems and the existence of fraudulent activities and voting irregularities. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the need for an election contest. The Contestant will argue that an election contest is necessary to address the alleged violations of election laws and allegations of Election fraud. Contestant will emphasize that these issues cast doubt on the true outcome of the contested election and require thorough examination. XXVII. Abuse of Position: Allegation: Accusations against various individuals for allegedly leveraging their positions to sway election results. Contestee Argument (Failed to Respond as Required by Rule 91a.2): Contestee did not respond to this cause of action as required by Rule 91a.2. Response: Contestees' failure to respond does not diminish the seriousness of the allegations made by the Contestant. The Contestant will present arguments and evidence during the proceedings to substantiate Contestant claim of abuse of position. In summary, Contestant's claims are well-founded in constitutional principles, statutory provisions, and relevant case law. These claims demand a thorough examination to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process and protect the fundamental rights of all participants. XXVIII. Conclusion and Contention The Contestant, JRMAR “JJ” JEFFERSON, Contestant firmly upholds the original law and the presumption of constitutionality enshrined in both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions, should not be compromised by legislative or judicial actions that may infringe 17 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. upon fundamental rights. Contestant alleges serious transgressions in the electoral process. Contestant contends that fraudulent actions have been taken and rules for electronic elections were manufactured by staff without democratic approval by the CEC. In light of these allegations, the contestant argues that the elections should be annulled, Contestee Kardel Coleman, the opposing candidate, should be disqualified due to alleged violation of Texas Election code, TDP & DCDP party bylaws, election interreference & election fraud. Furthermore, it is emphasized that political parties must adhere to the ELECTION CODE and its legislative intent, referencing the Texas Electric Code Section 1.003, which mandates a strict interpretation by officials. Due to Kardel Coleman's alleged failure to comply with the conditions set forth in Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.2 and the significant allegations raised by Jefferson about the Dallas County Democratic Party's (DCDP) conduct of the election; it is asserted that Coleman's motion to dismiss should be denied as a matter of law and equity. In summary, the Texas Election Code does not provide for the dismissal of election contest cases in the manner prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for civil cases. It establishes a specific and comprehensive framework for the conduct and resolution of election contests, reflecting the legislative intent to ensure a full scope of inquiry into election matters while preserving the contestant's rights. In contestant Jefferson's case, the issue arises from the transfer of certain legislative functions to the judicial branch, specifically related to a judge's role as the finder of fact regarding legislative intent in special legislative proceedings. Key points defining the separation of powers issue include: 18 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. • Special Legislative Proceedings: Typically, under the legislative branch's domain, these proceedings involve bill drafting, committee hearings, investigations, and debates. • Judicial Involvement: The involvement of the judiciary in these proceedings raises concerns about the separation of powers when judges are tasked with interpreting legislative intent. • Conflict of Interest: The presence of a judge with potential bias and opposing counsel representing the judge's interests compromises the judicial process's impartiality. • Lack of Legislative Participation: Involvement in special legislative proceedings within the judicial branch can raise constitutional concerns. To address this separation of powers issue, it is imperative to maintain clear distinctions between the legislative and judicial branches' roles. This ensures that legislative matters are handled within the legislative sphere, preserving democratic governance principles and preventing undue judicial influence. In summary, the Texas Election Code does not provide for the dismissal of election contest cases in the manner prescribed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for civil cases. It establishes a specific and comprehensive framework for the conduct and resolution of election contests, reflecting the legislative intent to ensure a full scope of inquiry into election matters while preserving the contestant's rights. Furthermore, the separation of powers issue in this case stems from the transfer of legislative functions to the judicial branch, potential bias or conflicts of interest, and the need to uphold the integrity of each branch's functions within the framework