Preview
FILED
DALLAS COUNTY
10/14/2015 11:17:05 AM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
CAUSE NO. DC-15-07174
JOHN DOE I, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
NEXT FRIEND TO JOHN DOE II, A MINOR §
Plaintiffs §
§
VS. §
§
THE ANDERSON PRIVATE SCHOOL, §
WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY, § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
LEVONNA C. ANDERSON, §
INDIVIDUALLY, ALEXANDER A. §
ANDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY, RIPLEY §
ENTERTAINMENT, INC., and JIM §
PATTISON U.S.A., INC. § 44TH-B JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES,
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AND SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
TO DEFENDANTS WILLIAM C. AND LEVONNA C. ANDERSON
To: Plaintiffs John Doe I and John Doe II by and through their counsel John D. Sloan, Jr.
and Douglas W. Lukasik, SLOAN MATNEY, LLP, 3838 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 1200,
Dallas, Texas 75219, jsloan@sloanmatney.com, dlukasik@sloanmatney.com, (f) 214-
237-5474.
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 196, 197 and 198, Defendant LeVonna C.
Anderson provides this, her objections and responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories,
First Requests for Admissions, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and
LeVonna C. Anderson.
Respectfully Submitted,
By /s/ Robert Hammer_______
Robert W. Hammer
State Bar No.: 08854780
William H. Kincaid
State Bar No.: 11431500
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 1 of 22
ROBERT W. HAMMER
300 Legacy Downs Drive
Fort Worth, Texas 76126
Telephone 817/ 332-8266
Telefax 817/ 332-8708
robert@rhammerlaw.com
AND
WILLIAM H. KINCAID
Box 457
Sanger, Texas 76266
Telephone 940/ 372-3598
whk4888@yahoo.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DFENDANTS
THE ANDERSON PRIVATE SCHOOL,
WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, LeVONNA C.
ANDERSON, and ALEXANDER A.
ANDERSON
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 2 of 22
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the above was served on each attorney of record
or party in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 14th day of October,
2015, as follows:
John D. Sloan, Jr.
Douglas W. Lukasik
SLOAN MATNEY, LLP
3838 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 1200
Dallas, Texas 75219
jsloan@sloanmatney.com
dlukasik@sloanmatney.com
(f) 214-237-5474
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
S. Todd Parks
WALTERS, BALIDO & CRAIN, L.L.P.
10440 North Central Expressway
Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500
Dallas, Texas 75231
todd.parks@wbclawfirm.com
parksedocsnotifications@wbclawfirm.com
(f) 214-760-1670
By /s/ Robert Hammer_______
Robert W. Hammer
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 3 of 22
LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST
SET OF INTERROGATORIES, FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, AND SECOND
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
TO DEFENDANTS WILLIAM C. and LEVONNA C. ANDERSON
I. DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO ALL
DISCOVERY REQUESTS
1. Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson (Defendant) generally objects to Plaintiffs’ use
of the term “Victim” with reference to Plaintiff John Doe II because it assumes facts not in
evidence, states a legal and factual conclusion, and is a status refuted by a report filed by the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. Specifically, the use of such term in
discovery materials would introduce bias if used or offered in court for any reason such as for
impeachment or otherwise. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections,
Defendant’s responses below are premised and based on the assertion and assumption that any
reference to the term “Victim” is strictly a reference to John Doe II only; and, Defendant’s
responses do not in any way confer on or admit to any legal or factual status of John Doe I as a
“victim” as that term is commonly used or as specifically alleged in this Lawsuit; Defendant’s
responses below do not admit, approve, or in any way validate any of Plaintiffs’ allegations; and
do not in any way impute, admit, or imply any wrongdoing by the responding party or any other
Defendants in this case.
2. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “Petition” as
stated in definition number 13 as overbroad, vague, ambiguous, and potentially misleading.
Specifically, Defendant objects to the expansion of the definition of the term Petition to include
multiple documents that could include subsequent filings that could allege different or new facts,
allegations, or causes of action resulting in the potential to misconstrue Defendant’s responses
herein. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant’s responses below
are based on the Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, Plaintiffs’ live pleading at the time these responses
were submitted. Defendant will amend and supplement his responses as required by the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “Personal e-mail
account” as stated in definition number 16 as overbroad in that it assumes facts not in evidence
and requires Defendant to exercise control over accounts that she does not have ownership or
authorization to exercise. Specifically, Defendant is an individual who has no employees.
Further, even if Defendant had employees, she is and would not be in a position to control,
reveal, or determine the existence of personal e-mail accounts used by any alleged employees.
Such discovery is properly conducted as third-party discovery targeted to those non-parties as
described in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 205. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing
objections, Defendant’s responses below are based on the application of a definition of “Personal
e-mail account” that is limited to only those e-mail accounts that are “personal” to the
responding party.
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 4 of 22
4. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the word “occurrence” as
stated in definition number 17 because Plaintiffs’ definition is vague and includes and requires a
legal conclusion. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ definition requires the responding party to reach the
legal conclusion of causation in order to apply the definition as presented. Subject to and
without waiving the foregoing objection, Defendant’s responses below assume that the definition
of “occurrence” is limited to as Plaintiff defines “the events made basis of this suit, which
occurred on October 31, 2014, at Ripley’s Believe it Or Not, in Grand Prairie, Texas” without
attempting to or drawing any legal conclusions as to the validity of those claims or any alleged
causation thereof.
5. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the terms “day of
occurrence” and “date of occurrence” that are also found in Definition number 17. The
referenced terms refer to specific points in time and not events, accordingly, Defendant objects to
the application of Plaintiffs’ definition to these terms as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and
without waiving the foregoing objection, Defendant’s responses below assume that the definition
of “day of occurrence” and “date of occurrence” mean October 31, 2014.
6. Defendant generally objects to the Relevant Time Period specified by Plaintiffs as
overbroad and not narrowly tailored to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs’ allege a single incident
of abuse alleged to have occurred on October 31, 2014. Despite asserting a single alleged
incident on a specific date in late 2014, Plaintiffs seek discovery dated back to January 1, 2009.
See In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing
that discovery orders requiring document production from an unreasonably long time period or
from distant and unrelated locales are impermissibly overbroad); In re Xeller, 6 S.W.3d 618, 626
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (“A central consideration in
determining overbreadth is whether the request could have been more narrowly tailored to avoid
including tenuous information and still obtain the necessary, pertinent information. Id. Discovery
requests must be limited by time, place, and subject matter.”). Additionally, Defendant objects
in that the bulk of the time period specified by Plaintiffs is outside the scope of discovery. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003). Specifically,
discovery for the expansive period requested is not temporally related to the proof required
herein, is not relevant and will not lead to admissible evidence. Although three of the four
underlying acts upon which Plaintiff bases his claims contain an element of “intent” and that
intent can be inferred from conduct, remarks, or all the surrounding circumstances, there is no
way that any of Defendant’s actions dating as far back as 2009, over five years before John Doe
II—who was only enrolled in Defendant Anderson School for approximately two months—was
even enrolled at or known to any of the Defendants, including Alex Anderson or the Anderson
Private School could be relevant to the proof of the allegations of a single event that is alleged to
have occurred in October 2014. See Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2006, pet ref’d) (recognizing intent can be inferred from conduct, remarks, or all the surrounding
circumstances); Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (panel opinion)
(“Intent, in particular, is often shown by acts done, words spoken, and conduct of the accused at
the time of the offense).
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 5 of 22
DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
Request No. 1:
All documents You provided to or received from the Department, as it relates to the licensing,
listing, certification, qualification or registration of You or The Anderson Private School with
the State of Texas.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored,
will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing
expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003);
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Specifically, Defendant
objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it
is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any document that even remotely
related to any “licensing, listing, certification, qualification or registration” of not only the
responding Defendant but also a separate and distinct entity that is also a Defendant herein and
as such includes a broad expanse of information that is in no way relevant to proving the general
and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiff’s claims. TEX. R. CIV. P.
192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 553; Al Parker
Buick Co., 788 S.W.2d at 129. Moreover, the information is readily available from The
Anderson’s Private School’s website and the various licensing entities, all of which likely
provide public records information request processes. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer
& Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.
denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient
or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, please
see Exhibit A attached hereto.
Request No. 2:
All documents You provided to or received from the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools Council on Accreditation and School Improvement (“SACS CASI”) or AdvanceED, as it
relates to the accreditation of You or The Anderson Private School with SACS CASI.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 6 of 22
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored,
will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing
expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003);
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Specifically, Defendant
objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it
is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include “all documents” is such a broad
expanse of information, all of which is in no way related or relevant to proving the general and
vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a);
In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 553; Al Parker Buick Co., 788
S.W.2d at 129. Moreover, the information is readily available from The Anderson’s Private
School’s website and the various licensing entities, all of which likely provide public records
information request processes. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v.
Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (sustaining
objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient or readily available
source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, please see Exhibit B
attached hereto.
Request No. 3:
Provide a copy of any diploma evidencing any degrees that you have earned from any
educational institution.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored,
will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing
expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003);
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant
objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it
is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any document that even remotely
mentions Defendant’s academic achievements including but not limited to diplomas, certificates,
grade reports and transcripts, financial aid information, class schedules, campus housing
information, applications, and continuing education course information, the obtainment of which
are not relevant and the documentation of which are readily available to Plaintiffs on the
Defendant schools website biography for Defendant. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer &
Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 7 of 22
denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient
or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, please
see Exhibit C attached hereto.
Request No. 4:
Provide a copy of any licenses (other than a driver’s license) that you have received.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored,
will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing
expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003);
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant
objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it
is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any license, including but not limited
to a hunting or fishing license, that are in no way relevant or related to proving the general and
vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4,
192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another
more convenient or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid
out herein, please see Exhibit A attached hereto.
Request No. 4:
Any documents evidencing complaints of any nature You have received concerning Your son,
Alexander A. Anderson, relating to his position at The Anderson Private School.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored,
will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing
expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003);
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant
objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 8 of 22
is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any complaint, including but not
limited those related to the downtime of the website or other technology issues falling under
Alexander A. Anderson’s scope of responsibility that are in no way relevant or related to proving
the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained
from another more convenient or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the
objections laid out herein, after a diligent search Defendant has found no responsive documents.
Request No. 5:
Any documents evidencing complaints made against You for the mistreatment of a child. For
purposes of this request, there is no time limitation.
Response:
Because Plaintiffs have not alleged any allegations of sexual abuse, abuse or any other form of
mistreatment of a child against Defendant, Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the
scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case
and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1;
In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson,
937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.
1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v
Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is
overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents
an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149,
152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick
Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding).
Defendant objects in that the term “mistreatment” is undefined and is vague and ambiguous.
