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Filing # 167517334 E-Filed 02/24/2023 03:08:17 PM
0131040 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE
TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 20-CA-989
SHERRI ZIMMERMAN,
Plaintiff,
v
MADELYN F. GAMMELL and
ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SETTLEMENT
COMES NOW the Defendants, MADELYN F. GAMMELL and ANGELA LEIGH
GAMMELL, by and through the undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule 1.510 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure and files this Motion for Summary Judgment and in support thereof
would state:
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1 Plaintiff filed a two count Complaint against Defendants regarding a motor
vehicle accident that occurred on or about July 2, 2019. See Amended Complaint attached as
“Exhibit A”.
2 On July 19, 2019, Plaintiff validly accepted $10,000 for settlement of the same
alleged damages in Exhibit A. See Transcript of recorded statement attached as “Exhibit B” and
draft of payment issued as “Exhibit C”.
3 Plaintiff confirmed in her deposition taken in this matter that she did come to a
settlement agreement, she essentially just didn’t like it and sought to undue it after she agreed.
Zimmerman v Gammell
20-CA-989
2
See Plaintiff Deposition transcript attached as “Exhibit D” in its entirety and more specifically
release recording discussed at Page 27 line 20 through page 33 line 12.
4. Ms. Zimmerman understood that she had a choice to accept the $10,450 to resolve her
claims against the Defendants; she understood that this money was coming from the Defendants
insurance policy to resolve her personal injury claim, and she agreed to make that choice even
though she wasn’t happy with it. Jd.; See also Exhibit D pages 35-48. This is the most pure
example of compromise involved in a settlement.
5 Settlements, even if based on verbal releases are highly favored in Florida
jurisprudence and as outlined below, summary judgment should be entered finding that
settlement was reached prior to this suit being filed.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
I. Summary Judgment Standard:
Florida’s Summary Judgment standard recently underwent changes to “mirror” the
Federal summary judgment standard, with an amendment to Florida R. Civ. P. 1.510 going into
effect on May 1, 2021. The Florida Supreme Court added the following sentence to the text of
the existing rule 1.510(c): “The summary judgment standard provided for in this rule shall be
construed and applied in accordance with the federal summary judgment standard articulated in
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242
(1986); and Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574 (1986). As
articulated in the Anderson decision, the standard focuses on “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson at 251-52.
Zimmerman v Gammell
20-CA-989
3
The substantive evidentiary burden of proof that the respective parties must meet at trial
is the “touchstone” as to whether a triable issue of fact exists. In Re: Amendments to Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No. SC20-1490 (Fla. 2021). Under the new standard, a defendant
moving for summary judgment need not set forth evidence to disprove the non-movant
Plaintiff's case in order to obtain summary judgment. /d.; See Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC, 915 F.3d 987, 997 (5™ Cir. 2019). Instead, the movant-defendant has the option to
produce evidence disproving the non-movant Plaintiff's case, or “point out that the nonmoving
party lacks the evidence to prove [its case at trial]” Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996-97 (3
Cir. 2018).
While the correct test is still to determine the existence of a genuine factual dispute,
Courts must now consider whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The new standard prohibits Courts
from stopping the inquiry when the nonmovant relies upon a bare scintilla of competent evidence
that could create a material dispute of fact. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one
of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c), the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law when “the pleadings and summary judgment evidence on
file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...” In Florida, the party moving
for summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the non-existence of any genuine
issue of material fact. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966); Jones v. Basha, Inc., 96
So. 3d 915,916 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Specifically, once the moving party meets that burden, the
Zimmerman v Gammell
20-CA-989
4
burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence to reveal a genuine issue of
material fact. See Jones, 96 So. 3d at 916.
Once the burden shifts, however, the non-moving party must do more than merely assert
the existence of an issue of fact. See Fisel v. Wynns, 667 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. 1996). Once the
moving party tenders competent evidence to support its Motion for Summary Judgment, the non-
moving party must come forward with counter-evidence to reveal a “genuine issue.” See Landers
y. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1979); Rooker v. Ford Motor Co., 100 So. 3d 1229, 1231
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Therefore, it is insufficient for the non-moving party to merely assert that
an issue does exist. See Landers, 370 So. 2d at 370 (citations omitted).
