Preview
Hearing Date: 2/5/2024 10:00 AM FILED
Location: Court Room 2510 10/6/2023 4:12 PM
Judge: Mullen, Michael Tully IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
CIRCUIT CLERK
COOK COUNTY, IL
2023CH08651
Atty. No. 41106 Calendar, 8
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 24692753
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION
FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651
ROBERT L. WRIGHT,
on behalf of Plaintiff and a class,
Plaintiff,
v.
WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS CO., L.P.A.,
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff, Robert L. Wright, respectfully requests that the Court order that Count I of this
action, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.
(“FDCPA”), may proceed on behalf of a class against Defendant Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co.,
L.P.A. (“WWR”).
The class consists of (a) all individuals (b) with respect to whom Defendant WWR
had a Rule 280.2 affidavit filed or served (c) that identified as the creditor at the time of charge-off a
debt buyer or other party who is not the pre-default creditor (d) which affidavit was filed or served
at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 30 days
after the filing of this action.
Plaintiff is required to file a motion for class certification with the Complaint, Ballard RN
Center, Inc. v. Kohll's Pharmacy and Homecare, Inc., 2015 IL 118644, 48 N.E.3d 1060, and may request
leave to supplement it later.
In support of this motion, Plaintiff states:
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. Plaintiff Robert L. Wright is a natural person residing in Cook County, Illinois.
2. Defendant WWR is a law firm organized as an Ohio corporation with its principal place
of business at 965 Keynote Circle, Cleveland, OH 44131-1829. It maintains offices at 180 N. LaSalle
Street, Suite 2400, Chicago, Illinois 60601.
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3. Defendant WWR is engaged in the principal business of collecting consumer debts for
others, using the mails and telephone system for that purpose.
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4. Defendant WWR states on its website that “The Consumer Collections Group at
Weltman provides comprehensive recovery solutions to many of the Top 10 banks in the U.S. and
some of the most well-known brands in the world.” (https://www.weltman.com
Solutions-Consumer-Collections)
5. Defendant WWR files thousands of debt collection lawsuits against consumers in
Illinois and other states each year.
6. Defendant WWR is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.
§1692a(6), as a person who uses one or more instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails
in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or which regularly
collects debts for others.
7. This action arises out of Defendant’s attempts to collect a Home Depot credit card
debt incurred for personal, family or household purposes.
8. On January 14, 2023, WWR had Plaintiff served with an alias summons and
complaint in an action entitled UHG I, LLC v. Wright, 2022-M1-117473 (Cook Co.) (Appendix A).
9. UHG I, LLC is a debt buyer which claims to own a debt alleged owed by Plaintiff.
10. The lawsuit was nonsuited on October 5, 2023, after Plaintiff retained counsel to
defend it.
11. Attached to the complaint was a Rule 280.2 affidavit (Appendix B) which stated that
as of the June 10, 2018 charge-off date, UHG I, LLC was the creditor.
12. As of June 10, 2018, UHG I, LLC was not the creditor.
13. The false statement was misleading and confusing. Debt buyers have to prove they
acquired the debt. Pre-default creditors do not have the same burden.
14. Based on examination of multiple court files, it was the regular practice of WWR to
fill in Rule 280.2 affidavits to state that a debt buyer that had nothing to do with the debt prior to
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charge-off was the creditor on the date of charge-off.
15. On information and belief, the instances can be readily identified using WWR’s
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computer system.
16. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that the misidentification of UHG I, LLC as the
creditor as of the date of charge-off was a material misrepresentation, in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§§1692e, 1692e(2), and 1692e(10).
17. Section 1692e provides:
False or misleading representations
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the
foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . .
(2) The false representation of—
(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; . . .
(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to
collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. . . .
THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
18. The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by
debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. §1692(e). This law “is designed to protect consumers from
unscrupulous collectors, regardless of the validity of the debt.” Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d
338, 341 (7th Cir. 1997). The FDCPA broadly prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection
methods; conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor; and any false, deceptive or
misleading statements in connection with the collection of a debt. It also requires debt collectors to
give debtors certain information about alleged debts, and about their rights as consumers. 15 U.S.C.
§§1692d, 1692e, 1692f and 1692g.
19. In enacting the FDCPA, Congress recognized the “universal agreement among
scholars, law enforcement officials, and even debt collectors that the number of persons who
willfully refuse to pay just debts is minuscule.... [The] vast majority of consumers who obtain credit
fully intend to repay their debts. When default occurs, it is nearly always due to an unforeseen event
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such as unemployment, overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties or divorce.” 95 S.Rep.
382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697.
FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651
20. As noted in Ramirez v. Apex Financial Management LLC, 567 F.Supp.2d 1035,
1042 (N.D.Ill. 2008), “the FDCPA’s legislative intent emphasizes the need to construe the statute
broadly, so that we may protect consumers against debt collectors’ harassing conduct. This intent
cannot be underestimated.” See Sonmore v. CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1132
(D.Minn. 2001) (the FDCPA “is a remedial strict liability statute which was intended to be applied in
a liberal manner”); Owens v. Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC, 550 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1063 (D.Minn. 2008)
(same); and Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (the FDCPA should be
“[construed]... broadly, so as to effect its purpose”).
21. “Congress intended the Act to be enforced primarily by consumers....” Federal
Trade Commission v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1980). The FDCPA encourages consumers to
act as “private attorneys general” to enforce the public policies expressed therein. Crabill v. Trans
Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001); Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780 (9th Cir.
