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  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
  • DAVID NGUYEN  vs.  PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANYMOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT document preview
						
                                

Preview

FILED 3/13/2020 3:35 PM FELICIA PITRE DISTRICT CLERK DALLAS CO., TEXAS Margaret Thomas DEPUTY CAUSE NO. DC-19-20391 DAVID NGUYEN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § VS. § 134m JUDICIAL DISTRICT § PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL § INSURANCE COMPANY § Defendant. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: COMES NOW, PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (“Progressive” and/or “Defendant”), Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause and, SUBJECT TO ITS MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, files this its Reply t0 Plaintiff’s Opposition t0 Defendant’s Motion t0 Transfer Venue and in support thereof would respectfully represent and show unto the Court the following: 1. Defendant Progressive timely filed its Motion t0 Transfer Venue of this case to the mandatory venue 0f Ellis County. In a suit against an insurance company regarding coverage, Texas Insurance Code §1952.1 10 provides two mandatory venues: (1) in the county where the policyholder or beneficiary instituted the suit resided at the time of the accident; or (2) in the county where the accident involving the uninsured 0r underinsured motorist’s vehicle occurred. Tex. Ins. Code §1952.1 10. Tex. Ins. Code §1952.110 is a mandatory venue provision that supersedes Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §15.032, which is expressly identified as a permissive venue statute. SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 1 See In re Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. C0., N0. 12-18-00100-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3920, at *6—*8 (TeX. App.—Tyler May 31, 2018) 2. During Plaintiff’s deposition taken last Friday 0n March 6, 2020, Plaintiff testified during his sworn deposition and it is undisputed that Plaintiff resided in Tarrant County (not Dallas County) at the time of the alleged accident. Further, it is undisputed that the alleged accident occurred in Ellis County. Therefore, venue is not proper in Dallas County because it is not a mandatory venue prescribed by TeX. Ins. Code §1952.110. See TeX. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §15.001(b)(1). Also, a trial court has no discretion t0 transfer venue 0n its own motion, even t0 a county 0f proper venue. See In re Masonite Corp, 997 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1999). 3. “Any response 0r opposing affidavits shall be filed at least 30 davs prior to the hearing 0f the motion t0 transfer.” Tex. R. CiV. P. 87(1). Here, Plaintiff filed its Response with no supporting evidence 0n March 12, 2020, only four (4) days before the hearing 0n Defendant’s Motion t0 Transfer Venue set for March 16, 2020. Because Plaintiff has failed t0 carry its burden to present proof by affidavit or evidence that venue is proper in Dallas County, “the right t0 choose proper venue passes t0 the defendant,” who has proven that venue is proper in Defendant’s chosen county ofEllis County. In re Berry GP, Ina, 530 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex. App.—Beaum0nt 2016); see In re Missouri Pacific R. C0., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); see also Tex. R. CiV. P. 87(2)(b), (3). Therefore, Defendant requests that this action be transferred t0 District Court in Ellis County, Texas, Where proper venue lies in this cause. SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 2 Respectfully submitted, WALTERS, BALIDO & CRAIN, L.L.P. BY: /S/ Randall G. Walters RANDALL G. WALTERS — 20819480 randy.wa1ters@wbclawfirm.com Service of Documents: WaltersEDOcsNotifications®wbclawfirm.com Meadow Park Tower, Suite 1500 10440 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75231 2 14/347-8381— FAX 214/347-8380 — DIRECT 214/749-4805 — MAIN ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on this the 13th day of March, 2020, a true and correct copy of the above document has been forwarded to all known counsel of record. /s/Randall G. Walters RANDALL G. WALTERS SUBJECT TO MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION T0 DEFENDANT’S MOTION T0 TRANSFER VENUE PAGE 3 Tex. Ins. Code 6 1952.110 This document is current through the 2019 Regular Session, 86th Legislature, and 2019 election results. Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® > Insurance Code > Title 10 Property and Casualty Insurance (Subts. A I) > — Subtitle C Automobile Insurance (Chs. 1951 2000) > — Chapter 1952 Policy Provisions and Forms forAutomobiIe Insurance (Subchs. A H) > — Subchapter C Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage (§§ 1952. 101 1952. 150) — Sec. 1952.1 1 0. Venue. Notwithstanding Section 15.032, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, an action against an insurer in relation to the coverage provided under this subchapter, including an action to enforce that coverage, may be brought only in the county in which: (1)the policyholder or beneficiary instituting the action resided at the time of the accident involving the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle; or (2)the accident occurred. History Enacted by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 727 (H.B. 2017), § g, effective April 1, 2007. Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® Copyright © 2020 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. End of Document Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 6 15.001 This document is current through the 2019 Regular Session, 86th Legislature, and 2019 election results. Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® > Civil Practice and Remedies Code > Title 2 Trial, Judgment, and Appeal (Subts. A — D) > Subtitle B Trial Matters (Chs. 15 30) > — Chapter 15 Venue (Subchs. A — E) > SubchapterA Definitions; General Rules (§§ 15.001 — 15.010) Sec. 15.001. Definitions. In this chapter: (a)“Principa| office” means a principal office of the corporation, unincorporated association, or partnership in this state in which the decision makers for the organization within this state conduct the daily affairs of the organization. The mere presence of an agency or representative does not establish a principal office. (b)“Proper venue” means: (1)the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue; or (2)if Subdivision (1) does not apply, the venue provided by this subchapter or Subchapter C. History Enacted by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 138 (S.B. 32), § 1, effective August 28, 1995. Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis® Copyright © 2020 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. End of Document RULE 86. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Time t0 File. An objection t0 improper venue is waived if not made by written motion filed prior to or concurrently with any other plea, pleading or motion except a special appearance motion provided for in Rule 120a. A written consent 0f the parties t0 transfer the case t0 another countymay be filed with the clerk of the court at any time. A motion to transfervenue because an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is pending is governed by the provisions 0f Rule 257. How to File. The motion objecting to improper venue may be contained in a separate instrument filed concurrently with 0r prior to the filing of the movant's first responsive pleading or the motion may be combined with other obj ections and defenses and included in the movant's first responsive pleading. Requisites 0f Motion. The motion, and any amendments t0 it, shall state that the action should be transferred to another specified county of proper venue because: (a) The county where the action is pending is not a proper county; or (b) Mandatory venue 0f the action in another county is prescribed by one or more specific statutory provisions Which shall be clearly designated 0r indicated. The motion and factual basis for the transfer 0f the action and request shall state the legal and request transfer of the action t0 a specific county of mandatory transfer 0f the action or proper venue. Verification of the motion is not required. The motion may be accompanied by supporting affidavits as provided in Rule 87. Response and Reply. Except as provided in paragraph 3(a) of Rule 87, a response to the motion t0 transfer is not required. Verificationof a response is not required. Service. A copy of any instrument filed pursuant t0 Rule 86 shall be served in accordance with Rule 2 1 a. RULE 87. DETERMINATION 0F MOTION T0 TRANSFER Consideration 0f Motion. The determination 0f a motion to transfer venue shall be made promptly by the court and such determination must be made in a reasonable time prior to commencement of the trial 0n the merits. The movant has the duty to request a setting on the motion t0 transfer. Except 0n leave of court each party is entitled to at least 45 days notice of a hearing 0n the motion to transfer. Except on leave 0f court, any response or opposing affidavits shall be filed at least 30 days prior to the hearing of the motion to transfer. The movant is not required to file a reply to the response but any reply and any additional affidavits supporting the motion to transfer must, except 0n leave 0f court, be filed not later than 7 days prior t0 the hearing date. 2. Burden 0f Establishing Venue. (a) In General. A party Who seeks t0 maintain venue of the action in a particular county in reliance upon Section 15.001 (General Rule), Sections 15.01 1-15.017 (Mandatory Venue), Sections 15.03 1-15.040 (Permissive Venue), or Sections 15.061 and 15.062 (Multiple Claims), Civil Practice and Remedies Code, has the burden t0 make proof, as provided in paragraph 3 0f this rule, that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. A party who seeks t0 transfer venue 0f the action t0 another specified county under Section 15.001 (General Rule), Sections 15.01 1- 15.017 (Mandatory Venue), Sections 15.031-15.040 (Permissive Venue), 0r Sections 15.061 and 15.062 (Multiple Claims), Civil Practice and Remedies Code, has the burden to make proof, as provided in paragraph 3 of this rule, that venue is maintainable in the county t0 Which transfer is sought. A party Who seeks t0 transfer venue of the action t0 another specified county under Sections 15.01 1-15.017, Civil Practice and Remedies Code 0n the basis that a mandatory venue provision is applicable and controlling has the burden t0 make proof, as provided in paragraph 3 of this rule, that venue is maintainable in the county to which transfer is sought by Virtue of one 0r more mandatory venue exceptions. (b) Cause 0f Action. It shall not be necessary for a claimant t0 prove the merits of a cause of action, but the existence 0f a cause of action, When pleaded properly, shall be taken as established as alleged by the pleadings. When the defendant specifically denies the venue allegations, the claimant is required, by prima facie proof as provided in paragraph 3 0fthis rule, t0 support such pleading that the cause 0f action taken as established by the pleadings, or a part of such cause of action, accrued in the county of suit. If a defendant seeks transfer t0 a county Where the cause of action 0r a part thereof accrued, it shall be sufficient for the defendant to plead that if a cause of action exists, then the cause of action or part thereof accrued in the specific county t0 Which transfer is sought, and such allegation shall not constitute an admission that a cause of action in fact exists. But the defendant shall be required to support his pleading by prima facie proof as provided in paragraph 3 of this rule, that, if a cause of action exists, it or a part thereof accrued in the county t0 Which transfer is sought. (C) Other Rules. A motion to transfer venue based 0n the written consent of the parties shall be determined in accordance with Rule 255. A motion to transfer venue 0n the basis that an impartial trial cannot be had in the courts Where the action is pending shall be determined in accordance With Rules 258 and 259. 