Under the new summary judgment rule, the “moving party that does not bear the burden
of persuasion at trial can obtain summary judgment without disproving the nonmovant’s case.”
See In re Amendments To Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, SC20-1490, 2021 WL
1684095, at *2 (Fla. Apr. 29, 2021). “[S]uch a movant can satisfy its initial burden of production
in either of two ways: ‘[I]f the nonmoving party must prove X to prevail [at trial], the moving
party at summary judgment can either produce evidence that X is not so or point out that the
nonmoving party lacks the evidence to prove X.”” Id. (quoting Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993,
996-97 (8th Cir. 2018)). Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). A “dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’...if the
evidence is such that a reasonably jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott
Zimmerman v Gammell
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5
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686
(2007). In Florida it will no longer be plausible to maintain that
“the existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact,
however credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, stops the
inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the ‘slightest
doubt’ is raised.” Bruce J. Berman & Peter D. Webster, Berman's
Florida Civil Procedure § 1.510:5 (2020 ed.) (describing Florida's
pre-amendment summary judgment standard).
In re Amendments To Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, at *3 (Fla. Apr. 29, 2021).
Florida courts are now required to state on the record its reasons for granting or denying a
summary judgment motion. /d. at *4.
To comply with this requirement, it will not be enough for the
court to make a conclusory statement that there is or is not a
genuine dispute as to a material fact. The court must state the
reasons for its decision with enough specificity to provide useful
guidance to the parties and, if necessary, to allow for appellate
review.
Id.
In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff cannot overcome the undisputed evidence that a
settlement was reached in this matter prior to suit, and summary judgment is appropriate.
IL. Plaintiff and Defendant reached a settlement agreement prior to the filing of
this lawsuit and a verbal release confirmed the settlement:
Settlement agreements are favored as a means to conserve judicial resources, and courts will
enforce them when it is possible to do so. See Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Care Ctr.,
Inc., 704 So. 2d669, 673 (Fla. Ist DCA 1997); Spiegelv. H. Allen Holmes, Inc., 834 So. 24295, 297
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.1985); and Healey v.
Healey, 658 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. Ist DCA 1995). In Florida, settlement agreements are governed
by and interpreted by the law of contracts. Thomas v. Thomas, 304 So. 3d 819, 820 (Fla. Ist DCA
Zimmerman v Gammell
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6
2020) and Williams v. Ingram, 605 So. 2d 890 (1st DCA 1992). An offer is an expression by a party
of assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining transaction
will likewise express assent to the same terms. Pierpont v. Lee County, 710 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1998).
An acceptance sufficient to create an enforceable agreement "must be (1) absolute and unconditional;
(2) identical with the terms of the offer; and (3) in the mode, at the place, and within the time
expressly or impliedly stated within the offer." Thomas, 304 So. 3d at 820, quoting Nichols v.
Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 834 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). However, the
subjective intent of the parties is not relevant when determining whether there was an offer made and
acceptance of such offer. Schlosser v. Perez, 832 So. 2d 179, 182 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002). Mutual
assent does not mean that two minds must agree on one intention; rather, the formation of a contract
depends on the parties having said the same thing, not on their having meant the same thing. See
Conte v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 3:13CV463/MCR/EMT, 2014 WL 4693072, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept.
22, 2014) and Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957). Thus in this case, regardless of
whether Ms. Zimmerman /iked that the offer was made to her with the requirement that she agree to
accept this amount in exchange for a verbal release, the meeting of the minds occurred- she agreed to
accept $10,450 in exchange for a release of her claims against Defendants.
Oral settlement agreements are enforceable under Florida law. See, e.g., Bankers Sec. Ins.
