Document for LEN ACKIN, et al vs. POLY-AMERICA INTERNATIONAL INC., et al

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

						
                                
Preview
                                FILED
                                                                                                                10/4/2022 3:33 PM
                                                                                                                  FELICIA PITRE
                                                                                                                DISTRICT CLERK
                                                                                                             DALLAS CO., TEXAS
                                                                                                             Debra Clark DEPUTY


                                    CAUSE NO. DC-22-08610

LEN ACKIN, Individually, et al.,                                               IN THE DISTRICT COURT




                                                     §§§§§§§§§§§§
         Plaintiflk,

VS.
                                                                                191“ JUDICML DISTRICT
POLY AMERICA INTERNATIONAL INC,
POLY-AMERICA, INC., POLY-AMERICA
GP, LLC., POLY-AMERICA LP, and MARS
PARTNERS, LTD,

        Defendants.                                                           DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

      DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL
           EXCEPTIONS TO PLAIN TIFF S’ SECOND AMENDED PETITION

       COMES NOW, MARS PARTNERS LTD. (Defendant), Defendant in                               the above-styled


matter, and files its Original Answer and Special Exceptions to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition,

and would respectfully show unto the Court as follows:

        I.      SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS FOR THE SECOND AMENDED PETITION
        1.     Defendant specially excepts to Section               X of the Second Amended Petition where
Plaintiffs reference Violations of the Texas Health and Safety Code (THSC) §§ 341.002 et                     a1.,


361.001 et a1., 382.002 et a1., as well as Violations of the Texas Water Code § 26.001 et             a1.   As a

general matter, "et a1." means "and others." The use          of this term after the specific statute section is

overly broad and obscure. Importantly, it does not give fair notice of Plaintiffs‘ claims under this

cause of action. The test of fair notice is whether an opposing attorney          of reasonable competence,

with the pleadings before him, can determine the nature of the controversy and the testimony that

would probably be relevant.   A court must be able, from an examination of the plaintiff‘s pleadings

alone, to ascertain with reasonable certainty the elements of a cause of action and the relief sought

with sufficient particularity...." Coffey v. Johnson, 142 S.W.3d 414, 417 (TeX.App.—East1and



DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 1
2004, no pet). By merely alleging that Defendant's conduct amounts to "Violations of" several

code sections, Plaintiffs have failed to state any of the elements of a negligence per se cause of

action, therefore causing Defendant to be unable to ascertain the nature of the claims against it—

a violation of Texas' "fair notice" standard. Plaintiffs should be required to replead with specificity.

Of which special exception, Defendant prays judgment of the Court. Specifically,

            a.   Chapter 341 of the   THSC falls under Title 5 Sanitation and Environmental Quality

                 and sets out the Rules of Sanitation and Health Protection. It is unclear how this

                 chapter applies to the factual allegations and,   if so,   which section Plaintiffs are

                 claiming Defendant violated to support this cause of action. This is not fair notice.

            b.   Chapter 361 of the   THSC is   the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Nothing in Plaintiffs'

                 factual allegations refers to Defendant's solid waste disposal. So, it is unclear how

                 this chapter applies to the factual allegations and,   if so, which section Plaintiffs are

                 claiming Defendant violated to support this cause of action. This is not fair notice.

            c.   Chapter 753 of the   THSC covers Flammable Liquids. Nothing in Plaintiffs‘ factual

                 allegations refers to Defendant's use of flammable liquids. So, like above, it is

                 unclear how this chapter applies to the factual allegations and,     if so, which section
                 Plaintiffs are claiming Defendant violated to support this cause of action. This is

                 not fair notice.

            d.   Chapter 26 of the Texas Water Code deals with Water Quality Control. While there

                 seem to be allegations that Defendant contaminated water, we are left speculating

                 which specific section(s) Defendant allegedly violated. This is not fair notice.

       2.        Defendant specially excepts to Section XIV of the Second Amended Petition where

Plaintiffs allege nuisance. According to the Supreme Court of Texas, a plaintiff may only prevail



DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 2
on a nuisance allegation when the defendant proximately causes substantial interference with the

use   of enjoyment of land owned or occupied by the plaintiff that is substantial and unreasonable

under the circumstances. Crosstex N.     Tex. Pipeline, L.P.   v.   Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 592—595