Allegations of “mistreatment” could include allegations of excessive homework, restricted
computer time, or receiving a lower grade than expected. Moreover, Defendant objects because,
as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it is not limited in
any way and is so expansive as to include any complaint, including but not limited to complaints
about course curriculum, textbook selection or the secular or non secular nature of course
material which is in no way relevant or related to proving the general and vague allegations of
sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6.
Request No. 7:
Your contract with your cell phone carrier. If you have more than one cell phone, please provide
all contracts you may have.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 9 of 22
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989). Specifically, the information requested, Defendant’s cell phone contract, is in no
way related to the proof of Plaintiffs’ claims and will not lead to admissible evidence in this case.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). Defendant further objects because the request is harassing and the
information assumed to be sought (Defendants’ cell phone number) can be derived from other,
less intrusive means or sources. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(a).
Request No. 8:
Access to any cell phone or smart phone identified in Interrogatory number 1. If you have more
than one cell phone or smart phone, please provide access to each of them.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex.1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct.
30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included
reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further
objects because the request to turn over his cell or smart phone is overbroad not narrowly
tailored, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. See In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014
Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2014) (recognizing that a request that a
party produce their cell phone that included the specific reasons therefore, was overly broad
because “[u]ndoubtedly, there are many ways for the defendants to propound narrow requests for
relevant items without requiring the plaintiff to produce her cell phone for a forensic examination
. . . .”). Additionally, Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a forensic
computer or cell phone analyst as expert, provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the
expert is familiar with the Defendant’s devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought,
and that the expert’s search methodology is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information
that Plaintiffs seek. See In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion
when the aforementioned items were missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally
Defendant objects in that the request seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client
privileged information that is likely stored on his phone by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access
thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3.
Request No. 9:
Access to any personal computer, laptop, or tablet identified in Interrogatory number 1.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex.1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 10 of 22
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex.1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct.
30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included
reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further
objects because the request to turn over the listed items is overbroad not narrowly tailored, and
represents an impermissible fishing expedition. In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d 835, 847
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Direct access to a responding party's electronic
storage devices is more likely to be appropriate "when there is some direct relationship between
the electronic storage device and the claim itself." In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309
(Tex. 2009) (citing cases where employers sued former employees for misuse of company
computers as examples of when close relationship between claims and defendant's computer
equipment justified production of the computers themselves)). And, the Texas Supreme Court
has said “[p]roviding access to information by ordering examination of a party's electronic
storage device is particularly intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting
open access to a party's file cabinets for general perusal would be." In re. Weekly Homes, 295
S.W.3d at 317. Additionally, Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a
forensic computer expert, provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the expert is familiar
with the Defendant’s devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought, and that the expert’s
search methodology is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information that Plaintiffs seek.
See In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion when the
aforementioned items were missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally Defendant
objects in that the request seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client privileged
information that is likely stored on his phone by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access thereto. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3.
Request No. 10:
Access to any computer that you have utilized for personal or professional use.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct.
30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included
reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further
objects because the request to turn over the listed items is overbroad not narrowly tailored, and
represents an impermissible fishing expedition. In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d 835, 847
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Direct access to a responding party's electronic
storage devices is more likely to be appropriate "when there is some direct relationship between
the electronic storage device and the claim itself." In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309
(Tex. 2009) (citing cases where employers sued former employees for misuse of company
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 11 of 22
computers as examples of when close relationship between claims and defendant's computer
equipment justified production of the computers themselves). And, the Texas Supreme Court
has said “ [p]roviding access to information by ordering examination of a party's electronic
storage device is particularly intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting
open access to a party's file cabinets for general perusal would be." In re. Weekly Homes, 295
S.W.3d at 317. Additionally, Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a
forensic computer expert, provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the expert is familiar
with the Defendant’s devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought, and that the expert’s
search methodology is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information that Plaintiffs seek.
See In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion when the
aforementioned items were missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally Defendant
objects in that the request seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client privileged
information that is likely stored on his electronic devices by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access
thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3.
Request No. 11:
Any documents evidencing complaints of any nature You have received concerning your son,
Alexander A. Anderson, relating to allegations of improper treatment of a child since January 1,
2001.
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored,
will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing
expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003);
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant
objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad.
Improper treatment is not defined and could include unrelated matters such as excessive
homework or the secular or non secular nature of course that are in no way relevant or related to
proving the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, after
a diligent search Defendant has found no responsive documents.
DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No. 1:
Please list by manufacturer and model all computers, laptops, cell phones, smart phones and
tablets You have owned, leased or utilized in the last 3 years.
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 12 of 22
Response:
Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery
sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in
resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988
S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v
Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Tex.1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct.
30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included
reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further
objects because the request to turn over the listed items is overbroad not narrowly tailored, and
represents an impermissible fishing expedition spanning a three year period when John Doe II
only attended the Defendant Anderson Private School for two months between September and
October 2014. In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d 835, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2013, no pet.) (“Direct access to a responding party's electronic storage devices is more likely to
be appropriate "when there is some direct relationship between the electronic storage device and
the claim itself." In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009) (citing cases where
employers sued former employees for misuse of company computers as examples of when close
relationship between claims and defendant's computer equipment justified production of the
computers themselves)). And, the Texas Supreme Court has said “ [p]roviding access to
information by ordering examination of a party's electronic storage device is particularly
intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting open access to a party's file
cabinets for general perusal would be." In re. Weekly Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 317. Additionally,
Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a forensic computer expert,
provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the expert is familiar with the Defendant’s
devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought, and that the expert’s search methodology
is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information that Plaintiffs seek. See In re Pinnacle
Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion when the aforementioned items were
missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally Defendant objects in that the request
seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client privileged information that is likely stored
on his phone by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3.