3. Proof. (a) Affidavits and Attachments. A11 venue facts, When properly pleaded, shall be taken as true unless specifically denied by the adverse party. When a venue fact is specifically denied, the party pleading the venue fact must make prima facie proof of that venue fact; provided, however, that no party shall ever be required for venue purposes to support prima facie proof the existence of a cause of action or part thereof, and at the hearing the pleadings of the parties shall be taken as conclusive on the issues of existence of a cause of action. Prima facie proof is made When the venue facts are properly pleaded and an affidavit, and any duly proved attachments to the affidavit, are filed fully and specifically setting forth the facts supporting such pleading. Affidavits shall be made 0n personal knowledge, shall set forth specific facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify. (b) The Hearing. The court shall determine the motion to transfer venue on the basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties and such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties in accordance with the preceding subdivision of this paragraph 3 0r of Rule 88. (C) If a claimant has adequately pleaded and made prima facie proof that venue is proper in the county of suit as provided in subdivision (a) of paragraph 3, then the cause shall not be transferred but shall be retained in the county 0f suit, unless the motion to transfer is based 0n the grounds that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the action is pending as provided in Rules 257-259 0r 0n an established ground 0f mandatory venue. A ground 0f mandatory venue is established When the party relying upon a mandatory exception to the general rule makes prima facie proof as provided in subdivision (a) of paragraph 3 of this rule. (d) In the event that the parties shall fail to make prima facie proof that the county of suit or the specific county to which transfer is sought is a county 0f proper venue, then the court may direct the parties to make further proof. N0 Jury. A11 venue challenges shall be determined by the court Without the aid of a jury. Motion for Rehearing. If venue has been sustained as against a motion t0 transfer, 0r if an action has been transferred to a proper county in response to a motion to transfer, then n0 further motions to transfer shall be considered regardless of Whether the movant was a party to the prior proceedings orwas added as a party subsequent t0 the venue proceedings, unless the motion to transfer is based on the grounds that an impartial trial cannot be had under Rules 257-259 or on the ground of mandatory venue, provided that such claim was not available t0 the other movant 0r movants. Parties Who added subsequently to an action and are precluded by this Rule from having are a motion to transfer considered may raise the propriety of venue on appeal, provided that the party has timely filed a motion t0 transfer. There shall be no interlocutory appeals from such determination. Notes and Comments No Shepard’s SignaITM As of: March 13, 2020 7:10 PM Z In re Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. Court of Appeals of Texas, Twelfth District, Tyler May 31, 2018, Opinion Delivered NO. 12-18-00100-CV Reporter 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3920 *; 2018 WL 2440461 MEMORANDUM OPINION METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY IN RE: INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL, RELATORS Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company, Metropolitan Direct Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Metropolitan General Insurance Company, Notice: PUBLISH Company of Texas, and Metropolitan Lloyds Insurance Economy Premier Insurance Company (collectively "Metropolitan") seek mandamus relief from the trial court's orders denying its motion to transfer venue and motion to sever.1 We deny the writ. Prior History: [*1]APPEALED FROM 4TH DISTRICT COURT, Rusk County; Judge J. Clay Gossett. BACKGROUND In 2013, Patti Wan was involved in an automobile collision with Fidel Campos's minor son, an uninsured Counsel: For Relator: SEAN HIGGINS. motorist. [*2] Wan was covered by an insurance policy issued by Metropolitan that included uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. Metropolitan paid Wan‘s property Real Party In Interest: JAMES HOLMES. damage and bodily injury claims, less her $250 deductible on the property claim. Metropolitan obtained partial Campos and entered into a subrogation from repayment agreement with him. Metropolitan Judges: Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., reimbursed Wan's deductible in April 201 7. and Neeley, J. Subsequent to the collision, Wan sued Campos for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the collision. In October 2017, she amended her petition to include Opinion by: JAMES