Preview
FILED
9/14/2023 4:36 PM
FELICIA PITRE
DISTRICT CLERK
DALLAS CO., TEXAS
Marissa Gomez DEPUTY
CAUSE NO. DC-22-17865
VicNRG, LLC, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v § 14th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
VICTORY RENEWABLES, LLC, and §
CONESTOGA ENERGY HOLDINGS, §
LLC, § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
Defendants. §
PLAINTIFF’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff VicNRG, LLC (”VicNRG”) files this Reply in support of its Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (”MPSI”). VicNRG asks that the Court reject the arguments
that Defendants Victory Renewables, LLC (”Victory”) and Conestoga Energy Holdings,
LLC (”Conestoga”) set out in their Response and grant the MPS]. VicNRG also seeks all
other relief to which it may justly be entitled.
I. INTRODUCTION
The summary judgment evidence establishes that Defendants have withheld—
since July 28, 2020—$2,847,429 from the 2019 Additional Purchase Price owed to VicNRG.
Defendants themselves calculated this payment. Recognizing their liability, Defendants
filed a straw man summary judgment Response. Defendants’ contentions are fatally
flawed because they do not counter VicNRG’s argument that the plain language of the
parties’ contract does not authorize allocation of Conestoga corporate overhead expenses
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1
to adversely affect the Additional Purchase Price. One contract interpretation is before
the Court. That interpretation prevails as a matter of law. The parties’ contract requires
Defendants to pay $2,847,429 to VicNRG— the remainder of the 2019 Additional Purchase
Price. Defendants have never paid this money to VicNRG. Defendants’ litigation-born
excuses about purported accounting mistakes mean nothing given the contract’s plain
terms. The Court should grant VicNRG’s MPS] in full.
II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
Defendants' Response to VicNRG’s MPS] unpersuasively makes three contentions
to avoid summary judgment. First. the Response repeats Defendants' futile motion for
arbitration. Second the Response makes miscellaneous extra-contractual excuses for
Defendants’ decision to underpay VicNRG by almost $3 million and attempt to claw back
nearly $2.7 million from VicNRG. the Response attempts to manufacture illusory
factual issues that simply do not exist. Each point fails to change the outcome. The Court
should grant VicNRG’s MPS] in its entirety.
A. Defendants are not entitled to arbitration
Arbitration is unwarranted for the reasons set out by VicNRG in its Response to
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration. VicNRG stands on these points, so it does
not address the duplicative arguments about arbitration in Defendants’ Response to the
MP5]. Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s MPS] 1, 2, 4, 5, 6—7, 10. VicNRG only notes that Defendants’
discussion of Adjusted Earnings Before Interest, Depreciation, Amortization, and Taxes
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2
(”Adjusted EBITDA”) fails to identify any mathematical dispute over calculations that
could be resolved by accountants. Id. at 6—7. This failure of Defendants heavily weighs
against arbitration of VicNRG’s legal claims.
B. Excuses do not release Defendants from their contract
Perhaps sensing the weaknesses in their arguments for arbitration, Defendants
offer extra-contractual excuses for their decision to underpay VicNRG by almost $3
million and claw back nearly $2.7 million from VicNRG. Id. at 3—4, 7—8, 10—11. These
excuses encompass a litany of accounting errors and business oversights by Defendants}
Id. But Defendants miss the mark in hiding behind their professed management failures.
The MPS] does not concern Defendants’ competence. Instead, the MP5] focuses on
whether Defendants breached the parties’ Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”). The
Court should disregard as immaterial any discussion by Defendants that does not pertain
to the language and terms set out in the APA.
C. VicNRG is entitled to partial summary judgment
Defendants finally fabricate illusory factual issues to avoid summary judgment.
Id. at 7—8. Relying entirely on a declaration of Conestoga Chief Financial Officer (”CFO”)
Among other things, Defendants claim they just now realized it is standard practice for parent companies
1
to allocate corporate overhead expenses to subsidiaries. See Defs.’ Resp. to P1.’s MP5] 3 (citing Ex. 1-C, PWC
Viewpoint Publication: Allocation of expenses to subsidiaries (November 30, 2022), at APP 014-015; Ex. 1-
D, PwC Viewpoint: Allocation of shared costs (February 28, 2023), at APP 016-018). But the documents
cited by Defendants address inapposite scenarios where: (1) the subsidiary makes an Initial Public Offering
(”1P0”); (2) identifiable overhead expenses are attributable to the subsidiary; (3) the subsidiary is not a
distinct legal entity; and (4) the parent company sells part or all of the subsidiary. The Court should ignore
all these documents as irrelevant to the facts of this case.