Interrogatory No. 2:
Please identity by name, telephone number and address any and all Doctors, counselors, therapists
or health care providers that Alex A. Anderson has seen regarding any counseling, mental health
or personality disorders. For purposes of this Interrogatory, there is no time limitation.
Response:
As a threshold matter, Defendant objects in that she is not authorized, and it may even be illegal
for Defendant, to divulge private and privileged health information about another adult,
Defendant Alexander A. Anderson, even if that adult is his son. And, for the period that
Alexander A. Anderson was a minor, if in fact Defendant is authorized to divulge that
information, which she is not, Defendant asserts privileges on Alexander A. Anderson’s behalf.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 509, 510; Bristol-Meyer Squibb Co. v. Hancock, 921 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex.
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 13 of 22
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant objects because she
is not the best source of the information sought and such information, if discoverable, is
obtainable from Alexander A. Anderson in a more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive manner. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(a). Defendant also objects to this request as it is
outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter
of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192
comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v.
Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d
491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per
curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Specifically, the information
requested, Defendant’s privileged physician and medical and health related providers, is in no
way related to the proof of Plaintiffs’ claims and will not lead to admissible evidence in this case.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). Defendant further objects because the request is harassing and
overbroad, the Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not allege or implicate that Defendant Alexander
Anderson has any preexisting mental or physical health issues, there is no time limitation on
Plaintiffs’ request, and the information sought is privileged and reaches back in time to when
Defendant was a minor.. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(a); Tex. R. Evid. 509; R.K., M.D. v. Ramirez,
887 S.W.2d 836, 843 (Tex. 1994) (“Exceptions to the medical and mental health privileges apply
when ‘(1) the records sought to be discovered are relevant to the condition at issue, and (2) the
condition is relied upon as a part of a party's claim or defense, meaning that the condition itself is
a fact that carries some legal significance.’”) Further, both parts of the test outlined in Ramirez
must be met and, even then, the judge must perform an in camera inspection to properly balance
competing interests. Id. And, Plaintiffs’ request is overly broad because when medical records
are sought the trial court must ensure that production is no broader than necessary. Id. And, even
if a condition is part of a party's claim or defense, the records should be disclosed only to the
extent necessary to provide evidence relevant to the condition alleged, which is not the case here.
Id. Furthermore, the records disclosed must be closely related in time and scope to the claims
made to prevent unnecessary invasion into private affairs, and Plaintiffs’ have not only not
defined the information they seek, they have requested an impermissibly broad timeframe. Id.
Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein and the Motion for Protective
Order filed on or about October 13, 2015, Defendant Alex Anderson withholds the requested
permission as protected by the physician-patient privilege and the mental health information
confidentiality found in Texas Rules of Evidence 509 and 510, the Texas Constitution’s Privacy
Protections, and the Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s protections.
DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
General Objections to Request for Admissions:
1. Defendant generally objects to all of Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admission because
those requests are vague or contain terms that lack specificity because they have different
meanings in different contexts. See Neal v. Wis. Hard Chrome, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). And, here where the Plaintiffs’ case rests on the specific
context of terms used to support their allegations, terms such as "touched," and "alone" without
Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to
Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and
Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 14 of 22
more definition by Plaintiffs, could lead to misrepresentation and misconstruing Defendant's
responses. Further, in the case of the term "touched" has a specific technical, legal use in the
Penal Code that is not automatically applied to discovery requests as well as other meanings
(inadvertent, non-sexual, etc). Accordingly, Defendant provides the following responses to
Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admissions subject to and without waiving these and the other applicable
general and specific objections outlined herein.
2. Defendant generally objects to any and all of Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admission
related to another Defendant’s mental or physical health because such information is outside the
scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case
and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1;
In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson,
937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.
1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v
Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Specifically, the information requested, Defendant’s
privileged physician and medical and health related providers, is in no way related to the proof of
Plaintiffs’ claims and will not lead to admissible evidence in this case. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a).
Defendant further objects because the request is harassing and overbroad, the Plaintiffs’
pleadings do not allege or implicate that Defendant Alexander Anderson has any preexisting
mental or physical health issues, there is no time limitation on Plaintiffs’ request, and the
information sought is privileged and reaches back in time to when Defendant Alex Anderson was
a minor. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(a); Tex. R. Evid. 509, 510; R.K., M.D. v. Ramirez, 887
S.W.2d 836, 843 (Tex. 1994) (“Exceptions to the medical and mental health privileges apply
when ‘(1) the records sought to be discovered are relevant to the condition at issue, and (2) the
condition is relied upon as a part of a party's claim or defense, meaning that the condition itself is
a fact that carries some legal significance.’”) Further, both parts of the test outlined in Ramirez
must be met and, even then, the judge must perform an in camera inspection to properly balance
competing interests. Id. And, Plaintiffs’ request is overly broad because when medical records
are sought the trial court must ensure that production is no broader than necessary. Id. And, even
if a condition is part of a party's claim or defense, the records should be disclosed only to the
extent necessary to provide evidence relevant to the condition alleged, which is not the case here.
