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  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
  • In re the Matter of G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County Human Services Department Appeal from Administrative Agency document preview
						
                                

Preview

62-CV-22-110 Filed in District Court State of Minnesota 7/24/2023 11:13 AM STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF RAMSEY SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT Judge: Sara R. Grewing In re the Matter of Court File No. 62-CV-22-110 G. A. and the Commissioner of Ramsey County ORDER ON APPEAL Human Services Department. The above-titled matter came before the undersigned on April 26, 2023, Appellant’s appeal from a Human Services Judge (“HSJ”) affirming an agency decision under Minn. Stat. §§ 14..69 and 256.045, subd. 7. Attorney Aaron Roy appeared on behalf of Appellant G.A., and Assistant County Attorney So Yeon Woo-Bockman appeared on behalf of respondent Ramsey County Human Services Department. All appearances were made remotely via Zoom. Based on all the files, pleadings, records, and proceedings, as well as on the arguments and submissions of the parties, it is hereby ordered: ORDER 1. The final determination of the Minnesota Department of Human Services is affirmed. 2. The attached memorandum is incorporated herein, by reference. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. BY THE COURT Dated: July 24, 2023 ____________________________ The Honorable Sara R. Grewing Judge of District Court 1 MEMORANDUM FACTUAL BACKGROUND G.A., the only appellant in this matter, is the eldest of four minor children to K.A. (“mother”) and D.A. (“father”), in order from eldest to youngest, his siblings are C.A., L.A., and A.A.; the children are homeschooled. G.A. was born in June, 2008, A.A. was born in May, 2015. On January 2, 2021, the Ramsey County Social Services Department (“County”) received a report that Appellant sexually abused A.A. on multiple occasions. (Ex. 1 at RC000012.) Pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 260E.17, 260E.20 subd. 1(b), the County and the Ramsey County Sherriff’s Office initiated a joint investigation into the report. In the course of this investigation, they interviewed the parents, Appellant, and the other children in the family; A.A. was interviewed by the Minnesota Children’s Resource Center (“MCRC”). Across multiple interviews, the father, mother, A.A., and Appellant disclosed information which indicated that Appellant had initiated contacts with A.A. that included oral to genital, genital to genital, genital to anal, and digital to genital contact across multiple occasions, that he had “urges” which began around age ten, and that he had offered A.A. presents and caramels to lie or otherwise hide what had happened. (Exs. 1, 2, 9, 12.) In his interview, the father recounted how on January 1, 2021, he found Appellant in the “boys’ room” upstairs, standing a few feet from A.A., who was standing on a child’s chair with her pants and underwear down. (Id.) He expressed shock and alarm at what he saw, and immediately separated the children; he told A.A. that her mom and her dad loved her and wanted to make sure she was safe as well as comfortable to tell them if anything happens to her. (Id.) A.A. then disclosed to her father that Appellant had been touching her, and that “he had done something” with her “middle part.” (Id.) The father promptly shared this information with the mother, who spoke with a “defensive” Appellant that same day. (Id.) On January 2, 2021, the County discussed a safety plan with the mother, who contacted MCRC the following Monday, January 4, 2021, to schedule an interview for A.A. (Id. at RC000031.) MCRC is a Children’s Minnesota clinic which evaluates children for potential cases of abuse in a medical and forensic setting. On January 5, the mother brought A.A. to MCRC for an interview. Prior to interviewing A.A. Registered Nurses Sara Wirkkala and Kimberly Berg spoke with the mother to obtain an initial history, 2 which was consistent with the father’s account of events. (Ex. 9 at RC000078.) The mother added that A.A. told her that Appellant had “made her suck his middle part” in the “school room,” and that he would “complain” if she did not. (Id. at RC00079.) Throughout discussions of the reports, both parents were tearful and distressed about what had occurred, and G.A. was sent to his grandparent’s home as a safety measure. (Ex. 2 at RC000030, RC000041.) Following intake, MCRC interviewed a five-year old A.A. separately in a different room. (Ex. 9 at RC000080.) After a discussion of her hobbies, recent holidays, and life at home, the Nurses established a set of rules for the interview, stressing that A.A. should not guess or make up an answer, and that it was important that they would only “talk about things that are true and that really happened.” (Id. at RC000080, 81.) A.A. was then shown a diagram of a girl and asked to identify the various body parts, she identified the vagina and bottom, which she discerned as “private parts.” (Id. at RC000081, 82, 90.) The Nurse then introduced the subject of good touches versus bad touches, noting that “bad touches” are those which children “don’t like that make them feel sad or hurt them,” or make them feel uncomfortable. (Id. at RC000081.) When asked if she had ever received any type of touch she didn’t like, A.A. noted that she had on her bottom, and referenced being spanked by her parents. (Id. at RC000081, 82.) When asked if she had received any other types of touches on her bottom she didn’t like, she identified that “[Appellant] does inappropriate stuff … and I don’t like it.” (Id. at RC000082.) When asked to describe what Appellant did, A.A. disclosed a history of contacts between her and Appellant, including:  Appellant made her suck on his “front part” which she identified as what boys normally use for “going to pee.” (Id.) She noted that when this happened “pee-pee comes out” clarifying that she doesn’t know what it was, but that it tasted “salty” and “sour.” (Id. at RC000083.)  