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3
Fred Rayner (”Rayner”), Defendants attempt t0 dispute that they breached the APA by
underpaying VicNRG by almost $3 million in 2019 and subsequently trying to Claw back
nearly $2.7 million already paid to VicNRG. But Defendants offer no APA interpretation
that permits Defendants’ nonpayment and claw back. VicNRG is therefore entitled to
entry of partial summary judgment because Rayner’s declaration alone cannot overcome
the plain terms of the APA. That is why the Court should reject any argumentation of
Defendants that relies on Rayner’s declaration.
For one thing, a December 20, 2018, letter Rayner sent to Torn Paquin (”Paquin”)
of VicNRG, attached as Exhibit A-3 to the MP8], conclusively defeats the contrived ”fact
issues” manufactured by Defendants. In this December 20, 2018, letter, Rayner makes
three express admissions that are fatal to Defendants’ arguments about factual issues: (1)
Rayner concedes that nonpayment by third parties does not impact Defendants’ revenue
or contractual payments to VicNRG; (2) Rayner declares that the APA forbids Defendants
from allocating any Conestoga corporate overhead expenses to Victory when calculating
payments to VicNRG; and (3) Rayner professes that Defendants’ own auditor verified
these stipulations as fully consistent with the APA and Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (”GAAP”). Screenshots of these crucial and dispositive admissions by Rayner
are provided in turn in the below table:
Even though we have not received payment from them, we are willing to move fonivard to close out
the EBITDA and resulting Earn-out calculation for 2017. For your review, we have provided a
schedule showing the reconciliation.
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 4
It’s important to note again that the starting point for the Earn—out was Victory Renewables' income
for the year, as reflected in the Conestoga Energy Holdings audit, and therefore subjected to the
same audit process and testing. As a part of a special procedure, our auditors verified the amounts
and calculations to ensure compliance from our end. understand that there are questions about
|
whether any corporate costs were allocated from the parent company, that would effectively
reduce income at the Victory Renewables level. The answer is simply this: there were no
-
allocations made. In fact, Victory Renewables is the of the holding
corporate only subsidiau
company that is n_ot charged a management fee or other allocation of expenses for shared
— — services,
such as HR, IT, corporate, tax, compliance, etc.
One area that we felt needed to be clear on is that from our perspective, we believe that these
_
calculations are in accordance with the were our KCoe ISOM
APAi pr‘epared‘verified by auditorsi
LLP, as Bart of Conestoga Energy Holdings} annual audit and agreed upon procedures in the APA,
and as such are not subject to negotiation.
I'd like to restate again that the calculations of and EBITDA were determined or
working capital
verified by our audit firml KCoe ISOME LLPI and are correct and consistent with GAAP, which drives
the basis of determination of these amounts per the APA. Conestoga Energy Holdings and all of its
subsidiaries comply with GAAP, without exception. In other words, we are confident with the
results in all material respects.
Defendants reinforced their fatal admissions by sending Paquin a letter dated July
28, 2020—attached as Exhibit A-4 to VicNRG’s MPS]. This letter expressly stipulates that
Conestoga was withholding approximately $2.8 million owed to VicNRG because certain
third parties had thus far failed to pay Defendants. The following two-row table encloses
screenshots of this admission by Defendants:
To date, Conestoga has yet to receive approximately $5.6M in payments related to the reinstatement of
the ETC. While Conestoga continues to be hopeful and pursue receipt of those payments, the company
cannot reasonably predict whether these payments will ultimately be received, in part or in full. As
soon as any outstanding payments are received, Conestoga will remit the 50% owed to Victory Diesel.
2 The amount not collected andl'or collectible from counterparties is $5fi9M. Any collected
amounts from these transactions will be remitted at 50% to the Seller since prior Earn Out
thresholds have been met.
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 5
These documents defeat any suggestion that Defendants complied with the APA
when they imposed a ”holdback of $2,847,429 while Victory researched and reviewed its
prior 2017-2019 earn out calculations to determine the potential application of newly
implemented accounting rules.” Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s MPS] 7—8. The one ”new accounting
rule” cited by Defendant is the ASC 606 standard for revenue recognition. 2 Defendants
regardless posit that, while ”Victory was reviewing . . . ASC 606 . . . , Victory determined
that, under . . . the APA . . . , [sic], it should pay its share for the corporate overhead
expenses of Conestoga.” Id. at 3—4. In conjunction with the above letters, this admission
by Defendants that they used Conestoga overhead to justify their nonpayment shows
that Defendants breached the APA by: (1) Withholding $3 million in Additional Purchase
Price payments for 2019 due to claimed nonpayment by third parties; (2) later using
allocation of Conestoga corporate overhead expenses to justify this nonpayment; and (3)
citing that overhead as a reason to attempt to claw back nearly $2.7 million from VicNRG.