T. WORTHEN 1The Respondent is J. Clay Gossett, Judge of the Honorable the 4th Judicial District Rusk County, Texas. The Court, Opinion underlying proceeding is trial court cause number 2013-395, styled Patti Wan, Individually & On Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated v. Fidel Campos; Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co.; Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co.; ORIGINAL PROCEEDING Metropolitan Direct Property & Casualty Co.; Metropolitan General Ins. Co.; Economy Fire & Casualty Co.; Economy Preferred Ins. Co.; Metropolitan Lloyds Ins. Co. of Texas; Economy Premier Assurance Co.; and Liberty County Mutual Ins. Co. Page 2 of 4 2018 TeX. App. LEXIS 3920, *2 allegations against Metropolitan for breach of contract, In its first issue, Metropolitan contends the trial court conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, abused its discretion when it denied the motion to sever and declaratoryjudgment. She alleged that Metropolitan Wan's claims against it from her claims against failed to timely reimburse her deductible, and she Campos. However, Wan filed a motion to lift the stay sought certification of a class. Metropolitan moved to imposed by this Court, on grounds that she no longer transfer venue to Dallas County and sever the claims desired to contest the severance? In her response to against it from the claims against Campos. Following a Metropolitan's petition, Wan withdrew her opposition to hearing, the trial court denied both motions. This original the motion to sever and agreed to sever her claims proceeding followed. against Metropolitan from her claims against Campos. When, as in this case, a controversy no longer exists AVAILABILITY OF MANDAMUS between the parties, the case becomes moot. Reule v. RLZ Inv., 41 1 S.W.3d 31, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. In re Sw. Bell Dist] 2013, no pet). When a judgment "cannot have a Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. 2007) (orig. practical effect on an existing controversy, the case is proceeding). Mandamus will issue only to correct a clear moot and any opinion issued on the merits in the appeal abuse of discretion for which the relator has no would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion." Id. adequate remedy by appeal. [*3] In re Prudential Ins. An opinion is advisory when it neither constitutes Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. specific relief to a litigant nor affects legal relations. See proceeding). A trial court has no discretion in Houston Chronicle Publ'q Co. v. Thomas, 196 determining what the law is or applying the law to the S.W.3d 396, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2006, facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. no get. 2. 19—92) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to analyze or apply the law correctly. Accordingly, because Wan has expressly represented to Id. As the party seeking relief, the relator bears the this Court [*5] that she no longer contests burden of demonstrating entitlement to mandamus Metropolitan's entitlement to a severance, we conclude relief. Id. at 837; In re Fitzgerald, 429 S.W.3d 886, 891 that this issuenow moot. See Reule 411 S.W.3d is at (Tex. App.—Tvler 2014, oriq. proceedinq.). g. Thus, we need not address it.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. An appellate remedy is adequate when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments. I_n MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. When the benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider In second issue, Metropolitan argues that the trial its whether the appellate remedy is adequate. Id. This court abused its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue to Dallas County. Metropolitan urges that determination is not "abstract or formulaic," but rather is there is no basis for venue in Rusk County once the a practical and prudential determination. Id. at 136. claims against it are severed. Flexibility is the principal virtue of mandamus relief and rigid rules are "necessarily inconsistent" with that flexibility. Id. Thus, the supreme court has held that "an A party may appeal a venue ruling following a trial on the merits. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 5 appellateremedy is not inadequate merely because it 15.064(b1 (West 2017). venue was improper, "it shall If may involve more expense or delay" than a writ of in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible mandamus, however, the word "merely" must be error." Id. Consequently, venue determinations carefully considered. Id. Appeal is not an adequate mandamus generally are not reviewable by mandamus. In_re remedy when the denial of relief would result in an "irreversible and public waste of judicial Masonite Corp., 997 S.W2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) resources." Id. at 137. The decision whether there is an (orig. proceeding). A party seeking to enforce a mandatory venue provision is not required to prove the adequate [*4] remedy on appeal "depends heavily on lack of an adequate appellate remedy, but is required the circumstances presented." Id. The decision is not confined to the private concerns of the parties but can extend to the impact on the legal system. Id. 2We denied Wan‘s motion to lift the stay. 3We trust that the parties will present Respondent with an order granting the severance and that Respondent will sign SEVERANCE Wan's acquiescence such an order in light of to the severance. Page 3 of 4 2018 TeX. App. LEXIS 3920, *5 only to show that theabused its discretion. l_n trial court brought in the county in which the accident occurred or re Mo. Pac. R.R. 