(Tex. 2016). An injury without a wrong does not create a cause of action; to establish a cause of

action, a plaintiff must show a legal wrong—a Violation of a legal right and a breach of a legal

duty. Id. at 601. To prove intentional nuisance, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant

deliberately caused the interference, not just that the defendant intentionally engaged in the

conduct that caused the interference. Id. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is strictly liable but

make no factual allegation that Defendant's use of its facilities is unreasonable or that it

intentionally engaged in conduct that caused an interference. There is no causal link between

Defendant's lawful, reasonable use of its facilities and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Plaintiffs allege,

in the alternative, that Defendant negligently created a nuisance. The Court in Crosstex explained

that, among other things, a plaintiff must show the existence of and the breach       of a legal duty to

prove nuisance under a negligence theory. Id. at 606-07. Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that

Defendant did or failed to do what a person of ordinary prudence in the same circumstance would

have done or not done to repair or abate the condition which caused the alleged nuisance.

         3.     Defendant specially excepts to Section XV of the Second Amended Petition where

Plaintiffs allege premises liability. For a premises liability case, the plaintiff must prove:    (l) the
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge         of some condition on      the premises; (2) the

condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care

to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) the owner's failure proximately caused the plaintiffs


injuries. See Texas Utilities Elec. C0. v.   Timmons, 947 S.W.Zd     191, 193—194 (Tex. 1997). Applied

to these elements, the factual allegation that Defendant's "Facility abruptly exploded causing a




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 3
significant quantity of toxic fumes to pour into the air, water, real property, and the surrounding

area" fails as a matter of law. In general, premises liability involves a plaintiff getting injured While

on the defendant's property, which would not apply to most Plaintiffs here. Also, according to

Plaintiffs' factual allegations, they are all residents of Dallas County, and "[a]t the time of this

explosion and subsequent fire, Plaintiffs were residents of the surrounding area who unwillingly

inhaled said toxic fumes and contaminants, which then seeped into the surrounding area for hours

after the explosion." Then, under this cause of action, Plaintiffs baselessly assert that some of them

"entered Defendant's premises in response to Defendant‘s invitation and for their mutual benefit.

Some Plaintiffs were on the premises for employment or business-related reasons." At a minimum,

Defendant needs notice of which Plaintiffs claim they were on Defendant‘s premises as employees

or for business-related reasons.

        4.      Defendant specially excepts to Section XVI of the Second Amended Petition where

Plaintiffs allege battery.   A civil   battery is an intentional tort and shares the same elements as a

criminal battery:   (l) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (2) causing bodily injury to another,
threatening another with imminent bodily injury, or causing physical contact with another when

you know or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or

provocative. See Tex. Pen. Code § 22.01(a); Wafile House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 801

n.4 (Tex. 2010); Johnson v. Johnson, 869 S.W.2d 490, 492—493 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1993, writ

denied). Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts which would support a battery cause         of action

against Defendant.

        5.      Defendant specially excepts to Sections XVIII—XXIII of the Second Amended

Petition where Plaintiffs allege Defendant is liable for wrongful death and survivorship damages

for three plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have attempted to claim wrongful death and survivorship damages




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAINTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 4
Without first pleading the underlying cause of action (wrongful death). Plaintiffs had made no

factual allegations of when anyone died, their cause of death, and most importantly, Plaintiffs have

made no effort to link any misconduct on Defendant's part to their deaths. Because Defendant's

counsel cannot determine the nature of the controversy and the testimony that would probably be

relevant and because a court cannot, from the pleadings alone, ascertain the cause of action and

the relief sought with sufficient particularly, Plaintiffs have not supplied Defendant with fair notice

under the Cofley standard in Sections       XVIII—XXIII of their Second Amended Petition.

        6.          Defendant specially expects to Section    XXIV of the    Second Amended Petition

where Plaintiffs allege products liability. As the title of the cause of action provides, such cases

require claims that one of Defendant's products contains a defect. See Tex. Civ. Prac.       & Rem. Code

§ 82.00 l (2). In   Texas, a products liability action is "any action against a manufacturer or seller for

recovery of damages arising out of personal injury, death, or property damage allegedly caused by

a defective product." Id. (emphasis added). The defect may lie in the product‘s design,

manufacturing, or in the defendant's failure to warn of a dangerous aspect of the product. See

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 383 (TeX. 1995); Ford Motor Co.            v.   Ledesma, 242

S.W.3d 32,   41—42     (Tex. 2007); Munoz    v.   Gulf Oil C0., 732 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. App—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1987, writ refd). Here, Plaintiffs did not create a products liability claim when they

asserted that Defendant's "failure to properly produce polyethylene and other products created a

defect that caused a fire that harmed Plaintiffs[,]" nor did they create one when they asserted, in

the alternative, "the Defendants created a manufacturing defect when their product deviated in

construction and/ or quality from the specifications of the product." The main flaw in Section XXIV

of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition is that Plaintiffs did not provide what products Defendant

produces that allegedly injured. Without this information, the Petition does not provide Defendant




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 5
with fair notice. Further, Plaintiffs fail to make any allegation that there was a defective design in

any of Defendant's products, that any of Defendant's products injured them due to how it was

manufactured, or that Defendant failed to warn them about possible dangers with one of its

products.

