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  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
  • ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI D vs. GAMMELL, MADELYN FAuto Negligence document preview
						
                                

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Filing # 167517334 E-Filed 02/24/2023 03:08:17 PM 0131040 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO.: 20-CA-989 SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff, v MADELYN F. GAMMELL and ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, Defendants. DEFENDANT MOTION FOR FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SETTLEMENT COMES NOW the Defendants, MADELYN F. GAMMELL and ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, by and through the undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule 1.510 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and files this Motion for Summary Judgment and in support thereof would state: UNDISPUTED FACTS 1 Plaintiff filed a two count Complaint against Defendants regarding a motor vehicle accident that occurred on or about July 2, 2019. See Amended Complaint attached as “Exhibit A”. 2 On July 19, 2019, Plaintiff validly accepted $10,000 for settlement of the same alleged damages in Exhibit A. See Transcript of recorded statement attached as “Exhibit B” and draft of payment issued as “Exhibit C”. 3 Plaintiff confirmed in her deposition taken in this matter that she did come to a settlement agreement, she essentially just didn’t like it and sought to undue it after she agreed. Zimmerman v Gammell 20-CA-989 2 See Plaintiff Deposition transcript attached as “Exhibit D” in its entirety and more specifically release recording discussed at Page 27 line 20 through page 33 line 12. 4. Ms. Zimmerman understood that she had a choice to accept the $10,450 to resolve her claims against the Defendants; she understood that this money was coming from the Defendants insurance policy to resolve her personal injury claim, and she agreed to make that choice even though she wasn’t happy with it. Jd.; See also Exhibit D pages 35-48. This is the most pure example of compromise involved in a settlement. 5 Settlements, even if based on verbal releases are highly favored in Florida jurisprudence and as outlined below, summary judgment should be entered finding that settlement was reached prior to this suit being filed. MEMORANDUM OF LAW I. Summary Judgment Standard: Florida’s Summary Judgment standard recently underwent changes to “mirror” the Federal summary judgment standard, with an amendment to Florida R. Civ. P. 1.510 going into effect on May 1, 2021. The Florida Supreme Court added the following sentence to the text of the existing rule 1.510(c): “The summary judgment standard provided for in this rule shall be construed and applied in accordance with the federal summary judgment standard articulated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574 (1986). As articulated in the Anderson decision, the standard focuses on “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Anderson at 251-52. Zimmerman v Gammell 20-CA-989 3 The substantive evidentiary burden of proof that the respective parties must meet at trial is the “touchstone” as to whether a triable issue of fact exists. In Re: Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No. SC20-1490 (Fla. 2021). Under the new standard, a defendant moving for summary judgment need not set forth evidence to disprove the non-movant Plaintiff's case in order to obtain summary judgment. /d.; See Wease v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 915 F.3d 987, 997 (5™ Cir. 2019). Instead, the movant-defendant has the option to produce evidence disproving the non-movant Plaintiff's case, or “point out that the nonmoving party lacks the evidence to prove [its case at trial]” Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996-97 (3 Cir. 2018). While the correct test is still to determine the existence of a genuine factual dispute, Courts must now consider whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The new standard prohibits Courts from stopping the inquiry when the nonmovant relies upon a bare scintilla of competent evidence that could create a material dispute of fact. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c), the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law when “the pleadings and summary judgment evidence on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...” In Florida, the party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966); Jones v. Basha, Inc., 96 So. 3d 915,916 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Specifically, once the moving party meets that burden, the Zimmerman v Gammell 20-CA-989 4 burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence to reveal a genuine issue of material fact. See Jones, 96 So. 3d at 916. Once the burden shifts, however, the non-moving party must do more than merely assert the existence of an issue of fact. See Fisel v. Wynns, 667 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. 1996). Once the moving party tenders competent evidence to support its Motion for Summary Judgment, the non- moving party must come forward with counter-evidence to reveal a “genuine issue.” See Landers y. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1979); Rooker v. Ford Motor Co., 100 So. 3d 1229, 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Therefore, it is insufficient for the non-moving party to merely assert that an issue does exist. See Landers, 370 So. 2d at 370 (citations omitted). Under the new summary judgment rule, the “moving party that does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial can obtain summary judgment without disproving the nonmovant’s case.” See In re Amendments To Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, SC20-1490, 2021 WL 1684095, at *2 (Fla. Apr. 29, 2021). “[S]uch a movant can satisfy its initial burden of production in either of two ways: ‘[I]f the nonmoving party must prove X to prevail [at trial], the moving party at summary judgment can either produce evidence that X is not so or point out that the nonmoving party lacks the evidence to prove X.”” Id. (quoting Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996-97 (8th Cir. 2018)). Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). A “dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’...if the evidence is such that a reasonably jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott Zimmerman v Gammell 20-CA-989 5 v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). In Florida it will no longer be plausible to maintain that “the existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the ‘slightest doubt’ is raised.” Bruce J. Berman & Peter D. Webster, Berman's Florida Civil Procedure § 1.510:5 (2020 ed.) (describing Florida's pre-amendment summary judgment standard). In re Amendments To Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, at *3 (Fla. Apr. 29, 2021). Florida courts are now required to state on the record its reasons for granting or denying a summary judgment motion. /d. at *4. To comply with this requirement, it will not be enough for the court to make a conclusory statement that there is or is not a genuine dispute as to a material fact. The court must state the reasons for its decision with enough specificity to provide useful guidance to the parties and, if necessary, to allow for appellate review. Id. In this case, it is clear that Plaintiff cannot overcome the undisputed evidence that a settlement was reached in this matter prior to suit, and summary judgment is appropriate. IL. Plaintiff and Defendant reached a settlement agreement prior to the filing of this lawsuit and a verbal release confirmed the settlement: Settlement agreements are favored as a means to conserve judicial resources, and courts will enforce them when it is possible to do so. See Long Term Mgmt., Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d669, 673 (Fla. Ist DCA 1997); Spiegelv. H. Allen Holmes, Inc., 834 So. 24295, 297 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.1985); and Healey v. Healey, 658 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. Ist DCA 1995). In Florida, settlement agreements are governed by and interpreted by the law of contracts. Thomas v. Thomas, 304 So. 3d 819, 820 (Fla. Ist DCA Zimmerman v Gammell 20-CA-989 6 2020) and Williams v. Ingram, 605 So. 2d 890 (1st DCA 1992). An offer is an expression by a