1982).
22. Courts hold that whether a debt collector’s conduct violates the FDCPA should be
judged from the standpoint of an “unsophisticated consumer,” Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc.,
330 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2003), or “least sophisticated consumer,” Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d
1314, 1318-19 (2nd Cir. 1993); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985). The
standard is an objective one – whether any particular consumer was misled is not an element of a
cause of action. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997). “The question is not whether
the plaintiff was deceived or misled, but rather whether an unsophisticated consumer would have
been misled.” Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 383, 392 (D. Del. 1991).
23. Because it is part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1601 et
seq., the FDCPA should be liberally construed in favor of the consumer to effectuate its purposes.
Cirkot v. Diversified Fin. Services, Inc., 839 F.Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1993).
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24. Statutory damages are recoverable for violations, whether or not the consumer
proves actual damages. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997); Baker v. G. C. Servs.
FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651
Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982); Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F. Supp. 724, 727
and n. 3 (D. Conn. 1990); Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502 (D. Conn. 1990); Riveria v. MAB
Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 174, 177 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Kuhn v. Account Control Technol., 865 F. Supp.
1443, 1450 (D.Nev. 1994); In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999, 1016-7 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1982).
REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
25. Section 2-801 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-801, states:
Prerequisites for the maintenance of a class action.
An action may be maintained as a class action in any court of this State and a party may sue
or be sued as a representative party of the class only if the court finds:
(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
(2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.
(3) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.
(4) The class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy.
Although the statute was modeled after Rule 23 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, some
differences exist between the two. Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 214 Ill. App. 3d 995, 999,
574 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1st Dist. 1991).
26. The class action determination is to be made as soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action brought as a class action and before any consideration of the merits.
735 ILCS 5/2-802. The circuit court has discretion as to whether an action may proceed as a class
action. Haywood v. Superior Bank, 244 Ill. App. 3d 326, 328, 614 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1st Dist. 1993)
(overturning the lower court’s denial of class certification in a landlord-tenant case).
27. Class actions are essential to enforce laws protecting consumers. As the court stated
in Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 214 Ill.App.3d 995, 574 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1991):
In a large and impersonal society, class actions are often the last barricade of consumer
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protection. . . . To consumerists, the consumer class action is an inviting procedural device
to cope with frauds causing small damages to large groups. The slight loss to the individual,
when aggregated in the coffers of the wrongdoer, results in gains which are both handsome
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and tempting. The alternatives to the class action -- private suits or governmental actions
-- have been so often found wanting in controlling consumer frauds that not even the
ardent critics of class actions seriously contend that they are truly effective. The consumer
class action, when brought by those who have no other avenue of legal redress, provides
restitution to the injured, and deterrence of the wrongdoer. (574 N.E.2d at 764, 766)
28. As demonstrated below, each of the requirements for class certification is met.
29. Congress expressly recognized the propriety of a class action under the FDCPA by
providing special damage provisions and criteria in 15 U.S.C. §§1692k(a) and (b) for FDCPA class
action cases. As a result, numerous FDCPA class actions have been certified. Phillips v. Asset
Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2013); McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 807 F.3d 872 (7th
Cir. 2015); Vines v. Sands, 188 F.R.D. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Nielsen v. Dickerson, 98cv5909, 1999 WL
350649, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8334 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1999); Sledge v. Sands, 182 F.R.D. 255 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); Shaver v. Trauner, 97cv1309, 1998 WL 35333712, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19647 (C.D. Ill.
May 29, 1998) report and recommendation adopted, 1998 WL 35333713, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19648
(C.D. Ill. July 31, 1998); Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., 1:99cv0152, 2002 WL 31936511,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25032 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2002), report and recommendation adopted in part,
2003 WL 1903266, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5996 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2003) aff'd, 399 F.3d 620 (6th
Cir. 2005); Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Keele v. Wexler,
95cv3483, 1996 WL 124452, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3253 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1996), aff'd, 149 F.3d
589 (7th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Wexler & Wexler, 97cv6593, 1998 WL 60798, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1382 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1998); Wilborn v. Dun & Bradstreet, 180 F.R.D. 347 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Arango v.
GC Servs., LP, 97cv7912, 1998 WL 325257, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1998)
(misleading collection letters); Avila v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 94cv3234, 1995 WL 41425, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 461 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1995), aff’d sub nom. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996);
Ramirez v. Palisades Collection LLC, 250 F.R.D. 366 (N.D.Ill. 2008); Cotton v. Asset Acceptance, 07cv5005,
2008 WL 2561103, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49042 (N.D.Ill. June 26, 2008) (class certified); Carr v.
Trans Union Corp., 94cv0022, 1995 WL 20865, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1995)
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(FDCPA class certified regarding defendant Trans Union's transmission of misleading collection
notices to consumers); Colbert v. Trans Union Corp. 93cv6106, 1995 WL 20821, 1995 U.S. Dist.
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LEXIS 578 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1995) (same); Gammon v. GC Services, L.P., 162 F.R.D. 313 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (similar); Zanni v. Lippold, 119 F.R.D. 32, 35 (C.D. Ill. 1988); West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564,
572-573 (W.D. Va. 1983) (FDCPA class certified regarding alleged failure to provide required
"validation" notices and addition of unauthorized fees); Cheqnet Systems, Inc. v. Montgomery, 322 Ark.