Appellant had been trying to put his “middle part in [her] middle part” on the day they were found, that this hurt, and that Appellant would “make” her do these things. (Id. at RC000082-83.)  Appellant would offer her presents and candy to lie about what had happened. (Id. at RC000084.)  Appellant had once tried to put his penis in her “bottom,” which was “not comfortable” and “hurt.” (Id.) 3  Appellant touched her vagina with his hands and “sucked it.” (Id. at RC000085.) After the interview, Registered Nurse Kimberly Berg conducted a physical examination of A.A., which did not find signs of physical trauma, bruising, tearing, or scarring to her private areas. (Id. at RC000088.) MCRC concluded based on its review of this interview and examination that A.A.’s statements were “diagnostic of child sexual abuse,” and referred her to mental health specialists. (Id.) On January 8, 2021, the County and the Sherriff’s office interviewed then-twelve-year-old Appellant at his family home. In this interview, Appellant concurred with much of what A.A. had disclosed to MCRC but denied that she had used her mouth. (Ex. 12.) He identified that his behavior was “very wrong,” that he “wanted to, and to know what it was like.” (Id.) Appellant identified that he had “urges” which began when he was around ten years old, and that he searched “sex” on YouTube when he was eleven. (Id.) In their own interviews, C.A. and L.A. denied witnessing any sexual behavior or touches between Appellant and A.A. On February 9, 2021, based on its investigation, the County determined that there was a preponderance of evidence that Appellant had maltreated A.A. by sexual abuse, and issued a notice accordingly. (Ex. 3.) Appellant was charged as a juvenile with Gross Misdemeanor Fifth-Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct. (Ex. 13, at RC 000111.) Appellant contested this determination via administrative appeal, which was suspended while the related delinquency case was active. In the summer of 2021, Appellant pleaded guilty and was adjudicated delinquent to an amended charge of Indecent Exposure under Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 2(1), a gross misdemeanor. (Id. at RC000107, RC000117). Following this, the administrative appeal resumed, with HSJ Nicole Kralik presiding; Appellant waived his right to an evidentiary hearing and requested that the matter be reviewed by briefings and exhibits only. HSJ Kralik affirmed the agency’s determination after a review of the record and the written arguments submitted by the parties. HSJ Kralik specially concluded that “Appellants acts were committed with sexual or aggressive intent,” recounting a significant portion of the record in support of this finding. 4 Here, Appellant seeks judicial review of DHS’s final decision pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 14.69 and 256.045, subd. 7. Appellant specifically challenges that the contacts were purely exploratory in nature, that the evidence did not support an inference of sexual intent, and therefore that HSJ Kralik’s order was arbitrary and capricious in addition to being affected by legal error. Respondent asks the Court to uphold DHS’s decision, and the County’s maltreatment determination, in accordance with the deferential standard Respondent argues it should be entitled to. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1. Standard of Review for Appeal. Minnesota Statute § 14.69 governs the proper scope and standard of review for the District Court of an agency’s findings and decision. Zahler v. Minnesota Dep't of Hum. Servs., 624 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Estate of Atkinson v. Minnesota Dep't. of Human Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Minn.1997); Johnson v. Minnesota Dep't. of Human Servs., 565 N.W.2d 453, 457 (Minn.App.1997); and cf. Brunner v. State, Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 285 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Minn.1979)). Under section 14.69, an agency decision is subject to reversal where the decision is: (a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or (b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (c) made upon unlawful procedure; or (d) affected by other error of law; or (e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (f) arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat. § 14.69. “Agency decisions enjoy a ‘presumption of correctness’ and warrant deference by courts.” Kind Heart Daycare, Inc. v. Comm'r of Hum. Servs., 905 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2017) (quoting Rsrv. Min. Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn. 1977)); See also In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota, 624 N.W.2d 264, 278 (Minn. 2001). On review, the factual findings of an agency “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and shall not be reversed if the evidence reasonably sustains them.” Bd. Ord., Kells (BWSR) v. City of Rochester, 597 N.W.2d 332, 336 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing White v. Metropolitan Med. Ctr., 332 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Minn.1983)). The Court’s proper role on review is “not to weigh the evidence, but to review the record to determine whether 5 there was legal evidence to support the [agency’s quasi-judicial] decision.” Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1978). “Where there is room for two opinions on the matter, such action is not ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached.” Brown v. Wells, 288 Minn. 468, 472, 181 N.W.2d 708, 711 (1970) (citations omitted). 