Co. v. Brady, 765 So. 2d 870, 872-73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that an oral settlement
agreement between the parties’ representatives with settlement authority was binding); Long Term
Mgmt., Inc., v. University Nursing Care Center, Inc., 704 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. pt DCA 1997)
(holding that a verbal settlement agreement is enforceable); and Boyko v. Ilardi, 613 So. 2d 103, 104
(Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that "execution of settlement documents was not a condition precedent
to the oral settlement agreement, but rather a procedural formality which both parties to the
settlement agreement were obliged to perform"). "As long as an intent to settle essential elements of
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20-CA-989
7
the cause can be established, it matters not that the agreement is not fully executed or reduced to
writing, as even oral settlements have been fully recognized and approved by the Courts of this
state." Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., Nos. 05-21338, 91-0986, 2007 WL 7756735, *2
(S.D.Fla. Sept.26, 2007) (unpublished); see also Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 495 So .2d
59, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (pointing out that "Florida law does not require that a settlement
agreement be in writing."). More specifically, a settlement agreement in a negligence action arising
from an automobile accident does not have to be in writing. See Boyko v. Ilardi, 613 So. 2d 103
(Fla. 3d DCA 1993). As long as the parties can complete their obligations within one year, the statute
of frauds does not apply and the oral agreement is enforceable. Id.
In this case, State Farm, on behalf of the Defendants GAMMELL, made an offer. It offered to
send Plaintiff $10,450.00 if Plaintiff released her claim against Defendants GAMMELL. Plaintiff
accepted State Farm's offer twice: once before the recording device was activated and again after the
recording device was activated. Pursuant to her obligation under this agreement, Plaintiff released
Defendants GAMMELL for all injuries known and unknown from the accident at issue. After the
telephone conference, State Farm complied with the terms of the offer by sending the Plaintiff a
settlement draft for $450.00 initially and then for $10,000 after the release was recorded. The
uncontested facts prove that there was an offer, there was acceptance of the exact terms of the offer,
and State Farm provided consideration to fulfill its obligation under the contract.
Therefore, the Plaintiff and State Farm entered into an enforceable settlement agreement on
behalf of Defendants GAMMELL. Since Plaintiff has released Defendants GAMMELL from the
very damages at issue in this suit, the Court should grant summary judgment and dismiss this lawsuit
against Defendants GAMMELL.
Zimmerman v Gammell
20-CA-989
8
WHEREFORE, Defendants, MADELYN F. GAMMELL and ANGELA LEIGH
GAMMELL respectfully request that this Court enter an Order granting final summary judgment in
favor of Defendant.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was e-mailed on
this February 24th, 2023 to all counsel on the attached service list.
KUBICKI DRAPER
13350 Metro Parkway,
Suite 401
Fort Myers, Florida 33966
Direct Line: 239-461-8102
Email: sde-kd@kubickidraper.com
BY: /s/ Stefanie D. Capps
STEFANIE D. CAPPS
Florida Bar No.: 0055738
SERVICE LIST
Isabel D. Barroso , Esq.
Morgan & Morgan
12800 University Dr.
Suite 600
Fort Myers, FL 33907
(239) 210-5340
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
CHARLOTTE COUNTY FLORIDA, CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO:
SHERRI ZIMMERMAN,
Plaintiff,
EX. A
vs.
MADELYN F. GAMMELL and
ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL,
Defendants.
/
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, sues Defendants, MADELYN F. GAMMELL and
ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, and allege(s):
1 This is an action for damages that exceed Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00),
exclusive of interest, costs and attorneys' fees.
2 Atall times material to this action, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, was a natural
person residing in Charlotte County, Florida.
3 At all times material to this action, Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, was a
natural person residing in Charlotte County, Florida.
4 At all times material to this action, Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, was
a natural person residing in Charlotte County, Florida.
5 On or about July 2, 2019, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, was operating a motor
vehicle traveling eastbound on Harborview Road in Charlotte County, Florida.
6. At that time and place, Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, operated a motor
vehicle owned by Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, and was headed East on Harborview
Road in Charlotte County, Florida.
7 At that time and place, Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, negligently operated
and/or maintained Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL’s motor vehicle so that it collided into
the rear-end of Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN’s motor vehicle.
COUNTI
CLAIM OF SHERRI ZIMMERMAN AGAINST MADELYN F. GAMMELL
Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-7, and further states:
8 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff suffered bodily
injury including a permanent injury to the body as a whole, pain and suffering of both a physical and
mental nature, disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, inconvenience, loss of
capacity for the enjoyment of life, aggravation of an existing condition, expense of hospitalization,
medical and nursing care and treatment, loss of earnings, loss of ability to earn money and loss of
ability to lead and enjoy a normal life. The losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff
will suffer the losses in the future. Plaintiff's motor vehicle was also damaged.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, demands judgment for damages
against Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, and any other such relief deemed proper by the
Court. Plaintiff also demands a jury trial on all issues so triable herein.