Id. Furthermore, the records disclosed must be closely related in time and scope to the claims
made to prevent unnecessary invasion into private affairs, and Plaintiffs’ have not only not
defined the information they seek, they have requested an impermissibly broad timeframe. Id.
Request for Admission No. 1: Admit You are aware that Alexander Anderson has been
diagnosed with a personality disorder.
Response:
As a threshold matter, Defendant objects in that she is not authorized, and it may even be ill
Preview
FILED DALLAS COUNTY 10/14/2015 11:17:05 AM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK CAUSE NO. DC-15-07174 JOHN DOE I, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT NEXT FRIEND TO JOHN DOE II, A MINOR § Plaintiffs § § VS. § § THE ANDERSON PRIVATE SCHOOL, § WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY, § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS LEVONNA C. ANDERSON, § INDIVIDUALLY, ALEXANDER A. § ANDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY, RIPLEY § ENTERTAINMENT, INC., and JIM § PATTISON U.S.A., INC. § 44TH-B JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AND SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANTS WILLIAM C. AND LEVONNA C. ANDERSON To: Plaintiffs John Doe I and John Doe II by and through their counsel John D. Sloan, Jr. and Douglas W. Lukasik, SLOAN MATNEY, LLP, 3838 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 1200, Dallas, Texas 75219, jsloan@sloanmatney.com, dlukasik@sloanmatney.com, (f) 214- 237-5474. Pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 196, 197 and 198, Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson provides this, her objections and responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admissions, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson. Respectfully Submitted, By /s/ Robert Hammer_______ Robert W. Hammer State Bar No.: 08854780 William H. Kincaid State Bar No.: 11431500 Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 1 of 22 ROBERT W. HAMMER 300 Legacy Downs Drive Fort Worth, Texas 76126 Telephone 817/ 332-8266 Telefax 817/ 332-8708 robert@rhammerlaw.com AND WILLIAM H. KINCAID Box 457 Sanger, Texas 76266 Telephone 940/ 372-3598 whk4888@yahoo.com ATTORNEYS FOR DFENDANTS THE ANDERSON PRIVATE SCHOOL, WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, LeVONNA C. ANDERSON, and ALEXANDER A. ANDERSON Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 2 of 22 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of the above was served on each attorney of record or party in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 14th day of October, 2015, as follows: John D. Sloan, Jr. Douglas W. Lukasik SLOAN MATNEY, LLP 3838 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 1200 Dallas, Texas 75219 jsloan@sloanmatney.com dlukasik@sloanmatney.com (f) 214-237-5474 Attorneys for Plaintiffs S. Todd Parks WALTERS, BALIDO & CRAIN, L.L.P. 10440 North Central Expressway Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500 Dallas, Texas 75231 todd.parks@wbclawfirm.com parksedocsnotifications@wbclawfirm.com (f) 214-760-1670 By /s/ Robert Hammer_______ Robert W. Hammer Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 3 of 22 LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, AND SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANTS WILLIAM C. and LEVONNA C. ANDERSON I. DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO ALL DISCOVERY REQUESTS 1. Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson (Defendant) generally objects to Plaintiffs’ use of the term “Victim” with reference to Plaintiff John Doe II because it assumes facts not in evidence, states a legal and factual conclusion, and is a status refuted by a report filed by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services. Specifically, the use of such term in discovery materials would introduce bias if used or offered in court for any reason such as for impeachment or otherwise. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant’s responses below are premised and based on the assertion and assumption that any reference to the term “Victim” is strictly a reference to John Doe II only; and, Defendant’s responses do not in any way confer on or admit to any legal or factual status of John Doe I as a “victim” as that term is commonly used or as specifically alleged in this Lawsuit; Defendant’s responses below do not admit, approve, or in any way validate any of Plaintiffs’ allegations; and do not in any way impute, admit, or imply any wrongdoing by the responding party or any other Defendants in this case. 2. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “Petition” as stated in definition number 13 as overbroad, vague, ambiguous, and potentially misleading. Specifically, Defendant objects to the expansion of the definition of the term Petition to include multiple documents that could include subsequent filings that could allege different or new facts, allegations, or causes of action resulting in the potential to misconstrue Defendant’s responses herein. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant’s responses below are based on the Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, Plaintiffs’ live pleading at the time these responses were submitted. Defendant will amend and supplement his responses as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 3. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the term “Personal e-mail account” as stated in definition number 16 as overbroad in that it assumes facts not in evidence and requires Defendant to exercise control over accounts that she does not have ownership or authorization to exercise. Specifically, Defendant is an individual who has no employees. Further, even if Defendant had employees, she is and would not be in a position to control, reveal, or determine the existence of personal e-mail accounts used by any alleged employees. Such discovery is properly conducted as third-party discovery targeted to those non-parties as described in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 205. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Defendant’s responses below are based on the application of a definition of “Personal e-mail account” that is limited to only those e-mail accounts that are “personal” to the responding party. Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 4 of 22 4. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the word “occurrence” as stated in definition number 17 because Plaintiffs’ definition is vague and includes and requires a legal conclusion. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ definition requires the responding party to reach the legal conclusion of causation in order to apply the definition as presented. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objection, Defendant’s responses below assume that the definition of “occurrence” is limited to as Plaintiff defines “the events made basis of this suit, which occurred on October 31, 2014, at Ripley’s Believe it Or Not, in Grand Prairie, Texas” without attempting to or drawing any legal conclusions as to the validity of those claims or any alleged causation thereof. 5. Defendant generally objects to Plaintiffs’ definition of the terms “day of occurrence” and “date of occurrence” that are also found in Definition number 17. The referenced terms refer to specific points in time and not events, accordingly, Defendant objects to the application of Plaintiffs’ definition to these terms as vague and ambiguous. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objection, Defendant’s responses below assume that the definition of “day of occurrence” and “date of occurrence” mean October 31, 2014. 6. Defendant generally objects to the Relevant Time Period specified by Plaintiffs as overbroad and not narrowly tailored to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs’ allege a single incident of abuse alleged to have occurred on October 31, 2014. Despite asserting a single alleged incident on a specific date in late 2014, Plaintiffs seek discovery dated back to January 1, 2009. See In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that discovery orders requiring document production from an unreasonably long time period or from distant and unrelated locales are impermissibly overbroad); In re Xeller, 6 S.W.3d 618, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (“A central consideration in determining overbreadth is whether the request could have been more narrowly tailored to avoid including tenuous information and still obtain the necessary, pertinent information. Id. Discovery requests must be limited by time, place, and subject matter.”). Additionally, Defendant objects in that the bulk of the time period specified by Plaintiffs is outside the scope of discovery. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003). Specifically, discovery for the expansive period requested is not temporally related to the proof required herein, is not relevant and will not lead to admissible evidence. Although three of the four underlying acts upon which Plaintiff bases his claims contain an element of “intent” and that intent can be inferred from conduct, remarks, or all the surrounding circumstances, there is no way that any of Defendant’s actions dating as far back as 2009, over five years before John Doe II—who was only enrolled in Defendant Anderson School for approximately two months—was even enrolled at or known to any of the Defendants, including Alex Anderson or the Anderson Private School could be relevant to the proof of the allegations of a single event that is alleged to have occurred in October 2014. See Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet ref’d) (recognizing intent can be inferred from conduct, remarks, or all the surrounding circumstances); Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (panel opinion) (“Intent, in particular, is often shown by acts done, words spoken, and conduct of the accused at the time of the offense). Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 5 of 22 DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION Request No. 1: All documents You provided to or received from the Department, as it relates to the licensing, listing, certification, qualification or registration of You or The Anderson Private School with the State of Texas. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Specifically, Defendant objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any document that even remotely related to any “licensing, listing, certification, qualification or registration” of not only the responding Defendant but also a separate and distinct entity that is also a Defendant herein and as such includes a broad expanse of information that is in no way relevant to proving the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiff’s claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 553; Al Parker Buick Co., 788 S.W.2d at 129. Moreover, the information is readily available from The Anderson’s Private School’s website and the various licensing entities, all of which likely provide public records information request processes. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, please see Exhibit A attached hereto. Request No. 2: All documents You provided to or received from the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Council on Accreditation and School Improvement (“SACS CASI”) or AdvanceED, as it relates to the accreditation of You or The Anderson Private School with SACS CASI. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 6 of 22 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Specifically, Defendant objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include “all documents” is such a broad expanse of information, all of which is in no way related or relevant to proving the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; Axelson, Inc., 798 S.W.2d at 553; Al Parker Buick Co., 788 S.W.2d at 129. Moreover, the information is readily available from The Anderson’s Private School’s website and the various licensing entities, all of which likely provide public records information request processes. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, please see Exhibit B attached hereto. Request No. 3: Provide a copy of any diploma evidencing any degrees that you have earned from any educational institution. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any document that even remotely mentions Defendant’s academic achievements including but not limited to diplomas, certificates, grade reports and transcripts, financial aid information, class schedules, campus housing information, applications, and continuing education course information, the obtainment of which are not relevant and the documentation of which are readily available to Plaintiffs on the Defendant schools website biography for Defendant. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 7 of 22 denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, please see Exhibit C attached hereto. Request No. 4: Provide a copy of any licenses (other than a driver’s license) that you have received. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any license, including but not limited to a hunting or fishing license, that are in no way relevant or related to proving the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, please see Exhibit A attached hereto. Request No. 4: Any documents evidencing complaints of any nature You have received concerning Your son, Alexander A. Anderson, relating to his position at The Anderson Private School. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 8 of 22 is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any complaint, including but not limited those related to the downtime of the website or other technology issues falling under Alexander A. Anderson’s scope of responsibility that are in no way relevant or related to proving the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 167 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (sustaining objection to discovery that could be obtained from another more convenient or readily available source). Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, after a diligent search Defendant has found no responsive documents. Request No. 5: Any documents evidencing complaints made against You for the mistreatment of a child. For purposes of this request, there is no time limitation. Response: Because Plaintiffs have not alleged any allegations of sexual abuse, abuse or any other form of mistreatment of a child against Defendant, Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Defendant objects in that the term “mistreatment” is undefined and is vague and ambiguous. Allegations of “mistreatment” could include allegations of excessive homework, restricted computer time, or receiving a lower grade than expected. Moreover, Defendant objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad in that it is not limited in any way and is so expansive as to include any complaint, including but not limited to complaints about course curriculum, textbook selection or the secular or non secular nature of course material which is in no way relevant or related to proving the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6. Request No. 7: Your contract with your cell phone carrier. If you have more than one cell phone, please provide all contracts you may have. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 9 of 22 Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Specifically, the information requested, Defendant’s cell phone contract, is in no way related to the proof of Plaintiffs’ claims and will not lead to admissible evidence in this case. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). Defendant further objects because the request is harassing and the information assumed to be sought (Defendants’ cell phone number) can be derived from other, less intrusive means or sources. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(a). Request No. 8: Access to any cell phone or smart phone identified in Interrogatory number 1. If you have more than one cell phone or smart phone, please provide access to each of them. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further objects because the request to turn over his cell or smart phone is overbroad not narrowly tailored, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. See In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2014) (recognizing that a request that a party produce their cell phone that included the specific reasons therefore, was overly broad because “[u]ndoubtedly, there are many ways for the defendants to propound narrow requests for relevant items without requiring the plaintiff to produce her cell phone for a forensic examination . . . .”). Additionally, Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a forensic computer or cell phone analyst as expert, provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the expert is familiar with the Defendant’s devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought, and that the expert’s search methodology is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information that Plaintiffs seek. See In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion when the aforementioned items were missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally Defendant objects in that the request seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client privileged information that is likely stored on his phone by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3. Request No. 9: Access to any personal computer, laptop, or tablet identified in Interrogatory number 1. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 10 of 22 curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further objects because the request to turn over the listed items is overbroad not narrowly tailored, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d 835, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Direct access to a responding party's electronic storage devices is more likely to be appropriate "when there is some direct relationship between the electronic storage device and the claim itself." In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009) (citing cases where employers sued former employees for misuse of company computers as examples of when close relationship between claims and defendant's computer equipment justified production of the computers themselves)). And, the Texas Supreme Court has said “[p]roviding access to information by ordering examination of a party's electronic storage device is particularly intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting open access to a party's file cabinets for general perusal would be." In re. Weekly Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 317. Additionally, Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a forensic computer expert, provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the expert is familiar with the Defendant’s devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought, and that the expert’s search methodology is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information that Plaintiffs seek. See In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion when the aforementioned items were missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally Defendant objects in that the request seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client privileged information that is likely stored on his phone by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3. Request No. 10: Access to any computer that you have utilized for personal or professional use. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further objects because the request to turn over the listed items is overbroad not narrowly tailored, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d 835, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Direct access to a responding party's electronic storage devices is more likely to be appropriate "when there is some direct relationship between the electronic storage device and the claim itself." In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009) (citing cases where employers sued former employees for misuse of company Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 11 of 22 computers as examples of when close relationship between claims and defendant's computer equipment justified production of the computers themselves). And, the Texas Supreme Court has said “ [p]roviding access to information by ordering examination of a party's electronic storage device is particularly intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting open access to a party's file cabinets for general perusal would be." In re. Weekly Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 317. Additionally, Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a forensic computer expert, provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the expert is familiar with the Defendant’s devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought, and that the expert’s search methodology is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information that Plaintiffs seek. See In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion when the aforementioned items were missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally Defendant objects in that the request seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client privileged information that is likely stored on his electronic devices by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3. Request No. 11: Any documents evidencing complaints of any nature You have received concerning your son, Alexander A. Anderson, relating to allegations of improper treatment of a child since January 1, 2001. Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Defendant further objects because the request is overbroad not narrowly tailored, will not lead to admissible evidence in this case, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990); Al Parker Buick Co. v. Touchy, 788 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant objects because, as presented, Plaintiffs’ request is burdensome, harassing or overbroad. Improper treatment is not defined and could include unrelated matters such as excessive homework or the secular or non secular nature of course that are in no way relevant or related to proving the general and vague allegations of sexual abuse underlying all of Plaintiffs’ claims. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4, 192.6; Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein, after a diligent search Defendant has found no responsive documents. DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES Interrogatory No. 1: Please list by manufacturer and model all computers, laptops, cell phones, smart phones and tablets You have owned, leased or utilized in the last 3 years. Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 12 of 22 Response: Defendant objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.1989); In re Indeco Sales, Inc., 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11859 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2014) (sustaining objection to discovery request as overbroad, which unlike here included reasons for the request, to produce cell phone for forensic examination). Defendant further objects because the request to turn over the listed items is overbroad not narrowly tailored, and represents an impermissible fishing expedition spanning a three year period when John Doe II only attended the Defendant Anderson Private School for two months between September and October 2014. In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d 835, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“Direct access to a responding party's electronic storage devices is more likely to be appropriate "when there is some direct relationship between the electronic storage device and the claim itself." In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009) (citing cases where employers sued former employees for misuse of company computers as examples of when close relationship between claims and defendant's computer equipment justified production of the computers themselves)). And, the Texas Supreme Court has said “ [p]roviding access to information by ordering examination of a party's electronic storage device is particularly intrusive and should be generally discouraged, just as permitting open access to a party's file cabinets for general perusal would be." In re. Weekly Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 317. Additionally, Defendant objects in that Plaintiffs have wholly failed to name a forensic computer expert, provide that expert’s qualifications, confirm that the expert is familiar with the Defendant’s devices and hard drives for which discovery is sought, and that the expert’s search methodology is likely to retrieve the as yet unspecified information that Plaintiffs seek. See In re Pinnacle Eng'g, 405 S.W.3d at 845-46 (finding abuse of discretion when the aforementioned items were missing from the Court’s discovery order). And, finally Defendant objects in that the request seeks or requires Defendant to reveal attorney-client privileged information that is likely stored on his phone by giving Plaintiffs unfettered access thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3. Interrogatory No. 2: Please identity by name, telephone number and address any and all Doctors, counselors, therapists or health care providers that Alex A. Anderson has seen regarding any counseling, mental health or personality disorders. For purposes of this Interrogatory, there is no time limitation. Response: As a threshold matter, Defendant objects in that she is not authorized, and it may even be illegal for Defendant, to divulge private and privileged health information about another adult, Defendant Alexander A. Anderson, even if that adult is his son. And, for the period that Alexander A. Anderson was a minor, if in fact Defendant is authorized to divulge that information, which she is not, Defendant asserts privileges on Alexander A. Anderson’s behalf. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 509, 510; Bristol-Meyer Squibb Co. v. Hancock, 921 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex. Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 13 of 22 App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding). Moreover, Defendant objects because she is not the best source of the information sought and such information, if discoverable, is obtainable from Alexander A. Anderson in a more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive manner. Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(a). Defendant also objects to this request as it is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Specifically, the information requested, Defendant’s privileged physician and medical and health related providers, is in no way related to the proof of Plaintiffs’ claims and will not lead to admissible evidence in this case. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). Defendant further objects because the request is harassing and overbroad, the Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not allege or implicate that Defendant Alexander Anderson has any preexisting mental or physical health issues, there is no time limitation on Plaintiffs’ request, and the information sought is privileged and reaches back in time to when Defendant was a minor.. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(a); Tex. R. Evid. 509; R.K., M.D. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 843 (Tex. 1994) (“Exceptions to the medical and mental health privileges apply when ‘(1) the records sought to be discovered are relevant to the condition at issue, and (2) the condition is relied upon as a part of a party's claim or defense, meaning that the condition itself is a fact that carries some legal significance.’”) Further, both parts of the test outlined in Ramirez must be met and, even then, the judge must perform an in camera inspection to properly balance competing interests. Id. And, Plaintiffs’ request is overly broad because when medical records are sought the trial court must ensure that production is no broader than necessary. Id. And, even if a condition is part of a party's claim or defense, the records should be disclosed only to the extent necessary to provide evidence relevant to the condition alleged, which is not the case here. Id. Furthermore, the records disclosed must be closely related in time and scope to the claims made to prevent unnecessary invasion into private affairs, and Plaintiffs’ have not only not defined the information they seek, they have requested an impermissibly broad timeframe. Id. Subject to and without waiving the objections laid out herein and the Motion for Protective Order filed on or about October 13, 2015, Defendant Alex Anderson withholds the requested permission as protected by the physician-patient privilege and the mental health information confidentiality found in Texas Rules of Evidence 509 and 510, the Texas Constitution’s Privacy Protections, and the Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s protections. DEFENDANT LEVONNA C. ANDERSON’S OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS General Objections to Request for Admissions: 1. Defendant generally objects to all of Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admission because those requests are vague or contain terms that lack specificity because they have different meanings in different contexts. See Neal v. Wis. Hard Chrome, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). And, here where the Plaintiffs’ case rests on the specific context of terms used to support their allegations, terms such as "touched," and "alone" without Defendant LeVonna C. Anderson’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Admission, and Second Request for Production to Defendants William C. and LeVonna C. Anderson Page 14 of 22 more definition by Plaintiffs, could lead to misrepresentation and misconstruing Defendant's responses. Further, in the case of the term "touched" has a specific technical, legal use in the Penal Code that is not automatically applied to discovery requests as well as other meanings (inadvertent, non-sexual, etc). Accordingly, Defendant provides the following responses to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admissions subject to and without waiving these and the other applicable general and specific objections outlined herein. 2. Defendant generally objects to any and all of Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admission related to another Defendant’s mental or physical health because such information is outside the scope of discovery in that the discovery sought is not confined to the subject matter of the case and the information will not aid in resolution of the dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192 comment 1; In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam); K-Mart v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.1996) (per curiam); Dillard Dept. Stores v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Texaco, Inc. v Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1995)(per curiam); Loftin v Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1989). Specifically, the information requested, Defendant’s privileged physician and medical and health related providers, is in no way related to the proof of Plaintiffs’ claims and will not lead to admissible evidence in this case. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). Defendant further objects because the request is harassing and overbroad, the Plaintiffs’ pleadings do not allege or implicate that Defendant Alexander Anderson has any preexisting mental or physical health issues, there is no time limitation on Plaintiffs’ request, and the information sought is privileged and reaches back in time to when Defendant Alex Anderson was a minor. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4(a); Tex. R. Evid. 509, 510; R.K., M.D. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 843 (Tex. 1994) (“Exceptions to the medical and mental health privileges apply when ‘(1) the records sought to be discovered are relevant to the condition at issue, and (2) the condition is relied upon as a part of a party's claim or defense, meaning that the condition itself is a fact that carries some legal significance.’”) Further, both parts of the test outlined in Ramirez must be met and, even then, the judge must perform an in camera inspection to properly balance competing interests. Id. And, Plaintiffs’ request is overly broad because when medical records are sought the trial court must ensure that production is no broader than necessary. Id. And, even if a condition is part of a party's claim or defense, the records should be disclosed only to the extent necessary to provide evidence relevant to the condition alleged, which is not the case here. Id. Furthermore, the records disclosed must be closely related in time and scope to the claims made to prevent unnecessary invasion into private affairs, and Plaintiffs’ have not only not defined the information they seek, they have requested an impermissibly broad timeframe. Id. Request for Admission No. 1: Admit You are aware that Alexander Anderson has been diagnosed with a personality disorder. Response: As a threshold matter, Defendant objects in that she is not authorized, and it may even be ill