                                        II. GENERAL DENIAL

        l.      Defendant denies each and every, all and singular, the material allegations

contained within Plaintiffs’ pleadings and demands strict proof thereof.

                          III. AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES

        2.      Pleading further, Defendant affirmatively alleges that as to this Defendant, Plaintifi‘s’

Petition fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

        3.      Pleading filrther, and without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant had no duty to

protect Plaintiffs from the criminal acts     of   a third person. These acts were unforeseeable to

Defendant. As such, the criminal conduct is a superseding and intervening cause that relieves

Defendant of liability.

        4.      Pleading further, and without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant would show that

any injuries and damages allegedly sustained by Plaintiffs were caused in whole or in part by the

acts, omissions, or defects   of third-parties or other defendants, conditions, or tangible items over

whom Defendant had no supervision or control and for whom Defendant is not legally responsible;

those acts, omissions, or defects were a proximate, producing, sole, or new and independent cause

of the incident and alleged damages; and there was no damage related to any alleged acts and/or

omissions on the part of Defendant or its employees.

        5.      Pleading further, and without waiver of the foregoing, under Sections 33.013 and

33.015 of the Texas    Civil Practice   and Remedies Code, Defendant is entitled to a comparative




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 6
apportionment of fault,   if any, as to other defendants and cross-defendants and/or third parties and
is entitled to judgment against them for contribution and/or indemnity and/or a percentage

reduction in accordance with the apportionment of fault.

       6.      Pleading further, and Without waiver of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred

by the doctrines of contributory negligence, comparative negligence, comparative responsibility,

and/or comparative causation. Pursuant to Texas         Civil Practice   and Remedies Code Section

33.001, et. seq., and the laws of Texas, Defendant invokes the law and doctrine of comparative

responsibility and specifically pleads a right of contribution from Plaintiffs and further pleads that

the Court should reduce the amount        of damages    to be recovered by Plaintiffs,   if   any, by a

percentage equal to Plaintiffs’ percentage   of responsibility.

       7.      Pleading fiirther, and Without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant denies any and

all liability on its part to Plaintiffs. However, in the unlikely event this Court or jury should find

Defendant was negligent, then Defendant would respectfully ask this Court to enter judgment for

contribution among Defendant and any responsible third parties, as that term is defined in Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 33, not a party to this lawsuit pursuant to Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code Section 33.001, et. seq., or any other applicable statute or common

law rule.

        8.     Pleading further, and without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant invokes the

provisions of Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, including:

       A.      Section 33 .003, which requires the determination of the percentage of responsibility
               of each party and settling defendant;

       B.      Section 33.001, which provides that the plaintiff may not recover damages          if his
               percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent;




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 7
        C.        Section 33.013(a), which provides that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff only
                  for the percentage of damages found by the trier of fact equal to the defendant’s
                  percentage of responsibility.

        9.        Pleading further, in the alternative and Without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant

denies it knew or should have known          of the alleged danger or condition that Plaintiffs allege

resulted in personal injury to Plaintiffs.

        10.       Pleading further, in the alternative and without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant

alleges that the risks of harm Plaintiffs allege to have suffered,         if   any, were not known or

reasonably knowable at the time of the incident made the basis of Plaintiffs’ claim. Thus, any risk

of harm was not reasonably foreseeable, and Defendant should not be held liable for Plaintiffs’

damages,     if any.
        11.       Defendant invokes the limitation on economic damages imposed by Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code § 41.0105, limiting such damages, and evidence thereof, to expenses

that are actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of Plaintiffs.

        12.       Defendant affirmatively pleads the limitations of damages provisions contained in

Chapter 304 of the Texas Finance Code, as superseded by § 311.031(c) of the Texas Government

Code. Specifically, Defendant asserts that prejudgment interest shall not accrue until the earlier of

180 days after the date Defendant received notice      of this claim or the date suit was filed, and that

the same is calculated as simple interest compounded annually.