COUNT IT
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AGAINST ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL
Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-8, and further states
9. At all times material to this action, Defendant MADELYN F. GAMMELL was
operating the motor vehicle owned by Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, with the
knowledge, permission, and consent of Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL.
10. Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, is responsible for the negligence of
Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL under Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, demands judgment for damages
against Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, and any other such relief deemed proper by the
Court. Plaintiffalso demands a jury trial on all issues so triable herein.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 11" day of April, 2022.
/s/ Isabel D. Barroso, Esq.
ISABEL D. BARROSO, ESQ.
FBN: 0083366
Morgan & Morgan
12800 University Drive, Suite 600
Fort Myers, FL 33907
Phone: (239) 433-6880
Attorneys for Plaintiff
E-Mail: idiazbarroso@forthepeople.com
EX.B
Claim Number: 599570259
Claim Office: Corporate Office
This is Kevin White speaking to Sherri Zimmerman on July 19th, 2019 at 4:16 P.M.
Central Standard Time in order to record the release for the settlement of their bodily
injury claim under claim number 599570259.
Q. Ms. Zimmerman, are you aware I'm recording this release?
A Yes.
Q Do | have your permission to do so?
Yes.
This release is for the accident which occurred on July 2nd, 2019 at 5:28 P.M. on
Harborview Road in Port Charlotte, Florida. This, with this settlement you are
releasing Roger Emmart, Angela Gammel(sp?) Clinton(sp?) Gammel,
Madeline(sp?) Gammel, Joanna Curtis(sp?), Kershawn(sp?) Curtis,
Mackenzie(sp?) Gammel, Ronald Manoholarlo(sp?) for all injuries known and
unknown resulting from this accident. We have agreed to settle your bodily injury
claim for $450 under the promise of payment all reasonable and necessary
expenses not to exceed $10,000 incurred for medical, dental, or surgical
treatment, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing services, and prosthetic
devices furnished to the benefit of Sherri Zimmerman within 180 days following
the date of the accident as a result of the accident described herein. The
settlement includes all medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. Do you
agree with this bodily injury settlement as outlined?
Yeah.
Do you understand that you can file no further actions or lawsuits against Roger
Emmart, Madeleine Gammel, Adalin- Angela Gammel, Clinton Gammel, Joanna
Curtis, Kershawn Curtis, Mackenzie Gammell, Ronald Manoholarlo after the
settlement?
Yeah.
Q Thank you very much, Ms. Zimmerman. And this concludes the recording.
Please hold the line.
A Okay.
Electronic Signature: Transcription Express, Inc. Transcript Returned: 9/28/2020
10:47:05 PM; Transcriptionist ID 20091102; Quality Assurance ID 16092701
Statement of: sherri zimmerman
Claim #: 599570z59
Page #: 1
PAYMENT NO 119 148917J CLAIM NO 59-9570-Z59 EX. C
PAYMENT AMOUNT $10,000.00 LOSS DATE 07-02-2019
ISSUE DATE 01-20-2021 POLICY NO G701-690-59
AUTHORIZED BY PULLIAM, DEBRA INSURED GAMMELL, CLINTON R & ANGELA L
PHONE (844) 292-8615
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COVERAGE DESCRIPTION ON BEHALF OF AMOUNT
BODILY INJURY LIABILITY ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI 10,000.00
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EX. D
CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA
SHERRI ZIMMERMAN,
PLAINTIFF,
Vv CASE NO 20-CA-989
MADELYN F. GAMMELL,
ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL,
DEFENDANTS.
DEPOSITION OF SHERRI ZIMMERMAN
APPEARING REMOTELY
NOVEMBER 3, 2022
3 #00 P.M.
REPORTED BY:
VERONICA I. PEREZ, CSR
APPEARING REMOTELY FROM CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA
REMOTE APPEARANCES:
FOR SHERRI ZIMMERMAN:
MORGAN & MORGAN
ISABEL D. BARROSO, ESQ.