2. Whether the Agency’s Decision was Arbitrary and Capricious. The key issue on this appeal is whether the Judge’s decision was supported by the evidentiary record. The burden rests with Appellant to demonstrate that the agency’s determination was unsupported by the record, and therefore arbitrary and capricious. Minnesota Chapter 260E provides what constitutes maltreatment of minors in this State; criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, under Minn. Stat. § 609.343 is included in this provision as maltreatment by sexual abuse. Minn. Stat. § 260E.03 subds. 12, 20. Under Minn. Stat. § 609.343, “[a] person who engages in sexual contact with anyone under 18 years of age is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree” in any of the following circumstances:  The complainant is under 14 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant. Subd. 1(a)(e).  The complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact and the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant. Subd. 1(a)(g).  The actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact, and the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time. Subd. 1(a)(h)(iii). In each instance, neither consent nor mistake as to the complainant’s age are available as a defense. Minn. Stat. § 609.343 subd. 1(a). For second-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC”), “sexual conduct” includes intentional touching with “sexual or aggressive intent” by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts, or the touching by the complainant of the actor’s intimate parts; in either case, this includes the touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the intimate parts. Minn. Stat. § 609.341 Subd. 11(b)(i), (b)(ii), (b)(iv). The ages of the parties, their significant relationship, and the conduct itself are not in dispute; the only remaining question is whether Appellant’s acted with “sexual or aggressive intent.” “Sexual intent” is not defined in the statute, and so it is construed in accordance with its “common and approved usage.” See State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); Minn. Stat. § 6 645.08(1). An act is committed with sexual intent where “the actor perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual gratification.” Id. Sexual intent is subjective, and “typically must be inferred from the nature of the conduct itself.” Id. Intent may be inferred by the factfinder from the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 321 (Minn. 2009). A party’s statements as to intent are not binding on a factfinder if the acts themselves demonstrated contrary intent. State v. Raymond, 440 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Minn. 1989). Here, the agency’s final decision was the product of a review of a substantial record, and on review of that decision, this Court is not tasked with re-weighing the evidence or making its own credibility determinations. In her order, HSJ Kralik referenced Appellant’s admissions of digital to genital and genital to genital contact, found that he understood his actions to be “very wrong” and his attempts at concealing events from his parents. (Agency Decision, pp. 4, 8.) She also noted his admissions of seeking out sexual materials on YouTube, and his explanation that he felt “urges” starting around the time he was ten years old. (Id.) She further found that A. A. “described multiple acts of oral to genital, genital to genital, genital to anal, and digital to genital contact over at least the course of at least one year.” (Id.) HSJ Kralik noted an absence of evidence in the record which would support a finding that Appellant’s actions were committed with anything other than sexual intent. (Id.) Appellant, in turn, offers the explanation that his conduct was merely “exploratory” rather than committed with sexual intent. As noted by HSJ Kralik, the record contains a volume of information surrounding the contacts between Appellant and A.A., including “multiple acts of oral to genital, genital to genital, genital to anal, and digital to genital contact” throughout at least one year. (Agency Decision, p. 8.) Further, she expressly identified that “[t]he multiple serious acts committed over an extended period of time, culminating in erection and ejaculation spurred on by urges” was indicative of sexual intent. (Id., internal quotation marks removed.) This finding is consistent with Minnesota case law, in which “repeated attempts to accomplish sexual contact” can establish sexually aggressive intent. In re Welfare of T.J.C., 670 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); see also State v. Ohrtman, 466 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that an erect penis is an unambiguous indicator of sexual intent). Even if Appellant’s argued exploratory intent was entirely distinguishable from sexual intent and could act to preclude a finding of 7 sexual intent, the record before HSJ Kralik was certainly capable of supporting the finding of sexual intent. The Court finds that the extensive factual record in this matter was sufficient to reasonably sustain an inference of sexual intent. Appellant has also challenged the decision by arguing that it was affected by an error of law. However, the prior order reflects a full consideration of the record, the circumstantial evidence, and the determination of each of the relevant issues. The Court therefore finds that the agency’s decision was made without legal error. Here, the agency’s determination of sexual intent is reasonably sustained by the evidentiary record. Accordingly, under the applicable deferential standard of review, the agency’s final decision was not arbitrary nor capricious, and is hereby affirmed. 8