        13.       Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and damages,     if   any, were proximately caused by

superseding and/or intervening acts that disrupted the chain of causation and were wholly beyond

the scope and/or control   of Defendant. Under such circumstances, Defendant prays its entitlement

to submit all appropriate issues supported by such evidence.




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 8
        14.     Plaintiffs’ injuries complained of in this suit were brought about Wholly by a new

and independent cause or causes not reasonably foreseeable by Defendant, and therefore such new

and independent cause or causes became the immediate and efficient cause or causes            of injury to

the extent any and all    of the alleged negligent acts and/or omissions complained of by Plaintiffs as

against Defendant were Wholly remote and non-causative of the injuries complained of by

Plaintiffs. Under such circumstances, Defendant prays its entitlement to submit all appropriate

issues supported by such evidence.

        15.     Defendant breached no duty of care to Plaintiffs,    if any.
        16.     Defendant affirmatively pleads that Plaintiffs’ alleged damages,      if any, in whole or
in part, were proximately caused by physical and/or mental conditions existing before the

occurrence in question.

        17.     Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by negligence and/or the comparative/contributory

negligence of Plaintiff or others, and/or by the assumption of risks,   if any, inherent in the activities

alleged to be at issue.

        18.     Defendant further invokes Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 18.091 and

would show that any claimant seeking recovery for loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity, loss

of contribution of a pecuniary value, or loss of inheritance should be required to be presented in

the form   of a net loss after reduction for income tax payments and Defendant will further request

jury instructions regarding whether recoveries are subject to Federal or State income taxes.

        19.     Pleading fiirther, in the unlikely event Defendant is found at fault, the amount

recovered for past medical or health care expenses incurred by Plaintiffs is limited by Section 41.0105

of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 9
         20.    Defendant asserts that   if Plaintiffs   have failed to make and perfect any available

claim for health insurance or worker’s compensation insurance or any other available method for

reducing the cost of necessary medical care, then Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate Plaintiffs’

damages as required, and recovery for such damages,           if any,   should be reduced on that basis.

Defendant fiirther asserts the terms and conditions of the Affordable Care Act requiring all persons

to carry and use health and medical insurance coverage. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ failure to do so,

if   any, amounts to a failure to mitigate the costs of Plaintiffs’ health and medical care and

treatment, both past and future.

         21.    Pleading further, and Without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant denies it

committed any act or omission constituting gross negligence against Plaintiffs.

         22.    Pleading further, and Without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant specifically

denies it is liable for exemplary damages. Nevertheless, Defendant requests that this Court give

proper definitions and instructions on standards for recovery        of exemplary damages, and further

pleads and invokes the limitations on the amount of recovery for exemplary and punitive damages

set forth in Chapter 4l   of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

         23.    Pleading further, and Without waiver of the foregoing, Defendant affirmatively

alleges that Plaintiffs’ claims for gross negligence and/or punitive or exemplary damages are

barred, because any award     of such damages in unconstitutional under the Constitutions of Texas

and the United States. In support   of this allegation, Defendant specially avers without limitation:

         (a)    The retrospective imposition of punitive damages under a new cause of action
                violates the rights of this Defendant under the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section
                10 of the United States Constitution.


         (b)    The imposition of punitive damages violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
                Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution as incorporated by the
                Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 10
       (C)     Due process requires proof of gross negligence and punitive damages by a standard
               greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard.

       (d)     Due process requires proof of such claims by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or,
               alternatively, by clear and convincing evidence.

       (e)     The assessment of punitive damages, a remedy that is essentially criminal in nature,
               Without safeguards greater than that afforded by Texas civil procedure and law,
               constitutes infliction of a criminal penalty without the safeguards guaranteed by the
               Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

       (f)     Any award of punitive damages against Defendant, without bifurcation and
               separate trial of the exemplary damages issues and all other issues in this case,
               would further violate Defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed by the
               Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section
               19, of the Texas Constitution, as well as by the public policy and common law of
               this State.

       (g)     Any award of punitive damages against Defendant, without requiring the jury to
               find every element of a cause or causes of action for punitive damages by clear and
               convincing evidence, and without specifically and expressly charging the jury that
               they must find every element of that cause or those causes of action by clear and
               convincing evidence, would violate Defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed
               by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I,
               Section 19, of the Texas Constitution, as well as by the public policy and common
               law of this State.