12800 UNIVERSITY DR., SUITE 600
FORT MYERS, FLORIDA 33907
239.210.5340
FOR MADELYN F. GAMMELL & ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL:
KUBICKI DRAPER
STEFANIE. D. CAPPS, ESQ.
10 13350 METRO PARKWAY, SUITE 401
FORT MYERS, FLORIDA 33966
11 239.461.8102
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
INDEX TO EXAMINATION
WITNESS: SHERRI ZIMMERMAN
PAGE
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. CAPPS
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. BARROSOS 39
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. CAPPS 46
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. BARROSO 47
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. CAPPS 48
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
REMOTELY MENTIONED PAGE
EXHIBIT 1 24
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY CHECK
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2022, 3:00 P.M.
SHERRI ZIMMERMAN,
HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND
TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
BY MS. CAPPS:
Q GOOD AFTERNOON. MY NAME IS STEFANIE CAPPS. I
10 REPRESENT THE DEFENDANTS, GAMMELL AND EMMART, IN A LAWSUIT YOU
11 BROUGHT. THIS IS A LITTLE BIT OF A UNIQUE SITUATION BECAUSE
12 WE'RE DOING A DEPOSITION TODAY IN THAT LAWSUIT, BUT IN A VERY
13 NARROW ISSUE THAT WE NEED TO DEAL WITH FIRST IN THAT LAWSUIT.
14 BEFORE I GET STARTED FULLY, CAN YOU GIVE ME YOU FULL NAME AND
15 DATE OF BIRTH?
16 A SHERRI LYNN ZIMMERMAN. 9-18-61.
17 Q OKAY. I'M GOING TO TURN MY VOLUME DOWN A LITTLE BIT
18 I DON'T KNOW IF THAT -- YEAH. I THINK MY VOLUME IS JUST A
19 LITTLE TOO HIGH. I'M GETTING A LITTLE BIT OF FEEDBACK THERE.
20 OKAY.
21 MS. ZIMMERMAN, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN A DEPOSITION
22 BEFORE?
23 A I HAVE NOT.
24 Q OKAY. I'M JUST GOING TO GO OVER WHAT I CALL
25 GUIDELINES FOR THE PROCESS THAT JUST HELP IT GO SMOOTHLY. THIS
WON'T TAKE VERY LONG THIS AFTERNOON, BY THE WAY. WE WANT IT TO
GO AS SMOOTHLY AND EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE. EVERYTHING WE SAY
IS BEING TYPED BY OUR COURT REPORTER. SO IT'S VERY IMPORTANT
THAT WE KEEP SOME THINGS IN MIND. FIRST, ALL OF YOUR ANSWERS
NEED TO BE VERBAL. EVEN THINGS LIKE MH-HM OR NAH-AH. I'M GOING
TO ASK IF THAT IS A YES OR IS IT A NO. I'M NOT TRYING TO BE
RUDE. I'M JUST MAKING SURE WE'RE CLEAR. OKAY?
A YES.
Q OKAY. ANOTHER THING IS THAT WE HAVE TO BE MINDFUL
10 THAT WE DON'T TALK OVER EACH OTHER. ZOOM CAN HAVE SOMETIMES A
11 LITTLE BIT OF A DELAY IN SOUND AND PEOPLE TEND TO NATURALLY
12 INTERRUPT EACH OTHER. I'M GOING TO ASK YOU VERY SIMPLE AND
13 BASIC QUESTIONS. IT'S A GOOD RULE OF THUMB JUST TO PAUSE FOR A
14 MOMENT, MAKE SURE I'VE FINISHED TALKING, AND I WILL DO THE SAME
15 FOR YOU. OKAY?
16 A YES.
17 Q IF YOU, AND ALONG THOSE SAME LINES WITH ZOOM, CANNOT
18 HEAR MY QUESTION, OR IT DOESN'T COME OUT CLEARLY WITH THE AUDIO,
19 PLEASE, DO NOT HESITATE TO ASK ME TO REPEAT MYSELF. OKAY?
20 A OKAY.
21 Q AND IF YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND MY QUESTION, MEANING THAT
22 I HAVE A CONFUSING QUESTION, PLEASE, LET ME KNOW. I WILL
23 REPHRASE IT. OKAY?
24 A OKAY. THANK YOU.
25 Q OKAY. WE'RE GETTING A LITTLE BIT OF FEEDBACK. I
DON'T KNOW IF ANYBODY ELSE GOT THAT. THERE WAS A LITTLE BIT OF
SKIPPING, BUT HOPEFULLY EVERYTHING WILL GO SMOOTHLY. I'M TRYING
TO FIX MY HAIR, BUT I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT. OKAY.