No amount of quibbling by Defendants can create false ”factual issues” on these decisive
points, so summary judgment is required.
2
Defendants’ discussion of ASC 606 as concerning allocation of parent company overhead expenses to
subsidiaries is entirely misplaced. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s MP5] 3—4. ASC 606 only pertains to recognition
_
of revenue from contracts f_rom customers It has absolutely nothing to do with the allocation of corporate
overhead expenses between a parent company and its subsidiaries. See, e.g., Revenue recognition, PRICE
WATERHOUSE COOPERS, https://viewpoint.pwc.com/us/en/revenue-recognition.htm1 (last visited
September 14, 2023). See also Lauren Gregory, What is ASC 606? A Guide to Its Ins (‘3’ Outs, HUBSPOT (June
14, 2022), https://b10g.hubspot.com/sales/asc-606 (”ASC 606 is an accounting standard set by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) that defines how businesses recognize revenue in their operations”).
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 6
Defendants’ breach of contract is confirmed by the plain terms of the APA. As set
out in VicNRG’s MP8], the Additional Purchase Price contains no ”pay when paid” or
”pay if paid” conditions—much less any conditions precedent at all—to Defendants’
performance. Defendants therefore cannot condition their obligation to pay VicNRG on
the occurrence of unstated events. MPS] 15 (citing APA § 3.2 (APP 002-006); Anderson v.
Lonestar Patent Servs., Ina, No. 05-18-00510—CV, 2020 WL 6018710, at *4 (Tex. App. —
Dallas Oct. 12, 2020, no pet.) (explaining that Texas law disfavors conditions precedent
and requires clear language showing the parties’ intent to create a condition precedent;
no such clear language exists in the APA)).
The MPS] further clarifies that Adjusted EBITDA, the starting point for Additional
Purchase Price payments, must be calculated using GAAP principles—which require ”a
consistent basis throughout the periods involved.” Id. at 15—16 (citing APA § 3.2 (APP
002-006) and quoting Exhibit A-1 at App’x A (APP 007)). This rule implicates the fatal
disconnect between Rayner’s December 20, 2018, letter (stating that nonpayment by third
parties does not impact payments to VicNRG) and the July 28, 2020, letter from Conestoga
that uses nonpayment by third parties as a reason to not pay VicNRG. These letters show
Defendants breached the APA. Defendants added to the APA a brand-new condition
precedent—full payment by third parties—when the APA strictly prohibits any changes
in payment requirements. Such improper revision of the APA by Defendants establishes
that Defendants breached the APA by refusing to pay VicNRG the full 2019 Additional
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 7
Purchase Price. Defendants cannot escape liability by arguing that their revision of the
APA somehow constitutes a ”calculation issue” for arbitration. Any such argument is
flat wrong and must be rejected by the Court.
Moreover, the APA provides that Victory’s internal financial statements are the
basis for Adjusted EBITDA and makes clear that Adjusted EBITDA must be calculated
using the formula identified in Exhibit A to the APA. Id. at 18 (quoting APA § 3.2 (APP
002-006)). Exhibit A does not authorize Defendants to use Conestoga corporate overhead
expenses to artificially decrease Victory’s Adjusted EBITDA. Indeed, Exhibit A entirely
omits Conestoga corporate overhead from its formula. Defendants thus cannot deduct
such overhead from Victory’s Adjusted EBITDA because this methodology contradicts
the formula that is prescribed by the APA through Exhibit A. Id. (citing APP 009 and Bob
Montgomery Chevrolet, Inc. o. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tex. App—Dallas 2013,
no pet.) (”Documents incorporated into a contract by reference become part of that
contract. When a document is incorporated into another by reference, both instruments
must be read and construed together.”)). If the parties had intended to allocate Conestoga
corporate overhead expenses to Victory in calculating Adjusted EBITDA and Additional
Purchase Price payments, they would have said so in the APA. The absence of any such
language from Exhibit A establishes that Defendants breached the APA when they used
Conestoga overhead expenses to reduce the Additional Purchase Price payments owed
to VicNRG. Summary judgment is required.