742, 911 S.W.2d 956 (1995) (class certified in FDCPA action challenging bad check charges); Brewer
v. Friedman, 152 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (FDCPA class certified regarding transmission of
misleading collection demands to consumers), earlier opinion, 833 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 607 (D. Ariz. 1982) (class certified in action
complaining of unauthorized charges).
Numerosity
30. Section 2-801(1) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1);
therefore, federal case law is instructive on the numerosity requirements under the Illinois Rules.
Wood River Area Dev. Corp. v. Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 445, 450, 555 N.E.2d
1150, 1153 (5th Dist. 1990). The numerosity requirement is satisfied if it is reasonable to conclude
that the number of members of the proposed class is greater than the minimum number required for
class certification, which is about 10-40. Kulins v. Malco, 121 Ill. App. 3d 520, 530, 459 N.E.2d 1038
(1st Dist. 1984) (19 and 47 members sufficient); Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, 415 F.2d
1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969) (40 class members sufficient); Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60, 62
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (10-29 members sufficient).
31. Illinois case law further indicates that “[t]he number of class members is relevant, not
determinative.” Wood River Area Dev. Corp., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 555 N.E. 2d at 1153. Where the
class size is smaller, other factors may come into play to demonstrate that joinder is impractical,
including: (1) geographical spread of class members, (2) ease of identifying and locating class
members, (3) the knowledge and sophistication of class members and their need for protection, (4)
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the size of class members’ claims, and (5) the nature of the case. Id. at 450-51, 555 N.E. 2d at 1153-
54.
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32. It is not necessary that the precise number of class members be known: "A class
action may proceed upon estimates as to the size of the proposed class." In re Alcoholic Beverages Lit.,
95 F.R.D. 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Lewis v. Gross, 663 F.Supp. 1164, 1169 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). The Court
may "make common sense assumptions in order to find support for numerosity." Evans v. United
States Pipe & Foundry, 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983). "The court may assume sufficient
numerousness where reasonable to do so in absence of a contrary showing by defendant, since
discovery is not essential to most cases in order to reach a class determination. . . . Where the exact
size of the class is unknown, but it is general knowledge or common sense that it is large, the court
will take judicial notice of this fact and will assume joinder is impracticable." 2 Newberg on Class
Actions (3d ed. 1995), §7.22.
33. On information and belief, based on a review of dockets and court files, there are
more than 40 members of the class, and the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is not
practicable, in that:
a. During the year prior to the filing of this action, WWR filed 198 cases for
debt buyer UHG I, LLC (Appendix C) and 57 cases for debt buyer Rock
Creek Capital (Appendix D) in Cook County alone.
b. The creditor at the time of default was listed as UHG I, LLC or Rock Creek
Capital in the Rule 280.2 affidavits.
c. WWR also represented other debt buyers, filed cases in other counties
besides Cook and served complaints within the one year period that were not
filed within that period, so the number of class members exceeds 255.
34. While discovery will be needed to determine the precise class size, it is reasonable to
infer that numerosity is satisfied. Wood River Area Dev. Corp., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 555 N.E.2d at
1153 (concurring with a leading scholar’s assertion that a class size of 40 clearly satisfies numerosity
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and that a class size of 25 likely satisfies numerosity); Swiggett v. Watson, 441 F.Supp. 254, 256
(D.Del. 1977) (an action challenging transfers of title pursuant to Delaware motor vehicle repairer's
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lien, the fact the Department of Motor Vehicles issued printed forms for such transfer was in of
itself sufficient to show that the numerosity requirement was satisfied); Westcott v. Califano, 460 F.
Supp. 737, 744 (D.Mass. 1978) (in action challenging certain welfare policies, existence of policies
and 148 families who were denied benefits to which policies applied sufficient to show numerosity,
even though it was impossible to identify which of 148 families were denied benefits because of
policies complained of); Carr v. Trans Union Corp., supra (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class
certified regarding defendant Trans Union's transmission of misleading collection notices to
consumers in which court inferred numerosity from the use of form letters); Colbert v. Trans Union
Corp., supra (same).
Common Questions and Predominance
35. A common question may be shown when the claims of the individual members of
the class are based on the common application of a statute or they were aggrieved by the same or
similar misconduct. McCarthy v. La Salle Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 230 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 595
N.E.2d 149, 153 (1st Dist.1992).
36. In the present case, the predominant common questions are whether Defendant
engaged in the practice described above and whether such practice violates the FDCPA.
37. Where a case involves “standardized conduct of the defendants toward members of
the proposed class, a common nucleus of operative facts is typically presented, and the commonality
requirement . . . is usually met.” Franklin v. City of Chicago, 102 F.R.D. 944, 949 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
38. The only individual issue is the identification of the class members, a matter easily
ascertainable from the files of Defendant or court files.
39. Questions readily answerable from a party’s files do not present an obstacle to class
certification. Heastie v. Community Bank, 125 F.R.D. 669 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (court found that common
issues predominated where individual questions of injury and damages could be determined by
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"merely comparing the contract between the consumer and the contractor with the contract between
the consumer and Community Bank").
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Adequacy of Representation
40. The class action statute requires that the class representative provide fair and
adequate protection for the interests of the class. That protection involves two factors: (a) the
attorney for the class must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed
litigation; and (b) the representative must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class.
Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992).
41. Plaintiff understands the obligations of a class representative, and has retained
experienced counsel, as is indicated by Appendix E, which sets forth counsel's qualifications.