EVERYTHING WILL GO SMOOTHLY HERE WITH THE INTERNET AND THIS
WON'T TAKE TOO LONG. OKAY. SO WE'RE HERE. ONE OF THE ISSUES
IN THIS LAWSUIT IS THAT STATE FARM, WHO INSURES MY CLIENT HERE,
ALLEGED THAT A SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED BEFORE THE LAWSUIT. SO
WHAT WE HAVE DONE IS, BASICALLY, WE ARE GOING TO BE ADDRESSING
THAT QUESTION FIRST BEFORE WE MOVE ON TO THE BODILY INJURY
10 CLAIM. OKAY. SO I AM NOT ASKING YOU ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
11 ACCIDENT OR HOW YOU WERE HURT OR ANY OF THAT TODAY. IT'S JUST
12 GOING TO BE ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PRIOR
13 TO SUIT. I AM GOING TO START WITH SOME VERY BASIC BACKGROUND
14 QUESTIONS THAT I ASK OF EVERY WITNESS IN EVERY CASE. STARTING
15 THERE, WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT ADDRESS?
16 A I, ACTUALLY, DON'T HAVE A PLACE TO LIVE.
17 Q I'M SORRY. IS THAT A RESULT OF THE HURRICANE?
18 A NO. IT'S A RESULT OF MOVING TO DURHAM, NORTH
19 CAROLINA. I BRIEFLY LIVED WITH MY SON AND THEN I GOT AN
20 APARTMENT THAT HAD A LOT OF BLACK MOLD SO I HAD TO LEAVE
21 IMMEDIATELY. THE LANDLORD WASN'T VERY KIND. LET'S JUST PUT IT
22 THAT WAY. SO, UNFORTUNATELY, THIS HAS BECOME A VERY WEALTHY
23 TOWN AND THEY PROBABLY WON'T RENT TO PEOPLE WITH LOWER INCOMES.
24 Q I'M VERY SORRY TO HEAR THAT.
25 A THANK YOU.
Q SO ARE YOU STAYING WITH YOUR SON AGAIN?
A NO. I'VE BEEN MOVING AROUND TO A FEW PLACES
TEMPORARILY DUE TO SOME OTHER FACTORS HAVING TO DO WITH MY SON
AND HIS SITUATION.
Q YOU'RE CURRENTLY IN DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA?
A CORRECT. I MOVED HERE ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. AUGUST OF
2020.
Q AND WHERE WERE YOU LIVING? WHAT WAS THE APARTMENT YOU
WERE LIVING IN BEFORE YOU HAD TO MOVE OUT BECAUSE OF THE MOLD?
10 A GEEZ. I REALLY DON'T REMEMBER AT THIS MOMENT.
11 Q DO YOU REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE COMPLEX?
12 A I DON'T REMEMBER. I'M IN THE MIDST OF SPEAKING TO THE
13 PEOPLE FROM THERE. I KNOW THAT THE WOMAN THAT WAS IN THE OFFICE
14 PASSED AWAY A FEW YEARS AGO. HER SON IS NOW RUNNING IT. sO
15 YEAH.
16 Q DO YOU STILL GET MAIL AT THAT APARTMENT ADDRESS?
17 A NO. I MOVED OUT ABOUT A YEAR AGO BECAUSE THAT WAS THE
18 MOLD. I HAD THE BUILDING INSPECTOR COME THROUGH AND VIOLATED
19 THE MAN. IT WAS FOUR OR FIVE VIOLATIONS BECAUSE THAT'S HOW BAD
20 IT WAS. IT DIDN'T LOOK THAT BAD. IF YOU WERE TO SEE IT, THEY
21 DID A GOOD JOB OF COVERING UP THINGS.
22 Q I'M VERY SORRY TO HEAR ABOUT YOUR TROUBLES. HAVE YOU
23 TAKEN ANY MEDICATIONS TODAY THAT WOULD AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO
24 TESTIFY?
25 A NO.
Q WHAT IS YOUR HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION?