party of assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining transaction will likewise express assent to the same terms. Pierpont v. Lee County, 710 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 1998). An acceptance sufficient to create an enforceable agreement "must be (1) absolute and unconditional; (2) identical with the terms of the offer; and (3) in the mode, at the place, and within the time expressly or impliedly stated within the offer." Thomas, 304 So. 3d at 820, quoting Nichols v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 834 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). However, the subjective intent of the parties is not relevant when determining whether there was an offer made and acceptance of such offer. Schlosser v. Perez, 832 So. 2d 179, 182 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002). Mutual assent does not mean that two minds must agree on one intention; rather, the formation of a contract depends on the parties having said the same thing, not on their having meant the same thing. See Conte v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 3:13CV463/MCR/EMT, 2014 WL 4693072, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2014) and Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So.2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957). Thus in this case, regardless of whether Ms. Zimmerman /iked that the offer was made to her with the requirement that she agree to accept this amount in exchange for a verbal release, the meeting of the minds occurred- she agreed to accept $10,450 in exchange for a release of her claims against Defendants. Oral settlement agreements are enforceable under Florida law. See, e.g., Bankers Sec. Ins. Co. v. Brady, 765 So. 2d 870, 872-73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that an oral settlement agreement between the parties’ representatives with settlement authority was binding); Long Term Mgmt., Inc., v. University Nursing Care Center, Inc., 704 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. pt DCA 1997) (holding that a verbal settlement agreement is enforceable); and Boyko v. Ilardi, 613 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (holding that "execution of settlement documents was not a condition precedent to the oral settlement agreement, but rather a procedural formality which both parties to the settlement agreement were obliged to perform"). "As long as an intent to settle essential elements of Zimmerman v Gammell 20-CA-989 7 the cause can be established, it matters not that the agreement is not fully executed or reduced to writing, as even oral settlements have been fully recognized and approved by the Courts of this state." Allapattah Serv., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., Nos. 05-21338, 91-0986, 2007 WL 7756735, *2 (S.D.Fla. Sept.26, 2007) (unpublished); see also Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 495 So .2d 59, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (pointing out that "Florida law does not require that a settlement agreement be in writing."). More specifically, a settlement agreement in a negligence action arising from an automobile accident does not have to be in writing. See Boyko v. Ilardi, 613 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). As long as the parties can complete their obligations within one year, the statute of frauds does not apply and the oral agreement is enforceable. Id. In this case, State Farm, on behalf of the Defendants GAMMELL, made an offer. It offered to send Plaintiff $10,450.00 if Plaintiff released her claim against Defendants GAMMELL. Plaintiff accepted State Farm's offer twice: once before the recording device was activated and again after the recording device was activated. Pursuant to her obligation under this agreement, Plaintiff released Defendants GAMMELL for all injuries known and unknown from the accident at issue. After the telephone conference, State Farm complied with the terms of the offer by sending the Plaintiff a settlement draft for $450.00 initially and then for $10,000 after the release was recorded. The uncontested facts prove that there was an offer, there was acceptance of the exact terms of the offer, and State Farm provided consideration to fulfill its obligation under the contract. Therefore, the Plaintiff and State Farm entered into an enforceable settlement agreement on behalf of Defendants GAMMELL. Since Plaintiff has released Defendants GAMMELL from the very damages at issue in this suit, the Court should grant summary judgment and dismiss this lawsuit against Defendants GAMMELL. Zimmerman v Gammell 20-CA-989 8 WHEREFORE, Defendants, MADELYN F. GAMMELL and ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL respectfully request that this Court enter an Order granting final summary judgment in favor of Defendant. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE WE HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was e-mailed on this February 24th, 2023 to all counsel on the attached service list. KUBICKI DRAPER 13350 Metro Parkway, Suite 401 Fort Myers, Florida 33966 Direct Line: 239-461-8102 Email: sde-kd@kubickidraper.com BY: /s/ Stefanie D. Capps STEFANIE D. CAPPS Florida Bar No.: 0055738 SERVICE LIST Isabel D. Barroso , Esq. Morgan & Morgan 12800 University Dr. Suite 600 Fort Myers, FL 33907 (239) 210-5340 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY FLORIDA, CIVIL DIVISION CASE NO: SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff, EX. A vs. MADELYN F. GAMMELL and ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, Defendants. / AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, sues Defendants, MADELYN F. GAMMELL and ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, and allege(s): 1 This is an action for damages that exceed Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), exclusive of interest, costs and attorneys' fees. 2 Atall times material to this action, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, was a natural person residing in Charlotte County, Florida. 3 At all times material to this action, Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, was a natural person residing in Charlotte County, Florida. 4 At all times material to this action, Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, was a natural person residing in Charlotte County, Florida. 5 On or about July 2, 2019, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, was operating a motor vehicle traveling eastbound on Harborview Road in Charlotte County, Florida. 6. At that time and place, Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, operated a motor vehicle owned by Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, and was headed East on Harborview Road in Charlotte County, Florida. 7 At that time and place, Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, negligently operated and/or maintained Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL’s motor vehicle so that it collided into the rear-end of Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN’s motor vehicle. COUNTI CLAIM OF SHERRI ZIMMERMAN AGAINST MADELYN F. GAMMELL Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-7, and further states: 8 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiff suffered bodily injury including a permanent injury to the body as a whole, pain and suffering of both a physical and mental nature, disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, inconvenience, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, aggravation of an existing condition, expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and treatment, loss of earnings, loss of ability to earn money and loss of ability to lead and enjoy a normal life. The losses are either permanent or continuing and Plaintiff will suffer the losses in the future. Plaintiff's motor vehicle was also damaged. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, demands judgment for damages against Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL, and any other such relief deemed proper by the Court. Plaintiff also demands a jury trial on all issues so triable herein. COUNT IT VICARIOUS LIABILITY AGAINST ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-8, and further states 9. At all times material to this action, Defendant MADELYN F. GAMMELL was operating the motor vehicle owned by Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, with the knowledge, permission, and consent of Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL. 10. Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, is responsible for the negligence of Defendant, MADELYN F. GAMMELL under Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, demands judgment for damages against Defendant, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, and any other such relief deemed proper by the Court. Plaintiffalso demands a jury trial on all issues so triable herein. RESPECTFULLY submitted this 11" day of April, 2022. /s/ Isabel D. Barroso, Esq. ISABEL D. BARROSO, ESQ. FBN: 0083366 Morgan & Morgan 12800 University Drive, Suite 600 Fort Myers, FL 33907 Phone: (239) 433-6880 Attorneys for Plaintiff E-Mail: idiazbarroso@forthepeople.com EX.B Claim Number: 599570259 Claim Office: Corporate Office This is Kevin White speaking to Sherri Zimmerman on July 19th, 2019 at 4:16 P.M. Central Standard Time in order to record the release for the settlement of their bodily injury claim under claim number 599570259. Q. Ms. Zimmerman, are you aware I'm recording this release? A Yes. Q Do | have your permission to do so? Yes. This release is for the accident which occurred on July 2nd, 2019 at 5:28 P.M. on Harborview Road in Port Charlotte, Florida. This, with this settlement you are releasing Roger Emmart, Angela Gammel(sp?) Clinton(sp?) Gammel, Madeline(sp?) Gammel, Joanna Curtis(sp?), Kershawn(sp?) Curtis, Mackenzie(sp?) Gammel, Ronald Manoholarlo(sp?) for all injuries known and unknown resulting from this accident. We have agreed to settle your bodily injury claim for $450 under the promise of payment all reasonable and necessary expenses not to exceed $10,000 incurred for medical, dental, or surgical treatment, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing services, and prosthetic devices furnished to the benefit of Sherri Zimmerman within 180 days following the date of the accident as a result of the accident described herein. The settlement includes all medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. Do you agree with this bodily injury settlement as outlined? Yeah. Do you understand that you can file no further actions or lawsuits against Roger Emmart, Madeleine Gammel, Adalin- Angela Gammel, Clinton Gammel, Joanna Curtis, Kershawn Curtis, Mackenzie Gammell, Ronald Manoholarlo after the settlement? Yeah. Q Thank you very much, Ms. Zimmerman. And this concludes the recording. Please hold the line. A Okay. Electronic Signature: Transcription Express, Inc. Transcript Returned: 9/28/2020 10:47:05 PM; Transcriptionist ID 20091102; Quality Assurance ID 16092701 Statement of: sherri zimmerman Claim #: 599570z59 Page #: 1 PAYMENT NO 119 148917J CLAIM NO 59-9570-Z59 EX. C PAYMENT AMOUNT $10,000.00 LOSS DATE 07-02-2019 ISSUE DATE 01-20-2021 POLICY NO G701-690-59 AUTHORIZED BY PULLIAM, DEBRA INSURED GAMMELL, CLINTON R & ANGELA L PHONE (844) 292-8615 \ { 0/310 Y0 MORGAN & MORGAN TRUST ACCOUNT 12800 UNIVERSITY DR STE 600 FBO SHERRI ZIMMERMAN S8D0 FORT MYERS FL 33907-5349 COVERAGE DESCRIPTION ON BEHALF OF AMOUNT BODILY INJURY LIABILITY ZIMMERMAN, SHERRI 10,000.00 RETAIN STUB FOR RECORDS “ ae POR BRN, #73 486 “os. ‘e ARM MUTUAL NY. fluor cla’ 561564766 MA! % 42 LUMBY “PAGECNTO.POi 4% ss aN ay, ey, Be aid “DAT Mt, iW No’ 59- '0-Z59: insureo / GAMM! CKINTO! BAN ELA “LOSS ;DATE 7-02-20 19: i is AhesabpteennceansnsenedeneeeExnenLy TEN: THOUSAND AND 60/1001 DOLLARS $****10, 000,00 Pay-to the: Order at MORGAN & MORGAN TRUST ACCOUNT FBO SHERRI ZIMMERMAN ° Makai bp auinbaiied cre % AUTHORIZED are ‘SECURED DOCUMENT WATERMARK APPEARS ON BACK, HOLD AT 45° ANGLE FOR VIEWING I —s EX. D CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY, FLORIDA SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, PLAINTIFF, Vv CASE NO 20-CA-989 MADELYN F. GAMMELL, ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL, DEFENDANTS. DEPOSITION OF SHERRI ZIMMERMAN APPEARING REMOTELY NOVEMBER 3, 2022 3 #00 P.M. REPORTED BY: VERONICA I. PEREZ, CSR APPEARING REMOTELY FROM CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA REMOTE APPEARANCES: FOR SHERRI ZIMMERMAN: MORGAN & MORGAN ISABEL D. BARROSO, ESQ. 12800 UNIVERSITY DR., SUITE 600 FORT MYERS, FLORIDA 33907 239.210.5340 FOR MADELYN F. GAMMELL & ANGELA LEIGH GAMMELL: KUBICKI DRAPER STEFANIE. D. CAPPS, ESQ. 10 13350 