On January 14, 2016 a
Letter,Correspondence
was filed
involving a dispute between
Hatcher Armory, Llc,
Hatcher, Nathan,
and
Armory Dealer Management, Inc,
Houston Armory, Lp,
Houston Armory Technology Group, Llc,
Pace, William P.,
for Contract - Consumer/Commercial/Debt
in the District Court of Fort Bend County.
Preview
REALISH EAL
A Professional Corporation
___________________________
TTORNEYS AND OUNSELORS AT
700 Louisiana, 48 Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone (713) 255 3234
Direct Line (713) 255 3237
Facsimile (713) 783 2502
www.grealishmczeal.com
From the Desk of:
Dwight E. Jefferson
Of Counsel
Retired State District Judge
djefferson@grealishmczeal.com
June 28, 2022
Via Email and E File
Honorable Tameika Carter
Email: 400dc@fortbendcountytx.gov
Fort Bend County District Court
Judicial District Court
301 Jac
Richmond, T
Re: Cause No. 229243 Hatcher v. Pace, et al 400th Judicial District,
Bend County, Texas
Dear Judge Carter,
This letter is written to correct a gross misstatement of the law offered by the efendants
counsel at the court’s hearing on laintiff's otion to econsider and otion for ew rial
yesterday June 27, 2022.
Counsel for efendant incorrectly argued to the court that the third paragraph of rule
165a(3) provides that the court’s plenary power to consider the laintiff’s otion to econsider
expired on May 5th, 2022, thirty ( days after the timely filing of the otion to econsider. This
argument totally disregards the remainder of the language of the third paragraph of 165a(3) which
states the court “has plenary power to reinstate the case until 30 days after all such timely filed
motions are overruled, either by written and signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs
first.”
laintiff submits that the full reading of rule 165a(3) avoids the absurdity of efendant
counsel’s argument that the effect of the court's failure to rule on laintiff s timely filed otion to
econsider within 30 days of its filing is the loss of the court’s plenary power to act on laintiff's
motion. The timely filing of a post judgment motion extends the court's plenary power until 30
days after the court rules on the motion and not 30 days from the date the post judgment motion
was filed.
Regarding the evidence submitted at the DWOP hearing on the issue of lack of notice
lthough the efendant argue that the laintiff received notice of the DWOP hearing, the
undisputed evidence offered by the Plaintiff at the hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate,
including the affidavits of Plaintiff’s counsel, his paralegal, and the landlord/owner of the property
being leased as Plaintiff counsel's office, shows that the landlord incorrectly registered with the
post office, and erroneously represented to Plaintiff’s counsel that the mailing address of the
property was 5150 Hardy Rd., and that no mail was ever delivered there.
Moreover, the evidence submitted at the hearing on the motion to reinstate showed that the
Fort Bend County District Clerk and County Clerk were provided written notice of Plaintiff
counsel's correct address prior to the time the notice of the DWOP hearing was mailed to the
erroneous address, which the evidence also showed was never a valid address with the U.S. Postal
Service. The fact that the Hardy address was not a valid mailing address was unknown to
Plaintiff’s counsel at the time he was told the office address was 5150 Hardy Rd, and that address
was identified in the signature blocks on several filings as his firm's office address.
In closing, clearly under rule 165a(3) this court has plenary power to rule on Plaintiff’s
Motion to Reinstate and Motion for New Trial timely filed in this case, and pending final ruling
by this court. The evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff and his counsel did not receive notice of
the DWOP hearing, and the law is well settled that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to deny a new
trial or reinstatement when a party received no notice. See Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.