A COLLEGE. I DIDN'T GRADUATE, BUT IT'S HARD TO BELIEVE
THAT IT WAS OVER TWENTY YEARS AGO.
Q OKAY. AND DID YOU HAVE A CONCENTRATION IN YOUR
COURSES?
A I'M SORRY?
Q DID YOU HAVE A CONCENTRATION OR A MAJOR THAT YOU WERE
WORKING TOWARDS IN THE COURSES YOU HAVE BEEN TAKING?
A I WAS GOING, ORIGINALLY, WHEN I STARTED FOR PUBLIC
10 HEALTH ADMINISTRATION.
11 Q AND HAVE YOU BEEN TAKING COURSES AT THE SAME COLLEGE
12 OR DIFFERENT UNIVERSITIES?
13 A. THE SAME. I'M TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW THIS IS
14 PERTINENT TO THE SUIT. I'M A LITTLE CONFUSED ON THAT.
15 Q LIKE I SAID, IT'S JUST BASIC BACKGROUND INFORMATION
16 AND IF WE WERE GOING INTO THE BODILY INJURY STUFF, IT WOULD BE A
17 LOT MORE THOROUGH. I JUST WANT TO GET A BASIC IDEA OF YOUR
18 BACKGROUND, EDUCATION LEVEL, ETC. WHAT COLLEGE HAVE YOU BEEN
19 TAKING COURSES AT?
20 A IT WAS CALLED EDISON COMMUNITY COLLEGE, WHICH HAS
21 CHANGED OVER TO FLORIDA STATE -- WESTERN STATE COLLEGE.
22 Q GOT IT. OKAY. AND PRIOR TO MOVING TO DURHAM IN
23 AUGUST 2020, WERE YOU LIVING IN THE SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AREA?
24 A I WAS.
25 Q AND WHAT WAS YOUR ADDRESS IN SOUTHWEST FLORIDA?
A LET ME TAKE A LOOK. 20423 HILLSBOROUGH BOULEVARD, AND
THAT'S PORT CHARLOTTE. I DON'T HAVE THE ZIP. I DON'T KNOW IF
THAT'S A PROBLEM.
Q THAT IS OKAY. CAN YOU GIVE US THE ADDRESS PART ONE
MORE TIME? IT KIND OF BROKE UP A LITTLE BIT.
A SURE. IT IS 20423 HILLSBOROUGH BOULEVARD PORT
CHARLOTTE.
GOT IT. OKAY. ARE YOU CURRENTLY EMPLOYED?
I AM NOT.
10 AND WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU WERE EMPLOYED?
11 ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO.
12 Q WHAT DID YOU DO?
13 A. I GOT A JOB. I WAS DOING CENTERS, STORE MANAGING,
14 TAKING CARE OF THE SHELVES AND KEEPING EVERYTHING IN LINE. I
15 WAS DOING A LITTLE BIT OF STOCKING. GENERALLY, I WAS LOOKING
16 OUT FOR A FEW DIFFERENT THINGS SAFETY WISE. IN CASE THERE WERE
17 SAFETY ISSUES THERE, I WOULD BRING IT TO MANAGEMENTS ATTENTION
18 AGAIN AND AGAIN.
19 Q OKAY. WHAT, IF YOU COULD JUST GIVE ME AN IDEA, JOBS
20 HAVE YOU HAD IN YOUR ADULT LIFE? IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU WORKED AT A
21 GROCERY STORE. HAVE YOU ALWAYS WORKED IN THE RETAIL AREA OR
22 WHAT KIND OF THINGS HAVE YOU DONE FOR WORK?
23 A SOME OF THE MAIN JOBS I'VE DONE IS A BARBER -- A
24 LICENSED BARBER. BY BARBER, I MEAN HAIR. I DON'T MEAN BEAUTY.
25 I'VE NEVER DONE BEAUTY. I DON'T THINK I COULD. I HAD BARBER
SHOPS. THERE WAS A BARBER SHOP IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD. A MAN
TAUGHT ME HOW TO CUT HAIR, AND I WAS TWELVE YEARS