of democratic governance. The contestant contends that a jury trial is necessary to ensure a fair and impartial resolution of this matter, given the complexity of the constitutional questions and legislative intent interpretation involved. Jurisdiction has been established per Tex. Elec. Code § 221.002, and the 19 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. contestant has raised various claims regarding election irregularities, which must be examined to uphold the integrity of the electoral process and constitutional rights. This comprehensive approach ensures that the contestant's rights are protected and that the court can fulfill its duty to maintain the integrity of elections in accordance with the law. Legal Provisions for Election Procedures • Jefferson's Assertion: Election processes for party roles were highlighted, referencing the Texas Election Code. • Texas Electric Code Sections: Detailed explanations of the Texas Electric Code Section 1.003 ("Code Construction"), Section 1.0015 ("Legislative Intent"), and other related sections are provided to substantiate the claims. • Local Government Code Section 22.005: Mention of the formal oath required by elected or appointed municipal officers before commencing official duties. • Texas Democratic Party's 2022-2024 Platform & Guiding Principles: Outlined are the fundamental principles and platform of the Texas Democratic Party, emphasizing representation, equality, and fairness. Personal Experience and Grievances My name is Jrmar “JJ” Jefferson, I am a heterosexual Indigenous Negro American and believer in YHWH the creator, I ran for County Chair of the Democratic Party, and I feels I was treated indifferently in the elections process. I was denied the right to speak as a candidate, the right to vote as a precent chair and I personally saw Violation of Texas Election Code. Internal Party Rules and Regulatory Compliance guidelines and rules for SDEC 20 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. meetings as set by the Texas Democratic Party are highlighted. It's emphasized that no provisions exist for elections to be held electronically or via platforms such as Zoom. XXIX. Prayer to Deny Motion to Dismiss under Rule 91a The Contestant firmly contend that the Contestee has failed to adhere to the procedural requirements outlined in Rule 91a(b) of the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. Their attempt to invoke Rule 91a to dismiss my cause of action appears to lack substantial merit, as they have not effectively demonstrated that my claims lack a legal or factual basis, a fundamental prerequisite mandated by the rule. In contrast, I have credible evidence and supporting documentation, such as affidavits, statutes, emails, witness statements, and forthcoming video evidence, to substantiate my claims. The Contestee's failure to meet Rule 91a's specific requirements and the potential repercussions of non-compliance with the rule, as evidenced by cases like Iles v. Walker and Thompson v. Willis, further weaken their motion to dismiss. My case, prepared meticulously, is poised to challenge the Contestee's motion during the upcoming hearing, supported by relevant case law, thus strengthening my position. Contestee respectfully requests the Court to reject the Contestee's Motion to Dismiss in accordance with Rule 91a. The basis for this request lies in the factual and legal reasons presented, indicating a genuine dispute concerning material facts. The claims of the Contestant are rooted in both law and reality. Relief Requested In response to the grievances mentioned: 1. Denial of Mr. Kardel Coleman's motion to dismiss. 2. A tribunal-led determination reflecting the accurate outcome of the election, as per 21 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. Tex. Elec. Code § 221.012. 3. In the event the true result remains undetermined, the Contestant calls for the election to be declared null and void due to the alleged procedural discrepancies and breaches. 4. The Contestant further appeals for any additional suitable and fair relief to which they might be entitled. Respectfully submitted on this 26 th day of OCTOBER 2023. _________________________ Jrmar ‘JJ’ Jefferson 3700 Reese Dr. Dallas, TX 75210 903-650-0069 jrmarjefferson@gmail.com PRO SE PLAINTIFF 22 AMENDED OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. DECLARATION OF JRMAR JEFFERSON I, Jrmar Jefferson, residing at 3700 Reese Drive, Dallas, Texas 75210, hereby make the following declaration: I confirm the accuracy of the factual allegations presented in the preceding document titled " OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 91A. " To the best of my knowledge and recollection, the information contained therein is true and correct. I solemnly affirm that the aforementioned statement is true and correct, and I acknowledge that it would serve as my testimony if I were under oath in a court of law, subject to the penalty of perjury. Date: OCTOBR 26, 2023 ____________________________________ Jrmar “JJ” Jefferson CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I served the foregoing " OBECTION AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS UN