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 8
The APA finally stipulates that Defendants can retroactively reduce previous
Additional Purchase Price payments only if the federal government alters or modifies its
biodiesel tax credit. Id. at 19 (citing APA 3.2(f) (APP 006)). Although Defendants made
Additional Purchase Price payments for 2017 and 2018, they waited until December 2020
to assert that the 2017 and 2018 payments must be reduced because they did not account
for Conestoga corporate overhead. Id. (citing Exhibit A-4 (APP 015); Exhibit A-5 (APP
017)). This attempt by Defendants to retroactively reduce the 2017 and 2018 Additional
Purchase Price payments to VicNRG using Conestoga corporate overhead expenses has
no nexus whatsoever to the federal biodiesel tax credit. The only conclusion from these
facts is that VicNRG is entitled to summary judgment because Defendants breached the
APA’s terms about retroactive adjustments.
In fact, Defendants know that the APA is clear such that they cannot dispute the
foregoing interpretations of its terms. That is why Defendants did not plead ambiguity
in their Original Answer and Counterclaim. Nor did Defendants mention ambiguity in
their threadbare Response to VicNRG’s MPS]. This lack of ambiguity requires summary
judgment on VicNRG’s breach of contract claims.
Defendants unpersuasively urge the Court to disregard VicNRG’s declaratory
judgment claim on the claw back issue because the MPS] predates the Second Amended
Petition. Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s MPS] 8—10. This argument is futile because Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 63 authorizes parties to amend their pleadings up to seven days before a
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 9
hearing. See B.C. v. Steak N Shake Opera, Ina, 598 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2020); Sosa v.
Central Power 8‘ Light, 909 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995). VicNRG timely filed its Second
Amended Petition, which indisputably requests a declaratory judgment regarding its
claw back claim, on September 8, 2023—ten days before the September 18, 2023, hearing
on the MPS]. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s MPS] 9.
Nor do Defendants’ alternative arguments about substantive changes to VicNRG’s
declaratory judgment claim have merit. Nowhere do Defendants explain how VicNRG’s
request for declaratory judgment evolved between the filing of the MPS] and the Second
Amended Petition. Nor could Defendants make this showing. These papers set out the
same declaratory judgment claims. And Defendants admit that the MPS] gave them
notice of VicNRG’s claw back claim over two weeks before their Response was due. Id.
at 9. Defendants therefore had adequate time to respond to VicNRG’s arguments about
Defendants’ attempted claw back. The Court should similarly disregard Defendants’
accusations about lack of diligence by VicNRG. As explained in VicNRG’s Responses to
Defendants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration and Continue the MPS] hearing, Defendants
are the only parties guilty of lack of diligence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, VicNRG asks the Court to grant its MP5]. VicNRG also
requests that the Court award it all other relief to which it may justly be entitled consistent
with this favorable disposition of the MPS].
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 10
Dated: September 14, 2023 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Alan Dabdoub
Alan Dabdoub
Texas Bar No. 24056836
adabdoub@1ynnllp.com
Daniel C. Polese
Texas Bar No. 24102364
dpolese@lynnllp.com
P. Campbell Sode
Texas Bar No. 24134507
csode@lynnllp.com
LYNN PINKER HURST 8: SCHWEGMANN, LLP
2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: (214) 981-3800
Facsimile: (214) 981-3839
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
VicNRG, LLC
CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was served on all counsel of record Via Texas E-File and/or Via email on September 14,
2023.
/s/ Alan Dabdoub
Alan Dabdoub
PLAINTIFF’s REPLY ISO PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 11
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
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Jodi Taylor on behalf of Alan Dabdoub
Bar No. 24056836
jtaylor@lynnllp.com
Envelope ID: 79574264
Filing Code Description: Response
Filing Description: IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMAMRY
JUDGMENT
Status as of 9/14/2023 6:19 PM CST
Associated Case Party: VicNRG, LLC
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Kay Ridenour kridenour@lynnllp.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Daniel C.Polese dpolese@lynnllp.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Jodi Taylor jtaylor@lynnllp.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Whitney Gillaspie wgillaspie@lynnllp.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Campbell Sode csode@lynnllp.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Alan Dabdoub adabdoub@lynnllp.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Gina Flores gflores@lynnllp.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: VICTORY RENEWABLES, LLC
Name BarN umber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Andrew Jackson 24055720 ajackson@velaw.com 9/ 14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
John C. Wander 791877 jwander@velaw.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Tara Ortiz tortiz@velaw.com 9/ 14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Matthew Stammel mstammel@velaw.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Susan chiniara schiniara@velaw.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT
Madelyn CStanley mstanley@velaw.com 9/14/2023 4:36:50 PM SENT