       (h)     Any award of punitive damages against Defendant, without requiring the jury           to
               consider the several factors established by the Texas Supreme Court for imposition
               of punitive damages, and without specifically and expressly charging the jury to
               consider those factors (namely, the nature of the wrong, the character of the conduct
               involved, the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer, the situation and sensibilities
               of the parties concerned, and the extent to which the conduct offends a public sense
               ofjustice and propriety) would violate Defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed
               by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I,
               Section 19, of the Texas Constitution, as well as by the public policy and common
               law of this State.

       (i)     Any award of punitive damages against Defendant, without any cap or limit
               whatsoever placed upon the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded,
               would violate Defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
               Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 19, of the
               Texas Constitution, as well as by the public policy and common law of this State.

       (i)     Any award of punitive damages against Defendant, which may be based upon any
               conduct not specifically alleged as the basis for Plaintiff‘s claim in this action,


DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 11
                 would Violate Defendant’s due process rights as guaranteed by the Foulteenth
                 Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section l9, of the
                 Texas Constitution, as well as by the public policy and common law of this State.

       24.       Defendant invokes the limitations upon punitive damages established pursuant to

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 41.001 et seq.,

both in terms of the maximum amount        of damages that can    be awarded pursuant to that statute,

and in terms of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the above-referenced provisions.

       25.       Defendant pleads all affirmative defenses available under Texas law to the extent

such defenses are supported by the evidence as adduced upon the completion of discovery.

       26.       Defendant adopts and asserts any affirmative defenses raised or asserted by other

defendants,   if any, to this action that are also applicable to Defendant.
       27.       Defendant reserves the right to assert any and all additional defenses that become

available or appear during discovery proceedings in this action, and Defendant specifically

reserves the right to amend its answer for the purpose of asserting such additional affirmative

defenses.

                                      IV. TRCP 193.7 NOTICE

       28.       Pursuant to Texas Rule    of Civil Procedure 193.7, Defendant hereby gives actual

notice to Plaintiffs that any and all documents produced may be used against Plaintiffs or any other

party at any pretrial proceeding and/or at the trial of this matter without the necessity of

authenticating documents.

                                         V. JURY DEMAND

       31.       Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 216, Defendant demands a jury trial and

the appropriate fee has been paid.




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE 12
                                            VL PRAVER
       WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant MARS PARTNERS LTD. prays

that Plaintiffs take nothing by this action and that Defendant be dismissed with its costs, and for such

other relief, both general and specific, at law or in equity, to which Defendant may be justly entitled.


                                                Respectfiilly submitted,

                                                DEHAY & ELLISTON, L.L.P.
                                                3500 Bank of America Plaza
                                                901 Main Street
                                               Dallas, TX 75202-3736
                                               Telephone: (214) 210-2400
                                               Fax: (214) 210-2500

                                                 By:   /s/ Pamela J. Williams
                                                       GARY D. ELLISTON
                                                       Texas State Bar No. 6584700
                                                       PAMELA J. WILLIAMS
                                                       Texas State Bar No. 00791936

                                                       ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
                                                       MARS PARTNERS LTD.



                                  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
       I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on October 4, 2022, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
instrument has been provided to all counsel of record Via e-filing, in accordance with the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, to all counsel of record.

                                                   /s/ Pamela J. Williams
                                                    PAMELA J. WILLIAMS




DEFENDANT MARS PARTNERS LTD.’S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO PLAJNTEFS’ SECOND AMENDED
PETITION AND JURY DEMAND - PAGE l3
                         Automated Certificate of eService
 This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
 document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
 The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
 of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cris Page on behalf of Pamela Williams
Bar No. 791936
cpage@dehay.com
Envelope ID: 68893011
Status as of 10/5/2022 9:44 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name                BarNumber   Email                          TimestampSubmitted     Status
Pamela J.Williams               pwilliams@dehay.com            10/4/2022 3:33:51 PM   SENT
ROCIO CASTRO                    RCASTRO@JUSTCALLKINDER.NET     10/4/2022 3:33:51 PM   SENT
Griffin McMillin                 gmcmillin@justcallkinder.net   10/4/2022 3:33:51 PM   SENT
                        Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this
document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below.
The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate
of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Cris Page on behalf of Pamela Williams
Bar No. 791936
cpage@dehay.com
Envelope ID: 68893011
Status as of 10/5/2022 9:44 AM CST
Associated Case Party: LEN ACKIN
Name              BarNumber     Email                        TimestampSubmitted     Status
Jennifer Kinder   787837        jkinder@justca|lkinder.net   10/4/2022 3:33:51 PM   SENT
FRED NESSLER                    fwn@nesslerlaw.com           10/4/2022 3:33:51 PM   SENT