42. There are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the class members.
Appropriateness of Class Action
43. Efficiency is the primary focus in determining whether the class action is an
appropriate method for resolving the controversy presented. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D.
545 (N.D.Ill. 1972). It is proper for a court, in deciding this issue, to consider the ". . . inability of
the poor or uninformed to enforce their rights, and the improbability that large numbers of class
members would possess the initiative to litigate individually." Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503
F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1974).
44. In this case there is no better method available for the adjudication of the claims
which might be brought by each individual consumer. The vast majority of consumers are
undoubtedly unaware that their rights are being violated. In addition, the modest size of the claims
makes it unlikely that consumers would be able to pay to retain counsel to protect their rights on an
individual basis.
45. The special efficacy of the consumer class action has been noted by the courts and is
applicable to this case:
A class action permits a large group of claimants to have their claims adjudicated in a single
lawsuit. This is particularly important where, as here, a large number of small and medium
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sized claimants may be involved. In light of the awesome costs of discovery and trial, many
of them would not be able to secure relief if class certification were denied . . . .
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In re Folding Carton Antitrust Lit., 75 F.R.D. 727, 732 (N.D.Ill. 1977) (citations omitted).) Another
court noted:
Given the relatively small amount recoverable by each potential litigant, it is unlikely that,
absent the class action mechanism, any one individual would pursue his claim, or even be
able to retain an attorney willing to bring the action. As Professors Wright, Miller and Kane
have discussed, in analyzing consumer protection class actions such as the instant one,
'typically the individual claims are for small amounts, which means that the injured parties
would not be able to bear the significant litigation expenses involved in suing a large
corporation on an individual basis. These financial barriers may be overcome by permitting
the suit to be brought by one or more consumers on behalf of others who are similarly
situated.' 7B Wright et al., §1778, at 59; see e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
809 (1985) ('Class actions...may permit the plaintiff to pool claims which would be
uneconomical to litigate individually.') The public interest in seeing that the rights of
consumers are vindicated favors the disposition of the instant claims in a class action form.
Lake v. First Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615 at 628, 629 (E.D.Pa. 1994).
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CONCLUSION
46. The Court should certify Count I of this action as a class action.
FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Daniel A. Edelman
Daniel A. Edelman
Daniel A. Edelman
Cassandra P. Miller
Stephen J. Pigozzi
EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC
20 South Clark Street, Suite 1500
Chicago, IL 60603-1824
(312) 739-4200
(312) 419-0379 (FAX)
Email address for service: courtecl@edcombs.com
Atty. No. 41106 (Cook)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Daniel A. Edelman, certify that I had a copy of this document placed for service with the
FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651
complaint.
/s/Daniel A. Edelman
Daniel A. Edelman
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FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651
APPENDIX A
Filer Selected Hearing Date: No hearing scheduled
Location: <>
Judge: Courtroom, 1101
WWR #:
System Generated 040962684
Hearing Date: 6/29/2023 9:00 AM FILED
Location: Court Room 1101 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 1/6/2023 3:26 PM
Judge: Allegretti, John Michael
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
CIRCUIT CLERK
COOK COUNTY, IL
UHG I LLC
PM 2023CH08651
20221117473
20221117473
Plaintiff, No. 22-M1-117473 Courtroom, 1101
20937827
v.
Amount Claimed: $2,615.08
3:26PM
ROBERT L WRIGHT
1/6/20234:12
Defendant(s),
10/6/2023
☐ SUMMONS ☒ ALIAS SUMMONS
DATE:
DATE:
To the defendant: ROBERT L WRIGHT 1738 W 17TH ST # 3 CHICAGO, IL 60608
FILED
FILED
You have been named a defendant in the complaint in this case, a copy of which is hereto attached.
You are summoned and required to file your appearance, in the office of the clerk of this court, within
30 days after service of this summons, not counting the day of service. IF YOU FAIL TO DO SO, A
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE RELIEF ASKED IN
THE COMPLAINT.
The Clerk of Courts information is: COOK County Circuit Court - 50 W WASHINGTON ST, CHICAGO,
IL 60602
You may be able to attend this court date by phone or video conference. This is called a “Remote
Appearance”, call the Circuit Clerk at 312-603-8300 or visit their website at
http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org to find out how to do this.
E-filing is now mandatory for documents in civil cases with limited exemptions. To e-file, you must first
create an account with an e-filing service provider. Visit http://efile.illinoiscourts.gov/service-providers.htm
to learn more and to select a service provider. If you need additional help or have trouble e-filing, visit
http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/faq/gethelp.asp or talk with your local circuit clerk’s office. If you cannot e-
file, you may be able to get an exemption that allows you to file in-person or by mail. Ask your circuit
clerk for more information or visit www.illinoislegalaid.org.
If you are unable to pay your court fees, you can apply for a fee waiver. For information about defending
yourself in a court case (including filing an appearance or fee waiver), or to apply for free legal help, go to
www.illinoislegalaid.org. You can also ask your local circuit clerk’s office for a fee waiver application.
To the officer: This Summons must be returned by the officer or other person to whom it was given for
service, with endorsement of service and fees, if any, immediately after service. If service cannot be made,
this Summons shall be returned so endorsed. This Summons may not be served later than 30 days after its
date.
Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co. LPA Witness:
Attorney for Plaintiff 1/6/2023 3:26 PM IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 2400
Chicago, Illinois 60601 Clerk of the Court
Telephone: 312-782-9676
Email: ChicagoLaw@Weltman.com Date of Service: , 20
Cook #: 31495 DuPage #: 9676 (To be inserted by office on copy left with
Peoria #: 3725 Winnebago #: 6893 defendant or other person)
S54 Rev 11/2021
System Generated Hearing Date: 6/29/2023 9:00 AM
Location: Court Room 1101
Judge: Allegretti, John Michael
WWR# 040962684 FILED
8/31/2022 9:27 AM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS IRIS Y. MARTINEZ
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CIRCUIT CLERK
COOK COUNTY, IL
20221117473
AM 2023CH08651
Preview
Hearing Date: 2/5/2024 10:00 AM FILED Location: Court Room 2510 10/6/2023 4:12 PM Judge: Mullen, Michael Tully IRIS Y. MARTINEZ CIRCUIT CLERK COOK COUNTY, IL 2023CH08651 Atty. No. 41106 Calendar, 8 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 24692753 COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 ROBERT L. WRIGHT, on behalf of Plaintiff and a class, Plaintiff, v. WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS CO., L.P.A., Defendant. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION Plaintiff, Robert L. Wright, respectfully requests that the Court order that Count I of this action, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), may proceed on behalf of a class against Defendant Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A. (“WWR”). The class consists of (a) all individuals (b) with respect to whom Defendant WWR had a Rule 280.2 affidavit filed or served (c) that identified as the creditor at the time of charge-off a debt buyer or other party who is not the pre-default creditor (d) which affidavit was filed or served at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 30 days after the filing of this action. Plaintiff is required to file a motion for class certification with the Complaint, Ballard RN Center, Inc. v. Kohll's Pharmacy and Homecare, Inc., 2015 IL 118644, 48 N.E.3d 1060, and may request leave to supplement it later. In support of this motion, Plaintiff states: NATURE OF THE CASE 1. Plaintiff Robert L. Wright is a natural person residing in Cook County, Illinois. 2. Defendant WWR is a law firm organized as an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business at 965 Keynote Circle, Cleveland, OH 44131-1829. It maintains offices at 180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 2400, Chicago, Illinois 60601. -1- 3. Defendant WWR is engaged in the principal business of collecting consumer debts for others, using the mails and telephone system for that purpose. FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 4. Defendant WWR states on its website that “The Consumer Collections Group at Weltman provides comprehensive recovery solutions to many of the Top 10 banks in the U.S. and some of the most well-known brands in the world.” (https://www.weltman.com Solutions-Consumer-Collections) 5. Defendant WWR files thousands of debt collection lawsuits against consumers in Illinois and other states each year. 6. Defendant WWR is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6), as a person who uses one or more instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or which regularly collects debts for others. 7. This action arises out of Defendant’s attempts to collect a Home Depot credit card debt incurred for personal, family or household purposes. 8. On January 14, 2023, WWR had Plaintiff served with an alias summons and complaint in an action entitled UHG I, LLC v. Wright, 2022-M1-117473 (Cook Co.) (Appendix A). 9. UHG I, LLC is a debt buyer which claims to own a debt alleged owed by Plaintiff. 10. The lawsuit was nonsuited on October 5, 2023, after Plaintiff retained counsel to defend it. 11. Attached to the complaint was a Rule 280.2 affidavit (Appendix B) which stated that as of the June 10, 2018 charge-off date, UHG I, LLC was the creditor. 12. As of June 10, 2018, UHG I, LLC was not the creditor. 13. The false statement was misleading and confusing. Debt buyers have to prove they acquired the debt. Pre-default creditors do not have the same burden. 14. Based on examination of multiple court files, it was the regular practice of WWR to fill in Rule 280.2 affidavits to state that a debt buyer that had nothing to do with the debt prior to -2- charge-off was the creditor on the date of charge-off. 15. On information and belief, the instances can be readily identified using WWR’s FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 computer system. 16. In this action, Plaintiff alleges that the misidentification of UHG I, LLC as the creditor as of the date of charge-off was a material misrepresentation, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692e(2), and 1692e(10). 17. Section 1692e provides: False or misleading representations A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . (2) The false representation of— (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; . . . (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. . . . THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 18. The purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. §1692(e). This law “is designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous collectors, regardless of the validity of the debt.” Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1997). The FDCPA broadly prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection methods; conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor; and any false, deceptive or misleading statements in connection with the collection of a debt. It also requires debt collectors to give debtors certain information about alleged debts, and about their rights as consumers. 15 U.S.C. §§1692d, 1692e, 1692f and 1692g. 19. In enacting the FDCPA, Congress recognized the “universal agreement among scholars, law enforcement officials, and even debt collectors that the number of persons who willfully refuse to pay just debts is minuscule.... [The] vast majority of consumers who obtain credit fully intend to repay their debts. When default occurs, it is nearly always due to an unforeseen event -3- such as unemployment, overextension, serious illness, or marital difficulties or divorce.” 95 S.Rep. 382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1697. FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 20. As noted in Ramirez v. Apex Financial Management LLC, 567 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (N.D.Ill. 2008), “the FDCPA’s legislative intent emphasizes the need to construe the statute broadly, so that we may protect consumers against debt collectors’ harassing conduct. This intent cannot be underestimated.” See Sonmore v. CheckRite Recovery Services, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1132 (D.Minn. 2001) (the FDCPA “is a remedial strict liability statute which was intended to be applied in a liberal manner”); Owens v. Hellmuth & Johnson PLLC, 550 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1063 (D.Minn. 2008) (same); and Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (the FDCPA should be “[construed]... broadly, so as to effect its purpose”). 21. “Congress intended the Act to be enforced primarily by consumers....” Federal Trade Commission v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1980). The FDCPA encourages consumers to act as “private attorneys general” to enforce the public policies expressed therein. Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001); Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 1982). 22. Courts hold that whether a debt collector’s conduct violates the FDCPA should be judged from the standpoint of an “unsophisticated consumer,” Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2003), or “least sophisticated consumer,” Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318-19 (2nd Cir. 1993); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985). The standard is an objective one – whether any particular consumer was misled is not an element of a cause of action. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997). “The question is not whether the plaintiff was deceived or misled, but rather whether an unsophisticated consumer would have been misled.” Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 383, 392 (D. Del. 1991). 23. Because it is part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq., the FDCPA should be liberally construed in favor of the consumer to effectuate its purposes. Cirkot v. Diversified Fin. Services, Inc., 839 F.Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1993). -4- 24. Statutory damages are recoverable for violations, whether or not the consumer proves actual damages. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997); Baker v. G. C. Servs. FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1982); Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F. Supp. 724, 727 and n. 3 (D. Conn. 1990); Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502 (D. Conn. 1990); Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 174, 177 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Kuhn v. Account Control Technol., 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1450 (D.Nev. 1994); In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999, 1016-7 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1982). REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 25. Section 2-801 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-801, states: Prerequisites for the maintenance of a class action. An action may be maintained as a class action in any court of this State and a party may sue or be sued as a representative party of the class only if the court finds: (1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. (3) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class. (4) The class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Although the statute was modeled after Rule 23 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, some differences exist between the two. Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 214 Ill. App. 3d 995, 999, 574 N.E.2d 760, 762 (1st Dist. 1991). 26. The class action determination is to be made as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action and before any consideration of the merits. 735 ILCS 5/2-802. The circuit court has discretion as to whether an action may proceed as a class action. Haywood v. Superior Bank, 244 Ill. App. 3d 326, 328, 614 N.E.2d 461, 463 (1st Dist. 1993) (overturning the lower court’s denial of class certification in a landlord-tenant case). 27. Class actions are essential to enforce laws protecting consumers. As the court stated in Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Co., 214 Ill.App.3d 995, 574 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1991): In a large and impersonal society, class actions are often the last barricade of consumer -5- protection. . . . To consumerists, the consumer class action is an inviting procedural device to cope with frauds causing small damages to large groups. The slight loss to the individual, when aggregated in the coffers of the wrongdoer, results in gains which are both handsome FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 and tempting. The alternatives to the class action -- private suits or governmental actions -- have been so often found wanting in controlling consumer frauds that not even the ardent critics of class actions seriously contend that they are truly effective. The consumer class action, when brought by those who have no other avenue of legal redress, provides restitution to the injured, and deterrence of the wrongdoer. (574 N.E.2d at 764, 766) 28. As demonstrated below, each of the requirements for class certification is met. 29. Congress expressly recognized the propriety of a class action under the FDCPA by providing special damage provisions and criteria in 15 U.S.C. §§1692k(a) and (b) for FDCPA class action cases. As a result, numerous FDCPA class actions have been certified. Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2013); McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 807 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2015); Vines v. Sands, 188 F.R.D. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Nielsen v. Dickerson, 98cv5909, 1999 WL 350649, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8334 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1999); Sledge v. Sands, 182 F.R.D. 255 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Shaver v. Trauner, 97cv1309, 1998 WL 35333712, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19647 (C.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) report and recommendation adopted, 1998 WL 35333713, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19648 (C.D. Ill. July 31, 1998); Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., 1:99cv0152, 2002 WL 31936511, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25032 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2002), report and recommendation adopted in part, 2003 WL 1903266, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5996 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2003) aff'd, 399 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2005); Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Keele v. Wexler, 95cv3483, 1996 WL 124452, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3253 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1996), aff'd, 149 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Wexler & Wexler, 97cv6593, 1998 WL 60798, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1382 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 1998); Wilborn v. Dun & Bradstreet, 180 F.R.D. 347 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Arango v. GC Servs., LP, 97cv7912, 1998 WL 325257, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1998) (misleading collection letters); Avila v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 94cv3234, 1995 WL 41425, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 461 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 1995), aff’d sub nom. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996); Ramirez v. Palisades Collection LLC, 250 F.R.D. 366 (N.D.Ill. 2008); Cotton v. Asset Acceptance, 07cv5005, 2008 WL 2561103, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49042 (N.D.Ill. June 26, 2008) (class certified); Carr v. Trans Union Corp., 94cv0022, 1995 WL 20865, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1995) -6- (FDCPA class certified regarding defendant Trans Union's transmission of misleading collection notices to consumers); Colbert v. Trans Union Corp. 93cv6106, 1995 WL 20821, 1995 U.S. Dist. FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 LEXIS 578 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1995) (same); Gammon v. GC Services, L.P., 162 F.R.D. 313 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (similar); Zanni v. Lippold, 119 F.R.D. 32, 35 (C.D. Ill. 1988); West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 572-573 (W.D. Va. 1983) (FDCPA class certified regarding alleged failure to provide required "validation" notices and addition of unauthorized fees); Cheqnet Systems, Inc. v. Montgomery, 322 Ark. 742, 911 S.W.2d 956 (1995) (class certified in FDCPA action challenging bad check charges); Brewer v. Friedman, 152 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (FDCPA class certified regarding transmission of misleading collection demands to consumers), earlier opinion, 833 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 607 (D. Ariz. 1982) (class certified in action complaining of unauthorized charges). Numerosity 30. Section 2-801(1) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1); therefore, federal case law is instructive on the numerosity requirements under the Illinois Rules. Wood River Area Dev. Corp. v. Germania Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 445, 450, 555 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (5th Dist. 1990). The numerosity requirement is satisfied if it is reasonable to conclude that the number of members of the proposed class is greater than the minimum number required for class certification, which is about 10-40. Kulins v. Malco, 121 Ill. App. 3d 520, 530, 459 N.E.2d 1038 (1st Dist. 1984) (19 and 47 members sufficient); Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969) (40 class members sufficient); Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (10-29 members sufficient). 31. Illinois case law further indicates that “[t]he number of class members is relevant, not determinative.” Wood River Area Dev. Corp., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 555 N.E. 2d at 1153. Where the class size is smaller, other factors may come into play to demonstrate that joinder is impractical, including: (1) geographical spread of class members, (2) ease of identifying and locating class members, (3) the knowledge and sophistication of class members and their need for protection, (4) -7- the size of class members’ claims, and (5) the nature of the case. Id. at 450-51, 555 N.E. 2d at 1153- 54. FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 32. It is not necessary that the precise number of class members be known: "A class action may proceed upon estimates as to the size of the proposed class." In re Alcoholic Beverages Lit., 95 F.R.D. 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Lewis v. Gross, 663 F.Supp. 1164, 1169 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). The Court may "make common sense assumptions in order to find support for numerosity." Evans v. United States Pipe & Foundry, 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983). "The court may assume sufficient numerousness where reasonable to do so in absence of a contrary showing by defendant, since discovery is not essential to most cases in order to reach a class determination. . . . Where the exact size of the class is unknown, but it is general knowledge or common sense that it is large, the court will take judicial notice of this fact and will assume joinder is impracticable." 2 Newberg on Class Actions (3d ed. 1995), §7.22. 33. On information and belief, based on a review of dockets and court files, there are more than 40 members of the class, and the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable, in that: a. During the year prior to the filing of this action, WWR filed 198 cases for debt buyer UHG I, LLC (Appendix C) and 57 cases for debt buyer Rock Creek Capital (Appendix D) in Cook County alone. b. The creditor at the time of default was listed as UHG I, LLC or Rock Creek Capital in the Rule 280.2 affidavits. c. WWR also represented other debt buyers, filed cases in other counties besides Cook and served complaints within the one year period that were not filed within that period, so the number of class members exceeds 255. 34. While discovery will be needed to determine the precise class size, it is reasonable to infer that numerosity is satisfied. Wood River Area Dev. Corp., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 450, 555 N.E.2d at 1153 (concurring with a leading scholar’s assertion that a class size of 40 clearly satisfies numerosity -8- and that a class size of 25 likely satisfies numerosity); Swiggett v. Watson, 441 F.Supp. 254, 256 (D.Del. 1977) (an action challenging transfers of title pursuant to Delaware motor vehicle repairer's FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 lien, the fact the Department of Motor Vehicles issued printed forms for such transfer was in of itself sufficient to show that the numerosity requirement was satisfied); Westcott v. Califano, 460 F. Supp. 737, 744 (D.Mass. 1978) (in action challenging certain welfare policies, existence of policies and 148 families who were denied benefits to which policies applied sufficient to show numerosity, even though it was impossible to identify which of 148 families were denied benefits because of policies complained of); Carr v. Trans Union Corp., supra (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class certified regarding defendant Trans Union's transmission of misleading collection notices to consumers in which court inferred numerosity from the use of form letters); Colbert v. Trans Union Corp., supra (same). Common Questions and Predominance 35. A common question may be shown when the claims of the individual members of the class are based on the common application of a statute or they were aggrieved by the same or similar misconduct. McCarthy v. La Salle Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 230 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 595 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1st Dist.1992). 36. In the present case, the predominant common questions are whether Defendant engaged in the practice described above and whether such practice violates the FDCPA. 37. Where a case involves “standardized conduct of the defendants toward members of the proposed class, a common nucleus of operative facts is typically presented, and the commonality requirement . . . is usually met.” Franklin v. City of Chicago, 102 F.R.D. 944, 949 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 38. The only individual issue is the identification of the class members, a matter easily ascertainable from the files of Defendant or court files. 39. Questions readily answerable from a party’s files do not present an obstacle to class certification. Heastie v. Community Bank, 125 F.R.D. 669 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (court found that common issues predominated where individual questions of injury and damages could be determined by -9- "merely comparing the contract between the consumer and the contractor with the contract between the consumer and Community Bank"). FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 Adequacy of Representation 40. The class action statute requires that the class representative provide fair and adequate protection for the interests of the class. That protection involves two factors: (a) the attorney for the class must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation; and (b) the representative must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class. Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992). 41. Plaintiff understands the obligations of a class representative, and has retained experienced counsel, as is indicated by Appendix E, which sets forth counsel's qualifications. 42. There are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the class members. Appropriateness of Class Action 43. Efficiency is the primary focus in determining whether the class action is an appropriate method for resolving the controversy presented. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D.Ill. 1972). It is proper for a court, in deciding this issue, to consider the ". . . inability of the poor or uninformed to enforce their rights, and the improbability that large numbers of class members would possess the initiative to litigate individually." Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1974). 44. In this case there is no better method available for the adjudication of the claims which might be brought by each individual consumer. The vast majority of consumers are undoubtedly unaware that their rights are being violated. In addition, the modest size of the claims makes it unlikely that consumers would be able to pay to retain counsel to protect their rights on an individual basis. 45. The special efficacy of the consumer class action has been noted by the courts and is applicable to this case: A class action permits a large group of claimants to have their claims adjudicated in a single lawsuit. This is particularly important where, as here, a large number of small and medium -10- sized claimants may be involved. In light of the awesome costs of discovery and trial, many of them would not be able to secure relief if class certification were denied . . . . FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Lit., 75 F.R.D. 727, 732 (N.D.Ill. 1977) (citations omitted).) Another court noted: Given the relatively small amount recoverable by each potential litigant, it is unlikely that, absent the class action mechanism, any one individual would pursue his claim, or even be able to retain an attorney willing to bring the action. As Professors Wright, Miller and Kane have discussed, in analyzing consumer protection class actions such as the instant one, 'typically the individual claims are for small amounts, which means that the injured parties would not be able to bear the significant litigation expenses involved in suing a large corporation on an individual basis. These financial barriers may be overcome by permitting the suit to be brought by one or more consumers on behalf of others who are similarly situated.' 7B Wright et al., §1778, at 59; see e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ('Class actions...may permit the plaintiff to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.') The public interest in seeing that the rights of consumers are vindicated favors the disposition of the instant claims in a class action form. Lake v. First Nationwide Bank, 156 F.R.D. 615 at 628, 629 (E.D.Pa. 1994). -11- CONCLUSION 46. The Court should certify Count I of this action as a class action. FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 Respectfully submitted, /s/Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cassandra P. Miller Stephen J. Pigozzi EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER & GOODWIN, LLC 20 South Clark Street, Suite 1500 Chicago, IL 60603-1824 (312) 739-4200 (312) 419-0379 (FAX) Email address for service: courtecl@edcombs.com Atty. No. 41106 (Cook) -12- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Daniel A. Edelman, certify that I had a copy of this document placed for service with the FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 complaint. /s/Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman -13- FILED DATE: 10/6/2023 4:12 PM 2023CH08651 APPENDIX A Filer Selected Hearing Date: No hearing scheduled Location: <> Judge: Courtroom, 1101 WWR #: System Generated 040962684 Hearing Date: 6/29/2023 9:00 AM FILED Location: Court Room 1101 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 1/6/2023 3:26 PM Judge: Allegretti, John Michael MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT IRIS Y. MARTINEZ CIRCUIT CLERK COOK COUNTY, IL UHG I LLC PM 2023CH08651 20221117473 20221117473 Plaintiff, No. 22-M1-117473 Courtroom, 1101 20937827 v. Amount Claimed: $2,615.08 3:26PM ROBERT L WRIGHT 1/6/20234:12 Defendant(s), 10/6/2023 ☐ SUMMONS ☒ ALIAS SUMMONS DATE: DATE: To the defendant: ROBERT L WRIGHT 1738 W 17TH ST # 3 CHICAGO, IL 60608 FILED FILED You have been named a defendant in the complaint in this case, a copy of which is hereto attached. You are summoned and required to file your appearance, in the office of the clerk of this court, within 30 days after service of this summons, not counting the day of service. IF YOU FAIL TO DO SO, A JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE RELIEF ASKED IN THE COMPLAINT. The Clerk of Courts information is: COOK County Circuit Court - 50 W WASHINGTON ST, CHICAGO, IL 60602 You may be able to attend this court date by phone or video conference. This is called a “Remote Appearance”, call the Circuit Clerk at 312-603-8300 or visit their website at http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org to find out how to do this. E-filing is now mandatory for documents in civil cases with limited exemptions. To e-file, you must first create an account with an e-filing service provider. Visit http://efile.illinoiscourts.gov/service-providers.htm to learn more and to select a service provider. If you need additional help or have trouble e-filing, visit http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/faq/gethelp.asp or talk with your local circuit clerk’s office. If you cannot e- file, you may be able to get an exemption that allows you to file in-person or by mail. Ask your circuit clerk for more information or visit www.illinoislegalaid.org. If you are unable to pay your court fees, you can apply for a fee waiver. For information about defending yourself in a court case (including filing an appearance or fee waiver), or to apply for free legal help, go to www.illinoislegalaid.org. You can also ask your local circuit clerk’s office for a fee waiver application. To the officer: This Summons must be returned by the officer or other person to whom it was given for service, with endorsement of service and fees, if any, immediately after service. If service cannot be made, this Summons shall be returned so endorsed. This Summons may not be served later than 30 days after its date. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co. LPA Witness: Attorney for Plaintiff 1/6/2023 3:26 PM IRIS Y. MARTINEZ 180 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 2400 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Clerk of the Court Telephone: 312-782-9676 Email: ChicagoLaw@Weltman.com Date of Service: , 20 Cook #: 31495 DuPage #: 9676 (To be inserted by office on copy left with Peoria #: 3725 Winnebago #: 6893 defendant or other person) S54 Rev 11/2021 System Generated Hearing Date: 6/29/2023 9:00 AM Location: Court Room 1101 Judge: Allegretti, John Michael WWR# 040962684 FILED 8/31/2022 9:27 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS IRIS Y. MARTINEZ MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CIRCUIT CLERK COOK COUNTY, IL 20221117473 AM 2023CH08651