METRO PARKWAY, SUITE 401 FORT MYERS, FLORIDA 33966 11 239.461.8102 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INDEX TO EXAMINATION WITNESS: SHERRI ZIMMERMAN PAGE DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. CAPPS CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. BARROSOS 39 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. CAPPS 46 RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. BARROSO 47 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. CAPPS 48 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 INDEX TO EXHIBITS REMOTELY MENTIONED PAGE EXHIBIT 1 24 STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY CHECK 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2022, 3:00 P.M. SHERRI ZIMMERMAN, HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: BY MS. CAPPS: Q GOOD AFTERNOON. MY NAME IS STEFANIE CAPPS. I 10 REPRESENT THE DEFENDANTS, GAMMELL AND EMMART, IN A LAWSUIT YOU 11 BROUGHT. THIS IS A LITTLE BIT OF A UNIQUE SITUATION BECAUSE 12 WE'RE DOING A DEPOSITION TODAY IN THAT LAWSUIT, BUT IN A VERY 13 NARROW ISSUE THAT WE NEED TO DEAL WITH FIRST IN THAT LAWSUIT. 14 BEFORE I GET STARTED FULLY, CAN YOU GIVE ME YOU FULL NAME AND 15 DATE OF BIRTH? 16 A SHERRI LYNN ZIMMERMAN. 9-18-61. 17 Q OKAY. I'M GOING TO TURN MY VOLUME DOWN A LITTLE BIT 18 I DON'T KNOW IF THAT -- YEAH. I THINK MY VOLUME IS JUST A 19 LITTLE TOO HIGH. I'M GETTING A LITTLE BIT OF FEEDBACK THERE. 20 OKAY. 21 MS. ZIMMERMAN, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN A DEPOSITION 22 BEFORE? 23 A I HAVE NOT. 24 Q OKAY. I'M JUST GOING TO GO OVER WHAT I CALL 25 GUIDELINES FOR THE PROCESS THAT JUST HELP IT GO SMOOTHLY. THIS WON'T TAKE VERY LONG THIS AFTERNOON, BY THE WAY. WE WANT IT TO GO AS SMOOTHLY AND EFFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE. EVERYTHING WE SAY IS BEING TYPED BY OUR COURT REPORTER. SO IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE KEEP SOME THINGS IN MIND. FIRST, ALL OF YOUR ANSWERS NEED TO BE VERBAL. EVEN THINGS LIKE MH-HM OR NAH-AH. I'M GOING TO ASK IF THAT IS A YES OR IS IT A NO. I'M NOT TRYING TO BE RUDE. I'M JUST MAKING SURE WE'RE CLEAR. OKAY? A YES. Q OKAY. ANOTHER THING IS THAT WE HAVE TO BE MINDFUL 10 THAT WE DON'T TALK OVER EACH OTHER. ZOOM CAN HAVE SOMETIMES A 11 LITTLE BIT OF A DELAY IN SOUND AND PEOPLE TEND TO NATURALLY 12 INTERRUPT EACH OTHER. I'M GOING TO ASK YOU VERY SIMPLE AND 13 BASIC QUESTIONS. IT'S A GOOD RULE OF THUMB JUST TO PAUSE FOR A 14 MOMENT, MAKE SURE I'VE FINISHED TALKING, AND I WILL DO THE SAME 15 FOR YOU. OKAY? 16 A YES. 17 Q IF YOU, AND ALONG THOSE SAME LINES WITH ZOOM, CANNOT 18 HEAR MY QUESTION, OR IT DOESN'T COME OUT CLEARLY WITH THE AUDIO, 19 PLEASE, DO NOT HESITATE TO ASK ME TO REPEAT MYSELF. OKAY? 20 A OKAY. 21 Q AND IF YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND MY QUESTION, MEANING THAT 22 I HAVE A CONFUSING QUESTION, PLEASE, LET ME KNOW. I WILL 23 REPHRASE IT. OKAY? 24 A OKAY. THANK YOU. 25 Q OKAY. WE'RE GETTING A LITTLE BIT OF FEEDBACK. I DON'T KNOW IF ANYBODY ELSE GOT THAT. THERE WAS A LITTLE BIT OF SKIPPING, BUT HOPEFULLY EVERYTHING WILL GO SMOOTHLY. I'M TRYING TO FIX MY HAIR, BUT I DON'T KNOW HOW TO DO IT. OKAY. EVERYTHING WILL GO SMOOTHLY HERE WITH THE INTERNET AND THIS WON'T TAKE TOO LONG. OKAY. SO WE'RE HERE. ONE OF THE ISSUES IN THIS LAWSUIT IS THAT STATE FARM, WHO INSURES MY CLIENT HERE, ALLEGED THAT A SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED BEFORE THE LAWSUIT. SO WHAT WE HAVE DONE IS, BASICALLY, WE ARE GOING TO BE ADDRESSING THAT QUESTION FIRST BEFORE WE MOVE ON TO THE BODILY INJURY 10 CLAIM. OKAY. SO I AM NOT ASKING YOU ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 11 ACCIDENT OR HOW YOU WERE HURT OR ANY OF THAT TODAY. IT'S JUST 12 GOING TO BE ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PRIOR 13 TO SUIT. I AM GOING TO START WITH SOME VERY BASIC BACKGROUND 14 QUESTIONS THAT I ASK OF EVERY WITNESS IN EVERY CASE. STARTING 15 THERE, WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT ADDRESS? 16 A I, ACTUALLY, DON'T HAVE A PLACE TO LIVE. 17 Q I'M SORRY. IS THAT A RESULT OF THE HURRICANE? 