W. 3D 845, 852 (Tex.2004); Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip. 994 S.W. 2d 628, 630 (Tex.
1999)
Very truly yours,
Hon. Dwight E. Jefferson
DEJ/am
cc: Keval Patel
LAW OFFICE OF KEVAL PATEL, PC
19855 Southwest Freeway
Suite 330
Sugar Land, TX 77479
Tel: (281) 313-5300
Email: kpatel@patel-law.com
Attorney for Defendants
Christopher Ramey
THE RB LEGAL GROUP, PLLC
Attorney for the Plaintiff
215 S. 4th Street
Wallis, TX 77485
Tel: (713) 974-1333
Email: ramey@rblegalgroup.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
2
Document Filed Date
June 28, 2022
Case Filing Date
January 14, 2016
Category
Contract - Consumer/Commercial/Debt
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REALISH EAL A Professional Corporation ___________________________ TTORNEYS AND OUNSELORS AT 700 Louisiana, 48 Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Telephone (713) 255 3234 Direct Line (713) 255 3237 Facsimile (713) 783 2502 www.grealishmczeal.com From the Desk of: Dwight E. Jefferson Of Counsel Retired State District Judge djefferson@grealishmczeal.com June 28, 2022 Via Email and E File Honorable Tameika Carter Email: 400dc@fortbendcountytx.gov Fort Bend County District Court Judicial District Court 301 Jac Richmond, T Re: Cause No. 229243 Hatcher v. Pace, et al 400th Judicial District, Bend County, Texas Dear Judge Carter, This letter is written to correct a gross misstatement of the law offered by the efendants counsel at the court’s hearing on laintiff's otion to econsider and otion for ew rial yesterday June 27, 2022. Counsel for efendant incorrectly argued to the court that the third paragraph of rule 165a(3) provides that the court’s plenary power to consider the laintiff’s otion to econsider expired on May 5th, 2022, thirty ( days after the timely filing of the otion to econsider. This argument totally disregards the remainder of the language of the third paragraph of 165a(3) which states the court “has plenary power to reinstate the case until 30 days after all such timely filed motions are overruled, either by written and signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs first.” laintiff submits that the full reading of rule 165a(3) avoids the absurdity of efendant counsel’s argument that the effect of the court's failure to rule on laintiff s timely filed otion to econsider within 30 days of its filing is the loss of the court’s plenary power to act on laintiff's motion. The timely filing of a post judgment motion extends the court's plenary power until 30 days after the court rules on the motion and not 30 days from the date the post judgment motion was filed. Regarding the evidence submitted at the DWOP hearing on the issue of lack of notice lthough the efendant argue that the laintiff received notice of the DWOP hearing, the undisputed evidence offered by the Plaintiff at the hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate, including the affidavits of Plaintiff’s counsel, his paralegal, and the landlord/owner of the property being leased as Plaintiff counsel's office, shows that the landlord incorrectly registered with the post office, and erroneously represented to Plaintiff’s counsel that the mailing address of the property was 5150 Hardy Rd., and that no mail was ever delivered there. Moreover, the evidence submitted at the hearing on the motion to reinstate showed that the Fort Bend County District Clerk and County Clerk were provided written notice of Plaintiff counsel's correct address prior to the time the notice of the DWOP hearing was mailed to the erroneous address, which the evidence also showed was never a valid address with the U.S. Postal Service. The fact that the Hardy address was not a valid mailing address was unknown to Plaintiff’s counsel at the time he was told the office address was 5150 Hardy Rd, and that address was identified in the signature blocks on several filings as his firm's office address. In closing, clearly under rule 165a(3) this court has plenary power to rule on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate and Motion for New Trial timely filed in this case, and pending final ruling by this court. The evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff and his counsel did not receive notice of the DWOP hearing, and the law is well settled that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to deny a new trial or reinstatement when a party received no notice. See Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S. W. 3D 845, 852 (Tex.2004); Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip. 994 S.W. 2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999) Very truly yours, Hon. Dwight E. Jefferson DEJ/am cc: Keval Patel LAW OFFICE OF KEVAL PATEL, PC 19855 Southwest Freeway Suite 330 Sugar Land, TX 77479 Tel: (281) 313-5300 Email: kpatel@patel-law.com Attorney for Defendants Christopher Ramey THE RB LEGAL GROUP, PLLC Attorney for the Plaintiff 215 S. 4th Street Wallis, TX 77485 Tel: (713) 974-1333 Email: ramey@rblegalgroup.com Attorney for Plaintiff 2