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. Co., the policyholder resided at the time of the accident fl). However, when the relator does not seek involving the uninsured motor vehicle. Tex. Ins. Code enforcement of a mandatory venue statute, mandamus Ann. § 1952.110 (West 2009). In this case, it is generally is not available absent an abuse of discretion undisputed that the accident in question occurred in by the trial court and an inadequate appellate remedy. Rusk County and that Wan resided in Rusk County at See id. But mandamus review of permissive venue the time of the accident. In addition, Wan's allegations determinations is appropriate only in "extraordinary [*6] against Metropolitan concern the manner in which circumstances." In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W3d Metropolitan handled the reimbursement of Wan's 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). uninsured motorist property claim. Unlike Section 15.032, Section 1952.110 is a mandatory venue Metropolitan alleges that venue in Rusk County is See In re Reynolds, 369 S.W3d provision. 638, 648 improper because its principal place of business is in (Tex.App.—Ty/er 2012, oriq. proceedinq). As a result, Dallas County. Therefore, according to Metropolitan, Wan's lawsuit against[*8] Metropolitan necessarily proper venue lies in Dallas County and Wan's claims relates to her uninsured motorist coverage and venue is against it be transferred because they were should mandatory in Rusk County. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § improperly joined with her claims against Campos and 1952.110.4 Thus, even assuming the lack of an no venue facts support venue in Rusk County. Although adequate remedy, Metropolitan cannot show that Metropolitan does not direct this Court to the specific Respondent abused his discretion by denying the venue provision on which it relies, we assume motion to transfer venue. Consequently, Metropolitan Metropolitan relies on Section 15.032 of the Texas Civil fails to meet its burden of establishing both prerequisites Practice and Remedies Code, which pertains to to mandamus relief regarding Respondent's venue insurance. Under that section, a suit against an determination. See Fitzqerald, 429 S. W.3d at 891. insurance company may be brought in the county in which the company's principal office is located, the county in which the loss occurred, or the county in which DISPOSITION the policyholder resided at the time the cause of action accrued. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 6 15.032 Having determined that Metropolitan's first issue is moot (West 2017). The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies and that it failed to establish an entitlement to Code expressly identifies Section 15.032 as a mandamus relief through its second issue, we denythe permissive venue statute, thus, Metropolitan relies upon petition for writ of mandamus. We lift our stay of permissive venue, not mandatory venue. See id.; see proceedings ordered on April 25, 2018. also Chiriboqa V. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 96 S.W3d 673, 682 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) JAMES T. WORTHEN (noting that Section 15.032 is a permissive venue Chief Justice scheme). As a result, absent "extraordinary circumstances," mandamus review is not appropriate Opinion delivered May 31, 2018. in [*7] this case. See Masonite, 997 S.W2d at 197; Team Rocket, 256 S.W3d at 262. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J. Assuming, without deciding, that this case satisfies the extraordinary circumstances requirement, Metropolitan (PUBLISH) is entitled to a writ of mandamus only if it establishes both prerequisites to mandamus review. See In_re Fitzqerald, 429 S.W.3d at 891. And the mandamus ORIGINAL PROCEEDING record does not demonstrate Metropolitan‘s ability to establish an abuse of discretion. 4 Rather, the record demonstrates that Wan brought forth In its reply brief, Metropolitan argues Section 1952.110 does sufficient venue facts to support Rusk County venue in not apply. We disagree for the reasons stated in the opinion. However, even assuming Metropolitanis correct, venue is still with respect to her lawsuit against Metropolitan. Under proper Rusk County under the permissive venue statute in the Texas Insurance Code, an action against an insurer because Wan resides in Rusk County. See TeX. Civ. Prac. & in relation to uninsured motorist coverage must be Rem. Code Ann. 15.032. Page 4 of 4 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3920, *8 ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of mandamus filed by Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, et al; who are the relators in Cause No. 2013-395, pending on the docket of the 4th JudicialDistrict Court of Rusk County, Texas. Said petition for writ of mandamus having been filed herein on April 24, 2018, and the same having [*9] been duly considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that writ should not issue, it is therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the said petition for writ of mandamus be, and the same is, hereby denied. It is further ORDERED that the Relators, METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL, pay all costs incurred by reason of this proceeding. James T. Worthen, Chief Justice. End 0f Document o As Cited March 2020 7:20 PM Z of: 13, In re Berry GP, Inc. Court of Appeals of Texas, Ninth District, Beaumont September 16, 2016, Submitted; November 3, 2016, Opinion Delivered NO. 09-1 6-00292-CV Reporter 530 S.W.3d 201 *; 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11913 **; 2016 WL 6518610 [*203] where the suit was filed, t0 Howard County, the county