18 A NO. IT'S A RESULT OF MOVING TO DURHAM, NORTH 19 CAROLINA. I BRIEFLY LIVED WITH MY SON AND THEN I GOT AN 20 APARTMENT THAT HAD A LOT OF BLACK MOLD SO I HAD TO LEAVE 21 IMMEDIATELY. THE LANDLORD WASN'T VERY KIND. LET'S JUST PUT IT 22 THAT WAY. SO, UNFORTUNATELY, THIS HAS BECOME A VERY WEALTHY 23 TOWN AND THEY PROBABLY WON'T RENT TO PEOPLE WITH LOWER INCOMES. 24 Q I'M VERY SORRY TO HEAR THAT. 25 A THANK YOU. Q SO ARE YOU STAYING WITH YOUR SON AGAIN? A NO. I'VE BEEN MOVING AROUND TO A FEW PLACES TEMPORARILY DUE TO SOME OTHER FACTORS HAVING TO DO WITH MY SON AND HIS SITUATION. Q YOU'RE CURRENTLY IN DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA? A CORRECT. I MOVED HERE ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. AUGUST OF 2020. Q AND WHERE WERE YOU LIVING? WHAT WAS THE APARTMENT YOU WERE LIVING IN BEFORE YOU HAD TO MOVE OUT BECAUSE OF THE MOLD? 10 A GEEZ. I REALLY DON'T REMEMBER AT THIS MOMENT. 11 Q DO YOU REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE COMPLEX? 12 A I DON'T REMEMBER. I'M IN THE MIDST OF SPEAKING TO THE 13 PEOPLE FROM THERE. I KNOW THAT THE WOMAN THAT WAS IN THE OFFICE 14 PASSED AWAY A FEW YEARS AGO. HER SON IS NOW RUNNING IT. sO 15 YEAH. 16 Q DO YOU STILL GET MAIL AT THAT APARTMENT ADDRESS? 17 A NO. I MOVED OUT ABOUT A YEAR AGO BECAUSE THAT WAS THE 18 MOLD. I HAD THE BUILDING INSPECTOR COME THROUGH AND VIOLATED 19 THE MAN. IT WAS FOUR OR FIVE VIOLATIONS BECAUSE THAT'S HOW BAD 20 IT WAS. IT DIDN'T LOOK THAT BAD. IF YOU WERE TO SEE IT, THEY 21 DID A GOOD JOB OF COVERING UP THINGS. 22 Q I'M VERY SORRY TO HEAR ABOUT YOUR TROUBLES. HAVE YOU 23 TAKEN ANY MEDICATIONS TODAY THAT WOULD AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO 24 TESTIFY? 25 A NO. Q WHAT IS YOUR HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION? A COLLEGE. I DIDN'T GRADUATE, BUT IT'S HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IT WAS OVER TWENTY YEARS AGO. Q OKAY. AND DID YOU HAVE A CONCENTRATION IN YOUR COURSES? A I'M SORRY? Q DID YOU HAVE A CONCENTRATION OR A MAJOR THAT YOU WERE WORKING TOWARDS IN THE COURSES YOU HAVE BEEN TAKING? A I WAS GOING, ORIGINALLY, WHEN I STARTED FOR PUBLIC 10 HEALTH ADMINISTRATION. 11 Q AND HAVE YOU BEEN TAKING COURSES AT THE SAME COLLEGE 12 OR DIFFERENT UNIVERSITIES? 13 A. THE SAME. I'M TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW THIS IS 14 PERTINENT TO THE SUIT. I'M A LITTLE CONFUSED ON THAT. 15 Q LIKE I SAID, IT'S JUST BASIC BACKGROUND INFORMATION 16 AND IF WE WERE GOING INTO THE BODILY INJURY STUFF, IT WOULD BE A 17 LOT MORE THOROUGH. I JUST WANT TO GET A BASIC IDEA OF YOUR 18 BACKGROUND, EDUCATION LEVEL, ETC. WHAT COLLEGE HAVE YOU BEEN 19 TAKING COURSES AT? 20 A IT WAS CALLED EDISON COMMUNITY COLLEGE, WHICH HAS 21 CHANGED OVER TO FLORIDA STATE -- WESTERN STATE COLLEGE. 22 Q GOT IT. OKAY. AND PRIOR TO MOVING TO DURHAM IN 23 AUGUST 2020, WERE YOU LIVING IN THE SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AREA? 24 A I WAS. 25 Q AND WHAT WAS YOUR ADDRESS IN SOUTHWEST FLORIDA? A LET ME TAKE A LOOK. 20423 HILLSBOROUGH BOULEVARD, AND THAT'S PORT CHARLOTTE. I DON'T HAVE THE ZIP. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT'S A PROBLEM. Q THAT IS OKAY. CAN YOU GIVE US THE ADDRESS PART ONE MORE TIME? IT KIND OF BROKE UP A LITTLE BIT. A SURE. IT IS 20423 HILLSBOROUGH BOULEVARD PORT CHARLOTTE. GOT IT. OKAY. ARE YOU CURRENTLY EMPLOYED? I AM NOT. 10 AND WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU WERE EMPLOYED? 11 ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO. 12 Q WHAT DID YOU DO? 13 A. I GOT A JOB. I WAS DOING CENTERS, STORE MANAGING, 14 TAKING CARE OF THE SHELVES AND KEEPING EVERYTHING IN LINE. I 15 WAS DOING A LITTLE BIT OF STOCKING. GENERALLY, I WAS LOOKING 16 OUT FOR A FEW DIFFERENT THINGS SAFETY WISE. IN CASE THERE WERE 17 SAFETY ISSUES THERE, I WOULD BRING IT TO MANAGEMENTS ATTENTION 18 AGAIN AND AGAIN. 19 Q OKAY. WHAT, IF YOU COULD JUST GIVE ME AN IDEA, JOBS 20 HAVE YOU HAD IN YOUR ADULT LIFE? IT SOUNDS LIKE YOU WORKED AT A 21 GROCERY STORE. HAVE YOU ALWAYS WORKED IN THE RETAIL AREA OR 22 WHAT KIND OF THINGS HAVE YOU DONE FOR WORK? 23 A SOME OF THE MAIN JOBS I'VE DONE IS A BARBER -- A 24 LICENSED BARBER. BY BARBER, I MEAN HAIR. I DON'T MEAN BEAUTY. 25 I'VE NEVER DONE BEAUTY. I DON'T THINK I COULD. I HAD BARBER SHOPS. THERE WAS A BARBER SHOP IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD. A MAN TAUGHT ME HOW TO CUT HAIR, AND I WAS TWELVE YEARS